On the Cold War
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NAME CLASS DATE On the Cold War The struggle with the Soviets provoked a range of responses from American leaders in the 1960s. As you read the passages below, tzy to relate each speaker s view of the cold war with his proposed strategies for dealing with cold-war issues. FOR CIVILITY IN THE COLD WAR FOR AGGRESSION IN THE COLD WAR Secretary of State Dean Rusk, speech at the Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona), address to University of California, Berkeley, March 20, 1961 the U.S. Senate, July 14, 1961 L The cold war was not invented in the West; it was [I]t is our purpose to win the cold war, not merely born in the assault upon freedom which arose out wage it in the hope of attaining a standoff. [lit of the ashes of World War II. We might have is really astounding that our government has hoped that the fires of that struggle might have never stated its purpose to be that of complete consumed ambitions to dominate others.. But victory over the tyrannical forces of international such has not been the case. The issues called the communism. I am sure that the American people cold war are real and cannot be merely wished cannot understand why we spend billions upon away. They must be faced and met. But how we billions of dollars to engage in a struggle of meet them makes a difference. They will not be worldwide proportions unless we have a clearly scolded away by invective [harsh words] nor defined purpose to achieve victory. frightened away by bluster, They must be met I suggest that our failure to declare total victory with determination, confidence, and sophistica as our fundamental purpose is a measure of an tion. Unnecessary or pointless irritations should official timidity that refuses to recognize the all- be removed; channels of communication should embracing determination of communism to capture be kept open to make it the more possible to find the world and destroy the United States. points at which tension might be relieved. Our [TI he American people have nothing to which discussion, public or private, should be marked by they can point as a positive indication that the civility; our manners should conform to our own New Frontier means to stand up to the forces of dignity and power and to our good repute international communism, after the fashion of a throughout the world. But our purposes and poli great world power. These are the things, I cy must be clearly expressed to avoid miscalcula believe, that our nation needs right now, instead tion or an underestimation of our determination to of more excuses for inaction and more justifica defend the cause of freedom. Perhaps most impor tions for an expanding foreign-aid program, tant of all, we should keep our eyes on the world which needs drastic alterations before it can yield beyond the cold war, the world we see when men results. We need a declaration that our intention come to their senses, the world which men have is victory. We need a careful cost accounting of dreamed about for centuries. For, in building that what will be required to meet this objective with world, we shall have friends in all parts of the in the framework of our economic ability. And we earth, we shall find strength in the very nature of need an official act, such as the resumption of man, we shall share purposes which make natural nuclear testing, to show our own people and the allies of us all. If defending freedom is to be called other freedom-loving peoples of the world that waging the cold war, then wage it we must, but we mean business. we would prefer to bring it to an end. For we look forward to a time when contest will be unneces sary because the freedom of man will be firmly I established. U 10 • Comparing Primary Sources Chapter 28 Survey Edition Chapter 18 Modern American History Edition _______________ NAME CLASS DATE (continued) COMPA RING PRIMARY SOURCES administration we avoided personal attacks on AVOIDING CONFRONTATIONS Soviet leaders and refrained from using such President Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point, phrases as “captive nations” and “ruthless total Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963—1969 itarians.” This was not a major breakthrough, but I thought that it might calm the waters. As Congressman, Senator, and Vice President, I had lived through every major Cold War crisis— from the threats to Iran, Greece, and Turkey after AvoIDING C0NFR0N’ii\TloNs World War II to the Cuban missile crisis of Pt esiden t John F. Kei mcdv, speech at Amen cat October 1962. This long record of tension gave me University in Washington, D.C., June 1963 little reason to feel confident that Moscow would forgo the use or threat of force to back its foreign History teaches that enmities between nations, policy if opportunities seemed advantageous. I as between individuals, do not last forever. expected no miracles in terms of U.S-Soviet rela However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, tions during my Presidency, but I felt strongly that the tide of time and events will often bring the two most powerful nations in the world had surprising changes in the relations between several things in common—above all, the need to nations and neighbors. avoid confrontations that could lead to disaster We are both devoting massive sums of for all mankind as well as for each other. money to weapons that could be better devoted to Rather than try to achieve a single, compre combating ignorance. poverty, and disease. We hensive agreement, I thought it more sensible to are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous try to find common ground on lesser problems. cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds If we could sweep away small irritants one by suspicion on the other and new weapons beget one, perhaps we could then gradually face and counterweapons. Agreements to this end solve the greater issues on which a stable peace [arms limitationj are in the interests of the Soviet depends. Union as well as ours. We must, therefore, The first step I took as President in my effort persevere in the search for peace in the hope that to improve East-West relations was to insist that constructive changes within the Communist bloc we avoid wherever possible the harsh name-calling might bring within reach solutions which now of the Cold War era. Those exchanges of ideological seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in rhetoric accomplished nothing except to stir up such a way that it becomes in the Communists’ angry emotions on both sides. Throughout my interest to agree on a genuine peace. QUESTIONS TO Discuss 1. Ho does Secretary of State Rusk piopose to deal with the issues of the cold war? 2. Determining Relevance The viewpoints of both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were expressed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. How might this cri sis and their experiences as President have influenced their attitudes toward relations with the Soviet Union? Making C.) 3. Comparisons Gunti ast Senatot Goldwater’s aggressiveness C with President Johnson s caution. What f’actors may account for their I differing views? C-) a) © Chapter 28 Survey Edition Comparing Primary Sources • 11 Chapter 18 Modern American History Edition DATE NAME CLASS (continued) PRIMARY SOURCE ACTIVITY The Cuban Missile Crisis had the unique Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel to President Kennedy, C opportunity to observe the President, to note what Kennedy thought and felt H Sorensen describes how and A and how he acted. In his bestselling book Kennedy, p why Kennedy’s approach to foreign affairs differed so greatly from his approach T to domestic affairs. ‘The big difference,” [Kennedyl remarked early in his term, E R “is between a bill being defeated and the country being wiped out.” 28 As you read the passage from Sorensen s Kennedy, look for reasons why the peaceful reso lution of the Cuban missile crisis was viewed with “deep feelings of reliefand exhilaration.” pon awakening Sunday morning, October 28, • if both our conventional and our nuclear turned on the news on my bedside radio, as forces had not been strengthened over the U I months... I had each morning during the week. In the course past twenty-one combined genius and of the 9 AM. newscast a special bulletin came in • if it were not for the and from Moscow. It was a new letter from Khrushchev, courage that produced U-2 photographs his fifth since Tuesday, sent publicly in the inter their interpretations est of speed. Kennedy’s terms were being accepted. • if a blockade had been instituted before we The missiles were being withdrawn. Inspection could prove Soviet duplicity and offensive would be permitted. The confrontation was over. weapons... been Hardly able to believe it, I reached Bundy at • if Kennedy and Khrushchev had not the White House. It was true. He had just called accustomed to communicating directly with the President, who took the news with “tremen each other and had not left that channel open.. had not dous satisfaction” and asked to see the message • if the President’s speech of October 22 on his way to Mass. Our meeting was postponed taken Khrushchev by surprise... not been President of from 10 to 11 AM. It was a beautiful Sunday • if John F. Kennedy had morning in Washington in every way. the United States. With deep feelings of relief and exhilaration, Room at eleven, our we gathered in the Cabinet “He had been engaged in a personal as thirteenth consecutive day of close collaboration.