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Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation – an African Case: Zambia

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Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation – an African Case: Zambia GIGA Research Programme: ¢ȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱ¢ ___________________________ Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and ȱ¢ȱĜȱȮȱ an African Case: Zambia Gero Erdmann N° 45 March 2007 www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers ==./2,**1= =470.3,= &5*78= = ).9*)='>==*72&3=389.9:9*=4+=14'&1=&3)=7*&=9:).*8=2=*.'3.?8389.9:9=+37=14'&1*= :3)="*,.43&1*=9:).*3_= %-*=470.3,=&5*7=*7.*8=8*7;*8=94=).88*2.3&9*=9-*=7*8*&7(-=7*8:198=4+=<470=.3=574,7*88= 57.47=94=5:'1.(&9.43=94=*3(4:7&,*=9-*=*=(-&3,*=4+=.)*&8=&3)=&(&)*2.(=)*'&9*_=3=4'/*(9.;*= 4+=9-*=8*7.*8=.8=94=,*9=9-*=+.3).3,8=4:9=6:.(01>`=*;*3=.+=9-*=57*8*39&9.438=&7*=1*88=9-&3=+:11>= 541.8-*)_=3(1:8.43=4+=&=5&5*7=.3=9-*=470.3,=&5*7=*7.*8=)4*8=349=(4389.9:9*=5:'1.(&9.43= &3)=8-4:1)=349=1.2.9=5:'1.(&9.43=.3=&3>=49-*7=;*3:*_=045>7.,-9=7*2&.38=<.9-=9-*=&:9-478_= -*3=470.3,=&5*78=&7*=*;*39:&11>=&((*59*)='>=47=5:'1.8-*)=.3=&=/4:73&1=47='440`=9-*= (477*(9=(.9&9.43=7*+*7*3(*=&3)`=.+=5488.'1*`=9-*=(477*8543).3,=1.30=<.11=9-*3='*=.3(1:)*)=.3= 9-*=470.3,=&5*78=<*'8.9*=&9a= <<<_,.,&8-&2':7,_)*2<470.3,5&5*78_= = =7*8*&7(-=:3.9=7*85438.'1*=+47=9-.8=.88:*a="*8*&7(-=74,7&22*= *,.9.2&(>=&3)= ++.8 (.*3(>=4+=41.9.(&1=>89*28= = ).947=4+=9-*==470.3,=&5*7=*7.*8a=4*79=54++2&33=0-4++2&33,.,&8-&2':7,_)*1= 045>7.,-9=+47=9-.8=.88:*a=&=*74= 7)2&33= = ).947.&1=&88.89&39=&3)=574):(9.43a=:*7*3&=;4-1*7=&3)=:*7&="&9-/*= = = = 11= = 470.3,= &5*78= &7*= &;&.1&'1*= 431.3*= &3)= +7**= 4+= (-&7,*= &9= 9-*= <*'8.9*a= <<<_,.,&8-&2':7,_)*2<470.3,5&5*78_=470.3,=&5*78=(&3=&184='*=47)*7*)=.3=57.39_=<47= 574):(9.43= &3)= 2&.1.3,= &= (4;*7= +**= 4+= W=/= .8= (-&7,*)_= <47= 47)*78= 47= &3>= 7*6:*898= 51*&8*= (439&(9a= 82&.1a=<470.3,5&5*78,.,&8-&2':7,_)*= -43*a=((.3=*.*=8=.,2=,/=/.2= = = = =*72&3=389.9:9*=4+=14'&1=&3)=7*&=9:).*8=2== *.'3.?8389.9:9=+37=14'&1*=:3)=*,.43&1*=9:).*3= *:*7= :3,+*7389.*,=,+= ,*-/.=$&2':7,= *72&3>= &82&.1a=.3+4,.,&8-&2':7,_)*= +*'8.9*a=<<<_,.,&8-&2':7,_)*= =+-=./2,**1= 9-3.(.9>`= 49*7=1.,32*39=&3)=41.9.(&1=&79>=++.1.&9.43=:== &3=+7.(&3=&8*a=&2'.&= = = '897&(9= /43;*39.43&1=<.8)42=-41)8=9-&9=*9-3.(.9>=574;.)*8=9-*=84(.&1=(1*&;&,*=+47=;49.3,='*-&;8 .4:7=&3)=5&79>=&++.1.&9.43=.3=+7.(&_=3*(&:8*=9-.8=.8=:8:&11>=.3+*77*)=+742=&,,7*,&9*=)&9&=4+= 3&9.43&1=*1*(9.43=7*8:198`=.9=2.,-9=574;*=94='*=&3=*(414,.(&1=+&11&(>_=5-*=*;.)*3(*='&8*)=43= .3).;.):&1=)&9&=+742=&3=45.3.43=8:7;*>=.3=6&2'.&=8:,,*898=9-&9=*9-3.(.9>=2&99*78=+47=;49*7= &1.,32*39=&3)=*;*3=247*=84=+47=5&79>=&++.1.&9.43`=':9=.9=.8=(*79&.31>=349=9-*=431>=+&(947_=5-*= &3&1>8.8=&184=54.398=94=&=3:2'*7=4+=6:&1.+.(&9.438=<-.(-=&7*=5&791>=2*9-4)414,>87*1&9*)_= 83*= .8= 9-&9= 9-*= )*,7**= 4+= *9-3.(= ;49.3,= (&3= ).++*7= +742= 43*= *9-348541.9.(&1= ,74:5= 94= 9-*= 49-*7=)*5*3).3,=43=;&7.4:8=)*,7**8=4+=*9-3.(=24'.1.8&9.43_=349-*7=.8=9-&9=.+=82&11*7=*9-8 3.(=,74:58=47=8:',74:58=)4=349=.)*39.+>=<.9-=43*=5&79.(:1&7=5&79>`=.9=.8=).++.(:19=94=+.3)=&= 8.,3.+.(&39=89&9.89.(&1=(477*1&9.43='*9<**3=5&79>=&++.1.&9.43=&3)=*9-3.(.9>=:=':9=9-&9=)4*8=349= 574;*=9-&9=9-*>=)4=349=&++.1.&9*=&143,=*9-3.(=1.3*8_= = :*>=<47)8a= 4(.&1= (1*&;&,*8`= *9-3.(.9>`= ;49.3,= '*-&;.4:7`= 541.9.(&1= 5&79>= .)*39.+.(&9.43`= 541.9.(&1=5&79>=&++.1.&9.43`=6&2'.&= = = +.789= ;*78.43= 4+= 9-.8= 5&5*7= <&8= 57*5&7*)= +47= 9-*= .39-= 33:&1= <**9.3,= 4+= 9-*= +7.(&3= 9:).*8=884(.&9.43`=&3==7&3(.8(4`=/`=4;*2'*7=+08+3`,**0_= = = 7_=*74=7)2&33= .8=&=541.9.(&1=8(.*39.89`=*3.47=*8*&7(-==*114<=&9=9-*=389.9:9*=4+=+7.(&3=++&.78=&3)=$*&)= 4+=3*71.3=8++.(*_= /439&(9a=*7)2&33,.,&8-&2':7,_)*`=<*'8.9*a=-995a2289&++_,.,&8-&2':7,_)*2*7)2&33_= = = = = = = :8&22*3+&88:3,= 9-3.?.9C9`="&-1;*7-&19*3=:3)=&79*.*32.9,1.*)8(-&+9=.3=+7.0&a=%&2'.&= +&-1;*7-&19*3=:3)=<.9,1.*)8(-&+9=.3=541.9.8(-*3=-&79*.*3=+7.0&8=.89=3:7=<*3.,=:39*78:(-9= <47)*3_= *<-31.(-= <.7)= &7,:2*39.*79`= )&88= &9-3.?.9C9= &18= 84?.&1*= :43+1.091.3.*= )&8= +&-1;*7-&19*3=:3)=).*=-&79*.*32.9,1.*)8(-&+9=897:09:7.*79_=B&=).*8*8=7,:2*39=&:+=-4(-= &,,7*,.*79*3=+&-1)&9*3='*7:-9`=0&33=-.*7=*.3=0414,.8(-*7==*-18(-1:88=;471.*,*3_=B.*=;478 1.*,*3)*=3&1>8*='*7:-9=)*8-&1'=&:+=.3).;.):*11*3=C2+7&,*)&9*3=&:8=&2'.&_=B&8=&7,*'8 3.8=.89`=)&88=&9-3.?.9C9=9&98C(-1.(-=*.3*=411*=+37=)&8=+&-1;*7-&19*3=:3)=).*=-&79*.*32.98 ,1.*)8(-&+9= 85.*19`= &'*7= 0*.3*8<*,8= )*3= *.3?.,*3= &701C7:3,8+&0947= )&789*119_= B.*= 3&1>8*= 4++*3'&79= ?:)*2= *.3*= *.-*= ;43= &.38(-7C30:3,*3= :3)= D:&1.+.?.*7:3,*3`= ).*= 9*.1<*.8*= 2*9-4).8(-*7= &9:7= 8.3)_= &.3*= .89`= )&88= *9-3.8(-*8= +&-1;*7-&19*3= :3)= -&79*.32.9,1.*)8 8(-&+9= ;43= *.3*7= *9-3.8(-*3= 7:55*= ?:7= &3)*7*3= :39*78(-.*)1.(-= 8.3)= :3)= ).*8= ;43= )*7= <4'.1.8.*7:3,=)*7=&9-3.?.9C9=&'-C3,9_=&.3*=&3)*7*=.89`=)&88`=<*33=8.(-=01*.3*7*=*9-3.8(-*= 7:55*3=4)*7=C39*7,7:55*3=2.9=0*.3*7=-&79*.=.)*39.+.?.*7*3`=*8=8(-<.*7.,=<.7)`=89&9.89.8(-= 8.,3.+.0&39*= :477*1&9.43*3= ?:= +.3)*3= := <&8= .3)*88*3= 34(-= 3.(-9= '*<*.89`= )&88= &9-3.?.9C9= 0*.3*=411*=85.*19_= Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation – an African Case: Zambia Gero Erdmann Article Outline 1. Introduction 2. Voter Alignment and Ethnicity 3. Ethnicity, Party System and Voter Alignment in Zambia 4. Partisanship: Survey Data 5. Conclusion ‘… voters are not fools.’ (Valdimir O. Key, 1966) 1. Introduction1 Voting behaviour and political party alignment in Africa’s young multi-party regimes – whether democratic or hybrid – is an almost completely ignored research topic, although this is a classical field of political science. Voting behaviour is usually explained by socio- structural, socio-psychological, or rational choice models, at least for industrialised societies. For African societies voting is explained predominantly by factors such as ethnicity, per- sonal ties, and clientelism (Hyden and Leys 1972; Barkan 1979; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Van de Walle 2003; Mozzafar et al. 2003; 2005; Erdmann 2004; Posner 2005). Elsewhere we have modified the social structural model of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to argue that that ethnicity provides the basic social cleavage for voting behaviour and the formation of parties 1 A first draft of the paper was prepared for the 2006 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Asso- ciation, San Francisco, CA, November 16-19, 2006, (Re) Thinking Africa and the World: Internal Reflections, External Responses’. The research was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemein- schaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) which sponsored the research project ‘Political Parties and Party Systems in Anglophone Africa – Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia’. In addition, I would like to thank Joanna Münkner and Julia Scheller who helped to compile parts of the statistics, and Sven Buth for administering and computing our survey data. Neo Simutanyi or- ganised the survey team in Zambia, and without his knowledge, support and advice this study would look differently. I owe him a great deal. 6 Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation and party systems (Erdmann and Weiland 2000; Erdmann 2004). The all-inclusive relevance of ethnicity for an understanding of African politics, in general, has been emphasised in a recent collection on ethnicity and democracy in Africa (Berman et al. 2004). The claim that ethnicity is a major factor for voting behaviour is usually inferred from elec- tion results. Citizens of specific districts or regions which are populated (predominantly) by a particular ethnic group vote for one party one election after the other.
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