The return of military conscription in Europe: understanding the political decision of bringing back the draft in

Sweden

An in-depth case study of the policy change in Sweden’s defence strategy through the theoretical lens of securitisation

Author: Jet Marres Number: 11024968 Date: June 23rd, 2017 Supervisor: Rocco Bellanova Second Reader: Beste Isleyen Thesis group: European Security Politics Program: MSc International Relations Graduate School of Social Science

University of Amsterdam

Abstract

On march 2nd 2017, the Swedish government formally announced it will reinstate a conscription model to realise military readiness of the Swedish Armed Forces. This century old military institution for the mobilisation of manpower through compulsory military service, was abolished by the Swedish government in 2010 when the military transformed into an all-volunteer professionalised force. Most European countries have demilitarised the armed forces since the end of the Cold War, yet a debate on bringing back conscription models to remilitarise national defences is being held in numerous European national governments. The Swedish government debated bringing back conscription over the last four years and the government maintained the power to reinstate the draft only if the national defence would be in a state of emergency which requires a high level of military preparedness. As such, bringing back conscription shows a policy rotation of the Swedish defence strategy and a change in the political discourse of the Swedish government. The political discourse justifies this defence policy change with clear interconnected statements on the ‘deteriorating security environment in Europe’ and ‘Russia’s assertive posture’ in Sweden’s vicinity. Herewith, a mutual attraction between the securitisation theory and the case of Sweden’s remilitarising its defence policy transpires. Securitisation constitutes a process of articulating an issue as an urgent security matter through which extraordinary measures are legitimated. Thereupon, this thesis critically examines the political discourse in Sweden’s governmental speeches, reports, parliamentary proposals and debates through the lens of securitisation in order to identify a securitised move in Sweden’s stark policy turn and a possible connection to Russia’s so-called ‘assertive posture’. The analysis of the language uttered by governmental actors identifies a securitising move in the speeches and public statements. The securitising move is connected to Russia’s assertive posture and the importance of countering that threat by strengthening national defence capabilities through conscription in order to be ready for multilateral military cooperative endeavours.

Keywords: securitisation theory, speech act, conscription, Swedish Armed Forces, militarisation, European security, defence policy, military preparedness.

word count: 18.708 1

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Acknowledgement

First and foremost, I would like to mention that the process of researching a fairly unstudied and new topic has been challenging, though rewarding. Hereby, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, dhr. R. Bellanova, from whom I have received guidance and encouragement throughout the research process. I want to thank all the people that have helped me find my way in the search for the relevant documents in the Swedish government data. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the positive atmosphere in the course group of European Security Politics specialisation. This has made the writing process an upbeat experience.

Amsterdam, June 2017

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Table of content

List of Acronyms ...... 5

List of Tables ...... 5

1. Introduction: Bringing back the draft ...... 6

1.1 Contextual background of Sweden’s defence policy ...... 8

1.2 State of the art ...... 10

1.3 The Research ...... 12

1.4 Objectives & Relevance ...... 13

1.5 Disposition ...... 14

2. Theoretical Frameworm: from politicastion to securitisation ...... ………..16

2.1 The concept of Security ...... 16

2.2 The Copenhagen School of Security Studies ...... 18

2.3 Securitisation and desecuritiation ...... 19

2.4 The speech Act ...... 23

2.5 The state of the (de-)securitisation debate ...... 24

2.6 Securitisation and the case of Sweden ...... 26

3. Methodology ...... 28

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis ...... 28

3.2 Case Selection ...... 30

3.3 Data Collection and materials ...... 31

3.4 Analytic Procedure ...... 33

3.5 Limitations and considerations ...... 34

4. Analysis ...... 36

4.1 The Defence Commission reports ...... 36

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4.2 Discussions within the parliament ...... 42

4.3 Public statements and political speeches ...... 48

4.4 The results ...... 52

5. Conclusion ...... 53

5.1 Results ...... 53

5.2 Discussion ...... 56

5.3 Further Research ...... 57

Bibliography ...... 58

Appendix ...... 71

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List of Acronyms

AVF All-volunteer force CDA Critical Discourse Analysis EU European Union NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation SAF Swedish Armed Forces

List of Tables

Table 1: The securitising process Table 2: Timeline of the selected data Table 3: Operationalising the securitisation theory Table 4: Operationalising the speech act theory

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1. Introduction: Bringing back conscription

“The security environment in Europe and in Sweden's vicinity has deteriorated and the all-volunteer recruitment hasn't provided the Armed Forces with enough trained personnel. The re-activating of the conscription is needed for military readiness”, a public statement cited by the government of Sweden on March 2nd , 2017 (Radebo, 2017).

With this public statement, the Swedish government formally announced it has decided to reinstate a conscription model to realise military preparedness. The statement ads that the conscription, also called drafting, is based on a gender-neutral recruitment and will include both men and women (Radebo, 2017). Herewith, the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) will recruit four thousand young men and women annually to undergo basic military training with compulsory service, starting no later than the first of January 2018 (Armed Forces, 2016b). In 2010, Sweden’s then centre-right government eliminated the conscription model after more than hundred years of using the draft. The elimination decision argued an all-volunteer force (AVF) with targeted recruitment that would increase the quality and effectiveness of the military in times of peace and stability (Järvenpää, 2016, p. 12). Seven years later, over seventy percent of the current left-leaning coalition in Sweden’s parliament, voted in favour of bringing back the draft (Radebo, 2017). Which illustrates a significant change in Sweden’s defence strategy and security policy.

Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has gradually scaled back its military- and defence- spending and actively moved towards a smaller, more professionalised army (Kernic, 2013, p. 165). This so called ‘strategic timeout’ resulted into the dramatic decline of the SAF structures, as the general assumption was that there was no imminent threat to Swedish national territory (Kunz, 2015, p. 11). However, when the former Supreme Commander of the SAF, Sverker Göransson, made the headlines in January 2013 when he explained that ‘Sweden would only be

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University of Amsterdam able to defend itself for no more than a week’, the issue of the state of the SAF and its military readiness became a heated topic of debate and resulted in questions to the parliament (Nünlist, 2013, p. 2). Since then, the issue of defence strategy and the awareness of security threats became an issue on the political agenda of Sweden’s government. For the first time in the post- Cold War era, the Swedish political discourse uttered issues such as ‘boosting its national territorial defence’ and establishing ‘military preparedness for possible wartimes’ (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 6).

This sweeping turn in defence strategy displays a change in the Swedish legislative perception on the threats to Sweden’s national security (Kunz, 2015, p. 13) The current government of Sweden has justified this turn by arguing it as a response to ‘the deteriorating security situation and problems connected to the manning of military forces’, in the public statement for reintroducing the conscription model (Radebo, 2017). The Swedish Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist, argues in an interview with CNN that a main trigger for the decision is that ‘we have a new security situation due to Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea which is against international law and their increased military exercises are close to the border’ (Masters, Smith-Spark and D’Agostino, 2017). The Swedish government has abundantly cited to have legitimate military and security concern for the Nordic and Baltic sea region due to the growing assertive posture of Russia, which poses a threat to its national security (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 17). In so doing, Sweden’s government justifies the remilitarising policy of the SAF in the light of a growing Russian threat and a significant shortage in military manpower. These threat-related political discourse of the Swedish government indicates an interconnectedness between the renewed security perception and the stark defence policy U-turn of bringing back the draft.

When the Swedish parliament voted in favour of the 2010 Government Bill ‘The Total Defence Duty‘ which transformed the territorial defence focus rooted in conscription into the AVF emphasis on specialised operations abroad (Ministry of Defence, 2010) The vote simultaneously decided that conscription can only be brought back in the light of a territorial security emergency which requires a high level of Sweden’s defence preparedness (ibid.). Hence, the development concerning bringing back conscription demonstrates a changing perception on security, namely a

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University of Amsterdam security emergency which poses a threat to national territory and therefore necessitates a high level security measure. In this regards, it is relevant to look into Sweden’s security background over the last years and put it into the context of defence policies.

1.1 Contextual background of Sweden’s defence policy

Sweden has a history of classifying itself as a neutral state during both the World Wars and all through the Cold War era, for it pursued a policy of non-involvement in any armed interstate conflicts (Kernic, 2013, p. 166). As such, Sweden has upheld significant military capabilities to defend its national territory through the guiding principle of neutrality in its defence and security policies (Gotkowska, 2013, p. 12). Mandatory military service for men has been the foundation of the national defence policy since 1901 and until its abolishment in 2010 (ibid.). During that time, Sweden designed a ‘Total Defence’ strategy, which meant that large amounts of government resources and spending were directly focussed on preparing the whole of the society for war (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 146). This military doctrine nurtured self-reliance of its national territorial defence policies, which made the idea of military cooperation obsolete and caused Sweden to be one of the most militarised democracies in the world (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 148). When Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, this doctrine gradually started to change.

When joining the EU, the policy of neutrality started to be replaced by military non-alignment, by which Sweden strategically maintained the ability to come back to a policy of neutrality when a conflict in its neighbourhood would occur (Holmberg, 2015, p. 239). As an EU-member, Sweden has become a morally charged player in the affairs of international security and actively promotes democratic norms, peace missions and human rights (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 149). By means of this, Sweden has transformed its armed forces to fit these globally focused missions which signifies the so-called ‘strategic time out’ of Sweden’s security and defence policies. Drastic cuts in military spending transformed the army to more professionalised and specialised units, based on the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ framework (Hedlund, 2013, p. 139). Consequentially, the SAF dismantled its ability to mobilise and militarise its defence capabilities and instead became a frontrunner in international crisis management as appose to sustain national territorial defence policies (Kragh and Åsberg, 2017, p. 19). With this, the public and 8

University of Amsterdam policy debates in Sweden has grown on the topic of joining military alliances, with the military alliance of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as the most prominent one over the last two decades (Kunz, 2015, p. 12).

The ongoing debate about Sweden’s membership of NATO has become increasingly turbulent since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, by which the perceived insecurity in the Baltic sea area appeared (Sperling and Webber, 2016, p. 23). Sweden’s response to the rising insecurity in the region consisted of the declaration of solidarity that specified that Sweden would not stand by passively in any case of an armed attack on the EU or Nordic countries and it expects the same of those countries in return (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 150). This declaration has become more prominent through Russia re-arming its military and the illegal annexation of Crimea, which stands as a violation of international law (Raik and Järvenpää, 2017, p. 17). Additionally, a supposed Russian submarine has infiltrated waters around Stockholm, which resulted in a week long search of the SAF in 2014 (Lasconjarias, 2017, p. 4) Russia is supposedly also guilty of cyberattacks on the Swedish air traffic control system last year (ibid.). They also conducted a mock invasion of the Swedish island Gotland in march 2015, which is considered to be a possible strategic military place in the middle of the Baltic sea area (Kragh and Åsberg, 2017, p. 29). According to statements of the Swedish government, the self-assured Russian presence in the Baltic and Nordic region has resulted in the decision to remilitarise the Gotland island and open up the debate on enhancing the Swedish national defence capabilities (The Government of Sweden, 2017). With this, the debate on the choice of a conscription model and the effects it will bring to society, have gained more attention in the European security sphere.

Besides the Swedish government, countries Germany, Italy, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands all have suspended or eliminated military conscription over the last two decades (Braw, 2017:2). The end of the Cold War brought about fundamental transformations in security policies in Europe and their national defence agenda’s (ibid.). This has resulted in phasing out conscription models throughout Europe, for it was considered to be an outdated defence model and unfit for a secure world where mass mobilisation is more and more replaced by cyberwarfare, air power, terrorism and foreign cooperative operations (Joenniemi, 2006, p. 8) Nevertheless, in the last

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University of Amsterdam year many of these countries governments have been debating the pros and cons of bringing back a drafting system and Ukraine, Estonia and Lithuania actually reinstated conscription over the last couple of years (Breitenbauch et al., 2017, p. 4). Additionally, Norway has continuously used a soft form of conscription and it is the first country in Europe to implement compulsory military service for men and women since the start of 2016 (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 147). As such, the concept of conscription has not only been brought back in national security and defence discussions in Europe, it is has opted an extended version of a gender neutral compulsory draft to the table. With the announcement of reinstating conscription, Sweden breaks the trend of phasing out conscription in Europe and puts forth a shift towards the remilitarising of its armed forces. Analysing the political decision-making process of Sweden’s return to conscription will provide insight of a possible frontrunner in the shift of the re-emergence of conscription models in Europe.

1.2 The state of the art

Conscription armies have played a crucial role in the establishment of the current international state system and intensified the connection between the state and its civilians (Mjøset & van Holde, 2002, p. 4). Military service directly relates to state formation, legitimation of state claims to the people, nationalist socialisation, and has historically transformed societies into states which constituted a central matters for historical and social science (Raymond, 2012, p. 5). Yet, the phenomenon of military conscription as a national institution and its various stages in history, has not been a central research topic in social science or related political and international relations core issues. The historical impact of conscription in Europe has not been abundantly researched, stronger yet, Martin Anderson (1976) and Peter Karsten (1998) seems to be one of the view authors to explicitly focus on conscription and its bearing in military history. For most of the nineteenth century, conscription models have been by far the most dominant way of military recruitment and defence building, which has brought about social and economic consequences for the societies at the time (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1998, p. 406). Nevertheless, the phenomenon has received very little attention from a social historical context, as well as from

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University of Amsterdam an economic historical context of the position the conscripts took in as a paying or non-paying labour.

Indeed, economic considerations of conscription have produced some studies in the last century. However, they are generally credited for ending it all together (Oi, 1967; Friedman, 1967, Bradford, 1968; Fisher, 1969). Additionally, studies about the totality of conscription as a social, political or economic institution in contemporary security policies is lacking, however conscription as a social institution for the creation of citizenship, social discipline and nationalist support during the Cold War era have been studied (Petersen, 1989; Levi, 1996) These studies are all done in specific case studies, like the United States case or the case of the United Kingdom (O’Sullivan 1982; Adams & Poirier, 1987; Flynn, 1993). The most prominent case study is the case of France, for it is considered to be the historical birthplace of the conscription model and the idea of recruiting manpower (Cobban, 1962; Dolye, 1989; Marble, 2012). Nevertheless, conscription and its developments in contemporary Europe, within the European security policies or in comparative analysis between western democracies is only been touched upon by George Flynn (2002). That is, in his comparative overview of conscription in the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and these cases are yet again of an historical context.

Military services and necessities in foreign policy spheres, have been and still remains one of the central issues of the contemporary modern world (Mjøset & van Holde, 2002:4). As the organised use of violence and survival of the state have always been a central topic in international politics. The large number of conscription armies in the history of European states have not only brought about questions of external threats or state competitions, it has opted debates about what is to be protected, by whom, and by which moral compass (Joenniemi, 2006, p. 6). It is in this regard that the notion of defence and security became an issue of the people of the nation, rather than of the state itself, which turns military service and conscription into a duty for all (Avant, 2000, p. 43). As such, the literature on military services has shifted over the last years from topics on state power and mass mobilisation towards research on topics like; women in the army and the role of women in conflicts (Segal, 1995; Carreiras, 2006), gender issues in the armed forces (Krosnell & Svedberg, 2001), the Revolution in Military Affairs (Metz &

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Kievit, 1995), civil-military relations (Bland, 2001; Burk, 2002) and various ways of effectively recruiting the armed forces (Avant, 2000; Kaldor, 2003). In so far, the recruitment of military services, voluntarily or compulsory, does therefore constitute a continued relevant research topic. Yet, the contemporary research on conscription, transforming an AVF into a conscription army, gender neutral conscription or for that matter the renewed conscription models in Europe is showing a significant research gap. In addition to that, the political motives for conscription as a form of remilitarising the defence policy, the pros and cons of conscription models in contemporary international relations and state politics, are research matters that fall short and what makes the study of this topic extremely relevant and original. In seeking to fill this gap, this thesis calls for a greater focus on the study of contemporary military and defence policy changes and the possible consequences it brings to defence and security policies in the European region. The theory of securitisation typically focusses on the moment when change occurs in a given political state of affairs and an issue of regular politics is transformed into high politics (McDonald, 2008, p. 576). In this regard, the thesis will focus on the political decision-making process of the Swedish government in the re-establishing of the conscription model and on the political discourse that shows a possible change in the political state of affairs.

1.3 The Research

This research examines the seemingly mutual attraction between the case of Sweden’s return to the conscription policy and the securitisation theory. The securitisation theory examines the change in the security conditions through the analysis of the performative power of political discourse and the labelling of threat politics (Waever, 2014, p. 123). Subsequently, for Sweden to bring back conscription is a policy that has to be justified by military threats to national territory, then the stark change in the policy has to show a change in the perception of threats represented by relevant government officials of Sweden. The theory of securitisation seeks to understand the politics of re-presentation in the possible meanings and contexts given of those presentations (Vuori, 2008, p. 74). As such, the reciprocal connection with the case of Sweden’s conscription seems a suitable one, for it is the return of conscription that signifies the stark

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University of Amsterdam moment of policy change in ending ‘the strategic timeout’ and the start of remilitarising Sweden’s national defence capabilities.

This thesis inspires to study the political discourse in the process of making the political decision to reinstate conscription by way of Swedish government documentation and the way in which this move is represented. The analysis aims to examine whether change in the perception of security threats can be identified in such a way that a possible connections to the public statement of Sweden’s government on Russia’s assertive posture in the region is exposed. Hence, the thesis examines the following two questions:

Can a securitising move be identified in the political discourse of the Swedish governmental decision of reinstating conscription?

How has Russia’s assertive posture in the region affected this political decision-making process?

1.4 Objectives & Relevance

The research topic of the return of conscription models and the re-positioning of governmental defence strategies in Europe, can be considered a pilot study in a research field that is gaining more relevance due to its growing reality, but is simultaneously lacking contemporary research. Therefore, the subject of the return of conscription and the research presented in this thesis, consist of several objectives. According to George & Bennett (2005), research objectives should be embedded in a renewed, well informed assessment that identifies gaps in current knowledge on the topic and acknowledgements in the contradictory and in the evidence of theory (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 44). Accordingly, the objectives of this research consist of descriptive purposes and exploratory purposes, which are rooted in the relevance of the study.

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The aim of this study is to describe whether a securitising move can be identified in Sweden’s political decision process of reinstating conscription, and if Russia’s assertive posture has affected this process. Thereupon, the research objective is descriptive because it aspires to find out why a certain action is being taken and how the content of research materials can explain this action (Darke, et al., 1998, p. 278). Attached, this thesis will include an exploratory objective in the study, as the study consists of gathering preliminary information that will put forth a contribution to the nature of the research topic (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 49). And as such, aspires to lay down a basis for better understanding the topic of the return of contemporary conscription models as empowering national defence capabilities. As a result, this thesis ensures scientific relevance of the study precisely because it will fill a significant gap in the existing scientific knowledge on the topic of bringing back the draft and it identifies a field that has not been extensively researched in social science.

The debates concerning the return of conscription have gained an important momentum with Sweden formally reintroducing the draft system. This change in the strategic posture of Sweden will have direct consequences for its role in the European security assembly, its political alliances and in relation to its neighbouring countries (Breitenbauch et al. 2017, p. 3). As of now, bringing back a draft system with a gender neutral addition, can be considered a vital reality against the backdrop of the growing international tension in Europe, and specifically in the Nordic-Baltic region (ibid.). Understanding the contemporary debates and policy documentations concerning the topic of conscription in Sweden and the political discourse concerning the decision process, is thus an important one for it will have political, economic and social impact in international and domestic ways. And as such, the research subsists of social relevance in its aim to better understand political and social processes that will have an effect on society.

1.5 Disposition

The structure of the thesis is outlined as follows. In order to clarify how this thesis approaches the examination of the political discourse of the Swedish decision to bring back conscription, the thesis will first discuss the conceptual consideration of security issues and the securitisation 14

University of Amsterdam theory in the theoretical framework and engages in theoretical on the analytical value of the theory. The speech act theory, which gives the securitisation theory its analytical and theoretical foundations, will also be discussed in the theoretical framework and thereafter operationalised in the methodology chapter. The chapter on methods provides an explanation on how the operationalisation of the speech act has resulted the use of critical discourse analysis and will give a justification to the methodological choices. Henceforth, the analysis chapter provides a discussion on the results of the critical discourse analysis of the Swedish documentation on the decision to reinstate conscription, and these research findings will be analysed critically. Finally, the concluding chapter will provide an overview of the main findings, it will answer the research questions, deliver a critical discussion on the research process and outcomes and gives suggestions for further research.

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2. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this inquiry is predominantly based on the securitisation theory, which origin is grounded in the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. By drawing up on the prime authors of the securitisation theory, namely the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) in their book ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, this chapter will address the foundations, analytical contribution and theoretical basis of the securitisation theory. Moreover, the concept of ‘security’ and ‘security issues’ will be set forth in the field of political decisions making and processes of securitising an issue. The emphasises is put on laying down the basis of a securitising move and how it can be identified in order to connect the theoretical framework with the aim of this study. In doing so, the objective of this chapter is delivering a theoretical foundation from which the analytical inquiry is based on in chapter four. This following chapter will firstly cover the conceptualisation of security and the related debates in the security studies. Secondly, it will also bring about a focus on where the securitisation theory comes from, what it does and how it can be utilised and applied throughout different theoretical presentations. Finally, this chapter will concentrate on to the ‘speech act’ framework, which moves the utterance of security itself into measures of language and can therefore be operationalised into a analytic tool.

2.1 The concept of security

The concept of security is increasingly part of a reconceptualization debate since the end of the Cold War, for it marks a changing understanding of the international environment in the political sense as well as the theoretical one (Buzan, 1991; Crawford, 1991; Art, 1993; Adler, 1997; Baldwin, 2001; Fierke, 2015). The reconceptualization of the security context resulted into renewed security issues on political agendas and academic debates concerning the definition, content and scope of the concept. These debates within social science emerged amongst three kind of scholars, namely the traditionalist, wideners and the critical scholars (Baldwin, 2001, p.7). Which makes security in itself a contested concept and dynamic in its analytical use. A commonality in the concept of security is rooted in aspects like ‘threats to precious values’ or

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‘freedom from threats’, however this does not resolve the obscurity (Buzan, 1991, p. 18; Art, 1993, p. 280; Williams, 2008, p. 5). It is in the obscurity of the security concept that the relation to political, individual and societal value is exposed and were the relevance of the reconceptualization debate in social science is anchored. As social science, and especially the study of international relations, aims to understand the behaviour, relationships and meanings of those political and societal considerations.

Classically, security is conceptualised as an objective sense which can be measured by the absence of threats (Wolfers, 1962, p. 149). Traditionalist like Stephen Walt (1991) and Colin Gray (1992) argue that security exists within the domain of the state and the government’s aim is to prevent or manage threats to the survival of the state (Walt, 1991, p. 213; Gray, 1992, p 27). Herewith, the traditionalists point of view is one that is state-centric and focusses on the materialism of force, like military capabilities (Nye, 1988, p.7). One can argue that objectivity in security issues is a necessity for the maintaining of it , but then again subjective factors are influential in the perception of security itself by interactions, negotiations, for the policymakers and the society who is subject to it (Booth, 2007, p. 105). Thereupon, traditionalists have excepted the wider range of issues in security that can cause conflicts, however the traditionalists argument is that the expansion of the research field by widening the security concept would mean losing the focus of the field and will consequentially means a loss of analytical coherency (Buzan, 1998, p. 9). This view is in contract with scholars who are arguing for a widening and deepening of security concept.

The wideners scholars, such as Ole Waever (1995), Barry Buzan (1998) and Lene Hansen (2000) aim to go beyond the state-centric paradigm and argue a wider range of threats to security. With this, these scholars argue for a broader and deeper security concept by adding new elements to the security agenda (Huysmans, 2011, p. 372). They reject the narrow space of state and military elements in the security research agenda and added issues like economics, health and environmental challenges (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). This wider range of the security agenda exposes a subjectivity in the angle of which one can study security, which leaves room for different theoretical approaches and scholars directions for research.

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Besides the traditionalists and widening debates, critical scholars such as Alexander Wendt (1998) and Michael Williams (2003) have focussed on the totality of the frame from which security exist. This post-positivist turn questions the core assumptions on which security is researched on positivist grounds and thereby challenges the traditionalist and the wideners debates all together (Fierke, 2007, p. 103). With this, the critical study of the issue of security prevails counter arguments for the positivist considerations, as Jim George (2008) cited:

“For the most part the debate over science and international relations has been carried out as a debate between positivism and its critics. This debate continues into the present with tensions within constructivist theory a particularly evident example of it” (George, 2008, p.34).

By this means, critical studies move beyond the liberal-realist and materialism controversies and towards a more discursive understanding of security. Understanding security as a process or an act, which can be influenced by interactions, norms, values, cultural and historical influences (Wendt, 1998, p. 413). It is in this post-positivist perspective in international relations that the social constructivist approach enters new ways of analysing security in contemporary politics (Adler, 1997, p. 256; Wendt, 1998, p.415). This makes the conceptualisation of security intersubjective and gives importance to actors who are involved, how these actors present security and what kind of language is used in political and public discourses. This makes the security concept both open to be used in the name of prevention or control, and as such is open to evoke extraordinary measures as to avoid them.

2.2 The Copenhagen School of Security Studies

The origin of the security studies can be traced back to the traditionalist scholars, with the uprising of critical security scholars, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies in the security research field is one of the most prominent (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 21). The Copenhagen School of Security Studies, as part of the post-positivist movement, is a body of academic research which emphasises the social features of security (Knudsen, 2001, p. 355). By adding social features unto the security concept, different stadia emerges in which security is spoken of (Buzan

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University of Amsterdam et al. 1998, p. 6). Consequentially, the Copenhagen School brings about a broadening of the security concept and joins the ‘widening debate’. This by including the different sectors, such as environmental threats, regional or societal threats in which it is possible to analyse security in different ways and with different factors. Herewith, the Copenhagen School agrees with the traditionalist notion that security is about survival, for it entails the analysis of threats to an object that makes security an issue in the first place and therefore needs counter measures (Buzan, 1991, p. 437). However, the analytical apparatus of the Copenhagen School differs from the traditionalist one, for it does not analyse the threat as an objective state of affairs but rather an concept that can be constructed.

Accordingly, the Copenhagen School and the primary associated authors Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998), have developed an analytic tool to conceptualise those security issues that evoke extraordinary measures in light of threats (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27). This approach addresses social and linguistic aspects of security in the analysing of the constructing of the threat, which entails a social constructivist perspective that breaks down the aspects of what constitutes the security issue (Booth, 2007, p. 102).This conceptualisation is outlined in the prominently debated theory of securitisation. As such, the practical aspects and consequences of securitisation allow for a broader understanding of contemporary security issues in the field of political and societal processes and developments.

2.3 Securitisation & de-securitisation

The securitisation theory signifies a disruption in the security field of International Relations (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 93). As stated above, it represents a body of theoretical challenges to the traditional ‘state-centric’ paradigm of analyses and thereby opts for new conceptual definitions and identifies new kinds of threats. These reconceptualization’s make room for a variation of ontological and methodological perspectives, which display a certain view on reality and are therefore rooted in the social constructivist approach in analysing those threats to security as an intersubjective reality (Floyd, 2011, p. 430). Such an analysis is therefore a more reflective ontological phenomenon than the traditional and often realist- orientated view on security as an objective reality (Waever, 1995, p. 56; Sjöstedt, 2013, p. 147).

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These ontological differences make room for methodological more discursive ways for analysing security rather as an outcome of a social process than an objective condition (Williams, 2003, p. 512). With this, the theory of securitisation defines security as an process that can be constructed, influenced, and is therefore intersubjective and dynamic.

Constructivist scholars have emphasised the political significance in the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘threats’ in security studies (Buzan et al., 1998; Campbell, 1998; Krause & Williams, 1997; Floyd, 2011). The constructivist perspectives asks questions like when an issue can be classified as an ‘security threat’, who makes that classification and with what kind of motives. Referring to an issue as a matter of ‘security’ or in the name of a ‘security threat’, suggests a sense of urgency, of extraordinary circumstances and high politics (Stritzel, 2007, p. 358). Consequentially, applying a sense of direct urgency to an issue that is an existential threat and thus is in need of extraordinary measures, an issue becomes open to securitisation (Waever, 1995, p.51 ;Buzan et al., 1998, p.21). In this context, an issue is moved from a regular political frame into a political frame that is out of the ordinary legislative procedures. Herewith, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies argues that securitising an issue can be considered as an extension of politicising an issue (Neumann, 1998, p. 12). By means of this, an issue can be securitised when political relevant actors are starting to talk about it and different phases occur, which is illustrated as follows:

Table 1: The securitising process (based on: Buzan et al., 1998, p. 13; Neumann, 1998, p. 12; Emmers, 2010, p. 138).

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The table shows the distinctiveness of the rhetorical process of a securitising move that influences an issue to be relocated out of the politicised frame and into the securitised representation (Emmers, 2010, p. 138). Henceforth, securitisation refers to the process where a phenomenon is created or constructed as an security issue. It seeks to understand how an issue is moved into the security nexus, under what kind of conditions and by whom this process is utilized (Floyd, 2011, p. 428). The process of securitising an issue consist of four main aspects, by which an issue can be regarded as a legitimate cause of change, which means it has found acceptable (ibid.). At first, a securitising move frames a phenomenon as an existential threat, that constitutes existential when the changing phenomenon is considered to be damaging and have negative impact on a referent object (Balzacq, 2005, p.524). The referent object constitutes as an object, ideal or entity that is threatened and therefore has to be protected in order to secure its survival (ibid.). To secure or maintain the survival of the referent object by the existential threat, extraordinary measures are suggested to do make that happen (Roe, 2004, p. 281). These measures can consist of policy changes, new laws, political instruments and can be considered as extraordinary when such a measure has not been used before and is thus requested outside the regular political legislative procedures (ibid.). Securitisation can be classified as successful when an audience, the target of the securitising move, has accepted the security issue as an existential threat which legitimises the use of extraordinary measures (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). These four main aspect of securitisation constitutes intersubjective phases in a process where political change occurs, for each phase is open to interpretation and different perceptions, and can thus be deliberate steered.

The practice of securitisation is based on the argument that by the utterance or labelling of ‘security’ onto an issue, it can be steered into emergency politics (Taureck, 2006, p. 54). This makes securitisation an act that can be studied through language and discourse, this so called ‘speech act’ theory is what gives securitisation its theoretical basis.

‘Security is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue –not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a

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threat’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 23).

The speech act theory signifies the direct link between the threat to security and the actor who represents it as a threat (Waever, 1995, p. 54). Consequently, the speech act theory classifies security issues as a self-referential practice, the security issue is treated as a threat when actors recognize and label it as such. Therefore, the conceptual definition of a security issue is dependable on the contemporary international political sphere and the actors who construct and represent issues unto the security agenda. This definition of the speech act theory brings about normative assumptions that there can be a three step plan to bring securitisation to a successful outcome. Namely, the classification of an existential threat, to represent the necessity of an emergency response action and by that particular justification can it move out of the regular political static rules (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 6). To represent an issue as an existential threat means to state that the issue is more pressing than others, which makes it legitimate to move beyond political regulations (Taureck, 2006, p. 56). The legitimation of the urgency and necessity of the action is to be swayed by an audience who accepts the securitising move.

The maintaining of security and the protection of it, is framed as the desirable status quo and suggests an ideal (Sjöstedt, 2013, p. 148). When an issue is securitised, the regular political process is overruled and thus shows a grey area in allowing actors to rise above the norm that would normally bind them to collective regulation. This grey area signifies normative implications of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, for it debates the consequences of securitisation itself (Hansen, 2012, p. 526). Securitisation as an strategy or deliberate act, can have negative consequences for the sense of security as an political or societal value (ibid.). The theory of de-securitisation, an opposite process of securitisation, conceptualises a strategy that returns an issue from the urgent politicised agenda to the domain of regular public politics, a politicised issue (Waever, 1995, p. 63). The de-securitisation process strives for deconstructing an ongoing securitisation discourse and is understood as the absence of labelling a threat and the absence of extraordinary measures requests (Cuita, 2009, p. 304). A security issue can move from one phase to another and back, as an issue can both be securitised as well as de-securitised by the performance of the speech act, which depicts the power of language in political processes.

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2.4 The speech act

The central claim of the securitisation theory is that the uttering and way of articulating security issues, produces a threatening state of affairs (Balzacq, 2005, p. 511) Herewith, the power is directly derived from the usage of words, thus the utterance itself constitutes an act. ‘By saying the word, something is done’ (Waever, 1995, p. 55). By verbally labelling an issue as a security threat, it becomes one and thereby creates a new social order. This means there is a choice for labelling an object or phenomenon as a matter of security, through discursive practice of labelling the choice of securitizing is a political one (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p. 8). Political precisely because to construct an issue through speech act is dependable on power-laden and correct use of words in conformity with the public recognised governing rules (Balzacq, 2005, p. 511). The speech act defines security as not being ‘out there’, but rather as a presentation by an actor (Waever, 1995, p. 55). So, the way in which the presentation is executed is relevant for understanding the what the ‘speaking actor’ means. For instance, the speaking actor can make a prediction, a promise, a request or an admission, all of which are ways to analyse the specifics on what the speaking actor means with his presentation (Tsohatzidis, 2010, p. 341). In it in the act of establishing those kinds of meanings that provide the operationalisation of the speech act theory. A theory based on linguistic analysis which is grounded on the notion that utterance has performative power and functions (Bach, 2014, p. 155). This performative power is based on the intentions and interpretations behind the utterance of speech acts and expose several acts at ones (ibid.). Herewith, the central concept of speech acts, the illocutionary force, analysis ‘what is meant’ by uttering and can be operationalised in five types of meanings.

This operationalisation describes the ‘illocutionary acts’, by which the performative power of utterance as a speech act is defined, ‘to act in saying something’ (Habermas, 1970, p. 361). With this, speech act scholars such as John Austin (1976) and David Holdcorft (1978) explain illocutionary acts as a force of intention behind the utterance performed by an speech act (Austin, 1976, p. 40; Holdcroft, 1978, p. 157). In this regards, the notion of the illocutionary force as the main drive behind the meaning in utterance, is thus subject to analysing the intention of the utterance. This analysis of the linguistics of communication and performative speech acts, is divided into types of illocutionary force given to an utterance.

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These five types of speech acts are designed by John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken (1985) and consist of the following explanations: assertive utterance of speech acts entails a speaking actor that presents a proposition as an actual true state of affairs; a directive speech act presents an clear request, order or command action to carry out a respond to the proposition given; a commissive speech act commits to promise, a vow, guarantee and gives legitimising force for an action in the future; an expressive speech act refers to what the speaking actors is expressing in an emotion, such as apologies, thankfulness, congratulations or disappointment; a declaration speech act refers to changing the reality in accordance with the proposition, thus statements like declaring something guilty, declaring war and therefore makes a real change happen (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p. 18).

The illocutionary force brings about contextual posture of the speech act and enables the speaking actor to activate a new context or heighten the existing context (Vuori, 2008, p. 88). Thereby, the speaking actor can impact the interpretation of the issue in the current state of affairs. This allows a performative speech act to create the ‘appropriate’ conditions to increase the receptiveness of the targeted audience (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). This receptiveness is in accordance with and dependable on the recognised security structure, the rank of the securitising actor and the historical and culture factors that facilitate the conditions on which securitisation can take place (ibid.). The theory of securitization and de-securitisation can thus not be regarded as neutral school of thoughts, for it is dependable on the context given and the receptiveness of the audience. Better yet, the Copenhagen school of thought signifies a laden political analytical tool, which usefulness and normative strands is debated among scholars

2.5 The state of the (de-)securitisation debate

The securitisation theory as a school of thought of International Relations, has been criticised and debated for it analytical and practical utility, as well for its normative implications as a theoretical framework (Cuita, 2009, p. 306). Although it is relevant to discuss the criticisms of the securitisation theory, this thesis aims to acknowledge and embrace the arguments posed below, for it will provide an explanation for the choice of the theory applied in this study.

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Securitisation and the speech act analysis, is continuously criticised for its lack of practical usefulness (McSweeney, 1996; Neumann, 1998; Lupovici, 2014). These scholars argue that other schools of thought in the study of International Relations, like the liberal or realist thoughts, provide a useful framework for analysing and understanding international diplomacy. Critics argue that identifying a securitised issue or a securitising actor, does not impact the political processes itself. It is the securitisation theory that is criticised because it can observe an ongoing or finished process, but lacks the ability to be utilised as a practice for political actors or as a prediction of international political behaviour (Lupovici, 2014, p. 303). However, the study of International Relations focusses on explaining and understanding behaviour within the international political dynamics, it does not seek to predict or steer political phenomenon (Baylis et al., 2017, p. 3) Consequently, one could argue the securitisation theory is thus an analytical tool for better understanding a process of political behaviour and can contribute to the awareness of the use of language in the practice of international diplomacy.

Another criticisms of the securitisation theory is cited in its theoretical foundation as a speech act (Hansen, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Wilkinson; 2007; Côté, 2016). Debates on the framework of the securitisation theory have been argued on the ground of its social constructivist premises, thus the idea of constructing issue through interactions, norms and agency (Côté, 2016, p. 541). However, scholars like Adam Côté (2016) and Lene Hansen (2000) have rejected the premises of active agency participation in the securitisation theory and argue that ‘speaking security’ is constrained by defining it as an illictionary performance. By this definition, securitisation can only be accessed by those authorised to ‘speack security’ (Hansen, 2000, p. 290). It is the causal relationship between the securitising actor and the audience that brings about normative assumption of this conceptualisation of the speech act theory (Balzacq 2005; Lupovici, 2014; Cuita, 2009; McDonald 2008, Hansen, 2000). As the analytical focus of the securitisation is the supposedly shared understanding of the urgency of the action between the audience and the securitising actor ought to have (Balzacq, 2005, p. 184). Its mutual recognised idea of an threatening phenomenon to the referent object, as the main theoretical assumption is what makes the theory audience-centred (McDonald, 2008, p. 574). However, it is the audience that seems to be subjected to the securitisation process instead of participation in the process. This does make

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University of Amsterdam the securitisation theory often concerned about state-actors instead of moving beyond the state- centric levels.

Lastly, the securitisation theory is often criticised for its dominance in European politics (Huysmans, 1998; Bigo, 2002; Balzacq, 2010). Most of the studies done on securitisation is based on political processes within the context of European policy and European political discourse, such as migration (Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005), terrorism ( Edmunds, 2012) and climate change policies (Brzoska , 2009; Trombetta, 2010). One might argue the securitisation theory signifies a narrow framework of analysing security, namely the designation of the threat. One might argue that the studies on securitisations is mainly done within the European political discourse and is therefore best applicable for a political environment based on consultations and democratic negotiations. One might also argue securitisation as an illocutionary speech act is only done by those institutionally placed to do so. However, the securitisation theory used in this thesis signifies a practical analytical tool for analysing a policy U-turn decision by the government of Sweden in the contextual background of the European geopolitical considerations. By this, it aims to analyse the speech acts of the Swedish parliament whom voted in favour of this policy change. This means, the securitisation speech act theory is suitable for this specific case study in spite of and precisely because it embraces the criticism and utilises them to understand the process leading up to the policy turn and does not seek to expand the theory itself.

2.6 Securitisation and the case of Sweden

The securitisation theory is developed and used for the specific purpose of de-securitisation and in a the particular context of European security politics, in the explicit timeframe of the post- Cold War era (Guzzini, 2015, p. 5). This theoretical approach serves as a tool to look at security issues with a focus on politics and aspects of social, economic and environmental relations should be or should not be securitised is essential in governments running national security agenda’s. The securitisation theory focusses on the moment when political change occurs and national governments seek to manage that (Bach, 2014, p. 156). Therefore, the securitisation theory can describe the way in which the political change occurs and in which context is it justified, and in connection to which issues. Which follows the aim and purpose of this thesis, for 26

University of Amsterdam it aspires to examine the political change of Sweden’s defence posture with returning conscription and by which context and connected factors this can be described. Hence, the securitisation theory, and specifically the concept of securitising moves, defined by Waever, Buzan and de Wilde (1998) provide an accurate theoretical lens for this research.

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3. Methodology

This thesis employs a critical discourse analysis alongside secondary data analysis to examine the mutual attractiveness between the securitisation theory and the case of Sweden’s change in national defence strategy through reinstating military conscription. Hence, this thesis implements an interpretive case-study of the policy turn of military, gender-neutral, conscription of the Swedish government. Research methods can be defined as a way to systemise and describe the analysis of the collected data, bring about focus and deploys the relevant tools (Cavaye, 1996, p. 228). Herewith, this methodology chapter provides the justification of the methodological choices for the case selection, the collected data, the chosen analytical tools and the way in which these tools are operationalised. This justification produces a clear picture of the contribution of the choices to the research, as well as the considerations of the limitations and delimitations taken into account in the process.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

This thesis examines the presentations of different speech acts performed by members of the Swedish parliament in explaining and describing the defence policy turn to military conscription. This policy turn is deployed in the world of security politics and the socio-political dynamics of perceptions of threats and security (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998, p. 53). The meaning of security is dependable on epistemology, ontology and methodology considerations and the theoretical basis it is grounded on (Floyd, 2011, p. 431). For the theory of securitisation, illocutionary speech acts look for meaning in the uttering and labelling of security (ibid). The Copenhagen School of Security Studies comprehends the concept of security on the exploratory capabilities of the social constructivist approach (McDonald, 2008, p. 577). Therefore, defining security and security phenomenon is considered to be textual laden, for which securitising practices earn political meaning and power (Wæver, 2015, p. 123). With this, the theoretical foundation of the securitisation theory offers epistemology and ontological leanings on which the methodology yields. This means, the research is ontologically grounded on the premises that reality is created by social actors, social interactions and is therefore interpretive, changeable and 28

University of Amsterdam dynamic (Bryman, 2012, p. 522). Epistemology, the social world produces knowledge that is open to interpretations, perceptions and subjectivity (ibid.). Based on these fundamental notions, the social constructivist approach views security as a socially constructed concepts, which can be influenced, formed and changed by language, presentations, actors and interactions (Vuori, 2008, p. 78). In so doing, the analysis of language within a social context is relevant for examining social and political linguistic influences of creating security issues, which can be critically analysed through discourse analysis.

This study considers the way in which language uttered by Sweden’s government representatives has engaged with their audience, given the assumption that the speech acts constitute interaction between the speaking actor and the audience (Bourbeau, 2014, p. 189). The speech act method structures language into actions that can influence audience perceptions and objectives (ibid.). For this reason, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is necessary for the examination of public statement and addresses. CDA constitutes an interdisciplinary approach for studying language and discourse as a form of social and political practices (Fairclough, 1995, p. 193). CDA has been applied for analysing policy documents, political speeches, public debates and governmental bills on order to given impressions or frames presented to an audience (Guzzini, 2011; Stritzel, 2007; Balzacg, 2005).

The CDA is based on a qualitative analysis in examining contextual securitisation in the relationship between security politics and the given context. This analysis will therefore consist of the interaction between the securitisation process and the specific context, which is the policy turn of Sweden’s defence strategy. It is in the securitisation process where the social and political speech acts present the determinations of the threat, the object and the measures for actions (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998, p. 58). This means, a CDA method structures the analysis of texts and context, to bring systematically together the meaning and socio-political implications of the speech acts done by Swedish representatives of the parliament.

This study is conducted as an interpretative case-study of Sweden’s case in reinstating conscription. An interpretive case-study can be defined as a direction within a subject matter that sees knowledge of reality as gained through social constructions and focusses on complexity of making sense of behaviour (Andrade, 2009, p. 44). Hence, the study explores a contemporary

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University of Amsterdam phenomenon within the real life context and is connected to gaining ‘in-depth’ understandings of this phenomenon (Yin, 1994, p. 13). Thus, the choice for an interpretative case study is justified by the nature of the case of Sweden. For it is a case based on a contemporary political phenomenon that is explored in depth through the theoretical lens of securitisation on order to comprehend the contextual influences in the changing defence policy of Sweden. Adding to that, a case-study is the most commonly used research design in scholarly debates on the topic of securitization (Balzacq and Guzzini, 2015, p. 101), and can thus bring together the method and the theoretical framework in the analytical approach.

3.2 Case selection

The use of a case-study in research, as Darke, Shanks & Broadbent (1998) have put it, is particularly useful in contemporary less well-researched fields, especially a case where the examination involves the relevance of context (Darke, et al., 1998, p. 280). Hence, the choice for the case of Sweden is based on the argument of the uniqueness of the political phenomenon of the research topic as well as the case of the country. Sweden’s return to conscription is considered to be distinctive for the reason that it consist of a stark policy reversal, which makes for a significant change in its national defence policy as well as its foreign policy strategy. In the Swedish case, this constitutes as rare because in the study of international relations a blunt policy turns often go hand in hand with social and political resistance or strong criticism (O’Donnell, 2012, p. 4), which does not seem to be the case in Sweden.

Other Nordic or European countries who are using conscription at the moment, have not put forth such a stark policy rotation. For instance, Norway and Estonia are using a conscription model and have continuously been using some mild form of it over the last decades. Also, Lithuania and Ukraine have both reinstated conscription models over the last view years, after having abolished the model before (Breitenbauc et al. 2017:4). However, Sweden is a distinctive case because the announcement that conscription will be reinstated brought about considerable attention of news headlines and is considered to be a trigger of the conscription debate in Europe (Järvenpää, 2016, p. 8). As such, Sweden is selected as the case for this research because the

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University of Amsterdam study is relevant for political and social considerations of the results the defence policy rotation will possible have for the whole of Europe.

3.3 Data collection and materials

The statement of the former Supreme Commander of the SAF, Sverker Göransson, about the fact that Sweden would only be able to defend itself for no more than a week, reached headlines in January 2013 (Nünlist, 2013, p. 2). Consequentially, the state of the SAF and its limited defence capabilities resulted in a heated public debate and political questions within the parliament (Dalsjö, 2014, p. 181; Kunz, 2015, p. 8). At the time, the renewed attention to Swedish security and defence strategy has led to the appointment of a cross-party Defence Commission by the parliament, with the task to conduct inquiries on Swedish current and future policies on security and defence matters. The Defence Commission is a medium for consultations between the government and representatives of the political parties of the parliament (The Government of Sweden, 2014). The Defence Commission is directed by the Ministry of Defence and its main task is to monitor security developments and investigate threats, risks of current and future defence policies (ibid.) Herewith, the Swedish government requested several studies on the state of the defence capabilities and ask for recommendations on boosting its strategic posture (Järvenpää, 2016, p.17). The data selected for the examination of bringing back conscription in the decision of the Swedisch government, can all be traced back to these reports. For it is stated by the government of Sweden that these reports have been de guiding principles for the architecture of the Defence Bill 2016-2020 (The government of Sweden, 2017). With the aprovement of this Defence Bill on March 2nd, 2017, the parliament formally voted in favour of changing the Swedish defence strategy by increasing defence spending and reinstating conscription. As the government cites:

“[t]he Defence Commission reports from 2013, 2014 and 2015 have served as the political basis and the Armed Forces report has been the guiding document to the Swedish Defence Bill 2016-2020” (The Government of Sweden, 2017).

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As such, the collected data for the critical analysis of the political decision of the Swedish government to bring back conscription, is based on the four Defence Commission reports. Namely, the following reports: ‘Choices in a globalised world’ (2013), ‘The defence of Sweden – a stronger defence for an uncertain time’ (2014), ‘Security in a new era’ (2015), and the Armed Forces report ‘The manning system of the military workforce’ (2016) (The Government of Sweden, 2017). These reports have directly given content to the policy proposals and bills, the debates in parliament and the speeches by governmental officials in discussing the bringing back a conscription model.

Table 2: Timeline of the selected data (Based on: The Government of Sweden 2017; The Government of Sweden, 2016).

The timeline in table 2, demonstrates the scope of the collected primary data for the critical discourse analysis of Sweden’s decision. In addition to ensure important documents or new developments have not been mist, a set of unstructured exploratory interviews have been conducted. This, in order to put weight behind the justification of the documents. Because the subject of this thesis is not a well-researched one, as well as the fact that the changing political phenomenon it aims to investigate changed during the research process. Then because the in- depth single case aspect of the research, several relevant respondents have been approached for 32

University of Amsterdam information and knowledge about the topic of conscription in Sweden. Relevant respondents consisted of The Swedish Defence Research Agency, The Swedish Defence University and The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. These institutions are all considered to be relevant because of the direct relation to the Swedish defense and security policies or the study of those policies. Although many people have been approaches, just a view people considered themselves to have knowledge about the topic of the thesis and were available for conversations, this is outlined in appendix 2.

3.4 Analytic procedure

The aim of this study is to explore whether or not a securitising move can be identified in the political discourse of the Swedish government decision. Hereby, the political discourse documentation on the public presentation in the decision process of reinstating conscription is critically analysed through the securitisation theory and the systematic approach of the speech act theory. At first, the central variables of securitisation theory the in this research are taken into account. The dependent variable of the research consist of the central aspects that make a securitising move possible. Herewith, the concept of an existential threat, a referent object and an extraordinary threat are explored throughout the analysis (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). To ensure the consistence of the analysis and to ensure the analysis explores what it needs to explore, a table of the conceptual definitions is designed and has been the guiding line in the critical analysis. The table is outlined in the appendix 3.

The linguistic variables are selected as follows through the speech act theory and consist of illocutionary acts as assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declaring acts (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p. 18). These acts are outlined in appendix 4 in order to ensure the consistence of the analysis and to ensure the analysis explores what it needs to explore. In order to put both levels of analysis in a systematic procedure to critically examine the documents, the following table is used for clarification:

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Illocutionary Speech act: Assertive Directive Commissive Expressive Declaring Performative aim: Convincing Legitimizes Intimidate Attitude Obedience Level of analysis Claim Warn Threat Acknowledge Command Threat: What threat is mentioned? Is the threat referred to as existential? Object: What is the referent object mentioned? Is it crucial to survival?

Measure: What measures are opted? Are they considered extraordinary? Table 3: Examining securitising speech acts (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23; Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p. 18)

3.5 Limitations and considerations

As mentioned above, this thesis is particularly interested in identifying a securitising move in the way in which the decision of the Swedish Government to bring back conscription is represented. In so far, the analysis focusses on the actor whom is possibly performing the securitising act. This means, the scope of the thesis is limited to the performative actor and not the audience. Thus, the thesis does not incorporate the audience or the identification of the audience, it merely aims to investigate a possible securitising move. By this, the thesis aims to sustain internal validity, for it will ensure the analytical procedures test the securitising move itself and does not intent to investigate other concepts of securitisation.

The governmental documentations of Sweden’s policy reform is rooted in the acceptance of the Defence Bill 2016-2020 (Radebo, 2017). The Defence Bills, the Commission reports, the debates, the speeches and most of the proposed bills are translated by the Swedish government and publically assessable on the Swedish governmental webpage. The translations made by the Swedish government do not have to weaken the premises of the thesis, for it is relevant who does

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University of Amsterdam the translation. In this thesis, the main actor the analysis focusses on, is the Swedish government and how it chooses to present the decision to reinstate conscription. Whether that is done by the government in English or Sweden, is in itself a choice of representation.

However, four of the thirty primary governmental sources for analysis the governmental political discourse, are written in Swedish. Which may weaken the analysis, for it has epistemological implications. However, the Swedish documentations have been explicitly discussed with the Swedish respondents of the exploratory interviews. This in order to give the translated versions context and to ensure the relevant parts of the documents are taken into account. In so doing, the aim to ensure a level of reliability in the analytical procedures is protected.

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4. Analysis

The aim of this thesis is to examine whether or not a securitisation process can be identified in the political discourse of Sweden’s government in changing the national defence strategy. Specifically, how this policy change has resulted in the justification of bringing back a drafting system. Thereupon, the analysis of the primary documents consist of three levels, namely exploring the utterance of a threat and if this threat is considered to be existential. Second, exploring the utterance of a referent object and if it can be considered threatened in its existence. Third, exploring the measures that are suggested to ensure the survival of the referent object and if those measure can be considered out of the ordinary political legislative procedures. Lastly, the quotations that come out of the analysis are studied on the theoretical basis of performative speech acts. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) allude, it is the way in which a threat, referent object and a measure is represented that it gives meaning and power to move the issue from being politicised towards securitised (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 23). Then, it is in that moving process that the thesis aims to identify securitising practices and why this analysis consist of the three securitising aspects and the speech act.

4.1 The Defence Commission Reports

The Defence Commission reports have been based on inquiries concerning the state of the SAF and Swedish defence and security policies, in order to through its weight behind statements of the former Commander in Chief of the SAF, Sverker Göransson, in an interview in January 2013 (Nünlist, 2013, p. 2). During which Göransson specified that the budget and operational capabilities of the SAF have shrunk to a point where Sweden’s defence force would be incapable of defending the national territory for a week (ibid.). These statements have triggered a politically laden debate on the state of Swedish national defence capabilities, as well as the NATO membership debate. These debates have culminated in the consensus of the Swedish parliament that possible upgrading of its defence capabilities gained high priority and should be properly investigated (Hultqvist, 2015d). Consequently, the Swedish parliament assembled a cross-party Defence Commission in order to analyse the state’s present and future defence and

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University of Amsterdam security policies. From there, the Defence Commission has produced several reports, namely ‘Choices in a globalised world’ (2013), ‘The defence of Sweden – a stronger defence for an uncertain time’ (2014), ‘Security in a new era’ (2015), and the collaborative Armed Forces report ‘The manning system of the military workforce’ (2016). These reports have been the guiding documents on which the parliament has ultimately approved the Defence Bill 2016- 2020. These reports have been subjected to the critical discourse analysis that entails the previously discussed three factors of a securitising move and performative speech acts.

The analysis of the four Defence Commission reports reveal that the inquiries are mainly presented in assertive and directive speech act manners. The assertive speech act accounts for the largest proportion with 48% of the illocutionary performed acts, and 38% is accounted for as directive speech acts. This means that the majority of the reports are based on assertive language, such as stating current matters, informing and claiming a reality, which performative aim is to convince the audience of the represented state of affairs as true, such as:

“[t]he European Union contributes to peace and security in its immediate and global context. Its advantage is the wide variety of tools: diplomacy, assistance, trade, and military and civilian crisis management capabilities” (Enström, 2013, p. 3).

Herewith, the claim is made that the EU is an actor for peace and is a positive factor in building security. By repeating such statements, it does not only commits the performative actor to the claim, it convinces the audience that the situation presented is in fact the case. It is in the mentioning of the EU in all four the reports, that the concept of security is represented with assertive performative force. The defence reports all make statements on the concept of security in direct relation to the EU. As the following quotation shows:

“[t]he challenges and threats to our security are more changing and boundless than before. Our security is cross-border and cross-sectoral. European cohesion, and a united, principled and clear European foreign policy, are central to meeting challenges to our security” (Enström, 2014, p. 5)

This statement, as well as the other statements on the conceptualisation of security, are all done in the same context of the European security nexus. A nexus based on, according to the reports, 37

University of Amsterdam solid political alliances, shared democratic norms, common interest and a strong solidarity in ensuring Europe’s security cohesion (Enström, 2013; Enström 2014; The Defence Commission, 2015; Armed Forces, 2016b) Security and the detarioting degree of security, is continuisly utterared in accordance with the European region. In al four reports, assertive claims are made that the state of affairs is a ‘detarioting security environment of Europe’. The repeating of this exact claim achieves a illocutionary declarative point. The point where the claim is no longer a changing phenomenon, but is represented as the world as it is changed.

This changing security environment in Europe is in all four reports mentioned several times, however, in the Defence Commission reports ‘Choices in a globalised world’ (2013) and ‘Stronger defence for an uncertain time’ (2014), it is mentioned in a more vagua and broader context in comparison to the Defence Commission reports ‘Security in a new era’(2015) and ‘The manning system of the military forces’ (2016). The reports show clear different luigistic approaches in the way threats and the referent object that is threatened, are described. The first two reports utter the concepts of threats and security both in accordance with violation of ‘established norms’, ‘international law’ and ‘fundamental principles of European peace and security’ (Enström, 2013, p. 15; Enström , 2014, p. 9). These statements do not specify which norms, which laws have been broken, and threatening to which principles of peace. Additionally, these statements are repeated in assertive speech acts as explanations of the growing insecurity of Europe, nonetheless those statements do not consist of legitimising power of a possible counter measure. This because an explanation on its own, does not consist of altering performative power but soley of descibtive context.

In these last two reports however, the threat to security is clearly linked to language on Russia’s asstertive posture and to military activities, as the following citation shows:

“[t]he Russian aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of the Crimea is the biggest challenge to the European security system. Russia is considered to have the capacity to establish military control over the Baltic region within a few day. Swedish territory would be of military operational importance to both the attacking and the defending parties in a given conflict. The observation is that in all likelihood, Sweden would be drawn into a Russian-Baltic military conflict at an

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early stage through what might be called ‘consequential aggression” (The Government of Sweden, 2015, p. 4-5).

These sort of quotations, quotations that refer directly to Russia’s military power, do occur in both of the later reports and show a clear commissive performative power. This power is based on representing Russia assertive posture and previous actions as clear threats to Sweden’s territory. In so doing, the language of the later two report identifies the threat as the military power and willingness of Russia to impose the Baltic region (The Defence Commission, 2015, p. 14; Armed Forces, 2016b, p. 29). This threat can be considered existential because both reports frame it as damaging to the referent object and to the survival of that object. The referent object is cited as ‘Sweden’s territory’. This in contrast to the Defence Commission reports (2013) and (2014), for the reports luinguistic representations consist of conceptual frames open to broad interpretations.

The extensive use of directive speech acts is prevalent represented when it comes to the suggested measures of countering the statements of the ‘deteriorating security environment in Europe’ (Enström, 2014, p. 14). The performative speech act gives a legitimising power in statements concerning collaberative measures, which are represented by all four reports. The reports represent counter-measures on the basis of bilateral and multilateral defence and security cooperation. This is utterared in a way that commits the performative actor to future behaviour, such as the following statement:

“[t]he defence committee emphasizes the importance of Sweden deepening bilateral and multilateral defence and security policy cooperation. These partnerships strengthen the security of our part of the world. The solidarity security policy is the foundation of the Swedish defence and security policy” (Enström, 2014, p. 35).

The statements about cooperative alliances as measures are in most quotations linked to the EU and NATO relations and are continuisly repeated throughout all four reports. Through the extensive amount of these recurrences, the reports makes the intention of the statement clear and assures to make it a reality (Bach, 2014, p. 164). In addition to that, the report of the SAF specifies that the cooperation with the alliance stay in place and that Sweden intents to be a

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University of Amsterdam bigger part of those cooperative practices. Herewith, the language in the Defence Commission reports put fort a normalisation of going back to conventional military practices. Practices that require mobiliation of manpower. In this regard, the SAF reports explains the need for a conscription model, as cited:

“[t]he report puts forward that military units manned by conscripts can, after necessary political decisions, be put into operation within the framework of the Swedish Declaration of Solidarity provided the operation comprise the defence of Sweden” (Armed Forces, 2016b, p. 56).

The reintroduction of the conscription model is briefly mentioned in al four reports and only the SAF report gives context to that notion in with an explanating act. The need for more military personnel is argued in the context of the Swedish Declaration of Solidarity (ibid.). Thus, stating that Sweden will particpate more in military practice operations, which means more military personnel will be send to do so. The language on conscription matters are stating a future state of affairs to be a reality, it is simply the case. Conscripts indicate a supplementary measure to send a message to the countries that Sweden will want to strengthen the solidarity relations.

The statement about strengthening the cooperation in the direct neighbourhood, the performative power becomes more of a guarantee and commits the statement to an actual action in the short term. Such as:

“[c]ooperation with Finland is Sweden’s closest bilateral defence and security relationship. The political objective is to deepen this on a wide front, with an ambition that is fundamentally new to both Sweden and Finland – ‘beyond peacetime conditions’. This cooperation constitutes a paradigm shift in security policy for Sweden, as well as for Finland”(The Government of Sweden, 2015, p. 31).

The reports reveal extraordinary measures in the objective of deepening the alliance with Finland, for it constitutes measures that have not been done before. The reports show clear objectives of strengthening the alliances and cooperation with other countries or international organisations, and specify the need for a Nordic-Baltic stronger united force (Enström, 2013, p. 40

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18; Enström, 2014, p. 23; The Defence Commission, 2015, p. 6; Armed Forces, 2016b, p. 41). Although all four reports agree on this extraordinary measure, the report of the SAF specifies that increased defence and security collaborations means that the Armed Forces has to be altered in order to fit the new defence policies. As the report of the SAF reveals:

[t]hese collaborations, not least Nordic cooperation, also strengthen the security of our part of the world. The Defence Council believes that Sweden will develop the conditions for giving and receiving support, which may also be military. The Armed Forces' interoperability with other countries and organizations should therefore be developed in this regard (The Government of Sweden, 2016, p. 51).

All four reports are based on large inquires on the state of the SAF and the current and future security and defence policies, and have the purpose of informing the Swedish government in making policy decisions (Ministry of Defence, 2015). The reports show a clear dominance in assertive speech acts regarding the EU, namely the EU is represented as both being threatened as well as in the frame of a counter measure. It is in the repeated speech acts, such as on EU matters and its deteriorating security settings, that the reports finds its legitimising power. By repeating a statement, it becomes more a state of reality, rather than a state of affairs that has to be convinced (Vuori, 2008, p. 91). However, when it comes to identifying a securitising move, for which an issue has to be framed as an existential threat to a referent object in order to legitimise the extraordinary counter measures, paradoxical language is uttered in three of the four reports. In order to classify speech acts as securitising, the threat to the referent object needs to be existential (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 23). Existential in the context of securitisation refers to the fact that the threat needs to be death with immediately because the threat is direct and damaging (Taureck, 2006, p. 56)Thus, by refering to a threat as not immediat or not urgent, the legitimising power of the securitisng move is weakened and that is the case in the following three quotes:

“Despite the absence of direct military threats, the Baltic Sea region, together with the other surrounding Baltic Sea countries, constitutes an important geostrategic area from a broad security perspective” (Enström, 2013, p. 21).

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“An individual military armed attack directly against Sweden is still unlikely” (Enström, 2014, p. 24).

“Russian attack against Sweden must be considered excluded for all practical purposes” (The Defence Commission, 2015, p. 37).

By means of these speech acts, the performative power of legitimising the extraordinary measures is dismantaled for the reason that the threat does not consist of a state of immediat emmergency. And yet, the immediat emmergency, wich displays a high level of urgency in counterering a threat, is exactly what is required for a securitising move to be succesful (Balzacq, 2008, p. 89). As a result, one could argue that the Defence Commission reports do show a full flateched securising move on the basis that contradictions on the level of urgency weaken the legitimising performative power and as such the justification argument. The process of policy decision-making still constitutes a implementation of the extraordinary measure because the represented threat is considered to be existential enough to do so.

4.2 Discussions within the parliament

The discussions in parliament consist of policy proposals and introduced bills that are the source of debates between government officials of Sweden. The previously discussed Defence Commission reports are the basis of the policy discussions and proposed bills by the Swedish parliament, wich are all publically documented on the webpage of the Sweden’s government (Parliamentary Defence Commission, 2017a). By means of these documentations, this thesis aims to identify a securitising move in the policy decision-making process of reinstating conscription through a critical discourse analysis on parliamantary debates. These debates are specifically on the topic of defence and security policy. Again, this analysis is done through the examination of performative speech acts utterad by government officials and by examining the interaction between the three factors of a securitising move, as previously mentioned above. As such, the analysis reveals that the discussions in the Swedish parliament show a significant portion of commissive and declaring speech acts in the debates, which are linked to a broad assertive luinguistic framework of security issues. Commissive and declaring speech acts have 42

University of Amsterdam the tendency to put intimidating force and demand power behind statements in order to get other actors to take action (Langton, 1993, p. 299).

The broad framework on security issues is different from the security discourse in the Defence Commissions reports and is mainly represented by government officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wallström, 2016b; Wallström, 2017). Security issues are framed in a more assertive speech act that shows the Ministry officials have a broader range of issues in mind when discussing the changes in the security and defence policies, as the discussed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“[w]e are adapting the to a broader view of security. Terrorism, climate change, migration, pandemics and human smuggling are foreign and security policy challenges. Military threats, armed conflicts, cyber threats, terrorism, violent extremism and organised crime create continuous risks in an increasingly complex and interconnected world, but pandemics, antibiotic resistance and natural disasters also affect Sweden’s security.” (Wallstrӧm, 2016, p 21).

These wide range of security issues does not fit the counter discourse of the Ministry of Defence and shows that in some debates the arguments move along side each other. This can partly be explained by those definitional differences as well as the different in illocutionary speech acts of the ministers themselves. The discussions in the Swedish parliament show 40% of the recognised speech acts are done in accordance with commissive language, which performative power reveals practices of intimidation or pressure to ensure its commitment to actions in the futre (Langton, 1993, p. 299). The majority of the commissive speech acts derive from actors of the Ministry of Defence and are connected to compelling the Swedish government of the importance of changing the security and defence policies. These commissive speech acts commits the performative actor in actually doing the presented counter measures, as the following statement of the Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist, cited in a proposal to the Swedish parliament:

“Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected. Our country must therefore be in a position

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to both give and receive support, civilian as well as military“ (Parliamentary

Defence Commission, 2015b, p. 7).

This demanded changes are connected to language of strengthening and empowering the defence capabilities of Sweden, which is a returning subject in all of the alaylised proposals and debates. Herewith, the commissive language and the repeating of the demand of strengethening the national defence forces, clearly outlines the urgency and pressure of the Swedish government to put forth a political decision in lign with the demanded language. It is in the policy proposals for the Defence Bill 2016-2020 of the Minister of Defence, where those demands are actually given context to. For example:

“[t]he overall defence’s ability to face and attack must be strengthened. The plan for the total defence should therefore be resumed. A coherent overall defence plan should be ensured through planning instructions to the relevant authorities. Mobilisation and mobilisation exercises will be implemented and developed, as well as emergency preparedness and emergency preparedness exercises. Exercises and controls are essential in order to detect deficiencies and to address weaknesses in the system that affect the effectiveness and ability to mobilise” (Parliamentary Defence Commission, 2015b, p. 26).

In the proposal for the renewed Defence Bill 2016-2020, the Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist, whom specifies the strengthening policies through a ‘Total Defence’ framework and the milibilsation of the military for emergency preparedness. Statements like these have a declaring permises by which the performative aim is to ensure obedience (Balzacq, 2005, p. 189). Declaring speech acts classifies as a statement done with the motivation to change the state of affairs via the utterance of affirming a policy change, and can thus only be recognised when it is done by someone of an institutional relevant role (Bach, 2014, p. 156). It is exactly in its role of Minister of Defence that Peter Hultqvist cannot only make such declaring statements, but also ensures of its power in making it into a reality. As such, the measures of strengthening the defence capabilites though the language of the Ministry of Defence, lay out two different kind of frameworks. The framework represented by Minister Hultqvist entail language of ‘emergency 44

University of Amsterdam preparedness’, ‘military readiness’ and ‘total defence’ (Hultqvist, 2015d; Parliamentary Defence Commission, 2015b). The framework of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallstrӧm, shows a performative aim in a more illustrative conceptual way. The proposals of Minister Wallström show utterance in concepts of ‘values’ and ‘principles’ (Wallström, 2016b; Wallström 2017). This conceptual language is represented as a legitimate argument for change in the defence posture of Sweden, as the following quote shows:

“[w]e want to see a Baltic Sea region characterised by respect, trust and security. And we will do so without compromising our principles based stance. Russia’s behaviour, when manifested in military action, disinformation and influence operations, remains aggressive and increases tensions. Our response is guided by principles and values, is firm, clear and long-term, and fosters EU unity. It requires an active, broad and responsible foreign and security policy combined with enhanced defence cooperation” (Wallström, 2017, p. 11).

The statement show different luinguistic approaches in hypothesing the issues of chaging the Swedish defence policy and performative power in promising and garuanting languga on the topic of strengthening the European relations. References to Russia show a contextual frame based on a threatening posture and the EU in the context of a response (Wallström, 2017, p. 12). The language of Minister Wallstrӧm refers to counter measures in connection to strengthening cooperation in lign with EU actors, with the neigboring countries and in the region, as she cites:

“[t]hreats to peace and to our security are best averted collectively and in cooperation with other countries and organisations. Sweden’s foreign and security policy builds on cohesion in the EU, and on increased cooperation on a broad front: in the Nordic region and the Baltic Sea region, together with Finland; in the UN and the OSCE; with NATO; and via a strengthened transatlantic link” (Wallstrӧm, 2016, p.12).

The language on counter measures in this contextual frame, does not show a extraordinary aspect but rather an increased version of an already politiced issue. This because the measure of increasing international security cooperation is already in place and is within the systematic 45

University of Amsterdam legislative processes (Wallström, 2016b, p. 9). Nevertheless, the way in which Minister Hultqvist refers to counter measures is based on more commissive and declaring language on national defence capabilities measures. As such, Minister Hultqvist demands strong actions of the SAF and specifies how the renewed defence policies is te be organised. Hultqvist proposals show those demanding performative acts in the following statements:

“[t]he Armed Forces' tasks shall be developed to explicitly include the task of maintaining accessibility in peace as well as preparedness for the taking of high preparedness. This is required in order to prevent and manage conflicts and war, protect Sweden's freedom of action for political, military or other pressure and, if necessary, defend Sweden against incidents and armed attacks” (Hultqvist, 2015d, p. 8).

“[t]he single most important thing during the defense target period 2016, even though 2020 is to increase the operational ability of war relations, is to ensure the overall ability of the total defense that civil defense planning should be resumed and implemented on the basis of a holistic view, where the threat scale includes both peace-based crisis situations and heightened preparedness” (Hultqvist, 2015b, p. 4).

Herewith, Minister Hultqvist not only commits himself to take action, the statements also commits the Swedish government to take responsibility through extraordinary measures and demands policy reform. The measures refer to motes of civil and military service which can be discribed as extraordinary because all the statements on military service are done in the same context as ‘high perparedness’ or ‘military preparedness’ (Hultqvist, 2015d; Hultqvist, 2016b; Parliamentary Defence Commission, 2015b). High military preparedness is in itself a extraordinary state of affairs, because it suggests that it is a strand out of the ordinary state of affairs and utterce a sense of emergency (Petersson, 2006, p. 627). High preparedness and the compulsory military service can thus be explained as a extraordinary measure, as the languga in

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University of Amsterdam the proposals of Hultqvist reveal. These claims have to be legitimises with a existential threat in order to identify an securitising move.

Russia is meationed over hundredandfifty times in all the proposals and debates put together. This clearly indicates that Russia’s asstertive posture is a factor in the decision making process of the Defence Bill 2016-2020, or at least Russia’s posture is being presented as such. However, it is in the meaning and intention behind the mentioning of Russia, that one can reveal what kind of influence it deems to have (Tsohatzidis, 2010, p. 345). The documentation on the debates within parliament show that government officials of the Ministry of Foreign affairs use expressive and assertive speech act, and as such give a clear attitude towards Russia’s actions:

“Sweden condemns Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea” (Hultqvist, 2015b, p. 15).

“Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military presence in eastern Ukraine constitute flagrant breaches of international law. We find this the greatest challenge to the European security order since the end of the Cold War” (Wallström, 2017, p. 21)

The documentation on the language of Minister Hultqvist on Russia, show more of a directive use of language which gives a performative warning and compelling force. With this, statements made on the topic of Russia’s assertive power are of a legitimising force in accordance with the suggested counter actions. This because directive speech acts aim to represent determinations and orders to act (Bach, 2014, p. 169). As Minister Hultqvist shows:

“Russia managed to initially lower the Ukrainian political will to make military resistance and delay the Ukrainian military response. In this way, territory could be annexed without controversy and without the emergence of an international consensus that armed conflict occurred” (Hultqvist, 2015b, p. 7).

Yet, the statements made on the topic of Russia’s assertive posture, are not directly related to the topic of conscription as an extraordinary measures in these proposals and debates. It is in the context of international cooperation’s and solidarity that the extraordinary measures are

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University of Amsterdam legitimised, and the remilitarisation of the defence capabilities is labelled as such (Hultqvist, 2015d, p. 13). It seems prevailing that the topic of conscription is argued as complementary to the purpose of the strengthening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, not as the basis for it. The proposals and debates explain the need for conscription in the light of bilateral and multilateral military practices in cooperation with standing alliances:

“[t]hreats to peace and security are wiped out in community with other countries and organizations. Sweden's security policy assumes that the defense can work with others. The Swedish Solidarity Declaration imposes requirements on Sweden's ability to give and receive support, which may also be military. The security policy line is also reflected in the Defense Force's tasks, which states that the authority is able to solve the stated tasks independently or in cooperation with others and that The Armed Forces must be able to provide and receive military support (Wallström, 2016b, p. 38).

In this statement, the performative power lies in the strong requested language, as the necessity of counter measures is a compelling sense. The language on threat and security in the proposals and debates in parliament show, just like the above mentioning, a broad conceptual framework that leaves room to give more specific interpretations. In this context, a securitising move has not been identified in the documentations of the proposed bills, policies and the debates on the topic of altering Sweden’s defence strategy. Although counter-measures can be identified as the intensifying of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation’s, these measures cannot be considered to be extraordinary because it is clearly cited that is intensified on the basis of policies already in place. According to the previous quotations, the counter-measures are a response to threats that of increased tension in Europe which calls for heightened preparedness (Hultqvist, 2015d, p. 11). However, the heightened preparedness is labelled as a long-term solution that is not of immediate reality. Although Russia’s assertive posture is mentioned a significant amount of times in the parliamentary discussions, it has not been directly linked to matters of conscription.

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4.3 Public statement and political speeches

The analysis of public statements and speeches bring about quotes of the Swedish government officials concerning the changing defence and security policies in the decision-making process of approving the Defence Bill 2016-2020. It is in this bill that the Swedish defence posture is considered to undergo sweeping change and that brought back conscription (Hultqvist, 2015d, p. 4). Therefore, analysing the public statements and speeches on this matter is relevant for the investigation of a possible securitising move in the process. The public statements and speeches show a majority of directive speech acts, over 38% of the quotes are uttered in accordance with directive force that consist of legitimising performative power. Thereupon, assertive speech acts account for 31% of the quotations, these quotes allude to the performative power of convincing a changing state of affairs as a reality. Most of the assertive language is exactly, or almost exactly, repeated quotes out of the Defence Commission reports, examples like the following statements:

“The security policy situation in our region has deteriorated over the past few years, particular following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea” (Wallström, 2016a).

“The act of aggression that Russia has committed against Ukraine is the greatest challenge to European peace and security since the end of the Cold War” (Hultqvist, 2017a)

“Threats to peace and to our security are best averted collectively and in cooperation with other countries” (Stefan Löfven, 2017).

“Cooperation with Finland is Sweden’s closest bilateral defence and security relationship. The political objective is to deepen this on a wide front” (Hultqvist, 2016c).

Every time certain discourses are repeated, it is taken out of one context and into another. This can mean the repeating speech act is either used to legitimise several kinds of acts, or the repeating speech act has shifted in meaning and weight (Tsohatzidis, 2010, p. 358). Either way,

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University of Amsterdam the recurrent speech acts show a different kind of contextual framework in the public statements and political speeches than the Defence Commission reports revealed. The most prominent example is the use of Russia’s assertive actions over the last couple of years as a direct legitimising argument to strengthen Sweden’s national defence capabilities. As the following two examples of those kinds of statements show:

“The Russian annexation of Crimea, the armed conflict in Ukraine, the increased amount of exercises as well as intelligence activities in the Baltic Sea region, the intrusive behaviour by Russia, and now the Swedish Armed Forces intelligence operation in the Stockholm archipelago demonstrate the necessity for Sweden to maintain a functional and effective operational defence organisation” (Wallström, 2016a)

“Russia’s actions represent the greatest challenge to the European security architecture These geopolitical changes demonstrate how important it is to develop the national dimension of Sweden's defence. Safeguarding Swedish sovereignty and territorial integrity is a key task. The Government considers that the military units and equipment acquisition of the Swedish Armed Forces need to gradually be strengthened in accordance with the proposals of the Defence Commission” (Hultqvist, 2016c)

The way in which these statements are build, indicates a causal connection between Russia’s actions and assertive posture, and the need for a stronger Swedish defence policies. The linguistic performance of such causal connections show a directive speech act where the speaker suggests, directs and compels the audience to follow the direction (Vuori, 2008, p. 89). The directive language in itself is neither true or false, it is the represented state of affairs that is directed as a strong desire, challenge or threat to legitimise the suggested measures (ibid.). Although the statements on itself may allude assertive language of describing current state of affairs, however it is performed constant and urgent challenge that transforms explanatory performative power into the force of warnings (Searle, 1975, p. 21). It is in the repeating of warning language that an order for action is intended and represented (ibid.). By way of putting it

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University of Amsterdam in a direct context to a future action, the statement gains more legitimising force for the reason that it represents a process of cause and consequence.

These statements seem to put forth a clear securitising move, as the issue of Russia’s assertive posture in the European region is represented as existential threatening. Existential, because the statements and speeches argue that Russia’s military power can be damaging to the survival of Swedish sovereignty and territorial integrity (Wallström, 2016a; Hultqvist, 2017a; Söder, 2017). Therefore, boosting the national defence capabilities with the remilitarisation and increased cooperation’s constitutes as an extraordinary measure. This because it requires implementing and voting on a new law to do so and as such is a process out of the regular legislative procedures. However, the speech act theory analysis the meaning and representations of statements behind the abstract language, this means a given context is a factor of influence (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p. 14). In so doing, the contextual frame of this security issue is put in the same frame as ‘international cooperation’ and the ‘strengthening and deepening’ of those relations (Hultqvist, 2016, 2017a; Wallström, 2016b). The Swedish governmental statements and speeches reveal to disassemble the so seemingly clear securitising move by putting clear emphasises on the importance of intensification its international and regional cooperation’s in every single speech and statement, as this example cites:

“[f]rom Sweden's perspective, the future of regional peace and stability depends on the EU, NATO and the US together defending our basic values the principle that all states are fully sovereign and have the right to make their own foreign and security policy choices must be upheld and any acceptance of spheres of influence rejected”

(Wallström, 2017)

In other words, the public statements and speeches on defence and security policies of Sweden reveal a significant recurring mentioning of Russia’s assertive posture. Specifically, Russia is mentioned in every document in connection to the annexation of Crimea. Russia’s assertive posture is thus clearly linked to Sweden’s defence policy change and can be described as at least one of the threatening factor. When one puts it in the context of the securitisation theory, Russia’s assertiveness can be described as an existential threat for the reason that it is damaging to the survival of ‘the cohesion of the EU’ and ‘the future of regional peace and stability’, as

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University of Amsterdam stated in the governmental speeches and statements (Wallström, 2013; Hultqvist, 2014, 2017b; Söder, 2017). The referent object is thus mostly identified in the context of regional cohesion and the sovereign, territorial integrity of countries in the European region and the security that is at the mercy of that (Hultqvist, 2017b). With this, the extraordinary measure can be identified as the move towards intensifying and deepen the regional bilateral and multilateral.

4.4 The results

The CDA of the Defence Commission reports, the discussions within parliament, the policy proposals, the public statements and political speeches overall reveal that identifying a securitising move in the decision-making process of reinstating the conscription model is possible. However, securitising move can be considered as moving beyond the politicising phase, when a threat is existential, a measure is extraordinary and a referent object is threatened in its survival. Thus, framing an issue as an threat does not consist securitising it when the threat is not immediate, urgent or in a state of emergency. By means of this argument, several seemingly securitising moves are dismantled or weakened due to paradoxical statements on the urgency of the threat. Securitising an act entails labelled outside of the regular political process and moves beyond normal politics. As such, the analysis results in the identification of a securitising move in the decision process of the Swedish government on the topic of conscription. The securitising move can most prominently be identified in the public statements and the speeches of the governmental officials of the Ministry of Defence. For it is in these speeches and statements that the remilitarising of the defence policies of Sweden is demanded outside of the regular political procedures. It is with the demanded force of the language that the connection between Russia and the decision for conscription is exposed. The connection is predominantly made on the basis of Russia’s intervention of Crimea, which is considered to be the threatening act. Although the majority of the language reveals assertive speech acts and thus follow the performative power of representing a changing phenomenon. It is in the exact repeating and the amount of recurrent quotes of the SAF report that one can make the argument for a securitising move.

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5. Conclusion

This concluding chapter provides an overview of the research results and the theoretical interpretations of the findings. The central research questions are answered on the basis of the research findings. Thereafter, the research findings are critically examined in the light of purpose and contribution of the study. The limitations and implications of the study are touched upon for the purpose of illustrating the boundaries in which the study is reasoned, before concluding with suggestions for further research.

The Swedish government formally announced it would re-establish a military conscription model to ensure emergency preparedness of the Armed Forces, when the Defence Bill was approved by the parliament. With this, a public statement by the Ministry of Defence stated the Defence Bill was produced in the context of Russia’s assertive power. Hence, a mutual attraction between the securitisation theory and the case of Sweden’s reinstating conscription is prevailing, which the thesis aims to identify. The securitisation theory seeks to understand the politics of re- presentations and therefore critically analyses the political discourse. Thereupon, the purpose of the research is to investigate whether a securitising move can be identified in the documented discussions and reports on the decision to reposition the national defence policy through employing a conscription model. In addition to that, the aim of the research is the examination of Russia’s assertive posture in connection to the decision of returning the draft and how this is represented in the political discourse of Sweden’s government.

5.1 Findings

The examination of the governmental documentations on the political decision to reinstate a conscription model reveals a broadening of the security and defence policy in conceptual frame as well as in practice. The security and defence strategy is mainly discussed in the frame of the EU. A frame of the EU security as being threatened as well as the EU in providing solutions to tackle the deteriorating security environment. The assertive speech acts in the way the change in

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University of Amsterdam the security and defence posture of Sweden is contextualised, it shows a significant amount of convincing performative force in the Defence Commission reports as well as in the discussions within parliament. This security and defence rhetoric shows the high value of the European security cooperation which is repeated extensively. The repeating of this exact claim achieves a illocutionary declarative point. The point where the claim is no longer an explanation of a changing phenomenon, but is represented as the world as it is already changed. The stark change in Sweden’s security and defence policy is build upon by that premises.

The reorientation of the defence policy means that the SAF is framed in a more national focus. In this internationalist trend that has been developed since the end of the Cold War, the foreign security policies and the defence policies were very closely linked. This repositioning of the defence strategy discourse shows a clear intention of separating the two policies. This is shown by the different language and different meanings that are given to foreign security matters and defence matters. The language shows an intent to separate the two in the different hypothesising stance, namely a focus on internationalist foreign security policy in contrary to a clear mobilising national territorial defence. The conventional remilitarising practices are mostly put into directive language that puts a legitimising weight behind the language on rebuilding and remobilising military capacities. This is clearly linked to performative warning language on the importance of cooperative endeavours, that is if Sweden does not rebuild and remilitarise the national defence capabilities. Then, the country would be viewed as a security breach in the future and a possible liability for other countries. This is put in the context of Sweden’s declaration of solidarity, which is stated as a declaring promise to counter attack in case of an attack on any European country. In so doing, the documentation of Sweden’s reorganising of their defence strategy, the emphasis is put on the notion that in order to cooperate in countering the so-called new security environment, the country need something to offer as well for ensuring a successful cooperation. That can be achieved by reinstating conscription.

It is within this framework that reinstating conscription is explained in the documentations of Sweden’s decision. The Defence Commission reports are the central documents that foster the frame on bilateral and multilateral cooperation’s. As such, conventional military practices and the remilitarising segment of Sweden’s defence policy does not exclude international

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However, the identification of a securitising move is found in the speeches and public statement of the Swedish government officials in relation to bringing back conscription. This particular political discourse reveals utterances in accordance with speech acts of ‘high preparedness’ and ‘emergency situations’ on the state of the national defence capabilities and the SAF. As such, a sense of urgency is given to the strengthening of the SAF, this has not been revealed in the former reports of proposals. Conscription is put forth as an essential aspect of boosting the national defence capabilities. This is mainly represented in contextual frames that include Russia’s assertive power. In this frame, Russia is directly linked to statements on a deteriorating security environment in Europe and is taken in context with a military threat. According to statements in the speeches, the process of the reorientation of Sweden’s defence policy has really started since the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the assertive posture was starting to get a dominant recurring place in the public statements.

It is in the repeating of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the use of the exact same words of ‘assertive posture’ and ‘military threat’ in connection with ‘the deteriorating environment of Europe’, that one can speak of a securitising move. The exact repeating of the same directive statement with a performative intention to legitimise, that a changing political phenomenon stops changing and is becoming a reality. Which is the moment when the premises of the securitisation theory puts it weight behind the recurring statement and ultimately frames it as securitised.

In conclusion, the central aim of this thesis consist of the questions whether a securitising move can be identified in the political discourse of Swedish governmental decision to reinstate conscription and how the proclaimed Russia’s assertive posture affects this political decision.

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The research findings thus show a securitising move of the Swedish political discourse and a clear connection to Russia’s assertive posture, mainly identified in the public statement and speeches of governmental officials. This is revealed by the heavily recurrent mentioning of Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 as explanation of Russia’s assertive posture as existential threatening. Russia’s posture is regarded as possibly damaging to Sweden’s sovereign integrity as the object that is threatened. The assertive posture of Russia is directly connection that is made to remilitarise the national forces in order to foster more bilateral and multilateral cooperative endeavours. In this, the conscription model is a sub-measure of the extraordinary counter-measure of actively pursuing the strengthening of military capabilities in order to be part of the cooperative relations. The changing phenomenon of building up Sweden’s national defence policy can be regarded as a securitising move that has mainly been affected by Russia’s actions in 2014. Although other factors have also played a role in the reform.

5.2 Discussion

Sweden’s decision to come back to conscription is a current relevant topic of discussion because the contemporary political and public debates in Europe are contemplating doing the same. Changing the strategic posture will have direct consequences for the role in the of a country within the European security cooperation, its political alliances and in relation to its neighboring countries. In doing so, this thesis contributes to the contemporary debate about understanding such a change in a security and defense strategy. Additionally, as Sweden is one of the first countries to make the turn in its defense reorientation, this thesis can be considered a pilot study which would benefit from more comparative cases.

The research findings also show paradoxical language on the subject of Sweden’s non-alignment political discourse. The non-alignment issue can be described as a part of Sweden’s history and social identity, as it is labelled as such in the political discourses of the analysis. In this regard, the high priority to manage its national defence can be given a clear explanation in the light of non-alignment. However, some political speech acts argued for the increasing military cooperative practices with NATO-members as well as within NATO alliances. As such, Sweden 56

University of Amsterdam wishes to be part of the military operations of NATO, but is refusing to be a formal member. This constitutes a paradoxical stance on the non-alignment language and the particular debate could be a relevant addition for the study, however this goes beyond the scope this research.

This thesis has examined the topic of a changing security and defence policy, hence a stark policy U-turn in the defence strategy of Sweden. Securitisation theory classically focusses on moment in political practices where change occurs. As a result the theory engages in the academic debate on the analytical grasp of the theory. Although the securitisation theory is built on constructivist assumptions regarding its ontological and methodological stance. It can be argued that these assumptions are used in order to leave out important factors that characterise a threat building process. Herewith, the scientific implication of analysing a securitising move through the speech act approach seems to be leaving little room for the premises of constructivism in the international relations discipline. For it is claimed that the principal aspects of political phenomenon in international relations are historically and socially constructed. These factors have not been a predominant part of researching a possible securitising move in this theses, which leaves room for future research.

5.3 Future research

An addition to the research on the securitisation theory, a broader framework for analysing political policy change mag address the previous mentioned limitation. Including analytical practices outside of the discourse practices, such as levels of bureaucracies in decision making processes or the power politics, the research can explore how an issue is moved into high politics without the use of language specifically. In this, a recommendation on for further research can be made specifically on the basis of a geopolitics theory, for is focusses on political power practices in foreign policy changes.

A second addition to the research can be made on in the civil-military relations, and the relationship between politics, society and the military in contemporary remilitarising regimes, such as Sweden. Analysing social aspects of the military institution is key to the understanding of a process of remilitarising.

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Appendix

Appendix 1:

Respondent: Institution: Vincent Boulanin Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Research: Defence industry; surveillance technologies; securitization theory and risk governance. Arita Holmberg Associate Professor in political science at The Swedish Defence University Research: Swedish security and defence sector; the demilitarization of the European state Fredrik Thisner Associate Professor in Military Studies at The Swedish Defence University Peter Nordlund Swedish Defence Research Agency Research: Kjell Engelbrekt Associate Professor in Military Studies at The Swedish Defence University

Appendix 2: The primary sources

Public Statements: Title: Presented by: Date & Source: Justification: Place: Budget Reinforcement to Ministry of Defence 27-10-2014 The Government of This document cites the changes the Swedish Armed Stockholm Sweden for the security and defence Forces policy discussed in parliament (Ministry of Defence, 2014a). Security Goals & Visions Ministry of Defence 27-11-2014 The Government of This document cites the most Stockholm Sweden important priority of Swedish defence policy (Ministry of Defence, 2014b). Objective of Foreign & Ministry of Foreign 12-2-2015 The Government of Citations on the objective of Security Policy Stockholm Sweden Sweden’s foreign and security Affairs policy for the following years. (Parliamentary Defence Commission, 2015a).

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Taking steps towards Peter Hultqvist, 10-4-2015 The Government of This page discusses matters of enhancing the cooperation Stockholm Sweden European security cooperation Minister of Defence on defence and defence policy. (Hultqvist, 2015c). Long-term perspective in Stefan Löfven 10-1-2016 The Government of Statements on defence and foreign and security Prime Minister of Stockholm Sweden cooperation, non-alignment and policies creates stability Sweden alliances (Löfven and Sipilä, 2016).

EU & NATO: divided Peter Hultqvist, 8-7-2016 The Government of Statements on defence they fall Stockholm Sweden cooperation’s and defence Minister of Defence building (Hultqvist, 2016a). European Cooperation and Margot Wallstrӧm 30-8-2016 The Government of Statements on defence and why we must defend it Sweden security building in the European Kaljurand, Marina region Linkevičius, Linas (Wallström et al., 2016). Rinkēvičs, Edgars Minister of Foreign Affairs Sweden’s Security must Stefan Löfven 8-1-2017 The Government of Statement on the broader idea of be seen in a broader Stockholm Sweden security, which gives emphasis Prime Minister of perspective on new defence perspectives Sweden (Stefan Löfven, 2017). Research and Bjӧrn von Sydow 17-2-2017 The Government of New developments on the developments in the area Stockholm Sweden defence cooperation’s and Governments inquiry of defence needs to be strategy statement strengthened says inquiry chair (Björn von Sydow, 2017) Sweden reactivates Marinette Nyh Radebo 2-3-2017 The Government of The formal announcement of the conscription Stockholm Sweden reinstating of conscription Press Secretary (Radebo, 2017) Ministry of Defence Parliamentary Debates: Title: Presented by: Date: Source: Justification: Statements of Government Margot Wallstrӧm 24-2-2016 The Government of Documentation on the debated Policy in the Stockholm Sweden subjects in parliament, on Minister of Foreign parliamentary debate on defence and foreign security foreign affairs Affairs policies (Wallström, 2016b)

Statements of Government Margot Wallstrӧm 13-02-2017 The Government of Documentation on the debated subjects in parliament, on Policy in the Minister of Foreign Stockholm Sweden parliamentary debate on defence and foreign security Affairs policies foreign affairs (Wallström, 2017) Statements of Government Margot Wallstrӧm 15-2-2017 The Government of Documentation on the debated Policy in the Minister of Foreign Stockholm Sweden subjects in parliament, on parliamentary debate on Affairs defence and foreign security policies (Wallström, 2017a) foreign affairs

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Parliamentary Proposals: Title: Presented by: Date: Source: Justification: Government Proposal: Peter Hultqvist, 23-4-2015 The Government of Proposals concerning the Sweden Defence Policy Stockholm Sweden changes in the defence policies Minister of Defence 2016-2020 (Hultqvist, 2015d) Defence Bill Proposal Peter Hultqvist, 1-6-2015 The Government of The defence bill that first drafts, 2016-2020 Stockholm Sweden which include later amendments Minister of Defence (Parliamentary Defence Commission, 2015b) Defence Committee Allan Widman 4-6-2015 The Government of Policy proposals for defence Proposals: Defense Policy drafts, which include later The Defence Stockholm Sweden Focus - Sweden amendments Defense 2016-2020 Commission (Widman, 2015)

Parliamentary Bills: Title: Presented by: Date: Source: Justification: Defence Forces Strategic Swedish Armed Forces 7-1-2016 Armed Forces Approved Defence Bill on the Approach 2015 Headquarters Stockholm Headquaters defence policy changes Amendment Bill (Armed Forces, 2016a) Bill: Cooperation in Peter Hultqvist, 9-3-2016 The Government of Approved Defence Bill on the Defence Material Area Minister of Defence Stockholm Sweden defence policy changes Agreement (Hultqvist, 2015a) Defence Commission Reports: Title: Presented by: Date: Source: Justification: Defence Committee Karin Enstrӧm 31-5-2013 The Government of First Defence Commission report Stockholm Sweden – inquiry on the state of the SAF Report on Security Minister of Defence, and future policies [Translated Policies: ‘Choices in a out of Swedish] globalised world’ (Enström, 2013) Defence Committee Karin Enstrӧm 15-5-2014 The Government of Defence Commission report – Report on Security Minister of Defence, Stockholm Sweden inquiry on the state of the SAF Policies: ‘Stronger [Translated out of Swedish] defence for an uncertain (Enström, 2014) time’ Security in a new era Defence Commission 20-8-2015 The Government of Defence Commission report – Ministry of Defence Sweden inquiry on the state of the SAF and defence policy (The Defence Commission, 2015) The Manning System of Defence commission 28-9-2016 Armed Forces Inquire report of the SAF and the Military Workforce Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters future reconmendations (Armed Forces, 2016b) Speech: Title: Presented by: Date: Source: Justification:

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Swedish Institute of Minister of Foreign 8-6-2015 The Government of A speech about changing foreign International Affairs Stockholm Sweden security relations and the defence Affairs: Margot and security policies Wallstrӧm (Wallström, 2015a) Margot Wallstrӧm speech Minister of Foreign 3-12-2015 The Government of A speech about increasing at the OSCE Ministerial Belgrado Sweden international cooperation in the Affairs: Margot meeting context of Sweden’s defence and Wallstrӧm security policy (Wallström, 2015b) Margot Wallstrӧm speech Minister of Foreign 13-1-2016 The Government of A speech about increasing at the Folk och Forsvar Sweden international cooperation in the Affairs: Margot Annual National context of Sweden’s defence and Conference Wallstrӧm security policy (Wallström, 2016a) Security Conference 2016 Peter Hultqvist, 13-2-2016 The Government of Speech on the security and Munich Sweden defence policies of Sweden and Minister of Defence the reorientation of it (Hultqvist, 2016b) NATO in Warsaw – Peter Hultqvist, 14-5-2016 The Government of A speech on the NATO, Nordic Steeling the Alliance? Talinn Sweden and Baltic military cooperation’s Minister of Defence and defence policies amendments for the SAF (Hultqvist, 2016c)

Minister of Defence, Peter Peter Hultqvist, 13-2-2017 The Government of Speech on the security and Hultqvist, at Leangkollen Oslo Sweden defence policies of Sweden and Minister of Defence Security Conference the importance of reorientation it (Hultqvist, 2017a) Remarks by State State Secretary 21-2-2017 The Government of A speech on the changing Secretary Annika Sӧder at Annika Sӧder New York Sweden security environment in Europe UN Security Council and the role of Sweden in that Open Debate on Conflicts (Söder, 2017) in Europe Northern European Peter Hultqvist, 17-5-2017 The Government of Increasing Nordic and Baltic Security Washington Sweden military cooperation’s and Minister of Defence building stronger defence (Hultqvist, 2017b)

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Appendix 3:

1. Concept Operationalisation Security Security is an socially constructed phenomenon that is created and altered through the speech act of language. Politicisation An issue is part of the public debate, integrated in the public policies and governmental decisions. The issue is managed within the ‘regular political sphere’. Securitisation Securitisation is a process were an issue of normal politics is transformed into an issue of high politics and put on the security agenda by an securitising actor, who demands extraordinary measures to tackle the existential threat to security and tries to convince the audience of the threat to justify the extraordinary measures. De-securitisation De-securitisation is the process were an issue is transformed out of the high security politics back into the regular political sphere. The actor whom have securitised the issue beforehand, can thus ‘unmake’ the existential threat. Securitising move The securitising actor frames, transforms and refers to an object as an urgent threat to security and opt to tackle the threat by measures, policies or practices out of the ordinary political regulations. Referent object The object, ideal or entity that has to be protected in order to survive. Audience The speech act is aimed to an audience in order to justify the securitisation and make it successful. Existential Threat A changing phenomenon or issues that constitutes a damaging or negative impact on the referent object and the survival of it. Extraordinary measures A measure, policy, or counter instrument is extraordinary when the act has not been done before or is requested outside of the systematic legislative processes. Securitising actor The actor that makes the securitising move and thus makes the speech act on introducing extraordinary measures to protect the referent object. Table 3: Operationalising the securitisation theory (based on: Buzan et al., 1998; Williams, 2003; Roe, 2004; Taureck, 2006; Balzacq, 2010)

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Appendix 4:

Concept Operationalisation Assertives An illocutionary speech act that represents a state of affairs. This is presented by stating, claiming, hypothesising, describing, swearing or explanations that something is the case. Directives An illocutionary speech act for getting the audience to do something. This presents an order, command, challenge or a request to make the audience compelled to do an action. Commissives An illocutionary speech act for getting the speaking actor to do something. This is presented by the speaking actor self and entails a promise, guarantee, vow or threat that commits the speaking actor to do something in the future. Expressives An illocutionary speech act that expresses the current state of mind about the issue of the speaking actor. This is presented like a congratulations, thanking, condoling, welcoming or apologizing. Declarations An illocutionary speech act that brings into existence the change in the state of affairs regarding the issue that has been referred to. Thus, by making a declaration and making it into a reality. For instance, declaring war, declaring someone guilty, firing someone, changing a policy or implementing a new law. Table 4: Operationalising the speech act theory (based on:Vuori, 2008; Searle & Vanderveken, 1985).

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