The Landscape between Bureaucracy and Political Strategy A Qualitative Case Study of the Policy Processes in Swedish Security and Defence Policy
Emy Larsson
Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp) Political Science with a focus on Crisis Management and Security Master’s Programme in Politics and War Autumn 2020 Supervisor: Dan Hansén Word count: 19865 Abstract
The Swedish Defence bill of 2015 demonstrated a rapid change in policy objectives, consequently moving away from an expeditionary force and converging into a territorial defence force. Previous research has attributed and explained the quick shift to the geostrategic unbalance that followed after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Yet, major policy changes are often years in the making, indicating that there must be additional explanations to the rapid shift. By applying a modified version of John Kingdon’s (2011) Multiple Streams Framework on the case of Sweden changing its security and defence policy, this thesis examines the policy process that preceded the official policy decision. The thesis provides further explanation to why the rapid policy change occurred by utilising qualitative content analysis. The analysis shows that the new policy was adopted due to several factors: one being the attention brought to several problems pertaining to the previous policy, another one was found in the timing between focusing events and the on-going work process of the Swedish defence commission, and lastly, strong actors within the policy field were in favour of a change in policy. The thesis concludes that the presence of several factors within the processes of politics, policy and problems enabled the rapid policy change.
Keywords: Security and defence policy, policy processes, policy change, Multiple Streams Framework, agenda-setting, Swedish Defence Commission
2 Table of content
1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 BACKGROUND 1 1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND AIM 3 1.3 DELIMITATIONS 4
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 6
2.1 SWEDISH SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 6 2.2 POLICY CHANGE AND THEORY 8
3. THEORY 10
3.1 THEORIZING THE POLICY PROCESS 10 3.2 MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK 11 3.2.1 PROBLEM STREAM 12 3.2.2 POLITICAL STREAM 14 3.2.3 POLICY STREAM 15 3.2.4 POLICY AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 16 3.2.5 AGENDA AND DECISION WINDOWS 17
4. METHODOLOGY 19
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 19 4.2 MATERIAL 20 4.2.1 INTERVIEWS 21 4.3 QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 23 4.3.1 LIMITATIONS 24 4.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 24
5. ANALYSIS 26
5.1 PROBLEM STREAM 26 5.2 POLITICAL STREAM 29 5.3 POLICY STREAM 32 5.4 THE POLICY AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 34 5.5 THE WINDOWS 37 5.5.1 THE AGENDA WINDOW 37 5.5.2 THE DECISION WINDOW 38
6. DISCUSSION 40
6.1 LIMITATIONS 40 6.2 CONCLUSIONS 40 6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 42
3 7. REFERENCES 44
7.1 LITERATURE 44 7.2 EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 48 7.1.2 INTERVIEWS 49 7.1.3 NEWS ARTICLES 50
8. APPENDIX 51
A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 51
4 1. Introduction
The last two decades of research focusing on Swedish security and defence policy have seen a change in its perception. Security and defence policies are no longer considered exceptional processes but are instead increasingly handled and thought of in the same practices as other policy areas (Holmberg 2015: 238-239; Christiansson 2020:337). Hence, can one spot an augmented politicisation of the defence and security policy process1 (Stiglund 2021: 206). In a European state perspective, this has occurred parallel to both a general trend of defence transformation after the Cold War (Christiansson 2020: 3), and increased demilitarisation within states, that passed by without much public notice (Sheehan 2008: 179). As a result of this, research has noted a reduced political and normative influence for the military (Holmberg 2015: 240). However, more recent events have sparked a new change, and western countries have once again reformed the focus of their security and defence policies – with, for instance, increases in defence budgets and a refocus on territorial defence. Many of these changes have been ascribed to the geostrategic shift that followed after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Holmberg 2015; Agrell 2016; Stiglund 2021). However, shifts in policies are famously slow in the making (Herweg et al. 2017), and a rapid change in policy stands out. One country that rapidly changed its policy after the events of 2014 was Sweden, where a new Defence bill was accepted only a year later – entailing a distinct shift in policy, which saw a transition into a territorial defence (Prop. 2014/15:109). In turn questions were sparked regarding how and why such a quick policy change came about, how it was possible and what further explanatory factors exist and can account for why such a rapid shift was achievable.
1.1 Background
During the last two decades, the Swedish defence policy has been marked by cooperation and demilitarization (Holmberg 2015; Westberg 2015; Agrell 2016). Ever since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has gradually and forcefully diminished its military. Defence and security policies were focused on international cooperation and joining foreign peacekeeping missions
1 A policy process is in this thesis defined as ”the interactions that occur over time between public policies and surrounding actors, events, contexts, and outcomes.” (Weible 2017: 2). (Berndtsson et al. 2015; Agrell 2016). The threat against Sweden’s own territory was deemed low, and a high focus was placed on participating within UN-, NATO- or EU-led missions. Security was to be created alongside Sweden’s neighbouring states and the concept of the “solidarity principle” was created as a means by which the country could generate security together with other nations (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014: 191)2. However, a shift in the international security debate was traceable following the Russo- Georgian War in 2008, where Russia, which was deemed as having limited war capacities, entered into a full-scale war with one of its neighboring states (Asmus 2010; Agrell 2016: 223-225). Swedish officials reacted to the situation by concluding that the actions of Russia had “put the all-European security order into a state of crisis [authors own translation]” (prop. 2008/09:140). The Swedish government notably remarked on the war in Georgia in their Defence bill in 2009 (prop. 2008/09: 140). However, there was minimal explicit political action or change in policy following it – suggesting that it was not deemed as a real threat or problem at the time. In the years following the Russo-Georgian war, Sweden was mainly engaged in discussions surrounding the ongoing, NATO-led, operation in Afghanistan, in which the country was heavily engaged (Agrell 2016). Apart from that, there were very few things that made it to the political debates. The only other thing that received some attention by the politicians was the reorganization and staffing difficulties that the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) were facing. The perception of the Russian threat was only present far away in the periphery, and warnings regarding a more vigorous, and growing military Russia were often dismissed via references to “Russian scare (rysskräck)” (Agrell 2016: 225). After the government put forward their defence proposition in 2009, very few issues pertaining to the armed forces’ future were visible on the political agenda (Agrell 2016: 238). However, a change in the discourse and the media narrative was traceable after several events and statements that occurred during the spring of 2013 (Lindberg 2013). Two of them received quite a lot of media attention. The first event was the on-following debate after an interview given by the then Swedish Chief of Defence (Chod), Sverker Göranson. He stated the SAF would only be able to defend one strategic location within the country, and they would only be able to do so during the duration of one week. After that, Sweden would have to rely on the help of others (Holmström 2012). The interview sparked an intense debate both
2 For further reading regarding the transformation process that Swedish defence and security policy went through after the end of the Cold War and the following decade, see Holmberg (2006) and Christiansson (2020) among others.
2 among politicians, but also within news media organisations, as well as an increased public debate (Holmberg 2015: 246). The second event, which also sparked an increase in the debate, was a simulated Russian airstrike against Sweden. The attack, also known as the “Easter attack”, occurred on Good Friday just outside of the Swedish territorial border and the SAF was unable to launch fighter jets as a response and protective measure (Holmström 2013a). This event showcased in reality what the Chod just a few months earlier had warned about. Around this time, a change in public opinion was also traceable via public opinion polls, regarding the Swede’s views on decreased defence spending and a NATO membership (SOM-Institutet 2020: 63, 66). Almost a year later, Russia once again shocked the world and the international system with the country's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the on-following conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This event has been attributed as “the mother” event that changed both the Swedish and the European perception of their security and defence (Agrell 2016: 238). Following the Swedish election in the autumn of 2014, a new government, led by the Social Democrats, took office and a dramatic turn occurred in the defence and security policy. Roughly a year after the Ukraine events, a new Swedish Defence bill was presented, entailing an immensely rapid policy change. A shift that entailed that national territorial defence was now the main task and focus of the Swedish defence, in stark contrast with the past 20 years’ objectives. However, conscription was also reinstated with a decision that followed two years after the defence bill, after being ended in the previous defence bill. Also, as previously noted, a shift in both the public and the politicians’ views was traceable before the Ukraine events (SOM-institutet 2020). This, alongside the unusually rapid shift in policy, indicates that a change in the Swedish defence and security policy was already underway before the early spring of 2014. Meaning, there must be other explanations as to why the shift came about, apart from the drastic change in the country’s geostrategic sphere, and also how it in a policy process context came about so quickly.
1.2 Research problem and aim
This thesis aims to obtain greater meaning surrounding the policy process that preceded the Swedish shift in policy and more explicitly it will seek to explain why and how the sudden shift in Swedish security and defence policy came about. The shift stands out in the sense that policy changes usually are quite long and intricate processes, especially within the complex
3 realm of security and defence policymaking (Christiansson 2020), indicating that there must exist more than only external explanatory factors. Therefore, the thesis will aim to attain more explanation for the events that lead Sweden into shifting its security and defence policy, leaving a seemingly long period of time marked by demilitarization and going into a future focusing on militarization and territorial defence. The reasons for the change are naturally several, such as strategic shifts in the international system, ideological factors, international trends, and much more (Rosati, Hagan & Sampson1994:270). However, previous research has failed in explaining how such a rapid policy shift was made possible. Therefore, the primary purpose of this thesis is to explore what other circumstances that caused the shift in policy to happen and explore the policy process that preceded the decision to change policy. In light of this and the above stated, this thesis will answer the following research question:
Why did the Swedish security and defence policy so rapidly change from an expeditionary to a territorial defence?
The formulation of the research question demonstrates how the thesis both has an explanatory, as well as an exploratory aim. By answering the question above, it expects to offer a richer account for why and how the change of defence and security policy came about. Thus, contributing to the empirical knowledge regarding the case. The answer might not provide a vast amount of generalizable knowledge regarding policy processes, but it will account for the fruitfulness of policy process theory when explaining shifts in complex areas such as defence and security policy. Furthermore, it will provide a description of the inner “machinery” around Swedish defence and security policy, thereby generating more knowledge surrounding its practices and contributing to the research field of both policy process studies and defence and security policies.
1.3 Delimitations
Given the focus of the thesis, one conceptual consideration that is necessary to define is the thesis’s policy scope. Foreign policy, security policy, and defence policy all have an intricate relationship with one another, both in terms of theory, empirics, and concepts. Given that the case being studied primarily entailed a shift in defence and security policy, and that foreign policy is a comprehensive concept, this study will only focus on the two primary concepts
4 defence and security policy. Where defence policy is defined as being part of a country’s external security policy (Andrén 1997: 133), and security policy is that through which a country, or other forms of actors, identifies and defines as a threat or risk (Stiglund 2021: 201). A second delimitation of the study is that of the time. The reasons for why the Swedish security and defence policy change are many, and where some can be traced several years back in history (Holmberg 2006; Christiansson 2020), given this and the limitations that the thesis is faced with, a decision was made in limiting the focal point of the research to the years 2007-2015. The motivation for this is that the period includes two different Defence bills, where the latter entailed the decision to shift policy. Finally, a third delimitation entails that a primary focus has been placed on the main actors involved in the Swedish security and defence policy process – which are the Government, the Parliament, the Government's office, the SAF and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (SCCA) (Regeringen 2017). These actors are identified as the main actors in the Defence Commissions (DC) work process, recognized as one of the primary forums for policy development regarding Swedish defence and security (Åkesson 2020; Regeringen 2017). The process includes several other agencies, and different kinds of experts, making it a large and complex process to study. Therefore, a centering and delimiting choice was made in focusing on the main actors involved in the policy process.
5 2. Previous research
2.1 Swedish security and defence policy
Research looking at shifts in security and/or defence policy exists in numerous amounts. However, studies looking at changes in security and defence policy in Sweden are not as abundant, but they nevertheless exist in a fair amount. A lot of the past research has focused on Sweden in the perspective of its “armed neutrality” as a security actor and non-alignment during the Cold War, and the country’s “exceptional” role in comparison with others (Noreen 1983; Agrell 2000; Kronvall and Petersson 2005), a strategy which after the end of the war quickly was replaced by one more focused on cooperation – especially within the EU (Bailes, Herolf and Sundelius 2006). An increased Europeanization within the national security identities of particularly the Nordic EU-states was visible (Rieker 2006). This research gives a good account of some of the development that the Swedish security policy underwent during the early 2000s. The Europeanising security policy research has more lately been followed by studies looking at variations of “Nordicness” in foreign and security policy (Doeser, Petersson and Westberg 2012). A multitude of European crises and the return of a more forceful Russia has provided more empirical evidence into references of a more Nordic turn in security and defence policies among the Nordic countries, especially after creating the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). Douglas Brommesson (2018) examines this development by using a theoretical framework set on capturing the notion of security cultures within the Nordic states. His analysis is centered around Sweden and identifies that the “exceptional” aspect in Swedish policy mainly is found within its security and not foreign policy, and that a changing security environment is the most plausible explanation for this. In the same volume that features Brommessons article, Adrian Hyde-Price (2018) writes a concluding epilogue over the five articles that have separately analysed the Nordic countries through the security cultures framework. In his article, he points out four factors that in his meaning are paramount for understanding the sudden increase in Nordic security cooperation – Russian relapse in foreign and security policy; the growing cost of defence materials; the weakening of the transatlantic security partnership; and the burden of historical defence cuts (Hyde-Price 2018: 437-439). He further pushes his case by pointing at the importance of identifying the geopolitical and strategic context to obtain greater explanatory power regarding the emergence of new policies. However, these arguments are not further discussed
6 in the article, only in the sense that role theory and the study of security cultures need to be further supplemented with aspects of geopolitical and strategic context. A study that looked at both Sweden as a case study and the processes behind Swedish defence and security policy is an article by Arita Holmberg (2015). The paper aims to explain the explanatory power of the existing relevant literature in explaining the demilitarisation that has happened in Europe since the end of the Second World War and how it has changed in the past decade. For her case study, she uses Sweden as an example on which she tests her analytical framework. In her study, she finds that the demilitarisation process in Sweden has affected and changed both the military's role and its influence within society. The study's primary focus is that of de- and militarisation processes, the study's focus is hence different, but it shares similarities because it studies the interaction between the military and government and how it affects policy. A very recent study that has looked at the discursive shifts and consequences of the Swedish demilitarization process, as well as the results of the most recent shift in Sweden’s security and defence policy – following the Russian annexation of Crimea – is done by Jonatan Stiglund (2021). In his research, a focus is placed on obtaining greater meaning regarding the on-going broadening and redefinition of the concept of security policy and usage of Sweden as a setting for a case study. It is one of few studies identified that have looked at the most recent shift in Swedish defence and security policy, following the events around 2014, and identifies several discursive changes occurring around the period. The primary findings being that security problems now relate to several policy areas, and that policy today does not abide under one overall security paradigm. Concluding that more research regarding security and defence policies is needed to grasp the underlying purposes of the discursive shifts. Concludingly, after going through this timeline of previously conducted research regarding Swedish security policy, two aspects stand out. Firstly, so far, quite a little research has been conducted on the topic of this latest shift in Swedish security and defence policy. This can naturally be explained by the simple fact that these events and the shift are relatively recent in time and still on-going. That does not, however, diminish the relevance and interest of studying them. Instead, it provides insight into the security fluctuation that has occurred during the past two decades, in Sweden and the world. Secondly, a lot of the previously conducted research on the topic of Swedish security and defence policy has either been done and explained via either more external factors (Doeser, Petersson and Westberg 2012; Hyde- Price 2018) or by more internal discursive ones (Brommesson 2018, Stiglund 2021).
7 However, the processes by which policy alternatives end up on the political decision-making agenda and influence action is an explanatory aspect that thus far has not been widely used among research set on understanding security and defence policy. This thesis will contribute to the empirical knowledge surrounding one of the more significant changes in modern Swedish defence and security policy, given that the shift constitutes a break with post-Cold War policies.
2.2 Policy change and theory
The theoretical lenses of previously conducted research regarding Swedish security and defence policy have varied between those of the Foreign Policy Analysis theory (Doeser 2008), a framework of security cultures (Brommesson 2018), security politicization (Bynander 2003), and that of strategic governance (Christiansson 2020). A lot of the previous research has had an institutional or structural focus, where key individuals’ roles have not been as widely researched - indicating a lack of research focusing on both the processes that shape policy output and the actors that are part of it. The dissertation of Arita Holmberg (2006) has several similarities with this thesis, because it uses Sweden as a case example and that it partly uses the theoretical lenses of John Kingdon’s (2011) Multiple Streams Framework. Holmberg sets out to investigate how the Swedish defence policy became Europeanized, to identify how Europeanization within the policy area looks like (Holmberg 2006:4-5, 197, 205). The dissertation is a good illustration for applying the framework on the case example of Sweden, and as a source of how the Swedish defence policy changed during the beginning of the 2000s. It differentiates itself by only focusing on defence, and not also security policy. Thereby, it misses some of the broader security aspects, more specifically in how security policies constitute a country’s self-image, which in turn affects its actions outwards. Nevertheless, it provides inspiration and insight to this thesis. A third, useful work on policy change is the dissertation of Magnus Christiansson (2020), in which he studies the defence transformation that Sweden underwent between 2000 and 2010. It relates to this study in the sense that it looks at the three defence bills that came before the one of primary focus in this thesis, the Defence bill of 2015-2020 (Prop. 2014/15: 109). The dissertation studies, more specifically, the administrative and political methods and processes by which the SAF are governed, via the case of practices in defence transformation.
8 A second aspect that it analyses is the conceptual understanding of governance in the defence sector (Christiansson 2020:10). The dissertation’s perspective is based on a neutralist conception and provides insight into the usage of strategic governance in the Swedish government and governing. One of the critical points identified is the increased need among leaders within the SAF to learn how to adhere to the norms of higher government. Christiansson’s primary focus is defence transformation, and not policy changes, indicating that emphasis is placed on the SAF:s role in the development process and how they responded to policy output, not the policy process in itself. A study set on explaining the occurrence of rapid changes in defence and security policy alternative is an article by Stephen Ceccoli (2019). He finds credible usage of the Multiple Streams Framework to explain why drone strikes became the US’s preferred policy alternative in the Yemen War. The article also finds that the framework has fortitude in explaining decisions with elements of ambiguity surrounding them (Ceccoli 2019), which indicates that it should be able to provide good explanatory value to this thesis case study. Furthermore, an essential contribution to the thesis’s research field is its study of the Swedish Defence Commission and its documentation of the “machinery” behind the Swedish defence and security policy process. The processes surrounding Swedish policy- and decision- making in security and defence matters, have not received much attention by previous research, at least not from a policy process perspective. This thesis will fill parts of that gap and provide empirical knowledge surrounding Swedish defence and security politics practices.
9 3. Theory
3.1 Theorizing the policy process
What this thesis aims at capturing within the vast area of policy is situated within the field of the policy process. More specifically, this thesis will focus on the aspects of the process concerned with what ends up on the political agenda and what decisions that get made - it will not focus as much on the aspects of implementation and evaluation within the process. The reasons for this are both because of the delimitations that the thesis is faced with, but also because how problems are defined, to some extent, shape how they are handled within the political system (Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 4; Knaggård 2009: 18-19). The degree of complexity of a policy process is also of relevance for the studied case, given that rational decision-making by some researchers is considered insufficient when it comes to complex issues or problems (Knaggård 2009: 91-92), indicating that a theoretical model able to account for a high degree of complexity is necessary for the thesis empirical case. A fair number of theories claims to explain changes in policies and the often-complex processes in which they are changed. Three of the more prominent ones, which also share a few similarities, are the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Weible 2017). They share a couple of assumptions, but two instances where the three theories differ are their explanations of the individual and collective action. The MSF sees the individual as a “satisficer”, while the other two sees it in terms of “preferences and situation characteristics” (PET) or guided by inner “belief systems” (ACF) (Schlager 1999: 242-244). Collective action is a second concept which differentiates them, where the MSF cares the least about collective action and instead focuses on the critical roles of specific individuals, policy entrepreneurs, for instance. The two other theories pay a lot more interest in the force of collective action (Schlager 1999: 244-245). Given this, it is found that the MSF theory is deemed most applicable to the inquiries of this thesis, due to its explanatory value in assessing the processes of policy change through the actions of specific individuals. This is deemed especially relevant, given that the actors within Swedish defence and security policy are of a small numeral, indicating that individuals’ roles should be prominent. Furthermore, the MSF is chosen due to its acclaimed prominence in explaining the policy process while maintaining its complexity. The framework has also received prominence for explaining rapid policy
10 changes, suggesting that it will give a good account for the rapid shift that this thesis means to explain (Rüb 2016). Lastly, the MSFs view of rationality and favouring of bounded rationality is seen as a final reason for why it will be able to explain the complex ways of the policy process, given that rational decision-making models, for instance, have been found insufficient in explaining complex issues or problems (Knaggård 2009).
3.2 Multiple Streams Framework
The framework, which originally was developed and put forward by Kingdon (2011, first published in 1984) with inspiration from the garbage-can model (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972), consists of six different basic assumptions – ambiguity, time constraints, problematic policy preferences, unclear technology, fluid participation, and stream independence (Herweg et al. 2017: 18-20). All these assumptions provide the guidelines by which the framework is to be used and understood. The basic outline and structural elements of the MSF are firstly signified by the notion of stream independence among the three streams – problem, policy, and political. The streams manifest the independent processes that flow through the political system (Herweg et al. 2017). Given the assumption that the consensus-building within the streams is done via different dynamics (Kingdon 2011). The MSF further assumes that there is no natural connection between a problem and a policy solution, which is why it uses the term coupling to indicate the possible linkage between the two (Herweg et al. 2017). The second stage involves how an issue or problem might attain agenda prominence and further along become decided upon by decision-makers, which requires the independent streams to at some point come together. That opportunity arises when and if a “policy window” opens. Often enough, though, a third factor is required to happen, according to the theory. Namely, the coupling between a problem and a solution needs to have been done by a “policy entrepreneur”, which presents this to receptive policymakers (Herweg et al. 2017: 20). In recent years, a modified version of Kingdon’s original framework was developed by Herweg, Huß and Zohlnhöfer (2015), to be more adapted to parliamentary political systems. Given that Sweden uses a parliamentary system and that defence and security policy to a high degree are handled on the national level, the modified frameworks’ usage is deemed instinctive. The modified process is signified by two coupling processes and two different outcome windows, the agenda window, and the decision window. The coupling for the second
11 window is done via “political entrepreneurs'', and the decision window enables the policy solution to become policy output (Herweg et al. 2015). All of the structural elements of the MSF are further elaborated upon in the next sections and can be seen below in the figure.
Figure 1. The modified multiple streams framework Source: Herweg et al (2015: 445)
The framework is, naturally, not without limitations. A reoccurring discussion among users and critics of it is the actual independence of the streams. The critics question the usefulness of having independent streams, stressing that interdependent ones are more fruitful. Pointing to the notion that changes in one stream can reinforce or trigger changes in the other ones (Robinson and Eller 2010; Mucciaroni 2013). The counterargument is that the independence of then can be seen or used as a conceptual tool, in order to, for instance, capture rationality (Herweg et al. 2017:39). A second factor relevant regarding the limitations of the framework is the inclusion of the mass media (Rüb 2016: 62). Their reporting on issues, and non- reporting, does indeed have some effect in terms of which problems make it to the political agenda or not. Hence, this is something that the thesis will use, by way of using the news reporting done about the studied problems.
3.2.1 Problem Stream
According to the MSF, a problem is “a condition that deviates from policymakers or citizens' ideal state” (Béland and Howlett 2016: 222) and is also defined as a public problem, meaning that government action is needed in resolving it. Furthermore, conditions can turn into problems if one, for instance, sees another country acting differently upon it and managing it
12 better, or the condition starts being seen through a different perspective and gets seen as a problem (Herweg et al. 2017: 21). Also, meaning that different problems include a “perceptual, interpretive element” (Kingdon 2011: 110). Problems come to decision-makers’ attention by various systemic indicators – either monitored by themselves or by governmental or nongovernmental agencies. They seldom do so via different kinds of political pressure or perceptual sleight of hand (Kingdon 2011: 90). Some of the most common indicators are either expenditures and budgetary impacts or commissioned studies. These are not used as indicators of whether a problem exists or not but are instead mainly used in two ways: receiving an indication of changes in problems and assessing the magnitude of them (Kingdon 2011 :91). The notion of indicators is not without problem in itself, given that they come with interpretations. Indicators can in themselves come with powerful implications, and the interpretation of these can result in extensive debates regarding their meaning (Kindon 2011: 94). However, according to Kingdon, these indicators are not always in themselves enough to grab decision-makers attention. This is often achieved by what he calls focusing events – such as a crisis or disaster that points at the problem, or a kind of powerful symbol that catches attention, or that a policymaker has personal experience of the problem (Kingdon 2011: 94-95). What it is that constitutes as a symbol or a personal experience for a policymaker, is not clearly defined by Kingdon. The constitution of focusing events has been both assumed and critically discussed by other research (Birkland and Warnement 2016: 99- 103). Nonetheless, Kingdon stresses the fact that a focusing event in and of itself very seldomly is enough to carry a subject to the policy agenda. Instead, the events could be seen as, firstly, something that brings attention to a problem that is already in “the back of people’s minds”; or secondly, as an early warning of something that could possibly evolve into a problem; and thirdly, a combination of focusing events can jointly affect the problem definition (Kingdon 2011: 98) – suggesting that enough awareness to a problem requires at least two events. The third factor by which attention for a problem can be gathered is via feedback on existing programs. For instance, it becomes known to the policymakers and the public that a program is not meeting its goals, or the budget is spiralling, and feedback regarding this can be used in framing something as a problem (Herweg et al. 2017: 22). The notion of framing then tells us that agency is in play and that the theory discards objective facts. However, Kingdon does not introduce agency in the problem stream, more recent research has done this. The concept of problem brokers addresses this and is defined as actors that “frame conditions
13 as public problems and work to make policymakers accept these frames. Problem brokers thus define conditions as problems.” (Knaggård 2015: 452). With this development of the problem stream, it is easier to distinguish between it and the policy stream, and policy entrepreneurs - something that previous research has stated as being a difficulty (Knaggård 2015: 451; Herweg et al. 2017: 22).
3.2.2 Political Stream
There are three core elements within the political stream: government, interest groups, and the national mood. The general core of the stream is based on bargaining and power, given that it is within this stream that the moves for a majority are made. Therefore, the stream is naturally located in the middle of the political system (Herweg et al. 2017: 24). In the first element, governments, the focus is placed on changes in composition. Because some policy proposals might be more in line ideologically with some politicians, then others, could a turnover in government help put an item on the political agenda. A second aspect within the element that is important is the power and turf battles that might exist among the bureaucratic administrators and legislators (Herweg et al. 2017: 25) – which naturally affects what issues make it to the agenda or not. Noteworthy in this aspect, is also the terminological inclusion of governments – where Kingdon incorporates (as in the American system) the administration, civil servants and Congress in the term (2011: 21). In a Swedish context, these actors would, for instance, be divided into at least four separate sub- elements – such as the Government (the Administration), the Governments Offices (the Administration and civil servants), Government agencies (civil servants), and the Parliament (Congress) (Larsson and Bäck 2008: 187-188). However, where political parties should fit in the stream is somewhat unclear - Herweg, Huß and Zohlnhöfer (2015), debates and lands in the conclusion that it should be a variable on its own within the stream. The second element, interest groups, is relevant given the effects they can have on the voiced support for an idea. Focus here is the effects interest groups can have via campaigns, not in the softening-up of policy ideas – which occurs in the policy stream (Herweg et al. 2017: 25). The degree and way interest groups work in Sweden differ to some extent, and research suggests that interaction methods have become much more informal, and the general influence weaker (Lindvall and Sebring 2005; Christiansen et al. 2010).
14 The final element, the national mood, is arguably an elusive factor, but important because it provides empirical results and is often referred to by politicians (Herweg et al. 2017: 24). An important factor in this is how parties compete over space on the political agenda, and which policy areas or questions that are seen being “owned” by a party. Research tells us that an issue owned by a governing party is more likely to end up on the agenda, than those owned by parties in the opposition (Herweg et al. 2015: 439-440). In the end, however, the national mood is manly up to the interpretation and perception of it by the politicians, except in the cases where the national mood is particularly strong and heavily in favour of a policy, where the government is more likely to bandwagon on this expression of preference (Herweg et al. 2015: 440). However, notable is the lack of a specific factor within the stream, namely, the mass media. The factor has been recognised as most certainly being a factor of important influence regarding what issues that receive the media’s attention or not (Herweg et al. 2017: 42) but is, nevertheless, unresearched. Tools by which to analyse the media's role are thereby missing. Research shows that the three elements do not need to agree in order for the political stream to be ready for coupling. Instead, it indicates that as long as a “political entrepreneur”, a key policymaker (an influential legislator or relevant minister), has been convinced of an idea and is willing to stitch together a majority backing it, the stream is ready for coupling (Herweg et al. 2017: 26), which means that the political stream merely requires enough persuasion of the “right” policymakers in order to be ready for an agenda window opening.
3.2.3 Policy Stream
In this stream, it is all about the policy alternatives, which are generated within different policy communities. These communities are defined as “mainly a loose connection of civil servants, interest groups, academics, researchers and consultants (the so-called hidden participants), who engage in working out alternatives to the policy problems of a specific policy field” (Herweg 2016: 132), also known as policy experts - where some even come from political parties (Herweg et al. 2017: 23, 36). Hence, participants are located both inside and outside of government, and their visibility to the public is both hidden and observable (Herweg 2016: 128). These experts join in what Kingdon calls the policy “primeval soup” (2011: 116), where several ideas float around. This is then often followed by a process which Kingdon named “softening up” (2011: 127), in which different ideas are discussed, debated
15 and eventually turn into a couple of viable and backed alternatives (Herweg et al. 2017: 23). A lot of it is done in a parliamentary system within the political parties (Herweg et al. 2015: 442). The process of the policy stream is heavily influenced by how the policy community is structured. More integrated communities that are consensual and smaller are more likely to engage in idea generations that are signified by an emergent to a convergent pattern (Herweg et al. 2017: 23). Meaning that they engage in a gradual gestation when it comes to new ideas, and a rapid gestation if it involves old ideas. A second factor to highlight, concerning the policy stream, is the influence of external causes. Lovell (2016) finds that the MSF application must be supplemented with a reflection regarding the mobility of policy and how it travels across national boundaries. Suggesting that a policy might not “move” until it has gained enough legitimacy abroad from other states (Herweg et al. 2017: 23). According to Kingdon, it is by no way random which policy alternatives that makes it past the “primeval soup”, he discussed this as “criteria for survival” (2011: 131-139); technical feasibility, value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints (comprised by financial viability and public acceptance). This meaning that if a policy alternative is deemed as being too hard to implement, or is in contradiction with the values of many in the policy community, is believed not to gain majority support in the political stream, or seen as too costly, it is not deemed as very likely that is will survive past the “softening up”-process (Herweg et al. 2017: 24). Finally, the stream can be seen as ready for coupling when there exists at least one alternative that has made it through the criteria. Otherwise, the MSF tells us that a coupling between the three streams is unlikely.
3.2.4 Policy and political entrepreneurs
Policy entrepreneurs are, in Kingdon’s words “advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidarity benefits.” (2011: 179), and they are key actors within the MSF. From a journalist to a bureaucrat, anyone can become a policy entrepreneur, and push their (pet projects) proposals within the policy stream. They push and adapt them within the policy community, and once they succeed in that, the process of coupling the idea with the two other streams gets initiated. The skill is to await an agenda window opening and then immediately start connecting one's policy solution to the arisen
16 problem, and then find a political entrepreneur that can push the solution in the political stream (Herweg et al. 2017:28). The policy entrepreneurs have several instruments to their disposal – such as the use of symbols, framing of problems, and “salami tactics”3 (Zahariadis 2007). Previous research states that the more resources an entrepreneur has, the higher the likelihood of success. It also states that the more access an entrepreneur has to policymakers, the more successful he/she is. However, in a choice between the two, the accessibility to policymakers is deemed more valuable than the number of resources or negotiating skills an entrepreneur has. Lastly, policy entrepreneurs that match the policymakers ideologically, also have a higher rate of success. Given that some problems that surface can already have existing policy-solutions coupled with them and they just “fit” or the other way around, a new minister, for instance, wants a new policy on the agenda and that then needs coupling with a problem (Herweg et al. 2017: 29). A final element in, is the political entrepreneurs, defined by being elected to leadership positions. They are highly relevant in the second face of the policy process when a decision window opens. Their job is to couple the streams and get the policy adopted. At their disposal, they have three different instruments: package deals, concessions, or manipulation (Herweg et al. 2015: 446). This additional entrepreneur is vital because it adds explanatory power to parliamentarian systems where the actions of political parties are of high importance, such as in Sweden.
3.2.5 Agenda and Decision Windows
At the heart of the MSF is the process of coupling, already described further up, and it is the successful coupling of the three streams that enable agenda change. However, that is not always necessarily enough to enact a change, the odds of enabling it is much higher if it is timed at specific moments in time, namely, via agenda or decision windows (Herweg et al. 2017: 26). According to the theory, these kinds of windows can open in two of the streams – either you have a problem window or a political window. However, the theory stresses that these types of windows are quite rare and often very short-lived. A problem window opens when there is a focusing event or a severe deterioration in specific indicators, such as sudden
3 ”Salami tactics” are defined as and meant to “ cut the process into distinct stages which are presented sequentially to policy-makers. Doing so promotes agreement in steps” (Zahariadis 2007: 78).
17 high rises in budget deficits or a considerable dissonance between set tasks and agencies’ actual capability (Herweg et al. 2017: 26-27). However, another factor that also affects the problem window, is the already discussed notion of decision-makers’ attention spans. If they, for instance, already are busy handling other issues on the agenda, they might not have enough attention to spar at that moment, given that they at that time have more pressing problems to handle (Herweg et al. 2015: 437). The opening of problem windows is then somewhat subjugated to what other issues call for the attention of decision-makers. However, necessary to add is that severe focusing events can be a crucial factor when it comes to opening problem windows in politically less prominent fields (Herweg et al. 2017 :28). The opening of windows in the political stream is somewhat more easily identified, due to it being subjugated to changes in government or parliament. New members enter one or both entities and bring along an interest in new or different ideas and can push fourth reformed policy proposals, or their own pet projects. A drastic swing in the national mood, concerning a specific policy area, can also initiate an agenda window opening in the political stream (Herweg et al. 2017: 26). An upcoming election or a change in government has been attributed as two key factors that can open windows, given that sweeping changes in policies can be used as tools in the political struggle for votes and influence (Herweg et al. 2015:443). A third coupling mechanism, which is leaser researched, is commissioning - introduced by Ackrill and Kay (2011), commissioning captures policymakers’ attention differently than doctrinal or consequential coupling. It differs in the sense that instead of a policy entrepreneur selling a policy idea to a policymaker, the policymaker (somewhat) impartially selects a solution that they deem suitable for the occurring changes in the problem or political stream. This instead indicates an active reaction by policymakers´ on the opening of policy windows (Ackrill and Kay 2011: 77-78). Implying that both policy entrepreneurs and policymakers can use windows. The final stage of the process is the decision window, in which the policy solution decided upon in the agenda window, moves all the way up to the decision-making stage – the legislative body. Here the policy gets its final formulation and legitimation. The main focus is to create a majority for the solution; a task carried out by the political entrepreneurs (Herweg et al. 2015). How all of this will be applied to the case is defined and operationalized at the end of the next chapter, in section 4.4 Analytical Framework.
18 4. Methodology
4.1 Research design
Given the explanatory aim of this thesis, with its stated research question, it has a theory consuming purpose. The goal is to see in what ways the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) can provide further explanation to what made the shift in Sweden’s defence and security policy occur. Furthermore, the research design is signified by the thesis being a single case study that further means to generate a broader understanding of why a state changed its defence and security policy. Being that the study only consists of a single case, it will of course, not be able to make predominantly generalisable conclusions (Risjord 2014). However, it will tell us more about security and defence policy processes in Sweden and how well the MSF can account for these. The case of Sweden changing its security and defence policy can be seen as rather intriguing, due to the country’s somewhat singular position in defence and security policy (Brommesson 2018). The country is a member of the European Union, only a partner nation with NATO and the country underwent a drastic defence transformation following the end of the Cold War (Agrell 2010: 241; Christiansson 2020: 5- 6). Focusing on the theoretical framework that the thesis will use, also here does the case differentiate itself, given that the theory has only to a small degree been used on cases including security and defence policy (Ceccoli 2019). The general strength of case studies lies in their ability to develop historical explanations of particular events, identify omitted or new hypotheses and variables, attain high levels of conceptual validity, and also their ability to address causal complexity (George and Bennett 2005: 19; Bennett 2010: 19), where the latter is of most importance for this study. The exploratory and explanatory purpose of the case study will, thereto, make it a good introductory study for future research concerning either Swedish defence policy or policy processes in defence and security. Given the purpose of the thesis, the choice of research design is not necessarily straightforward. Many researchers can agree upon, no matter their ontological or theoretical point of departure, the relevance and explanatory power of causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The methods by which single cases can be studied are several, but given the chosen theoretical frameworks focus on causal processes, a research design able to identify causal mechanisms or processes is deemed essential. Also, given that the thesis merely has a
19 “discovering” purpose, a reflection surrounding matters of biasness or causal generalisable claims is deemed unnecessary (Risjord 2014). The thesis’s task is to try and capture the events and processes that preceded the shift in policy that occurred in 2015. In order to achieve that, a large amount of empirical material is needed. For instance, the actual Defence bill (Prop. 2014/15:109), entailing the actual shift in policy, was preceded by two large White papers4 by the Defence Commission (DC), public inquiries, and other official documents. Important to mention is also the Defence bill of 2009 (Prop. 2008/09:140), with a similar trail of official documents preceding it, which provides insight into the lay of the land before the new Defence bill of 2015. This large body of official documents is supplemented by two other types of textual material, interviews and news media reporting (see 4.2 Material). These three are used by way of triangulation, to achieve a richer explanatory power to the research question. The method by which all of this empirical material will be analysed is explained further down in the chapter.
4.2 Material
To achieve the task of qualitative content analysis and analysing the three different streams: political, problem, and policy, as well as the entrepreneurs and the possible windows, it is important to capture the material by which these are found. A qualitative textual analysis of official documents, news reporting, and interviews will serve as a basis for locating the three streams, and the entrepreneurs and the windows. In qualitative research, it is expected that studies draw upon a multitude of sources (at least two different). This is done in order to seek convergence and corroboration. Hence, one way of achieving this is by triangulating different sources of empirics, to reach as much credibility as possible for the conducted research. Using different methods by which to collect empirics, such as official documents; interviews; media coverage, the researcher can safeguard herself from the risk that the findings of a study are more than her own biases, or a single source (Bowen 2009: 28). Documentary material has a vital role in this, given the many types that exist, and how information, for instance, in specific official reports can provide context and historical insight into how things were
4 White paper is the general term for different Defence Commissions presented reports, used by several countries
20 situated (Bowen 2009: 29-30). Hence, the material used for this thesis will be a collection of official documents, interviews, and relevant media material5. Kingdon stresses the importance of identifying actors that shape the agenda, both inside government and outside (the media, interest groups, public opinion, researchers, etc.) (2011: 21). The political system’s layout differs between the United States and Sweden, which indicates that there might be differences in the actors that are of relevance and interest. The work process of the Swedish DC is, in this sense, somewhat atypical – given that the form of it is similar to official reports conducted by the Government, but comments on them by expert agencies are not made via the traditional form of a letter of comments (remissvar). Instead, the process of comments is done more internally via the Commission, appointed experts from each concerned agency of expertise (predominantly the SAF and the SCCA) (Regeringen 2017; Åkesson 2020). Hence, is the usage of interviews for the thesis deemed as particularly valuable, due to somewhat lack of official, accessible, documentation. One important factor related to the above stated and differentiates research within the field of security and defence policy, from that conducted in other policy fields – is the degree of secrecy surrounding certain areas within the two areas. This thesis will, hence, only use open-source material for its analysis. Meaning, that there could exist explanatory factors that are beyond the scope and grasp of this analysis. For the analysis, a news article search was conducted via the database Retriver.se, in which the search words “säkerhetspolitik [security politics]” and “försvarspolitik [defence politics]” were used. The search included news articles published between 2007-01-01 and 2015-12-31, the dates selected on the premise that they are within the period motivated and selected by the thesis. Given the considerable numbers of local and regional newspapers in Sweden, a decision was made to only use the most important national papers and news websites6 - due to the more prominent coverage and national spread. For the analysis, a sampling of the news articles was done with the purpose of having key articles for references.
4.2.1 Interviews
For his work and the development of the Multiple Streams Framework, Kingdon used interviews as a method for gathering empirics. Emphasis was placed on locating and
5 See chapter 7.2 and the Appendix for a complete presentation of the material used for the analysis 6 Aftonbladet, Expressen, Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet (Kantar Sifo 2019)
21 interviewing individuals in key positions within congressional committees, top career civil servants close to decision-makers, and representatives of influential interest groups (Kingdon 2011: 250-255). In this thesis, interviews are deemed a purposeful tool to obtain a greater understanding of the processes that preceded decision-making - especially given that the interaction that occurs between key actors might not be located via official documents solely. Therefore, a focus has been placed on identifying key individuals within the different DC that were active during the studied period, the years 2007-2015. Key individuals within the Commission are here identified as the appointed politicians, the head of the secretariat7, experts and specialists from head agencies, and the head Government Offices (Defence and Foreign). See section 4.3.1 Limitations for further reflections regarding the thesis usage of interviews. A snowballing method was used at the end of each interview, to identify key individuals within the processes more precisely. A difficult task to reflect upon in any study, but especially in research occupied with interviews, is validity and reliability. Regarding reliability, the question of what answers an interview subject gives to the same inquiry at different times becomes a necessary reflection. For the sake of validity, a strong connection between that of purpose, theory, and method is necessary (Kvale and Brinkmann 2014: 293-294). The principal interview usage for the analysis has been semi-structured formal interviews (see below and Appendix A), but it has also been supplemented with informal interviews – however, mainly for the sake of background information.
Name Organization Role Urban Ahlin Parliamentarian for the Social democrats Member of Parliament and the Defence (retired) Commission, 2012-2014 Kristina Bergendal Swedish Armed Forces Political Advisor to the Chief of Defence, 2010-2015 Dennis Gyllensporre Swedish Armed Forces Military expert in the Defence Commission, 2012-2014 Sverker Göranson Swedish Armed Forces (retired) Chief of Defence, 2009-2015 Hans-Christian Hagman Ministry for Foreign Affairs Expert in the Defence Commission, 2007- 2008 Ola Hedin Ministry of Defence Expert in the Defence Commission, 2012- 2014 Jörgen Sollin The Moderate Party Senior political advisor, 2008- Björn von Sydow Parliamentarian for the Social democrats Member of Parliament, former Chairman (retired) of the Defence Commission 2017-2919 Nils Svartz Civil Contingency Agency Expert in the Defence Commission, 2013- 2014 Allan Widman Parliamentarian for the Liberals Member of Parliament and the Defence Commission, 2007- Tommy Åkesson Ministry of Defence Head Secretary of the Defence Commission, 2012-
Table 1. List of all formal interviews
7 The Secretariat has a key role within the Commission, given that it is tasked with writing all official documents and also planning and structuring the work process of the Commission.
22
4.3 Qualitative content analysis
Qualitative content analysis is a method used by a wide range of researchers in many different fields of study. The approach has reached acclaim for its usage in analyzing changes over time and finding patterns in larger bodies of materials – such as official documents, media reporting or large transcripts of interviews (Boréus and Bergström 2017: 25). For the sake of intersubjectivity, coding of a sort is necessary for conducting a content analysis. A traditional way of using content analysis involves some sort of word counting. Straightforward in its application perhaps, but it also presents difficulties in the sense that it misses the way in which things are expressed. (Boréus and Bergström 2017). Therefore, for the thesis analysis, a qualitative content reading was conducted, using the analytical elements provided by the chosen theory, the MSF. This means that essential sections of the collected empirical material were sorted via the analysing elements of the theoretical framework, problems, political, policy, policy entrepreneurs, political entrepreneurs, agenda window and decision window. A categorization of the textual material was hence conducted. When conducting the content analysis, a linear time study of the official documents was done. The textual studying was initiated with the White papers and official documents that preceded the Defence bill of 2009 (Prop. 2008/09:140), then the Defence bill of 2009, followed by the same types of official documents informing the Defence bill of 2015, and then lastly the defence bill (Prop. 2014/15:109). That reading was followed by the same method application done on the interview transcriptions conducted for the thesis. Lastly, a qualitative content analysis was conducted on the sampled news media articles. The operationalization done for the thesis is found in the final section of this chapter. It identifies how the five elements of the MSF are located within the official documents, news articles and the interview transcripts. Given the thesis aim of identifying how the shift in policy came about, one could also have contemplated the usage of the process-tracing method in locating the causal mechanism inside the policy process. However, given that the method has clear path-dependent usages and is applicable for identifying temporal sequencings (Kay and Baker 2015), it can prove problematic to use in combination with the MSF - especially given the temporal independence that exists between the frameworks three streams.
23 4.3.1 Limitations
As with most research, there are naturally some limitations to the research design that a study uses. One of the more directly affecting limitations is the Covid-19 pandemic and the consequences the on-following interaction limitations had for formal interviews. The effect that a distinct interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee was often lost and important details can have been missed. Ideally, the thesis should have conducted two interview sessions with the interviewees to attain great precision in terms of both reliability and validity, but the time limits of the thesis made it a too difficult task to achieve. The second limitation in this is the number of persons interviewed and the width and scope they together provided. An attempt was made in attaining interviews with at least one politician, part of the DC during the 2012-2014 period, from each parliamentary party, which sadly was unsuccessful. However, as with all time-limited studies, choices had to be made, resulting in a not ideal representation of interview subjects. Ideally, the scope of the interviewees should have included politicians from all parliamentary parties, more members of the two DC’s, and relevant external actors from the media and other interest groups. Especially unfortunate was the unavailability of two prominent actors, Peter Hultqvist and Karin Enström, who were both identified as insightful individuals. Nonetheless, a choice was made in focusing on the three parties pointed out as the primary actors engaged in defence and security policy and some of the key experts and policy advisors involved in the process. Moreover, it is necessary to touch upon the limitations of the data collected from the interviews. Qualitative interviews are by some researchers considered too subjective and non- scientific, and also troublesome given the power/knowledge relationship that arises between the interviewer and the interviewee (Kvale and Brinkmann 2014: 210-213). However, this is handled in the sense that the purpose of the thesis is to access new knowledge, by which interviews are a good tool to accomplish this and that the thesis uses triangulation of the material to access objective knowledge.
4.4 Analytical framework
To apply the modified Multiple Streams Framework on this thesis case and the Swedish political system, an operationalization is conducted. The original theory was, as already mentioned, developed and tested on the US political system, which entails that a small
24 adaptation to the Swedish model has been made, see chapter 3.2 Multiple Streams Framework. Below are the five analytical elements of the thesis stated, and with them a short operationalization regarding how the streams, the windows and the entrepreneurs will be identified.
- The Problem stream is here defined and represented by indicators that signal possible changes in the perception of problems; these are identified via problem formulations in commissioned reports as well as the conducted interviews. Feedback on existing problems is the second indicator in this, located via official reports, interviews, and media reporting. These indicators are subjugated to interpretation and can be influenced via problem brokers, which are identified via interviews and news media reporting. Focusing events are deemed as a contributing factor, more so if two or more events connect with one another, which are identified via interviews and media reporting. The events are signified via their effect on the perception of a problem. - The Political stream is here marked by the opinions of the time, focusing on public opinion and how parties and politicians react to and fight over this. These are identified with opinion polls, interviews, parliamentary discussions, and news media reporting. Ideology and closeness to election also come into play, given that the move towards attaining a majority for a policy is gained here. Identifying these aspects is done via the official commissioned reports, alongside debates surrounding the Government bills, and the interviews. - The Policy stream will be analysed via the policy community that was engaged during the policy process. A key part in this is the working process in and around the DC, which is central within the Swedish context. Identifying the alternatives that circled and moved forward within this community is done via interviews, news media reporting, parliamentary debates and deviating opinions. The alternatives are identified via the criteria of survival. - Policy and political entrepreneurs will be identified among the politicians and civil servants engaged in security and defence policy, mainly individuals’ part of the DC, since it is the politicians that are part of the direct outcome of the policy process, whether a policy gets accepted or not. Moreover, possible entrepreneurs located outside of the defence and security politicians' inner workings will be identified via their usage of possible methods such as framing, use of symbols, and salami tactics. - Agenda and decision windows are identified via their essential part in coupling the streams. A window is considered opened when there is an evident deterioration in either the problem stream, sparked by certain events that jeopardise the national security or a severe issue regarding the current policy. Changes in parliament or government can also open a window, or a drastic change in the public mood regarding the defence, and security policy.
25 5. Analysis
5.1 Problem stream
The analysis finds proof that several of the problem stream factors were present in the studied case. Four different problem indicators are located, as well as provided feedback regarding these. Further, it is found that two separate focusing events had a significant effect on the problems’ perception. Lastly, the analysis finds that a problem broker's presence played a big part in the framing of the problems. All four problem indicators identified in the process leading up to the policy shift in 2015, had already been present in the debates leading up to the 2009 Defence bill – namely, budget, staffing, threat perception and strategic outline. The budget indicator entailed that the SAF lacked the funds necessary to perform all the policy goals the organization was tasked with (Försvarsmakten 2009; Göranson 2020). Further, it was indicated that the organization had problems in staffing all of its units and would continue to have problems doing so (Försvarsmakten 2009: 32). The third indicator identified is most easily described as a factor of threat perception. It entails to what degree and what types of threats that are described as facing Sweden. The types are depicted as several, ranging from terrorism, and climate change, to conflicts in the Swedish geostrategic sphere. Put more precisely, the problem indicator pertains to what degree Sweden was facing a threat against its sovereignty and values (Ds. 2008:48; Ds. 2014). One of the more prominent and discussed problems is Russia's actions and their effect on Sweden. The indicators being that Russia was modernising and increasing its military forces and became more of a threat against its neighbouring states (Bergendal 2020; Gyllensporre 2020; Ahlin 2020; Sollin 2020). The final indicator is somewhat harder to explain, given that it has more strategic and ideological aspects connected to it. Several of the actors interviewed for the thesis indicated that the SAF problems and the more general aspects of the defence and security policy were that the whole apparatus had become too reduced. The primary objective of the defence and security policy was, in a sense, lost. Capacity and objectives on the national scene no longer matched, too much focus had been placed on slimming the costs of the defence and having an operational force that worked well on international missions (Göranson 2020; Ahlin 2020, Åkesson 2020). However, the problems facing the SAF were not sufficiently solved by the policy solutions presented in the 2009 Defence bill, and already around 2011 the SAF started
26 indicating that they still had problems regarding staffing and that budget allocated to them was not enough to solve their policy goals (Lindberg 2011; Göranson 2020; Bergendal 2020; 2013/14:FöU7). The SAF continuously provided the Government with feedback regarding the problems, but the feedback and the indicators were not enough to grab the decision-makers' attention (Bengtsson 2012; Lindberg 2012; Göranson 2020). Instead, it is found that the combination of two focusing events was the factor that brought the problems up to the political agenda and the public's attention. The two events identified are the following: on the 30th of December 2012, Chod Sverker Göranson made an interview statement that would have far longer consequences than first expected. In the interview, he tries as visibly and simply as possible to explain the current national defence capacities of the SAF. The term “one-week-defence” is coined, and suddenly defence-related topics receive a lot of attention both from the media and the opposition (Bergendahl 2020; Göranson 2020; Holmström 2012). The decision to do the interview was preceded by a long period of time during which Göranson and the SAF had tried to indicate to the incumbent government that there was a big gap between the funds allocated to the SAF and the policy goals they were tasked to complete (Göranson 2020; Försvarsmakten 2009). The previous budgetary cuts that had been made were too great, and the SAF would no longer be able to perform one of its main tasks – defend Sweden and its territorial borders (Prop. 2008/09:140). A lack of sufficient resources and staffing difficulties were described as two of the main problems facing the SAF in achieving their tasks (Försvarsmakten 2009; Göranson 2020). The problem was met with mixed responses, Defence Minister Enström made a vague remark and was shortly after criticized by the leading figure of the opposition, Peter Hultqvist, who instead insisted on higher demands and an increased capability of the SAF (Hultqvist 2013). Moreover, the statement was referred to as a “political bomb” by parliamentarian Allan Widman, who also stated that the event would change the entire debate surrounding the Swedish defence policy (Stenberg 2013a). The incumbent prime minister Reinfeldt responded a month later and simply stated that the SAF was one agency among several others and that Göranson was simply worried about general funding, like all heads of agencies (Stenberg 2013b). Showing that the problems were not considered as more pressing than other matters in the political agenda. The statement by Göranson did generate even greater importance when his warnings became realized via the second identified focusing event, namely the “Russian Easter” attack that occurred circa four months later. The “Easter attack” had materialized the Chods’ indications regarding the severely diminished capabilities of the SAF (Eriksson 2013; von
27 Sydow 2020; Göranson 2020). The fact that Sweden had been unable to launch responding fighter jets to defend its own air space, which instead was done by two NATO jets, received much attention and wonder from several neighbouring states (Holmström 2013b). Several of the persons interviewed, confirms this sequencing of events and indicates that the two events jointly had a strong effect on bringing the problems of the SAF, in terms of budget and staffing into the attention of both the public and the politicians, but also the more strategic and general problems regarding threat perception and policy outline. The “Easter attack'' had also shown an increased Russian military activity, indicating that threats now existed closer to home (von Sydow 2020; Widman 2020). The problems identified are to a high degree similar to those indicated in Hyde-Prices (2018) article. He emphasized the importance of locating the strategic context to attain greater explanatory power regarding the emergence of new policies - which to some degree is realized here. Göranson and the SAF's statement, including several other forms of communications done before the newspaper interview, can be identified as a method by which they, during this time, assumed the role of problem broker. Being that the SAF is an expert agency, very much affected by the problems identified, one can conclude that the SAF’s actions, with Chod Göranson at the front, was an actively chosen strategy. This strategy was also confirmed in the three interviews conducted with Göranson, Gyllensporre and Bergendal, where they motivate it by stating that the SAF:s previous attempts at attaining the attention of the decision-makers had failed and that the problems were growing too big and would have a severe effect on the security of the nation (2020). The SAFs assumed role of problem broker does, in this sense, further relate to strategic governance conclusions made by Christiansson (2020). It is further found that the SAF during the policy process successfully attained more influence and legitimacy, contrasting with the findings made by Holmberg (2015), indicating that the policy shift brought with it more than one change. Furthermore, the second focusing event identified is the Russian annexation of Crimea and the on-following conflict in Eastern Ukraine in the early months of 2014. The event had a profound effect on almost everything related to security or defence policy. Seen in combination with the Russo-Georgian War, the situation in Ukraine became the final tipping point, indicating that Russia was a threat to its neighbouring countries. Defence Minister Enström's reaction to the event was that it had changed the political-security situation in Sweden and Europe and that it would have a stark effect on the future development of the Swedish defence policy (Åkerman 2014). Demonstrating that the Moderate Party did not
28 change its perception of the problems threat perception and strategic outline, until after the focusing event of Ukraine. Concludingly, it is found that within the problem stream existed several problems and that indicators and feedback regarding these were not enough to bring them all the way up to the political agenda. Instead, two focusing events played a crucial role in bringing the problems high enough on the agenda. Showcasing the importance that focusing events have in the problem stream. Important in the stream was also the actions of the SAF, led by Göranson, in their role as problem broker through which they eventually, with some help, were able to frame the policy issues as problems successfully. The findings of the analysis point furthermore at an increased influence for the SAF, following their successful problem framing.
5.2 Political stream
Several interesting factors were found within the political stream, bearing on all three elements - government, interest groups, and the national mood - and a fourth element involving political parties. Explaining the full story of all the political aspects that played a part in the stream goes beyond the thesis's range and scope, which is why it has been shortened to some extent. Nevertheless, the analysis finds that the swing in the national mood, alongside the arrival and offensive actions of the identified political entrepreneur Peter Hultqvist, was essential in the political stream's coupling. The MSF and several other theories make the assumption that politicians and parties, whether in government or opposition, have one main goal in common: to win votes (Herweg et al. 2017). Defence and security issues are seldom considered to be an election-winning area. In Sweden, they often rank outside of the top ten political issues voters are interested in (SOM-institutet 2020). Nevertheless, the Moderate Party had before the 2014 election, for a long time been considered to be the party mostly engaged with defence and security problems. However, during the Reinfeldt government, the issues received less and less attention, and other policy areas were seen as more important and were given priority (Sollin 2020; Stenberg 2013b). The Moderate Party's shift opened up an opportunity for other parties to step forward and claim the role as the leading defence and security party. This was done by the Social democrats, led by their new defence spokesperson – Peter Hultqvist. Leaving the year 2012 and going into 2013, the Social Democrats, with Hultqvist, became more and more
29 active in the defence and security debates, and also assumed a leading role in promoting the opposing policy alternative pertaining to a shift to territorial defence. It is important to note that Hultqvist in his offensive was backed by the new party leader Stefan Löfven and the party leadership (von Sydow 2020; Ahlin 2020). A clear shift of power and influence within defence and security politics is hence identifiable given the arrival of Hultqvist, who, via several forums started voicing the need for a defence and security policy set on focusing on the territorial defence of Sweden (Hultqvist 2013a; 2013/14:FöU7, 2013/14:FöU12). Why the Social Democrats chose to take over the role as “Defence Party” is somewhat unclear. One suggestion being that the politics on the regional and local level played into that on the national level (Bergendal 2020: Hagman 2020). Nevertheless, it did provide them with a possibility to increase their influence and power within the policy field - suggesting that the Party saw political points to win, but maybe also an opportunity to change the policy into one more ideologically close to themselves. Looking at both the reports from the SOM-institutet (2019) and Opinion 2012-2015 by MSB, a shift and increased interest from the public regarding defence and security topics are found. Indicating that a shift in the national mood regarding the problems did occur. For instance, the number of people favouring increased military spending saw an increase of over 20% between the years 2012 and 2015, being 60% in favour in relation to ca 20% against. A distinct change traceable between the years 2012 och 2013, but are not as significant as those above. Important to note in relation to the polls is the news coverage during the time period. Looking at the number of published articles relating to Swedish defence and/or security policy, one finds a somewhat large difference between the years 2011 and 2012, 20 articles versus 51, and an even more significant increase in 2014, in which 103 articles were found (retriever.se). The escalation in numbers of articles is by no means very high, but given the small degree of attention the issues previously received, it does show an increased spread of information regarding the state of Swedish defence and security policy. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the media had a considerable part in shifting the national mood and increasing the interest among politicians. A deduction two of the interviewed drew as well (Widman 2020; Hedin 2020). A final aspect of relevance regarding the national mood is the influence and importance that some of the more prominent defence debaters had and their usage of other forums than traditional newspapers. Defence bloggers such as Annika Nordgren Christensen and Carl Bergqvist (Wiseman) are pointed out as playing an important role in widening the defence and security debate and increasing the public interest in the issues (Sollin 2020). Thereby indicating that both interest groups and the media did play a
30 part in influencing the political stream - suggesting that the role of media and interest groups using social media has an important role in the stream, which has been overlooked by the theoretical framework. Looking at the third element within the stream, interest groups, some smaller indicators stand out. Firstly, for its size and population, Sweden has a very large defence industry. It is not as sizable as it once was, but it still plays a relevant role in Swedish defence and security policy (Bergendal 2020; von Sydow 2020). The industry's primary interest is not necessarily the policy outline of the Sweden defence, but instead, its spending and how much of it gets allocated into new or modified material (Widman 2020; Hagman 2020). A severe amount of the SAF budget is spent on material, where the JAS Gripen fighter jet program is one of the more costly ones (Hedin 2020; Sollin 2020). Hence, some political motivation can be found in the interest that the Swedish defence industry has regarding the shape and budget that the Defence bills have. Secondly, another interest group identified is the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences (RSAWC). It is hard to judge the exact impact of the Academy, but they are identified as playing a role both inside the political stream and the policy stream (von Sydow 2020; Widman 2020). Both groups' influence was deemed hard to uncover, it being predominantly based on statements from the interviewed, which in turn lacked distinct descriptions of the degree of influence exercised by the interest groups. In turn, indicating that the theoretical framework lacks the tools by which to analyse external influence. Subsequently, the thesis has found that there were many factors in play within the political stream. An increased interest in defence and security politics, sparked by the policy debate initiated by Peter Hultqvist, supported by Allan Widman and the Liberal Party, was essential in bringing about a coupling process within the stream. The Reinfeldt government prioritized other policy areas and thereby lost their power of influence, making it easier for Hultqvist to gather a majority in favour of his politics. The upswing in the national mood also helped Hultqvist receive support for the territorial policy solution, whereas the influence of the interest groups is harder to derive. The defence bloggers and the RSAWC played a part in making the problems more public, though the defence industry's exact influence remains somewhat murkier - indicating that some of the political aspects played out in the more hidden sphere of the political system.
31 5.3 Policy stream
The main forum or community identified in the policy stream is the DC. This is due to it being composed of experts from different agencies, including the Governments’ office, and designated politicians from the Parliament parties, who jointly travel around Sweden and the world meeting pears, and partaking in special briefings with many policy experts within several fields. There are naturally other forums and events important in debating Swedish defence and security policy, such as the Sälen conference and the parliamentarian debates within the Committee on Defence. However, the Commission is designed to jointly discuss and move forwards with policy alternatives (Åkesson 2020; Hedin 2020). Hence, one can assume that it is the debates within the Commission that constituted the forum in which the “softening up” process occurs, but also that some of the aspect of the policy “primeval soup” process is found within it. This, given that the Commission's purpose is to attain a majority for a policy alternative before it gets presented to both the Government and the Parliament. Several of the interviewed agree that the policy community engaging in security and defence policy is considered small and quite elitist (Bergendal 2020; Sollin 2020). Indicating the community can be classified as having a structure that is signified as consensual and that it is more prone to gestate old ideas rapidly than it is in accepting new ones. Calling the territorial defence alternative an old one is not entirely true, given that the defence structure during the Cold War was signified by its focus on invasion defence, a direction and option that was deemed too expensive and unrealistic in the discussion preceding the 2015 Defence bill. Nevertheless, the territorial defence alternative was still more in line with the defence format that Sweden had before, making it more agreeable and digestible to parties within the policy community that pushed for a more national centric focus, after growing tired of all the international missions that had been in focus with the current and past Defence bills. Proving that the community was quick in digesting a policy alternative that was quite similar to older alternatives. This general tiredness of different Missions was seen in several Western countries and indicated that the general trend within defence objectives was changing (von Sydow 2020; Ds. 2013:33). Noteworthy is the specific focus placed on military defence solutions, compared to civil defence-related issues, within the community. Discussion regarding “totalförsvar” or other civil defence related aspects was only addressed to a small degree (Svartz 2020 - indicating that the SAF issues were given priority within the
32 community. A change of direction and preference is, therefore, distinguishable within the policy community and stream. In the discussions and debates that occurred before 2014 and the events in Ukraine, two defence policy alternatives are distinguishable. The first one is an alternative that replicated the then-current security and defence policy to a very high degree, with a focus on an expeditionary defence force and a defence staffed by only professional soldiers. This alternative was mainly backed and driven by the Moderate party, with the intent of retaining a “status quo” in defence and security-related questions (Hedin 2020). The main motivations for the alternative being that it was the most cost-effective, and usable on (Prop. 2008/09:140, Sollin 2020). Conscription was also seen as non-liberal and ethically challenging from an ideological perspective, so the Moderate backed alternative saw a solely professional defence as important (Sollin 2020). However, this alternative had a hard time living up to the “criteria of survival” within the community. Some of the reasons for this being that it had been proved hard to implement, given that it was under-financed (Göranson 2020; Hagman 2020), it contradicted with the values of several within the community (Widman 2020; von Sydow 2020), and given the shift in opinion by the Liberal Party, the Christian Democrats, and the Centre Party (Svensson 2013; Widman 2020). The second alternative, which was being backed and pushed by the Social democrats, had a primary focus on having a defence primarily focused on territorial defence (von Sydow 2020; Ahlin 2020). Still partaking in international missions, but with a primary focus on territorial defence. Looking instead at alternatives regarding the security policy outline, two viable alternatives are found. The first one being the solidarity principle, which in short entails that “Sweden will not take a passive stance should another EU member state or Nordic country suffer a disaster or come under attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected.” (Prop. 2008/09:140; Ds. 2008:48). A principle adopted already in the 2009 Defence bill. This alternative was now mainly favoured and pushed by the Social Democrats (2013/14:FöU7). The second alternative identified is an alliance principle, de facto entailing that Sweden should join a military alliance – NATO. Strongly pushed and favoured by the Liberals, it also became more strongly favoured by the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats, and also the Moderate Party (2013/14:FöU7; Widman 2020; von Sydow 2020). However, the latter of the alternatives lacked majority support within the Parliament and did not make it past the MSF:s criteria of survival within the DC. As a way of compromise instead, a majority of the parties were able to stand behind the solidarity principle, although now including a grimmer view of the threats facing Sweden than compared to the previous
33 Defence bill process (Ds. 2013:33; Åkesson 2020). There was at the time mixed opinions regarding the threats facing Sweden. With one side pointing to the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and the much-increased defence spending done by the Russians ever since the end of the war, declaring that the threats facing Sweden and its geostrategic neighbours were growing bigger and becoming more distinct. In comparison, the other side maintained that the threat was exaggerated and that there was no need for increased defence spending in Sweden (Ahlin 2020; Gyllensporre 2020; Svensson 2013). Hence, one can spot an extended willingness in shifting the direction of the defence policy, as opposed to the security policy, thereby showcasing the extensive role and impact that compromise plays within the DCs work process and the policy process in defence and security in general. Summarizing the findings gathered from the policy stream a few aspects stand out. Firstly, policy solutions pertaining to the problems facing the SAF had a clear priority within the community. Secondly, the defence policy decision that came out of the 2009 Defence bill lacked support from the policy community, making it easier for another policy alternative to gather consent from it instead. The territorial policy alternative had support from the SAF and now also more of the politicians and parties. The solidarity principle was the only security policy alternative that made it through the criteria of survival, indicating the strong influence and power that the political parties have also within the policy stream.
5.4 The policy and political entrepreneurs
Identifying key actors in processes that are very complex and to some extent are shielded by secrecy, proved no easy task. Focusing once again on the work and discussions inside the DC, two important actors are identified: a policy entrepreneur and a political entrepreneur. Looking at the entrepreneurs involved in the second stage of the process, the decision- window, more actors are identified. The discussions in the DC are done under the Chatham House Rules8, entailing that identifying key policy entrepreneurs proved a challenging task. Nevertheless, the Head of the Secretariat, Tommy Åkesson, was identified as an actor ascribing to some of the qualities recognized in that of a policy entrepreneur. Namely, he played a vital role in the discussions, and writings surrounding both DC reports that preceded and informed large parts of the 2015
8 Well known rules for discussions, used around the world (Chathamhouse.org)
34 Defence bill (Hedin 2020; Gyllensporre 2020). Åkesson began working within the DC already in 2008, but it was not until he was named Head of the Secretariat in 2012 by Defence Minister Karin Enström that he was able to really promote his policy solutions within the policy community. His detailed knowledge regarding defence and security related issues, skill in talking to politicians, and his ability to gain the trust of the politicians, is what, according to himself, made him successful in gathering support for his suggestions and policy alternatives (Åkesson 2020). To what degree Åkesson can be termed a “full-fledged” policy entrepreneur is hard to tell, given that the DC’s reports and suggestions to a large degree are made up of compromises in the politicians' strive for consensus. Nevertheless, Åkesson played a key role in the shaping of the two reports Ds. 2013:33 and Ds. 2014:20, and also the 2015 Defence bill proposal, which identifies him as a policy entrepreneur being very close to the policymakers and also having the instrument of framing at his disposal. A possible motivation for Åkessons actions could be found in his past, being a reserve officer, and that his ideological views were different from those of the 2009 policy. The second key actor identified is Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist, member of the DC in 2012-2014, and defence spokesperson for the Social democrats before their win in the 2014 election. Hultqvist is identified as a political entrepreneur by almost everyone interviewed for the thesis. He was able to gather an opposition against the policy driven by the Reinfeldt government and rally support for the policy alternative entailing a shift towards a territorial defence (Ds. 2014:20). By taking over the role previously held by the Moderate Party regarding defence issues, Hultqvist alongside Allan Widman were successful in framing their views regarding the state and direction of the Swedish defence (Hultqvist 2013; Widman 2020; von Sydow 2020). Hultqvist, alongside Åkesson, played an essential role in getting the territorial policy alternative on the agenda within the DC, and into the sphere of the public (Åkesson 2020). He was successful in the sense that he was good at anchoring his suggestions and politics with the public, his more territorial and “close-to-home” framing of the defence and security politics was something that was more relatable to Swedes around the country. Given Hultqvist dual roles, in both the agenda-setting and decision-making processes, it is suggested that an entrepreneur can be both a policy and political entrepreneur. Demonstrating that the processes within the political and policy streams are not as independent as suggested by the theory, thereby indicating a high degree of politisation within the policy fields. Hultqvists framing resembled, to some extent, that of the past and was perhaps easier for both the public but also other politicians to relate to (Hagman 2020). Playing into previous research regarding both the Swedish security discourse (Stiglund 2021), but also the
35 “exceptional” security culture that the country tends to reform to (Brommesson 2018). As well in the second face of the policy process, Hultqvist was identified as a crucial actor moving towards a decision window. After winning the election in 2014, and becoming the minister in charge, Hultqvist took swift action and started putting his own mark on the 2015 Defence bill proposal - which is further analyzed in section 5.5.2 The decision window. In the second face, several other political actors are identified as important for making the policy shift come about. Given that the new government, led by Stefan Löfven, was only a minority one, getting support from several of the other parties was essential in attaining broad majority support for the new 2015 Defence bill. Having the party leadership's support is essential for any party politician; without it, you are most likely unlikely to accomplish any real change. Looking at the DC’s 2014 report (Ds. 2014:20) and also the final parliamentary debate within the Defence Committee (2013/14:FöU12) before the election, it becomes clear that several of the parties had started shifting their views regarding the policy outline. Some explanatory power for these shifts is found in the work of the different defence spokespersons, who persuaded their parties that a policy change was necessary and that it needed higher priority on the political agenda. After the 2014 election loss, the Moderate Party did a re-evaluation of their security and defence politics. Resulting in the party standing behind the policy proposal put forward by Hultqvist and the Social democrats (Sollin 2020). This shift is explained by the change in leadership that occurred within the Moderate Party after the election and that the new defence spokesperson, Hans Wallmark, was successful in attaining a majority for the policy proposal inside his own party. Whether Tommy Åkesson can be seen as a policy entrepreneur in the typical Kingdonian sense is hard to tell, given that the degree in which he pushed the policy alternative is hard to get at. However, looking beyond that, he is still recognized as having a major part in pushing the territorial defence policy and framing it successfully to politicians and other experts. His access to policymakers is here deemed as imperative for his success. Peter Hultqvists importance in the process has already been stated, but his actions before becoming Minister of Defence are also noteworthy in the sense that he took a lead role in promoting the territorial defence policy. Furthermore, it is clear that both entrepreneurs were skilled in framing their policy solution. Lastly, the thesis finds that the policy deliberations conducted inside the political parties also were of great importance and that the individual campaigning by the different defence spokesperson contributed in the gathering of a political majority.
36 5.5 The windows
5.5.1 The agenda window
In light of the findings presented in the sections above, three windows are identified. The first one is presented here, and the second and third ones are presented in the next section, 5.5.2 The Decision window. The first window identified in the case of the Swedish policy shift is an agenda window, and more precisely a problem window. It is signified by two events already accounted for in section 5.1 Problem stream, namely the Chod's statement and the on-following “Easter attack” which corroborated his statement. The interview in itself was not enough to attain enough attention surrounding the problems that the SAF were facing, but the sequencing that occurred with the “Easter attack” was enough to make the problem come to the attention of the public and the politicians (Åkesson 2020; Holmström 2013b). The two events also had a deciding effect on the discussions conducted within the DC, which at that time were in the final stages of finishing their first report (Ds. 2013:33) for the 2015 Defence bill. It was not enough to convince all parties in the Commission that the Moderate Party representatives were still pushing their alternative. Nevertheless, the problem was identified and prioritized by two defence politicians, Peter Hultqvist (S) and Allan Widman (L), who joined forces and stood behind an opposing alternative, lobbying for a policy solution centering on national defence and increased budgetary spending for the SAF. Hultqvist and Widman would later disagree on some matters regarding the new policy, but their initial collaboration was regarded as essential for the agenda-setting (Åkesson 2020). The 2014 events in Ukraine are also identified as affecting the political agenda, naturally, but it is still found that the two prior events that jointly opened an agenda window in which the policy alternative debated in the DC, and other forums, were changed. Debatable is the exact influence of the Ukrainian event, given that the policy shift already was in motion when it occurred. Nevertheless, it is clear that the event had a strong effect in strengthening the case pushed by Hultqvist and others, and that the other side had a much more challenging task in promoting theirs. It also helped portray Russia as a threat and thereby find further motivation for increased defence spending and prioritization of defence and security policy on the political agenda. The Crimean annexation is definitely a focusing
37 event, but to what degree it also constitutes an agenda window is hard to determine. It could be considered an agenda window in the sense that it had a powerful effect on all three streams, but that would influence the streams' said independence.
5.5.2 The decision window
In the second stage, we find the decision window, in which the policy solution becomes a finalised policy, that in turn becomes the policy output. Here, there are two windows: the first window identified is a political window, given the election outcome that followed the Swedish parliamentary election in September 2014; the second one being a policy window, identified via the third coupling mechanism, commissioning. The results of the 2014 election brought about a change in government, where the Alliance government, led by Moderate Party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt, lost and a new minority government was formed by the Social Democrats and the Green Party. In short, the election had removed the Moderate Party from the ministerial roles of both Prime minister, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Defence. They were all after the election taken by leading politicians within the Social Democrats. The position of Minister of Defence was given to the Social Democrats’ defence spokesperson, Peter Hultqvist, who now had an even more powerful and influential role than before, enabling him to push forth and formulate his favoured reformed policy proposal – Prop. 2014/15:109 (Åkesson 2020; 2014/15:FöU11). The election and its outcome also brought with it change in several of the other parties, where the Moderate Party's change could be seen as one of the more important ones. When it was clear that the Alliance government and the party had lost the election, Fredrik Reinfeldt chose to step down as party leader as well, enabling a new leader to take over and reshape the Moderate’s policies. The new party leader Anna Kindberg Batra and the new defence spokesperson Hans Wallmark, are both seen as important in the Moderate Party’s quick shift in defence and security policy following the election (Sollin 2020). In turn, this helped Peter Hultqvist to assemble a workgroup consisting of the six parties that had been closest in reaching a consensus within the DC’s work – all but the Left Party and the Sweden Democrats – to jointly formulate a policy proposal for the 2015 Defence bill (2014/15:FöU11). Thereby jointly creating a package deal and attaining a majority. However, it is questionable whether Hultqvist had attained a solid majority for his proposal had not the Moderate Party changed its party leadership and changed their policy
38 views. Given the strong historical tradition of compromise and consensus regarding matters of defence and security policy within Swedish politics, the outcome could have been a different one. Indicating that the policy process within security and defence issues is a field in which the policy and political entrepreneurs' work is of extra importance, due to their role in framing and bargaining for policy support. This conclusion further strengthens the necessity in applying the modified MSF when studying parliamentarian political systems, given the influence and power that party's support has, as demonstrated in the other analysis sections. Alongside the discussions on the problem window and the political window, the notion of commissioning and policy windows also requires some further consideration. The work of the DC is signified that it is a commissioned workgroup, which is tasked by the Minister of Defence to present the government with suggestions for an upcoming Defence bill (Regeringen 2017). The bills have traditionally been presented every five years, which provides a natural coupling opportunity and an opening of a policy window. Naturally, this puts further complexity to the policy process. However, one could also conclude that the commissioning aspect, with the opening of a policy window, is necessary in order to start a policy process within the domain of defence and security politics, due to the fact that Sweden traditionally has used the DC as a forum by which to reach consensus behind closed doors, and then outwards presenting a more unified frontier (Hedin 2020). Hence, one can conclude that the opening of the problem window identified earlier, most likely would have had less effect if it had not coincided with the on-going work of the DC and the policy window later opened due to the Commission's work. A simplistic explanatory factor for the rapid change in policy could thereby be found in the notion of timing. It does not account for all aspects but does provide one critical mechanism. The agenda window was timed with the DC, and their first White papers’ initiated work process, enabling a change in policy alternative. The decision window and the election outcome occurred in close proximity to the Ukrainian event and the second White paper by the DC, which corresponded with the on-following policy output decision to happen less than a year after the election. Looking beyond the simplicity of timing, the thesis finds that several actors had an interest in changing the outline of the security and defence policy. One being the SAF, who through its role of problem broker and active part of the policy community was successful in attaining more influence and legitimacy with the arrival of a new policy alternative. Another being Peter Hultqvist, who saw a gain in shifting the policy outline into one facing home, and thereby also using it as a political tool.
39 6. Discussion
6.1 Limitations
This case study was set up to explore an empirical event which, as of yet has received very little attention by other research, which is why it must be viewed as just that – exploratory. It has only been able to cover and identify parts of the explanatory factors important in the case. Further research is needed in order to uncover more of them. The focus has been placed on identifying factors on the national level of Sweden, meaning that other policy processes probably influence this one, situated perhaps on the EU-level or even on a regional level, and not to mention the policy agenda of the United States. Further research is necessary in order to validate the claims made by this study, although it should nevertheless be considered a grounded introductory qualitative case study.
6.2 Conclusions
The thesis's aim and purpose have been to answer the research question why did the Swedish security and defence policy so rapidly change from an expeditionary to a territorial defence? by locating the policy process that preceded the shift and through it find further explanatory causes to the swift shift. With the help of the MSF, the thesis can conclude that the rapid policy change occurred as a result of four problems; budget, staffing, threat perception and strategic outline, being highlighted by two identified combined focusing events, which in turn coincided with the commissioned work process of the DC. The problem broking actions by the SAF and Chod Göranson are furthermore determined as imperative in relation to the focusing events and the coupling of the problem stream. The attention brought to these problems provided an opportunity for a new challenging policy alternative, that of territorial defence. Political will and public support to change the policy were found to be present already before the Ukrainian events in 2014. A window of opportunity to turn the policy alternative into policy output was created given the 2014 parliamentary election outcome. The change in government provided the political entrepreneur Peter Hultqvist with a new influential position as Minister of
40 Defence, from which he successfully gathered majority support for the new policy, resulting in the 2015 Defence bill. Hence, this thesis findings tell us that rapid policy changes are possible in complex areas and that there were more explanatory factors behind the shift beyond those stated by previous research. Via its usage of the modified Multiple Streams Framework theory, the thesis was able to identify several domestic factors that played a part in the rapid change of policy. The application of the MSF alongside the qualitative content analysis on the studied case is considered successful in terms of providing several explanatory factors. Additionally, the case study illustrated the usage of applying the modified framework on a parliamentary system, demonstrating the importance of both policy- and political entrepreneurs within the policy fields. A few specific actors played an essential part in the policy process, showcasing the importance of studying the processes that influence decisions and outcomes. One can also, on the other hand, draw the conclusion that small elitist policy communities could prove a danger. In the sense that there are very few persons with a large degree of power and that it only takes the convincing of a small group of actors to make significant changes in policy output – a power aspect worth highlighting and taking into account. The thesis also found relevant usage in its application of news articles, especially in strengthening the claims and arguments made by the interviewed but also in locating influence in the political stream, thereby demonstrating the fortitude in using triangulation of empirics. However, it did also prove a challenge in applying the articles, given that the theoretical framework has not demonstrated how the factor is best assessed and used in the streams. Indicating another aspect of the theory in need of further research. Furthermore, the thesis highlighted the role of political parties within both the political and policy stream, suggesting that small elitist policy communities, who have politicians partaking in the policy stream, run a risk of having interference between the streams—relating to another observation by the thesis, namely the support for the third coupling mechanism, commissioning. The policy window identified within the DC's work process played an influential role in influencing the rest of the streams and enabled the policy shift to be as rapid. However, the thesis's findings are not generalisable and illustrate that more research around the commissioning coupling mechanism is needed, especially given its considerable effect in this study. This thesis's exploratory aim and analysis have also contributed to the empirical knowledge surrounding a pivotal period in Swedish security and defence policy. By looking at the policy process preceding the shift in policy, the thesis has identified more explanatory
41 factors pertaining to the rapid shift and demonstrated how sections of the inner policy machinery in Swedish governance operates. The usage of the thesis findings should prove a sound basis for future research to carry on, both in security and defence policy and in the field of policy process theory, given that it has been confirmed useful in explaining as complex processes such as defence and security policy. By its descriptive purpose and theoretical application, the thesis has been able to provide a richer understanding and explanation of the case, thereby successfully proving that there existed several explanatory factors to why the Swedish policy change was so rapid. Concludingly, this thesis has proven the value of identifying and analysing the mechanisms that lie between problems and decisions. Through it, we are able to attain richer explanations and understanding of the choices that guide and shape us.
6.3 Future research
As previously mentioned, this study has been an exploratory one, indicating that there exist plenty of other aspects that are in need of further research. Here presented are three relevant suggestions in which future research can continue to examine some of the more recent developments in both Swedish and foreign security and defence policy, as well as the utilisation of policy process theory. To further strengthen and prove the usage of applying the MSF to defence and security policy processes, as well as to test the findings in this study, a comparative case study looking at, for instance, Sweden, Finland and the two other Nordic NATO member states Denmark and Norway, would provide a great future research opportunity. Such a study would most likely bring several interesting results in terms of both similarities and differences regarding policy processes and defence and security strategies, not to mention the “Nordicness” (Brommesson 2018: Holmberg 2006) aspect pertaining to it as well. Several aspects of framing were identified in the analysis, proving the importance and power that it generates. One suggestion of how the aspect of media could be better integrated into the MSF is by combining it with a theory or method set on capturing the framing of things. Research on framing analysis exists in large amount, and the findings of this thesis suggest that a fruitful union for future research could be found in its incorporation with the MSF. An analysis would thereby capture both the framing of the media and that of the actors on the inside of the policy process – such as the policy and political entrepreneurs, but also
42 that of the problem brokers. This would naturally make an already complex theoretical framework even more complicated, but aspects of digitalization have already made the world more complex – indicating the need for a policy process theory capable of dealing with the modern elements. The study’s results have also demonstrated that the Swedish policy process and the change of policy brought about an increased amount of influence and power to the SAF. Suggesting that a study centering on the implementation of the 2015 policy output could provide further insight into both the policy process and how policy implementation relates to it but also on a more concrete, strategic level in the sense of how the SAF has handled the problems of threat perception and strategic outline. This could furthermore find possible linkages between the findings of this thesis and the work of Christiansson (2020). Nevertheless, the thesis has demonstrated that there exist several relevant paths for future research in security and defence policy to be made.
43 7. References
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Bynander, F. (2003). The Rise and Fall of the Submarine Threat: Threat Politics and Submarine Intrusions in Sweden 1980-2002. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Department of Government
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Christiansson, M. (2020). Defence transformation in Sweden: The strategic governance of pivoting projects 2000-2010, Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press
Cohen, M., March, J. and Olsen, J. (1972) “A garbage can model of organizational choice”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol: 17: 1–25
Doeser, F. (2008). In search of Security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy Change in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 1988-1993. Stockholm: Department of Political Science, Stockholm University
Doeser, F., Petersson, M., and Westberg, J. (eds.). (2012). Norden mellan stormakter och fredsförbund: Nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete i det gamla och nya Europa. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
Edström, H. and Gyllensporre, D. (2014). Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter kalla kriget: Förlorade decennier eller vunna insikter? Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press
George, A. L., and Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press
Herweg, N., Huß, C., and Zohlnhöfer, R. (2015). “Straightening the three streams: Theorising extensions of the multiple streams framework.”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 54: 435-446
Herweg, N. (2016). “Clarifying the Concept of Policy-Communities in the Multiple Streams Framework.”, in Decision-making under Ambiguity and Time Constraints: Assessing the Multiple-Streams Framework, (eds.) Zohlnhöfer, R. and Rüb, F. W. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press. Ch. 8: 125-145
Herweg, N., Zahariadis, N. and Zohlnhöfer, R. (2017). “The Multiple Streams Framework: Foundations, Refinements, and Empirical Applications”, in Theories of the Policy Process (eds.) Weible, C. M., and Sabatier, P. A., 4th edition. New York: Westview Press. Ch. 1: 17-53
Holmberg (Eriksson), A. (2006). Europeanization and Governance in Defence Policy: the Example of Sweden. Stockholm: Department of Political Science, Stockholm University
Holmberg, A. (2015). “A demilitarization process under challenge? The example of Sweden”, Defence Studies, vol. 15, no. 3: 235-253
45 Holmström, M. (2012). “Försvar med tidsgräns”, in Svenska Dagbladet, 30 Dec 2012. Available: https://www.svd.se/forsvar-med-tidsgrans [Accessed: 2020-09-17]
Holmström, M. (2013a). “Ryskt flyg övade anfall mot Sverige”, in Svenska Dagbladet, M., 22 Apr 2013. Available: https://www.svd.se/ryskt-flyg-ovade-anfall-mot-sverige [Accessed: 2020-10-26]
Hyde-Price, A. (2018). “Epilogue: “Nordicness” – theory and practice”, Global Affairs, vol. 4, no. 4-5: 435-443
Kantar Sifo (2019). “Räckviddsrapport: Orvesto konsument 2019 Helår”, mars 17 2019. Available:https://www.kantarsifo.se/sites/default/files/reports/documents/rackviddsrapp ort_orvesokonsument2019helar.pdf
Kay, A. and Baker, P. (2015). “What Can Causal Process Tracing Offer to Policy Studies? A Review of the Literature, The Policy Studies Journal, vol. 43, no. 1: 1-21
Kingdon, J. W. (2011). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edition, Glenview, IL: Pearson
Knaggård, Å. (2009). Vetenskaplig osäkerhet i policyprocessen. En studie av svensk klimatpolitik. Lund: Lund University
Knaggård, Å. (2015). “The Multiple Streams Framework and the Problem Broker,”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 54: 450-465
Kronvall, O., and Petersson, M. (2005). Svensk säkerhetspolitik i supermakternas skugga, 1945–1991. Stockholm: Santérus.
Kvale, S. and Brinkmann, S. (2014). Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun, 3rd edition, Lund: Studentlitteratur
Larsson, T. and Bäck, H. (2008). Governing and Governance in Sweden, 1st edition, Lund: Studentlitteratur
Lindberg, A (2013). ”Försvaret blir mer nordiskt”, in Aftonbladet, 1 juni 2013. https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/ledarkronika/anderslindberg/article16883950.ab (Accessed: 2020-11-29)
Lindvall, J, and Sebring, J. (2005).”Policy reform and the decline of corporatism in Sweden”, West European Politics, vol. 28, no. 5: 1057-1074
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46 Proposition 2008/09:140 (Government bill). Ett användbart försvar. Stockholm, 19 mars 2009
Proposition 2014/15:109 (Government bill). Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020. Stockholm, 23 april 2015
Regeringskansliet (2017). Försvarsberedningen – Bakgrund, updated 19 jan 2017 Available: https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens- politik/forsvarsberedningen/bakgrund/ [Accessed 2020-11-30]
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Zahariadis, N. (2007). “The multiple streams framework. Structure, limitations, prospects”, in Sabatier, P. A. (ed.) Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd edition. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 65-92
7.2 Empirical material
7.2.1 Official Documents
2013/14:FöU7. Debatt om förslag – försvarspolitiska frågor, Betänkande 2013/14:FöU7. Riksdagen, 29 januari 2014.
2013/14:FöU12. Debatt om förslag 2013/14:12 – Försvarsmaktens förmåga till uthålliga insatser, Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2013/14:FöU12, Riksdagen, 17 June 2014
2014/15:FöU11. Debatt om förslag 2014/15:11, Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2014/15:FöU11. Riksdagen, 15 June 2015.
Ds. 2007: 46. Säkerhet i samverkan: Försvarsberedningens omvärldsanalys, Försvarsberedningens rapport, Försvarsdepartementet, 4 December 2007
Ds. 2008:48. Försvar i användning, Försvarsberedningens rapport, Försvarsdepartement, 13 June 2008
Ds. 2013: 33. Vägval i en globaliserad värld, Försvarsberedningens rapport, Försvarsdepartementet, 31 May 2013
Ds. 2014: 20. Försvaret av Sverige: Starkare försvar för en osäker tid, Försvarsberedningens rapport, Försvarsdepartementet, 15 May 2014
Försvarsmakten (2009). Försvarsmaktens underlag för regeringens försvarspolitiska proposition 2009, 30 januari 2009
Försvarsmakten (2014). Försvarsmaktens underlag till försvarspolitisk inriktningsproposition 2015, 16 December 2014
MSB (2012). Opinioner 2012: Allmänhetens syn på samhällsskydd, beredskap, säkerhetspolitik och försvar. Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, januari 2013
MSB (2013). Opinioner 2013: Allmänhetens syn på samhällsskydd, beredskap, säkerhetspolitik och försvar. Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, januari 2014
48 MSB (2014). Opinioner 2014: Allmänhetens syn på samhällsskydd, beredskap, säkerhetspolitik och försvar. Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, januari 2015
MSB (2015). Opinioner 2015: Allmänhetens syn på samhällsskydd, beredskap, säkerhetspolitik och försvar. Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, januari 2016
Proposition 2008/09:140 (Government bill). Ett användbart försvar. Stockholm, 19 mars 2009
Proposition 2014/15:109 (Government bill). Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020. Stockholm, 23 april 2015
Regeringskansliet (2017). Försvarsberedningen – Bakgrund, updated 19 jan 2017 Available: https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens- politik/forsvarsberedningen/bakgrund/ [Accessed 2020-11-30]
SOM-institutet (2020). “Svenska trender 1986–2019”, Samhälle, Opinion, Medier, Göteborgs universitet. Available: https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2020- 04/6.%20Svenska%20Trender%20%281986-2019%29.pdf [Accessed: 2020-11-29)
7.1.2 Interviews
All of the transcripts and notes from the interviews are kept by the author.
- Urban Ahlin, 2020-11-24, Telephone - Kristina Bergendal, 2020-11-24, Online video-call - Dennis Gyllensporre, 2020-12-02, Online video-call - Sverker Göranson, 2020-11-30, Online video-call - Hans-Christian Hagman, 2020-11-25, Stockholm - Ola Hedin, 2020-11-17, Stockholm - Jörgen Sollin, 2020-11-23, Online video-call - Nils Svartz, 2020-11-16, Telephone - Björn von Sydow, 2020-12-02, Online video-call - Allan Widman, 2020-11-23, Telephone - Tommy Åkesson, 2020-11-11, Online video-call
49 7.1.3 News articles
Bengtsson, N. (2012). ”ÖB: välj mellan marinen och armén”, in Dagens Nyheter, 1 juli 2012. Available: https://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/ob-valj-mellan-marinen-och-armen/ [Accessed 2020-11-29]
Eriksson, N. (2013).”Ryska plan övade attack mot Sverige”, in Aftonbladet, 22 Apr 2013. Available: https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/gPp96A/ryska-plan-ovade-attack-mot- sverige [Accessed: 2020-10-26]
Holmström, M. (2012). “Försvar med tidsgräns”, in Svenska Dagbladet, 30 Dec 2012. Available: https://www.svd.se/forsvar-med-tidsgrans [Accessed: 2020-09-17]
Holmström, M. (2013a). “Ryskt flyg övade anfall mot Sverige”, in Svenska Dagbladet, 22 Apr 2013. Available: https://www.svd.se/ryskt-flyg-ovade-anfall-mot-sverige [Accessed: 2020-10-26]
Holmström, M. (2013b). “Ryskt flyg övade för att stoppa NATO”, in Svenska Dagbladet, 29 May 2013. Available: https://www.svd.se/ryskt-flyg-ovade-for-att-stoppa-nato [Accessed: 2020-10-28]
Hultqvist, P. (2013a). ”Enströms nöjdhet över försvaret är vansklig”, in Aftonbladet, 13 januari 2013. https://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/article16055163.ab [Accessed: 2020-11-29]
Lindberg, A. (2011). ”Försvaret utan folk”, in Aftonbladet, 17 januari 2011 https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/article12490071.ab [Accessed: 2020-11-29]
Lindberg, A. (2012). ”Köttberget som måste redas ut”, in Aftonbladet, 16 januari 2012. https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/article14216606.ab [Accessed: 2020-11-29]
Stenberg, E. (2013a).”Uttalande från ÖB är en politisk bomb”, in Dagens Nyheter, 3 Jan 2013. Available:https://www.dn.se/arkiv/nyheter/uttalandet-fran-ob-ar-en-politisk- bomb/ [Accessed 2020-11-02]
Stenberg, E. (2013b). ”Reinfeldt: Försvaret är ett särintresse”, in Dagens Nyheter, 29 Jan 2013. Available: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/reinfeldt-forsvaret-ar-ett-sarintresse/ [Accessed 2020-09-21]
Svensson, N. (2013). “Beredningen nära en kollaps”, in Expressen, 13 jan 2013. Available: https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/beredningen-nara-en-kollaps/ [Accessed: 2020-10-29]
Åkerman, M. (2014). “Enström vill rusta upp i ändrat läge”, in Svenska Dagbladet, 6 March 2014. Available: https://www.svd.se/kommer-paverka-var-forsvarspolitik [Accessed 2020-11-30]
50 8. Appendix
A. Interview questions
Syftet med uppsatsen är att skapa mer kunskap och förståelse för de processer som föregår policyförändringar, mer specifikt kring de som innefattar försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska förändringar. Uppsatsens huvudsakliga mål är att undersöka de händelser och aktioner som möjliggjorde att skiftet kom till, samt identifiera vilka andra möjliga policyalternativ som låg på beslutsbordet. Undersökningen är av tids- och utrymmesskäl inriktad och avgränsad till att fokusera på tidsperioden 2007–2015.
Intervjufrågor,
1. Vilken/vilka var din/dina roll/er under denna tidsperiod? 2. Hur skulle du beskriva den process som föregick beslutet att ändra Sveriges försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska inriktning 2015? a. Fanns där några särskilda händelser som påverkade detta särskilt? Vilka? 3. Vilka större försvars och säkerhetspolitiska problem/hot identifierade du och andra under den period som föregick försvarsbeslutet för åren 2010–2015? Samt under perioden som föregick försvarsbeslutet för åren 2015–2020? a. Skulle du kunna rangordna dem? b. Var det stor skillnad mellan problem identifierade under de två perioderna? Ifall ja, på vilka sätt? 4. Varför tror du att just dessa problem gavs särskild uppmärksamhet? a. Vad gjorde dem viktiga? 5. Varför tror du att skiftet i policy ägde rum när det gjorde? a. Vad tror du gjorde, eller åtminstone bidrog till att det hamnade på den politiska dagordningen? b. Vilka andra alternativ fanns det? 6. Vilka var de ledande aktörerna inom den/de här processen/erna? a. Fanns det någon/några som särskilt drev probleminramningen? 7. Vilka olika idé/problem-grupperingar upplevde du att det fanns? a. Fanns där någon form av påverkan från utomstående parter? 8. Är det något övrigt du själv vill tillägga? 9. Vilka andra personer tycker du att jag bör intervjua för den här uppsatsen?
51