Russian- American Relations in Crisis
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AVAILABLE FOR SUBSCRIBERS ONLY RUSSIA DIRECT BRIEF | #18 | JANUARY 2015 EDITOR’S NOTE Ekaterina Zabrovskaya Editor-in-Chief Since the end of the Cold War, relations between Russia and the United States have never been surrounded by such pes- simism and uncertainty. Bilateral contacts RUSSIAN- in almost all areas are frozen, suspended or stagnant at best. In order to move for- ward, we need to understand what exact- ly happened and what still holds us back. The author of this Brief, Victoria I. Zhurav- AMERICAN leva of the Russian State University for the Humanities, analyzes the main factors that continue to influence the develop- ment of Russian-American relations, in- cluding the so-called ‘war of images’, and RELATIONS suggests possible ways for finding an exit to the crisis. As always, we look forward to your feedback. Please email me directly at IN CRISIS: [email protected]. LESSONS FOR 2015 AP RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN CRISIS | #18 | JANUARY 2015 RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR 2015 Victoria I. Zhuravleva, Russian State University for the Humanities EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 2014, Russian-American relations experienced a drop to their lowest level since the conclusion of the Cold War. The cri- sis was directly precipitated by Moscow’s actions in unifying Crimea with Russia. In the months that followed, the sanctions © VITALY ANKOV / RIA NOVOSTI ANKOV © VITALY war and the information war have become an integral part of the crisis, deepening the level of mistrust between both sides. What’s needed now is a fundamentally new approach to U.S.- Russian relations that takes into account how both sides view the origins of the Ukraine crisis. This includes a more nuanced understanding of the historical “war of images” between both nations that has fed the rhetoric and propaganda surrounding the crisis in Russian-American relations. With that in mind, this Brief focuses on the lessons of this crisis as well as on poten- tial ways for its resolution, including a closer look at the pri- mary factors that will influence the ultimate success or failure of these strategies. 2 RUSSIA DIRECT BRIEF WWW.RUSSIA-DIRECT.ORG RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN CRISIS | #18 | JANUARY 2015 AP INTRODUCTION moratorium on Russian- American cooperation will hinder The rapid deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations in 2014 or completely freeze the resolution of fundamentally im- was unexpected by many, even by those in the high- portant international problems, from nuclear non-prolifer- est diplomatic circles. As recently as June 17, 2013 Rus- ation to protecting environmental resources. sian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack A crisis is always a test. Only time will tell what types of Obama made a Joint Statement on Enhanced Bilateral collateral damage will be inflicted on both countries and Engagement, which stated that: “The United States of the rest of the world while Russian and American leaders America and the Russian Federation reaffirm their readi- attempt to pass this test. However, the sooner a serious ness to intensify bilateral cooperation based on the prin- Russian-American dialogue is begun on the causes, the ciples of mutual respect, equality, and genuine respect nature and the lessons of this crisis, the more hope there for each other’s interests.”1 However, by March 2014, the is of their success. By understanding the root causes of United States and European Union had launched an un- the crisis, as well as how they continue to influence the precedented program of sanctions against Russia that policy calculations of top leaders in Moscow and Wash- stimulated a crisis in Russia’s economy that was further ington, we can begin to devise potential exit strategies destabilized by the headlong drop in oil prices. This pro- from the crisis, taking into account its lessons. gram of sanctions eventually led to counter-sanctions be- ing coordinated by Moscow. THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS IN Within the United States, the agenda of policy makers RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS in Washington in the following months has raised ques- tions about the prospects for a Cold War II and the return The current crisis cannot simply be explained by Rus- of policies for containing Russia and Russia’s revisionist sia’s actions in Crimea. The reasons for the crisis have plans. In Russia, various conspiracy theories about the their own historical context and are linked by American events in Ukraine have come to the fore, many of which perceptions that Russia is a former superpower that have focused on the central role of the United States in lost the Cold War. leading a universal conspiracy against Russia. As a result, NATO’s policy of expanding eastward has sim- the relationship between Russia and the U.S. has become ply strengthened Russia’s certainty that its national one of tit-for-tat actions and shrill propaganda state- interests are being disregarded. The United States, the ments. Such an approach seems irresponsible. After all, a European Union and Russia have been unable to estab- 1 Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Enhanced Bilateral Engagement. June 17, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/joint-statement-presidents-united-states-america-and-russian-federatio-1 3 RUSSIA DIRECT BRIEF WWW.RUSSIA-DIRECT.ORG RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN CRISIS | #18 | JANUARY 2015 The Ukrainian crisis is an indicator of a critical crisis in the relationship between the U.S. and post-Soviet Russia lish a stable European-Atlantic system for security in crisis. As he explains, “following the end of the Cold which Russia could play a real role. It not only could War, the U.S., European countries and Russia failed to give Russia advantages, but also could impose certain build an effective security structure for Europe which obligations. In this sense, the Ukrainian crisis is an indi- included Russia” because some Western policies – in- cator of a critical crisis in the relationship between the cluding NATO’s eastward expansion – have been seen U.S. and post-Soviet Russia, being directly connected by Russians as hostile, even though there were other with the broader crisis of managing global and regional motivations on the Western part. “The idea that Rus- processes in a post Cold War world. sia has been treated as a “defeated” nation has lodged Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Moscow Carnegie in many Russian minds and has been encouraged by Center, is certain that the current confrontation be- unjustified “triumphalism” in the United States – an tween Russia and the U.S. “is the logical result of… the attitude adopted by American politicians more for failure to establish a stable international order following domestic political purposes than from an intent to de- the conclusion of the Cold War.” On one hand, Russia mean Russia,” he said.4 is asserting its right to full sovereignty and its vision of At the same time, Richard N. Haass, President of the the world order. On the other hand, the U.S. is defend- Council on Foreign Relations, while highlighting Rus- ing its leadership of an international system that was sia’s contribution to the unfolding confrontation, does established as a result of the end of the Cold War and not remove responsibility for the conflict from Amer- the disappearance of the Soviet Union.2 ica or the West. “Putin himself chose to consolidate Angela Stent, director of the Center for Eurasian, Rus- his political and economic power and adopt a foreign sian, and East European Studies at Georgetown Uni- policy that increasingly characterizes Russia as an op- versity, who served as an adviser on Russia under Bill ponent of an international order defined and led by the Clinton and George W. Bush, has come to the conclu- United States,” Haass argues. “But U.S. and Western sion that Russia and the U.S. must endure not only the policy have not always encouraged more constructive legacy of the Cold War but also that of the 1990s, when choices on his part... NATO enlargement was seen by the asymmetrical character of bilateral relations was many Russians as a humiliation, a betrayal, or both. established. “The recognition of the reality that Russia More could have been made of the Partnership for is less important per se, that indirectly is a continuing Peace, a program designed to foster better relations source of irritation to Russian officials,” she argues. “In between Russia and the alliance. Alternatively, Russia this sense, the various American resets have represent- could have been asked to join NATO, an outcome that ed attempts to engage Russia productively by persuad- would have made little military difference, as NATO ing it to acknowledge and accept the asymmetries in has become less of an alliance in the classic sense than the relationship and move forward on that basis. Putin’s a standing pool of potential contributors to “coalitions 2001 attempted reset, by contrast, was a bid to estab- of the willing.” Arms control, one of the few domains lish a strategic partnership of equals, acting as if these in which Russia could lay claim to still being a great asymmetries did not exist.”3 power, was shunted to the side as unilateralism and Likewise, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union minimalist treaties became the norm.”5 Jack F. Matlock has also turned to the legacy of the After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was offered 1990s in his search for the root causes of the current a model for engagement, implemented through the 2 Dmitri Trenin. Russia and the U.S.: A Temporary Break or a New ‘Cold War’? Testimony, State Duma Committee on International Affairs, December 8, 2014.