On the Cold War

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On the Cold War

The struggle with the Soviets provoked a range of responses from American leaders in the 1960s.

As you read the passages below, tzy to relate each speaker s view of the cold war with his proposed strategies for dealing with cold-war issues.

FOR CIVILITY IN THE COLD WAR FOR AGGRESSION IN THE COLD WAR SecretaryofState Dean Rusk,speechat the SenatorBarry Goldwater(R-Arizona),addressto UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,March 20, 1961 the U.S.Senate,July 14, 1961 L

The cold war was not invented in the West; it was [I]t is our purpose to win the cold war, not merely born in the assault upon freedom which arose out wage it in the hope of attaining a standoff. . . . [lit of the ashes of World War II. We might have is really astounding that our government has hoped that the fires of that struggle might have never stated its purpose to be that of complete consumed ambitions to dominate others.. But victory over the tyrannical forces of international such has not been the case. The issues called the communism. I am sure that the American people cold war are real and cannot be merely wished cannot understand why we spend billions upon away. They must be faced and met. But how we billions of dollars to engage in a struggle of meet them makes a difference. They will not be worldwide proportions unless we have a clearly scolded away by invective [harsh words] nor defined purpose to achieve victory. frightened away by bluster, They must be met I suggest that our failure to declare total victory with determination, confidence, and sophistica as our fundamental purpose is a measure of an tion. Unnecessary or pointless irritations should official timidity that refuses to recognize the all- be removed; channels of communication should embracing determination of communism to capture be kept open to make it the more possible to find the world and destroy the United States. points at which tension might be relieved. Our [TIhe American people have nothing to which discussion, public or private, should be marked by they can point as a positive indication that the civility; our manners should conform to our own New Frontier means to stand up to the forces of dignity and power and to our good repute international communism, after the fashion of a throughout the world. But our purposes and poli great world power. . . . These are the things, I cy must be clearly expressed to avoid miscalcula believe, that our nation needs right now, instead tion or an underestimation of our determination to of more excuses for inaction and more justifica defend the cause of freedom. Perhaps most impor tions for an expanding foreign-aid program, tant of all, we should keep our eyes on the world which needs drastic alterations before it can yield beyond the cold war, the world we see when men results. We need a declaration that our intention come to their senses, the world which men have is victory. We need a careful cost accounting of dreamed about for centuries. For, in building that what will be required to meet this objective with world, we shall have friends in all parts of the in the framework of our economic ability. And we earth, we shall find strength in the very nature of need an official act, such as the resumption of man, we shall share purposes which make natural nuclear testing, to show our own people and the allies of us all. If defending freedom is to be called other freedom-loving peoples of the world that waging the cold war, then wage it we must, but we mean business. we would prefer to bring it to an end. For we look forward to a time when contest will be unneces sary because the freedom of man will be firmly I established. U

10 • Comparing Primary Sources Chapter 28 Survey Edition Chapter 18 Modern American History Edition ______

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(continued) COMPA RING PRIMARY SOURCES

administration we avoided personal attacks on AVOIDING CONFRONTATIONS Soviet leaders and refrained from using such President LyndonB. Johnson,The Vantage Point, phrases as “captive nations” and “ruthless total Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963—1969 itarians.” This was not a major breakthrough, but I thought that it might calm the waters. As Congressman, Senator, and Vice President, I had lived through every major Cold War crisis— from the threats to Iran, Greece, and Turkey after AvoIDING C0NFR0N’ii\TloNs World War II to the Cuban missile crisis of Pt esident John F. Keimcdv,speechat Amencat October 1962.This long record of tension gave me University in Washington,D.C., June 1963 little reason to feel confident that Moscow would forgo the use or threat of force to back its foreign History teaches that enmities between nations, policy if opportunities seemed advantageous. I as between individuals, do not last forever. expected no miracles in terms of U.S-Soviet rela However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, tions during my Presidency, but I felt strongly that the tide of time and events will often bring the two most powerful nations in the world had surprising changes in the relations between several things in common—above all, the need to nations and neighbors. avoid confrontations that could lead to disaster We are both devoting massive sums of for all mankind as well as for each other. money to weapons that could be better devoted to Rather than try to achieve a single, compre combating ignorance. poverty, and disease. We hensive agreement, I thought it more sensible to are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous try to find common ground on lesser problems. cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds If we could sweep away small irritants one by suspicion on the other and new weapons beget

one, perhaps we could then gradually face and counterweapons. . . . Agreements to this end solve the greater issues on which a stable peace [arms limitationj are in the interests of the Soviet

depends. Union as well as ours. . . . We must, therefore, The first step I took as President in my effort persevere in the search for peace in the hope that to improve East-West relations was to insist that constructive changes within the Communist bloc we avoid wherever possible the harsh name-calling might bring within reach solutions which now of the Cold War era. Those exchanges of ideological seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in rhetoric accomplished nothing except to stir up such a way that it becomes in the Communists’ angry emotions on both sides. Throughout my interest to agree on a genuine peace.

QUESTIONS TO Discuss

1. Ho does Secretary of State Rusk piopose to deal with the issues of the cold war? 2. Determining Relevance The viewpoints of both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were expressed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. How might this cri sis and their experiences as President have influenced their attitudes toward relations with the Soviet Union?

C.) 3. Making Comparisons Gunti ast Senatot Goldwater’s aggressiveness C with President Johnson s caution. What f’actors may account for their I differing views? C-) a)

Chapter 28 Survey Edition Comparing Primary Sources • 11 Chapter 18 Modern American History Edition NAME CLASS DATE

(continued) PRIMARYSOURCE ACTIVITY

The Cuban Missile Crisis Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel to President Kennedy, had the unique opportunity to observe the President, C to note what Kennedy thought and felt H and how he acted. In his bestselling book Kennedy,Sorensen describes how and A why Kennedy’s approach to foreign affairs differed so greatly from his approach p T to domestic affairs. ‘The big difference,” [Kennedyl remarked early in his term, E “is between a bill being defeated and the country being wiped out.” R 28 As you read thepassagefrom Sorensens Kennedy, lookfor reasons why thepeacefulreso lution of the Cuban missile crisis was viewedwith “deepfeelingsofreliefand exhilaration.”

pon awakening Sunday morning, October 28, • if both our conventional and our nuclear U I turned on the news on my bedside radio, as forces had not been strengthened over the I had each morning during the week. In the course past twenty-one months... of the 9 AM. newscast a special bulletin came in • if it were not for the combined genius and from Moscow. It was a new letter from Khrushchev, courage that produced U-2 photographs and his fifth since Tuesday, sent publicly in the inter their interpretations est of speed. Kennedy’s terms were being accepted. • if a blockade had been instituted before we The missiles were being withdrawn. Inspection could prove Soviet duplicity and offensive would be permitted. The confrontation was over. weapons... Hardly able to believe it, I reached Bundy at • if Kennedy and Khrushchev had not been the White House. It was true. He had just called accustomed to communicating directly with the President, who took the news with “tremen each other and had not left that channel open.. dous satisfaction” and asked to see the message • if the President’s speech of October 22 had not on his way to Mass. Our meeting was postponed taken Khrushchev by surprise... from 10 to 11 AM. It was a beautiful Sunday • if John F. Kennedy had not been President of morning in Washington in every way. the United States. With deep feelings of relief and exhilaration, we gathered in the Cabinet Room at eleven, our thirteenth consecutive day of close collaboration. “Hehad beenengagedin a personal as Just as missiles are incomparably faster than all wellas national contest for world their predecessors, so this world-wide crisis had ended incredibly faster than all its predecessors. leadershipand he had won.” The talk preceding the meeting was boisterous. “What is Castro saying now?” chortled someone. John F. Kennedy entered and we all stood up. Robert McNamara said he had risen early that He had, as Harold Macmillan [Prime Minister of morning to draw up a list of “steps to take short Britainj would later say, earned his place in histo of invasion.” When he heard the news, said John ry by this one act alone. He had been engaged in McCone, “I could hardly believe my ears.” a personal as well as national contest for world Waiting for the President to come in, we speculat leadership and he had won. He had reassured ed about what would have happened those nations fearing we would use too much • if Kennedy had chosen the air strike over the strength and those fearing we would use none at blockade... all. Cuba had been the site of his greatest failure • if the OAS and other Allies had not supported and now of his greatest success. The hard lessons us... of the first Cuban crisis were applied in his steady

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PRIMARY SOURCE ACTIVITY (continued) — —

handling of the second with a carefully measured decision. . . an important and constructive contri combination of defense, diplomacy and dialogue. bution to peace.” Then the President’s fourth Yet he walked in and began the meeting without letter of the week—a conciliatory reply to the C a trace of excitement or even exultation. Chairman’s “firm undertakings”—was drafted, H Displaying the same caution and precision discussed, approved and sent on the basis of the with which he had determined for thirteen days wire service copy of the Chairman’s letter, the T exactly how much pressure to apply, he quickly official text having not yet arrived through diplo E and quietly organized the machinery to work for matic channels. R a UN inspection and reconnaissance effort. He Weeks later the President would present to 28 called off the Sunday overflights and ordered the each of us a little silver calendar of October, 1962, Navy to avoid halting any ships on that day. (The mounted on walnut, with the thirteen days of one ship previously approaching had stopped.) October 16 through October 28 as extra deeply He asked that precautions be taken to prevent engraved as they already were in our memories. Cuban exile units from upsetting the agreement But on that Sunday noon, concealing the enor through one of their publicity-seeking raids, He mous sense of relief and fatigue which swept over laid down the line we were all to follow—no him, he merely thanked us briefly, called another boasting, no gloating, not even a claim of victory. meeting for Monday morning and rejoined his We had won by enabling Khrushchev to avoid family as he had each night of the crisis. complete humiliation—-we should not humiliate I went down the hall to where my secretary, him now, If Khrushchev wanted to boast that he Gloria Sitrin, was at work as she had been day had won a major concession and proved his and night for almost two weeks, From her book peaceful manner, that was the loser’s prerogative. case I picked up a copy of Profiles in Courage and Major danger spots in the world remained. Soviet read to her a part of the introductory quotation treachery was too fresh in our memory to relax John Kennedy had selected from Burke’s eulogy our vigil now, of Charles James Fox: “He may live long, he may Rejecting the temptation of a dramatic TV do much. But here is the summit. He never can appearance, he issued a brief three-paragraph exceed what he does this day.” statement welcoming Khrushchev’s “statesmanlike From KENNEDY by Theodore C. Sorenson. Copyright © 1965. Published by HarperCollins Publishers.

QUESTIONS TO DISCUSS

1. Identifying Alternatives What different options did President Kennedy and his advisers consider for dealing with the Cuban missile crisis?

2. How was the confrontation finally resolved?

3. How did the President view his “victory”? What lessons had he learned?

22 • Chapter 28 Primary Source Activity © Prentice-Hall,Inc. ______

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President Johnson’s Thanksgiving Address

On Thanksgiving Day, 1963, Lyndon Johnson, having been President for only seven days, addressed the nation.

As you read this excerpt from his address, try to identify the goals President Johnson has set for himself

ll of us have lived through seven days that It is this work that I most want us to do—to A none of us will ever forget. We are not given banish rancor from our words and malice from the divine wisdom to answer why this has been, our hearts; to close down the poison springs of but we are given the human duty of determining hatred and intolerance and fanaticism; to perfect what is to be—what is to be for America, for the our unity North and South, East and West: to has world, for the cause we lead, for all the hopes that ten the day when bias of race, religion and region live in our hearts. is no more, and to bring the day when our great A great leader is dead, a great nation must energies and decencies and spirit will be free of move on. the burden that we have borne too long. Our view Yesterday is not ours to recover, but tomorrow is outward. Our thrust is forward. But we remem is ours to win or to lose. I am resolved that we ber in our hearts this brave young man who lies shall win the tomorrows before us. So I ask you to in honored eternal rest across the Potomac. We join me in that resolve, determined that from this remember him. We remember his wonderful and midnight of tragedy we shall move toward a new courageous widow that we all love. We remem American greatness. ber Caroline and John and all the great family More than any generation before us, we that gave the nation this son and brother. have cause to be thankful, so thankful, on this Let us today renew our dedication to the Thanksgiving Day. Our har\’ests are bountiful, ideals that are American. Let us pray for His our factories flourish, our homes are safe, our divine wisdom in banishing from our land any defenses are secure. We live in peace, the good injustice or intolerance or oppression to any of will of the world pours out for us. But more than our fellow Americans, whatever their opinion, these blessings, we know tonight that our system whatever the color of their skins—for God made is strong—strong and secure. A deed that was all of us, not some of us, in His image. All of us, meant to tear us apart has bound us together. not just some of us, are His children. I would ask all Americans in reverence to And, finally, to you as your President, I ask think on these things. Let all who speak, and all that you remember your country and remember who teach, and all who preach, and all who pub me each day in your prayers, and I pledge to you lish, and all who broadcast, and all who read or the best within me to work for a new American listen, let them reflect upon their responsibilities to greatness—a new day when peace is more secure, bind our wounds, to heal our sores, to make our when justice is more universal, when freedom is society well and whole for the tests ahead of us. more strong in every home of all mankind.

QuEsTIoNs TO DIscuss

1. Identifying Central Issues What was the overall purpose of President Johnson’s speech? What themes did he emphasize? 2. Expressing Problems Clearly What did the President see as the major I 0 issues that he wanted to confront during his administration? C) 0 0 0

34 • Primary Source Activity Chapter 28 Survey Edition Chapter 18 Modern American History Edition The this responsible chemical not, space, program space. rocket Space MEMORANDUM THINK commitment space, President the quickly Kennedy In On Inquiring I 4. 5. 3. 2. In what 1. Americans have nation April at will Are Are How In Do accordance Council or the to successfully building ways responded. we asked you we we which THROUGH or by go wrote Kennedy’s about 12. earliest

much ON to © officials have liquid working a making to McDougal largely make did landing 1961. trip to Jim the promises the John the large additional with Johnson’s a be possible fuel, round chance moon completing Webb, FOR recommendations A following status an first

to THE in driven maximum 24 a Litteli our boosters month HISTORY: F. charge cooperate astronaut man or memo? hours VICE the and dramatic Kennedy conversation of a of Dr. Inc. moment. would memo by combination on moon, beating THE the later, back of memo Wiesner, competition

a SPACE PRESIDENT one should effort? the WASHINGTON day making U.S. from with go it WHITE results with Kennedy orbit moon or Identifying cost? and on the 1961 far to efforts to you we by Are the I 1 Vice-President existing Secretary a beyond Soviets me would an of of Lyndon before a put man. in USSR fully. we HOUSE with rocket the overall these as which to announced our

achieving PROGRAM to Issues explore earth. Is like the by programs. the the I became McNamara how three? there would emphasis to putting survey B. we questions for Soviet decade land On Johnson work Lyndon could space, you any that necessary the appreciate April John on Isigned] of a Union. If was other as on first laboratory can where win? he not, the posed and and Chairman nuclear, Johnson, F. 20. was out, be moon, human April why space Kennedy other Johnson results? President we to speeded a committing a report not? him stand 20, in or in of by by 1961 If the up. on in a ON THE SPACE PROGRAM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON, D.C. April 28, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT Subject: Evaluation of Space Program. Reference is to your April 20 memorandum asking certain questions regarding this country’s space program. A detailed survey has not been completed in this time period. The examination will continue. However, what we have obtained so far from knowledgeable and responsible persons makes this summary reply possible.... The following general conclusions can be reported: a. Largely due to their concentrated efforts and their earlier emphasis upon the development of large rocket engines, the Soviets are ahead of the United States in world prestige attained through impressive technological accomplishments in space. b. The U.S. has greater resources than the USSR for attaining space leadership but has failed to make the necessary hard decisions and to marshal those resources to achieve such leadership. c. This country should be realistic and recognize that other nations, regardless of their appreciation of our idealistic values, will tend to align themselves with the country which they believe will be the world leader—the winner in the long run. Dramatic accomplishments in space are being increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership. d. The U.S. can, if it will, firm up its objectives and employ its resources with a reasonable chance of attaining world leadership in space during this decade. This will be difficult but can be made probable even recognizing the head start of the Soviets and the likelihood that they will continue to move forward with impressive successes. In certain areas, such as communications, navigation, weather, and mapping, the U.S. can and should exploit its existing advance position. e. If we do not make the strong effort now, the time will soon be reached when the margin of control over space and over men’s minds through space accomplishments will have swung so far on the Russian side that we will not be able to catch up, let alone assume leadership. f. Even in those areas in which the Soviets already have the capability to be first and are likely to improve upon such capability, the United States should make aggressive efforts as the technological gains as well as the international rewards are essential steps in eventually gaining leadership. The danger of long lags or outright omissions by this country is substantial in view of the possibility of great technological breakthroughs obtained from space exploration. g. Manned exploration of the moon, for example, is not only an achievement with great propaganda value, but it is essential as an objective whether or not we are first in its accomplishment—and we may be able to be first. We cannot

2 The Americans © McDougal Littefl Inc. ON THE SPA CE PRoGRAM

leapfrog such accomplishments, as they are essential sources of knowledge and experience for even greater successes in space. We cannot expect the Russians to transfer the benefits of their experiences or the advantages of their capabilities to us. We must do these things ourselves. h. The American public should be given the facts as to how we stand in the space race, told of our determination to lead in that race, and advised of the importance of such leadership to our future. i. More resources and more effort need to be put into our space program as soon as possible. We should move forward with a bold program, while at the same time taking every practical precaution for the safety of the persons actively participating in space flights.

As for the specific questions posed in your memorandum, the following brief answers develop from the studies made during the past few days. These conclusions are subject to expansion and more detailed examination as our survey continues. Q.1- Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man. Is there any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win? A.1- The Soviets now have a rocket capability for putting a multi-manned laboratory into space and have already crash-landed a rocket on the moon. They also have the booster capability of making a soft landing on the moon with a payload of instruments, although we do not know how much preparation they have made for such a project. As for a manned trip around the moon or a safe landing and return by a man to the moon, neither the U.S. nor the USSR has such capability at this time, so far as we know. The Russians have had more experience with large boosters and with flights of dogs and man. Hence they might be conceded a time advantage in circumnavigation of the moon and also in a manned trip to the moon. However, with a strong effort, the United States could conceivably be first in those two accomplishments by 1966 or 1967. There are a number of programs which the United States could pursue immediately and which promise significant world-wide advantage over the Soviets. Among these are communications satellites, and navigation and mapping satellites. These are all areas in which we have already developed some competence. We have such programs and believe that the Soviets do not. Moreover, they are programs which could be made operational and effective within reasonably short periods of time and could, if properly programmed with the interests of other nations, make useful strides toward world leadership.

3 The Americans © McDougal Littell Inc. ON THE SPACE PRoGRAM

Q.2- How much additional would it cost? A.2- To start upon an accelerated program with the aforementioned objectives clearly in mind, NASA has submitted an analysis indicating that about $500 million would be needed for FY 1962 over and above the amount currently requested of the Congress. A program based upon NASA’s analysis would, over a ten-year period, average approximately $1 billion a year above the current estimates of the existing NASA program.... Q,3- Are we working 24 hours a day on existing programs? If not, why not? If not, will you make recommendations to me as to how work can be speeded up? A.3- There is not a 24-hour-a-day work schedule on existing NASA space programs except for selected areas in Project Mercury, the Saturn C-i booster, the Centaur engines and the final launching phases of most flight missions. They advise that their schedules have been geared to the availability of facilities and financial resources, and that hence their overtime and 3-shift arrangements exist only in those activities in which there are particular bottlenecks or which are holding up operations in other parts of the programs. For example, they have a 3-shift 7-day-a- week operation in certain work at Cape Canaveral; the contractor for Project Mercury has averaged a 54-hour week and employs two or three shifts in some areas; Saturn C-i at Huntsville is working around the clock during critical test periods while the remaining work on this project averages a 47-hour week; the Centaur hydrogen engine is on a 3-shift basis in some portions of the contractor’s plants. This work can be speeded up through firm decisions to go ahead faster if accompanied by additional funds needed for the acceleration. Q.4- In building large boosters should we put our emphasis on nuclear, chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of these three? A.4- It was the consensus that liquid, solid and nuclear boosters should all be accelerated. This conclusion is based not only upon the necessity for back-up methods, but also because of the advantages of the different types of boosters for different missions. A program of such emphasis would meet both so-called civilian needs and defense requirements. Q,5- Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results? A.5- We are neither making maximum effort nor achieving results necessary if this country is to reach a position of leadership. [signed] Lyndon B. Johnson

Source: NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program by Roger D. Launius (Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 173—180.

4 The Americans © McDougal Littell Inc. THATDAYINDALLASfrom 1963

Tom Wicker

On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was killed by a gunshot wound to the head while riding in a motorcade through the streets of Dallas, Texas. This account by New York Times correspondent Tom Wicker describes what it was like to be a reporter on the scene when President Kennedy was assassinated.

THINK THROUGH HISTORY: Distinguishing Fact from Opinion What does Wickers description of his reporting on that day suggest about news accounts as sources of evidence about historical events?

I think I was in the first press bus, But I can’t be sure. Pete Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News says he knows he was in the first press bus and he describes things that went on aboard it that didn’t happen on the bus I was in. But I still think I was in the first press bus. I cite that minor confusion as an example of the way it was in Dallas early in the afternoon of November 22. At first no one knew what happened or how or where, much less why. Gradually bits and pieces began to fall together, and within two hours a reasonably coherent version of the story began to be possible. Even now, however, I know no reporter who was there who has a clear and orderly picture of that surrealistic afternoon; it is still a matter of bits and pieces thrown hastily into something like a whole, It began for most reporters when the central fact of it was over. As our press bus eased at motorcade speed down an incline toward an underpass, there was a little confusion in the sparse crowds that at that point had been standing at the curb to see the President of the United States pass. As we came out of the underpass, I saw a motorcycle policeman drive over the curb, across an open area, and up a railroad bank for a few feet, where he dismounted and started scrambling up the bank. Jim Mathis of the Advance (Newhouse) syndicate went to the front of our bus and looked ahead to where the President’s car was supposed to be, perhaps ten cars ahead of us. He hurried back to his seat. “The President’s car just sped off,” he said. “Really gunned away.” (How could Mathis have seen that if there had been another bus in front of us?) But that could have happened if someone had thrown a tomato at the President. The press bus at its stately pace rolled on to the Trade Mart, where the President was to speak. Fortunately it was only a few minutes away. At the Trade Mart, rumor was sweeping the hundreds of Texans already eating their lunch. It was the only rumor that I had ever seen; it was moving across that crowd like a wind over a wheat field. A man eating a grapefruit seized my arm

1 The Americans © McDougal Littell Inc. FROM THAT DAY IN DALLAS

as I passed. “Has the President been shot?” he asked. “I don’t think so,” I said. “But something happened.” With the other reporters—I suppose 35 of them—I went on through the huge hail to the upstairs press room. We were hardly there when Marianne Means of Hearst Headline Service hung up a telephone, ran to a group of us, and said, “The President’s been shot. He’s at Parkiand Hospital.” One thing I learned that day; I suppose I already knew it but that day made it plain. A reporter must trust his instinct. When Miss Means said those eight words—I never learned who told her—I knew absolutely they were true. Everyone did, We ran for the press bus. Again a man seized my arm—an official-looking man. “No running in here,” he said sternly. I pulled free and ran on, Doug Kiker of the Herald-Tribune barreled head-on into a waiter carrying a plate of potatoes. Waiter and potatoes flew about the room. Kiker ran on. He was in his first week with the Trib and on his first Presidential trip. I barely got aboard a moving press bus. Bob Pierrepoint of CBS was aboard, and he said that he now recalled having heard something that could have been shots or firecrackers or motorcycle backfire. We talked anxiously, unbelieving, afraid. Fortunately again, it was only a few minutes to Parkland Hospital. There at its emergency entrance stood the President’s car, the top up, a bucket of bloody water beside it. Automatically, I took down its license number: GG300 District of Columbia. The first eyewitness description came from Senator Ralph Yarborough, who had been riding in the third car of the motorcade with Vice-President and Mrs. Johnson. Senator Yarborough is an East Texan, that is to say, a Southerner, a man of quick emotion and old-fashioned rhetoric. “Gentlemen,” he said, pale, shaken, near tears, “it is a deed of horror.” The details he gave us were good and, as it later proved, mostly accurate. But he would not describe to us how the President looked being wheeled into the hospital except to say that he was “gravely wounded.” We could not doubt, then, that it was serious. I had chosen that day to be without a notebook. I took notes on the back of my mimeographed schedule of the two-day tour of Texas we had been so near to concluding. Today I cannot read many of the notes; on November 22 they were as clear as 60-point type. A local television reporter, Mel Crouch, told us he had seen a rifle being withdrawn from the corner fifth- or sixth-floor window of the Texas School Book Depository. Instinct again—Crouch sounded right, positive, though none of us knew him. We believed it and it was right. Mac Kilduff, an assistant White House press secretary in charge of the press on that trip, and who was to acquit himself well that day, came out of the hospital. We gathered round and he told us the President was alive. It wasn’t true, we later learned, but Mac thought it was true at that time and he didn’t mislead us about a possible recovery. His whole demeanor made plain what was likely to happen. He also told us, as Senator Yarborough had, that Gov. John Connally of Texas had been shot too.

2 The Americans © McDougal Littell Inc. FROM THAT DAY IN DALLAS

Kilduff promised more details in five minutes and went back into the hospital. We were barred. Word came to us secondhand—I don’t remember exactly how— from Bob Clark of ABC, one of the men who had been riding in the press pool car near the President’s, that the President had been lying face down in Mrs. Kennedy’s lap when the car arrived at Parkland. No signs of life. That is what I mean by instinct. That day a reporter had none of the ordinary means or time to check and double-check matters given as fact. He had to go on what he knew of people he talked to, on what he knew of human reaction, on what two isolated “facts” added up to, above all on what he felt in his bones. I knew Clark and respected him. I took his report at face value, even at second hand. It turned out to be true. In a crisis, if a reporter can’t trust his instinct for truth, he can’t trust anything. When Wayne Hawks of the White House staff appeared and said that a press room had been set up in a hospital classroom at the left rear of the building, the group of reporters began straggling across the lawn in that direction. I lingered to ask a motorcycle policeman if he had heard anything on his radio about the pursuit or capture of the assassin. He hadn’t, and I followed the other reporters. As I was passing the open convertible in which Vice-President and Mrs. Johnson and Senator Yarborough had been riding in the motorcade, a voice boomed from its radio: “The President of the United States is dead. I repeat—it has just been announced that the President of the United States is dead.” There was no authority, no word of who had announced it. But—instinct again—I believed it instantly. It sounded true. I knew it was true. I stood still a moment, then began running. Ordinarily I couldn’t jump a tennis net if I’d just beaten Gonzales, That day, carrying a briefcase and a typewriter, Ijumped a chain fence looping around the drive, not even breaking stride. Hugh Sidey of Time, a close friend of the President, was walking slowly ahead of me. “Hugh,” I said, “the President’s dead, Just announced on the radio, I don’t know who announced it but it sounded official to me.” Sidey stopped, looked at me, looked at the ground. I couldn’t talk about it. I couldn’t think about it. I couldn’t do anything but run on to the press room. Then I told the others what I had heard. Sidey, I learned a few minutes later, stood where he was a minute. Then he saw two Catholic priests. He spoke to them. Yes, they told him, the President was dead. They had administered the last rites. Sidey went on to the press room and spread that word too. Throughout the day every reporter on the scene seemed to me to do his best to help everyone else. Information came only in bits and pieces. Each man who picked up a bit or piece passed it on. I know no one who held anything out. Nobody thought about an exclusive; it didn’t seem important. After perhaps ten minutes when we milled around in the press room—my instinct was to find the new President but no one knew where he was—Kilduff appeared red-eyed, barely in control of himself. In that hushed classroom he made the official, the unbelievable announcement. The President was dead of a gunshot

3 The Americans © McDougal Littell Inc. FROM THATDAYIN DALLAS wound in the brain. Lyndon Johnson was safe, in the protective custody of the Secret Service. He would be sworn in as soon as possible. Kilduff, composed as a man could be in those circumstances, promised more details when he could get them, then left. The search for phones began. Jack Gertz, the AT&T man traveling with us, was frantically moving them by the dozen into the hospital, but few were ready yet. I wandered down the hall, found a doctor’s office, walked in, and told him I had to use his phone. He got up without a word and left. I battled the hospital switchboard for five minutes and finally got a line to New York—Hal Faber on the other end, with Harrison Salisbury on an extension. They knew what had happened, I said. The death had been confirmed. I proposed to write one long story as quickly as I could, throwing in everything I could learn. On the desk they could cut it up as they needed—throwing part into other stories, putting other facts into mine. But I would file a straight narrative without worrying about their editing needs. Reporters always fuss at editors and always will. But Salisbury and Faber are good men to talk to in a crisis. They knew what they were doing and realized my problems. I may fuss at them again sometime but after that day my heart won’t be in it. Quickly, clearly, they told me to go ahead, gave me the moved-up deadlines, told me of plans already made to get other reporters into Dallas, but made it plain they would be hours in arriving. Salisbury told me to use the phone and take no chances on a wire circuit being jammed or going wrong. Stop reporting and start writing in time to meet the deadline, he said. Pay anyone $50 if necessary to dictate for you. The whole conversation probably took three minutes. Then I hung up, thinking of all there was to know, all there was I didn’t know. I wandered down a corridor and ran into Sidey and Chuck Roberts of Newsweek. They’d seen a hearse pulling up at the emergency entrance and we figured they were about to move the body. We made our way to the hearse—a Secret Service agent who knew us helped us through suspicious Dallas police lines—and the driver said his instructions were to take the body to the airport. That confirmed our hunch, but gave me, at least, another wrong one. Mr. Johnson, I declared, would fly to Washington with the body and be sworn in there. We posted ourselves inconspicuously near the emergency entrance. Within minutes, they brought the body out in a bronze coffin. A number of White House staff people, stunned, silent, stumbling along as if dazed, walked with it. Mrs. Kennedy walked by the coffin, her hand on it, her head down, her hat gone, her dress and stockings spattered. She got into the hearse with the coffin. The staff men crowded into cars and followed. That was just about the only eyewitness matter that I got with my own eyes that entire afternoon. Roberts commandeered a seat in a police car and followed, promising to “fill” Sidey and me as necessary. We made the same promise to him and went back to the press room. There we received an account from Julian Reed, a staff assistant, of Mrs. John Connally’s recollection of the shooting. Most of his recital was helpful, and it established the important fact of who was sitting in which seat in the President’s car at the time of the shooting.

4 The Amer/cans © McDougal Littell mc, FROM THAT DAY IN DALLAS

The doctors who had treated the President came in after Mr. Reed. They gave us copious detail, particularly as to the efforts they had made to resuscitate the President. They were less explicit about the wounds, explaining that the body had been in their hands only a short time and that they had had little time to examine it closely. They conceded they were unsure of the time of death and had arbitrarily put it at 1 P.M., CST. Much of their information, it developed later, was erroneous. Subsequent reports made it pretty clear that Mr. Kennedy was probably killed instantly. His body, as a physical mechanism, however, continued to flicker an occasional pulse and heartbeat. No doubt this justified the doctors’ first account, There also was the question of national security and Mr. Johnson’s swearing-in. Perhaps too there was a question about the Roman Catholic rites. In any caseS,until a later doctors’ statement about 9 P.M. that night, the account we got at the hospital was official. The doctors had hardly left before Hawks came in and told us Mr. Johnson would be sworn in immediately at the airport. We dashed for the press buses, still parked outside. Many a campaign had taught me something about press buses and I ran a little harder, got there first, and went to the wide rear seat. That is the best place on a bus to open up a typewriter and get some work done. On the short trip to the airport, I got about 500 words on paper, leaving a blank space for the hour of Mr. Johnson’s swearing-in and putting down the mistaken assumption that it would take place somewhere in the terminal. As we arrived at a back gate to the airport, we could see Air Force One, the Presidential jet, screaming down the runway and into the air. Sid Davis of Westinghouse Broadcasting, one of the few reporters who had been present for the swearing-in, had been left behind. Roberts, who had guessed right in going to the airport when he did, had been there too and was aboard the Presidential plane on the way to Washington. Davis climbed on the back of a shiny new car that was parked near where our bus halted. I hate to think what happened to its trunk deck. He and Roberts, true to his promise, had put together a magnificent pooi report on the swearing-in. Davis read it off, answered questions, and gave a picture that so far as I know was complete and accurate. I said to Kiker of the Trib: “We’d better go write, There’ll be phones in the terminal.” He agreed. Bob Manning, an ice-cool member of the White House transportation staff, agreed to get our bags off the press plane, which would return to Washington as soon as possible, and put them in a nearby telephone booth. Kiker and I ran a half-mile to the terminal, cutting through a baggage-handling room to get there. I went immediately to a phone booth and dictated my 500-word lead, correcting it as I read, embellishing it too. Before I hung up, I got Salisbury and asked him to cut into my story whatever the wires were filing on the assassin. There was no time left to chase down the Dallas police and find out those details on my own. Dallas Love Field has a mezzanine that runs down one side of its main waiting room and is equipped with writing desks for travelers. I took one and went to work. My recollection is that it was then about 5 P.M., New York time. I would write two pages, run down the stairs and across the waiting room, grab a phone, and dictate. Miraculously I never had to wait for a phone booth or to get a line

5 TheArner/cans© McDougal Littell nc, FROM THATDAY IN DALLAs

through. Dictating each take, I would throw in items I hadn’t written, sometimes whole paragraphs. It must have been tough on the dictating room crew. Once while in the booth dictating I looked up and found twitching above me the imposing mustache of Gladwin Hill. He was the first Times man in and had found me right off; I was seldom more glad to see anyone. We conferred quickly and he took off for the police station; it was a tremendous load off my mind to have that angle covered and out of my hands. I was half through, maybe more, when I heard myself paged. It turned out to be Kiker, who had been separated from me and was working in the El Dorado room, a bottle club in the terminal. My mezzanine was quieter and a better place to work, but he had a TV going for him, so I moved in too. The TV helped in one important respect. I took down from it an eyewitness account of one Charles Drehm, who had been waving at the President when he was shot. Instinct again—Drehm sounded positive, right, sure of what he said, and his report was the first real indication that the President was probably shot twice. Shortly after 7 P.M., New York time, I finished. So did Kiker. Simultaneously we thought of our bags out in that remote phone booth. We ran for a taxi and urged an unwilling driver out along the dark runway. As we found the place, with some difficulty, an American Airlines man was walking off with the bags. He was going to ship them off to the White House, having seen the tags on them. A minute later and we’d have been stuck in Dallas without even a toothbrush. Kiker and I went to the Dallas News. The work wasn’t done; I filed a number of inserts later that night, wrote a separate story on the building from which the assassin had fired, tried to get other Times reporters on useful angles as they drifted in. But when I left the airport, I knew the worst of it was over. The story was filed on time, good or bad, complete or incomplete, and any reporter knows how that feels. They couldn’t say I had missed the deadline. It was a long taxi ride to the Dallas News. We were hungry, not having eaten since an early breakfast. It was then that I remembered John F. Kennedy’s obituary. Last June, Hal Faber had sent it to me for updating. On November 22 it was still lying on my desk in Washington, not updated, not rewritten, a monument to the incredibility of that afternoon in Dallas.

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and it ever works The of freedom country sake Viet-Nam. ended men, do American Pennsylvania. choose area American interest THINK Was there—the South President against United “Americanization” 1965. 184,000 We This Viet-Nam We Why Why This Tonight I Last man Americans we have to of the of born wish fight their Vietnam That seek of PEACE —--—------— States? be kind week is its a are must must the North in can escalation be United come THROUGH people peace. the Johnson as policy own southeast Government. into Americans Vietcong. such that any. world. © because lives spring, finally shape of is we we this principle 17 McDougal It Vietnam, Explain. far here world an path for this The is nations States wish. so that take on tonight Nation America the away its of delivered secure. the far the we of to Viet-Nam’s were Asia. to war force military this Though own will Littell principle and the review for HISTORY: away? troops previous United WITHoUT must change. sent and from which hazard is not painful We never which Vietnam Asians destiny. must Inc. that dirty this by fight involvement Lyndon their so. this once are into small States for we July, is steaming decade, be its often speech and But our road? Joining are if quiet views bursting South And which believe built again ease, conflict. numbers we DistinguishingFactlromOpinion began we Johnson 1965 ancestors brutal dying precede B. 1 are campus. only at this must by to and in Vietnam those with our soil. Johnson Johns will with some Southeast to a bombs for and drastic in its sustained of sons deal had live my reason, fought contribute 17 a such interest, CONQUEST American opportunity difficult. We two Hopkins world to in own countries ordered with fight or escalation -----—--— have a a fight dozen Asia bullets. in world and world bombing people the where tonight and the And no toward the the University troops an the world countries and valleys and its will territory where Yet additional best Communist some the each signaled waste in power stating campaign promise, our the had as peace views the course people of every 400 it of on infirmities own Jungles having there, been is, for the our war, in April young of if for rebels the have this may the in it nor the the an is of 7, FROM PEACE WITHouT CONQUEST

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place. The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest. Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to south. This support is the heartbeat of the war. And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities. The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy. Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

WHY ARE WE IN VIET-NAM? Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam? We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence. And I intend to keep that promise. To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong. We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America’s word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war. We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance, Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict, The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: “Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further.”

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China’s power is such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up. There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

OUR OBJECTIVE IN VIET-NAM

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective. And we will do only what is absolutely necessary. In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires. We do this in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties. And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a very simple fact: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement. We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace. We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery, the will to endure as well as the will to resist. I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: Armed hostility is futile. Our resources are equal to any challenge. Because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending. Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement. Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement. We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam.

THE DREAM OF WORLD ORDER This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country now—does not always come without conflict. We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful; or because we have made some mistakes; or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions. But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation. We will do this because our own security is at stake. But there is more to It than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true. For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so. For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so. For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so. The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam—of China and India—of Russia and America—are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed. Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it. I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers. But the simple truths are there Just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

4 TheAmericans C McDougalLittellInc. FROM PEACE WITHOUT CONQUEST

CONCLUSION

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly. A dam built across a great river is impressive. In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchens warmed, and the homes heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive. A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive. The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive. These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American Nation believes to be impressive.... This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale never dreamed of before. Well, we will choose life. In so doing we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind. To Dr. Eisenhower and Mr. Garland, and this great institution, Johns Hopkins, I thank you for this opportunity to convey my thoughts to you and to the American people. Good night.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 394—399.