:
MASTER'S THESIS M-1474
PETRY, Marilyn Belle UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH HAITI DURING THE OCCUPATION.
The American University, M.A., 1968 Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan 1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH HAITI DURING THE OCCUPATION
/" L. , Marilyn Petry
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS
Signatures of pommittee;
Chairmai
Date : Dean of thy School
D a te :
May, 1968
The American University Washington, D. C, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MAY 101968
WASHtNGTON. D. ft 3T-M Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited withoutpermission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1= EARLY HISTORY OF H A I T I ...... 1
Haiti from 1492-1804 .o...... 3
Haiti from 1804-1915 . . . . » ...... 6
Haiti's Relations with the United States . . 11
IIo CONDITIONS IN HAITI PRIOR TO THE OCCUPATION , , 14
Political and Social Conditions in Haiti . . 14
Economic Conditions in Haiti ...... 17
Foreign Interests in Haiti ...... 21
III. CONTEMPORARY CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN
INTERVENTION ...... 29
Chaotic Conditions in Haiti ...... 29
Financial Disorder in Haiti ...... 35
Threat of Foreign Intervention ...... 38
Strategic Importance of Haiti ...... 40
Access to Mole St. Nicholas ...... 41
IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF AMERICAN CONTROL IN HAITI „ „ 44-
Election of a President ...... 45
Establishment of Customs Control ...... 47
Declaration of Martial Law ...... 49
Ratification of the Treaty ...... 50
The Treaty of 1915 51
The Haitian Constitution of 1918 ...... 54
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CHAPTER PAGE
Vo HAITI DURING THE DARTIGUENAVE ADMINISTRATION . 60
Control over Finances ...... 62
Protocol of 1919 ...... 64
Legislative Control ...... 68 / Judicial Control ...... 70
Control of the Press ...... 72
Executive Control ...... 73
VI. THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN HAITI . 76
Initial Pacification ...... 77
Corvée System ...... 79
Caco Rehellron ...... 82
Senate Hearings ...... 86
VII. HAITI DURING THE BORNO ADMINISTRATION ..... 89
The Functions of the High Commissioner . . . 89
The Election of President Borno ...... 92
Flotation of a Loan ...... 94
New Contract with the Bank ...... 96
Attempts to Improve Fiscal Policy ...... 97
A new Educational System ...... 100
Constitutional Amendments .. o ...... 101
Disenchantment with President Borno ..... 103
VIII. RELINQUISHMENT OF AMERICAN CONTROL IN HAITI . . 108
The Forbes Commission ...... 108
A New Administration ...... 112
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CHAPTER PAGE
Haitianization Agreement of August 5, 1931 115
Further Negotiations ooeooeoeeeee 116
Treaty of 1932 eoeoooeoooo oooe 118
Executive Agreement'— 1933 120
Withdrawal of Military Forces from Haiti 123
IX. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERVENTION o o e e o e Q 125
Maintenance of Order OQOooeoe ooo 125
Roads and Public Works 127
Publ]_c Health ...... 130
Education oooooooo...... o.. 133
Financial Progress eeeeoeeeoeoo 138
The Haitian Economy . . . . . oeee eooo 143
X. OBSERVATIONS ON THE OCCUPATION ooeeoooo 145
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... oooooeooo 155
APPENDIX A. Presidents of Haiti eoeooeoooee 167
APPENDIX B. Revenues and Expenditures and Excess
of Revenues or Expenditures Fiscal
Years 1916-1917 to 1932-1933 168
APPENDIX C. Public Debt 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 169
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I
EARLY HISTORY OF HAITI
Throughout its history, Haiti has been a nation in
strife. Following its discovery by Columbus in 1492, the
influx of foreigners brought violence to Haiti. After
years of foreign domination and heavy slave importation,
Haiti emerged, in the early 1800's, as an independent but
unstable nation, populated, for the most part, by ignorant
former slaves. Even with independence, conditions improved
little; for, Haiti merely substituted native tyranny for
alien rule. --
The years following independence were characterized
by political and economic chaos. Grave financial errors
were made in the flotation of bonds in foreign and domestic
markets. The economy stagnated with the plantations, roads,
and aqueducts built by the French in need of repair. The
dearth of agricultural and industrial progress, coupled
with the lack of cultural development of the population,
led to political instability.
In the urban centers of Haiti, an elite class emerged,
educated in the French language and traditions. The rural
areas, however, were populated by an uneducated peasantry
which was exploited by the better class. The elite, who
looked primarily to the government for employment, found
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insufficient opportunities available. Thus, factions de
veloped and revolutions occurred as those out of office
mobilized peasant armies in an attempt to obtain political
control.
Between 1879 and 1915, the political situation in
Haiti further deteriorated. Chronic revolutions were accom
panied by financial disorder which brought threats of Euro
pean intervention. In 1915, after the brutal murder of the
Haitian President and the violation of foreign embassies,
the situation became so unstable that the United States
made the decision to intervene-jLn. Haiti. This intervention
led to a twenty-year period of military occupation.
The occupation of Haiti has been a subject of much
controversy. American motives have been questioned by those
who claim that dollar diplomacy provided the real impetus
to this intervention. United States methods in governing
Haiti have also been criticized, with charges of brutality
and murder directed at the military who were responsible
for the pacification of the interior. Even the material
achievement of the occupation have been disparaged by those
who were opposed to the American intervention. In order to
understand the reasons for the occupation and to determine
its effects on the development of Haiti, it is necessary to
view the intervention in its proper perspective by first
presenting, in some detail, the history of Haiti and then
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by examining the political, social, financial, and economic
conditions that precipitated the American action..
Haiti from 1492-1804
Haiti, or Santo Domingo, was first discovered by
Columbus in 1492 and soon afterwards became a source of
agriculture exploitation for the Spanish. The Indians
occupying the island were not suited to a life of slavery
and were soon replaced by the importation of Africans. As
the Indian population continued to diminish and as the
demand for plantation labor increased, Negroes were brought
to Haiti in greater numbers, eventually becoming the domi
nant force of the island.
Meanwhile, the French had obtained a foothold on the
western part of the island. However, it was not until after
the War of the Grand Alliance in Europe that Spain recog
nized France's right to this territory; and, in 1697, by
the Treaty of Ryswick, Spain ceded France the western third
of Hispanola, which she ruled under the name of Saint
Domingue.^
The French did much to develop Saint Domingue.
Large plantations, operated by slave labor, produced sub
stantial amounts of sugar, tobacco, indigo, coffee, and
^Seldin Rodman, Haiti : The Black Republic (New York: Devin Adair Company, 1954), p. 6.
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cacaoo Along the plains' areas, roads were built and irri
gation projects installed. The colony prospered and was
considered a prized possession.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, in spite
of the material prosperity of the island, antagonisms
amongst the various elements became more apparent, and, fi
nally culminated in the downfall of white supremacy. In
this period, the population consisted of 32,000 whites, 2 24,000 freedmen, and 480,000 slaves. The whites were
divided into three classes— the French-born officials and
landowners, the Creole aristocracy, and the poorer French
men. Jealousy and hatred existed between these classes,
but their determination to maintain the color line became a 3 unifying force.
Subservient to the white man were the free mulattoes
and slaves, who were further divided into two distinct
classes. While the free mulattoes were permitted to own
property and possess wealth, they still faced social,
political, and legal discrimination."^ The slaves, on the
other hand, were an oppressed lot of people whose source of
2 H. P. Davis, Black Democracy (second edition ; New York; Dodge Publishing Company, 1936), pp. 24-25.
^Ibid., p. 28.
'^Arthur C. Millspauqh, Haiti Under American Control (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931), p. 8.
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unity was derived from their hatred of the white man and
their jealousy of the mulatto.
At the time of the French revolution, when French
control of the colony was weakened, this dissension came to
a head. The unsuccessful mulatto revolt in 1791 was fol
lowed by a slave insurrection later that year.^ It was
during this revolutionary period that one of the most com
petent leaders in Haitian history, Toussaint 1'Ouverture,
emerged from obscurity and assumed leadership of the slaves.
Although born a slave, Toussaint 1'Ouverture had received
a good education with the help of his master, and later
utilized his skills to aid his people. Under his leader
ship, the Negro army defeated the Spanish and the British,
and subdued the mulattoes in the West and South. Toussaint
1'Ouverture became the ruler of Saint Domingue.^
Napoleon, however, sought a reconquest of the island
and ordered General Leclerc to re-establish French authority.
In 1802, the French recaptured the island and forced the
retirement of Toussaint 1'Ouverture. Leclerc, fearful that
Toussaint would organize another rebellion, captured Tous
saint and sent him to France, where he died shortly after
wards in a French prison. By the end of 1802, the slaves
5 Davis, op." cit. , pp. 34-36,
^John Edwin Fagg, Cuba, Haiti, & The Dominican Re- public (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), ppl lTT-122,
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were in revolt all over the island. The French, unable to
combat the enemy and the fever, retreated by the end of
18.03. On January 1, 1804, Jean Jacques Dessalines, Tous
saint 's successor, proclaimed the independence of his nation 7 and renamed it Haiti, the aboriginal name for the island.
Haiti from 1804 to 1915
Haiti suffered under the rule of Dessalines. Having
declared himself Emperor, he was faced with the responsi
bility of ruling the nation. Lacking an education and pos
sessing no administrative skill, Dessalines became a cruel
dictator. It was under his orders that the remaining whites
were surrounded by troops and taken to their execution,
Dessalines continued to exploit the people until 1806, when
Q he was murdered by one of his non-commissioned officers.
After the death of Dessalines, the country was
divided, with the north forming the "State of Haiti” under
the Presidency of Henri Christophe, a full-blooded Negro,
while the south and west elected a mulatto, Petion, as
President of the "Republic of Haiti." Before his death,
Petion chose General Boyer, another mulatto, as his suc
cessor, who, upon the death of Christophe, was able to
^Ibid., pp. 122-123.
®Davis, 0£. cit., pp. 87-98
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reunite the country. In 1821, even the Spanish part of the
island was brought into the union with Haiti.^
On March of 1818, Jean Pierre Boyer was elected to
the Presidency of Haiti, a position he was to occupy for
twenty years. He was faced with an electorate, uneducated
and unprepared for self-government, and a nation, devastated
from battle and neglect. Boyer sought to improve economic
and financial conditions in Haiti; but, in order to achieve
this end, French recognition of Haitian independence had to
be obtained. The price of recognition was very steep. The
French demanded a 50 per cent reduction on all customs
duties and the payment of a large indemnity to compensate
former French landowners. Out of this agreement came the
beginning of Haitian debt problems.
During the Boyer regime, the mulattoes were able to
improve their position and entrench themselves in Haitian
politics. Though greatly outnumbered by the darker skinned
Haitian, this elite group of people became the real rulers
of the country.
In 1843, though having been elected President for
life, Boyer was forced to retire from office. After a
series of Presidents and the loss of Spanish Haiti, the
^Millspaugh, op. cit., pp. 9-10
^^Davis, op. cit., 114-118.
^^Fagg, pp. cit., pp. 126-127.
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elite selected General Faustin Soulouque, an ignorant and
superstitious Negro, as President of Haiti, Shortly after
he assumed the Presidency, Soulouque turned against the
elite and, in 1848, caused the massacre of the mulattoes.
He then proceeded to reconquer Spanish Haiti, but the expedi
tion ended in failure. In order to divert the people, on
August 26, 1849, he declared himself Emperor of Haiti. His
regime became very unpopular. His military failures against
the Dominican Republic and his reliance on intimidation and
brutality to secure his authority led to the overthrow of 12 his government in 185 9.
On January 20, 1859, General Fabre Geffrard took
office and proceeded to improve conditions in Haiti. He re
organized the army, established a system of primary and
secondary education, and started a school of medicine. By
1864, he had successfully negotiated a commercial treaty
with the United States. By February of 1867, after years
of suppressing revolts against his regime, Geffrard was
forced to resign. Major Sylvain Salnave then become Presi
dent.^^
Although Salnave, like his two predecessors, was
elected President for life, his regime came to an abrupt
^^Davis, jop. cit. , pp. 120-126
^^Ibid., pp. 125-127.
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and violent end. In 1869, Nissage-Saget was chosen Presi
dent and completed his terra without a revolution. He was
succeeded, in 1869, by General Michel Domingue who was so
incompetent that he turned over the government to his
nephew, Rameau, whom he appointed Vice-President of the
Counizil^of Secretaries of State. Rameau quickly took advan
tage of his position and, through unscrupulous financial
transactions, looted the treasury. Rumors that the govern
ment was depositing public funds abroad led to the murder
of Rameau and the escape of the President. In 1876,
Boisrond-Canal became President. After serving three years
of a four-year term, he was forced to resign by opposition
leaders. Following his resignation, Lysius Salomon was
elected President, the term of office having been extended
to seven years by Constitutional amendment. Although the
Constitution explicitly prohibited the immediate re-election
of a President, Salomon had the Constitution modified and
secured his own re-election. This action precipitated
another revolution, which resulted in Salomon’s resignation,
from office and departure to France.Thus ended the
career of one of the more competent leaders of Haiti, who,
during his tenure of office, had inaugurated some genuine
reforms.
^^Ibid., pp. 127-134,
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After Salomon's departure from office, the political
situation further deteriorated. Except for several periods
of comparative peace during the administrations of Presi
dents Hippolyte, Simon Sam, and Nord Alexis, Haiti lived a
chaotic existence. Between 1879 and 1915, no President,
with the exception of Salomon, successfully completed his
term of office. During this period, Haiti had twelve
Presidents, Four were killed in office, and six others
were overthrown,
Revolution was easy in Haiti, generally starting in
the north near Cap-Haitien where bands of cacos lived in
the hills. Under a revolutionary general, these peasants,
or cacos, would march on Port-au-Prince to upset the govern
ment and collect their rewards. Also promoting insurrection
were various factions in Haiti composed primarily of the
mulatto aristocracy. Educated in the French tradition and
abhorring productive labor, they looked to the government
for their income. Because the government was unable to sup
port such a civil service, those out of power resorted to
revolution to obtain control of the government and, thus,
control of the treasury. With one administration replacing
another in this manner, Haiti was constantly plagued by
revolution ; and, in spite of its many Constitutions
^^See infra, Appendix A,
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professing republicanism, Haiti never achieved representa
tive government.
Haiti's Relations with the United States
In addition to its chaotic internal situation, Haiti
also was confronted with external problems. While French
recognition of its independence was delayed until 1825,
American recognition was withheld until 1862.^^
The failure of the United States to recognize Haiti,
after 1804, can be attributed to various factors. Under
President Monroe, recognition was not granted in view of
Haiti's anti-white Constitution and southern resistance.
When, in 1829, a discriminatory 10 per cent increase in
customs duties was imposed on American ships in retaliation
for our policy, recognition was still withheld. This action
resulted in the decline of American exports to Haiti. How
ever, in 1850, United States trade with Haiti was restored
to a most-favored nation basis, with exports increasing
from $602,593, in 1849, to $1,350,188, in 1850.^^
By 1855, Haiti was importing more goods from the United
States than was Mexico, but recognition was postponed to
appease the South. It was not until 1862 that the United
^^Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1940), p. 8 6 . 17 Ibid., pp. 54-59
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States finally recognized Haiti when the Senate passed such
a bill on April the fourth, and the House of Representatives
gave its assent on June the fifth. Four years later, Henry 18 Eo Peck was selected as the first Minister to Haiti.
In 1864, a new commercial treaty was negotiated with
Haiti, which made no significant changes in our commercial
relationship as the United States had obtained most-favored
nation treatment since 1856. However, it granted to Ameri
can citizens equality with Haitians in relation to the pay
ment of license fees and taxes— a privilege not usually 19 given to aliens.
Between American recognition of its independence and
the occupation, though the United States normally maintained
friendly relations with Haiti, this relationship was dis
turbed on several occasions. In 1888, an American ship,
the Haitian Republic, was seized by the Haitians for violat
ing a blockade. Unable to secure its return by diplomatic
means, the United States consigned two warships to retrieve 20 the vessel; whereupon, the vessel was released.
^^Ibid., pp. 80 and 87.
^^Ibid., pp. 87-88. ? n Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (fifth edition ; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), pp. 264-265.
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On numerous other occasions, American vessels were
sent to Haiti to protect lives and property of foreigners
during revolutions. As time went on, the Haitian govern
ments became less able to maintain themselves against their
opponents and revolts became more frequent. Although no
foreign lives were lost in these revolutions, recurrent 21 apprehension necessitated the visits of American ships.
During the year preceding the intervention, in response to
the deteriorating political picture, Haiti received fre
quent visits from European and American vessels. However,
conditions failed to improve and, by July 28, 1915, Haiti
was in a state of anarchy.
21 Robert Lansing, Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Hearings before Senate Select Committee, 67tb Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Senate Committee Printing, 1922), p. 2,
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CONDITIONS IN HAITI PRIOR TO THE INTERVENTION
Prior to the American intervention, Haiti lived a
primitive existence. After more than one hundred years of
independence, political, social, and economic conditions
had shown no improvement. In fact, the government was more
unstable in 1915 than in previous years, while the economy
had never surpassed its productivity under the French, At
the same time, there was little social improvement in Haiti,
with the acquisition of education confined to the elite.
Thus, after a century of national existence, the chronic
state of revolutions and the absence of progress resulted
in the complete breakdown of the Haitian political system.^
Political and Social Conditions in Haiti
Although Haiti had adopted ten Constitutions since
its independence, in 1915 the Constitution of 1889 was
still in force. This Constitution provided for a republican
form of government, similar to that of France, and followed 2 French codes and the French system of justice. It divided
^Ulysses Weatherly, "Haiti, An Experiment in Pragma tism," American Journal of Sociology, XXXII (November, '19'26), 355. p Raymond Leslie Buell, "The American Occupation of Haiti," Foreign Policy Association Information Service, V (November 27-December 12~J 1929) , 328.
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the government into three branches— the legislative, execu
tive, and the judicial— with the National Legislature con
sisting of two chambers. The Chamber of Representatives
was elected by the people for a term of three years, while
the Senate was elected by the Representatives for a six-
year term. The National Assembly elected the President 3 whose term of office was for seven years.
While the Constitution provided for a democratic
system of government, the realities of Haitian politics
resulted in dictatorial regimes perpetuating themselves.
Election controls were in the hands of the President who
prevailed upon the General of the district, himself a Presi
dential appointee, to select sympathetic representatives to
run for the legislature. Thus, the President's own re-
election or the election of his chosen candidate could be ■ 4 assured. If the legislature failed to follow Presidential
policies, it was quickly dissolved.
Thus, with candidates nominated through revolutions
and elected to office by manipulation, Haiti failed to
acquire political experience. In 1915, Haiti had no politi
cal parties worthy of note, no platforms, and no well
William A. MacCorkle, The Monroe Doctrine in its Relation to the Republic of Haiti (New York : Neale Pub lishing Company, 1915), p. 50.
"^Ibid. , p. 51.
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established principles of government. In addition, 80 per
cent of the population had little interest in government,
while 10 per cent of the people fought among themselves for 5 the profits of politics.
The lack of political progress in Haiti could be
partly attributed to its social structure. In this nation
of nearly two million people, there were two distinct
classes— the elite and the peasant farmers and laborers.
The elite, educated in the French tradition, sought an un
productive life in government service. The peasantry, con
sisting of 90 per cent of the population, was illiterate
and outside the money economy. In addition, there existed
a small middle class of merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and
lawyers
A cleavage existed between the elite and the peasants,
and was further strengthened by the differences in educa
tion. The elite, for the most part, were cultured indivi
duals, sending their children to church schools for their
early education and then to Paris to complete their studies.
The peasants, on the other hand, lived in isolated areas
and lacked educational opportunity. Those that attended
^George Marvin, "Helping Haiti," World's Work, XXX (September, 1915), 524-529.
^Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control (Boston; World Peace Foundation, 1931')', pp. 13-14.
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school were often taught by teachers unable to read and
write.
The color line was another divisive factor and influ
enced the political and social life of Haiti. The 90 per
cent of the people with black skin, living primarily in
rural areas, were members of the lower class. Although
they had little interest in politics, they were continu
ously exploited by the politicians. The elite consisted
mainly of mulattoes who lived in the cities and the larger 7 towns. Although educated and cultured, this class lacked
a sense of social responsibility, and their goal in poli
tics was to obtain access to the treasury.® With public
officials unwilling to accept responsibility and with a
population lacking the rudiments of education, Haiti made
little progress after independence.
Economic Conditions in Haiti
In 1804, after its war against the French, Haiti was a
devastated country. The large plantations, which had once
been the source of its wealth, were destroyed in the fight
ing. The roads, bridges, and irrigation systems built by
the French also lay in ruin. In 1915, after more than a
7Dantes Bellegarde, "Haiti and Her Problems," Uni- versity of Puerto Rico Bulletin, VII (September, 1936T"5 19,
8'Millspaugh, _o£. cit. , p. 14.
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century of independence, the economic situation had shown
no improvement.
After 1804. agriculture, the most important sector
of the Haitian economy, had been allowed to decline. By
1915, it was difficult to find one thousand acres that were
properly cultivated or one agricultural enterprise worthy
of the name. Although 90 per cent of the population worked
in agriculture, productivity was poor. The farmer sustained
himself by carrying his product to market on foot or by
donkey, over rugged mountain trails. His crop consisted
primarily of wild fruit, vegetables, coffee, and cotton 9 seed, produced by the most primitive means of cultivation.
The production of tobacco and cacao, formerly two of the
more important export crops, had not increased. Sugar, one
of the leading crops during the colonial period, was no
longer exported. Thus, Haiti found itself in a most un
favorable position, dependent primarily on the production of
coffee for its foreign exchange.^®
Hence, Haiti had become a one-crop country, whose
primary export, coffee, had shown only a 26 per cent in
crease since the"country became independent. In addition.
Eve E. Sorensen, "The Dawn of Haiti's New Era," Current History Magazine of The New York Times, XXIII (December^ 1925), 37 3.
^®Millspaugh, _o£. cit., p. 15.
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its other exports, such as cacao and logwood, made only
slight improvements. By 1915, there had been a decrease in
per capita production, with the volume of exports remaining
the same as in 1791.
The constant series of revolutions and the stigma of
slavery made the Haitian male unproductive. Labor was per
formed by the women who worked in the fields and carried
the crop to the market. The male remained near home to
avoid draft into the caco ranks.
There were other impediments to the development of
agriculture. Much of the land was owned by the government
or city residents who took little interest in its develop
ment. A new system of irrigation was needed for agricul
tural improvement, but the capital required was not
available. Foreigners were discouraged from agricultural
investment as the Constitution prevented them from owning
land. In addition, the poor system of land titles deterred 12 investors.
With the exception of the land, there were few pro
ductive resources in Haiti. No valuable mineral deposits
had been discovered, and no mining operations existed. The
productivity of labor was poor due to lack of education.
The absence of local capital and engineering experience
^^Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1940)", ^ 2 -I 2 Millspaugh, o£. cit., pp. 15-17.
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forced the government to look elsewhere for its needs, re
sulting in the use of the concession method for the con
struction of public works. Thus, by 1915, Haiti had only
built one wharf, two lighthouses, one electric plant, and 13 one hundred and twelve miles of railroad. - -
The concession method of development proved injurious
to Haiti, as concessions were granted to individuals in the
absence of competitive bids. The developer was permitted
to receive all profits plus a subsidy for a specific period
of time, after which the project would be returned to the
government. Difficulties arose because the concessionaire
was often dishonest. Once obtaining the concession, he
would leave for Paris or New York to sell his rights and
then force the government to repurchase the original con
cession. Then, the government would grant another conces- 14 Sion.
Conditions were further aggravated by the govern
ment's lack of revenue. While the Constitution failed to
impose taxes on the popuTation, most Presidents exacted
payments from everyone who had an occupation or owned prop- 15 erty. However, the government's primary source of revenue
13 Montague, ££_. cit. , p. 22.
^'^Ibid. 1 5 MacCorkle, op-, cit. , p. 51.
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was from import and export duties levied by the various
customhouseso These duties were imposed in accordance with
an antiquated tariff system, taxing luxuries slightly and
necessities heavily. Because of the unfavorable commercial
situation, Haiti floated bond issues to meet large deficits,
pledging its customs duties as security for the loans. In
order to increase its revenue, export duties were placed on
farm products, thus placing the burden on the peasants and
deterring further agricultural development.^^ Thus, by
1915, Haiti had failed to develop its agricultural and in
dustrial sector, and faced a deteriorating commercial situa
tion which was partly attributable to its economic stagna
tion.
Foreign Interests in Haiti
Although Dessalines had driven out the French in
1804, Haiti still remained under French influence. Their
national language was French, with even the peasants speak
ing "Creole," a derivative of French. The elite looked to
France for education and culture, and even established
Catholicism as the official religion. Although German,
British, and American citizens had limited financial inter
ests in Haiti, French investors were the ones heavily
^^Montague, op. cit., p. 22,
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involved in the National Bank of Haiti and the National
Railroad. While other foreign concessions existed in Haiti,
the National Bank and National Railroad were most signifi
cant and will, thus, be discussed in greater detail.
The National Bank of Haiti, established in 1880,
exercised a large influence on the political and economic
life of the country. Between 1880 and 1910, the Bank was
solely a French establishment which acted as the Haitian
treasury, whereby government funds were deposited in it;
and, the Bank, in turn, made payments on behalf of the
government.
The Bank added little stability to the Haitian
economy as it derived large profits from its exchange specu
lation and acted as the intermediary through which Haiti
contracted its loans, It was through the Bank that Haiti
negotiated the loan of 1896, by which she received only * 18 40,000,000 francs from a 50,000,000 franc loan. - .
In 1910, the Bank was reorganized. At first, it was
to remain a French establishment; but, after a United
States protest, the stock was distributed between French
and American interests, with a small bloc held by German • '' 19 ■ ' • - stockholders. No stock was held by Haitians.
^^Buell, o£, cit., p. 333, ^^Ibid.
^^United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States 1915 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), p. 497.
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Although three Americans were Directors, an American
was Vice President, and still another acted as Manager, the
Bank was directed from Paris as the French owned 75 per
cent of the stock. The remaining ten thousand shares were
divided equally amongst five companies— the National City
Bank of New York, Speyer and Company, Hallgarten and Com
pany, Ladenburg, Thalmann and Company; while a German Bank 20 owned two thousand shares.
By contractual arrangement, the Bank was to act as
the treasury for the government, receiving all revenues and
making payments on its behalf. The contract also gave the
Bank an exclusive note issuing privilege and provided for a 21 reform of Haitian currency.
At the time of reorganization, a loan was given to
Haiti, out of which ten million francs was put aside for
monetary reform. Under a law of retrait, part of this sum
was used to retire paper’ money, but the law was suspended
in August of 1914, The remainder of the money, amounting to
two million francs, was held in trust to be used for mone- 22 tary reform. However, in January of 1914, a shortage was
discovered, and the Bank promised Haitian officials that
^^Buell, o_£. cit. , p. 334 21 United States Department of State, 0£. cit., p. 497
22. -Ibid
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the funds would be replaced by the importation of gold from
New York.
As time went on, the relationship between the Bank
and Haiti became more tenuous, with dissension reaching a
peak in 1914. . The Bank, under an annual convention, had
been voluntarily providing the government with funds to
meet its expenses and salaries. This advance was later re
paid out of surplus funds. After 1912, revolutions had
become so frequent that the government lacked the revenue
to repay the advances. Because the government already owed
the Bank a large sum of money, by the summer of 1914, the 24 Bank refused further advances.
Although this procedure was merely an accommodation
on the part of the Bank, the government was dependent upon
it for its functions. This action created problems for the
Haitian government, as it had no access to funds. The Bank
officials thus forced Haiti to look elsewhere for funds—
specifically to the United States. However, before a customs
agreement could be reached, the Haitian President, Charles 25 Zamor, was thrown out of office. The next administration.
2 3 Buell, 0£. cit., p. 336. 24 United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1914 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1922 ) , 345-346. 2 S United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1914, op. cit., pp. 354-355.
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under President Theodore, sought other sources of funds and
planned an issue of paper money. In spite of the State
Department's objection to the illegality of the act. Presi
dent Theodore proceeded with his plans.
Meanwhile the Bank voiced concern over the safety of
its funds and sent a telegram to the Secretary of State on
December 8, 1914. Because no merchant vessels were in the
area, the Bank sent $500,000 to New York on the gunboat
"Machias.
The Haitian government was angered by both the action
of the Bank and the State Department's position on this
matter. Thus, shortly after the "Machias" incident, the
government seized $55,000 from the Bank's vaults, threaten
ing bodily injury to officers in the process. This action 2 0 forced the retirement of the Bank's acting Director.
By the end of 1914, the government was desperate for
funds and authorized the issue of eight million gourdes.
When the State Department took the side of the Bank on this
issue, in spite of the fact that the contract prohibited
diplomatic intervention, the Haitian government became fur- 29' ther offended.
ZGibid. , p. 365. ^'^Ibid. , pp. 365 and 380-381,
Z^lbid., pp. 380-381. 29 Buell, _0£. cit. , p. 337.
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These controversies came to a head in February of
1915 with the removal of the treasury service from the Bank
and the designation of various merchants to receive the cus
toms duties. Consequently, under this arrangement, funds
were no longer available for the interest and sinking fund 30 payments on the foreign debt. Hence, not only did the
Bank protest this contractual violation, but foreign bond
holders , supported by their governments, also sought reme
dies. This intensified American efforts on behalf of the
Bank and was a critical factor in the United States deci
sion to intervene in Haiti.
The National Railroad, the other principal concession
in Haiti, was also a source of controversy. The construc
tion of a railroad in Haiti had created problems for the
country. Lacking the native capital and know-how, various
governments had granted concessions to foreigners. In 18 76,
an American was granted such a concession, but work on the 31 railroad was never started.
However, in 1904, after other efforts had failed, a
concession was granted to Rodolphe Gardere who sold control 32 to American interests. In 1910, the contract was revised,
30 United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1915, op. cit., p. 511,
^^Montague, _o£. cit., pp. 198-199. 32 Millspaugh, _o£. cit. , p. 21.
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with the government agreeing to guarantee payment of 6 per
cent interest on railroad bonds that would be used to build
a railroad from Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haitien. The costs
were not to exceed $20,000 a kilometre. Unless the rail
road was completed within five years, the company could be
faced with the threat of foreclosure except in the case of
force maj eure. Both parties agreed that the government
could purchase the railroad after a twenty-year period and
that, in case of dispute, diplomatic intervention would not
be used. By 1913, the concession passed from Mr, J. P.
McDonald to the Grace Syndicate, with two-thirds of the
railroad bonds, amounting to $3,500,000, being held by the
French.?^
However, a serious dispute arose between the company
and the government when the government refused to accept
the completed sections of track on the grounds that the
work was deficient. But, in 1914, the State Department
intervened on behalf of the railroad and persuaded the
government to accept the work and guarantee the railway , , 34 bonds.
This settlement was short lived. Haiti not only
reneged on her agreement with the State Department but also
^^Buell, op_. cit. , pp. 334-335. ^^Ibid.
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informed it that foreclosure proceedings would be instituted
for non-compliance with the contract. The State Department
replied that the United States would safeguard the rights 35 of the company.
The government contended that the company failed to
live up to its agreement and that it provided six delivered
sections rather than the eleven it should have completed.
The railroad claimed that, although construction began on
April 15, 1911, between that date and July of 1915, there
had been only one year and one month free from revolution.
The company further insisted that, during the chaos, not
only had the police failed to protect its property, but also 37 various factions had extracted payments from it.
Because the State Department intervened on behalf of
the company, several delays were granted on the foreclosure
threat; but Haiti still refused to fulfill its pledge to Op French bondholders. In July of 1915, when the interven
tion occurred, the railroad controversy was still unre
solved. _
p C United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1915, op. cit., p. 538,
^^Ibid., p. 542,
^^United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), pp, 369—370 and 376—377.
^^Ibid., p. 368.
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CONTEMPORARY CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION
Although it has often been stated that the United
States intervened in Haiti to safeguard American interests
in the National Bank and National Railroad, this accusation
is, at best, a gross overstatement. There is no doubt that
American investors urged the State Department to intervene
and that they took action that made the intervention inevi
table; however, it is improbable that so large a contingent
of troops was committed to the protection of an investment
of less than $15,000,000. Rather, other considerations in
fluenced American policy, and each will be discussed sepa
rately in the following pages.
Chaotic Conditions in Haiti
Although the events of July, 1915, precipitated the
occupation, the United States had long been concerned with
the chronic state of revolution that had engulfed the
island. While Haiti had endured political instability since
its independence, the political situation steadily deterio
rated after August, 1911, resulting in the election of six
Presidents between this date and July of 1915. With each
President gaining office through a successful revolution,
these years brought several instances of American interven
tion .
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As revolutions in Haiti became more frequent, the
United States became more concerned with that nation's
political and financial instability, and sought to improve
the administration of the country. In the months prior to
the occupation, there were several instances of military
intervention and several attempts made to conclude an agree
ment with Haiti.
In January of 1914, after less than a year in office.
President Michel Oreste's government was threatened by re
volt. The United States, eager to maintain constitutional
government, sent in troops to bolster Oreste's position; but
the President was forced out of office on January 2 7feb.^
With the support of a caco army, Oreste Zamor became
President. His administration was confronted with financial
and political problems. The Bank was refusing further ad
vancements to the. government, thus leaving the President
with an empty treasury, and no money to reimburse his caco
army. In October of 1914, the United States sought a cus
toms agreement with Haiti but, before its conclusion, a 2 revolution occurred; and Zamor fled.
United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1914 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1922), 334-336.
^Ibid., pp. 349 and 355.
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In November of 1914, President Davilmar Theodore
took office and faced the same financial problems of his ,
predecessor. The United States withheld recognition until
a treaty for customs administration could be negotiated.
The situation became so crucial in December of 1914 that
the United States gunboat "Machias" transported Bank funds
to New York.^
The reign of Theodore ended abruptly after General
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam inaugurated another revolution. The
United States sent Admiral Caperton to prevent looting of
the towns and to protect American lives and property. Fol
lowing the inauguration of Sam to the Presidency, an Ameri
can commission was sent to negotiate a treaty. The Haitian
government, unwilling to come to agreement, claimed the com
mission lacked proper credentials.*^
Another attempt was made to negotiate an agreement
when the United States sent Paul Fuller, Jr. to Haiti, In
the Fuller proposal, the United States agreed to protect
Haiti against foreign attacks and to assist her in suppress
ing insurrection at home. In return, Haiti agreed not to
sell or lease the island of Mole to any foreign government
^Ibid., pp. 380-381,
“^Harold P. Davis, Black Democracy (second edition ; New York: Dodge Publishing Company, 1936), pp. 155-157,
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and to enter into an arbitration agreement for the settle
ment of foreign claims. In its reply to the proposal in
June of 1915, Haiti acknowledged acceptance of much of the
agreement. However, another revolution prevented further 5 discussion.
In the north of Haiti, under the leadership of Dr.
Rosalvo Bobo, the cacos were once again threatening the
President, While the government deployed many troops, it
was unable to put down the revolt ; and Bobo soon occupied
Cap-Haitien. The French responded by sending the cruiser
"Descartes" to that city to protect the French Consulate
and the Bank. The United States, in turn, ordered Admiral
Caperton to Cap-Haitien to protect the lives and property
of foreigners.^
Although all the recent Presidents had been revolu
tionary leaders, Guillaume Sam carried militarism to an
extreme. After the resurgence of Dr. Bobo, Sam had estab
lished an absolute dictatorship— suspecting everyone of
treason and imprisoning the opposition. Those who were
able had escaped to Legations to await the opportunity to
overthrow the government.
C Carl Kelsey, The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, C TMarch, 1922')', 135,
^United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1915 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), pp. 472-475.
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On July 27, 1915, massive firing was heard for.two
hours. The palace had been attacked, resulting in many
casualties. The President, protected by his officers, bar
ricaded himself in the palace, thus forcing the revolution
aries to set fire to the building. In retaliation. General
Oscar, the Commandant of the prison, ordered the killing of
all political prisoners, many of whom were from the best
families. Although Sam safely escaped to the French Lega
tion, General Oscar was not as fortunate and was murdered 7 on route to the Dominican Embassy.
The people of Haiti were in a fury and vowed to re
venge the death of their loved ones. On the first search
of the French Legation, the President was not found, and
the French Minister refused to divulge his whereabouts. On
July the 28^, in spite of the Minister's protest, a second
search was undertaken, and Sam was found. The mob, hearing
of the arrival of American ships, knew it was their last
opportunity for retribution. They dragged Sam from the
Embassy, lynched him, and then mutilated his body. The
city was in a frenzy, and the situation was serious for
foreigners as a legation had been violated. Looting was
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washington: Government Print ing Office, 1 9 2 5 p. 314.
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taking place, and people were arming themselves. Haiti was Q in a state of anarchy.
In a telegram from the Secretary of State to the
Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Caperton was asked to land
marines from the "Washington" at the earliest possible
moment to prevent further disorder. He was also told to
request that the Captains of the British and French ships
refrain from landing troops as the United States would pro- 9 tect all foreign interests.
On the 28b of July of 1915, marines and bluejackets
landed with the permission of the Committee of Safety— the
only authority in Haiti. Conditions remained chaotic as Dr,
Bobo, supported by a caco army, was planning to assume the
Presidency. Fighting ensued, resulting in the death of two
bluejackets.^^ Thus, additional American forces were re
quested to patrol the city and disband the cacos, so order
could be achieved. For, unless some semblance of order was
obtained, other nations might intervene to protect their
financial interests in Haiti.
United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. I, 57tb Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., August 5, 1921-November 16, 1921 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 307. Herein referred to as Senate Hearings,
^United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, op. cit., pp. 475-476.
^^Ibid., p. 4 76.
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Financial Disorder in Haiti
The chronic revolutionary situation in Haiti had led
the country to the brink of financial default. Since its
1825 decision to obtain French recognition, Haiti had been
in debt to its European creditors. In addition to earlier
loans, bond issues of 26,000,000 and 50,000,000 francs, re
spectively, had been floated in France in 1875 and 1896.
In 1910, Haiti obtained a further loan of 65,000,000 francs
from German, French and American bankers. As security for
these loans, Haiti pledged customs receipts, which the
National Bank was to allocate according to contract. How
ever, with 85 per cent of its revenue designated for the
debt repayment and 95 per cent of its funds derived from
its customs duties, any decline in its commerce or increase 12 in its expenses would place Haiti near bankruptcy. Be
tween 1912 and 1915, Haiti was confronted with both prob
lems which led to subsequent decisions which further
jeopordized her financial position.
^^Dana G. Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Area (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934), p. 147. 1 7 United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. II. 67tb Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., November 29- 1921-June 16, 1922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 1224-1225. Hereafter referred to as Senate Hear ings , Vol. II.
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For the year 1912-1913, Haiti's total revenue was
$5,073,691.40, with the total sum pledged to debt service
amounting to $2,507,553.07 and the amount required for ex
penses reaching $3,787,426.48, thus leaving a deficit of
more than $1,000,000, To cover this deficit, the govem- 13 ment obtained loans from creditors and the National Bank.
When revenue slightly declined during 1913-1914, at a time
that increased funds were required for the debt service,
the government engaged in further borrowing. While the
Bank loaned the government part of the money, additional
money was raised from internal borrowing at terms which
were most outrageous.
During the year prior to the occupation, Haitian
finances reached a low ebb, with revenues declining to
$3,311,548.14.In the face of a deteriorating trade
situation, the government illegally transferred the treasury
service from the National Bank to private banking firms—
the principal firm being Simmond Frères. Because revolu
tionary groups could more easily obtain funds from these
firms and because a commission was exacted on the govern
ment funds, only $754,892.86 was available for the national
debt. Money also was required for government expenses.
^^Ibid., p. 1123.
^^Ibid., p. 1224. ^^Ibid,
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Since few sources of credit were still available to Haiti,
the government resorted to an illegal currency issue which
resulted in the depreciation of its currency to 9.90 gourdes
to the dollar
By 1915, the nation was near bankruptcy. In addi
tion to a large foreign debt, Haiti was faced with the re
payment of internal loans which had been contracted at
declining terms between 1911 and 1914— many being held by
German merchants. Because money designated for the repay
ment of the foreign debt had been diverted to the repayment
of internal loans, Haiti was forced to default on the amorti- 1 7 zation of the loans of 1875 and 1896. By the date of the
intervention, the outstanding capital balance on the external 18 debt was as follows:
Loan of 1875 19,252,500 francs
Loan of 1896 37,638,500 "
Loan of 1910 64,020,000 "
Total 120,912,000 "
Amortization payments in arrears were:
Senate Hearings, Vol. I, pp. 124 and 323.
^^Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1940) , p. 203.
^^Senate Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1226.
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Loan of 1875 10,539,120 francs
Loan of 1896 1,142,000 "
Loan of 1910 359,500 "
Total 12,040,620 "
Threat of Foreign Intervention
As Haiti came closer to insolvency, the United
States grew more concerned over possible foreign interfer
ence. Although the United States had tolerated European
intervention prior to 1880, between 1884 and 1891, it re
versed its position. In 1 8 8 4 and again in 1889, the United
States issued a warning to France that the acquisition of
Mole or Tortée would conflict with the Monroe Doctrine.
Several years later, when England showed interest in Tortée,
the United States warned England against its seizure.
France received another admonishment in 1891, when she was
told that no European power could interfere with the
Haitian government without the consent of the United 19 States.
With Haiti in chaos in the twentieth century, a new
danger of European intervention appeared. With economic
problems mounting for Haiti, the United States feared a
threat to the Monroe Doctrine. This fear was not ground
less. As early as 1912, there came to the State Department
^^Montague, o£. cit., p. 176
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evidence that Germany had offered a $2,000,000 loan to Haiti
in return for German control of customs and certain ports.
In addition, Germany would be granted the right to a coaling
station at Mole. Although Germany denied such negotiations, 20 she made other attempts to intervene in Haiti.
During 1914, French, German, and British warships were
sent to Haiti to protect their respective financial interests
as Haiti had fallen behind in her interest payments to their
nationals. When the French vessel approached the Haitian
port, it stopped a Haitian gunboat and demanded the immediate
payment of back interest to French bondholders. When payments
were not forthcoming, the French captured the gunboat and pro
ceeded to the West Indies with the gunboat in tow. The pay
ment was then rushed to the French command, whereupon the boat
was released. Both Great Britain and Germany made similar 21 threats to receive their respective payments.
As the financial position of Haiti deteriorated and
with economic default appearing more inevitable, the credi
tor nations became more alarmed, Germany, protecting the
interests of her nationals, sought joint control over Hai
tian revenue. This position was reiterated by France in an
identical note from its Ambassador to the American Secretary
2 f) "German Intentions in Haiti," Literary Digest, XLVIII (May 30, 1914), 1303.
^^News item in The New York Times, May 14, 1914, p. 1,
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of State suggesting that France should be taken in partner
ship in any endeavor because of her financial interests and 22 her past ties with Haiti. The State Department replied
that it was against American policy to allow even partial 23 control over the government of any American state.
The outbreak of war in Europe prevented further ac
tion. Although there was little threat of German interven
tion with the war in Europe, a victorious Germany could be
troublesome to the United States. On the other hand, if
Germany were to be defeated by England, England might be
less complacent in respect to American control of the
Caribbean,
Strategic Importance of Haiti
American concern over the chaotic political and
financial conditions in Haiti was prompted by the strategic
importance of the country. MacCorkle says that it is second
to Cuba in strategic importance in the Gulf of Mexico and
the Caribbean Sea. He further states that "it should be a
fundamental principle of the United States that we should
- ^^United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1915, op. cit., pp. 514-515.
^^Wilfred Callcott, Caribbean Policy of the United States 1890-1920 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942)',' p. 408. 24 Montague, o£. cit., p. 211.
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control the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. This control 25 should be absolute and exclusive."
With the construction of the Panama Canal, the United
States pursued a policy of preventing foreign countries from
occupying this area. At the same time, it sought tighter
control of the Caribbean and, by 1903, controlled Guan
tanamo, Puerto Rico, and Panama. It ruled the Dominican
Republic by 1905 and, by August of 1914, had leased certain
naval bases from Nicaragua. With the occupation of Haiti
and the purchase of the Virgin Islands, the United States had
fortified the Panama Canal area.
Access to Mole St. Nicholas
The United States, realizing the strategic location
of Haiti, had long sought a naval station in that area. As
early as the Polk Administration, an emissary was sent to
Haiti to discuss this issue. The Pierce Administration made
another attempt to secure a naval station when it sent
Captain George B. McClellan to inspect the Bay of Samana;
? s William A. MacCorkle, The Monroe Doctrine in its Relation to the Republic of Haiti (New York: Neale Pub lishing Company, 1915), p. 28.
^^Raymond Leslie Buell,"The American Occupation of Haiti," Foreign Policy Association Information Service, V (November 27-December 'l'2, 1929) , 342.
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but, negotiations were thwarted by foreign opposition. 2 7
Other attempts were also unsuccessful.
Although the real history of the American interest
in Haiti did not begin until the inauguration of the
Harrison Blaine Administration, in 1868, President Salnave
agreed to give-the United States control of the island and
three leagues of adjacent mainland if it would assume the
Haitian debt to France and protect him from foreign and
domestic enemies. The United States, not wishing to have a 28 protectorate, declined his offer.
With the construction of the transcontinental rail
road, the United States lost interest in securing the naval
station. However, after the Panama Canal was started, the
United States renewed its interest in St, Thomas, Samana,
and Mole. By 1890, the Harrison Administration had tried
to lease Mole through diplomatic channels. When this effort
met with no success. Admiral Cherardi was sent to Port-au-
Prince in 1891 to bribe Hippolite to obtain the lease; but
Hippolite refused this offer. A later attempt to acquire
this island was made through William Clyde, President of
the West Indian Steamship Company. His efforts to
2 7Charles Stephen, Monograph of Haiti (Port au Prince: Imprimerie Saint Jacques Directeur, Arthur Isidore, 1915), p. 33.
28Montague, o£. cit., pp. 100-101
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incorporate the lease of Mole with his steamship concession 29 met with no success. Subsequent efforts to obtain a lease
in years prior to the intervention also resulted in failure.
While the United States was reluctant to force the lease
issue on its own behalf, it was determined that no other
foreign power would establish a coaling station at Mole.
2Q Ibid., pp. 148-150 and 158,
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ESTABLISHMENT OF AMERICAN CONTROL IN HAITI
On the 28Ü3 of July of 1915, American forces, under
the leadership of Admiral William B. Caperton, landed in
Haiti to protect the lives and property of foreigners.
Haiti was in a state of anarchy. The only semblance of
authority rested in a self-proclaimed Committee of Safety
which agreed to the landing and the establishment of Ameri
can control. Thus, the occupation of Haiti began.
While the United States was anxious to re-establish
a government, it was first necessary to quell the unrest.
A large number of cacos were roaming the city, demanding
the election of their leader Dr. Bobo. Although Bobo had
requested that his generals give up their arms, 1500 cacos
still remained at Port-au-Prince, maintaining their organi
zation and hiding their weapons. In order to repulse fur
ther caco violence. Admiral Caperton requested immediate
reinforcements.^
Having successfully restored order in Haiti, Admiral
Caperton proceeded to establish a government. Believing
that the United States could influence the choice of an
United States Marine Corps, "Report on Affairs in Haiti, 1915-1920," report read at the Columbus Memorial -Library, Washington, D. C . , p. 11. (Mimeographed.)
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executive and knowing the Haitians' desire for their own
government, the Naval Department authorized the election of
a President. Therefore, the election was set for August
the l2tb.
Election of a President
Prior to the election of the President, conferences
were held between American officials and prominent citizens
which resulted in the nomination of two candidates— Dr.
Rosolvo Bobo and M. Sudre Dartiguenave. A meeting was held
at the American Legation on August Stb, at which both candi
dates were questioned on their views toward the Presidency.
Each candidate was asked if he would support the other, if
the other were elected to the Presidency. While Darti
guenave unhesitantly promised Bobo his cooperation, Bobo
was unwilling to do the same. Rather, he declared that he
alone was fit to rule Haiti, and he would leave the country 2 if he lost the election.
On August 12, 1915, thirty-nine senators and one
hundred two representatives met in the Chamber of Deputies
to select a President. With sixteen votes cast for Bobo
0 United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. I, 67a Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., August 5, 1921-November 16, 1921 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 316. Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings.
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and a smattering for others,' Dartiguenave won an impressive
victory. Since Dartiguenave's friendly attitude toward the
intervention had made him the choice of the American govern
ment , there were many accusations as to the freedom and
validity of the elections. While the election was not free
in the American sense, it was far more democratic than pre
vious elections, during which caco troops had terrorized
the legislature,^
Immediately after the inauguration of Dartiguenave,
the State Department sought to obtain a treaty from Haiti,
Although no obstacles were anticipated in the negotiations
of the treaty, the United States made formal recognition of
the new government dependent on its ratification of the
agreement.
While Haiti recognized the inevitability of the
treaty, certain provisions of the document were most un
acceptable— especially those dealing with American control
of customs. One of the government’s foremost objections
involved the appointment of a Financial Adviser whose
duties, it claimed, would infringe on the constitutional
powers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Although the
United States refused to eliminate this position, the
complaint that the Financial Adviser possessed greater
^Ibid,, pp. 321 and 362
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powers than the President resulted in certain modifications
of the treaty,^
Members of the legislature voiced further protest
regarding the manner of appointment of treaty officials;
for, they were insistent that this right be given to the
Haitian President, Another source of discord involved the
inclusion of a clause providing for the renewal of the
convention,^
However, in spite of the numerous objections of the
Haitians, the United States was committed to the prompt
ratification of the treaty. When promises failed to move
the legislature, the United States resorted to other
tactics and threatened to either establish a military
government in Haiti or transfer control to another faction.
Still, the treaty remained unratified,^
Establishment of Customs Control
While politiqal pressure failed to bring about the
ratification of the treaty, financial pressure was more
^News item in The New York Times, September 22, 1915, p, 7. ^United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924y, p. 439,
^Ibid,, pp, 437-438,
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successful. On August 19, 1915, Admiral Caperton was 7 ordered to seize the Haitian customhouses:
, , , in order that duties upon imports and ex ports paid by merchants and shippers in Haiti to those now in control of customhouses may not be lost to the Haitian people, and in order to provide funds for organizing and maintaining an efficient constabulary, for conducting such temporary public works as will afford immediate relief through em ployment for starving populace and the discharged soldiers, so as to bring peace and contentment to Haiti which is the sole purpose and desire of this government, and finally for the support of the Dartiguenave government.
Admiral Caperton was told to maintain guards in the custom
houses so that United States officials could collect the
customs. The revenue was to be deposited in a separate
account to be opened at the National Bank of Haiti which
once again had been entrusted with the treasury service of
the country,^
One of the principal reasons for the immediate seiz
ure of customhouses was to remove from the cacos their
sources of operating funds. Another motive for this action
was to deprive the government of its source of revenue,
thus making it more vulnerable to American pressure. Be
tween August 20a and September 2d, customhouses were brought 9 under the control of the United States,
'^Ib i d . , p, 518, ^Ibid, , pp. 518-519,
^Robert Lansing, Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Hearings before Senate
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The Haitian government was now in a difficult posi
tion. When control over customs passed to American offi
cials, the government lost its principal source of revenue.
Lacking the funds needed for expenses and salaries, the
President was more amenable to signing the treaty. On
September 16, 1915, Dartiguenave signed the convention.
However, before the treaty could become effective, approval
of the Haitian Congress was necessary— an approval which
was not immediately forthcoming. To encourage further the
acceptance of the treaty, Admiral Caperton confiscated a con
signment of unsigned bank notes intended for the government
and refused to return them until the convention was rati
fied.
Declaration of Martial Law
During this early period of the occupation, when
political and financial steps were being taken, the United
States was also faced with military problems. In spite of
the efforts made to disband the cacos, there was still un
rest in Haiti, On September 3, 1915, martial law was pro
claimed by Admiral Caperton, who later claimed it was done
Select Committee, 67tb Cong., 2d Sess, (Washington: Senate Committee Printing, 1922), p. 7,
^^Raymond Leslie Buell, "The American Occupation of Haiti," Foreign Policy Association Information Service, V (November 27-December l"2^ 1929) , 346.
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at the request of President Dartiguenave,^^ While uneasi
ness and criticism troubled the government, the declaration
of martial law was prompted by a barrage of inflammatory
newspaper propaganda opposing-the ratification of the
treaty.
Ratification of the Treaty
A combination of political, financial, and military
pressure resulted in the ratification of the treaty by the
Chamber of Deputies on October 6, 1915, However, the
Senate was still reluctant to accept the treaty and strived
to obtain further modifications of the document. The Naval
Department, becoming impatient with the delay, instructed
Admiral Caperton to inform the government that the United
States would retain control in Haiti even if the treaty
were not accepted. He further threatened to prosecute all
those who received bribes to vote against the treaty. On 12 November 11, 1915, the Senate approved the treaty, A
modus vivendi, signed on November 29, 1915, put the treaty 13 into effect provisionally. It finally went into effect
^^Senate Hearings, Vol. I, o£. cit., p. 373.
^^United 6bates Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1915, op. cit,, p. 458.
^^Ibid.', p. 439,
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in May of 1916, after the United States Senate unanimously
approved the treaty.
The Treaty of 1915
The Haitian-American Treaty was a far-reaching docu
ment which transformed a military intervention into a
political occupation. It dealt with most aspects of the
Haitian government and provided the basis for the conduct
of Haitian-American relations.
The treaty provided that the United States would aid
Haiti in the development of its natural resources and the
establishment of its finances on a solid basis. In order to
bring about an improvement in Haiti's financial situation,
the agreement provided for the appointment of a General
Receiver and Financial Adviser by the President of Haiti on
the nomination of the President of the United States, The
General Receiver would "collect, receive, and apply all
customs duties on imports and exports accruing at the several
customhouses and ports of entry of the Republic of Haiti,
The Financial Adviser, who was to be attached to the Min
ister of Finance, was to devise a proper system of account
ing, help in increasing the revenues, inquire into the debt
United States Department of State, "Treaty between the United States and Haiti Relating to the Finances, Economic Development and Tranquility of Haiti," signed September 16, 1915, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washing ton: Government Printing Office, 1925), Articles I and II, pp, 328-329,
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situation, and make recommendations on collecting and
applying the revenue. The inclusion of the positions of
both a Financial Adviser and General Receiver into the con
vention was done to avoid weaknesses of previous treaties.
These provisions not only gave the United States control
over revenues but also gave it supervision of governmental 15 expenditures„
The treaty established a priority list for the appli
cation of revenues collected by the General Receiver. Funds
would first be applied to the payment of salaries and ex
penses of the Receivership, including the Financial Adviser.
Next, they would be applied to the interest and sinking fund
of the public debt. Thirdly, they would be allocated to the
maintenance of a constabulary— with the remainder given to
the Haitian government for salaries and expenses
Included in the treaty were provisions which pro
tected the financial interests of the Haitian government.
A limitation was placed on the expenses of the receivership,
providing that such expenses, including the salary and ex
penses of both the General Receiver and Financial Adviser
and their employees would not exceed 5 per cent of the
^^News item in The New York Times, August 27, 1915,
P o 4 o
^^United States Department of State, "Treaty between the United States and Haiti Relating to the Finances, Eco nomic Development and Tranquility of Haiti," 0£. cit., p. 329,
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revenue collected from customs duties unless the government
agreed otherwise. The treaty also made monthly reports by 17 the General Receiver obligatory.
Other provisions of the agreement, however, acted to
restrict Haiti's independence of action. The government
agreed not to increase its public debt without the permis
sion of the President of the United States or assume finan
cial obligations for which the revenue of Haiti would be
inadequate. Haiti also was prevented from modifying its
customs duties without the permission of the United States
and from leasing, selling, or giving jurisdiction of its 18 territory to a foreign government.
The treaty also committed Haiti to the improvement
of its internal situation by arranging for the establishment
of a native constabulary, organized and officered by Ameri
cans and appointed by the President of Haiti on the nomina
tion of the President of the United States. It also pro
vided for the appointment of engineers to improve the 19 sanitation and public works of the country.
In the final articles of the treaty, Haiti agreed to
permit the intervention of the United States to preserve
^'^I b i d . , Articles VI and VII, p. 330.
^®Ibid., Articles VIII, IX, and XI, pp. 330-331
^^Ibid., Articles X and XIII, pp. 330-331.
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its independence, and to reach a settlement on its various
pecuniary claims. The last article of the convention pro
vided for its possible extension after the original ten-
year period.• ^ 20
Although the United States had intended to draft a
comprehensive treaty with Haiti, there were several areas
which were not mentioned. No provision was made for main
taining American forces in Haiti. Moreover, there was no
attempt to settle Haiti's educational problems while the
relationship between the treaty officials and the judiciary
was not discussed.
On March 28, 1917, the United States took advantage
of Article XVI, thus extending the treaty period to twenty
years. This was formally concluded by the "Additional Act
Between the United States and Haiti Extending the Duration
of the Treaty," in which Haiti admitted the necessity of a 21 loan for a period exceeding ten years.
The Haitian Constitution of 1918
With the treaty safely accepted, the United States
proceeded to revise the Haitian Constitution as certain
provisions were inconsistent with the treaty objectives.
^°Ibid., Articles XII and XVI, p. 331.
^^United States Treaties, "Additional Act between United States and Haiti Extending the Duration of the Treaty," signed March 28, 1917, Series Number 623-A (Wash ington: Government Printing Office, 1917), Article I, pp. 1- 2 . - •
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It was in 1915, at the suggestion of President Dartiguenave,
that revision began. There were several issues of particu
lar concern to the United States, especially certain pro
visions relating to land ownership by foreigners. Under
the Constitution of 1889, foreigners were prohibited from
owning land in Haiti, The United States, believing that
this provision impeded the movement of capital to Haiti and
prevented its economic development, sought to have it
amended. The United States was also disturbed with the
power given to the legislature which could veto the acts of
the President.
A draft of a new Constitution was prepared and was
the subject of several discussions between the American
authorities and President Dartiguenave. However, the
National Assembly, which had the authority to amend the
Constitution, was not disposed to concur with these plans.
Realizing that a majority was opposed to the revision and
fearing that impeachment proceeding might be initiated, the
President put forth a decree on April 5, 1916, dissolving
the Senate.
At the same time, another decree was promulgated
which provided for the establishment of a Council of State
to be composed of Presidential appointees. Their functions
2 2 Senate Hearings, Vol. I, o£, cit., p. 416
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were to be as follows: to give advice on all matters that ■* the government sûbmits; to make up bills, decrees, and docu
ments which the government might request; and to provide 23 advice when requested by the government and the cabinet.
With the Senate dissolved, the Chamber of Deputies
was asked to act as a Constitutional Assembly; but, the
members refused to act in this capacity. With the expira
tion of their terms approaching, a new election was called 24 in January of 1917.
In April of 1917, the new National Assembly met. By
this time, the United States was at war with Germany and
wanted a similar declaration from the Haitian Congress.
Although war against Germany was declared at a later time,
anti-American feeling prevented an immediate declaration.
It was not until June of 1917, that Haiti agreed to sever 25 relations with Germany,
The new Assembly was no more malleable than the pre
ceding one and refused to adopt a Constitution which allowed
foreigners to own land. The reason for such strong objec
tion to this provision can be traced back to the colonial
^^Ibid., p. 418.
^^Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931), p. 73.
^^News item in The New York Times, June 19, 1917, P'
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era, when Haiti saw large land ownership under the French.
Believing that a people could not be enslaved unless their
land was first expropriated, Haiti had refused to permit
alien land ownership.
It soon became apparent that the Assembly would not
accept the revisions, but rather was attempting to adopt a
Constitution which failed to conform to the original draft.
Hence, Dartiguenave set forth a decree dissolving the
Assembly, which the Chief of the Constabulary took to the 2 7 presiding officer. With the Assembly dissolved, the path
was clear for the adoption of the Constitution. The method
chosen was the plebiscite, which was held on June 12, 1918.
The Constitution was adopted almost unanimously, 28 with 69,337 votes in favor and 335 against it. The use
of a plebiscite in this instance led to accusations that
the United States had perpetrated the plebiscite and forced 2 9 citizens to vote. Reverend L. Ton Evans, a Baptist mis
sionary, testified before the Senate Investigating Committee
as to the fraudulent aspects of the election. He claimed
that people were handed only "yes" ballots, while the
^^Albert Jay Nock,"The Bright Isle," Atlantic Monthly, CLIX (May, 1937), 556. 2 7 Millspaugh, 0£. cit., p. 75.
^^Buell, 02. cit., p. 349. 2 9 Senate Hearings, Vol. I, o£. cit., p. 26.
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bundle of pink slips with the French "non" were tied to
gether -and put beyond reach. Moreover, he claimed that the
educated class boycotted the election except for those
employed by the government,
In the new Constitution, the right to own real es
tate was given to foreigners residing in Haiti and to for
eign corporations for purposes of residence, agriculture,
commercial, industrial, or educational reasons. But the
privilege was to be terminated five years after the for- 31 eigner left the country or the activities ceased.
The new Constitution also contained provisions deal
ing with the constabulary and the legislature. It provided
for the establishment of the gendarmerie to preserve order
and police the country. While it permitted the Senate and
the Chamber of Deputies to retain most of their powers, it
provided that further Constitutional Amendments would be 32 adopted by the vote of the electorate.
By its "Special Articles," all the acts of the govern
ment of the United States during the military occupation
were ratified and validated. It prevented any Haitian from
Ibid., pp. 187 and 193.
^^"Constitution 1918," Le Moniteur, June 19, 1918, p. 177. 32 Ibid., pp. 178-179 and 182,
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being subject to prosecution "for any act executed by vir- 33 tue of orders received during the occupation."
Amongst the more important modifications were the
Transitory Provisions. Article C stated that "the first
election of the legislative body after the adoption of the
present Constitution shall take place on January 10, of an
even-numbered year." The President was to decide on the
year of the election and was to publish a decree three
months before the meeting of the primary assemblies. Arti
cle D established a Council of State similar to that
created by the decree of April 5, 1916. It was to be com
posed- of twenty-one members who would exercise legislative
power until the legislature was reconstituted. Article E 34 suspended the irremovability of judges for six months.
Thus, American control over Haiti established by the
Treaty of 1915 was further expanded with the adoption of
the new Constitution. Having pressured the electorate into
its acceptance, the United States proceeded to dominate the
political institutions of Haiti,
^^Ibid., p. 183
^"^Ibid.
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HAITI DURING THE DARTIGUENAVE ADMINISTRATION
Between 1915 and 1922, the United States came to
dominate the political institutions of Haiti, Although en
countering some resistance from the Haitian government, the
American officials were able to suppress opposition. Thus,
by enacting new laws and instituting new tactics, the
United States increased its control over the government.
Control over the political system of the country was
divided. The Haitian government consisted of a President,
elected by the legislature, who administered his government
through a Cabinet composed of five Ministers, Assisting
him in his governmental functions was an elected bicameral
legislature which was later replaced by an appointed twenty-
one member Council of State, Judges were appointed by the
Haitian government and once in office were generally irre
movable, Thus, the judicial was the most independent branch
of the government.
Superimposed upon the Haitian system of government
was an American organization composed of military and civi
lian personnel. Admiral Caperton was the highest United
States authority in Haiti until he left for Santo Domingo
in the summer of 1916. He was later replaced by Colonel
Russell.
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In addition to its military involvement in the Hai
tian government, the United States was also represented by
a civil authority. This group consisted of the American
Minister and the treaty officials who held the top posi
tions in the offices of the financial adviser, general re
ceiver, public works, and sanitation. However, until the
ratification of the treaty and the execution of supplemen
tary agreements, these duties were performed by marines.
The placement of the military into the civilian ad
ministration resulted in administrative problems which took
several years to resolve. It was not until 1917, that the
sanitary engineer had American assistants, while the , _
National Public Health Service was not created by law until
1919. The public works engineer was denied full authority
until 1920.^
The authority over the entire occupation rested with
the United States Department of State which failed to coor
dinate the work of the treaty officials. The Department of
NaVy v^as also involved in the occupation, as was the Depart- / & ' merit of Insular Affairs.
However, between 1915 and 1922, in spite of the
problems in organizing the treaty officials and in spite of
^Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control (Boston: VJorld Peace Foundation, 1931), pp. 69-70.
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the lack of direction from Washington, the United States
consolidated its control over Haiti, taking over its fi
nances and influencing its political decisions.
Control over Finances
After the seizure of customhouses in 1915, the Pay
Corps of the United States Navy collected the revenues and
deposited them in the National Bank, which again was to act
as the treasury of Haiti, Following the appointment of a
Financial Adviser and General Receiver in 1916, control
over Haitian revenue was transferred to the American civil 2 authority.
Under the efficient and honest American administra
tion of the customs service, the collection of export and
import duties improved. However, the collection of the in
ternal revenue under Haitian auspices failed to show a
corresponding increase.^
For several years after the acceptance of the treaty,
certain disbursement functions had been exercised by the
p United States Congress, SenateSelect Committee, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. I, 5 7tb Cong., 1st and 2d Sess,, August 5, 1921-November 16, 1921 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), p, 619, Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings, Vol. I,
^United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. II, 67tb CongT^ 1st and 2'd "Sess,, Novem- ber 29, 1921-June 16, 1922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), p, 1395, Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings, Vol. II.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63
Haitian government, The excess of receipts over expendi
tures was given to the government in order to meet its cur
rent expenses. However, when it was discovered that funds
from the internal revenue were not being applied to expendi
tures authorized by the treaty officials but rather were
being allocated to forbidden expenditures, the United States
sought control over the disbursement of all funds. Hence,
by military order, the depository of internal revenue was
told "to make no payments authorized by the Haitian govern
ment unless the warrants of payments were viseed by the
Financial Adviser. With this action, the United States
obtained control over the disbursement of funds as well as
their collection.
The Haitian government objected to this new arrange
ment and fought to prevent further usurpation of its sov
ereignty. Prior to its enactment, when the Haitian govern
ment was sent a proposal giving the Financial Adviser
control over all expenditures, it had refused to accept
this further restraint. Only after the government was
deprived of its financial resources did it agree to sur
render its control over expenditures.^
'^Ibid...... C Raymond Leslie Buell, "The American Occupation of Haiti," Foreign Policy Association Information Service, V (November 27-December I'Tj 1929 ) , 353.
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Having obtained control over the disbursement of
revenue, the United States could more readily exert pres
sure on the Haitian government. On several occasions,
government salaries were suspended when the President or
his subordinates opposed American policies. On other occa
sions, the budget was delayed. In 1920, the Financial
Adviser suspended the consideration of the budget because
certain recommendations were not favorably considered by
the government and because the government delayed in its
repeal of certain laws passed in violation of past agree
ments ,^ In October, 1920, the Haitian government bowed to
American pressure in regard to the modification of these 7 laws ; thus, salary payments were resumed.
During the administration of President Dartiguenave,
the United States obtained financial control of Haiti,
Although revenue increased under the American administration
of customs, Haiti's prior indebtedness necessitated the flo
tation of a loan— a loan which became the subject of much
controversy.
Protocol of 1919
When the intervention occurred in 1915, Haiti's
financial situation made it impossible to meet the fixed
^Senate Hearings, Vol. II, ciÆ. , p. 1407 7 Millspaugh, _o£, cit, , p. 81.
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charges on the public debt; for, funds were needed for the
maintenance of the government. Shortly after the interven
tion began, a commission was established to negotiate a
loan with the United States, the proceeds of which would be
applied to refunding the debt. World War I prevented the O completion of the negotiations.
The war had other effects on Haiti's financial posi
tion. Because of shipping difficulties and a French embargo
on the importation of coffee, the income of the government
was unfavorably affected. Nevertheless, the General Re
ceiver had accumulated a fund of more than one million
dollars to be applied to the debt, but no payment was made 9 during that period.
Although funds were being allocated to the payment
of the funded debt, the government needed revenue for other
obligations. Prior to the intervention, various administra
tions had engaged in unauthorized borrowing from foreign
and native sources. Having agreed to the payment of a por
tion of these loans at a time when revenue was insufficient
to repay even the funded debt, Haiti vjas forced to contract ^ 10 b a foreign loan.
Q United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Vol. II (Washington: Governmènt Printing Office, 1934), p. 341,
^Ibid,
^^Dana C, Munro, The United States and the Caribbean
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The signing of a Protocol on October 3, 1919, brought
Haiti a step closer to obtaining the loan. The Protocol of
1919 established a claims commission to analyze and adjust
the claims against the country. Excluded from this commis
sion’s consideration were the Bond issues of 1875, 1896, and
1910, as were the claims of the National Bank of Haiti and
the claims of the National Railroad. In order to pay all
its outstanding obligations, Haiti agreed to issue within
two'years a forty-million-dollar loan, payable within
thirty years. Haiti also agreed that the payment of inter
est and amortization of this loan would constitute a first
charge on its internal revenue and a second charge on the
customs revenue, after payment of salaries and expenses of
the General Receiver, the Financial Adviser, and their
assistants. Moreover, the government consented to a provi
sion giving control over the collection and allocation of
revenues to officers appointed by the President of Haiti on
the nomination of the President of the United States during
the life of the loan, even after the expiration of the ^ , 11 treaty.
Area (Boston: World Peace Foundajzion, 1934), pp. 164-165
11'United, States Department of State, "Protocol be- tween the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti," signed October 3, 1919, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), Articles II, III, 71, and VII, pp. 348-350
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During the remainder of President Dartiguenave's
term, a number of problems arose preventing the Protocol
from going into effect. While the United States was
strongly in favor of the loan, the Haitian government was
opposed to this financial solution and continuously sought
to modify the Protocol of 1919. Before a loan would be
acceptable, the Haitian government wanted certain modifica
tions; namely, that internal bond issues not be subject to
the claims commission and that the service of the internal
bond issues be resumed. When the Financial Adviser failed
to agree to these terms, Haiti lost interest in the pro
posed loan.
Another reason for the delay in the loan was the
attempt of the National City Bank of New York to acquire
complete control of the National Bank of Haiti. In 1920,
under the auspices of the State Department, the National
City Bank bought up the remainder of the stock. After a
further conference with the State Department, the National
City Bank agreed to certain Charter modifications which 13 were to the benefit of Haiti,
Despite continuous pressure from the United States,
the loan as proposed in the Protocol of 1919 was never to
^^Senate Hearings, Vol. II, _o£. cit., p. 1408.
^^Buell; 2E° cit., p. 368,
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be concluded. Instead, after the election of a new Haitian
President, agreement was reached on a much smaller loan.
Although the United States had promptly obtained
financial control of Haiti, it encountered greater resist
ance when it attempted to dominate the legislature, judi
cial, the press, and the Chief Executive. Although the
treaty and the Constitution permitted some control over
these institutions, the United States utilized other
tactics to enhance its control.
Legislative Control
In order to carry out the work of the treaty, cer
tain legislation had to be enacted while other legislation
had to be avoided. Although the Transitory Provisions of
the Constitution permitted the replacement of an independent
legislature with an appointed Council of State, the United
States still sought further control over legislation. Thus,
the State Department brought to the attention of the
Haitian government its desire that "all proposed legislation
bearing upon any objects of the Treaty should be submitted"
to the representatives of the United States so that discus
sions between the two governments could take place prior to 14 the enactment of the legislation. Such an agreement was
concluded in August of 1918,
^^United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1919, op. cit., pT 3Ô4.
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However, this agreement failed to settle the issue
entirely and led to disagreements between the two govern
ments concerning whether legislation actually pertained to
the treaty. When the Haitians failed to repeal laws on the
ownership of property and other measures which the United
States claimed were passed in violation of the August 1918
agreement, government salaries were again suspended. Only
after their repeal were payments resumed. 15
Legislative control was further tightened when the
President was forced to agree that "upon receipt of a law
passed by the Legislative Body and submitted to the Presi
dent for action, the President, himself, would communicate
such laws to the Legation before promulgation
The American attempts to control the legislative
process encountered various types of resistance. Laws con
trary to the treaty were passed, while legislation which 17 the American officials sought was delayed or ignored. In
addition, the Haitian government sent correspondence to the
State Department objecting to the control over legislation
exercised by the United States Minister and the Financial
Adviser, All efforts of resistance were to no avail.
United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1920, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), pp, 776-777,
^^Ibid., p, 807, 1 7 Millspaugh, o£, c it ., p, 79,
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Judicial Control
Because the treaty neglected to discuss the courts,
the judiciary remained an independent body and, thus,
caused problems for the American authorities. In many in
stances, the judges contradicted the United States adminis
tration on the interpretation of the treaty laws. In other
instances, they refused to consider the evidence, awarding
damages far in excess of appraised estimates. Therefore,
in spite of court decisions, the Financial Adviser often 18 refused to pay awards.
Although the judges of the courts varied in compe
tence, the tenure of all was guaranteed. The judges of the
lower court were very incompetent, while the next class of
judges was good but tended to favor Haitians. The members
of the highest court, the Court of Cassation, were digni
fied jurists; but, they were primarily concerned with ques- 19 tions of law.
Hence, the United States was confronted with a
hostile judicial system whose judgments encroached on Ameri
can policies. Notwithstanding the legality of the judg
ments, the United States simply ignored many decisions.
Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States (Durham, North Carolina; Duke University Press, 194Ô), p. 241.
^^Senate Hearings, Vol. I, o£. cit., pp. 568-559.
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When the Constitution of 1918 was drafted, the United
States made certain that provisions were made for the sus
pension of the irremovability guarantee of judges for a
period of six months.
The United States officials resorted to other
methods to obtain additional control over the judicial sys
tem. Even in the early part of the occupation, use was
made of military tribunals. For two years, they were used,
resulting in many trials and convictions. Between 1917 and
1919, little use was made of these courts. However, after 20 the caco rebellions in 1919, their number increased.
In response to increasing impatience with the Haitian
court system, the United States agreed to the re-establishment
of provost courts. On May 26, 1921, a proclamation was
issued stating that those who agitate the population by
speech or printed material would be subject to trial by
military courts. As a result of this proclamation, several 21 were tried and sentenced to prison. Thus, by the use of
military courts, the United States could overrule the deci
sions of Haitian judges.
p n United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1922, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 556.
^^Ibid., pp. 558-559.
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Control of the Press
While freedom of the press was guaranteed by Article
15 of the Constitution, limitations were placed on this
freedom and abuses did not go unpunished. As time went on,
the press became more critical of both the American occupa
tion and of the Haitian government which was dominated by
the United States, Therefore, more restraints were placed
on the press.
In Haiti, newspapers were historically organs of
personal opinion and not inclined toward factual reporting.
Rather, they engaged in personal attacks or praise of indi
viduals according to the opinions of their editors. Attacks
made by these journals were often irresponsible and bore 22 little relation to fact situations. Such unfounded
attacks were leveled against the Haitian government, the
treaty officials, and the military representatives of the
United States.
There was no redress for such attacks, as no Haitian
court would condemn any anti-American propaganda, no matter
how offensive or how libelous. Thus, in order to deter
such attacks, the May 1921 order was given prohibiting
^^Arthur Ruki, "Muzzling Editors in Haiti," American Mercury, V (August, 1925), 470.
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articles of an incendiary nature and subjecting offenders
to a military trial
President Dartiguenave favored this decree, as at
tacks against his administration were becoming increasingly
hostile. After the promulgation of the decree, several
editors were tried and sentenced by a United States court
martial for printing articles unfavorable to the adminis
tration o
While the American press was unaffected by this
decree, it also was confronted with certain restraints. A
correspondent of the Associated Press claimed that, for
three years, he was unable to send to the United States
cables or dispatches concerning the American military opera- 24 tion in Haiti.
Executive Control
As the United States obtained financial control of
Haiti and as it came to dominate the various branches of
government, it also infringed upon the powers of the Presi
dency. President Dartiguenave found that his powers were
severely limited by both the military and civilian treaty
officials and by the various agreements he was forced to
^^United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1922, op. cit., pp. 558-559. P A Herbert J. Seligman, "The Conquest of Haiti," Nation, CXI (July 10, 1920), 35. ,
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accept. Upon signing the treaty, his army was replaced by
a constabulary which, while technically under his control,
was actually controlled by an American Commandant. The
treaty further restricted his authority in the conduct of
foreign relations, while in domestic situations he was
restrained by the Constitution and various supplementary
agreements. His control over finances was severely limited
when both the powers of disbursement and collection were
removed from the government and given to the Financial,
Adviser and General Receiver, respectively.
However, while the President continued to cooperate
with the United States— for fear his lucrative position
would be avjarded to someone else— he vigorously resisted
the extension of American authority and opposed United
States attempts to broaden the interpretation of the treaty.
He also fought against the enactment of legislation trans
ferring the National Bank to American banking interests and
the internal revenue service to American administration. 25 Eventually, he became hostile to the flotation of a loan.
In an effort to prevent further American control.
President Dartiguenave directed his appeals to Washington.
In November of 1918, he sent a telegram to the American r I State Department complaining of the tyranny of United
2 5 Buell, 0£. cit., p. 355
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States officials. Shortly afterwards, at the Paris Peace Con
ference, the Haitian government instructed its Foreign Minis
ter to discuss the problem of Haiti with President Wilson.
In both January and April of 1.919, the Haitian govern
ment sent the State Department a memorandum of its complaints.
These complaints involved the retention of martial law, the
severity of the United States military courts, the violations
of the Constitution and treaty by American officials, non
payment of the public debt, low salaries given to Haitian
officials, and the lack of concern for the Haitian government 27 and for Haitian public opinion.
In 1921, in a letter written to President Harding,
Dartiguenave continued to denounce American policy. He spoke
of the economic development and financial stability which had
failed to materialize. He asked for the withdrawal of Ameri
can forces and their replacement by a military mission. More
over, he sought cooperation between American and Haitian
officials as opposed to dictation by United States représenta- 28 tives. However, despite the efforts made by President
Dartiguenave, Haitian-American relations failed to improve
until he left office.
^^Ibid., p. 355. p 7 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, op. cit., p. 333.
^^United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 194-195,
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THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN HAITI
From the very beginning of the occupation and until
its termination, the United States military was present in
Haiti. Until his departure in 1916, Admiral Caperton was
the highest military authority in that country. Following
his absence from the island, Colonel Russell became the
"military governor." However, the military authority of
the United States in Haiti was actually exercised by the
Commandant of the Marine Brigade. Subordinate to him in
the military hierarchy was the United States Commandant of
■the Haitian gendarmerie.^
The gendarmerie came into existence in 1916 to re
place the Haitian army, which, by 1915, was virtually a
paper army. While the main function of the gendarmerie was
to maintain civil order, its members were required to per
form additional duties, such as checking municipal employees,
supervising local courts, and dispersing government payments 2 in their respective districts. They also supervised the
Raymond Leslie Buell, "The American Occupation of Haiti," Foreign Policy Information Service, V (November 2 7- December 12, 1929), 349. 2 Henry Kittredge Norton, "American Imperialism in Haiti," World's Work, LI (December, 1925), 216.
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construction of roads and public works and enforced new
health and sanitation measures.
The gendarmerie was officered by American marines, 3 an arrangement made possible by a special Act of Congress,
Gradually, these officers were to be replaced by Haitians
who successfully passed an examination before a board
selected by the United States. Within time, by this system
of promotion, the Haitians would take over the military
functions of the occupation. In reality, the Haitians did
not become officers until very late in the occupation ; and
although, in 1920, the gendarmerie consisted of twenty-five
hundred Haitians, they were still being commanded by Ameri- 4 can officers,
Initial Pacification . '
After' the landing of the marines.-in July of 1915,
there was li-btle resistance from the general population, as
many of the peasants and some of the elite wanted to see an
end to the disorders. However, the marines were prevented
3 United. States Congress, Senate Select Committee, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. I, 67ü) Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., August 5, 1921-November 16, 1921 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 446. Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings.
^United States Marine Corps, "Report on Affairs in Haiti 1915-1920," report read at the Columbus Memorial Library, Washington, D. C., p. 6.
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from restoring order by bands of cacos who were roaming
Port-au-Prince. After two bluejackets were killed by sniper
fire, Admiral Caperton requested the dispatch of reinforce- 5 ments. By the end of August of 1915, two thousand marines
were serving in Haiti under the command of Colonel Waller.^
On October 1, 1915, an agreement was reached between
Colonel Waller and the caco leaders, which provided for the
cessation of fighting. Although the cacos had promised to
hand over their arms and not to interfere with the country's
transportation and communication facilities, they failed to 7 ■ honor their agreement.
In Cap-Haitien and Gonaives, the cacos were very hos
tile and prevented supplies from reaching the city. When
the marines attempted to open the railroad as a supply line,
they fired upon the marines. A skirmish between the two
sides followed, resulting in the cacos suffering several 8 casualties.
Although the cacos were terrorizing other areas, the
State Department refused to support a large American
^News item in The New York Times, July 31, 1915, p. 1,
^United States Marine Corps, _o£. cit., p. 40,
^Ibid., p. 28.
^United States Navy Department, Report of the .Secre tary of the Navy, 1915 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915T7 po 17.
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offense. In spite of restrictions placed on their activity,
by the end of November of 1915, the marines had disbursed 9 the cacos, capturing their munitions and strongholds.
During the next two years, apart from occasional
caco activity, conditions in Haiti remained tranquil. A
majority of the peasants were content with the occupation,
as they were once again free to till their plots and travel
to market without fear of the cacos. The elite, on the
other hand, objected to the intervention, as they suffered
socially and financially from the American presence. They
were quite sensitive to the color prejudices of the Ameri
cans and resented being excluded from American clubs.
Moreover, they endured financial hardship, for no longer
could they depend on the government for jobs. Also, mem
bers of this class held government bonds upon which the
interest was overdue. They were further embittered when
anticipated investments of American capital failed to
materialize. Nevertheless, Haiti remained calm until the
re-establishment of the corvée system, after which the coun
try was again faced with disorder.
Corvee System
The corvee system, as originated by law in 1864,
provided every male .citizen of Haiti with the option of
^United States Marine Corps, _o£. cit., p. 38.
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either paying a road tax or working on road construction
for a specified length of time each month. Although this
law continued to remain on the books, it fell into disuse.
Thus, since the law had been dormant for many years, Haiti
had no roads,
At the time of the occupation, Haiti had three miles
of paved road, built at a cost of $51,000 per mile. In
order for the United States to obtain military control of
the country, supply lines were needed. Therefore, the
United States, confronted with an empty treasury, allocated
$8,000, to be derived from future external revenue, for the
construction of roads.This money was. to be used for the
purchase of material, while labor had to be provided free.
Thus, under the supervision of American marines, the corvee
system was reinstituted, whereby 470 miles of roads were
constructed at a cost of $205 a mile.
In the beginning, there was no strong objection to
the re-establishment of the corvée. The workers were per
mitted to remain in their districts and were fed, housed, 12 and even provided with entertainment. However, as time
went on, abuses occurred. In many cases, the laborers were
^^Senate Hearings, Vol. I, o£. cit., p. 529,
^^Ibid., p. 530,
^^Ibid., pp. 530-531.
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working on the roads in chains under the supervision of
gendarmerie guards, who were brutal overseers.
Abuse also occurred in the administration of the
corvée by those who helped in the management of the system.
After a laborer had completed his assignment, he was to
have been issued a certificate to exempt him from further
work. Sometimes, unless a bribe was paid to the proper
authority, the worker would be denied a certificate. In
other instances, the certificate was destroyed and the 13 laborer was sent back to work on the roads.
The law was ignored in other ways. The law stipu
lated that workers were to work a specified number of hours,
••"•but only in their owiii^^'Stricts. However, as roads went ■ ■ , : ' away from the populat;i%n c.enters and no ready supply of.
labor existed, workers were sent to other districts and
were forced to work overtime. Also, shelter ceased to be
provided and some of the food provided for the laborers was 14 diverted to other uses.
On September 2, 1918, because of increasing dissatis
faction with the system, a general order was given to dis
continue the use of the corvée. From then on, the job of
1 3 Senate Hearings, Vol. I, 0£. cit., p. 82.
^"^Carl Kelsey, "The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, C (March, 1922), T3TI
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road maintenance would be performed by prison gangs or paid
laborHowever, in remote districts the order was ig
nored or was circumvented by the payment of a token wage.
As late as March, 1919, the corvee was still being used in
the Hinche-Massade district— though the foreman claimed it
was paid labor
Abuse of the corvée led to anti-American feeling
which was easily exploited by the caco leaders. Men would
flee to the hills to avoid working on the roads and often
joined caco bands. As these bands increased in number,
disturbances broke out in various regions of Haiti.
Caco Rebellion
After 1918, the caco movement gathered momentum, with
cacos roaming the countryside. Because the gendarmerie
were unable to suppress the revolts, the United States
ordered the marines to restore order. The marines faced a
large undertaking in trying to seek out cacos in the moun
tainous regions of Haiti. Although one-quarter of the ter
ritory and one-fifth of the population were involved in the
rebellion, there were only two or three leaders who made it 17 effective.
^^Senate Hearings, Vol. I, 0£. cit., p. 562,
^^Ibido, p. 564.
"American Marines in Haiti Exonerated," Current
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The most important leader of the caco rebellion was
Charlemagne Peralte who, himself, was from a family of
cacos and was a voodist who claimed invulnerability to bul
lets . Peralte *s band consisted of nearly 5:,.000 men, whose
activities victimized other Haitians. To recruit men, they
would seize a town, destroy the homes, and abduct the men.
They would also capture small gendarmerie posts and seize 19 their arms and munitions.
As the country became more bandit-ridden, greater
efforts were made to- capture Peralte. One night in October
of 1919, at tremendous risks. Captain Hannekan and his men
disguised themselves as cacos and penetrated through six
lines of outposts to attack the caco camp from which Peralte
commanded his troops. Having secured admission to the camp
in this manner, the marines fired upon the cacos, killing 20 Peralte and nine of his guards,
.In May of 1920, Benoit, the successor to Peralte,
was killed in a battle against the marines. Disheartened
History Magazine of The New York Times, VI (August, 1922), 837-838,
^®John Houston Craige, Cannibal Cousins (New York : Menton Balchs Co., 1934).
^^Senate Hearings, Vol. I, o£. cit., p. 652, P 0 Harry Franck, "The Death of Charlemagne," Century, C (May, 1920), 33-34.
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by the death of their two top leaders and confronted by an
increase in American troops, by the summer of 1920, the 21 remaining caco chiefs surrendered to the marines.
The conduct of the war against the cacos led to
charges of torture and indiscriminate killing of prisoners.
Because the war involved the use of guerrilla tactics, with
small platoons of men searching for cacos in the mountains,
control by the military hierarchy was weak and, undoubtedly,
military abuses occurred. In March of 1919, the Commandant
of the gendarmerie ordered that no prisoner should be exe
cuted. Later that year, the Brigade Commander issued an
order that any Haitian or American military personnel found
guilty of illegal killing would henceforth be tried for 22 murder or manslaughter.
During 1919, court martial proceedings were held in
volving two privates in the marines, who were under the
command of a temporary lieutenant. Lieutenant Brokaw. Lieu
tenant Brokaw, who was judged insane, had ordered Privates
Johnson and McQuillan to shoot several prisoners. While
they were found guilty of following an illegal order, the
case took on added importance because of a letter written
21 H. Po Davis, Black Democracy (first edition ; New York: Dodge Publishing Company, 1928) , p. 223. 2 2 Buell, _0£. cit. , p. 351.
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by General Barnett to Colonel Russell alleging that many 2 3 other Haitians had been murdered in this manner.
Although the letter was marked "personal" and "con
fidential," the letter was accidently given to the press.
The publicity which accompanied this unfortunate disclosure
provoked the Secretary of Navy to order the establishment
of the Mayo Court of Inquiry, which lasted from October 15,
1920, to October 19, 1920. While the Court found that two
unjustified cases of homicide had been committed and that
sixteen other serious abuses had occurred, they praised the
work of the marines as a whole and were satisfied that the 24 guilty had been brought to trial.
In the meantime, in Haiti, the "Union Patriotique"
had been formed by intellectuals who were dedicated to end
ing the occupation. They complained that the Mayo Court was
a whitewash and pressed for a more thorough investigation
of the intervention. As a result of their protests and the
protests of liberal Americans, the Senate authorized an
inquiry into the administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo.
2 3 United States Navy Department, Report -of the Secre tary of the Navy, 1920 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921), p. 183. 24 Senate Hearings, Vol. I, 0£. cit., p. 85.
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Senate Hearing
In November of 1921, under the chairmanship of Sena
tor Medill McCormick, the Senate investigation of Haiti
began. The members were concerned with the poor adminis
tration of Haiti and the accusations of American atrocities
and killings. They heard testimony on the court martial
proceedings against Private McQuillan and Private Johnson.
Another publicized incident, the Lavoie incident— in which
nineteen caco prisoners were allegedly murdered outside a 25 graveyard— was also discussed. _
They also heard testimony concerning civilian bru
tality in which the gendarmerie harassed families on their
way to church. Other protests were made because of indis
criminate arrests after which individuals were subjected to
poor treatment in prisons. Although there were many
charges of American atrocities, most had their basis in
rumor or heresy.
In addition to the unfavorable testimony regarding
the occupation, the Committee listened to reports discussing
American accomplishments in Haiti. Under American direction,
roads were constructed ; model schools were established; and
sanitation measures were enforced. Rural areas, which had
never received medical treatment were served by dispensaries
^^Ibid., p. 549. ^^Ibid., pp. 158-169,
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financial conditions improved. Trade revenues had in
creased; the currency was stabilized; and the French debt 2 8 was reduced by almost 3 3 per cent.
After hearing testimony on the American occupation,
the Senate Committee reported on its conclusions and recom
mendations . While it concluded that certain abuses occurred,
it attributed much of the trouble to the native gendarmerie
who had little respect for human life. In spite of these
isolated abuses of authority, it recommended that the
United States remain in Haiti.
The Committee condemned the organization of the
corvee, but refused to attribute the caco rebellion to its
establishment. It stated that the United States failed to
develop a coordinated policy in Haiti and failed to estab
lish clear lines of authority. It recommended that the
United S'ta.^s send to Haiti men with fewer racial preju
dices and : men with more sympathy to the Haitian cause.
,' p. 683
United States Congress, Senate Select Committee, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. II, 67tb Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Novem ber 29, 1921-June 16, 1922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 1504-1505. p q United States Congress, Senate Select Committee, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67üi Cong., 2d Sess., Report Number 794 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 23-26.
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Although the Committee recognized the material bene
fit the United States brought to Haiti, it suggested that
the occupation go further and provide education and justice
for the masses. In addition, it recommended sending a com
mission to Haiti to aid in its commercial, agricultural,
and educational development. It concluded by urging that
Haitians cooperate and support their government so Haiti 30 could be rehabilitated.
^^Ibid., pp. 24-26.
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HAITI DURING THE BORNO ADMINISTRATION
Shortly after the investigation of the occupation
began, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator
Medill McCormick, recommended the appointment of a Commis
sioner to coordinate the work of the military and civilian
treaty officials. Thus, on February 22, 1922, President
Harding appointed General John H. Russell to the position
of High Commissioner of Haiti with the rank of Ambassador X Extraordinary,
The Functions of the High Commissioner
The High Commissioner was to represent the President
in Haiti "for the purpose of investigating, reporting on,
and supervising the performance of their duties by the offi- 2 cers nominated by the President of the United States,"
His job entailed the supervision of the treaty officials,
including the General Receiver, Financial Adviser, and the
officers commanding the gendarmerie. Moreover, he was to
coordinate the work of the treaty officials and to promote
cooperation between the United States officials and the
United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1922, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 461.
^Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 3 Haitian government. He reported directly to the Secretary
of State.
In a memorandum from Secretary of State Hughes to
High Commissioner Russell, the High Commissioner was told
to direct his efforts in certain directions since "the his
tory of our intervention in Haitian affairs is not viewed
with satisfaction by this government. He was told to re
organize the powers and duties of the United States treaty
officials, to work for stabilization of finance, and spe
cifically to arrange for the flotation of a loan for debt
repayment, the payment of claims, and economic development.
Also, he was instructed to establish an internal revenue
system and an adequate system for audit and control. In
order for the High Commissioner to have supervisory func
tions over the Financial Adviser, the budget was to be sub
mitted to him for recommendation before being sent to the
Haitian government. In case a dispute arose concerning
the budget, the Department of State would make the final 5 decision.
In addition to his supervisory and coordinating
function, the High Commissioner was to lay the foundation
for an eventual American withdrawal from Haiti. In order
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 462
^Ibid. , pp. 463-464.
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to effect an end to the occupation, the gendarmerie had to be strengthened, a reform of the judiciary had to take place, and a sound educational system had to be established. Moreover, improvements were needed in sanitation and commu nication, and were being delayed by the failure of Haiti to obtain a loan. Thus, the High Commissioner was directed to study these problems and make recommendations as to their
SOlutlOilS.
Although it had generally been conceded that the
appointment of a High Commissioner was necessary for the
coordination of American policy in Haiti, the appointment of
General Russell was bitterly resented by many of the island’s
important citizens. Opposition to his appointment arose
from the fact that he was a military man who had been Com
mandant of the marines during the period of the caco rebel
lion. Moreover, the Haitians had anticipated the appointment
of a civilian who would possess a wide range of administra
tive experience.
Although General Russell lacked civilian administra
tive experience, he was very successful in the coordination
of the treaty services. He took over all correspondence,
other than routine matters, between the treaty officials
and the State Department and between the treaty officials
^Ibid., pp. 464-466,
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and the Haitian government. His approval was required
prior to the consideration of the budget and prior to the
introduction of new projects of law. In order to improve
the coordination of the work of the treaty officials, he
instituted weekly meetings which all attended. Thus, fric-,
tion between the treaty services was reduced and relations 7 with the Haitian government were improved.
The Election of President Borno
In order for the High Commissioner successfully to
perform his functions, he needed the support of the Haitian
government. With the expiration of President Dartiguenave's
term of office on May 15, 1922, a new President had to be
chosen. Since Dartiguenave had failed to exercise his pre
rogative under the Constitution to call for legislative
elections, the Council of State was to choose the new Presi
dent. Despite the fact that the members of the Council of
State had been appointed by Dartiguenave, he was defeated
in his re-election attempt by Louis Borno, who was said to
have bribed the Council with funds secured from an unknown q source. While this accusation was not well substantiated,
the legality of Borno's candidacy was questionable as he
7 Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931)', pp. 102-105
^Paul Douglas, "American Occupation of Haiti," £ cal Science Quarterly, XLII (June-September, 1927), 255
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failed to comply with a Constitutional prerequisite for the
Presidency— since he was not the son of a Haitian father.
Between 1922 and 1926, the Borno administration was
free from political opposition and enjoyed the avid support
of the American authorities. During his tenure of office,
Borno neglected to call for legislative elections, thus
permitting the Council of State to choose the new President
upon the expiration of his term. In 1926, encountering no
objection from the United States, Borno was re-elected 9 President of Haiti for another four-year term.
With the inauguration of President Borno, opposition
to American policies came to an end. For the next six
years. President Borno and High Commissioner Russell were
to enjoy a cooperative relationship which brought about
legislation, programs, and achievements which had been im
possible until that time. During the Borno administration,
a loan was secured from American sources; Haiti's fiscal
problems were attacked; a new educational system was insti
tuted; and various reform measures were introduced. How
ever, toward the end of his second term of office, Borno
lost the support of his own people.
United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1926, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 102-105.
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Flotation of a Loan
Shortly after his inauguration, President Borno
turned his attention to the flotation of the United States
proposed loan. During the Dartiguenave administration, the
Haitian government had been so opposed to the loan that the
Protocol of. 1919 had been allowed to elapse. However, since
President Borno was more amenable to a loan, negotiations
with the United States were resumed. On June 26, 1922, the
Council of State voted to authorize the government of Haiti
to contract a forty-million-dollar loan from the United
States to be issued in a series. The first series would be
for sixteen million dollars, with other series being issued
when the needs would be determined.
Following the decision of the Council of State, the
government issued an invitation to American bankers to bid
on the forthcoming bond issue. Bonds were to be secured by
a first lien on the internal revenue and a second lien on
the customs, subject to the 5 per cent allowance provided
for in the treaty. This issue was to be designated as the
Series A loan, the main purpose of which was to refund the
French debt.
United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1922, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 500-502,
^^News item in The New York Times, September 13, 1922, p. 30.
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The sixteen-million-dollar loan was awarded to the
National City Company of New York at a bid of 92,137 and
sold to the public at 95,50, These were said to be favor- 12 able terms. With the proceeds of the loan amounting to
$15,039,945,04, $6,037,650,00 was used to refund the foreign
debt, with the rest allocated to the payment of National 13 Bank and National Railroad claims and to public works,
Within the next two years, the government contracted the
following loans :
1, Series A— from the National CZLtBank,,,,a,oo,oo-ooo.'voo,oooooo,o$16,000,000
2o Series B— an internal l o a n 5,000,000
3o Series C— in exchange for National Railways Bonds ,oo,,ooooo,,ooooo,o,oo,, 1 A TOTAL $23,660,000-^
The Series B loan was used to pay for internal bonds
that were issued between 1912-1914 and for claims estab
lished by a Claims Commission which sat between 1922-1926,
This Commission only allowed $3,495,836,54 out of claims
amounting to $38,394,146,44. The Series C loans were used 15 to pay railroad claims.
Raymond Leslie Buell, "The American Occupation of Haiti," Foreign Policy Association Information Service, V (November 27-December I'Tl 1929 ) , 3 70. 1 O Millspaugh, o^. cit., p. 120.
^“^Buell, _o£. cit., p. 370. 1 c Millspaugh, o£. cit., p. 120.
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New Contract with the Bank
Early in the occupation, the National City Bank of
New York gained control of the National Bank of Haiti, By
1920, it had purchased the stock of the other American
firms and the French interests, In 1922, a new contract
was made with a subsidiary of the National City Bank, with
conditions modified in favor of the Haitian government.
While the Bank continued to make a profit in its monopoly
of note issues and in its performance of treasury services
for the government, its commision for acting as fiscal
agent was reduced from 1.5 per cent to 1 per cent. Also,
the profit on the issuance of subsidiary coinage went to 17 the government.
Although nothing was said about the payment of inter
est on the government surplus, the Financial Adviser trans
ferred $3,000,000 of surplus money to the National City
Bank of New York which paid an interest rate of 3.5 per
cent. However, the government earned $80,000 less interest 18 than it would ordinarily have received.
^^Buell, _o£. cit. , p. 368. 1 7 Emily Greene Balch (ed.). Occupied Haiti (New York Writer’s Publishing Company, 1927), p. 48.
^®Ibid., p. 51.
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Attempts to Improve Fiscal Policy
Since independence, Haiti had a very poor fiscal
policy, with the government deriving most of its revenue
from customs collections. This, in turn, made Haiti depend
ent on its principal export, coffee, for funds. An internal
revenue tax was needed to remove the burden from the farmer
and the small producer of coffee. Thus, an agreement was
made with the Haitian government whereby the United States
government was given the right of supervision over the expen
diture of the internal revenue but not over the collection IQ of these funds. In 1924, in order to increase the revenue
from this source, the Council of State passed a law creating
a Bureau of Internal Revenue under an American Director
responsible to the General Receiver. As a result, revenue 20 from internal sources nearly doubled.
Early in the Occupation, the United States had sought
to revise the tariff system in Haiti; but since the customs
duties were needed to fund the debt and no substitute source
of revenue had been found, no modifications occurred. During
United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. II, 67tb Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. , Novem— ber 29, 1921-June 16, 1922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 1236-1237. Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings. p Q Buell, o£. cit., p. 365.
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the 1922 Senate Hearings on the occupation, much testimony
was presented which criticized the tariff arrangements as
export duties were very burdensome to the small producer
who could not pass on the additional cost to the foreign
consumer. Import duties fell on the consumer, who, for the 21 most part, spent his money on importing necessities.
Even before the enactment of an internal revenue tax,
work was begun on revision of the tariff. After holding a
series of hearings on the proposed tax revision, the Coun
cil of State passed a bill on July 26, 1926, The new tax
increased duties on luxuries and put protective tariffs on
products which could be manufactured within the country.
An unfortunate modification in the tariff law was the dis
continuation of the free list. However, in the next two
years this list was reinstated ; and, agricultural implements,
machines, and educational material were again admitted 22 free.
In order to make additional improvements in the
tariff system, efforts were made to increase the revenue
from internal taxes. Until 1928, internal taxes had been
derived from stamp sales, telephone and telegraph services,
emigration fees, and the income tax. In August of 1928,
21 Senate Hearings, Vol. II, o£. cit., p. 1401 pp Millspaugh, o£. cit., p. 128.
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the Council of State passed a controversial law placing an
excise tax on alcohol and tobacco. The President was then
given the privilege to decrease export duties, after 1929,
by the same sum as was derived from the increase in internal 23 revenue. Although the alcohol tax was difficult to admin
ister— since much of the rum was produced in home stills—
during the first year of its operation, it produced nearly
$500,000 of revenue. This increase in revenue allowed
President Borno to reduce export duties on the highest two 24 grades of coffee.
In looking for new means to increase the internal
revenue, the Financial Adviser sought to place a tax on
land. Because of the inefficient system of land titles,
this tax was very difficult to administer. Progress was
achieved, however, when a law was passed in 1927, transfer
ring public lands from the Department of Interior to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. This law made tenants out of
squatters and charged them a rental of 5 per cent of the
sale value of the property. With the enactment of this law,
peasants who had lived on the land for years could be 25 evicted if they refused to pay rent.
2 3 Buell, _o£. cit. , p. 366, 24 Millspaugh, _o£. cit. , p. 130
Z^ibid., pp. 130-131.
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During the administration of President Borno, pro
gressive steps were taken to improve the fiscal policy of
Haiti. Other achievements were made in this realm. The
budget system was improved, an accounting system was intro
duced, and pre-auditing of expenses was instituted.
A New Educational System
At the time of the American intervention, the Haitian
educational system was-poor— with 95 per cent of the popula
tion unable to read and write. However, little was done
during the administration of President Dartiguenave to im
prove the quality of Haitian education. With the appoint
ment of High Commissioner Russell, an attempt was made to
improve the educational system and direct it toward a more
manual form of training. In 1922, the Borno government
agreed to the establishment of a Service Technique of Agri
culture.
By 1924, Service Technique was organized, but only
two teachers were located with any technical instruction in
agriculture. Consequently, programs were established to
train teachers in both agricultural and industrial educa
tional methods. Some candidates were sent to the United
States for instruction. Also, Ecole Centrale was created
"Agricultural and Industrial Education in Haiti," Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, XLIII (October, 1929), 1010- 1011.
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to train teachers for agricultural and industrial schools.
Special courses were divided into three areas: Agriculture,
Mechanical Engineering, and Civil Engineering— with the 27 greatest emphasis placed on agriculture.
Through Service Technique, a system of rural schools
was established which taught reading, writing, arithmetic,
and farming. Agricultural extension groups and experimental
stations worked to improve the quality in coffee and other
crops. Also veterinary clinics were set up to improve live- , , 28 stock.
In addition to schools established in the rural
areas, industrial training schools were started in many of
the cities. While much effort was put into the organization
of Service Technique, the Haitians had little appreciation
for its work.
Constitutional Amendments
As the Borno administration was nearing its end.
President Borno sought to strengthen his position and pro
posed amendments to the Constitution. The United States
was concerned over the proposals as it feared disorder
^^Ibid., p. 1010.
^^United States Department of State, Seventh Annual Report of the American High Commissioner : 1928 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1929), pp. Tl - S T I
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might erupt as a result of the amendments. Moreover, the
State Department objected to certain articles which appeared 29 in the draft proposal of the Constitution,
On January 10, 1928, a plebiscite was held, and the
Constitution was adopted by a vote of 177,436 in favor and 30 3,799 against its acceptance. As a result of the newly-
adopted amendments, the President was given greater power.
The term of the Presidency was extended from four to six
years, with re-election forbidden, while senatorial terms
were reduced from six to four years. The government was
given more control over the press and greater control over 31 the taxation of the communes.
The new amendments gave the government control over
the judiciary and permitted the reform long sought by the
United States, Under the revision, the courts were reorgan
ized, allowing the Court of Cassation to act as the Court of
Appeal, Also, the number of judges was reduced, while the
President was given a year's suspension concerning the irre- 32 movability of judges.
p q United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1927, Vol. Ill (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 52 and 59-60.
^'^United States Department of State, Seventh Annual Report of the American High Commissioner : 1928, op. cit. p,
^^Ibid., p. 2.
^^Ibid., p. 6.
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The 1928 amendments to the Constitution seemed to
increase the powers of the President. With the Presiden
tial term approaching its end, there was a question as to
whether Borno could run for re-election— a question which
was settled by the events of 1929.
Disenchantment with President Borno
While the United States continued to regard Borno
with favor, there is no doubt that his popularity had de
clined with the electorate. His repression of the press,
his treatment of the courts, and his failure to call legis
lative elections had led to the growth of a vocal opposi
tion.
The Haitian people supported the opposition as there
was disagreement with many of the policies of the Borno ad
ministration. Many Haitians objected to the Loan of 1922,
while others were angered by .the tax increase— especially,
the higher tax on alcohol.
The Land Title Issue was another source of friction
as some feared that land would be taken from the peasants.
Although the United States claimed that the purpose of the
law was to remove the last obstacle to orderly land develop- ment, the Haitians continued to be suspicious. 33
Clarence Streit, "Land Title Issue to Front in Haiti," The New York Times, April 8, 1928, Section III, pp. 1 and 7.
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The educational system established in the Borno ad
ministration was bitterly criticized by the Haitian people.
While Haiti spent only 10,32 per cent of its budget on edu
cation, Service Technique, serving one-tenth of the students,
received the same amount of money as the Haitian school 34 system.
The economic situation in 1929 also contributed to
the dissatisfaction with the administration. In October of
that year, coffee prices fell, resulting in a far less 35 favorable financial and commercial situation in Haiti.
Thus, by the end of 1929, the political situation
was becoming tense. As Borno continued to vacillate on the
holding of legislative elections, the people began to fear
that the Council of State would once again elect the Presi
dent of Haiti. Since Borno considered his own candidacy
legal, fear increased that either he or a hand-picked candi
date would be in office in 1936— the year of the expiration
of the treaty. The uncertainty regarding the Presidential
election and Borno's candidacy was a rallying point for the
Raymond Leslie Buell, "Black Haiti, A Republic of Many Disorders," The New York Times, December 15, 1929, Section XI, p. 6.
^^United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner 1929 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 3.
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critics of the occupation and contributed greatly to the
events of 1929.
Trouble began in October of 1929 at the Central
School of Agriculture in Damien, a school composed primarily
of scholarship students preparing to become agricultural or
vocational education teachers. Most of the scholarship
recipients were city boys who were the only ones able to
meet scholastic requirements. In order to provide oppor
tunities for rural students, the government wanted to divert
$2,000 from the scholarship fund to pay those willing to
work on demonstration farms. Because this plan would reduce
the stipend for city boys, the students boycotted their 3 7 classes in protest.
The student protest was joined by the opposition
politicians and press who wanted to expand the demonstration
and weaken the Borno administration. Thus, when the admin
istration offered to increase the scholarship fund, the stu- 3 8 dents refused to accept this concession.
Despite the issue of an arrêté ordering the students
to return to classes and despite several extensions of the
order, the students still refused to return to school.
O Millspaugh, _o£. cit. , p. 176.
^^United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, op. cit., pp. 7-8 ^®Ibid.
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They continuously increased their demand for more bourses—
stipends paid to students as an incentive for going to , , 39 school,
The students extended their strike to the custom
house at Port-au-Prince, to the customs control office, and
to Service Technique. After mobs entered the offices of
American treaty officials and injured two American employees,
the government brought about a declaration of martial law,^^
While Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien were calm,
trouble occurred in Aux Cayes. Hoodlum elements took over
a school strike and stirred up cane farmers in the area. A
mob of fifteen hundred started for Cayes but were met by a
group of twenty marines. When the crowd attempted to stone
the marines, the marines fired shots above the mob and then
into the mob, killing ten.
With the dispatch of additional marines to Haiti, the
situation began to improve. After President Borno's decla
ration that he would not be a candidate in the next election,
conditions improved immeasurably. In the meantime. Presi
dent Hoover became very disturbed with the situation in
Haiti. Thus, on December 7, 1929, President Hoover sent a
^^United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions , 1929, Vol. Ill, op. cit., p. 183.
^*^News item in The New York Times, December 7, 1920.
“^^United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, op. cit., pp. 9-11
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message to Congress requesting that it appropriate $50,000
for a commission to look into the disorders in Haiti, to
review United States policies, and make recommendations as 42 to what the United States should do in the future. After
a delay of more than two months, the Commission left for
Haiti,
42 United States Congress, "Message from the Presi dent of the United States to the Congress of the United States," Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., December 2, 1929-January 23, 1930 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 232.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VIII
RELINQUISHMENT OF AMERICAN CONTROL IN HAITI
In February of 1930, Congress appropriated the funds
for the appointment of a commission to study and review
conditions in Haiti. The five-man commission, under the
chairmanship of the Honorable W. Cameron Forbes, arrived in
Haiti on February 28. The principal questions which were
to be investigated were "when and how we are to withdraw
from Haiti," and "what we shall do in the meantime.At
the same time. President Hoover announced the appointment
of a commission under Dr. R. R. Moton, President of Tuskegee
Institute, who was to study the .educational system of
Haiti; however, the departure of the Moton Commission was 2 delayed.
The Forbes Commission
Between March 1 and March 8, the Presidential Com
mission held hearings in Port-au-Prince, after which they
visited the northern part of Haiti. During the hearings.
United States Department of State, Report of the President's Commission for the Study and Review of Condi tions in the Republic of Haiti, Latin American Series 2 (Washington; Government Printing Office, March 25, 1930), p. 1.
^Ibid., p. 2.
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it heard from the opposition who had organized itself into
eight groups with the president of each group belonging to
a commission which called itself "The Federated Committee
of the Associated Groups of the Opposition." The primary
source of the opposition's discontent was the fear that
President Borno would control the election of his successor.
In order to prevent more serious disorders, the Forbes Com
mission agreed to a compromise. Rather than hold immediate
legislative elections, the Commission devised a plan for
the election of a temporary President by the Council of
State. Shortly after his inauguration, the new President
would call for the election of legislators who would con
vene and elect a permanent President, Eugene Roy, a banker
who had remained above politics, was named as the coalition 3 candidate.
The Commission devoted the remainder of its time to
hearings concerning the accomplishments and inadequacies of
the occupation. In a report made to President Hoover on
its return to the United States, the Commission discussed
all aspects of the occupation. While the Commission praised
the improvement in the financial position of Haiti and
lauded the American accomplishments in public works, road
construction and public health, it criticized Haiti's lack
^Ibid., pp. 5-6.
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of representative government and the failure of the United
States to establish the foundations of democracy in that
country. It further commented that "the acts and attitudes
of the treaty officials gave your commission the impression
they had been based upon the assumption that the occupation
would continue indefinitely.
The Commission discussed the frictions which existed
between the Haitian Courts and the treaty officials. It
further discussed the dissent caused by the modifications
to the Constitution of 1889 and advised that Haiti be per
mitted to change its laws in respect to foreign land
ownership. Before making its recommendations, the Forbes
Commission stated its belief that racial prejudice on the
part of the Americans was to blame for many of the difficul- 5 ties of the occupation.
The Commission made a series of recommendations to
the President regarding the future of the occupation, the
most important of which were called "sequent steps." In
cluded in these were the following: the President of the
United States should approve a policy for the increasingly-
rapid Haitianization of the treaty services, even if effi- .. ^ ciency is sacrificed; officials chosen for service in Haiti
should be free from racial prejudices ; the United States
'^I b i d . , p. 8. ^Ibid. , pp. 18-19
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should recognize the temporary President if an election is
held in accordance with the agreement made by the Commission
and President Borno; the United States should recognize the
President elected by the legislature if no fraud or force
is used ; and, a non-military Minister, who would be charged
with the early Haitianization of the treaty services, should
take the place of the High Commissioner. However, the Com
mission did not find the immediate withdrawal of marines
advisable but rather recommended gradual withdrawal in
accordance with arrangements to be made in the future by
the two governments.^
On March 28, 1930, President Hoover adopted the rec
ommendations of the Forbes Commission, Hence, President
Borno, in order to fulfill his agreement with the Commission
concerning the election of the coalition candidate, replaced
twelve members of the Council of State, In May of 1930, 7 Eugene Roy was elected President of Haiti,
In October of that year, the Congressional elections
were held, and the Nationalists, or anti-Borno group, won a
large victory. On November 19, 1930, after the resignation
^Ibid., pp. 19-21.
^United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, Vol. Ill (Washington: Govern ment Printing Office, 1945), p. 249.
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of President Roy, M« Stenio Vincent, a strong critic of the
occupation, was elected President of Haiti.
A New Administration
One month prior to the election of President Vincent,
General Russell resigned and the position of High Commis
sioner was abolished. Dr. Dana Munro, Chief of the Latin
American Division of the State Department, was appointed
Minister to Haiti. He would not only conduct foreign rela
tions with Haiti, but also would supervise and coordinate
the activities of the treaty officials. Also, as prescribed
by the Presidential Commission, the new Minister was to •
carry on negotiations with the government for the Haitiani
zation of the Treaty Services in preparation for an American g withdrawal,
In January of 1931, Minister Munro received instruc
tions from Secretary of State Stimson concerning the
Haitianization agreements for the various treaty services.
While advocating a more rapid Haitianization of the Depart
ment of Public Works and Service Technique, Secretary Stim
son favored a more gradual Haitianization of the Garde and
a modified Haitianization of the Public Health Service,
providing for the American control of the Districts of Port-
au-Prince and Cap-Haitien as long as the United States
^Ibid., pp. 255-258
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remained in Haiti. The fifth treaty service, the Office of
the Financial Adviser-General Receiver was not to be in
cluded in the Haitianization plan; for, the United States
intended to retain financial control over Haiti because of 9 its pledge to American holders of. Haitian bonds.
While some gradual Haitianization had taken place
since 1922, the key positions in the Treaty Services were
still occupied by Americans. Haitian doctors and engineers
were very active in the Public Health Service, and Public
Works Department; while, Haitians held important positions
in the Financial Services and Service Technique. But, in
the Garde, ,the new name for the gendarmerie, as of Septem
ber, 1929, only 36.42 per cent of the officers were
Haitian.
The Vincent administration was dissatisfied with the
gradual Haitianization of the Treaty Services and pressed
for a more rapid Haitizanization program. President Vincent
wanted the immediate appointment of a Haitian as Assistant
Engineer-in-Chief of Public Works, faster Haitianization of
the Public Health Services, the withdrawal of the United
States from the customs service, the appointment of a
9 United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1931, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 404—406.
^^Dana G. Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Area (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934T7 P» 183.
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Haitian director of the Bureau of Contributions, and full
*1 *] Haitianization of the Internal Revenue Service. The
United States, on the other hand, felt that more rapid Hai
tianization would impede efficiency and prevent an orderly
transition of personnel.
The misunderstandings between the two governments
and disagreements between President Vincent and his Congress
interfered with negotiations; thus, little was accomplished
in the winter of 1930-1931. In May of 1931, the internal
disagreements led to the resignation of President Vincent's
first Cabinet and the replacement of Minister of Foreign
/ 12 Affairs M. Saanon by the more concilatory M. Abel Léger.
At the same time, the United States position had
changed somewhat. The United States was now prepared to
agree to the Haitianization of Public Works and the Public
Health Service, the two treaty services in which trained
corps of employees existed, and the Haitianization of Serv
ice Technique, the Treaty Service in which achievements had
been negligible since the strikes of 1929, However, the
United States was not prepared to consent to a similar
Haitianization of the Financial Services and the Garde.
Thus, after concessions were made by both parties, a
^^United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1931, Vol. II, o£. cit., pp. 415-418. 12 Munro, o£. cit., pp. 184-185
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Haitianization agreement, covering only those questions on
which accord could be reached, was signed on August 5, 1 3 1931,
Haitianization Agreement of August 5, 1931
The Haitianization Agreement of August 5, 1931, pro
vided for the Haitianization of Public Works, Public Health,
and Service Technique. This agreement gave the government
of Haiti the right to assume control and administration of
the above-mentioned departments on October 1, 1931, with
the exception of the sanitation departments and water sup
plies of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien. These departments
would remain under the charge of the American Scientific 14 Mission.
This treaty also gave Haiti greater control over its
legislative and financial affairs. The United States agreed
to abrogate the Accord of August 24, 1918, whereby laws had
to be communicated to the American Legation prior to passage,
and the Accord of December 3, 1918, making necessary the
visa of the Financial Adviser on all orders of payment
^^Ibid., pp. 185-186
United States Department of State, "Haitianization Agreement between the United States of American and Haiti," signed August 5, 1931, Executive Agreement Series Number 22 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), Article II, pp. 1-2.
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issued by the Secretary of State for Finance. While the
visa was no longer necessary, Haiti had to agree to keep
its expenditures within the limits of law until the liqui- 15 dation of the debt.
Haiti was also forced to agree to the indemnification
of American employees of the treaty services who would
suffer monetary loss because of their abrupt discharge.
Finally, it was agreed that, until the settlement of the
question of the Garde, the status quo'would be maintained.
Further Meqotiations
While the agreement placed three treaty services
under Haitian administration, it failed to deal with the
withdrawal of the Marine Brigade, the Haitianization of the
Garde, and the reorganization of the Financial Services—
the latter being the most difficult problem. The Vincent
government claimed that neither the Protocol of 1919 nor
the loan contract of 1922 had given the United States the
right to maintain such complete financial control after
1936— especially in light of the comparatively small remain
ing balance on the loan. The United States, on the other
hand, contended that such an arrangement was necessary to
^^Ibid., Articles IV, VI, VII, pp. 2-3,
^^Ibid., Articles IX and XI, pp. 3-4.
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safeguard the interest of its bondholders after the expira- 17 tion of the treaty.
The United States was less adamant concerning the
question of the Garde. Haiti demanded the immediate Hai
tianization of the Garde, the withdrawal of the Marine
Brigade and Scientific Mission, and the establishment of a T8 military mission. Although the State Department would
agree to the establishment of a military mission with ade
quate power to preserve the peace, it made the withdrawal
of the marines contingent on the Haitianization of the
Garde and the withdrawal of the Scientific Mission subject 19 to the departure of the marines. Thus, the question of
the Haitianization of the Garde had to be solved prior to
the settlement of other issues.
Since the United States had been working to train
and promote Haitian officers since the repopt of the Presi
dential Commission, the Garde was not as serious a problem
as the Financial Service. Progress had been made in the
Haitianization of the Garde as one of the five military
departments had been placed under the command of a Haitian
United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1932, Vol. V (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 637.
^^Ibid., pp. 529-632.
^^Ibid., pp. 557-658.
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officer. Also, other Haitian officers of the Garde were
performing their duties satisfactorily, thus permitting the
governments to begin negotiations for the American with
drawal from Haiti, On September 3, 1932, a treaty was
signed by Haiti and the United States, which was intended 20 to settle the remaining issues of the occupation.
Treaty of 1932
In the Treaty of 1932, the United States agreed to
terminate its occupation of Haiti. It provided for the
abrogation of American participation in public health and
sanitation. It also provided for the abrogation of provi
sions pertaining to the Garde, upon the Haitianization of
that organization, and of those provisions relating to
financial control, upon the acceptance of the new agreement,
Both questions were settled in protocols attached to the
4treaty.- 4-21
Protocol A dealt with the Haitianization of the
Garde and provided that the Garde should be officered
solely by Haitians as of December 31, 1934, at which time
the departure of marines would begin and the work of the
2 n Munro, £2 ^ 0 cit. , pp. 188-189.
^^United States Department of State, "Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti for the Further Haitianization of the Treaty Services," unper fected treaty. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932, V (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), ^ 572.
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Scientific Mission would terminate. While an American mili
tary mission would remain to conclude the training of the 22 Garde, it would have no control over that force.
Protocol B provided for the replacement of the Finan
cial Adviser-General Receiver with a "Fiscal Representa
tive," on December 31, 1934, who would be appointed by the
President of Haiti upon the nomination of the President of
the United States„ While he retained authority over the
collection of customs duties, the Internal Revenue Service
was to be transferred to Haitian control. However, if the _
collection of revenue experienced a serious decline, the
"Fiscal Representative" could make recommendations. He 23 also had some control over the pre-audit of expenditures.
In September of 1932, the new treaty was rejected by
the National Assembly, Although political differences with
President Vincent entered into its rejection, there were
other reasons for its repudiation. Some of the legislators
opposed the new treaty because they believed that the Treaty
of 1915 should be allowed to expire, thus leaving no legal
basis for the continuance of American military or financial 2à control. ' Others opposed the treaty because of its
^^Ibid., pp. 672-673. ^^Ibid., pp. 573-678. 24 United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1932, Vol. V, 0£. cit., p. 587,
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financial and military provisions, fearing that Haiti would 2 5 still be under foreign control.
After the Treaty of 1932 failed to obtain the approval
of the National Assembly, the Vincent government sought to
conclude a separate agreement with the United States per
taining to a military withdrawal while postponing financial
questions for settlement in the future. The United
States Legation then informed the Haitian government that
the Presidential Commission had recommended that separate
arrangements not be concluded. At the same time, it
announced that Protocol B represented the maximum concession
on the part of the United States. Both issues were
finally settled by executive agreement.
Executive Agreement 19 3 3
On August 7, 1933, an executive agreement was signed
by Haiti and the United States which was very similar to
Protocols A and B of the Haitianization Treaty which Cong
ress had previously rejected. This agreement provided for
the Haitianization of the Garde and the replacement of
American officers by Haitian officers as of October 1, 1934.
While it permitted the designation of a military mission of
^^News item in The New York Times, September 21 1932, p. 10.
^^Monro, o£. cit., p. 193.
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United States officers who had served in Haiti, this ar- 2 7 rangement could be terminated by either party. The with
drawal of the Marine Brigade and the American Scientific
Mission would begin on October 1, 1934, and be completed
within thirty days. Thus, in order to preserve order, the 28 Haitians must maintain strict discipline in the Garde.
The agreement of August 7, 1933, also contained a
financial section. It provided that a Fiscal Representa
tive and a Deputy Fiscal Representative would take over the
office of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver and would
have under their direction the Customs Service and the
application of laws relating to this agency until the amor-
tizatization of the loan or refunding of the debt took
place. While the Fiscal Representative would not control
the Internal Revenue Service, he could still make recommen
dations and would supervise the existing service of pay-
ments., 29
The Fiscal Representative was given the right to
have employees and assistants, but the number of Americans
United States Department of State, "Haitianization of the Garde, Withdrawal of Military Forces from Haiti and Financial Arrangements," signed August 7, 1933, Executive Agreement Series Number 46 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), Articles I and III, pp. 1-2.
^^Ibid., Articles V and VI, p. 2.
^^Ibid., Articles VII and VIII, pp. 3-4.
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in his employ was limited to eighteen. Their salaries
would be determined by the Haitian and American governments,
with salaries and expenses not permitted to exceed 5 per
cent of customs receipts except by special agreement. The
Haitian government would still be prevented from assuming
financial obligations above its ordinary revenues or from
disposing of investments, reducing tariffs, or modifying
taxes and internal revenue which would reduce the amount of , ^ , 30 total revenue.
Nevertheless, in spite of various American conces
sions, the Vincent government remained dissatisfied with
the remaining financial supervision and continued to press
for a United States financial withdrawal from Haiti. Presi
dent Roosevelt, however, was adamant on the need to protect
United States bondholders and suggested a refunding arrange
ment whereby the United States would be relieved of all
responsibilities in that country. Discussions were con
tinued when President Vincent visited Washington in April
of 1934 and were followed by a joint statement announcing
that the two Presidents had arrived at the basis of a satis- 31 factory agreement. This culminated in a visit to
^°Ibid., Articles VII, IX, XVII, XVIII, and XX, pp. 4—5 and 9—10. 31 H. P. Davis, Black Democracy (second edition; New York: Dodge Publishing Company, 1936), pp. 268-269.
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Port-au-Prince by President Roosevelt and his issuance of a 3? communique on July 5, 1934»
Withdrawal of Military Forces from Haiti
The new agreement reached between Presidents Vincent
and Roosevelt terminated the service of American officers
in the Garde as of August 1, 1934, after which the command
would be turned over to a Colonel chosen by the Haitian
government. It also provided that the Marine Brigade and
the Scientific Mission would leave Haiti by the middle of 3 3 August of that year.
During the Roosevelt visit to Haiti, other issues
were also resolved. The large stocks of military and non
military material and numerous buildings accumulated on
private and government property were donated to Haiti as a 34 gesture of American good will. Discussion also was
directed to the possible purchase of the National Bank by
^^News item in The New York Times, July 5, 1934, p . 1.
^^United States Department of State, "Withdrawal of Military Forces from Haiti, Agreement between the United States of American and Haiti Modifying Agreement of August 7, 1933," Signed July 24, 1934, Executive Agreement Series Number 68 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), Articles I and II, pp. 1-2.
34 United States Department of State, Foreign Rela tions of the United States, 1934, Vol. V (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 300-301.
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the Haitian government. In spite of legislative opposition
in Haiti, the deal was concluded in 1935.^^
In July and August of 1934, the marines departed
from Haiti. After nearly twenty years under American con
trol, Haiti was faced with the problems of self-government.
While those twenty years had been years of material prog
ress, they had also been years of political stagnation, in
which the foundations of representative government had not
been established.
^^Harwood Hull, "Haiti Goes Ahead under Self Rule," The New York Times, Section IV, August 4, 1935, p. 5.
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERVENTION
With the withdrawal of the marines in August of 1934,
the United States occupation of Haiti was terminated and the
last restraint on Haitian independence was removed. Al
though Haiti had made significant advances during its years
under American control, the populace resented progress made
under alien direction and pressed for an early departure by
the United States. Thus, after 1930, the efforts of the
American treaty officials were directed toward Haitianiza
tion of the Treaty Services.
Prior to 1930, the work of the five treaty services
had resulted in great material benefits to Haiti, For the
first time in many years, peace and order were re
established. Roads were built; public works were con
structed; public health and sanitation were improved; a new
educational system was instituted ; and the financial system
was reorganized. However, in spite of the many advances
made during this period, Haiti failed to achieve economic
and political stability.
Maintenance of Order
While the occupation provided the Haitians with
numerous material benefits, its most important achievement
was the maintenance of order. Prior to the American
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intervention, the country was constantly disturbed by revo
lution. Peasants were kidnapped and forced to serve in
revolutionary armies presided over by caco generals. Crops
were destroyed and towns were pillaged by cacos who were
fighting for political control of the country.
With the inception of the occupation, chronic revo
lution came to an end. The stereotype of the ragged sol
dier, exploited by the ruthless politician, was no longer
applicable to the Haitian situation. Peasants were no
longer fearful of traveling the roads, as the country was
under the protection of a competent civil force, the gen
darmerie, which was officered and trained by the American
marines,
During the first six years of the occupation, much
effort was devoted to the organization and training of the
gendarmerie, resulting in the establishment of a reliable
Haitian police force. Under the High Commissioner, the
functions of the gendarmerie were expanded. Besides acting
as an urban and rural police force, members of the gen
darmerie participated in prison administration, fire pro
tection, the coast guard, and served as financial advisers
to communal governments. By 1928, they had changed their
name to Garde d ’Haiti,^ At the time of the American
Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1940), p. 250.
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departure from Haiti, the Garde consisted of 2,000 enlisted 2 Haitians officered by 199 of their countrymen.
While order was maintained— after the initial pacifi
cation— throughout the major part of the occupation, the
American-imposed peace was marred by the events of 1918-
1920, the caco rebellion,. in which the northern part of
Haiti was disrupted by guerrilla warfare. When the battles
between the cacos and gendarmerie became more frequent, the
marine reinforcements were sent in to put down the caco up
risings, After this period of disorder, the peace remained
undisturbed for nine years until the student strikes of
1929. While these strikes never represented a serious
threat to the peace, they precipitated an investigation by
a United States Presidential Commission which, subsequently,
resulted in the American withdrawal from Haiti.
Roads and.Public Works
In order to maintain peace and promote economic
progress in Haiti, roads had to be constructed from the
■ cities into the interior. At the time of the intervention,
there was no definite organization entrusted with the
Robert N, Fuller, "Haiti Again Rules Herself with out American Guidance," The New York Times, October 28, 1934, Section VIII, p. 9.
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construction of roads and public works. Rather, a number
of engineers and laborers were employed by the Ministry of
Public Works but were not utilized in an efficient manner.
Thus, there was a definite need for a department with a
proper accounting system and an efficient staff for carry- 3 ing out the tasks of road construction and public works.
In 1915, there were three miles of paved roads in
Haiti, with no roads connecting the cities and the towns.
The road system built during the colonial period lay in
ruin, Even the streets in the towns and cities were
largely unpaved. Construction of public buildings was
negligible. Communication facilities were also lacking as
the Haitian telephone and telegraph systems were poor.
While there were some shipping facilities, those outside of 4 Port-au-Prince were in a deplorable state.
Since the beginning of the occupation, nearly 1,006
miles of roads were constructed while the number of bridges
increased nearly three times. The number of automobiles
and buses increased from only a handful in 1915 to nearly
3,000 in 1929. A modern telephone and telegraph system was
established; and public buildings, parks, streets, schools.
United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, 1929 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1930), pi 23’,
'^Ibid. , p. 26.
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and hospitals were constructed. Improvements were made to
wharves, lighthouses, and customhouses, while more than
100 miles of canal, serving 8,000 farms and 62,000 people, 5 were completed.
While the Haitians appreciated the material progress,
they criticized the unnecessary delay in the organization
of the Department of Public Works, The Department remained
under the supervision of the Navy until the ratification of
the Treaty of 1915, It was not until 1917, a year after
the ratification of the treaty, that the first treaty engi
neer, a Commander in the Navy, arrived in Haiti, After his
arrival, he was further delayed by lack of funds for em
ployees and the absence of a public works law. In July of
1920, a law was finally passed which organized a corps of
Haitian engineers under the Chief Engineer and placed the
various departments under his control. The Chief Engineer
was then charged with the construction, maintenance, and
repair of public utilities, the operation of the telephone
and telegraph systems, and supervision of the water system
and irrigation projects.
^Ibid,, p , 26c
^Carl Kelsey, "The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, C TMarch,. 1922), p, 147,
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The United States was also criticized for the lack
of funds available for roads and public works and for the
manner in which it utilized these funds. Until 1920, the
money spent for the construction and maintenance of roads
amounted to only- $744,000, This money was allocated for
the purchase of tools and materials, allotting no funds for
the payment of laborers. This absence of funds for wages
led to the revival of the corvée system in which forced
labor was used for road construction— one of the major 7 sources of complaint against the occupation.
Public Health
In 1915, Haiti had only three hospitals, an inade
quate number of doctors and nurses, and an oversupply of
witch doctors.® Its Public Health Service consisted of a
loosely-organized group of physicians called the Jury
Médical which received little financial support from the
government. Thus, the country was in a deplorable state,
with sanitation ignored and diseases prevalent. In 1917,
the first sanitary engineer, a Commander in the Navy, took
office ; and by 1919, the National Public Health Service was
organized,^
— ^Ibid,, p. 148,
®Nelson Fuller, "American Achievements in Haiti," Current History, XXXII (April, 1930), 90,
^United States Department of State, Eighth Annual
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Many problems confronted the American authorities in
their attempts to improve public health. In Haiti, as in
any tropical climate, fevers were prevalent. Malaria, in
testinal worms, syphilis, yaws, and tuberculosis were the
predominant diseases. In order to combat these illnesses,
the Health Service divided Haiti into ten public health
districts, each under the supervision of a Public Health
Officer, By 1925, Haiti had built 11 hospitals, 16 dispen
saries, and 102 rural clinics,^® A medical and rural hospi
tal training school was constructed which did valuable
research in the area of tropical diseases,
While the Haitian city dweller derived many benefits
from the new Health Service, the peasants benefited pri
marily from its establishment of rural clinics. Prior to
their inception, people in rural areas had been without
doctors, receiving most of their medical attention from the
local witch doctor. After the establishment of the rural
clinics, provisions were made for monthly visits by a physi
cian who diagnosed illnesses and prescribed treatment.
This treatment was rendered by a priest or a Haitian woman
Report of the American High Commissioner, op, cit,, p, 32, 1 n Emily Greene Balch (ed,), Occupied Haiti (New York Writer's Publishing Company, 1927), p, 87,
^^United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, op, cit,, p. 32,
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dresser who had taken a three-month course in practical 12 nursing. By 1929, there were 147 clinics serving
1,341,596 people.^®
Although the occupation brought improvements in
public health to Haiti, the National Health Service, from
its inception, was confronted with many problems. It was
primarily hampered by insufficient funds and lack of
trained personnel. As late as 1929, there were only 159
practicing doctors in Haiti, with 42 per cent employed by
the Public Health Service. This number was inadequate to
provide the mass treatment required by the victims of yaws
and other tropical diseases .
Still, the health care provided under American direc
tion won unqualified praise from both supporters and critics
of the occupation. Praise was given to United States naval
physicians for their efficiency and devotion to the Haitian
people. They managed to establish a health service given a
budget averaging less than $500,000 a year. In spite of an
inadequate budget, new hospitals were built; older ones
were remodeled; nurses training schools were established;
12 Balch, _o£o cit. , p. 88.
^®Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control (Boston : World Peace Foundation, 1931), p. 139.
^"^United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, op. cit., pp. 33- 34.
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and the system of rural clinics was expanded. Also, a sani
tation system was instituted in metropolitan areas, includ-
ing garbage removal, street cleaning, and mosquito control. 1 5
By 1930, Haiti had ten major hospitals whose personnel,
buildings, and equipment were comparable to those of the
more-developed countries,
Education
At the time of the American intervention, the illit
eracy rate in Haiti was nearly 95 per cent, The school
system was a political one, with teachers being appointed
by government officials. School buildings were generally
not owned by the government. Rather, buildings were rented
from private owners and were often unfit for pupil instruc
tion, The only adequate schools outside of Port-au-Prince
and Cap-Haitien were those affiliated with the Catholic and 17 Protestant churches.
Although the Treaty of 1915 did not provide for
United States control over Haitian education, the American
^®Henry Fletcher, "Quo Vadis Haiti," Foreign Affairs, VIII (July, 1930), p, 539,
^®Fuller, o£, cit,, p. 90, 1 n United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Vol. I, 57tb Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., August 5, 1921-November 15, 1921 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 584, Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings.
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authorities still sought to improve Haiti’s educational
system. Many improvements were needed. A program of con
struction which would increase the number of school rooms
and another program which would increase the number of
teachers were essential to the improvement of Haitian edu
cation. An inspection system was needed to improve the
quality of teaching, while a revision of the study program
and the preparation of a pedagogical guide would provide
some uniformity in teaching. Also, the educational budget
had to be increased; for, in 1919, only $340,000 was spent
for education.
During the first six years of the occupation, no
educational reforms took place. In fact, the American ad
viser in the Ministry of Public Instruction was so convinced
as to the incompetence of the Haitian teachers that, in
1920, their number was reduced from thirteen hundred to
four hundred. Also, the Financial Adviser refused to ap
prove funds for a normal school and thwarted Haitian
attempts to invite three French professors to teach in the
lycées,^®
1 Q Samuel Guy Inman, "America's Task in Santo Domingo and Haiti," Forum, LXIX (September, 1920), 224-225.
^^Raymond Leslie Buell, "The American Occupation of Haiti," Foreign Policy Association Information Service, V (November 27-December 12"^ 1929) , 351.
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However, in 1922, after President Dartiguenave left
office, the United States obtained greater control over
education. After the inauguration of President Borno, an
agreement was reached for the establishment of a Service
Technique of Agriculture under the direction of an agricul
tural engineer and an assistant engineer nominated by the
United States, In 1924, the Service Technique was created
as a branch of the Agricultural Department and, in addition,
a Central School of Agriculture was planned. Also six tech
nical departments were established within the service under 20 the supervision of the United States,
Service Technique was established to provide the
peasants with an education which taught the rudiments of
reading, writing, and arithmetic, but concentrated on the
teaching of farming techniques so that the Haitians could
improve their standard of living. At the time of its crea
tion, the peasants were utilizing primitive farming methods.
Rather than cultivate their land, they merely gathered the
crops. Their tools were primitive; for, they used a hoe, 21 spade, and machete, and never a plow.
Since Haiti was an agricultural country with 90 per
cent of its population engaged in farming, the United
^®Ibid. , p. 352. 21 Balch, _op. cit. , p. 59,
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States believed that its educational system must provide
for practical training. Thus, Service Technique was to
provide the people with a system of agricultural and voca
tional education. At first, teachers had to be trained.
After their training was completed, farm schools and indus
trial schools were opened. By 1925, nine farm schools and 22 three large industrial schools were in operation.
Through Service Technique, the appointment of agri
cultural advisers and the establishment of demonstration
farms helped the peasants improve their crops. Also the
farmers received other advice in the form of analytical
clinics and demonstrations in the control of plant and ani
mal diseases. New plant varieties and new animal breeds 23 were developed at experimental farms.
Service Technique worked on other projects. It was
active in forestation and flood prevention and also encour
aged foreign investment in Haiti. Thus, through the efforts
of Service Technique, large-scale sisal farming v;as intro
duced in Haiti, But, its works were continuously hampered 24 by lack of funds.
? ? United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, op. cit., pp. 36- 38.
^®Ibid., p. 38. 24 Ibid., p. 39.
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Although Service Technique was created under Ameri
can supervision, there still existed a Haitian school sys
tem under the direction of the Minister of Public
Instruction. In 1928-1929, out of 400,000 school age chil
dren in Haiti, 100,000 attended Haitian schools, while only 25 11,430 attended schools connected with Service Technique.
During that year, $977,252 was spent on education, with 58
per cent of the funds allocated to Service Technique,
The distribution of the school budget drew opposition from
the Haitians, who favored the classical system of education
and resisted the introduction of vocational and agricul
tural training.
In 1929, Haitian dissatisfaction with the American
supervision of education culminated in student strikes. As
a result of these strikes, the President of the United
States appointed a commission of experts, under the chair
manship of Dr, Moton, to evaluate educational progress in
Haiti. Upon investigation, the Commission found grounds
for complaint against Service Technique. The members be
lieved that Service Technique should be articulated with
the national school system of Haiti and recommended that a
committee of American Negroes and Haitians be established
^®Ibid., p. 51,
Montague, _o£. cit. , p. 261,
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for the articulation of the two systems. They also recom
mended that the United States help Haiti in the development
of an adequate educational system by providing the country 2 7 with a grant or low interest loan.
The Commission concluded that education deteriorated
under American supervision because the national school sys
tem obtained less funds. The members believed that the
establishment of a separate system was an error on the part
of the United States and felt that the Haitians had a basis
for their fear that Service Technique would supplant their
own system. They further criticized the extravagance of
Service Technique and the high salaries paid to American
employees. While the Commission believed that there was a
need in Haiti for technical education, they concluded that,
after seven years of American supervision of education, no
real progress was made in improving the peasants' standard
ofÆ living.n • • 28
Financial Progress
When the United States intervened in Haiti, the coun
try was on the verge of bankruptcy. Because of Haiti's
previous indebtedness to French bondholders and its more
2 7 "Report of the Educational Survey," School and Society, XXXII (December 6, 1930), 755-755,
^®Ibid., p. 756,
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recent flotation of loans, the public debt had risen to 29 15 3,861,068,85 gourdes. The financial situation in Haiti
was deplorable. The salaries of officials were not being
paid, and interest and amortization on the debt were in 30 arrears. In addition to its poor financial state, Haiti
also lacked financial organization, Haiti had no adequate
system of accounting and a very poor tariff system, with
most of its revenue derived from import and export taxes.
Corruption in the customhouses was rampant. It had no ef
fective internal revenue system. Its currency was depressed 31 and subject to wide fluctuation.
When the occupation began, the Navy took over the
customhouses until the appointment of the Receiver-General.
Under the supervision of the General-Receiver, a loyal and
competent staff was assembled who were honest in their ad
ministration of customs. Moreover, they put into practice
an adequate system of accounting and auditing and a uniform 32 tariff rate in all the various ports.
29Haiti— Annual Report of the Financial Adviser- General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1932-September 1933 TPort-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l'Etat, 1933), p, 115,
®®United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, op, cit., p , 19,
®^Ibid., p, 99.
O p General Receiver of Customs, Resume of Accomplish- ments of the Customs Receivership of the Republic of Haiti from August 28, 1916-January 31, 1924, Executive Agreement
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With the honest administration of customs and a more
favorable trade situation, by 1928-1929, government revenues-
had more than doubled. The increased yield from internal
revenue, which yielded more than $1,200,000 during that year,
as opposed to $100,000 in 1916, was an added source of income 33 for the government. By the year 1932-1933, government
revenues had increased to 37,305,298.67 gourdes as opposed to
18,934,684.70 gourdes in 1916. Expenditures in 1932-1933 were
33,258,808.08 gourdes. Thus, a surplus of 4,046,490.59 re
mained in the treasury.
Because of Haiti's fiscal system, government revenue
was almost solely dependent on foreign trade. Between 1915
and 1933, Haiti made much financial progress. In the year
1916-1917, its total value of trade was 87,694,856 gourdes.
By 1925-1926, the value of trade was 195,177,055 gourdes.®®
The high was reached in the year 1927-1928, when the value
of trade was 214,577,513 gourdes. This was followed by a
decline in the value of trade which lasted until 1932-1933,
Series Number 68 (Port-au-Prince: General Receiver of Cus toms, 1924).
3 3United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, op. cit., pp. 19 and 22.
34 Haiti— Annual Report of the Financial Adviser- General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1932-Beptember 1933, op. cit., p. 114. See infra, Appendix B. 3 5 W. W. Cumberland, "Notable Commercial and Financial Progress in Haiti," Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, LXI (April, 1927), 316,
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the decline being attributable to the depression of com
modity prices.®®
Under the American occupation, Haiti's debt situation
also improved. The public debt declined from 15 3,861,058.85
gourdes on September 30, 1915, to 66,901,412.84 gourdes on 37 September 30, 1933. The practice of accumulating cash
reserves in prosperous times helped Haiti to pay its debt 3 8 in spite of the depression in commodity prices.
While the United States improved the financial con
ditions in Haiti, it made many errors in the process. One
of the most poignant criticisms of the United States finan
cial administration related to the Haitian default on the
public debt. Despite the fact that a surplus existed in
the treasury after 1915-1916, payment was not made on the 39 external debt until 1920.
Another criticism of the occupation was the American
insistence on the Haitian acceptance of the loan of 1922.
The United States believed it was necessary for the floating
Haiti— Annual Report of the Financial Adviser- General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1932-September 1933, op. cit., p. 4. 3 7 Ibid., p. 115. See infra, Appendix B.
®®News item in The New York Times, April 9, 1933, p. 8.
39 Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (fifth edition; New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1955), p. 284.
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public debt to be funded and the existing bond issues re
funded, At the same time, Haiti required a surplus of
money over expenditures for governmental expenses. Haiti
resented a loan based on the continuance of financial con
trol after the expiration of the Treaty of 1915, but no
party would have assumed the loan without this extension of
American control,^®
The critics of the occupation could also point to
the American failure to make significant improvements in
the Haitian fiscal policy, Haiti, in 1933, was still de
pendent on customs duties for 83,2 per cent of its revenue.
When commerce declined, the government's revenue position
suffered accordingly. Despite American efforts to obtain
more funds from the collection of internal revenue, the
United States failed to lessen Haiti's dependence on trade.
The attempt of the United States to revamp the anti
quated tariff system in Haiti was equally unsuccessful.
This system hampered Haiti's ability to compete with other
producers on the world market. At the same time, certain
imports which were necessities were heavily taxed, while
De La Rue, "Memorandum on Continuation of Finan cial Policy in Haiti," to Cordell Hull, March 25, 1934, Paper rêad at National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Washington, p. 8.
"^^Haiti— Annual Report of the Financial Adviser- General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1932-September 1933, op . cit., p. 38.
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many luxuries were admitted at a relatively low tax rate.
When a new tariff schedule was adopted, many of these in
equities remained, while certain educational imports were
removed from the free list. However, in spite of a result
ing increase in revenue, the abolition of the free list was 42 an error— an error which was later rectified.
Another failure of the United States intervention
was its inability to divorce Haiti from its dependence on
one export commodity. In 1932-1933, coffee still repre- 43 sented 77.71 per cent of Haiti's exports. While efforts
were made to increase the production of cotton, sisal,
sugar, and other products, coffee continued to determine
the financial status of Haiti. - - .
The Haitian Economy
Although the Treaty of 1915 had promised American
aid in the development of Haiti's agricultural and mineral
resources, the Haitian economy made little improvement dur
ing the occupation. During this period, Haiti failed to
experience the upsurge in American capital investment which
had been anticipated. By 1930, only 2 per cent of Haiti's
^^Rayford W. Logan, "The Haze in Haiti," Nation, CXXIV (March 16, 1927), 283.
‘^®Haiti— Annual Report of the Financial Adviser- General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1932-September 1933, o p . cit., p. 23.
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agricultural exports came from plantations; for, only 1 per
cent of the land was brought under cultivation by American 44 firms o
The failure of Americans to invest in Haitian agri
culture can be attributed to a confused land title system
in that country. Businessmen were reluctant to invest in
Haitian land without the assurance of a land title. In
Haiti, the system was so muddled that more than one person
might hold title to a plot of land, resulting in the in
vestor being placed in a precarious position.
The attempts of the United States to improve the
land situation failed to provide the necessary impetus to
American investment in Haiti. Although the Constitution
was amended to permit foreign land ownership, Haiti sought
to restrict this ownership on several occasions. These
attem]^]^s to limit alien ownership frightened away some po
tential investors. Also, Haiti's reluctance to clear up
its chaotic state of land titles made foreign investors
look elsewhere for opportunity. Even after the passage of
the Cadastral Law, as late as 1929, Haiti lacked proper
land laws, a land survey map, registration offices, and an 45 adequate system of settling land titles. Hence, until
'^Montague, o£. cit. , p. 25 3.
^®United States Department of State, Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner, op. cit., p. 19
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the Haitian government agreed to modify its land policies.
American economic efforts could not succeed ; and without
the investment of foreign capital, Haiti would remain rele
gated to the status of a second-rate economy.
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OBSERVATIONS ON THE OCCUPATION
For many years prior to the occupation, the United
States had been concerned over the chronic revolutions in
Haiti which had interfered with the economic development of
the country and forced it to the brink of financial default,
In 1915, Haiti was in arrears in its payments to foreign
bondholders and its creditors were demanding control of its
customhouses. However, since the Caribbean was an area of
strategic importance to the United States, this country was
determined to prevent European intervention in Haiti.
While the case for the United States intervention in
Haiti to forestall French and German action may sound con
vincing, there is little evidence to support this viewpoint,
Although Germany and France had made earlier attempts to
interfere with Haitian finances, it is highly improbable
that either nation, at the beginning of World War I, could
have threatened the sovereignty of Haiti. Rather, a more
plausible explanation for the United States intervention
can be traced to President Wilson's long-held contention
that American action was necessary to restore stability in
Haiti.^
John Edwin Fagg, Cuba, Haiti, &_ The Dominican Republic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 129.
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That President Wilson pressed for military interven
tion to protect United States investors is, at best, a dis
tortion of the facts. American interests in Haiti were
nominal by any standard and were limited to investments in
the National Bank, the National Railroad, and several utili
ties. However, in spite of their numerical weakness, the
American investors in Haiti had a vociferous and influential
representative in the person of Roger L. Farham, President
of the National Railroad and Vice President of the National
Bank. Between 1913 and 1915, Mr. Farham waged an active
campaign in the State Department to promote American inter- 2 vention and customs control of Haiti, Thus, while the
United States did not intervene in Haiti to protect Ameri
can investors, their active campaign for such action may
have influenced the State Department,
Once the intervention was effected and a new Haitian
government established, the United States representatives
in Haiti had many difficulties to face. They received
little help from the State Department in coordinating the
work of the treaty services; for, between 1915 and 1922,
there were four Secretaries of State, six chiefs of the
Latin American Division in Washington, six Marine Brigade
2 Ernest Gruening, "Haiti for the Haitians," Current History, XL (July, 1934), p. 419.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 8 3 Commanders, and six Chiefs of the Gendarmerie. However,
it was not until 1922 that the authority over the treaty
officials and the military was placed in a High Commis
sioner, who was to coordinate the work of the occupation.
While the creation of this position was a progressive step,
the United States erred in its appointment of a military
man as High Commissioner.
During this 1915-1922 period, the United States
established control over Haiti, Its initial step in the
establishment of control was to arrange for the election to
the Presidency of the United States preferred candidate.
After the election of President Dartiguenave, the United
States sought measures to consolidate its control. Thus, a
treaty was signed between the United States and Haiti pro
viding for American control of the Haitian police force,
its finances, public works, and sanitation through the de
vice of a treaty official in charge. To extend further its
control over Haiti, the United States arranged for the ex
tension of the Treaty of 1915 and the adoption of constitu
tional amendments which would limit interference from the
legislature— the legality of both acts being questionable.
Thus, because of the suppression of the Haitian
government, legitimate criticism arose in Haiti. During
3 Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1940), p. 225.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149 .
that period, the United States, through the use of a
variety of pressures, threats of removal, and actual sus
pension of government salaries, was able to dominate the
President and his Cabinet. The elected legislature was
eliminated and replaced by a more tractable appointed Coun
cil of State, While less control was exercised over the
Judicial system, the Constitution of 1918 provided for a
suspension in the irremovability of judges. Also, the
press was subdued.
Even after the appointment of High Commissioner
Russell in 1922, the domination of the Haitian government
continued. During the 1922-1930 period of the occupation,
there was little executive initiative and no legislative in
dependence, for legislative elections were not held until
1931. The judges and the newspapers were further suppressed.
The Constitutional amendments of 1928 again suspended the
irremovability of judges while decrees were issued prohibit
ing the publication of incendiary material.
Thus, between 1915 and 1930, despite American inten
tions to build a stable government in Haiti, little was
done toward this end. Although the chaotic conditions of
previous years had disappeared, still no representative
government existed in Haiti. Rather, the United States
established a Haitian government which was receptive to
American dictates. During that period, the American
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preferred candidate was elected to the Presidency and main
tained in office until the expiration of his term. The
legislative functions were exercised by an appointed Coun
cil of State while provost courts were established to cope
with the independence of the Haitian judges.
While the United States was subject to criticism
regarding the political aspects of the occupation, it was
severely censored for its military operations. The conduct
of the marines during the caco rebellion was not above re
proach, Although the marines as a group were exonerated by
the Mayo Commission, there is evidence that some marines
were involved in the abuse of prisoners and in the indis
criminate killing of natives. Whiie.such violence was not
directed by the American military command, it was certainly
a poor reflection on the United States.
Also, subjected to much criticism were the members
of the gendarmerie, the protégées of the marines. These
men, who were recruited from the lower classes, were quick
to abuse their authority. There is little doubt that their
management and abuse of the corvée encouraged the outbreak
of the caco rebellion.
After 1930, the United States re-evaluated its Hai
tian policy. Pursuant to the recommendations of the Presi
dential Commission, a more representative government was
established in Haiti, Congressional elections were held
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited withoutpermission. 15'i
which resulted in the victory of those who opposed the
American occupation. President Vincent, the choice of the
National Assembly, was a strong critic of the United States.
It was during the Vincent administration that the Treaty
Services were Haitianized and the American occupation was
terminated.
Although the occupation was dilatory in establishing
representative government in Haiti, prompt attention was
given to the material improvement of the country. Thus, the
physical conditions of Haiti were greatly improved. Roads
were built which served both the cities and the countryside.
New buildings were constructed and the telephones and tele
graph systems were improved. The public health service
triumphed over the voodoo priests, and better sanitation
was instituted in homes, streets, and market places.
In order to raise the standard of living-of the Hai
tians , the United States created a system of vocational and
agricultural education. Although the new educational sys
tem further embittered the elite, it was one of the most
constructive programs inaugurated during the occupation.
This opinion was maintained by some progressive Haitians and
was espoused by Charles Fernand, a Haitian author, in an
article entitled "Shall Haiti Adopt the Latin or Anglo-
Saxon Civilization?" He defended the establishment of
Service Technique, stating that a country whose primary
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resources are agriculture needs an educational curriculum
molded along those lines. He bemoaned the fact that ten
times more students prepared for careers in law, business,
and government service than in agriculture, a field in
which better methods were needed to improve the cotton and
coffee crop. He also criticized the lack of vocational
education for students as there were more applicants for
professional jobs than positions available
The work of the United States in the financial area
was also creditable. The burdensome debt was refunded and
being reduced. Government revenues had increased due to
honest collection and the institution of a better accounting
system. An internal revenue system was established, and
the currency was stabilized. A surplus remained in the
treasury.
However, despite the many advances made under the
occupation, the economic forecast was not encouraging,
Haiti, in 1934, remained a backward agricultural nation.
It was a one-crop economy with coffee accounting for 74 per
cent of the total value of its exports. The only other
products of any significance were also agricultural. There
were few manufacturing industries in Haiti, and those that
George Gordon, "Haitian Education," (paper read at the National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Washington, D, C , ), pp. 1-3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153
existed were limited in size. Thus, purchasing power was
limited to the wealthy, as the peasants lived on a subsist
ence level with their cash incomes varying between $30 and 5 $50 a year.
In summary, the United States failed to ameliorate
the economic conditions in Haiti and was unsuccessful in
its attempts to improve the political situation. Instead
of preparing Haitians to run their own government, the
United States established a complicated bureaucracy,
staffed, for the most part, by efficient men; but, the
treaty services became so involved that Haitians became
shut off from full governmental participation.^ While the
treaty officials were instructed to advise the Haitian
cabinet officers, this procedure was followed onl’^'^ in
theory. The treaty officers, rather than teach administra
tion, continued to perform the details of government and 7 left little to the discretion of Haitian officials.
If it was the purpose of the United States to prepare
the Haitians for self government, it is obvious that this
United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com merce, Haiti— Basic Data on Import Trade and Trade Barriers (Washington: Department of Commerce, 19 34), pp. IV-VI,
^Melvin Mo Knight, "Haiti's Progress under American Protectorate," Current History Magazine of The New York Times, XXIV (June, 192611 35 3.
^"Misrepresenting Haiti," New Republic, LIX (June 5, 1929), 59.
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effort did not succeed. Rather than allow Haitians to
assume responsibility, the American officials kept them in
subordinate roles. This was most conspicuous in the Garde;
for, after fourteen years, five Haitians had attained the
rank of Captain.®
In addition to not preparing the Haitians for self
government, the biggest error on the part of the United
States was its "failure to establish decent human contacts
with the Haitian people and particularly to cultivate the 9 Haitian upper class." The American officials did little
to understand the customs of the country and did nothing to
conciliate the discontent of the elite. Instead, these
officials avoided social contact v/ith the Haitians and in
sulted them further by establishing private clubs which
denied membership to all Haitians— even the President.
It is this author's opinion that the United States
occupation of Haiti was an overreaction to a chronic problem
which could have been treated in a more limited manner.
While Haiti benefited materially from the occupation, it is
clear that Haiti failed to achieve the political, economic,
and social stability which might possibly justify nearly
twenty years of American control. •
®Henry Fletcher, "Quo Vadis Haiti," Foreign Affairs, VIII (July, 1930), 547
^Ernest HH. . Grue Gruening, "Haiti under American Occupa- tion." Century, G U I (April, 1922), 839
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
In the research conducted in the preparation of this
thesis, the author utilized both primary and secondary
sources. Amongst the more valuable primary sources examined
were the Foreign Relations Series— 1914-1934, the Inquiry
into Occupation and Administr>tion of Haiti and Santo
Domingo by the Senate Select Committee, and the Report of
the President ' s Commission for the Study and R'eview of Con
ditions in the Republic .of Haiti. Since the author derived
much information from the Seventh Annual Report of the
American High Commissioner : 1928, and the Eighth Annual
Report of the American High Commissioner : 1929, she at
tempted to locate the first six such reports— which she
later found to be unavailable.
Amongst the secondary sources which the author found
to be of assistance webe Arthur C, Millspaugh's, Haiti
under American Control ; H, P, Davis', Black Democracy (second
edition); Ludwell Lee Montague’s, Haiti and the United
States ; Dana G„ Munro's, The United States and the Caribbean
Area; and Raymond Leslie Buell's article, "The American
Occupation of Haiti," found in Volume V of the Foreign
Policy Association Information Service, Selected issues of
Current History Magazine of The New York Times, Foreign
Affairs, and the--Bulletin of the Pan-American Union were of
particular value in the writing of this thesis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
A, PRIMARY SOURCES
_! » Treaties
United States Department of State. "Haitianization Agree ment between the United States of America and Haiti." • Signed August 5, 1931. Executive Agreement Series Number 22. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931.
______. "Haitianization of the Garde, Withdrawal of Mili tary Forces from Haiti and Financial Arrangements." Signed August 7, 1933. Executive Agreement Series Number 46. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933.
"Protocol Between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti." Signed October 3, 1919 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934.
"Treaty Between the United States and-Haiti Relating to the Finances, Economic Development and Tranquility of Haiti." Signed September 16, 1915. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916. Wash ington: Government Printing Office, 1925.
"Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti for the Further Haitianization of the Treaty Services." Unperfected Treaty. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932. V. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948.
"Withdrawal of Military Forces from Haiti, Agree- ment between the United States of America and Haiti Modifying Agreement of August 7, 1933." Signed July 24, 1934. Executive Agreement Series Number 58. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934.
United States Treaties. "Additional Act Between United States and Haiti Extending the Duration of the Treaty.' Signed March 28, 1917. Series Number 623-A. Washing ton: Government Printing Office, 1917.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 8
_2. Published Documents
General Receiver of Customs. Resume of Accomplishments of the Customs Receivership of the Republic of Haiti from August 28, 1916-January 31, 1924. Executive Agreement Series Number 68. Port-au-Prince: General Receiver of Customs, 1924.
Haiti— Annual Report of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1932-September 1933 o Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l'Etat, 1933.
Lansing, Robert. Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Hearings before the Senate Select Committee, §"7th Cong. , 2d Sess. Washing ton: Senate Committee Printing, 1922.
United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Haiti— Basic Data on Import Trade and Trade Barriers. Washington : Department of Commerce, 1934.
United States Congress. Congressional Record. Message from the President of the United States to the Congress of the United States. House of Representatives, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., December 2, 1929-January 23, 1930. Washington; Government Printing Office, 1930.
United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67tb Cong., 2d Sess. Report Number 794. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922,
______„ Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo. Vol, I. 67lb Cong, , 1st and 2d Sess., August 5.', 1921-November 16, 1921 ; Vol, II, 67th Cong,, 1st and 2d Sess,, November 29, 1921-June 16, 1922, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
United States Department of State. Eighth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner : 1929. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914-1934. Washington : Government Printing Office, 1922-1952.
Seventh Annual^ Report of the American High ^Com missioner : 1928. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929.
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______o Report of the President's Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in the Republic of Haitio Latin America Series Number 2. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930.
United States Navy Department. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1915-1934. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915-1934.
United States Office of the Coordinator of American Affairs, Basic Data on the Other American Republics. Washing ton: Commerce Department, 1945.
_3. Unpublished Documents
Beach, Captain E. L. "Conditions in Haiti." Paper read at the National Archives, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, Washington, D, C.
De La Rue. "Memorandum on Continuation of Financial Policy in Haiti," to Cordell Hull, March 25, 1934. Paper read at National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Washington, D . C,
Gordon, George. "Haitian Education," Paper read at the National Archives, General Records of the Department of State ; Record Group 59, Washington, D, C,
Munro, Dana, "General Conditions Report for June 1, 1932- June 30, 1932," Paper read at the National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Washington, D, C,
United States Marine Corps, "Report on Affairs in Haiti 1915-1920," Report read at the Columbus Memorial Library, Washington, D. C, (Mimeographed.)
j4. Newspapers
"Constitution 1918," Le Moniteur. June 19, 1918, pp. 177- 1843,
The New York Times. January, 1914-December, 1936.
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Be SECONDARY SOURCES
l_o Books
Balch, Emily Greene (ed.). Occupied Haiti. New York : Writer's Publishing Company, 1927.
Blakeslee, George. Mexico and the Caribbean. New York : G. E . Steckert and Company, 1920.
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Calixte, Colonel D. P. The Calvary of _a Soldier. New York : Wendell Malliet and Company, 1939.
Callcott, Wilfred. Caribbean Policy of the United States 1890-1920. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942.
Craige, John Houston, Cannibal Cousins. New York : Menton Balchs Company, 1934.
Davis, H . P. Black Democracy. First and second editions. New York : Dodge Publishing Company, 1928 and 1936,
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Marshall, Harriet Gibbs, The Story of Haiti, Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1930.
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Montague, Ludwell Lee, Haiti and the United States. Dur ham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1940.
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Munro, Dana G. The United States and the Caribbean Area, Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934,
Price, Hannibal, The Haytian Question, New York: Louis Weiss and Company, 1891,
Rippy, J, Fred, The Caribbean Danger Zone. New York : Go P, Putnam's Sons, 1940.
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_2, Periodicals
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Cumberland, W, W, "Financial and Commercial Situation in Haiti," Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, LX (July, 1926), 665-669,
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_ , "Haiti's Foreign Commerce," Bulletin of the Pan- American Union, LIX (November, 1925')' ^ 1133-1139 »
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McIntosh, Ko C. "Gold and Gourdes," American Mercury, IX (December, 1926), 484-489.
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Haiti and Santo Domingo," American Review of Reviews, LXVI (July, 1922), 46-60.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIXES
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A
PRESIDENTS OF HAITI
General Salomon...... 1879-1886 (full term)
General Salomon...... 1886-1888 (killed after two Years)
General Hippolyte...... 1889-1896 (died near close of term)
General Simon Sam...... 1896-1903 (overthrown)
General Alexis Nord...... 1903-1908 (overthrown)
General Antoine Sam...... 1908-1911 (overthrown)
General Cincinnatus Leconte... 1911-1912 (killed in office)
General Tancrede Auguste...... 1912-1913 (killed in office)
General Michel Oreste...... 1913-1914 (overthrown)
General Oreste Zamor...... 1914-January to December (overthrown)
General Davilmar Theodore..... 1914-1915 December to April (overthrown)
General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam.1915-April to July (killed in office)
SOURCE: United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washington: Govern ment Printing Office, 1925), p. 311.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CD ■ D O Û. C S a.
- o APPENDIX B CD (/> REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES AND EXCESS OF REVENUES OR c/) EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEARS 1916-1917 TO 1932-1933 (in Gourdes)
■D8 Year Revenues Expenditures Surplus Deficit
3 ___ CD 1916-17 18,934,684.70 15,884,177.80 3,050,506.90 -n 1917-18 16,048,390.75 14,614,997.45 1,433,393.30 3.c 1918-19 29,955,933.45 15,499,480.45 14,456,453.00 — — — 3" CD 1919-20 33,997,450.79 20,646,866.2513,350,584.54 — — — ——— CD 1920-21 19,946,095.70 32,788,455.90 12 ,842,360.20 "D ——— O 1921-22 24,964,795.72 39,775,908.40 14 ,811,112.68 Q. C 1922-23 31,950,101.24 30,560,113.15 1,389,988.09 —— — — — — O8: 1923-24 32,902,321.33 34,215,495.94 1 ,313,174.61 3 1924-25 40,487,667.00 39,218,202.02 1,269,464.98——— O 1925-26 45.364,648.10 40,930,725.084,433,923.02 —— — 3" 1926-27 38,861,534.79 39,747,163.75 ——— 885,628.96 1927-28 50,421,016.49 40,977,914.49 9,443,102.00 --- & 1928-29 42,521,528.40 44,119,503.94 —— — 1 ,597,975.54 1929-30 38,648,163.39 40,643,229.52 — —— 1 ,995,066.13 O C 1930-31 31,746,582.38 36,190,070.45 — — T- 4 ,443,488.07 % 1931-32 28,023,742.10 32,888,112.00 — — — 4 ,864,369.90 1932-33 37,305,298.67 33,258,808.08 4,046,490.59 --- enC/) o" 3 Total 562,079,955.00551,959,224.67 52,873,906.42,753,176.09 42 Surplus for period 10,120,730.33
SOURCE : Haiti— Annual Report of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1932-September 1933 (Port^au-Prince : Imprimerie de l'Etat, 1933), p. 114. Table Number 46. ;d CD ■ D I s Q.
■D APPENDIX C CD
C/) PUBLIC DEBT cn 3o' (in Gourdes)
fD 8 Fiduciary T3 Series A Series B Series C Total Currency C5-
3 CD September 30, 1915 107 ,821,656.45 37 ,185,657.60 8 853,754.80 153 861 068.85 September 30, 1916 113 ,455,856.35 38,974,237.85 ± ______8 352,663.15 160 782 757.35 September 30, 1917 119 ,089,179.15 42 ,093,154.00 ------7 786,974.80 168 969 307.95 September 30, 1918 124,722,501.95 45 ,014,560.65 ------— 7 510,837.75 177 247 900.35 September 30, 1919 90,556,562.00,774,145.85 48 ——— 7 245,000.00 146 575 707.85 CD "O September 30, 1920 33,487,414.30 51 ,078,637.35 ——— 7 245,000.00 91 811 051.65 8 Û. September 30, 1921 32,225,464.3053 ,090,682.40 ——— 6 080,362.50 91 396 509.20 C Q September 30, 1922 33 ,505,429.95 52 ,945,770.25 — — 6 080,362.50 92531 562.70 September 30, 1923 79 ,235,000.00 25 ,000,000.00 ------— 6 080,362,50 110 315 362.50 ■D September 30, 1924 78 ,242,500.0023 ,566,980.60 13,158,711.10 6 080,309.50 121 048 501.20 3 September 30, 1925 75 ,183,419.30 21 ,747,462.3012,640,072.70 5 660,309.50115 231 263.80 September 30, 1926 71,474,157,35 19 ,775,074.6511,825,524.80 5 232,322.50108 307 079.30 CD Q. September 30, 1927 68,939,916.15 14 ,552,976.44 11,401,640.004 812,322.50 99706 855.09 September 30, 1928 66,039,039.40 13 ,105,431.55 10,901,321.604 392,322.50 94 438 115.05 September 30, 1929 62 ,751,128.3511 ,603,630.8010,352,636.853 970,000.00 88677 396.00
■ D September 30, 1930 59 ,190,194.70 10 ,001^593.30 9,749,761.35 3 764,100.00 82 705 649.35 CD September 30, 1931 56 ,712,940.95 8,697,405.33 9,324,729.82 3 622,500.00 78 357 576.10 C/) September 30, 1932 53 ,221,413.85 ■ 7 ,103,321.31 8,678,635.80 3 622,500.00 72 625 870.96 C/) September 30, 1933 49,600,677.60' 5 ,655,492.39 8,022,742.85 3 622,500.00 66 901 412.84
SOURCE : Haiti— Annual Report of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1932-September T933 (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de 1 * Etat, ï'9'33T^ p. 115. Table Number 48.