Russian- American Relations in Crisis

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RUSSIA DIRECT BRIEF | #18 | JANUARY 2015

EDITOR’S NOTE

Ekaterina Zabrovskaya Editor-in-Chief

Since the end of the Cold War, relations between Russia and the United States have never been surrounded by such pes- simism and uncertainty. Bilateral contacts RUSSIAN- in almost all areas are frozen, suspended or stagnant at best. In order to move forward, we need to understand what exact- ly happened and what still holds us back. The author of this Brief, Victoria I. Zhurav- AMERICAN leva of the Russian State University for the Humanities, analyzes the main factors that continue to influence the development of Russian-American relations, including the so-called ‘war of images’, and RELATIONS suggests possible ways for finding an exit to the crisis. As always, we look forward to your feedback. Please email me directly at IN CRISIS: [email protected]. LESSONS FOR 2015 AP RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN CRISIS | #18 | JANUARY 2015 RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR 2015

Victoria I. Zhuravleva, Russian State University for the Humanities

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 2014, Russian-American relations experienced a drop to their lowest level since the conclusion of the Cold War. The crisis was directly precipitated by Moscow’s actions in unifying Crimea with Russia. In the months that followed, the sanctions © VITALY ANKOV / RIA NOVOSTI war and the information war have become an integral part of the crisis, deepening the level of mistrust between both sides. What’s needed now is a fundamentally new approach to U.S.- Russian relations that takes into account how both sides view the origins of the Ukraine crisis. This includes a more nuanced understanding of the historical “war of images” between both nations that has fed the rhetoric and propaganda surrounding the crisis in Russian-American relations. With that in mind, this Brief focuses on the lessons of this crisis as well as on potential ways for its resolution, including a closer look at the primary factors that will influence the ultimate success or failure of these strategies.

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INTRODUCTION moratorium on Russian-American cooperation will hinder The rapid deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations in 2014 or completely freeze the resolution of fundamentally im- was unexpected by many, even by those in the high- portant international problems, from nuclear non-prolifer- est diplomatic circles. As recently as June 17, 2013 Rus- ation to protecting environmental resources. sian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack A crisis is always a test. Only time will tell what types of Obama made a Joint Statement on Enhanced Bilateral collateral damage will be inflicted on both countries and Engagement, which stated that: “The United States of the rest of the world while Russian and American leaders America and the Russian Federation reaffirm their readi- attempt to pass this test. However, the sooner a serious ness to intensify bilateral cooperation based on the prin- Russian-American dialogue is begun on the causes, the ciples of mutual respect, equality, and genuine respect nature and the lessons of this crisis, the more hope there for each other’s interests.”1 However, by March 2014, the is of their success. By understanding the root causes of United States and European Union had launched an un- the crisis, as well as how they continue to influence the precedented program of sanctions against Russia that policy calculations of top leaders in Moscow and Wash- stimulated a crisis in Russia’s economy that was further ington, we can begin to devise potential exit strategies destabilized by the headlong drop in oil prices. This pro- from the crisis, taking into account its lessons. gram of sanctions eventually led to counter-sanctions being coordinated by Moscow. THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS IN Within the United States, the agenda of policymakers RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS in Washington in the following months has raised questions about the prospects for a Cold War II and the return The current crisis cannot simply be explained by Rus- of policies for containing Russia and Russia’s revisionist sia’s actions in Crimea. The reasons for the crisis have plans. In Russia, various conspiracy theories about the their own historical context and are linked by American events in Ukraine have come to the fore, many of which perceptions that Russia is a former superpower that have focused on the central role of the United States in lost the Cold War. leading a universal conspiracy against Russia. As a result, NATO’s policy of expanding eastward has sim- the relationship between Russia and the U.S. has become ply strengthened Russia’s certainty that its national one of tit-for-tat actions and shrill propaganda state- interests are being disregarded. The United States, the ments. Such an approach seems irresponsible. After all, a European Union and Russia have been unable to estab-

1 Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Enhanced Bilateral Engagement. June 17, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/joint-statement-presidents-united-states-america-and-russian-federatio-1

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The Ukrainian crisis is an indicator of a critical crisis in the relationship between the U.S. and post-Soviet Russia

lish a stable European-Atlantic system for security in crisis. As he explains, “following the end of the Cold which Russia could play a real role. It not only could War, the U.S., European countries and Russia failed to give Russia advantages, but also could impose certain build an effective security structure for Europe which obligations. In this sense, the Ukrainian crisis is an indi- included Russia” because some Western policies – in- cator of a critical crisis in the relationship between the cluding NATO’s eastward expansion – have been seen U.S. and post-Soviet Russia, being directly connected by Russians as hostile, even though there were other with the broader crisis of managing global and regional motivations on the Western part. “The idea that Rus- processes in a post Cold War world. sia has been treated as a “defeated” nation has lodged Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Moscow Carnegie in many Russian minds and has been encouraged by Center, is certain that the current confrontation be- unjustified “triumphalism” in the United States – an tween Russia and the U.S. “is the logical result of… the attitude adopted by American politicians more for failure to establish a stable international order following domestic political purposes than from an intent to de- the conclusion of the Cold War.” On one hand, Russia mean Russia,” he said.4 is asserting its right to full sovereignty and its vision of At the same time, Richard N. Haass, President of the the world order. On the other hand, the U.S. is defend- Council on Foreign Relations, while highlighting Rus- ing its leadership of an international system that was sia’s contribution to the unfolding confrontation, does established as a result of the end of the Cold War and not remove responsibility for the conflict from Amer- the disappearance of the Soviet Union.2 ica or the West. “Putin himself chose to consolidate Angela Stent, director of the Center for Eurasian, Rus- his political and economic power and adopt a foreign sian, and East European Studies at Georgetown Uni- policy that increasingly characterizes Russia as an op- versity, who served as an adviser on Russia under Bill ponent of an international order defined and led by the Clinton and George W. Bush, has come to the conclu- United States,” Haass argues. “But U.S. and Western sion that Russia and the U.S. must endure not only the policy have not always encouraged more constructive legacy of the Cold War but also that of the 1990s, when choices on his part... NATO enlargement was seen by the asymmetrical character of bilateral relations was many Russians as a humiliation, a betrayal, or both. established. “The recognition of the reality that Russia More could have been made of the Partnership for is less important per se, that indirectly is a continuing Peace, a program designed to foster better relations source of irritation to Russian officials,” she argues. “In between Russia and the alliance. Alternatively, Russia this sense, the various American resets have represent- could have been asked to join NATO, an outcome that ed attempts to engage Russia productively by persuad- would have made little military difference, as NATO ing it to acknowledge and accept the asymmetries in has become less of an alliance in the classic sense than the relationship and move forward on that basis. Putin’s a standing pool of potential contributors to “coalitions 2001 attempted reset, by contrast, was a bid to estab- of the willing.” Arms control, one of the few domains lish a strategic partnership of equals, acting as if these in which Russia could lay claim to still being a great asymmetries did not exist.”3 power, was shunted to the side as unilateralism and Likewise, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union minimalist treaties became the norm.”5 Jack F. Matlock has also turned to the legacy of the After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was offered 1990s in his search for the root causes of the current a model for engagement, implemented through the

2 Dmitri Trenin. Russia and the U.S.: A Temporary Break or a New ‘Cold War’? Testimony, State Duma Committee on International Affairs, December 8, 2014. http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=57601 3 Angela Stent. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the 21st Century. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014, pp. XI-XII, 257. 4 Jack Matlock. Cold War II??? Notes for a Presentation. November 30, 2014. http://jackmatlock.com/2014/11/cold-war-ii-notes-for-a- presentation/. See also: Jack Matlock. Superpower Illusions: How Myths and False Ideologies Led America Astray – And How to Return to Reality. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010. 5 Richard N. Haass. The Unraveling. How to Respond to a Disordered World, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142202/richard-n-haass/the-unraveling

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paradigm of “partnership without membership.” As a seen in its context. Thirdly, unlike the Cold War, this result, forms of cooperation arose such as the NATO- crisis does not have the character of a military con- Russia Council and the EU-Russia “strategic partner- frontation with its inherent arms race. Instead, its main ship” as well as a wide variety of pan-European struc- dimensions are geopolitical, geo-economic and infor- tures (the Organization for Security and Cooperation mational. Fourthly, the Iron Curtain is absent, and it is in Europe, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, already impossible to prevent the flow of information the Vienna Document, and the Open Skies Treaty). and the development of people-to-people contacts And although these structures did not satisfy com- in the context of globalization. Fifthly, the Ukrainian pletely either party, they were bridges between Rus- crisis is one of many current crises taking place in the sia and the West and formed a place for dialogue and world in which there remains the possibility of Rus- cooperation until the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis. sian-American cooperation that doesn’t only include The signal that aroused Russia to action was NATO’s non-proliferation and arms control. Bucharest Summit declaration that proclaimed that Consequently, we are dealing with not so much the Ukraine and Georgia would become members of the practice as the discourse of the Cold War. Old stereo- alliance.6 This confirmed Russia’s “nightmare scenario” types are mutually repeated in speeches by politicians that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually join the EU and social figures, experts and journalists, and also vis- and NATO. The Russian-Georgian crisis in 2008 and ually in political cartoons on both sides of the Atlantic. the proclamation of the independence of Abkhazia The information war has become one of the most im- and South Ossetia dealt a serious blow to the para- portant features of the current crisis in Russian-Amer- digm of partnership without membership for West- ican relations. ern-Russian relations. It was then that the myth of a new Cold War was con- THE ‘WAR OF IMAGES’ structed in the U.S. thanks to the influence of neocon- servatives.7 And although as part of the “reset” that In this information war, it is characteristic to disregard began in 2009 and was announced by the Obama ad- some facts for the sake of others. Moreover, it has led ministration, the Russian-American dialogue became to simplistic explanatory sketches to “demonize” the more balanced, no real changes have occurred in the enemy, the use of the “Russian card” in the U.S. and framework of U.S.-Russia relations.8 The Russian gam- the “American card” in Russia as part of domestic po- bit in Ukraine has led to a re-examination of the policy litical games, and finally, attempts to rewrite history. of involving Russia in European-Atlantic cooperation Currently, all the factors influencing the process of mu- and, even after the Ukrainian crisis, the confrontation tual understanding (the climate of Russian-American between Russia and the West will remain. relations, the U.S.-Russian socio-cultural and political context, the international situation, historical legacy) NATURE OF THE CRISIS: FIVE are unambiguously negative. This forms the basis for REASONS WHY THIS IS NOT A NEW the “war of images” in the context of Russian-American COLD WAR relations. This war of images has a long historical tradition and At the same time, regardless of the existence of this is as cyclical in its nature as Russian-American relations confrontation, there is no reason to begin talking about themselves. The rapprochement between Russia and the start of Cold War II for a number of reasons. the United States and, accordingly, the rejection of sim- Firstly, the Cold War was a systemic phenomenon, plified schemes of mutual understanding, has always and Russia, ceasing to be a superpower, was no long- happened during those periods when Russia and the er capable of offering the world an alternative model United States have expanded the agenda of their rela- opposed to liberal capitalism. Secondly, with the col- tionship. This has occurred through the resistance to a lapse of the bipolar system of international relations, common enemy or responses to global challenges and the world has become polar-centric and Russian- threats (like it was during two world wars, or large-scale American relations per se no longer determine the anti-terror campaigns after the 9/11 terror attack). And course of international development, while being this has also happened in the times of political reforms

6 Bucharest Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on April 3, 2008. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm 7 Stephen Kotkin. Myth of the New Cold War, Prospect Magazine. April, 2008. Issue 145. http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/ mythofthenewcoldwar 8 Tatiana Shakleina. Russia and the U.S. in Global Politics. Moscow, 2012, pp. 199-222.

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TASS

and/or economic modernization in the Russian Empire, ments took place at the end of the 19th and the begin- the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Russia, when the U.S. ex- ning of the 20th centuries. In 1903-05, the first crisis ported goods, capital and technologies and Americans in Russian-American relations occurred leading to the taught Russians the lessons of capitalism and reform. first “war of images”.9 With respect to the 20th century, one can recall the Sources of Anti-Americanism in Russia period of industrialization in the Soviet Union, the idea At present, Russia is experiencing the highest levels of of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev “to catch up and anti-Americanism since the end of the Cold War. This surpass the United States in production,” the moderni- anti-Americanism is being encouraged by the govern- zation program during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin ment and is being used to support a siege mentality. building on the American experience, or the Partnership According to a November poll by the Public Opinion for Modernization program declared by then-President Foundation, the number of Russian citizens who posi- Dmitry Medvedev. During these periods, the U.S. has tively relate to the U.S. has reached a historic low, com- served as an example to be copied. prising 11 percent. Another 46 percent perceive the U.S. During Russia’s period of stabilization with its char- neutrally while 37 percent relate negatively to America. acteristic process for consolidating power structures, Since 2001, sociologists have not recorded such a growing authoritarianism and rejection of reforms, large number of people relating negatively to the U.S. a trend arose creating the image of a hostile Russian The majority of them (78 percent) are convinced that Other in the U.S. and a hostile American Other in Rus- the U.S. today “most likely plays a negative role” in the sia. This, in turn, led to the rise of Russophobia and anti- world, while only seven percent consider it to be “most Americanism, both of which can be actively deployed likely a positive role.” It gives hope that, according to to achieve political goals and to revitalize nationalism. the opinion of 62 percent of Russians, good relations This trend appeared to its full extent during the Cold between the U.S. and Russia are necessary in equal War, whose legacy influences the current crisis in Rus- measure for both countries.10 sian-American relations. The American Other continues to be significant for The first complete cycle of hopes and disappoint- the creation of Russian identity. The construction of

9 David Foglesong. The American Mission and the “Evil Empire”: The Crusade for a “Free Russia” since 1881. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2007. Also: Victoria I. Zhuravleva. Understanding Russia in the United States: Images and Myths 1881-1914. Moscow: Russian State University for the Humanities, 2012. 10 Russia’s Public Opinion Foundation (FOM). Relations between the U.S. and Russia: Monitoring Public Opinions. How Do Russians See the U.S. and Relations Between Our Countries? (in Russian) http://fom.ru/Mir/11842

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At present, Russia is experiencing the highest levels of anti-Americanism since the end of the Cold War

the image of the United States as a country hostile to lic’s consciousness and play an important role in Rus- Russia – a country that views itself as the victor in the sia’s identity discourse. “America is our only significant Cold War, that wants to impose its dictates and double Other. The rivalry with America does not unravel in the standards on the whole world, and that irresponsibly ‘real’ world arena, but in its reflection that exists in the played with religious extremists and radicals to achieve Russian mass consciousness,” the Russian sociologist political goals – has now reached an unprecedented Alexei Levinson accurately observed in 2007. “And scale. Moreover, President Vladimir Putin himself en- there, it is not important that you defeat the Other. courages this political discourse. It is sufficient to look What is important is to be completely certain that we at his Valdai speech given in Sochi on Oct. 25, 2014.11 ‘are not worse than them.’ ... Examples of good rela- The appeal to the double standard in American politics tions with America are a confession that they are equal has become a favorite argument to confirm the legiti- to us or similar to us, and us – to them as the only basis macy of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Putin’s famous the- for mutual good feelings.”12 sis – “Why are they permitted and we are prohibited?” Foremost is the image of America as a singular “dark – has been taken up and broadly used by political and twin” to Russia. The prevailing desire is to highlight that public figures, journalists and TV commentators. America has serious problems in domestic and foreign However, what lies behind this anti-American mes- politics, that their claims to mentor Russia are ludicrous, sage (which is quite persuasive for a broad layer of Rus- and that Russia does not do anything of the kind in its sian society) is a complex range of love-hate feelings foreign policy as the U.S. has done to establish danger- towards America, all of which are rooted in the pub- ous international precedents (such as in Kosovo). Para-

11 Vladimir Putin’s Valdai Speech. October 24, 2014. (in Russian) http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/46860 12 Alexei Levinson. America As ‘Significant Other’, Pro et Contra, #2 (36). March-April, 2007, p. 69.

Russian attitudes toward the United States (1990-2014)

90 Total % positive Total % negative 80 74 Invasion of Iraq Russia-Georgia conﬂict 70 66 67 Ukrainian conﬂict 60 61

0 Jan. ‘11 Jan. ‘12 Mar. ‘10 Mar.

Mar. ‘14 Mar. Nov. ‘14 Nov. Nov. ‘01 Nov. Oct. ‘02 Oct. Nov. ‘12 Nov. May ‘07 May Apr. ‘90 Apr. Apr. ‘03 Apr. Apr. ‘05 Apr. May ‘08 May Jan. ‘04 July ‘06 Dec. ‘98 Mar. ‘09 Mar. Nov. ‘07 Nov. Feb. ‘06 Feb. Sept. ‘13 Dec. ‘06 Nov. ‘04 Nov. May ‘02 May June ‘04 Aug. ‘03 Aug. July ‘00 Sept. ‘05 Sept. ‘99 NATALIA MIKHAYLENKO SOURCE: LEVADA-CENTER

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United States’ attitudes toward Russia (1990-2014) Total % positive Total % negative 80

70 66 66 66 61 60 62 59 49 50 48 50 46 40 44 44

30 33 33 34 29 27 20 25

0 ‘90 ‘92 ‘94 ‘96 ‘98 ‘00 ‘02 ‘04 ‘06 ‘08 ‘10 ‘12 ‘14 NATALIA MIKHAYLENKO SOURCE: GALLUP

doxically, in the present case, Russia is attempting to of Russia’s policy in the 21st century are found in the legitimize its actions for its own policy of incorporating American policy of the 19th century. Crimea by describing them as being similar to actions Parallel to the construction of the image that America is whose legitimacy Russia does not accept. a hostile Other to Russia, Putin, in the spirit of Russian 19th Russian state-controlled media places increased century conservatives, loves to discuss Russia’s genetic attention on events in Ferguson and, in general, makeup or talk about the unique Russian soul.14 This has to the surge of racial controversy in the U.S. (and resulted in a return to famous debates among Western- this was also commonplace for Soviet propaganda izers (zapadniki) and Slavophiles more than a century ago and its “whataboutism”), spy scandals and Edward – debates that have been stimulated by Russia’s turn to Snowden’s revelations, torture in secret CIA prisons, the East. By reminding the Russian people of their civiliza- and U.S. foreign policy from Iraq to Syria.13 Without a tional and sacred roots, Putin explained the annexation of doubt, these events are a blow to America’s interna- Crimea in his Federal Assembly Address on Dec. 4, 2014. tional status but to use them as confirmation of the Roots of anti-Russian sentiments in America legitimacy of one’s own breaches of international le- In turn, an unprecedented surge in anti-Russian feel- gal norms has its limits. They once more underscore ings is being observed in the United States, much of Russia’s potential lack of preparedness to play the it associated with the Ukrainian crisis. According to a role of defender of global norms, which Russia cul- poll by Pew Research Center, Americans with a nega- tivated with so much effort until the Ukrainian crisis. tive view of Russia has risen to 72 percent in compari- In addition, Russian authorities, politicians and some son to 43 percent in 2012. Furthermore, eight out of ten journalists have started drawing parallels not only Americans say that they have no trust in Putin.15 with current U.S. foreign policy, but also with Amer- The media creates an image of Russia as an interna- ica’s continental expansionism in the 19th century (in tional villain, responsible not only for the escalation of this case Crimea’s annexation is compared with the the conflict in Ukraine but directly or indirectly, for all incorporation of Texas). Thus the arguments in favor of “humanity’s woes” – including even the outbreak of

13 The visualization of these ideas can be seen in the cartoons of Vitaly Podvitsky who works for the pro-Kremlin RIA Novosti, a news agency now known as Rossiya Segodnya. http://podvitski.ru/ 14 Nina L. Khrushcheva. Inside Vladimir Putin’s Mind: Looking Back in Anger. World Affairs, July/August, 2014. http://www.worldaffairsjour- nal.org/article/inside-vladimir-putin%E2%80%99s-mind-looking-back-anger 15 Russia’s Global Image Negative Amid Crisis in Ukraine. Pew Research, July 9, 2014. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/09/russias-global-image-negative-amid-crisis-in-ukraine/

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The media creates an image of Russia as an international villain, responsible for all “humanity’s woes”

Ebola.16 The “demonization” and even “barbarization” order to shape the image of a hostile American Other. of Putin occurs while the image of Russia in the U.S. is Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger drew at- personified as much as possible. tention to the following important point in depicting This is a long-lived trend in American perceptions of the image of “Putin’s Russia” in America. “For the West, Russia. During the previous two centuries, Americans the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it strove to consider positive and negative changes in au- is an alibi for the absence of one,” he argues. “Putin thoritarian Russia through the prism of the actions of should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, its leaders, from tsars to presidents. If we discuss the a policy of military impositions would produce another shaping of Vladimir Putin’s image in the American me- Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid dia discourse, currently the emphasis is on the continu- treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught ity not only between the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet rules of conduct established by Washington.”18 Russia as before, but between the Tsarist Empire and Doubtless, the Russian Other at the start of the 21st post-Soviet Russia as well. Putin’s own rhetoric con- century has stopped being as significant for the Ameri- tributes to that perception since he likes to discourse can discourse of identity as it was during the Cold War on conservatism and Orthodoxy and he criticizes Ni- and its “enemy studies,” since Russia has lost its status kita Khrushchev for giving Crimea to Ukraine. Jeff Dan- as a superpower. However, when necessary, the “Rus- ziger’s cartoon that reproduces the 500-ruble Tsarist sian card” is actively used as before in domestic politi- banknote has the face of the “New Tsar,” Vladimir Putin, cal games. This has appeared in all its conspicuousness instead of the image of Peter I. Putin is creating a new during Barack Obama’s presidency. For example, nu- Russia that will turn its back on the West.17 merous commentaries by conservative analysts, politi- In the context of crises, a values-based approach to cians, journalists and political writers on Putin’s op-ed the image of Russia prevails in American political and article on Syria in the New York Times on Sept. 11, 2013 media discourse. Unlike the pragmatic approach, it cor- clearly showed the desire to use Putin’s address to dis- relates directly with the American socio-cultural con- credit the Obama’s administration international policy text and is based on the certainty that Russia’s foreign and the liberal program as a whole. After the annexa- policies are an extension of its domestic policies. And it tion of Crimea, when Putin cancelled out the achieve- is a typical outward projection of one of the basic self- ments of his public diplomacy, the opposition Putin vs. representations of the American society itself, which Obama was involved in widespread criticism against believes that U.S. foreign policy is based on its demo- the American president, initially for not being prepared cratic political system. to take decisive action against Russia and protect the A values-based approach determines the Russian nascent democracy in Ukraine. strand of American foreign policy. It is simultaneous- The Ukrainian crisis has increased Russia’s signifi- ly interrelated with the domestic political situation in cance among U.S. foreign political priorities, placing it Russia, whose leaders, from an American point of view, in the same category as Iran, Syria and China.19 In this should be punished for their growing authoritarianism sense, Putin has succeeded in making Russia’s foreign and for their policy toward Ukraine. Russia, in turn, uses policy one of the main factors in international rela- this American approach to foster the anti-American tions. As a result, every action and statement by Rus- sentiments through the state-controlled mass media in sia’s president is widely commented on in the U.S., and

16 Dominic Basulto. The “Blame Russia” Game Might Hurt the West. Russia Direct, November 12, 2014. http://www.russia-direct.org/blame- russia-game-may-hurts-west 17 The image of the banknote with a face of the “New Tsar”, Vladimir Putin. http://www.gocomics.com/jeffdanziger/2014/03/24 18 Henry Kissinger. To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start At the End. The Washington Post, March 5, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story. html 19 Jessica Tuchman Mathews. 2015: A World Confused. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 10, 2014. http://carnegieen- dowment.org/2014/12/10/2015-world-confused

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his image has not disappeared from American political iar images and stereotypes of perception are used in the cartoons. official and public levels, how strong a position they -oc Attempts to rewrite history by Russia and the US cupy in the media discourse. In Russia, the main problem In the information war, both parties have been involved lies in the fact that the state-controlled media deliber- in rewriting history. In the U.S., for example, the emi- ately constructs an anti-American discourse that is ad- nent historian Timothy Snyder attempted to rewrite vantageous to the authorities. In the U.S., the executive the history of World War II in favor of the Ukrainians branch – while being dependent on Congress, the party- at the expense of the Russians, placing doubt on the political struggle, and public opinion – may become a Russian contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. hostage to the “demonic” images of Russia, that have “There was no Russian army fighting in World War II, become prevalent in an American society in the period but rather a Soviet Red Army,” Snyder assumes. “Its of U.S.-Russia confrontation. soldiers were disproportionately Ukrainian, since it took so many losses in Ukraine and recruited from the LESSONS OF THE CRISIS IN US-RUSSIA local population. The army group that liberated Aus- RELATIONS AND WAYS FOR ITS 20 chwitz was called the First Ukrainian Front.” STABILIZATION In Russia, in turn, the history of the Cold War was being rewritten, in connection with the introduction of Understanding the lessons of the current crisis in Rus- Soviet forces to Afghanistan.21 President Putin himself, sian and American-Western relations is directly con- in searching for the causes of Islamic extremism, point- nected with finding a resolution to the crisis. Here are ed out that these movements had been sponsored by possible ways for finding an exit to the crisis, taking America to fight against the Soviet Union and their into account its lessons. participants had “been tempered in Afghanistan.” As a result, a suggestion has been made to review the deci- #1: EMPHASIZE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE sion of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR CRISIS in 1989, in which the war in Afghanistan was described The Ukrainian crisis has clearly demonstrated that the as flawed, morally and politically.22 legacies of the Cold War and the 1990s pose a threat The information war between Russia and the U.S. to the development of regional crises and help to skew clearly demonstrates how long and difficult the process Russian-American relations. At the same time, the of mutual demythologizing will be and how easily famil- weak integration of Russia into the European-Atlantic

20 Timothy Snyder. Fascism, Russia and Ukraine. The New York Review of Books, March 20, 2014. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ar- chives/2014/mar/20/fascism-russia-and-ukraine/?insrc=hpss 21 Vladimir Putin’s Valdai Speech. October 24, 2014. (in Russian) http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/46860 22 Franz Klintsevich. The USSR Was Right, Deploying Its Troops in Afghanistan, December 14, 2014. (in Russian) http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2014/12/141224_afghanistan_klintsevich_interview

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Both sides need to give up the position of criticizing each other’s double standards

security system leaves Russia room for unilateral ac- #2: CREATE A NEW PRAGMATIC AGENDA FOR tion. In this case, there is a fundamental discrepancy BILATERAL COOPERATION at the policy level of action and counteraction, when The crisis in Russian-American relations has clearly Russia’s attempts to resist the expansion of NATO and demonstrated that, both in the U.S. and in Russia, the EU eastward in order to protect its geopolitical there is no carefully delineated strategy for build- interests are treated in the West as an attempt to re- ing bilateral relations. The clearest evidence of this store the Soviet empire and to suppress democracy in is the formulation of policies in the form of actions/ the post-Soviet space. counter-actions and sanctions/counter-sanctions, ac- The situation will only change when, in the course of companied by increasing confrontation. The creation diplomatic negotiations, a solution can be found for the of such a coordinated bilateral strategy is a compli- Ukrainian question that takes into account the interests cated process and sufficiently problematic in the face of both Ukraine and Russia, subject to international le- of a serious crisis of trust and the absence of an insti- gal norms. That is why the appeal by three former U.S. tutional structure for Russian-American relations, in ambassadors to Russia – Jack Matlock, Thomas Picker- which the personal connection (or its absence) being and James Collins – to give diplomacy with Russia a tween the leaders of the two countries plays a crucial chance is so timely. They emphasized that, “Sanctions role. and further efforts to escalate political and military pres- To begin with, both sides need to give up the position sure, and reliance on unilateral action without accompa- of criticizing each other’s double standards and claim- nying diplomacy, would all but assure continued suffer- ing to teach each other the principles of proper foreign ing for the people of Ukraine.”23 policy behavior. They need to begin to develop a new The expert community has encouraged a series of step-by-step pragmatic agenda of bilateral relations, sensible propositions to resolve the crisis, taking into focusing on existing possibilities for cooperation and account its lessons. One of these has been suggest- integration of Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security ed by Samuel Charap of the International Institute system, primarily through the creation of intermediate for Strategic Studies and Jeremy Shapiro of Brook- pan-European structures. ings. “The West’s continuing insistence that the only The traditional agenda in Russian-American relations path to stability and security in Europe is for Russia’s that developed after the Cold War in a system of selec- neighbors to be absorbed into Euro-Atlantic institu- tive partnership along the lines of nuclear non-prolifer- tions is now begetting threats to stability and security ation, anti-terrorist activities and Afghanistan, can be in Europe,” they argue. “In practical terms, sanctions made more specific and can really be extended taking must be accompanied by an offer to negotiate new into account global and regional processes, challenges institutional arrangements.”24 According to Richard N. and threats. Haass, “a mixture of efforts” is necessary “to shore up Regional security partnerships Ukraine economically and militarily, strengthen NATO”, Russia and the U.S. are equally interested in coopera- sanction Russia and offer Moscow “a diplomatic exit”, tion in Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Middle East, Asia- that would include assurances that Ukraine won’t be- Pacific and the Arctic. Russian-American collaboration come a NATO member or enter intoexclusive ties with in Afghanistan will not lose its relevance, in particular the EU.25 taking into account the withdrawal of American troops

23 Jack F. Matlock Jr., Thomas R. Pickering and James F. Collins. Give Diplomacy With Russia a Chance. The New York Times, September 9, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/opinion/give-diplomacy-with-russia-a-chance.html?_r=0 24 Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro. How to Avoid a New Cold War. Brookings, October, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/research/ articles/2014/09/how-to-avoid-new-cold-war-charap-shapiro 25 Richard N. Haass. The Unraveling: How to Respond to a Disordered World. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142202/richard-n-haass/the-unraveling

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The Middle East is the region where, despite different approaches to solving the Syrian issue, curtailing cooperation on the issue of its political regulation and a different interpretation of the events of the Arab Spring, there is great potential for Russian-American cooperation. Both sides are equally interested in the fight against transnational jihadist terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conflict prevention and resolution. The Arctic, according to the president of the Coun- cil on U.S.-Russian Relations, Derek Norberg, can serve as a platform where the two countries will strengthen their mutually beneficial contacts.28 Russia and the U.S. pursue similar objectives in the Arctic and cooperate on a number of areas related to Arctic shipping, the development of Arctic fields, protection of ecosystems and natural resources. New counter-terrorism initiatives Despite the fact that in November, 2014 the West re- fused to coordinate counter-terrorism responses with Russia on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater AP Syria (ISIS), Russian-American anti-terrorist cooperation maintains its primary significance on the prag- and the real threat of destabilization in the region. matic agenda of bilateral relations. There is no doubt However, this format of cooperation could be produc- that the period when it flourished remains in the past. tively extended not only within the triangle including As Nadezhda Arbatova, the Head of the Departments the Russia, the U.S. and China, but also with the in- of European Political Studies at the Institute of World volvement of Afghanistan, as some Russian pundits Economy and International Relations, highlighted, the point out.26 annexation of Crimea led to curtailment, at NATO’s ini- The region for Russian-American cooperation could tiative, of all collaborative projects with Russia on Af- well become Central Asia: Despite the asymmetrical in- ghanistan, terrorism, drug trafficking and piracy. terests between Russia and the U.S. in the region, they Nonetheless, experts remain optimistic due to “the could cooperate in the area of joint expert evaluations absence of Russian security forces in the U.S. ‘blacklist’, concerning issues related to the internal development [a fact] that could be interpreted as Washington’s in- of Central Asia, in the spheres of non-military security tention to keep alive the possibility of cooperation with and border security as well as drugs trafficking.27 Russia.” Cautious optimism and hope that, despite the Both the U.S. and Russia have announced a reversal present schism, Russia and the West still perceive the of policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, but continue common threat (albeit in the background) are inspired to ignore each other’s interests in the region. Further- by the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution on more, both countries are not interested in an overly Aug. 15, 2014, providing for the imposition of sanctions strong China that could lead to a restructuring of the against individuals linked to the activities of Islamic entire security system in Asia. Russia will also receive State and Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-Nusra Front) in Iraq significant benefits from U.S. involvement in the pro- and Syria.29 “It is the first resolution since the start of cess of developing and modernizing Siberia and the Far the Ukrainian crisis to be backed by all fifteen members East, while not allowing China to become the dominant of the Security Council – including Russia,” underlines force there. Arbatova.30

26 Mikhail Konarovsky. Afghanistan and New Unpredictability. Russia in Global Affairs, December 18, 2014. (in Russian) http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Afganistan-i-novaya-neopredelennost-17201 27 Marlene Laruelle, Irina Zvyagelskaya. The Prospects of U.S.-Russia Collaboration in Central Asia: Joint Assessment. Moscow: Spetskniga, 2014, pp. 7, 20-29. 28 U.S.-Russia Collaboration: Arctic Can Become a Starting Point for Improving Relations. August 27, 2014. (in Russian) http://deita.ru/news/ politics/27.08.2014/4737534-sotrudnichestvo-rossii-i-ssha-arktika-mozhet-stat-otpravnoy-tochkoy-k-normalizatsii-otnosheniy/ 29 Security Council Adopts Resolution 2170 (2014) Condemning Gross, Widespread Abuse of Human Rights by Extremist Groups in Iraq, Syria. United Nations, August 15, 2014. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11520.doc.htm

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Economic partnerships and bilateral trade cial organizations – are much more important. At the Great opportunities still exist in the area of economic same time, for the U.S., trade and economic links with cooperation between the two countries. However, any Russia are much less significant. Yet, “taken in perspec- economic cooperation still depends on political rela- tive, these links might hold a significant place in Ameri- tions. Russia’s accession to the WTO and the repeal ca’s external trading links” because “Russia is as a huge of the Jackson-Vanik amendment gave a new impetus potential consumer and capital market” for the U.S.31 to economic cooperation, but sanctions struck again. The U.S. has been and remains an important source of However, even before the imposition of sanctions, there technical and technological innovations for Russia and were serious obstacles for Russian-American economic is necessary for modernizing Russia’s economy. Sanc- cooperation, related to the fact that Russia and the U.S. tions have struck a blow against the so-called “innovation are targeting different markets and have different roles vector” of Russian-American relations in the nuclear and in the global economy. The U.S. is an active participant atomic energy fields, as well as the space and military- in economic globalization, and Russia is a passive ob- industrial complex. However, it is encouraging that coop- ject, acting mainly as a developing country (86 percent eration is being maintained among the universities of the of total Russian exports to the U.S. are accounted for by countries in the sphere of innovation. the following product groups: oil, liquefied natural gas, Finally, the key to the normalization of bilateral relations non-ferrous metals, ferrous metals, and fuel for nuclear remains joint space exploration, the development of hu- reactors). manitarian contacts, scientific, educational and cultural However, for Russia, the value of trade and economic ties and projects addressing environmental disasters and relations with the U.S. is not confined to quantitative in- epidemics. dicators, as the Deputy Director of the Institute of USA The confrontation in Russian-American relations has and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sci- damaged all real and potential spheres of their coopera- ences, Viktor Supyan, points out. According to him, the tion. The whole history of U.S.-Russia relations after the following factors – U.S. investment opportunities, the Cold War has obviously shown with what effort and what American role in the global market for new technology price this partnership was established. So, is it worth put- and America’s role in international economic and finan- ting it at risk?

30 Nadezhda Arbatova. The Rise And Fall of U.S.-Russian Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. Russia Direct Monthly Memo, September, 2014, pp. 4, 6, 8-10. 31 Viktor Supyan. U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Trade and Investment in The Early 21th Century. Institute of USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, January, 2014, pp. 13-14, 23.

Volume of trade between Russia and 50 42.9 the United States in 2013 39.9 38.2 Top U.S. exports to Russia ($ million) 40 (-4.9%) 34.6 Aircraft, space vehicles and components 1,760 27 30 29.3 Motor vehicles 1,230 (-8.2%) Equipment spare parts 404 20 Automobile components 347 11.2 Poultry products and (+4.3%) by-products 307 10.6 10 8.3 Top Russian exports to the U.S. ($ million) 0 Oil products 16,700 2011 2012 2013 Crude oil 1,100 Trade turnover ($ billion) U.S. exports to Russia ($ billion) Russian exports to the United States ($ billion) Radioactive elements and isotopes 996 Russia’s share of U.S. trade in 2013 amounted Semi-ﬁnished products from iron and plain steel 694 to 1%, making the country the 24th largest Aluminum 429 trade partner of U.S. SOURCE: MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION NATALIA MIKHAYLENKO

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gap, according to experts of the older generation. This is #3: BRING MORE ACADEMIC EXPERTISE INTO THE associated with a decline in the level of researchers them- FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT selves as the best brains go into Arabic and Chinese stud- The current crisis in Russian-American relations has ies. However, the young professionals themselves do not clearly demonstrated that losing interest in the serious agree with this statement, pointing out that the reduction study of other countries is fraught with errors in foreign in the budget has led to an increase in quality, as competi- policy expertise and has potential long-term negative tion has intensified. Also, opportunities for field research consequences. America’s specialists on Russia were the have been greatly enlarged. Yet knowledge of Russia has first to raise the alarm.32 The American press unveiled a ceased to be multifaceted and comprehensive. Further- discussion about the critical state of Russian studies in more, many U.S. experts speak Russian poorly, and this the U.S., which has led to the loss of an entire genera- limits their circle of friends and influences the quality of tion of specialists and a reduction in knowledge within their expertise. Fourthly, there is the challenge of univer- the U.S. government about Russia. There were several sity environment. There is a priority being placed on tra- reasons explaining the failure in expert knowledge about ditional sciences in university programs, where studying Russia in the U.S., with the following points mentioned languages and regional courses take a back seat. Despite most often. this, American specialists on Russia are not as bad as their Firstly, there were financial problems associated with critics may claim; however, quality expert opinions do not closing the Title VIII program (State Department) and Ti- necessarily transfer into good policies. For these reasons tle VI (Ministry of Education), which provided grants for there is a problem in the system of making foreign policy studying Russia and attracted students and post gradu- decisions. ates to Russian studies. Moreover, private foundations also It was only against the background of the Ukrainian reduced their financial support. Secondly, there are nar- crisis that the U.S. again remembered about its former row opportunities for career growth, although there are programs (now closed) to finance Russian studies. As positions available for American specialists on Russia in one highly placed source in the White House said in an think tanks and universities. Thirdly, there is a generation interview to the Russian journal Vlast, “now programs for

32 Jason Horowitz. Russia Experts See Thinning Ranks’ Effect on U.S. Policy. The New York Times, March 6, 2014. http://www.nytimes. com/2014/03/07/world/europe/american-experts-on-russia.html; Angela Stent. Why America Doesn’t Understand Putin. The Washington Post, March 14, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-america-doesnt-understand-putin/2014/03/14/81bc1cd6-a9f4-11e3- b61e-8051b8b52d06_story.html; Kenneth Yalowitz, Matthew Rojansky. The Slow Death for Russian and Eurasian Studies. The National Interest, May 23, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-slow-death-russian-eurasian-studies-10516

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The conclusion to the Russian-American confrontation will not be determined in Ukraine or Syria

financing Russian studies will probably be restarted, and generally typical for society to rally round the coun- perhaps even increased... Now we have something we can try’s leader. thank the Kremlin for.”33 And indeed, taking into account It is another matter that it is quite difficult to keep that Russia is again at the center of America’s foreign poli- society in this state of mobilization for any length of cy, the State Department is beginning to extend financing time. According to a poll by the Levada Center carried of Russian programs. out between Dec. 19 and Dec. 22, when asked to name Awareness of the need for a multifaceted study of each the most memorable events of the previous four weeks, other, as well as expanding opportunities for academic 62 percent of those questioned said the fall in the value knowledge to influence the foreign policy expertise and of the ruble, 33 percent said Putin’s press conference, the media, is essential. It is necessary to place the issue of 28 percent said the continuing drop in global oil prices, enhancing our mutual knowledge of each other into the and only 25 percent said the incorporation of Crimea.35 agenda of Russian-American relations, as happened dur- As Dmitri Trenin of Carnegie Moscow Center accurately ing the period of the First World War. observed, “the conclusion to the Russian-American Throughout the history of the two countries there is confrontation will be determined not in Ukraine or Syr- much that Russians and Americans can thank each other ia, but largely in the sphere of economics, science and for and can even take pride in. And if we are to talk about technology, social development, and more broadly - the historical past and present of Russia and the U.S. in a Russia’s domestic situation.”36 Russia needs to diversify comparative context, then there is no need to break the its economy and increase processes for modernizing principle of historicism and distort historical facts for the key areas in social and economic development, as Putin sake of political expediency. so often and emotionally says in his public speeches. Ultimately, this is what will provide the basis for the WHAT WILL INFLUENCE RUSSIAN- implementing Russia’s foreign policy ambitions, as well AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE as multilateral cooperation in various fields, both in the FUTURE? East and in the West. The main issue at present is to what extent will Russia take a constructive position for There are three main factors that continue to influence regulating the conflict in Southeast Ukraine. the development of Russian-American relations: The Factor #2: America’s internal political situation domestic situation in Russia, the domestic situation in In the U.S., among the factors affecting foreign policy America, and the situation in international relations. towards Russia it is necessary to name competition be- Factor #1: Russia’s internal political situation tween the political parties in the context of upcoming If we are to discuss Russia, then it is worth highlight- presidential elections, and the confrontation between ing the “Crimean Consensus” that placed Putin and of supporters of values-based and realistic approaches his popularity at the center of the political system. relating to Russia and the issue of how to resolve the The level of support for his policies remains close to Ukrainian crisis. 85 percent. Furthermore, television has become an im- Angela Stent wrote in her book The Limits of Partner- portant element for consolidating his position.34 This ship: “There is a recurring – and unresolved – debate means that the degree of anti-American rhetoric in the in the United States about how best to handle Russia. near future will not be reduced, since the image of the Those favoring an approach based on realism and na- U.S. as an external enemy will be used by the authori- tional interest argue that the relationship is most pro- ties to consolidate society; with external pressure, it is ductive when Washington concentrates on pragmatic

33 Alexander Gabuev. Fervent Advisors: Who in Washington ‘Gets’ Russia. Kommersant-Vlast. Republished in English in Russia in Global Affairs, June 15, 2014. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/Kommersant-Vlast-Fervent-Advisors-Who-in-Washington-Gets-Russia-16733 34 Kommersant Daily, December 26, 2014. (in Russian) http://www.kommersant.ru/pda/kommersant.html?id=2641017 35 The Most Memorable Events in 2014. December 25, 2014. (in Russian) http://www.levada.ru/25-12-2014/samye-zapominayushchiesya- sobytiya 36 Dmitri Trenin. Russia and the U.S.: A Temporary Break or a New ‘Cold War’? Testimony, State Duma Committee on International Affairs, December 8, 2014. http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=57601

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foreign policy cooperation with Moscow, limits criti- The only encouraging point is that Obama has left cism of its domestic system, focuses on the resolution open the possibility of diplomatic negotiations and of common problems, and treats Russia with respect. the lifting of sanctions in compliance with the Minsk Critics of Realpolitik on the right and left – including agreements. There is also the fact that a point as- some members of the U.S. Congress – argue that the signing Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova the status of United States should link its foreign policy cooperation “main, nonaligned U.S. allies” was removed from the to Russia’s domestic system.”37 Act. Given that Republicans now control both houses of Furthermore, there is one other factor that might the U.S. Congress, any attempt by Barack Obama’s influence the development of Russian-American re- Democratic administration to transition from a values- lations. Russia’s policy in Ukraine, the actions of the based approach to a pragmatic approach will likely re- Islamic State, the situation in Libya, Chinese provoca- sult in a storm of criticism. tions in the East and South China Seas – they all bring The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 201438 is evi- to the foreground the question of America’s foreign dence that a values-based approach is dominant for policy principles as a whole. This is actively discussed Russian policy. Signed on Dec. 18 by U.S. President in the expert community on both sides of the Atlantic Obama, this law enables him to introduce new sanc- in the context of the fall of the United States’ inter- tions against Russia and also provide military as- national authority and crisis management in regional sistance to Ukraine. This document has enabled the and global processes. American president to introduce sanctions relating to As the President of the Carnegie Endowment for Crimea identical to those introduced by the European Peace, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, argues, “in the Union. Cold War, America’s role in the world was self-evi-

37 Angela Stent. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the 21st Century. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014, p. 274. 38 S.2828 - Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014. 113th Congress, November 12, 2014. https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/sen- ate-bill/2828

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The current crisis doesn’t mean that Russian-American relations are irreversibly broken

dent – to lead the fight against the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian crisis and its integration into security communism worldwide. Individual decisions weren’t structures?” obvious, and there were often agonizing tensions The current crisis has clearly demonstrated that a between that overriding goal and American values. united Europe under Berlin’s direction is playing the But Americans largely shared a commitment to what role of a geopolitical rival to Russia, while remaining they understood to be their country’s necessary pur- its economic partner. This means that Europe is inter- pose abroad.” According to Mathews, the end of the ested in restoring a dialogue with Russia on the condi- Cold War brought with it a number of unresolved tion that it returns to the international legal framework questions, with the domestic debate being couched to a greater extent than the United States, and is also in terms of regime change vs. nation building, obei- more willing to take into account Russia’s security in- sance to international law vs. exceptionalism, unilat- terests. At a time when even the partial stabilization of eralism vs. multilateralism, or interests vs. values. “But the Ukrainian question can play a positive role, Russia behind the varying terminology is the same search should pay particular attention to the EU and its indi- for a guideline or framework for deciding when and vidual members. The current confrontation between where to commit money, blood, or political capital,” Russia and the U.S. cannot be reduced to the Ukraine Mathews argues.39 and will remain even after the situation in the southeast Among American politicians and experts, there are has stabilized, and, consequently, it is Europe that will many who are aware that the United States cannot be an important link between Russia and the West. change Russia, that the reform of its society depends on the Russians themselves, that the worldview of CONCLUSIONS Russia and the United States is significantly different, and this situation will continue for the foreseeable The current crisis does not mean that Russian-Amer- future. Therefore, the best way to develop relations ican relations are irreversibly broken – only that they with this vast and important country, possessing a are at the start of their next cycle after having reached hybrid political and economic system and experienc- a new low point. This state of crisis will be maintained ing serious internal problems is the development of for the next few years. However, the crisis will eventu- pragmatic cooperation in areas where it is possible. ally be overcome, because in today’s poorly managed Will the relationship between the supporters of the polycentric world, Russia and the U.S. have to resolve values-based and realistic approaches to policy to- too many common problems, and, consequently, their wards Russia change, and in what direction, only time strategic alliance is inevitable. will tell. The question remains: How much will Russia, Amer- Factor #3: The international context ica and the rest of the world have to pay to find a If we are to talk about the impact of the international way out of this crisis? The answer to this question context on the development of Russian-American re- depends on the will and wisdom of politicians and lations, it is necessary to pay attention to such factors lawmakers, the actions of diplomats and the effort of as the fall of the role of international institutions, re- the experts and the academic communities of both gional crises and global threats, oil prices and fluctua- countries. And, given the ability of the information tions of the world economy, the dynamics of Eurasian war to alter how both sides view each other, it also integration, and the position of Europe connected depends on the professional activities of people who with the answer to the question: “Does Europe need form the media agenda and are involved in replicat- a weak and embittered Russia or will Europe do eve- ing the image of another country on both sides of rything possible to facilitate the exit of Russia from the Atlantic.

39 Jessica Tuchman Mathews. 2015: A World Confused. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 10, 2014. http://carnegieen- dowment.org/2014/12/10/2015-world-confused

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Victoria I. Zhuravleva is Professor of American History and International Relations, Direc- tor of the Program on American Studies and Vice-Chairman of the Department of Inter- national Relations and Area Studies at the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow, Russia. Her research interests include American history, American foreign policy and Russian-American relations. She wrote the book “Understanding Russia in the United States: Images and Myths 1881-1914” (Moscow, 2012), “World History of the 20th Century” (Moscow, 2002, co-authored with Igor Dolutskii), contributed to “Russia and the US: Dip- lomatic Relations 1900-1917” (Moscow, 1999), and edited the following three volumes on Russian-American relations and American history: “Russian-American Relations in Past and VICTORIA I. Present: Images, Myths, and Reality” (Moscow, 2007); “Russia and the United States: Mutu- ZHURAVLEVA al Representations in Textbooks” (Kennan Institute, Volgograd, 2009, co-editored with Ivan I. Kurilla); and “Abraham Lincoln: Lessons of History and the Contemporary World” (Mos- cow, 2010). She is an alumna of the Fulbright Program and the Kennan Institute Program.

COMING UP Ahead of the Munich Security Confer- IN FEBRUARY ence, which will be held from Feb. 6-8, we take a look at the implications of the BRIEF Ukraine crisis for global security. How did it change Russia’s relations within Global the post-Soviet space? Can we predict what Russian actions in other parts of Security the world will be? And, most important- ly, has the Ukraine crisis changed what After wars will look like in the future? the Ukraine LOOK FOR THE NEXT ISSUE IN YOUR INBOX Crisis OR DOWNLOAD DIRECTLY FROM THE WEBSITE WWW.RUSSIA-DIRECT.ORG/ARCHIVE

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RECOMMENDED BOOKS AND ARTICLES TOP 10 TWITTER ACCOUNTS FOR ON RUSSIA-US RELATIONS #RUSSIA AND #US

1. Angela Stent. The Limits of Partnership: U.S-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton: @KremlinRussia_E Official news directly from the Kremlin (in English). Princeton University Press, 2014.

2. John Lewis Gaddis. The Cold War: A New History. New @SpeakerBoehner John Andrew Boehner is the current Speaker of the U.S. York: Penguin Books, 2006. House of Representatives and a member of the Republican Party. He was one of the nine U.S. officials banned entry to 3. Jack F. Matlock Jr. Superpower Illusions: How Myths Russia in March. and False Ideologies Led America Astray and How to Return to Reality. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. @mfa_russia Official Twitter account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 4. Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich and John J. Mearsheimer. Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis? Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2014 Is- @JohnKerry Tweets from U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. sue. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142260/ michael-mcfaul-stephen-sestanovich-john-j- mearsheimer/faulty-powers @RusEmbUSA Tweets from the Russian Embassy in the United States. 5. David S. Foglesong. The American Mission and the ‘Evil Empire’: The Crusade for a ‘Free Russia’ since 1881. @USEmbRu News updates from the U.S. embassy in Moscow and U.S. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Ambassador John Tefft. 6. Vladislav Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel Hill: The @ECAatState Tweets from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Educa- University of North Carolina Press, 2009. tional and Cultural Affairs. 7. Vladimir Rukavishnikov. Cold War, Cold Peace. Public opinion in the USA and Europe about the USSR/Rus- @russiabeyond News and updates from Russia Beyond the Headlines. sia, foreign policy and Western security. Moscow: Aka- medicheskiy proyekt, 2005. (in Russian) @USRIC_en The US-Russia Innovation Corridor (USRIC) provides assis- 8. Eduard Batalov, Victoria Y. Zhuravleva and Kseniya tance to start-up companies, innovative projects, and univer- Khozinskaya. “Growling Bear” on the “Wild East”. Mos- sities wishing to explore U.S.-Russia collaborations and part- cow: Rossiyskaya Politicheskaya Ensiklopedia, 2009. nerships around commercializing innovations. (in Russian)

9. Tatiana Shakleina. Russia and the U.S. in Global Politics. @Russian_Council The Russian International Affairs Council, a think tank which Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2012. (in Russian) covers issues related to Russian foreign policy and Russia- U.S. relations. 10. James Graham Wilson. The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War. New York: Cornell University Press, 2014.

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