IIMB-WP N0. 580/2020 WORKING PAPER NO: 580 Influencer Marketing with Fake Followers Abhinav Anand Assistant Professor Finance and Accounting Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Bannerghatta Road, Bangalore – 5600 76
[email protected] Souvik Dutta Assistant Professor Social Sciences Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi - 110020
[email protected] Prithwiraj Mukherjee Assistant Professor Marketing Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Bannerghatta Road, Bangalore – 5600 76
[email protected] Year of Publication – January 2020 Influencer Marketing with Fake Followers Abhinav Anand∗ Souvik Duttay Prithwiraj Mukherjeez January 23, 2020 Abstract Influencer marketing is a practice where an advertiser pays a popular social me- dia user (influencer) in exchange for brand endorsement. We develop an analytical model in a contract-theoretic setting between an advertiser and an influencer who can inflate her publicly displayed follower count by buying fake followers. There is a non-strategic third party audit which successfully detects fraud with some prob- ability, leading to additional reputational costs for the influencer. We show that the optimal contract exhibits widespread faking which increases with the influencer’s true follower count (type). The advertiser exploits the influ- encer's fraud as a screening mechanism to identify her type. The audit accuracy and penalty from being exposed do not affect optimal faking levels but the in- creased cost imposed by the audit to the influencer gets passed on to the advertiser in terms of higher payments. Our paper illustrates why fake followers are rife in influencer marketing, and how digital marketers can exploit this phenomenon to their advantage. Keywords: Digital marketing, social media, influencer marketing, fake follow- ers, optimal control, contract theory.