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Report B! E!"#$%# www.eurint.ch I&'())%*(&+( report B!"#$%"" & P'(#)#*" I$ R!""#+ & P'")-S',#%) S)+)%" №" ∙ $ctober %& %'(' Published every two wee!s I!"#$!%"&'!%( E)&"&'! !"##$%& 2 E!"#$%"&' !e spirit of Deauville $ussia 3 N(#)$%*+ Valentina Matvienko and the ruling circles of Saint Petersburg 4 O'",&%-.+ Vladimir Potanin makes progress in his struggle with Oleg Deripaska E/-'0+"1( General Makarov criticizes the GRU Sukhoi "ghter jets for South Sudan? "oldova 5 D"2'$3&-4 Moscow and Caracas strengthen economic !¡ F$-0+ co-operation Russia and Europe resume discussions over “frozen” Transnistria dispute 6 F$-0+ Gennady Timchenko checkmates Gazprom over Yamal #ilk $oad A'(%# Alstom strengthens its positionv in Russia !™ K&6&*.+#&5 Maksat Idenov turns up at ENI 7 8 E5(%,4 South Stream: Gazprom and the Bulgarian A'(%# stumbling block IPO expected for KazMunaiGaz 9 G$1(%53(5# !£ T0%*3(5"+#&5 Collateral damage from Mezhprombank collapse Russia encourages Ashgabat to look towards its southern neighbours B(."5! #.( +-(5( Vyacheslav Volodin moves up A'(%# Kyrgyzstan: All roads lead to Moscow Dmitry Medvedev to attend Davos Forum !¢ I%&5 Teheran deepens relations with South Caucasus States !kraine !∞ C&0-&+0+ Baku-Yerevan arms race continuesv !º G&+ Ukraine caught between Russian pressure and Armenian and Azerbaijani parties discuss Nagorno- European hopes Karabakh ! click to get to the page E!"#$%# I&'())%*(&+( report www.eurint.ch B!"#$%"" & P'(#)#*" I$ R!""#+ & P'")-S',#%) S)+)%" rE"#$%&#'( T*# +&,-$# The Russian government announced !e spirit of Deauville late October that it wants to allocate Overshadowed by French political and social issues, the !"bn two billion dollars for research in the summit in Deauville, on October 18 and 19, that brought Antarctic. Russia has 've permanent together French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chan- stations on the icy continent and wants cellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Dmitry Medve- to boost its scienti'c presence there. dev, was a diplomatic event of great importance. Although Ƥ from the discussions, one may nevertheless draw some conclusions from what took place in Normandy last week. ǡDzƤdz G'&!, -. Ǥ ƪ j of relations between Russia and the rest of Europe, and on the European security architecture (which is really Eur- Mikhail Fedotov asian). The decisions that might, or might not, be made The secretary of the Union of Journalists, will commit our nations for many long years to come. In who is a former Russian ambassador the wake of the failed opportunities of 1992 and 2001, we to UNESCO and author of the !((% ơ federal media law, has been appointed order between Vancouver and Vladivostok. head of the Presidential Council for Secondly, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel have Civil Society Institutions and Human decided to give their support to Dmitry Medvedev, who Rights, replacing Ella Pam'lova. ơ from what it was in the years 2004-2008, one that is more open to the future. For all that, the show of unity between France and Germany should not blind one to the fact that these countries have their own eastern agendas and pri- G'&!, )'/! orities that do not necessarily coincide with each other’s, l whether it be on NATO, nuclear issues, antimissile defence, Ashot Egiazaryan or relations between the European Union and Russia. Par- is’ concern is not to give up in relation to Berlin, especially The Russian deputy and businessman, on matters regarding the economy and investments. who has been on the run for several Although not invited to Deauville, the United States did weeks, has had his parliamentary not, of necessity, disapprove of the trilateral summit. It immunity lifted by the State Duma at is not as wary of Sarkozy and Merkel as it was of Jacques the request of the General Prosecutor’s Chirac, Gerhard Schroder and Vladimir Putin in 2003. Yet O)ce. Egiazaryan is suspected of the initiatives that these two friends of America may take embezzlement and fraudulent dealings, could potentially go a lot further than the positions taken in particular with regard to renovation Dzdz Ǥ work on the Hotel “Moskvadz. It is, however, still too early to measure the real im- pact of the Deauville summit. Many questions remain. Can Paris and Berlin still lead the rest of the European T' /%"0* Union? How far are Sarkozy and Merkel ready to go? The k question also applies to Dmitry Medvedev. Then there Mikhail Khodorkovsky are serious uncertainties. In Russia, this, of course, would be the election in 2012. It would surely not make matters Prosecutors have asked for a !"- easier if Putin were to return to the Kremlin. And in the year sentence for the former boss of United States, the return of the Republicans to the White Yukos, who has been in prison since House would certainly compromise the detente initiated #$$% serving an &-year sentence by Obama in 2009. for tax evasion. The verdict of the second Khodorkovsky-Lebedev trial Arnaud Dubien E is not expected for several weeks. №" ∙ $ctober %& %'(' click to get to the page 123456789 !º !¡ !™!£!¢!∞ E!"#$%# I&'())%*(&+( report www.eurint.ch B!"#$%"" & P'(#)#*" I$ R!""#+ & P'")-S',#%) S)+)%" rN)$*%&+, Valentina Matvienko and the ruling circles of Saint Petersburg The fact that Saint Petersburg na- close associates, including Vakhmistrov and Deputy Gov- tives are everywhere within the fed- ernor Alexander Polukeev. Matvienko was considerably eral institutions in Moscow has led weakened by these changes and found herself having to one, paradoxically, to lose sight of the deal with a group that has longstanding ties to Vladimir power plays taking place in the “north- Putin. This is not the case for the governor herself. Her dzǤValentina Matvienko support on the federal level came from former Prime Min- was elected governor of the city in ister Yevgeny Primakov, who helped her rise to power in Valentina Matvienko 2003. In December 2006 Vladimir the 1990s. Putin nominated her to continue at The Kogan network. In 2003, at the time when Val- her post. She has long found support entina Matvienko succeeded Vladimir Yakovlev (whom from her old network of contacts from Putin never forgave for having beaten Anatoly Sobchak in the Komsomol, the communist youth the 1996 municipal elections), a man by the name of Vladi- ǡ Ƥ mir Kogan was one of the most prominent businessmen in secretary for Leningrad in the early Saint Petersburg. He was a member of Putin’s entourage Viktor Lobko 1980s. However, since 2009, another and known to have close ties to Alexey Kudrin and Ser- clan, originally linked to the banker gey Stepashin, the former head of the security services Vladimir Kogan and represented by and today head of the audit chamber. At the time, Kogan Mikhail Oseevsky and Yuri Molcha- was the head of Promstroybank, which he sold in 2004 nov, ƪ to the State-owned bank Vneshtorgbank (VTB). He suc- the expense of the governor’s old po- ceeded in putting several of his right-hand men in the City litical associates, while a third group, Hall. Both Mikhail Oseevsky, who was appointed deputy with ties to the security services, re- Ƥ ǡVladimir Yuri Molchanov mains in place. Matvienko, whose Blank, who presides the Committee for Industrial Policy in mandate will not be renewed when it the municipal assembly, are former Promstroybank execu- expires at the end of 2011, is paying a tives. Kogan also has ties to the deputy governor in charge heavy price for turning against Dmi- of investments, Yuri Molchanov, who was in charge of in- try Medvedev’s former law professor, ternational relations at Leningrad University at the start of Nikolay Kropachev, who has mean- the 1990s. Mulchanov gained the trust of Vladimir Putin, while been appointed rector of the whom he recommended to Sobchak upon his return from Mikhail Oseevsky University of Saint Petersburg. the GDR. Yuri Molchanov also has very close ties to the The fall of the Lobko clan. The current speaker of the senate, Sergey Mironov, with whom Ƥǯ Dz Ǥdz - inextricably linked to Viktor Lobko. tion company in the early 1990s. Today, Oseevsky and Mol- Born in 1943 in Belarus, Lobko came chanov are, without a doubt, Valentina Matvienko’s most into regular contact with Valentina ƪǤ Matvienko at the Komsomol in the administration since June, having succeeded Vakhmistrov. 1970s and played a decisive role in her The ineradicable Chekists. In 2003, Vladimir Putin Valery Tikhonov rise to power in Leningrad in the mid- ƥ dle of the 1980s. As governor, she returned the favour by the City Council. At the time, Andrey Chernenko was the appointing Lobko deputy governor and head of her admin- Dzdz Ǥ istration. Lobko was an unrivalled apparatchik who helped He was appointed to head the Federal Migration Service his protégé put several of her allies in key posts. Some of in 2004 and was replaced by Valery Tikhonov, the former these include Oleg Virolaynen, who was appointed dep- second in command of FSO, who is still deputy governor uty governor in charge of housing, energy and transport, in charge of public security. Alexander Vakhmistrov, nominated as deputy governor Valentina Matvienko is not a favourite of Dmitry Med- in charge of the building sector, and Alexander Prokho- vedev’s, who knows that she favoured Sergey Ivanov as renko, president of the Saint Petersburg Committee for ǯDzdzͣ͜͜͞Ǥ Ƥ External Relations, a post long held by Vladimir Putin, and most of her allies in the City Hall in order to stay at her Alexey Sergeev. post until the end of her mandate. One may venture to However, in conformity with orders from the Kremlin, guess that her succession at the end of 2011 will result in at Matvienko was obliged to dismiss Lobko in January 2009.
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