The Landscape between Bureaucracy and Political Strategy A Qualitative Case Study of the Policy Processes in Swedish Security and Defence Policy Emy Larsson Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp) Political Science with a focus on Crisis Management and Security Master’s Programme in Politics and War Autumn 2020 Supervisor: Dan Hansén Word count: 19865 Abstract The Swedish Defence bill of 2015 demonstrated a rapid change in policy objectives, consequently moving away from an expeditionary force and converging into a territorial defence force. Previous research has attributed and explained the quick shift to the geostrategic unbalance that followed after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Yet, major policy changes are often years in the making, indicating that there must be additional explanations to the rapid shift. By applying a modified version of John Kingdon’s (2011) Multiple Streams Framework on the case of Sweden changing its security and defence policy, this thesis examines the policy process that preceded the official policy decision. The thesis provides further explanation to why the rapid policy change occurred by utilising qualitative content analysis. The analysis shows that the new policy was adopted due to several factors: one being the attention brought to several problems pertaining to the previous policy, another one was found in the timing between focusing events and the on-going work process of the Swedish defence commission, and lastly, strong actors within the policy field were in favour of a change in policy. The thesis concludes that the presence of several factors within the processes of politics, policy and problems enabled the rapid policy change. Keywords: Security and defence policy, policy processes, policy change, Multiple Streams Framework, agenda-setting, Swedish Defence Commission 2 Table of content 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 BACKGROUND 1 1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND AIM 3 1.3 DELIMITATIONS 4 2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 6 2.1 SWEDISH SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 6 2.2 POLICY CHANGE AND THEORY 8 3. THEORY 10 3.1 THEORIZING THE POLICY PROCESS 10 3.2 MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK 11 3.2.1 PROBLEM STREAM 12 3.2.2 POLITICAL STREAM 14 3.2.3 POLICY STREAM 15 3.2.4 POLICY AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 16 3.2.5 AGENDA AND DECISION WINDOWS 17 4. METHODOLOGY 19 4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 19 4.2 MATERIAL 20 4.2.1 INTERVIEWS 21 4.3 QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 23 4.3.1 LIMITATIONS 24 4.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 24 5. ANALYSIS 26 5.1 PROBLEM STREAM 26 5.2 POLITICAL STREAM 29 5.3 POLICY STREAM 32 5.4 THE POLICY AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 34 5.5 THE WINDOWS 37 5.5.1 THE AGENDA WINDOW 37 5.5.2 THE DECISION WINDOW 38 6. DISCUSSION 40 6.1 LIMITATIONS 40 6.2 CONCLUSIONS 40 6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 42 3 7. REFERENCES 44 7.1 LITERATURE 44 7.2 EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 48 7.1.2 INTERVIEWS 49 7.1.3 NEWS ARTICLES 50 8. APPENDIX 51 A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 51 4 1. Introduction The last two decades of research focusing on Swedish security and defence policy have seen a change in its perception. Security and defence policies are no longer considered exceptional processes but are instead increasingly handled and thought of in the same practices as other policy areas (Holmberg 2015: 238-239; Christiansson 2020:337). Hence, can one spot an augmented politicisation of the defence and security policy process1 (Stiglund 2021: 206). In a European state perspective, this has occurred parallel to both a general trend of defence transformation after the Cold War (Christiansson 2020: 3), and increased demilitarisation within states, that passed by without much public notice (Sheehan 2008: 179). As a result of this, research has noted a reduced political and normative influence for the military (Holmberg 2015: 240). However, more recent events have sparked a new change, and western countries have once again reformed the focus of their security and defence policies – with, for instance, increases in defence budgets and a refocus on territorial defence. Many of these changes have been ascribed to the geostrategic shift that followed after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Holmberg 2015; Agrell 2016; Stiglund 2021). However, shifts in policies are famously slow in the making (Herweg et al. 2017), and a rapid change in policy stands out. One country that rapidly changed its policy after the events of 2014 was Sweden, where a new Defence bill was accepted only a year later – entailing a distinct shift in policy, which saw a transition into a territorial defence (Prop. 2014/15:109). In turn questions were sparked regarding how and why such a quick policy change came about, how it was possible and what further explanatory factors exist and can account for why such a rapid shift was achievable. 1.1 Background During the last two decades, the Swedish defence policy has been marked by cooperation and demilitarization (Holmberg 2015; Westberg 2015; Agrell 2016). Ever since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has gradually and forcefully diminished its military. Defence and security policies were focused on international cooperation and joining foreign peacekeeping missions 1 A policy process is in this thesis defined as ”the interactions that occur over time between public policies and surrounding actors, events, contexts, and outcomes.” (Weible 2017: 2). (Berndtsson et al. 2015; Agrell 2016). The threat against Sweden’s own territory was deemed low, and a high focus was placed on participating within UN-, NATO- or EU-led missions. Security was to be created alongside Sweden’s neighbouring states and the concept of the “solidarity principle” was created as a means by which the country could generate security together with other nations (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014: 191)2. However, a shift in the international security debate was traceable following the Russo- Georgian War in 2008, where Russia, which was deemed as having limited war capacities, entered into a full-scale war with one of its neighboring states (Asmus 2010; Agrell 2016: 223-225). Swedish officials reacted to the situation by concluding that the actions of Russia had “put the all-European security order into a state of crisis [authors own translation]” (prop. 2008/09:140). The Swedish government notably remarked on the war in Georgia in their Defence bill in 2009 (prop. 2008/09: 140). However, there was minimal explicit political action or change in policy following it – suggesting that it was not deemed as a real threat or problem at the time. In the years following the Russo-Georgian war, Sweden was mainly engaged in discussions surrounding the ongoing, NATO-led, operation in Afghanistan, in which the country was heavily engaged (Agrell 2016). Apart from that, there were very few things that made it to the political debates. The only other thing that received some attention by the politicians was the reorganization and staffing difficulties that the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) were facing. The perception of the Russian threat was only present far away in the periphery, and warnings regarding a more vigorous, and growing military Russia were often dismissed via references to “Russian scare (rysskräck)” (Agrell 2016: 225). After the government put forward their defence proposition in 2009, very few issues pertaining to the armed forces’ future were visible on the political agenda (Agrell 2016: 238). However, a change in the discourse and the media narrative was traceable after several events and statements that occurred during the spring of 2013 (Lindberg 2013). Two of them received quite a lot of media attention. The first event was the on-following debate after an interview given by the then Swedish Chief of Defence (Chod), Sverker Göranson. He stated the SAF would only be able to defend one strategic location within the country, and they would only be able to do so during the duration of one week. After that, Sweden would have to rely on the help of others (Holmström 2012). The interview sparked an intense debate both 2 For further reading regarding the transformation process that Swedish defence and security policy went through after the end of the Cold War and the following decade, see Holmberg (2006) and Christiansson (2020) among others. 2 among politicians, but also within news media organisations, as well as an increased public debate (Holmberg 2015: 246). The second event, which also sparked an increase in the debate, was a simulated Russian airstrike against Sweden. The attack, also known as the “Easter attack”, occurred on Good Friday just outside of the Swedish territorial border and the SAF was unable to launch fighter jets as a response and protective measure (Holmström 2013a). This event showcased in reality what the Chod just a few months earlier had warned about. Around this time, a change in public opinion was also traceable via public opinion polls, regarding the Swede’s views on decreased defence spending and a NATO membership (SOM-Institutet 2020: 63, 66). Almost a year later, Russia once again shocked the world and the international system with the country's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the on-following conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This event has been attributed as “the mother” event that changed both the Swedish and the European perception of their security and defence (Agrell 2016: 238). Following the Swedish election in the autumn of 2014, a new government, led by the Social Democrats, took office and a dramatic turn occurred in the defence and security policy. Roughly a year after the Ukraine events, a new Swedish Defence bill was presented, entailing an immensely rapid policy change. A shift that entailed that national territorial defence was now the main task and focus of the Swedish defence, in stark contrast with the past 20 years’ objectives.