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I ALSO BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI I The Middle East Iran under the Pahlavis (Editor) Mtddle East Oil in a Revolutionary Age I

Oll and State in the Middle East I Thc Political Awakening in the Middle East (Editor) I I in World Affairs Elites in the Middle East (Editor) Polltical I

I the West in lran Russla and i

Sovlat Advances in the Middle East 1 Interests in the Middle Easr (Editor) Unlted States I FOURTH EDITION

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CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

ITHACA AND LONDON i',:, y51r rill ',',' ' l

DSea-,9 * l*4t, lqq,6

bopyright'@ 1952,1956,1962, 1980 by Cornell University TO B. L. AND J

All rlghts reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be re- Produood in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information address Cornell Unlvcrsity Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850.

hbllchcd in the,United Kingdom by Cornell University Press Ltd., 2-4 Brook Strcet, Iondon WIY 1AA.

Flilt cdltion 1952 troond odition 1956 Thlrd odttion 1962 Fouih sdltlon'1980 t.'

Inimrtional Standald Book Number (cloth) 0-8014-1273-0 Inb4tiltonat Standard Book Number (paper) 0-8014-9872-4 IJbruy of Congress Catalog Card Number 7g-t715g Filnbd in the Unitea Shteb of America Llhrartans: Library of congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book. 368 THE MIDDLE EAIT IiI WORI.D AFFA,TN r,rinANoN 369 the already surcharged atmospherc prcvuiring umong their folowcrs, ing tension wirh the resurt_ the militury sense) justified their position by the necessity of l-rbanon's keeping on between the latteiand tt. ciririion eremints il;;. The christians friendly considered, for example., p.u_blic displays "i terms with the surrounding Arab world, which, they claimed, the one-sided of Nasser,s portraits in Moslem com_ munities as an insulr to the idea pro-Western and anti-Cairo policy of President Chamoun had made impossible. By of rcbanese independence ;"J;; some reacted to such provocations occasions the same token, the predominantly Moslem leaders of the insurrection disclaimed an in a viorent manner. These feuds and tensions were exclusively Moslem character for their rebellion by pointing to their few Christian rrbanese n"*,pupl.r, some or which i:::d;H:1#r:n" were subsidized by allies. The ideological creavage had the In political terms this rebel coalition was opposed, in the first place, by the effect of rendering the traditional struggle power among the poriticians for government and those deputies in the recently elected parliament which supported more acute than ever before. Beginning central issue with lg57 the it. These in turn were backed by the Phalanges Libanaises (Kataeb), an overwhelm- in this struggre was president chamoun,s second reerected for a ingly Christian-Maronite party dedicated to the preservation term in 1958' To achieve this the constitution ",,bit#;;; of Lebanese integrity wouto rraveiuo,o u" amended by a two-thirds vote of the and independence, and reinforced by the militant members of the P.P.S., whose parliament. en"ior. to attain his goal, hesitate Chamoun did not hatred of Nasserism pushed them into collaboration with lrbanese nationalists. The to use his influence to secure a soiia majority in the parriamentary erections of May-June 1957. As a result, government, however, was gravely handicapped by its inability to count on the full .".tuin t.uaitionar non-christian leaders pan_ Arab sympathies, such-as yafi, of support of the army. Although a majority of army officers were Christian, including Abdurlah saeb saram, una elected' ru.uiirmblat were not its commanding general, Fuad Chehab, the rank and file were heterogeneous Deprived of a legal pratform rrorn *rri.t a t ,i"i. ffirrionr, these men inevitably tumed toward ,r-r::1, ,""ting "ri"" group which might easily split along ideological and confessional lines if exposed to *: through extralegal means to reassert their role in kbanon's politicar rre. rne great strains. Consequently, the army played a rather passive role, contenting itself between chamoun and the pan- Arab opposition gained in intensity "orni"t with the protection of government buildings and certain military objects, but rarely *t iyriu merged with Egypt into Arab Republic. pro-Nasser maniiestati*r'in"n the united attempting an offensive. trbanon gre* in number and vio_ lence' resulting in bodily clashes u"t*""n g-ups This brings us to the military aspect of the rebellion. lnsurgents had barricaded of different orientation as well in intemperate editoriars in the as themselves in the Moslem quarter of Beirut, the Basta, under the leadership of press.-r;?" rate spring the tension proportions had reached former Premier Saeb Salam, who, strangely enough, was enjoying without hindrance and only a spart *us ,e"a"aio piovoke lil:"r"* a major conflagra- the facilities of the government-controlled telephone system. The second major rebel stronghold was in Tripoli, where the scion of the local feudal family, Rashid The Lebanese Civil War Karamah, reigned supreme. The third was in the Shuf mountain district, where such a spark was provided Jumblat's Druzes had taken the warpath. Furthermore, large portions of lrbanon in w-hen, on May 8, 195g, unknown killed assassins shot and the the themselves Nassib Metni, editor of. Ar-Teirgroj,-lr*rpaper south and east, along the Syrian border, found under rebel latery known for ken Pan-Arabism and previously its outspo_ control. io".iih"i with communist symparhies. pan- Arabists immediatery blamed The rebels were enjoying the active support of the newly formed United Arab I-euanese *t'guli*!, while launching on President Chamoun premier strong attacks Republic, which from its Syrian province was supplying them with arms, muni- and su-i for-torerating terrorism and auetting acts of tions, money, and some personnel. Furthermore, several [rbanese border ports against their political opponents."rlil} ny rrruy l2 antigovernment riots reached the proportions of an armed insurrection. poriticalry were shelled and attacked by military raiding parties from Syria. Throughout the the rebers formed themselves into the so-calred Nationar Front, major part of the rebellion the govemment forces controlled merely 18 kilometers a toor" comprising those sunni Ieaders who had lost^parriamerrrry "outition Mosrem out of Lebanon's 324:kilometer boundary with Syria.s The rest was under rebel ,"u,r-in 7957, the Druze faction Jumblat, the Moslem folrowers of Kamar control and open to easy penetration from the Syrian side. Mule-pack trains of rri".rriJr-*r-ah of rripoli, trr" tutort"* organization Najjada headed youtr, military equipment made regular inroads into l.ebanon through these long stretches by the raaicJpan-erabist Adnan Hakim, Moslem faction of Ahmed the shia of unprotected border. essaa of siJoiiunotr,er loser in ttre variety of pro-Nasser tgsz erections), a In view of the army's passive role; much of the brunt of defense against'the elements in the Bekaa varey *a ott"i p.i, and last, but not rr,. country, rebels had to'be borne by armed volunteer groups. Not infrequently the latter were least, certain christian Jr*rr, opposing president "i latter incruded chamoun. The organized and led by the members of the P.P.S., whose superiororganization and the influentiar cran.9iri"i.;ry"1 of zgrrlrtn represented ii;h". lrbanon, experience (especially true of Syrian refugee army officers affiliated with the party) by their kinsman Rene Muawad. Furtherinore, twists i" the ironicar placed of history, the patriarch or trre naturally them in a position of military leadership. It was such a heavily rvraroiite chu*h, paur Md;;hi,";;; gave implicit blessing to the insurgertr, his lurgrivL.ru*, oru personar fcud president chamoun. chrisrians with tFor particilating i, ir,r'rvuiioiar Front (though a dotailed ncoount of tho civil war, rioc Fnhlm l, Quhain, Crisis in Lehanon (Washington, D.C., not ovorry active in t96l). J/v rEE MIDoLE IT.TqriE-w€RtD AFFAIng LtiuANoN .l7l "hnrrle" sherrrr,n. i;lf,;;*,X'flij,fl'il1n:*l: I.1l'- ,l successruny sropperr poritica,ryJ; clott tlirectccl frottt the nerve-ccnler in Cairo. With an eye to preventing t'urther ;;l::il#'il'fi J,l:,f il: J aprt:nrl ol' Pun-Arab revolutiorr (with its anti-western implications), the United some extent T,l,i:ll,:TTlJHtl*}:":i{ it courd be exprainecr us a sirrrprc Staterr clccided to send military fbrces to lrbanon with the immediate task of Chamoun-a of revenge against president man virified rn trre' .pIraq on'Jury 14. As in n.ei,i"o constituted Narser would be unwilling to continue his support of the rebels in view of the Ji:X.,HT,I "*n1, *.,r,1, ii,r in a chatn no"-",i""ir,,il;'"T'ff prcHence ol'American fbrces. on July 31, General Fuad chehab was elected presi- il',#;:'AJH,rrffi tlent ol'lhe Rcpublic by thc Charnber ol'Deputies by a 48 to 7 vote. The seven votes were to ii.,il:fi l,i,;f Uil; crumble under the brows of miritantiropaganda, nf wcnt to Ruyruond Eddc, Derpite thesc inrportunt developments, sporadic fighting ,rt u.rri.,,r,'nna uggrrn_ crtntinucd unlil early scptemher, on september 23, Fuud chehah assumed the 372 THE MtDDt.E fiAs'r lN woRl,D AFFAtns I,EBANoN 373 duties of the presidency and on the fbllowing clay he appoirrted us prenrier Rashid one thing, there was the prohleur ttl' intcrpretation of the lurgcly verbal agreetrtcnts Karamah, former rebel leader of rripoli. His eighrman cabinel was composed of made in midsummer 1958 bctwecn the two warring factions' -For another, the men who had either sided with the rebellion or had been neutral in the conflict, with political need of prominent Moslem leaders to cater to the popular Pan-Arab tastec no representation of the former loyalist elements. This gave rise to a protest move- or *r"i, constituents has not vanished as a result of the compromise formulas ment by the militant Lebanese phalanges, boast nationalist party, the who demanded at reached at a higher level of politics. Some former rebel leaders tended to of least one seat in the cabinet who for themselves and backed up this demand by proclaim- the achievements of the revolution to the annoyance of the lrbanese loyalists, ing a ten-day-long general public strike, since termed a counterrevolution, on Siptember countered by emphasizing the no-victor formula. By the same token, worship 29. Thefu action gained widespread support from Lebanon,s Christian population, of Nasser Uy tne former rebels continued as before. It was expressed by numenous which viewed Karamah's cabinet as a victory for the rebels and a travesty of the trips to Cairo and by staging group pilgrimages of their followers to Damascus every compromise solution to which the opposing parties had pledged themselves. Fi- time Nasser paia a visit io hisnorthem province. Pan-Arab zealots would somctimOs nally, on october 14 Karamah formed a new cabinet, this time representing a hoist the flag of the U.A.R. alongside or instead of that of lrbanon, thercby genuine compromise. It comprised merely four members, of whom two (premier supplying provocation to the prestige-conscious Phalangists and other Lebanese Karamah and Foreign Minister Hussein el-Oweini) represented former insurgents, .,aiionutistr. The policy of enirusting the premiership to a former rebel leador while the other two (Education pierre Minister Gemayel, head of the phalangei, and continued even after the demise of Karamah's cabinet in 1959. He was followcd by Raymond Edd6, minister of interior) represented the lrbanese loyalists. peace Saeb Salam, who likewise continued the formula of a balanced cabinet, with this having been restored, American troops evacuated Lrbanese territory by october 24. difference that, instead of four ministers, he had eighteen, thereby converting tho By mid-November the observer personal uN group also withdrew, its taskdeemed accom- cabinet into a little parliament in which individual ministers fought fierce plished. In early December the United States extended to Lebanon a $10 million and ideological baitles among themselves. This was especially true of Picnc grant to help it restore its economy, which had been gravely affected by the hos- Gemayel, a leading loyalist holding the portfolio of public works, and Kamal tilities. There was a gradual retum to normalcy, both in the economic and the Jumblat, who became minister of education. Critical of French and American in' political sectors. pro- fluences in the Lrbanese educational system, Jumblat tried to restrict them by university, oriented toward Egypt both in ideology and in The Aftermath of the Strife moting a new, Arab persoinel, and by enlarging nonconfessional education at the expense of Western' in retrospect, the part _vrewed civil war was an unnecessary and tragic development sponsored Christian schools. To these attempts he met fierce resistance on the which cost many lives, inflicted deep psychological wounds, and achieved no basic oi Gemayel, who strongly defended the existing private and denominational school change in l,ebanon's political structure or processes. The only remotely positive system as productive oiit" tigt"tt level of literacy and education in any Arabic' gain was that it reaffirmed-at a high price-certain truths about Lebanon,s ,p"ut ing country. The feud between these two men and their policies was in many realities. These truths could be summed up as follows: (1) if Lebanon was to survive *uy, ,"ir"r"ntuiiu" of lrbanon's basic dilemma: how to survive as a separate island as a going concem, its component religious groups had to cooperate with each other of iolerance and freedom in the midst of the Arab-Moslem sea agitated by severc on the basis of a fair compromise; an attempt by any one of them, whether Moslem tempests of Pan-Arabism and authoritarian trends' or christian, to dominate the country was bound to provoke resistance and violence; (2) while the Moslem part of Lebanon's population would always look nostalgically in the 1960s and 1970s toward closer association with Syria and the Arab world as a whole, kbanon,s Persistent Issues Moslem leaders had a stake in preserving Irbanon as a sovereign state, in which The relative tranquillity of lrbanese politics following the 1958 crisis can be they were assured a position of influence and a real share in pJ*.r; (3) to avoid attributed partly to ihe exhaustion of the warring parties, partly to the felicitoun major international frictions and enjoy prosperity, Lebanon could not afford to live choice of a president who was and appeared to many observers as a scrupuloUnly in isolation either from its Arab at in environment or from the west; to strike the right neutral comfromise figure, and panly to the fact that revolutionary forces work balance between these two influences has become the principal objective of a sound the Arab world shifted their att;ntion and energies to other theatersfian lrbanon, foreign policy and a major test of Lrbanese statesmanship; (aJ inasmuch as Lebanon for iraq emerged as the principal focus of revolutionary activity and of inter'Arab would always live in danger aC of possible intervention from its Arab neighbors, it was controversies. This tranquillity, however, was more apparent than real insOfar clear that it was bound to issUes look toward Westem counterintervention as i guarantee of Lebanon was concerneO. fne crisis of 1958 did not resolve any of the basic its independent status. problomn that had brought it about. I*banon's political system faced a number of The restoration normalcy of did not mean that Lebanon had achieved a static that were bound to reemergc, harmony. on the contrary, its political life continued fluctuuting, with pressurcs and In l*bunon, it should Uc pointcd out, the interweaving of domontic and forclgn counterpressures not unlike those prior to the civil war very much in evirlencc. For policier war always more pronoune€d then in any other country in the arca' Thlc