The Return of Military Conscription in Europe: Understanding the Political Decision of Bringing Back the Draft in Sweden

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Return of Military Conscription in Europe: Understanding the Political Decision of Bringing Back the Draft in Sweden The return of military conscription in Europe: understanding the political decision of bringing back the draft in Sweden An in-depth case study of the policy change in Sweden’s defence strategy through the theoretical lens of securitisation Author: Jet Marres Number: 11024968 Date: June 23rd, 2017 Supervisor: Rocco Bellanova Second Reader: Beste Isleyen Thesis group: European Security Politics Program: MSc International Relations Graduate School of Social Science University of Amsterdam Abstract On march 2nd 2017, the Swedish government formally announced it will reinstate a conscription model to realise military readiness of the Swedish Armed Forces. This century old military institution for the mobilisation of manpower through compulsory military service, was abolished by the Swedish government in 2010 when the military transformed into an all-volunteer professionalised force. Most European countries have demilitarised the armed forces since the end of the Cold War, yet a debate on bringing back conscription models to remilitarise national defences is being held in numerous European national governments. The Swedish government debated bringing back conscription over the last four years and the government maintained the power to reinstate the draft only if the national defence would be in a state of emergency which requires a high level of military preparedness. As such, bringing back conscription shows a policy rotation of the Swedish defence strategy and a change in the political discourse of the Swedish government. The political discourse justifies this defence policy change with clear interconnected statements on the ‘deteriorating security environment in Europe’ and ‘Russia’s assertive posture’ in Sweden’s vicinity. Herewith, a mutual attraction between the securitisation theory and the case of Sweden’s remilitarising its defence policy transpires. Securitisation constitutes a process of articulating an issue as an urgent security matter through which extraordinary measures are legitimated. Thereupon, this thesis critically examines the political discourse in Sweden’s governmental speeches, reports, parliamentary proposals and debates through the lens of securitisation in order to identify a securitised move in Sweden’s stark policy turn and a possible connection to Russia’s so-called ‘assertive posture’. The analysis of the language uttered by governmental actors identifies a securitising move in the speeches and public statements. The securitising move is connected to Russia’s assertive posture and the importance of countering that threat by strengthening national defence capabilities through conscription in order to be ready for multilateral military cooperative endeavours. Keywords: securitisation theory, speech act, conscription, Swedish Armed Forces, militarisation, European security, defence policy, military preparedness. word count: 18.708 1 University of Amsterdam Acknowledgement First and foremost, I would like to mention that the process of researching a fairly unstudied and new topic has been challenging, though rewarding. Hereby, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, dhr. R. Bellanova, from whom I have received guidance and encouragement throughout the research process. I want to thank all the people that have helped me find my way in the search for the relevant documents in the Swedish government data. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the positive atmosphere in the course group of European Security Politics specialisation. This has made the writing process an upbeat experience. Amsterdam, June 2017 2 University of Amsterdam Table of content List of Acronyms ...................................................................................................................... 5 List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ 5 1. Introduction: Bringing back the draft ................................................................................ 6 1.1 Contextual background of Sweden’s defence policy ................................................................. 8 1.2 State of the art ........................................................................................................................ 10 1.3 The Research ......................................................................................................................... 12 1.4 Objectives & Relevance ......................................................................................................... 13 1.5 Disposition ............................................................................................................................. 14 2. Theoretical Frameworm: from politicastion to securitisation .......................... ………..16 2.1 The concept of Security .......................................................................................................... 16 2.2 The Copenhagen School of Security Studies ........................................................................... 18 2.3 Securitisation and desecuritiation ........................................................................................... 19 2.4 The speech Act ...................................................................................................................... 23 2.5 The state of the (de-)securitisation debate ............................................................................... 24 2.6 Securitisation and the case of Sweden .................................................................................... 26 3. Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 28 3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis .................................................................................................... 28 3.2 Case Selection ........................................................................................................................ 30 3.3 Data Collection and materials ................................................................................................. 31 3.4 Analytic Procedure ................................................................................................................. 33 3.5 Limitations and considerations ............................................................................................... 34 4. Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 36 4.1 The Defence Commission reports ........................................................................................... 36 3 University of Amsterdam 4.2 Discussions within the parliament .......................................................................................... 42 4.3 Public statements and political speeches ................................................................................. 48 4.4 The results ............................................................................................................................. 52 5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 53 5.1 Results ................................................................................................................................... 53 5.2 Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 56 5.3 Further Research .................................................................................................................... 57 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 58 Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 71 4 University of Amsterdam List of Acronyms AVF All-volunteer force CDA Critical Discourse Analysis EU European Union NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation SAF Swedish Armed Forces List of Tables Table 1: The securitising process Table 2: Timeline of the selected data Table 3: Operationalising the securitisation theory Table 4: Operationalising the speech act theory 5 University of Amsterdam 1. Introduction: Bringing back conscription “The security environment in Europe and in Sweden's vicinity has deteriorated and the all-volunteer recruitment hasn't provided the Armed Forces with enough trained personnel. The re-activating of the conscription is needed for military readiness”, a public statement cited by the government of Sweden on March 2nd , 2017 (Radebo, 2017). With this public statement, the Swedish government formally announced it has decided to reinstate a conscription model to realise military preparedness. The statement ads that the conscription, also called drafting, is based on a gender-neutral recruitment and will include both men and women (Radebo, 2017). Herewith, the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) will recruit four thousand young men and women annually to undergo basic military training with compulsory service, starting no later than the first of January 2018 (Armed Forces, 2016b). In 2010, Sweden’s then centre-right government eliminated the conscription model after more than hundred years of using the draft. The elimination decision argued an all-volunteer force (AVF) with targeted recruitment that would increase the quality
Recommended publications
  • Peter Hultqvist MINISTRY of DEFENCE
    THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT Following the 2014 change of government, Sweden is governed by the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Green Party. CURRICULUM VITAE Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Party Swedish Social Democratic Party Areas of responsibility • Defence issues Personal Born 1958. Lives in Borlänge. Married. Educational background 1977 Hagaskolan, social science programme 1976 Soltorgsskolan, technical upper secondary school 1975 Gylle skola, compulsory school Posts and assignments 2014– Minister for Defence 2011–2014 Chair, Parliamentary Committee on Defence Member, Defence Commission 2010–2011 Group leader, Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution 2009–2014 Board member, Dalecarlia Fastighets AB (owned by HSB Dalarna) 2009–2014 Board member, Bergslagens Mark och Trädgård AB (owned by HSB Dalarna) 2009–2014 Chair, HSB Dalarna economic association 2009– Alternate member, Swedish Social Democratic Party Executive Committee 2006–2010 Member, Parliamentary Committee on Education 2006–2014 Member of the Riksdag 2005–2009 Member, National Board of the Swedish Social Democratic Party 2002–2006 Chair, Region Dalarna – the Regional Development Council of Dalarna County 2001–2005 Alternate member, National Board of the Swedish Social Democratic Party 2001– Chair, Swedish Social Democratic Party in Dalarna 1999–2006 Board member, Borlänge Energi AB 1999–2006 Chair, Koncernbolaget Borlänge Kommun (municipality group company) Please see next page 1998–2006 Municipal Commissioner in Borlänge, Chair of the Municipal
    [Show full text]
  • UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8fs1h45n Author So, Florence Publication Date 2012 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California University of California Los Angeles Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies Adissertationsubmittedinpartialsatisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So 2012 c Copyright by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So 2012 Abstract of the Dissertation Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies by Florence Grace Hoi Yin So Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2012 Professor Kathleen Bawn, Chair My doctoral dissertation begins with this puzzle: why do large, moderate parties sometimes select leaders who seem to help improve their parties’ electoral performances, but other times choose unpopular leaders with more extreme policy positions, in expense of votes? I argue that leadership selection is dependent on both the electoral institution that a party finds itself in and the intra-party dynamics that constrain the party. Due to a high degree of seat- vote elasticity that is characteristic of majoritarian systems, replacing unpopular leaders is a feasible strategy for opposition parties in these systems to increase their seat shares. In contrast, in proportional systems, due to low seat-vote elasticity, on average opposition parties that replace their leaders su↵er from vote loss. My model of party leadership selection shows that since party members can provide valuable election campaign e↵ort, they can coerce those who select the party leader (the selectorate) into choosing their preferred leader.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Summit Guide Brussels, 11-12 July 2018
    NATO Summit Guide Brussels, 11-12 July 2018 A stronger and more agile Alliance The Brussels Summit comes at a crucial moment for the security of the North Atlantic Alliance. It will be an important opportunity to chart NATO’s path for the years ahead. In a changing world, NATO is adapting to be a more agile, responsive and innovative Alliance, while defending all of its members against any threat. NATO remains committed to fulfilling its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. At the Brussels Summit, the Alliance will make important decisions to further boost security in and around Europe, including through strengthened deterrence and defence, projecting stability and fighting terrorism, enhancing its partnership with the European Union, modernising the Alliance and achieving fairer burden-sharing. This Summit will be held in the new NATO Headquarters, a modern and sustainable home for a forward-looking Alliance. It will be the third meeting of Allied Heads of State and Government chaired by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. + Summit meetings + Member countries + Partners + NATO Secretary General Archived material – Information valid up to 10 July 2018 1 NATO Summit Guide, Brussels 2018 I. Strengthening deterrence and defence NATO’s primary purpose is to protect its almost one billion citizens and to preserve peace and freedom. NATO must also be vigilant against a wide range of new threats, be they in the form of computer code, disinformation or foreign fighters. The Alliance has taken important steps to strengthen its collective defence and deterrence, so that it can respond to threats from any direction.
    [Show full text]
  • Och Försvarspolitiskt Samarbete Inklusive Krisberedskap
    2012/13 mnr: U21 pnr: S29007 Motion till riksdagen 2012/13:U21 av Urban Ahlin m.fl. (S) med anledning av skr. 2012/13:112 Nordiskt utrikes-, säkerhets- och försvarspolitiskt samarbete inklusive krisberedskap Förslag till riksdagsbeslut 1. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om utrikes-, säkerhets- och försvarspolitiskt samarbete i Nor- den. 2. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om samarbete inom Förenta nationerna. 3. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om samarbete inom Europeiska unionen. 4. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om samarbete med Nato. 5. Riksdagen tillkännager för regeringen som sin mening vad som anförs i motionen om ett utvecklat nordiskt försvarssamarbete. Utrikes-, säkerhets- och försvarspolitiskt samarbete i Norden Samarbetet mellan de nordiska länderna är starkt och vilar på en gedigen folklig förankring. Det nordiska samarbetet berör många olika områden och har bidragit till att göra Norden till en region i världsklass. Vi anser att detta samarbete ska stärkas och utvecklas. Vi socialdemokrater anser att Sverige ska vara militärt alliansfritt. Vi säger nej till medlemskap i Nato. En modern svensk säkerhetspolitik byggs på ett ökat nordiskt samarbete, en aktiv Östersjöpolitik, ett fördjupat samarbete i EU och ett starkare stöd till Förenta nationerna. Sverige ska inte förhålla sig pas- sivt om en katastrof eller ett angrepp skulle drabba ett EU-land eller ett nor- 1 Fel! Okänt namn på dokumentegenskap. :Fel! diskt land och vi förväntar oss att dessa länder agerar på samma sätt om Sve- Okänt namn på rige drabbas.
    [Show full text]
  • Föredragningslista
    Föredragningslista 2008/09:70 Fredagen den 13 februari 2009 Kl. 09.00 Interpellationssvar ____________________________________________________________ Avsägelse 1 Laila Bjurling (s) som suppleant i Nordiska rådets svenska delegation 2 Anmälan om sammansatt utrikes- och försvarsutskott Anmälan om fördröjda svar på interpellationer 3 2008/09:272 av Peter Hultqvist (s) Begreppet utanförskap 4 2008/09:306 av Helene Petersson i Stockaryd (s) Småhusindustrin och bostadsbyggandet 5 2008/09:310 av Olof Lavesson (m) Öresundsintegrationen under det svenska EU-ordförandeskapet 6 2008/09:322 av Veronica Palm (s) Sjukskrivningsreglerna Svar på interpellationer Interpellationer upptagna under samma punkt besvaras i ett sammanhang Näringsminister Maud Olofsson (c) 7 2008/09:265 av Carina Adolfsson Elgestam (s) Glasriket Utrikesminister Carl Bildt (m) 8 2008/09:252 av Monica Green (s) Barnen på Gazaremsan 2008/09:267 av Peter Hultqvist (s) Produkter tillverkade på av Israel ockuperat område 1 (3) Fredagen den 13 februari 2009 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2008/09:268 av Peter Hultqvist (s) Situationen i Gaza 2008/09:303 av Thomas Strand (s) Dialog med Hamas Statsrådet Mats Odell (kd) 9 2008/09:224 av Carina Adolfsson Elgestam (s) Tvångsförvaltning av hyresfastighet och hyresgästs rättigheter 10 2008/09:263 av Hans Hoff (s) Försäkringspremien för dem med betalningsanmärkning 11 2008/09:278 av Thomas Östros (s) Stabilitetsprogram för bankerna 12 2008/09:305
    [Show full text]
  • Verksamhetsberättelse 2020
    Bilaga 2 Verksamhetsberättelse 2020 Socialdemokraterna i Kalmar län Distriktsstyrelsen Ordinarie ledamöter Anders Henriksson, Kalmar, ordförande Peter Wretlund, Oskarshamn, kassör Helen Nilsson, Vimmerby, vice ordförande Emöke Bokor, Söderåkra (till 27 oktober) Robert Rapakko, Mönsterås, studieledare Jonas Erlandsson, Högsby, facklig ledare Martina Aronsson, Alsterbro Gunnar Jansson, Västervik Lena Hallengren, Kalmar Maria Ixcot Nilsson, Emmaboda Mattias Nilsson, Mörbylånga (fram till 17 oktober) Marie-Helen Ståhl, Borgholm (fram till 17 oktober) Ilko Corkovic, Borgholm (från 17 oktober) Matilda Wärenfalk, Färjestaden (från 17 oktober) Nermina Mizimovic, Hultsfred Ersättare Michael Ländin, Kalmar Angelica Katsanidou, Överum Tobias Fagergård, Nybro Laila Naraghi, Oskarshamn Peter Högberg, Vimmerby Verkställande utskottet Anders Henriksson, Kalmar Helen Nilsson, Vimmerby Peter Wretlund, Oskarshamn Lena Hallengren, Kalmar Gunnar Jansson, Västervik Revisorer Herman Halvarsson, Köpingsvik Doris Johansson, Kalmar Monica Anderberg, Torsås Ersättare Ove Kåreberg, Mönsterås Diana Bergeskans, Högsby Mathias Karlsson, Färjestaden 2 Antal sammanträden Verkställande utskottet har haft 17st protokollförda sammanträden. Distriktsstyrelsen har haft 9st protokollförda sammanträden samt 1 per capsulam. Representation i partistyrelsen Ordinarie ledamot, Lena Hallengren, Kalmar och ersättare, Johan Persson, Kalmar. Valberedning 2019-2023 Ordinarie ledamöter Ewa Klase, Mönsterås Simon Pettersson, Emmaboda Ann-Britt Mårtensson, Torsås Yvonne Hagberg, Högsby,
    [Show full text]
  • Bet. 2007/08:NU4 Statliga Företag
    Näringsutskottets betänkande 2007/08:NU4 Statliga företag Sammanfattning I anslutning till behandlingen av 2007 års redogörelse för statliga företag, vilken har överlämnats till riksdagen med regeringens skrivelse 2006/07: 120, avstyrker utskottet motionsyrkanden rörande synen på statligt ägande av företag och försäljningar av statliga bolag. Utskottet redovisar sin syn i dessa frågor. Den aktuella skrivelsen bör läggas till handlingarna. I en reser- vation (s, v) föreslås bl.a. att riksdagen ska återta det bemyndigande om försäljning som lämnades i juni 2007. I betänkandet behandlas vidare motionsyrkanden om statens ägarutöv- ning – allmänt och beträffande ersättning till ledande befattningshavare. Yrkandena avstyrks, huvudsakligen med hänvisning till pågående bered- ning inom regeringen. I olika reservationer från företrädarna för Socialde- mokraterna, Vänsterpartiet och Miljöpartiet följs yrkandena upp. 1 2007/08:NU4 Innehållsförteckning Sammanfattning .............................................................................................. 1 Utskottets förslag till riksdagsbeslut ............................................................... 4 Redogörelse för ärendet .................................................................................. 5 Utskottets överväganden ................................................................................. 6 Skrivelsen om statliga företag ...................................................................... 6 Motionerna ..................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • NORDEFCO Annual Report 2015
    NOR DEF CO NORDEFCO Annual Report 2015 “By 2020 we envision an enchanced political and military dialogue on security and defence issues and where we actively seek for possibilities for cooperation. We create efficent and cost-effective solutions based on shared understanding of our mutual potential and challenges. We are committed to enhanced cooperation and coordination in capability development and armaments cooperation. We coordinate activities in international operations and capacity building, human resources, education, training and exercises. We seek to increase the pooling of capabilities and to deepen cooperation in the area of life-cycle support of our defence inventories.” From the Nordic Defence Cooperation Vision 2020, December 2013 2 NORDEFCO Annual Report 2015 NORDEFCO ANNUAL REPORT 2015 Content 04 FOREWORD 07 SWEDISH CHAIRMANSHIP 2015 11 NORDEFCO COOPERATION AREAS 12 COOPERATION AREA ARMAMENTS (COPA ARMA) 14 COOPERATION AREA CAPABILITIES (COPA CAPA) 16 COOPERATION AREA HUMAN RESOURCES AND EDUCATION (COPA HRE) 18 COOPERATION AREA OPERATIONS (COPA OPS) 20 COOPERATION AREA TRAINING AND EXERCISES (COPA TEX) 22 COOPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES 24 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NORDIC DEFENCE COOPERATION 1952–2014 30 THE NORDEFCO STRUCTURE 32 MINISTERS JOINT ARTICLE 2015 34 DANISH CHAIRMANSHIP 2016 Production: Ministry of Defence Sweden • January 2016 Photo: Swedish Armed Forces • Ministry of Defence Sweden • Norwegian Armed Forces Print: Elanders Sverige AB NORDEFCO Annual Report 2015 3 FOREWORD The Nordic countries meet the challenging security situation in our region through solidarity and enhanced cooperation. Our cooperation is built on shared values and we address challenges together. With differing organizational affiliations we cooperate closely within the framework of the EU and NATO.
    [Show full text]
  • Northern Europe's Strategic Challenge from Russia: What
    Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 111 Northern Europe’s Strategic Challenge from Russia What Political and Military Responses? Barbara KUNZ October 2018 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non- governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) under “Russia, Caucasus and Eastern Europe Observatory”. ISBN: 978-2-36567-930-5 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2018 How to quote this document: Barbara Kunz, “Northern Europe’s Strategic Challenge from Russia: What Political and Military Responses?”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 111, Ifri, October 2018. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Written by leading experts, these policy-oriented papers deal with strategic, political and economic issues.
    [Show full text]
  • The Swedish Government
    The Swedish Government Stefan Löfven (S) Magdalena Andersson (S) Ibrahim Baylan (S) Per Bolund (MP) Prime Minister Minister for Finance Minister for Business, Minister for Environment and Prime Minister’s Office Ministry of Finance Industry and Innovation. Climate, and Deputy Prime Minister Ministry of the Environment Hans Dahlgren (S) Mikael Damberg (S) Anna Ekström (S) Tomas Eneroth (S) Minister for EU Affairs Minister for Home Affairs Minister for Education Minister for Infrastructure Prime Minister’s Office Ministry of Justice Ministry of Education and Ministry of Infrastructure Research Matilda Ernkrans (S) Anna Hallberg (S) Lena Hallengren (S) Peter Hultqvist (S) Minister for Higher Education Minister for Foreign Trade, Minister for Health and Minister for Defence and Research with responsibility for Nordic Social Affairs Ministry of Defence Ministry of Education and Affairs Ministry of Health and Research Ministry for Foreign Affairs Social Affairs Morgan Johansson (S) Amanda Lind (MP) Ann Linde (S) Åsa Lindhagen (MP) Minister for Justice and Minister for Culture and Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Financial Markets Migration Democracy, with responsibility Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister for Ministry of Justice for sport Finance Ministry of Culture Ministry of Finance Lena Micko (S) Eva Nordmark (S) Per Olsson Fridh (MP) Ardalan Shekarabi (S) Minister for Public Minister for Employment Minister for International Minister for Social Security Administration Ministry of Employment Development Cooperation Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance Ministry for Foreign Affairs Social Affairs Märta Stenevi (MP) Anders Ygeman (S) Minister for Gender Equality Minister for Energy and Digital and Housing, with responsi- Development bility for urban development, Ministry of Infrastructure anti-segregation and anti- discrimination Ministry of Employment Since 21 January 2019 the Swedish Government consists of the You will find more information about the work of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (S) and the Green Party (MP).
    [Show full text]
  • The Swedish Defence Policy Paradox: Sweden Wants to Stay Militarily Non-Allied While Seeking Ever Closer Defence Cooperation
    March 2016 8/2016 Charly Salonius-Pasternak Senior Research Fellow The Finnish Institute of International Affairs The Swedish defence policy paradox > Sweden wants to stay militarily non-allied while seeking ever closer defence cooperation with others Changes in the security landscape of the Baltic region have had a notable effect on Sweden’s security policy. While the Swedish government still emphasizes continuity and stability, developments in the country’s security environment may lead to significant changes in its foreign and security policy. For two decades after the end of the In building its defence, Sweden less focus and the current extensive Cold War, Sweden’s security policy now emphasizes the role of Finland cooperation with NATO would be was based on the notion of perma- and the US. Figuratively speaking, reduced. However, due to economic, nent peace in the country’s neigh- one might say that Sweden is draw- historical as well as practical reasons, bourhood. Sweden’s defence forces ing its shield closer while reaching this is an unlikely direction. were reorganized for the conduct of out across the Atlantic for a bigger A second alternative would be international and crisis management sword. for Sweden to apply for membership operations. Cooperation with Denmark and of NATO. This would be the biggest In recent years, however, the Poland has also increased, as part of change in the country’s defence and Swedish government has reassessed Sweden’s recent activity in creat- security policy since joining the EU the potential threats facing Sweden. ing closer military relations with two decades ago.
    [Show full text]
  • EMBASSY of INDIA STOCKHOLM India-Sweden Relations Diplomatic
    EMBASSY OF INDIA STOCKHOLM India-Sweden Relations Diplomatic ties between India and Sweden were established in 1949. The two countries enjoy cordial relationship and excellent cooperation in regional and international fora. Sweden supports India’s membership of the expanded United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Sweden supported India in its membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has extended full support in India’s bid for its pending membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The two countries have been supporting each other on reciprocity for their non-permanent memberships in the UNSC and various positions in different organs of the UN and other multilateral fora. Mutual economic interests have emerged as the driving force in the relationship. Political Relations High level contact between the two countries goes back to 1957 when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Sweden. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Sweden for attending the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Sweden in March 1986 and January 1988. The first-ever State Visit by the President of India, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, wasin 2015. This was followed by the visit of Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven to India in 2016. The landmark State Visit of the President of India in 2015 has taken the relationship to new heights. He was accompanied byShri Hansraj GangaramAhir, Minister of State for Chemicals and Fertilizers; Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad, MP, Rajya Sabha; Shri Ashwani Kumar, MP, Lok Sabha; senior Government officials; several Vice Chancellors and Directors of leading Indian Universities; and over 60 business leaders from India.
    [Show full text]