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Voir Mani`Erede MDV174couverture.qxp 10/11/2020 13:56 Page 1 ` MANIERE DE VOIR LIBAN 1920 - 2020, UN SIÈCLE DE TUMULTES 1920-2020 un siècle de tumulte • PORTUGAL CONT. 8,90 € • SUISSE 13,80 CHF • TOM 1700 XPF • TUNISIE 11,90 DT. 11,90 TUNISIE • XPF 1700 TOM • CHF 13,80 SUISSE • € 8,90 CONT. PORTUGAL • € • BELGIQUE 8,90 € • CANADA 12,75 $CAN • ESPAGNE 8,90 € • ÉTATS-UNIS 13,50 $US • GRANDE-BRETAGNE 7,95 £ • GRÈCE 8,90 € • • € 8,90 GRÈCE • £ 7,95 GRANDE-BRETAGNE • $US 13,50 ÉTATS-UNIS • € 8,90 ESPAGNE • $CAN 12,75 CANADA • € 8,90 BELGIQUE • € LIBAN PAYS-BAS 8,90 € € 8,90 PAYS-BAS MAROC 85,00 DH • • DH MAROC 85,00 UXEMBOURG 8,90 € • • € UXEMBOURG 8,90 ALLEMAGNE 8,90 € • ANTILLES-RÉUNION 8,90 € • AUTRICHE 8,90 AUTRICHE • € ANTILLES-RÉUNION 8,90 • € 8,90 ALLEMAGNE N° 174 /// DÉCEMBRE 2020 - JANVIER 2021 JAPON 1600 Y • L • Y JAPON 1600 8,50 EUROS FRANCE MÉTROPOLITAINE MANIÈRE DE VOIR 174 AFRIQUE CFA 5500 F CFA • • CFA F 5500 CFA AFRIQUE ITALIE 8,90 € • € 8,90 ITALIE PHOTO : PETER VAN AGTMAEL / MAGNUM PHOTOS MAGNUM / AGTMAEL VAN PETER : PHOTO MDV174ouverture_Mise en page 1 10/11/2020 14:29 Page 2 Le Monde diplomatique Manière de voir Numéro 174. Bimestriel. Décembre 2020 - janvier 2021 Liban, 1920-2020, un siècle de tumulte Numéro coordonné par Akram Belkaïd et Olivier Pironet Conception graphique : Boris Séméniako Photogravure : Patrick Puech-Wilhem Cartographie : Sarah Marin Peter van Agtmael ///// Manifestation sur Correction : Dominique Martel la place des Martyrs, et Xavier Monthéard Beyrouth, 2019 MAGNUM PHOTOS MAGNUM Inge Morath ///// Rue principale d’Aley, ville touristique Sommaire à une demi-heure de route de Beyrouth, 1956 Éditorial 4 L’urgence d’un État social et souverain ///// Akram Belkaïd et Olivier Pironet Perspectives 6 Cent ans de sujétion ///// Gilbert Achcar 1. 1958 – 1990 : la spirale du chaos 12 L’augure de 1958 ///// Karim Émile Bitar 16 Quinze ans de malheurs ///// A. B. 20 Quand Damas change de cap ///// Georges Corm 22 De quoi vivent les Libanais ? ///// Sélim Turquié 24 Un conflit complexe analysé sans nuances ///// G. C. 27 Rêves sionistes au pays du Cèdre ///// O. P. 30 Israël et la tentation maronite ///// Amnon Kapeliouk 32 Sabra et Chatila, un crime impuni ///// Pierre Péan 35 La Syrie à la manœuvre ///// Samir Kassir 38 « Deux négations ne font pas une nation » ///// Georges Naccache PHOTOS MAGNUM MDV174ouverture_Mise en page 1 10/11/2020 16:21 Page 3 Balises 15 La « Suisse » du Proche-Orient 17 Des présidents dans la guerre 18 Un partage communautaire du pouvoir 26 Fayrouz et Beyrouth 54 Marcel Khalifé et le « blasphème » 57 « Nahla », film élégiaque 63 Samir Geagea, criminel de guerre 75 Saïd Akl, poète contradictoire 83 Le flop d’Emmanuel Macron 84 L’étrange séquestration de Saad Hariri Paroles Doha Shams 12 Inqilab 30 Al-Hiyad 34 « Salika wa amina » 37 Ta’âyouch 44 « Li’ ouyounek » 61 « Faja’nakoum, mou ? » MAGNUM PHOTOS MAGNUM 69 « Keloun yaâ’ni Keloun » Peter van Agtmael ///// Scène de manifestation sur la place des Martyrs, Beyrouth, 2019 72 « Dawla aw Ichtirak ? » 80 « Tal’âat rihatkoum » 2. 1990 – 2005 : une bien fragile reconstruction Iconographie 40 La marche contrariée vers l’unité ///// S. K. Ce numéro est accompagné de photographies : • tirées des archives de l’agence Magnum : 44 Une banque centrale à la manœuvre ///// Ibrahim Warde promagnumphotos.com 50 Dans la tourmente de la guerre des frontières ///// Henry Laurens • de Astrid Boulos : www.instagram.com/myriamboulos 52 Les défis du Sud libéré ///// Hana Jaber et Mounzer Jaber 56 Caméra au poing ///// Simone Bitton Bande dessinée Guillaume Barou 47 Chère B. ///// Mazen Kerbaj 58 Soha Béchara, icône de la résistance ///// Marina Da Silva 60 Une transition dans la continuité ///// Alain Gresh Documentation Olivier Pironet 24, 58, 86 64 Samir Kassir, la promesse foudroyée ///// A. B. Bibliographie Sur la Toile 29, 64, 88 3. 2005 – 2020 : temps incertains Le Monde diplomatique 67 Un conflit de 33 jours ///// Tania-Farah Saab Édité par la SA Le Monde diplomatique, société anonyme avec directoire et conseil de surveillance. Actionnaires : 70 Alliance historique dans le camp chrétien ///// Société éditrice du Monde, Association Gunter Holzmann, Les Amis du Monde diplomatique Nicolas Dot-Pouillard Directoire : Serge HALIMI, président, directeur de la publication 73 Bachir El-Khoury En attendant la manne gazière ///// Autres membres : Benoît BRÉVILLE, Vincent CARON, 76 Emmanuel Haddad Pierre RIMBERT, Anne-Cécile ROBERT L’ombre des disparus ///// Secrétaire générale : Anne CALLAIT-CHAVANEL 79 Le Hezbollah maître des armes ///// Marie Kostrz 1, avenue Stephen-Pichon, 75013 Paris Tél. : 01-53-94-96-01. Télécopieur : 01-53-94-96-26 81 À l’heure du soulèvement populaire ///// Hajer Alem et N. D-P. Courriel : [email protected] Site Internet : www.monde-diplomatique.fr 85 Le scandale des employées de maison ///// Madeleine Laurent Directeur de la rédaction : Serge HALIMI Rédacteur en chef : Benoît BRÉVILLE 88 E. H. À Tripoli, l’espoir sur une ligne de front ///// Rédacteurs en chef adjoints : 90 Doha Shams Akram BELKAÏD, Renaud LAMBERT « À combien est la livre aujourd’hui ? » ///// Commission paritaire des journaux et publications : 1020 I 87574. ISSN : 1241-6290 Imprimé en France - Printed in France. Reproduction interdite de tous Voix de faits articles, sauf accord avec l’administration. 92 Chronologie, cartographie, chiffres-clés, citations… Origine du papier : Italie. Taux de fibres recyclées : 0 %. Ce magazine est imprimé Les articles publiés dans ce numéro – à l’exception de dix inédits – sont déjà parus dans chez Maury, 56, Avenue du Général Patton, Malesherbes, 45330 Le Malesherbois. Le Monde diplomatique. La plupart ont fait l’objet d’une actualisation, et leur titre a souvent été Certifié PEFC. Eutrophisation : Ptot = 0,018 kg/t de papier modifié. La date de première publication ainsi que les titres originaux figurent en page 98. MDV174ouverture_Mise en page 1 10/11/2020 16:22 Page 4 L’urgence d’un État social et souverain AKRAM BELKAÏD ET OLIVIER PIRONET Évoquer le Liban, c’est souvent rappeler la «double négation» qui accompagna la conclusion du pacte national entre chrétiens et musulmans à l’indépendance : ni adhésion au panarabisme, ni ralliement au camp occidental. Une troisième néga- tion mériterait pourtant d’être relevée : le refus des élites dirigeantes du pays du Cèdre de s’emparer de la question sociale et de se libérer du carcan libéral pour Econstruire leur politique. En octobre 2019, alors que les manifestants défilent à Beyrouth et Tripoli, sous le mot d’ordre «Que tombe le régime des banques!», et réclament le départ d’une classe politique jugée incompétente et corrompue, le premier ministre d’alors, M. Saad Hariri, pense calmer leur colère en promettant des réformes – six mois auparavant, pourtant, ce même Hariri annonçait des mesures d’austérité pour réduire le déficit budgétaire. Certes, il assure que les éta- blissements financiers vont participer à l’effort de redressement, mais le train de mesures qu’il propose – notamment la division par deux du salaire des députés – ne convainc pas la population. D’autant que le cœur du programme concocté par M. Hariri prévoit de nouvelles privatisations, dont celle du port de Beyrouth, pou- mon de l’activité économique. Si ces mesures sont susceptibles de satisfaire la «communauté internationale», laquelle conditionne le versement d’une aide financière de 11,3 milliards de dollars à la mise en œuvre d’un plan de rigueur, elles ignorent la revendication sociale. Dans un pays frappé par la précarité – près de 30 % de la population vit à l’époque sous le seuil de pauvreté (55 % à la fin 2020) –, le chômage (qui touche officielle- ment 35 % des actifs), la déliquescence des services publics et des inégalités crois- santes (1 % des Libanais détiennent 40 % des richesses nationales), les «conces- sions» faites par le premier ministre, dont la fortune personnelle se monte à 1,5 milliard de dollars, ne sont pas de nature à remédier aux difficultés quoti- diennes de la plupart de ses compatriotes. Un an plus tard, le pays est en cessation de paiement, les banques gèlent une partie des dépôts des particuliers, la pauvreté monte en flèche, mais la grille de lecture n’a pas changé. Quel que soit le profil du chef de gouvernement, une stra- tégie économique fondée sur l’activité bancaire et immobilière continue d’être imposée, aux dépens de l’industrie et de l’agriculture, tandis Au sortir de la guerre civile, que la captation des capitaux étrangers fait figure de Graal. les réformes entreprises Ce modèle économique est le fruit d’un double héritage. En par Rafic Hariri vont transformer premier lieu, à l’époque du mandat français (1920-1943), la puis- le pays du Cèdre sance tutélaire axa l’économie du pays sur le négoce, le secteur des services et les importations, autrement dit sur ce qui était le plus rentable à court terme. Ce système favorisa l’émergence d’une bourgeoisie com- pradore liée aux grands clans confessionnels. À l’indépendance, quelques milliers de ces familles, enrichies grâce aux concessions cédées par les Français, se partagèrent les parts du gâteau national. Elles poursuivirent la politique de «tertiarisation de l’économie», dont la conséquence fut le rôle pivot dévolu au secteur financier et la place centrale accordée à la capitale Beyrouth, au détriment des régions. Le second legs est celui laissé par Rafic Hariri, le père de Saad, dans les pas duquel se sont inscrits tous les gouvernements – dont ceux dirigés par son fils – qui se sont succédé après l’assassinat, en 2005, de l’ancien
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