ffil;' ,i' ll ' ,. {' { lll ,l,l * ,i ,l -l GEORGE LENCZOWSKI / University of Califurnia at Berkeley , ll ll I i I ALSO BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI I The Middle East Iran under the Pahlavis (Editor) Mtddle East Oil in a Revolutionary Age I Oll and State in the Middle East I Thc Political Awakening in the Middle East (Editor) I I in World Affairs Elites in the Middle East (Editor) Polltical I I the West in lran Russla and i Sovlat Advances in the Middle East 1 Interests in the Middle Easr (Editor) Unlted States I FOURTH EDITION I I CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON i',:, y51r rill ',',' ' l DSea-,9 * l*4t, lqq,6 bopyright'@ 1952,1956,1962, 1980 by Cornell University TO B. L. AND J All rlghts reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be re- Produood in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information address Cornell Unlvcrsity Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. hbllchcd in the,United Kingdom by Cornell University Press Ltd., 2-4 Brook Strcet, Iondon WIY 1AA. Flilt cdltion 1952 troond odition 1956 Thlrd odttion 1962 Fouih sdltlon'1980 t.' Inimrtional Standald Book Number (cloth) 0-8014-1273-0 Inb4tiltonat Standard Book Number (paper) 0-8014-9872-4 IJbruy of Congress Catalog Card Number 7g-t715g Filnbd in the Unitea Shteb of America Llhrartans: Library of congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book. 368 THE MIDDLE EAIT IiI WORI.D AFFA,TN r,rinANoN 369 the already surcharged atmospherc prcvuiring umong their folowcrs, ing tension wirh the resurt_ the militury sense) justified their position by the necessity of l-rbanon's keeping on between the latteiand tt. ciririion eremints il;;. The christians friendly considered, for example., p.u_blic displays "i terms with the surrounding Arab world, which, they claimed, the one-sided of Nasser,s portraits in Moslem com_ munities as an insulr to the idea pro-Western and anti-Cairo policy of President Chamoun had made impossible. By of rcbanese independence ;"J;; some reacted to such provocations occasions the same token, the predominantly Moslem leaders of the insurrection disclaimed an in a viorent manner. These feuds and tensions were exclusively Moslem character for their rebellion by pointing to their few Christian rrbanese n"*,pupl.r, some or which i:::d;H:1#r:n" were subsidized by allies. The ideological creavage had the In political terms this rebel coalition was opposed, in the first place, by the effect of rendering the traditional struggle power among the poriticians for government and those deputies in the recently elected parliament which supported more acute than ever before. Beginning central issue with lg57 the it. These in turn were backed by the Phalanges Libanaises (Kataeb), an overwhelm- in this struggre was president chamoun,s second reerected for a ingly Christian-Maronite party dedicated to the preservation term in 1958' To achieve this the constitution ",,bit#;;; of Lebanese integrity wouto rraveiuo,o u" amended by a two-thirds vote of the and independence, and reinforced by the militant members of the P.P.S., whose parliament. en"ior. to attain his goal, hesitate Chamoun did not hatred of Nasserism pushed them into collaboration with lrbanese nationalists. The to use his influence to secure a soiia majority in the parriamentary erections of May-June 1957. As a result, government, however, was gravely handicapped by its inability to count on the full .".tuin t.uaitionar non-christian leaders pan_ Arab sympathies, such-as yafi, of support of the army. Although a majority of army officers were Christian, including Abdurlah saeb saram, una elected' ru.uiirmblat were not its commanding general, Fuad Chehab, the rank and file were heterogeneous Deprived of a legal pratform rrorn *rri.t a t ,i"i. ffirrionr, these men inevitably tumed toward ,r-r::1, ,""ting "ri"" group which might easily split along ideological and confessional lines if exposed to *: through extralegal means to reassert their role in kbanon's politicar rre. rne great strains. Consequently, the army played a rather passive role, contenting itself between chamoun and the pan- Arab opposition gained in intensity "orni"t with the protection of government buildings and certain military objects, but rarely *t iyriu merged with Egypt into Arab Republic. pro-Nasser maniiestati*r'in"n the united attempting an offensive. trbanon gre* in number and vio_ lence' resulting in bodily clashes u"t*""n g-ups This brings us to the military aspect of the rebellion. lnsurgents had barricaded of different orientation as well in intemperate editoriars in the as themselves in the Moslem quarter of Beirut, the Basta, under the leadership of press.-r;?" rate spring the tension proportions had reached former Premier Saeb Salam, who, strangely enough, was enjoying without hindrance and only a spart *us ,e"a"aio piovoke lil:"r"* a major conflagra- the facilities of the government-controlled telephone system. The second major rebel stronghold was in Tripoli, where the scion of the local feudal family, Rashid The Lebanese Civil War Karamah, reigned supreme. The third was in the Shuf mountain district, where such a spark was provided Jumblat's Druzes had taken the warpath. Furthermore, large portions of lrbanon in w-hen, on May 8, 195g, unknown killed assassins shot and the the themselves Nassib Metni, editor of. Ar-Teirgroj,-lr*rpaper south and east, along the Syrian border, found under rebel latery known for ken Pan-Arabism and previously its outspo_ control. io".iih"i with communist symparhies. pan- Arabists immediatery blamed The rebels were enjoying the active support of the newly formed United Arab I-euanese *t'guli*!, while launching on President Chamoun premier strong attacks Republic, which from its Syrian province was supplying them with arms, muni- and su-i for-torerating terrorism and auetting acts of tions, money, and some personnel. Furthermore, several [rbanese border ports against their political opponents."rlil} ny rrruy l2 antigovernment riots reached the proportions of an armed insurrection. poriticalry were shelled and attacked by military raiding parties from Syria. Throughout the the rebers formed themselves into the so-calred Nationar Front, major part of the rebellion the govemment forces controlled merely 18 kilometers a toor" comprising those sunni Ieaders who had lost^parriamerrrry "outition Mosrem out of Lebanon's 324:kilometer boundary with Syria.s The rest was under rebel ,"u,r-in 7957, the Druze faction Jumblat, the Moslem folrowers of Kamar control and open to easy penetration from the Syrian side. Mule-pack trains of rri".rriJr-*r-ah of rripoli, trr" tutort"* organization Najjada headed youtr, military equipment made regular inroads into l.ebanon through these long stretches by the raaicJpan-erabist Adnan Hakim, Moslem faction of Ahmed the shia of unprotected border. essaa of siJoiiunotr,er loser in ttre variety of pro-Nasser tgsz erections), a In view of the army's passive role; much of the brunt of defense against'the elements in the Bekaa varey *a ott"i p.i, and last, but not rr,. country, rebels had to'be borne by armed volunteer groups. Not infrequently the latter were least, certain christian Jr*rr, opposing president "i latter incruded chamoun. The organized and led by the members of the P.P.S., whose superiororganization and the influentiar cran.9iri"i.;ry"1 of zgrrlrtn represented ii;h". lrbanon, experience (especially true of Syrian refugee army officers affiliated with the party) by their kinsman Rene Muawad. Furtherinore, twists i" the ironicar placed of history, the patriarch or trre naturally them in a position of military leadership. It was such a heavily rvraroiite chu*h, paur Md;;hi,";;; gave implicit blessing to the insurgertr, his lurgrivL.ru*, oru personar fcud president chamoun. chrisrians with tFor particilating i, ir,r'rvuiioiar Front (though a dotailed ncoount of tho civil war, rioc Fnhlm l, Quhain, Crisis in Lehanon (Washington, D.C., not ovorry active in t96l). J/v rEE MIDoLE IT.TqriE-w€RtD AFFAIng LtiuANoN .l7l "hnrrle" sherrrr,n. i;lf,;;*,X'flij,fl'il1n:*l: I.1l'- ,l successruny sropperr poritica,ryJ; clott tlirectccl frottt the nerve-ccnler in Cairo. With an eye to preventing t'urther ;;l::il#'il'fi J,l:,f il: J aprt:nrl ol' Pun-Arab revolutiorr (with its anti-western implications), the United some extent T,l,i:ll,:TTlJHtl*}:":i{ it courd be exprainecr us a sirrrprc Staterr clccided to send military fbrces to lrbanon with the immediate task of Chamoun-a of revenge against president man virified rn trre' .p<lricy del'crrtlirrg the latter's sovereignty and independence. In a special statement presi- intelrigence-for t*-Ir"o pr.r, u, un'-ffi, of British his hards-on d*r;il; sl"l rlettl lliscnhttwer declared that this action was undertaken at the explicit request of the dissenters ryri"y w# alT* harboring of and plotters from Syria. frU.'r" "#' llte governnrent of [rbanon. The first contingent of 3,600 American marines landed to be punisheo ro, itrLuron to the A.ub itt Be irut on July 15, followed by further units qf the army. American troops took no directed against Arab unity "uur"?ni";,'Jfl:::f,::,iliff:;ff1#:: u"a riu"ruiion. o;"" this punishm"ii*ul'irni"ted, nclion in the conflict: they merely stayed, distributed on the beaches and at the rest remained uncertain- the u3',.*Tu,, ,u.go one tlill)ort. But their very presence constituted an important factor in the situation. incorporate 1,r might suspect Nasser,s desire Lebanon into the u.A.R.