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PF Cadre Gets Beating After Talking Ill About Kaizer

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PF Cadre Gets Beating After Talking Ill About Kaizer No343 K10 www.diggers.news Monday January 7, 2019 By Mukosha Funga Renowned PF cadre Fidelis Solomon Ngoma (below) was left for dead after being beaten by unknown people ‘Nosy’ PF cadre gets beating on Saturday night, following a drinking spree in Lusaka. Ngoma is said to be a witness in a fight and shooting incident in which President Edgar Lungu’s political advisor Kaizer Zulu is after talking ill about Kaizer implicated. To page 2 ...LEFT FOR DEAD Lsk cop dies from gunshot wound By Mukosha Funga Constable Lennox Kapila, who was shot by his colleague who is still on the run, has died. Police spokesperson Esther Mwaata Katongo has confirmed this in a statement, saying Kapila died between 09:00 hours and 10:00 hours yesterday at Levy Mwanawasa University Teaching Hospital. To page 4 Police IG Kakoma Kanganja (c) watches as Home Affairs Minister Stephen Kampyongo cuts a cake with Senior Assistant Commissioner of police Nsofwa Butala (l) at the Annual Ball held at ZNS Chamba Valley base in Lusaka on January 4, 2019. Below is Commissioner of Police in charge of Administration Lombe Kamukoshi at the event – Pictures by Tenson Mkhala Sesheke by-election is ZRA paid an opportunity to test mines alliance – Kampyongo K7.3bn By Mukosha Funga opportunity to test the alliance that the party has adopted PF national youth chairperson of “little parties”. Dean Masule as its candidate Stephen Kampyongo says And PF Secretary General in the Sesheke by-election. in VAT the Sesheke by-election is an Davies Mwila has announced To page 4 refunds By Stuart Lisulo ZRA says it has paid out a total CCZ denies pushing opposition of K9.4 billion in VAT refunds in the 2018 financial year, with the mining sector having agenda in dialogue process received at least 78 per cent of By Sipilisiwe Ncube meetings. that amount. Council of Churches in Zambia In an interview, Fr Chikoya And ZRA have disclosed that Lusaka residents move (CCZ) general secretary Fr explained that the Church had Emmanuel Chikoya (r) says no hidden agenda in its quest to the mining sector’s contribution Story the Church has been mandated spearhead the national dialogue in terms of tax revenues and to sue LWSC over page 4 mineral royalties equated to to lead the national dialogue process, and that assertions 13 per cent of the total revenue process, hence no one should that it is driving an opposition collection. Story page 2 contaminated water dictate when it must hold agenda are not true. Story page 3 2. Local News www.diggers.news Monday January 7, 2019 By Stuart Lisulo The Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) has paid out a total of K9.4 billion in VAT refunds in the 2018 financial year, with the mining sector ZRA paid mines K7.3bn having received at least 78 per cent of that amount. And the ZRA have disclosed that the mining sector’s contribution in terms of tax revenues and mineral royalties equated to 13 per cent of the in VAT refunds in 2018 total revenue collection or less 78 per cent of that total, mining companies, Chanda taxes without fear or favour. It’s the Authority had concluded TPINs. The TPINs are a than three per cent of Gross translating to around K7.3 still could not, however, only fair and right,” he insisted. the audits and assessments mandatory requirement for Domestic Product (GDP). billion. disclose the outstanding And Chanda revealed that the had been raised following transactions with Zesco, Meanwhile, the Authority has “We managed to pay out K9.4 arrears owed in VAT refunds. mining sector’s contribution the reconciliations done with Ministry of Lands, RTSA and so far issued a total of 805,754 billion in VAT refunds. Out of “…Unlike some mining in terms of tax revenues and the mines and their clearing financial institutions. The Tax Payer Identificationthis amount, 78 per cent was companies who are issuing mineral royalties equated to agents,” Chanda added. banks have given us feedback Numbers (TPINs) between paid to the mining sector while public statements on how much 13 per cent of the total revenue Meanwhile, Chanda that we are currently at 61 January, 2017, and December, 22 per cent was paid to other ZRA allegedly owes, we will collection or less than three announced that the per cent compliance hence I 2018. sectors in the economy. I am continue to respect taxpayer per cent of GDP. Authority had so far issued wish to officially announce the Speaking during a press confident that going forward, confidentiality. Suffice to say “In 2018, the direct a total of 805,754 Tax Payer extension of TPIN registration briefing in Lusaka, Friday, the outstanding VAT refunds that the assessments have been contribution of the mining Identification Numbersdeadline to June 30, 2019 for ZRA Commissioner-General will be a thing of the past communicated to individual sector in tax revenues and (TPINs) between January, bank account holders who Kingsley Chanda disclosed once the Goods and Services mining companies and the tax royalties stood at 2.3 per cent 2017, and December, 2018. had bank accounts prior to that the Authority refunded Tax (GST) is implemented will be collected without fail. of GDP or 13 per cent of total “I am further pleased to note January, 2017,” announced a total of K9.4 billion in VAT later this year,” Chanda told ZRA will use all legal options revenues collected by ZRA. I that the Authority has from Chanda. refunds last year, with the journalists at Pamodzi Hotel. available to ensure that mining wish to inform the public that January, 2017, to December, “Let me emphasize that this mining sector having received On what the ZRA still owed companies account for these as at end of December, 2018, 2018, issued a total of 805,754 extension only applies to bank account holders who opened their accounts prior to January 1, 2017, and as such, transactions with Zesco, RTSA Kaizer linked to beating of PF cadre and the Ministry of Lands will By Mukosha Funga surrendered to his employers na post (It’s good you have Fidelis narrated that it was head-butted one of them, require the presentation of the Renowned PF cadre Fidelis to take him to the hospital. come and you have posted) at that juncture that his but others also came in and TPIN certificates before they Solomon Ngoma was left This is where Fidelis came one of the posts you did, with assailants waylaid him and started hitting me until I fell. can be processed as per the for dead after being beaten in. This guy is said to be the a confession that you have clobbered him with metal Now there was a vehicle that requirements of the law. This by unknown people on witness together with Jimmy, an interest in the matter. bars. was coming, that’s how those includes prospective bank Saturday night, following a who witnessed the incident. Probably tell us how you “As I crossed from Waterfalls guys ran away,” narrated account holders.” drinking spree in Lusaka. Apparently, we understand have an interest in a matter Mall to Garden City Mall, I Fidelis. The ZRA’s total gross revenue Ngoma is said to be a witness that Fidelis blew up the issue where I am apprehending just saw five people show up "I think let's change the collections hit K57.8 billion, in a fight and shooting on some PF blogs, accusing people who are trying to and said ‘iwe niwe weulemba politics in Lusaka. Those while total refunds amounted incident that happened at a Mr Kaizer of trying to kill harm my family to the extent ama articles (you are the who are voicing out should to K9.4 billion, registering a Kabulonga house, in which someone." of shooting. For those that one who writes articles) not be attacked. I am hurt net total collection of around President Edgar Lungu’s The source said that back are thinking this is a joking attacking our leaders. Before and I have a scar on my back. K48.5 billion or 18 per cent political advisor Kaizer Zulu at the scene of the incident, matter, please stay in your I knew it, they hit me with a This scar is for the people of GDP compared to their is implicated. witnesses heard gunshots, lane because mwalaicena metal bar. I tried to stand and that we are speaking for." targeted 16.2 per cent. Sources close to Zulu claim and a bullet was retrieved, (you will harm yourselves),” that the State House official which appeared to have been Zulu said in a voice note. was not involved in any way, discharged by an assault rifle; The matter then died down and that it was his family but the puzzle of the shooter following a daring exchange that was under attack from and where the bullet came of warnings between the unknown people. from remained unsolved. said Fidelis and Zulu, each “There is a group of people Lusaka Province police having a gang of followers that is trying to start a smear commissioner Nelson Phiri supporting their position campaign against Mr Kaizer, told News Diggers that he and arguments in the matter. these have been paid by was not aware of any such The matter, however, known elements to tell lies incident, adding that no one resurrected yesterday when about him. Mr Kaizer was had logged any complaint Zulu visited a drinking spot not even around when those with any police station called Granddaddy’s in incidences happened, he was regarding a shooting.
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