The Swedish Defence Policy Paradox: Sweden Wants to Stay Militarily Non-Allied While Seeking Ever Closer Defence Cooperation

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Swedish Defence Policy Paradox: Sweden Wants to Stay Militarily Non-Allied While Seeking Ever Closer Defence Cooperation March 2016 8/2016 Charly Salonius-Pasternak Senior Research Fellow The Finnish Institute of International Affairs The Swedish defence policy paradox > Sweden wants to stay militarily non-allied while seeking ever closer defence cooperation with others Changes in the security landscape of the Baltic region have had a notable effect on Sweden’s security policy. While the Swedish government still emphasizes continuity and stability, developments in the country’s security environment may lead to significant changes in its foreign and security policy. For two decades after the end of the In building its defence, Sweden less focus and the current extensive Cold War, Sweden’s security policy now emphasizes the role of Finland cooperation with NATO would be was based on the notion of perma- and the US. Figuratively speaking, reduced. However, due to economic, nent peace in the country’s neigh- one might say that Sweden is draw- historical as well as practical reasons, bourhood. Sweden’s defence forces ing its shield closer while reaching this is an unlikely direction. were reorganized for the conduct of out across the Atlantic for a bigger A second alternative would be international and crisis management sword. for Sweden to apply for membership operations. Cooperation with Denmark and of NATO. This would be the biggest In recent years, however, the Poland has also increased, as part of change in the country’s defence and Swedish government has reassessed Sweden’s recent activity in creat- security policy since joining the EU the potential threats facing Sweden. ing closer military relations with two decades ago. For several reasons, The country’s new official line other Baltic Sea littoral nations. The the probability of Sweden applying is built, paradoxically, on being Common Security and Defence to NATO in the coming years has both militarily non-allied and on Policy (CSDP) of the European Union grown. a declaration of military solidarity is, however, not a priority as its Sweden’s domestic situation towards EU members and other contribution to operative capacity- has changed significantly enough Nordic states. In order for it to work, building is limited. during the past three years for a shift this policy requires both a credible Sweden’s security and defence in security policy to take place. The national defence capability (which policy is often described as stable, winds of change have been blowing Sweden does not yet have) and more but the choices successive govern- at least since the spring of 2013, international cooperation (which it ments have made in recent decades when Russia practised a nuclear is currently working on). do not support this claim. Some in strike against key military targets in The emerging ‘Hultqvist doctrine’, Sweden are already preparing for Sweden. named after Minister of Defence the possibility that the ‘transitional’ Events such as this ‘Russian Peter Hultqvist, has been seen as an policy based on the aforementioned Easter’ have had an effect on the attempt to solve the discrepancies in paradox is nearing the end of its Swedish decision-makers as well as this policy. Sweden is reinforcing its usefulness. Should there be changes the population at large. All opinion own defence capability, and building in the government, Sweden may polls show that opposition to NATO the capacity for operational wartime make swift changes to its security membership has decreased. The cooperation with Finland and the policy. change is undeniable, as the polls United States. One option could be to signifi- have never before shown Swedes to At the same time, Sweden is con- cantly strengthen national defence have as much support for NATO as tinuing to build a closer relationship capabilities, combined with deep they do now. This is indicative of with NATO while retaining its status bilateral cooperation with Finland an increasing understanding that as a country that does not belong to a and the US. At the same time, the Sweden is dependent on outside military alliance. solidarity declaration would receive assistance in its national defence. 2 Finnish Institute of The most significant change is Those Swedes in favour of join- International Affairs taking place amongst the politicians. ing NATO are concerned by one Kruunuvuorenkatu 4 All of the parties in the centre-right question: would Finland be ready to POB 400 Alliance are now openly supportive make a joint decision with Sweden 00161 Helsinki of NATO membership, and the party about applying for NATO member- leaders aim to make this one of the ship? Observers in Stockholm are Telephone defining issues in the next parlia- concluding that Finnish debates +358 (0)9 432 7000 mentary elections. Less attention has about defence policy now seem more been paid to the fact that amongst constrained than a few years ago. Fax the supporters of the governing The conclusion drawn in Sweden +358 (0)9 432 7799 Social Democratic party, only a small seems to be that Finland will not be majority now oppose NATO member- ready to make a joint NATO decision www.f iia.f i ship. Some have even noted a new in the next few years, maybe not kind of tone in the public statements even during this decade. This comes of Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist. as a relief to the current Swedish There has been speculation that red-green government and to others NATO might not have accepted who hope that Finland’s reluctance new members in the immediate would also prevent Sweden from aftermath of Russia’s annexation of applying for NATO membership. Crimea in 2014. However, the situa- In the event that domestic tion has already changed during the changes or outside events increase past year, for one simple reason: the the pressure on Sweden to change its political and military leadership of course, the Swedish leaders will have NATO has woken up to the challenges two options regarding Finland. One of defending its Baltic members, is to try to harmonize the goals of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. the two countries through an active Simulations and exercises have defence policy discussion. The other The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an made it clear that NATO needs is to decouple the two countries’ independent research institute that produces high-level research to support political decision-making and Sweden’s ground and airspace in decisions. In the latter case, Sweden public debate both nationally and internationally. a crisis or conflict concerning the would simply state that it is in its Baltic states. Correspondingly, own national security interests to All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other Sweden needs support from NATO apply for NATO membership, regard- experts in the field to ensure the high quality members for its own defence. As a less of what Finland chooses to do. of the publications. In addition, publications result of this, many now consider undergo professional language checking and editing. The responsibility for the views that NATO would accept Sweden as a expressed ultimately rests with the authors. member should it apply..
Recommended publications
  • Peter Hultqvist MINISTRY of DEFENCE
    THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT Following the 2014 change of government, Sweden is governed by the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Green Party. CURRICULUM VITAE Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Party Swedish Social Democratic Party Areas of responsibility • Defence issues Personal Born 1958. Lives in Borlänge. Married. Educational background 1977 Hagaskolan, social science programme 1976 Soltorgsskolan, technical upper secondary school 1975 Gylle skola, compulsory school Posts and assignments 2014– Minister for Defence 2011–2014 Chair, Parliamentary Committee on Defence Member, Defence Commission 2010–2011 Group leader, Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution 2009–2014 Board member, Dalecarlia Fastighets AB (owned by HSB Dalarna) 2009–2014 Board member, Bergslagens Mark och Trädgård AB (owned by HSB Dalarna) 2009–2014 Chair, HSB Dalarna economic association 2009– Alternate member, Swedish Social Democratic Party Executive Committee 2006–2010 Member, Parliamentary Committee on Education 2006–2014 Member of the Riksdag 2005–2009 Member, National Board of the Swedish Social Democratic Party 2002–2006 Chair, Region Dalarna – the Regional Development Council of Dalarna County 2001–2005 Alternate member, National Board of the Swedish Social Democratic Party 2001– Chair, Swedish Social Democratic Party in Dalarna 1999–2006 Board member, Borlänge Energi AB 1999–2006 Chair, Koncernbolaget Borlänge Kommun (municipality group company) Please see next page 1998–2006 Municipal Commissioner in Borlänge, Chair of the Municipal
    [Show full text]
  • UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8fs1h45n Author So, Florence Publication Date 2012 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California University of California Los Angeles Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies Adissertationsubmittedinpartialsatisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So 2012 c Copyright by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So 2012 Abstract of the Dissertation Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2012 Professor Kathleen Bawn, Chair My doctoral dissertation begins with this puzzle: why do large, moderate parties sometimes select leaders who seem to help improve their parties’ electoral performances, but other times choose unpopular leaders with more extreme policy positions, in expense of votes? I argue that leadership selection is dependent on both the electoral institution that a party finds itself in and the intra-party dynamics that constrain the party. Due to a high degree of seat- vote elasticity that is characteristic of majoritarian systems, replacing unpopular leaders is a feasible strategy for opposition parties in these systems to increase their seat shares. In contrast, in proportional systems, due to low seat-vote elasticity, on average opposition parties that replace their leaders su↵er from vote loss. My model of party leadership selection shows that since party members can provide valuable election campaign e↵ort, they can coerce those who select the party leader (the selectorate) into choosing their preferred leader.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Summit Guide Brussels, 11-12 July 2018
    NATO Summit Guide Brussels, 11-12 July 2018 A stronger and more agile Alliance The Brussels Summit comes at a crucial moment for the security of the North Atlantic Alliance. It will be an important opportunity to chart NATO’s path for the years ahead. In a changing world, NATO is adapting to be a more agile, responsive and innovative Alliance, while defending all of its members against any threat. NATO remains committed to fulfilling its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. At the Brussels Summit, the Alliance will make important decisions to further boost security in and around Europe, including through strengthened deterrence and defence, projecting stability and fighting terrorism, enhancing its partnership with the European Union, modernising the Alliance and achieving fairer burden-sharing. This Summit will be held in the new NATO Headquarters, a modern and sustainable home for a forward-looking Alliance. It will be the third meeting of Allied Heads of State and Government chaired by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. + Summit meetings + Member countries + Partners + NATO Secretary General Archived material – Information valid up to 10 July 2018 1 NATO Summit Guide, Brussels 2018 I. Strengthening deterrence and defence NATO’s primary purpose is to protect its almost one billion citizens and to preserve peace and freedom. NATO must also be vigilant against a wide range of new threats, be they in the form of computer code, disinformation or foreign fighters. The Alliance has taken important steps to strengthen its collective defence and deterrence, so that it can respond to threats from any direction.
    [Show full text]
  • Och Försvarspolitiskt Samarbete Inklusive Krisberedskap
    2012/13 mnr: U21 pnr: S29007 Motion till riksdagen 2012/13:U21 av Urban Ahlin m.fl. (S) med anledning av skr. 2012/13:112 Nordiskt utrikes-, säkerhets- och försvarspolitiskt samarbete inklusive krisberedskap Förslag till riksdagsbeslut 1. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om utrikes-, säkerhets- och försvarspolitiskt samarbete i Nor- den. 2. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om samarbete inom Förenta nationerna. 3. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om samarbete inom Europeiska unionen. 4. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om samarbete med Nato. 5. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om ett utvecklat nordiskt försvarssamarbete. Utrikes-, säkerhets- och försvarspolitiskt samarbete i Norden Samarbetet mellan de nordiska länderna är starkt och vilar på en gedigen folklig förankring. Det nordiska samarbetet berör många olika områden och har bidragit till att göra Norden till en region i världsklass. Vi anser att detta samarbete ska stärkas och utvecklas. Vi socialdemokrater anser att Sverige ska vara militärt alliansfritt. Vi säger nej till medlemskap i Nato. En modern svensk säkerhetspolitik byggs på ett ökat nordiskt samarbete, en aktiv Östersjöpolitik, ett fördjupat samarbete i EU och ett starkare stöd till Förenta nationerna. Sverige ska inte förhålla sig pas- sivt om en katastrof eller ett angrepp skulle drabba ett EU-land eller ett nor- 1 Fel! Okänt namn på dokumentegenskap. :Fel! diskt land och vi förväntar oss att dessa länder agerar på samma sätt om Sve- Okänt namn på rige drabbas.
    [Show full text]
  • Föredragningslista
    Föredragningslista 2008/09:70 Fredagen den 13 februari 2009 Kl. 09.00 Interpellationssvar ____________________________________________________________ Avsägelse 1 Laila Bjurling (s) som suppleant i Nordiska rådets svenska delegation 2 Anmälan om sammansatt utrikes- och försvarsutskott Anmälan om fördröjda svar på interpellationer 3 2008/09:272 av Peter Hultqvist (s) Begreppet utanförskap 4 2008/09:306 av Helene Petersson i Stockaryd (s) Småhusindustrin och bostadsbyggandet 5 2008/09:310 av Olof Lavesson (m) Öresundsintegrationen under det svenska EU-ordförandeskapet 6 2008/09:322 av Veronica Palm (s) Sjukskrivningsreglerna Svar på interpellationer Interpellationer upptagna under samma punkt besvaras i ett sammanhang Näringsminister Maud Olofsson (c) 7 2008/09:265 av Carina Adolfsson Elgestam (s) Glasriket Utrikesminister Carl Bildt (m) 8 2008/09:252 av Monica Green (s) Barnen på Gazaremsan 2008/09:267 av Peter Hultqvist (s) Produkter tillverkade på av Israel ockuperat område 1 (3) Fredagen den 13 februari 2009 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2008/09:268 av Peter Hultqvist (s) Situationen i Gaza 2008/09:303 av Thomas Strand (s) Dialog med Hamas Statsrådet Mats Odell (kd) 9 2008/09:224 av Carina Adolfsson Elgestam (s) Tvångsförvaltning av hyresfastighet och hyresgästs rättigheter 10 2008/09:263 av Hans Hoff (s) Försäkringspremien för dem med betalningsanmärkning 11 2008/09:278 av Thomas Östros (s) Stabilitetsprogram för bankerna 12 2008/09:305
    [Show full text]
  • Verksamhetsberättelse 2020
    Bilaga 2 Verksamhetsberättelse 2020 Socialdemokraterna i Kalmar län Distriktsstyrelsen Ordinarie ledamöter Anders Henriksson, Kalmar, ordförande Peter Wretlund, Oskarshamn, kassör Helen Nilsson, Vimmerby, vice ordförande Emöke Bokor, Söderåkra (till 27 oktober) Robert Rapakko, Mönsterås, studieledare Jonas Erlandsson, Högsby, facklig ledare Martina Aronsson, Alsterbro Gunnar Jansson, Västervik Lena Hallengren, Kalmar Maria Ixcot Nilsson, Emmaboda Mattias Nilsson, Mörbylånga (fram till 17 oktober) Marie-Helen Ståhl, Borgholm (fram till 17 oktober) Ilko Corkovic, Borgholm (från 17 oktober) Matilda Wärenfalk, Färjestaden (från 17 oktober) Nermina Mizimovic, Hultsfred Ersättare Michael Ländin, Kalmar Angelica Katsanidou, Överum Tobias Fagergård, Nybro Laila Naraghi, Oskarshamn Peter Högberg, Vimmerby Verkställande utskottet Anders Henriksson, Kalmar Helen Nilsson, Vimmerby Peter Wretlund, Oskarshamn Lena Hallengren, Kalmar Gunnar Jansson, Västervik Revisorer Herman Halvarsson, Köpingsvik Doris Johansson, Kalmar Monica Anderberg, Torsås Ersättare Ove Kåreberg, Mönsterås Diana Bergeskans, Högsby Mathias Karlsson, Färjestaden 2 Antal sammanträden Verkställande utskottet har haft 17st protokollförda sammanträden. Distriktsstyrelsen har haft 9st protokollförda sammanträden samt 1 per capsulam. Representation i partistyrelsen Ordinarie ledamot, Lena Hallengren, Kalmar och ersättare, Johan Persson, Kalmar. Valberedning 2019-2023 Ordinarie ledamöter Ewa Klase, Mönsterås Simon Pettersson, Emmaboda Ann-Britt Mårtensson, Torsås Yvonne Hagberg, Högsby,
    [Show full text]
  • Bet. 2007/08:NU4 Statliga Företag
    Näringsutskottets betänkande 2007/08:NU4 Statliga företag Sammanfattning I anslutning till behandlingen av 2007 års redogörelse för statliga företag, vilken har överlämnats till riksdagen med regeringens skrivelse 2006/07: 120, avstyrker utskottet motionsyrkanden rörande synen på statligt ägande av företag och försäljningar av statliga bolag. Utskottet redovisar sin syn i dessa frågor. Den aktuella skrivelsen bör läggas till handlingarna. I en reser- vation (s, v) föreslås bl.a. att riksdagen ska återta det bemyndigande om försäljning som lämnades i juni 2007. I betänkandet behandlas vidare motionsyrkanden om statens ägarutöv- ning – allmänt och beträffande ersättning till ledande befattningshavare. Yrkandena avstyrks, huvudsakligen med hänvisning till pågående bered- ning inom regeringen. I olika reservationer från företrädarna för Socialde- mokraterna, Vänsterpartiet och Miljöpartiet följs yrkandena upp. 1 2007/08:NU4 Innehållsförteckning Sammanfattning .............................................................................................. 1 Utskottets förslag till riksdagsbeslut ............................................................... 4 Redogörelse för ärendet .................................................................................. 5 Utskottets överväganden ................................................................................. 6 Skrivelsen om statliga företag ...................................................................... 6 Motionerna ..................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • NORDEFCO Annual Report 2015
    NOR DEF CO NORDEFCO Annual Report 2015 “By 2020 we envision an enchanced political and military dialogue on security and defence issues and where we actively seek for possibilities for cooperation. We create efficent and cost-effective solutions based on shared understanding of our mutual potential and challenges. We are committed to enhanced cooperation and coordination in capability development and armaments cooperation. We coordinate activities in international operations and capacity building, human resources, education, training and exercises. We seek to increase the pooling of capabilities and to deepen cooperation in the area of life-cycle support of our defence inventories.” From the Nordic Defence Cooperation Vision 2020, December 2013 2 NORDEFCO Annual Report 2015 NORDEFCO ANNUAL REPORT 2015 Content 04 FOREWORD 07 SWEDISH CHAIRMANSHIP 2015 11 NORDEFCO COOPERATION AREAS 12 COOPERATION AREA ARMAMENTS (COPA ARMA) 14 COOPERATION AREA CAPABILITIES (COPA CAPA) 16 COOPERATION AREA HUMAN RESOURCES AND EDUCATION (COPA HRE) 18 COOPERATION AREA OPERATIONS (COPA OPS) 20 COOPERATION AREA TRAINING AND EXERCISES (COPA TEX) 22 COOPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES 24 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NORDIC DEFENCE COOPERATION 1952–2014 30 THE NORDEFCO STRUCTURE 32 MINISTERS JOINT ARTICLE 2015 34 DANISH CHAIRMANSHIP 2016 Production: Ministry of Defence Sweden • January 2016 Photo: Swedish Armed Forces • Ministry of Defence Sweden • Norwegian Armed Forces Print: Elanders Sverige AB NORDEFCO Annual Report 2015 3 FOREWORD The Nordic countries meet the challenging security situation in our region through solidarity and enhanced cooperation. Our cooperation is built on shared values and we address challenges together. With differing organizational affiliations we cooperate closely within the framework of the EU and NATO.
    [Show full text]
  • Northern Europe's Strategic Challenge from Russia: What
    Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 111 Northern Europe’s Strategic Challenge from Russia What Political and Military Responses? Barbara KUNZ October 2018 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non- governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) under “Russia, Caucasus and Eastern Europe Observatory”. ISBN: 978-2-36567-930-5 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2018 How to quote this document: Barbara Kunz, “Northern Europe’s Strategic Challenge from Russia: What Political and Military Responses?”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 111, Ifri, October 2018. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Written by leading experts, these policy-oriented papers deal with strategic, political and economic issues.
    [Show full text]
  • The Swedish Government
    The Swedish Government Stefan Löfven (S) Magdalena Andersson (S) Ibrahim Baylan (S) Per Bolund (MP) Prime Minister Minister for Finance Minister for Business, Minister for Environment and Prime Minister’s Office Ministry of Finance Industry and Innovation. Climate, and Deputy Prime Minister Ministry of the Environment Hans Dahlgren (S) Mikael Damberg (S) Anna Ekström (S) Tomas Eneroth (S) Minister for EU Affairs Minister for Home Affairs Minister for Education Minister for Infrastructure Prime Minister’s Office Ministry of Justice Ministry of Education and Ministry of Infrastructure Research Matilda Ernkrans (S) Anna Hallberg (S) Lena Hallengren (S) Peter Hultqvist (S) Minister for Higher Education Minister for Foreign Trade, Minister for Health and Minister for Defence and Research with responsibility for Nordic Social Affairs Ministry of Defence Ministry of Education and Affairs Ministry of Health and Research Ministry for Foreign Affairs Social Affairs Morgan Johansson (S) Amanda Lind (MP) Ann Linde (S) Åsa Lindhagen (MP) Minister for Justice and Minister for Culture and Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Financial Markets Migration Democracy, with responsibility Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister for Ministry of Justice for sport Finance Ministry of Culture Ministry of Finance Lena Micko (S) Eva Nordmark (S) Per Olsson Fridh (MP) Ardalan Shekarabi (S) Minister for Public Minister for Employment Minister for International Minister for Social Security Administration Ministry of Employment Development Cooperation Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance Ministry for Foreign Affairs Social Affairs Märta Stenevi (MP) Anders Ygeman (S) Minister for Gender Equality Minister for Energy and Digital and Housing, with responsi- Development bility for urban development, Ministry of Infrastructure anti-segregation and anti- discrimination Ministry of Employment Since 21 January 2019 the Swedish Government consists of the You will find more information about the work of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (S) and the Green Party (MP).
    [Show full text]
  • EMBASSY of INDIA STOCKHOLM India-Sweden Relations Diplomatic
    EMBASSY OF INDIA STOCKHOLM India-Sweden Relations Diplomatic ties between India and Sweden were established in 1949. The two countries enjoy cordial relationship and excellent cooperation in regional and international fora. Sweden supports India’s membership of the expanded United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Sweden supported India in its membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has extended full support in India’s bid for its pending membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The two countries have been supporting each other on reciprocity for their non-permanent memberships in the UNSC and various positions in different organs of the UN and other multilateral fora. Mutual economic interests have emerged as the driving force in the relationship. Political Relations High level contact between the two countries goes back to 1957 when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Sweden. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Sweden for attending the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Sweden in March 1986 and January 1988. The first-ever State Visit by the President of India, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, wasin 2015. This was followed by the visit of Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven to India in 2016. The landmark State Visit of the President of India in 2015 has taken the relationship to new heights. He was accompanied byShri Hansraj GangaramAhir, Minister of State for Chemicals and Fertilizers; Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad, MP, Rajya Sabha; Shri Ashwani Kumar, MP, Lok Sabha; senior Government officials; several Vice Chancellors and Directors of leading Indian Universities; and over 60 business leaders from India.
    [Show full text]
  • Novus Rapport: Förtroendet För Sveriges Ministrar Undersökningen Om Förtroendet För Sveriges Ministrar Har Genomförts På Novus Eget Initiativ
    2021-01-25 Novus Rapport: Förtroendet för Sveriges ministrar Undersökningen om förtroendet för Sveriges ministrar har genomförts på Novus eget initiativ. I den här rapporten presenteras och förklaras förtroendet för ministrarna utifrån fem tabeller: • Förtroendet för regeringen som helhet • Samtliga ministrars resultat sorterat efter störst förtroende. • Topp tio ministrar med störst förtroende. • Samtliga ministrars förtroende sorterat efter ett så kallat balansmått (stort förtroende minus litet förtroende). • Ministrarna sorterat på kännedom. • Förändring jämfört med föregående undersökning Undersökningen genomfördes i Novus Sverigepanel med 1056 intervjuer på ett riksrepresentativt urval på åldern 18 - 79 år mellan den 14–20 januari 2021. Bortsätt från partiledarna som samtliga respondenter har tagit ställning till, har 554 respektive 502 respondenter tagit ställning till hälften av ministrarna vardera. Deltagarfrekvensen var 59%. Vid osäkerhet för hur en siffra skall tolkas eller övriga frågor om undersökningen, kontakta Novus. Förtroendet för regeringen Regeringen ligger kvar på samma nivå i förtroende som i föregående undersökning från december 2020, 37 procent uppger att de har mycket eller ganska stort förtroende för regeringen. Alltså de har inte tappat i förtroende generell pga ett tappat förtroende för deras hantering av Coronapandemin. Regeringen har fortsatt ett högre förtroende nu än innan pandemin. Vilket förtroende har du för regeringen som helhet? 2101 2012 2009 2006 2003 2001 1912 1909 1901 1811 1806 1803 1712 1705 5. Mycket stort förtroende 8 % 7% 6 % 9 % 14% 3% 4% 3 % 3 % 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 4. Ganska stort förtroende 29 % 30% 29 % 31 % 34% 16% 16% 21 % 20 % 17% 24% 21% 23% 26% 3. Varken stort/litet 22 % 23% 23 % 21 % 21% 19% 24% 25 % 23 % 24% 23% 28% 26% 25% förtroende 2.
    [Show full text]