Russian Federation: Presidential Election

Home , Irina Khakamada, Ivan Rybkin, Nikolay Kharitonov, Sergey Mironov

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION – 2004

Report by Nils Gunnar Songstad

NORDEM Report 11/2004 Copyright: the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM and (author(s)). NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, is a programme of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main objective to actively promote international human rights. NORDEM is jointly administered by NCHR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. NORDEM works mainly in relation to multilateral institutions. The operative mandate of the programme is realised primarily through the recruitment and deployment of qualified Norwegian personnel to international assignments which promote democratisation and respect for human rights. The programme is responsible for the training of personnel before deployment, reporting on completed assignments, and plays a role in research related to areas of active involvement. The vast majority of assignments are channelled through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NORDEM Report is a series of reports documenting NORDEM activities and is published jointly by NORDEM and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Series editor: Siri Skåre Series consultants: Hege Mørk, Gry Kval, Christian Boe Astrup The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher(s). ISSN: 1503–1330 ISBN: 82–90851– 79– 0 NORDEM Report is available online at: http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/publikasjonsliste.html

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 1

Preface The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) to monitor the presidential election in the Russian Federation on 14 March 2004 was headed by Julian Peel Yates (UK). A core team of 17 election experts were based in Moscow. On 13 February 2004, 34 long-term observers (LTO) arrived and were deployed to Moscow and 15 other locations in the Russian Federation. The election day observation was under the auspices of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), which was a co-operative undertaking of OSCE/ODIHR and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). A total of 340 STOs were deployed on election day, including 12 from PACE, reporting from some 1,600 polling stations out of a total of some 95,000 countrywide. NORDEM, The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights was asked by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to identify two long-term observers (LTO). They were Kenneth de Figueiredo who covered the region of the Kalmyk Republic and Nils Gunnar Songstad who covered the region of Moscow North.

The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights / NORDEM University of Oslo August 2004 RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 2

Contents Preface Contents Map of Country Introduction ...... 3 Political background ...... 3 The Legislative Framework...... 4 The Electoral Administration ...... 5 Voter and Civic Education ...... 6 Voter Registration ...... 7 Candidate registration ...... 8 The Election campaign ...... 9 The Media...... 10 Observation on the Polling Day ...... 11 Observation of the opening ...... 13 Observation of the polling...... 13 Observation of the closing and counting ...... 15 Observation of the tabulation ...... 16 The review of Complaints Process...... 17 Conclusions and recommendations...... 17 Comments on the election observation mission ...... 18 Appendices ...... 19 Observing organisation’s statement/preliminary report...... 19 Copy of observers’ reporting form...... 19 CEC protocol and final results, 23 March 2004...... 19

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 3

Introduction

The EOM was established in response to the invitation from the Central Election Commission (CEC) to observe the presidential election’s compliance with the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and national legislation. Seven candidates, including the incumbent president, obtained registration as presidential candidates. The context of the election observation was one of very high popularity scores for the incumbent president, Vladimir Putin, who was widely expected to be elected to a second term in office. As expected, Putin was re-elected with a clear margin to the other candidates in the first round of the election. The overall assessment is that the presidential election was generally well administered but lacked elements of a genuine democratic contest. The election campaign was very low key and lacked central features of a competitive election, such as political rallies and posters presenting the candidates. Broadcasted debates between presidential candidates took place without the incumbent president who did not want to take part. Furthermore, the state controlled broadcasters favoured the incumbent president in their news coverage. The CEC and lower level election commissions demonstrated a high degree of professionalism in the technical preparations for the election. On election day, however, shortcomings compromising the secrecy of the vote and transparency of the counting process were reported. In the course of the pre-election period, the voter turnout proved to be an issue of concern to the election commissions. As the election result was very much given before election day there was fear of voter apathy causing the turnout to fall below the required 50 percent. Election commissions and local administration devoted much work to ensure that voters turned out in sufficient number to ensure a valid election. Simultaneously with the presidential election, numerous other electoral contests took place in various parts of the country. These additional elections included one republic presidential election, nine governorship elections, six federal subject legislature elections, and many municipal elections. There were also re-run elections taking place in three single-mandate constituencies for the State Duma. This report draws on the LTO observations in Moscow, general findings by the core team and other LTOs during the pre-election period and STOs on election day.

Political background

The Russian Federation is a federal presidential republic.1 The 14 March 2004 election was the third presidential election since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and

1 Administratively, the country consists of 89 regional entities, or “federal subjects”, a generic term that embraces 21 national republics, six territories, 49 regions, one autonomous region, two federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and 10 autonomous districts. The president’s relations with the 89 federal subjects are conducted mainly through presidential representatives to seven federal districts, into which the 89 subjects have been grouped. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 4 adoption of the 1993 constitution. The constitution gives the president extensive powers but restrict the number of terms to two successive four-year terms. Vladimir Putin was elected on 26 March 2000 with 52.94 percent of the votes. In the 7 December 2003 elections to the lower chamber of the legislature (State Duma), the pro-Putin United Russia became the largest party with 224 of the 450 seats. The established opposition parties experienced a dramatic decline in support. For the 2004 presidential election, the Central Election Commission (CEC) received 11 nominations. Seven candidates ultimately secured registration. Name2 Nominated by Registered on the basis of Sergey GLAZYEV Self-nominated 2.2 million signatures Oleg MALYSHKIN LDPR Automatic Sergey MIRONOV Russian Party of Life 2.4 million signatures Vladimir PUTIN Self-nominated 2.5 million signatures Ivan RYBKIN Self-nominated 2.5 million signatures Irina KHAKAMADA Self-nominated 2.46 million signatures Nikolay KHARITONOV CPRF Automatic

The incumbent president decided to seek self-nomination through signature collection. Only two of the candidates were nominated by political parties represented in the State Duma with more than 5 percent of the vote in the federal constituency. These two were the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). Neither of these two candidates held senior leadership positions in their respective nominating parties. Five of the candidates were registered after proving the support of a minimum of 2 million signatures. Some candidates either outspokenly supported Putin or were political unknowns with little popular appeal. Factional splits in political parties and blocs also affected the campaign capacities of several candidates. Under these circumstances the incumbent president had a clear advantage on the other candidates and the general understanding among voters and elections officials alike was that Putin would easily be elected to a second term.

The Legislative Framework

The presidential election is regulated by the Law on Elections of President of the Russian Federation (PEL) and relevant provisions of the Law on Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights (BGL). The PEL is a detailed legislative act that in most respects complies with international standards and OSCE commitments. The BGL was adopted in June 2002, with some minor amendments in 2003.

2 Names in same order as on the ballot paper. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 5

A candidate for the presidency must be at least 35 years old, must be a Russian citizen, and must have been resident in the Russian Federation for at least 10 years. PEL article 3(5) provides that a person who holds the office of president for a second consecutive term may not be candidate for the presidency. This reflects the prohibition against more than two consecutive terms in office contained in article 81(3) of the constitution. PEL article 77 states that in the case where more than two candidates stand for election and no candidate receive more than 50 per cent of the valid votes cast, the two with the highest number of votes will enter a second round of voting within 21 days. PEL article 43(3) regulates the candidates’ access to the election process. Upon formal registration as a presidential candidate, the candidate is entitled to appoint up to 600 proxies3 to be registered by the CEC. The candidate and the proxies are allowed to observe the sessions of the election commissions and to observe commissions dealing with electoral documents and counting of votes in election commissions at all levels. Furthermore, the candidates may appoint as many observers as they wish to observe the process on election day (PEL article 23), with the only limitation of one observer per candidate allowed to be in any one commission at a time. Decisions in election commissions require a simple majority quorum. The exception to this is the CEC which needs 10 members to constitute a majority (out of 15). The candidates are also entitled to appoint non-voting members to election commissions. PEL article 76 requires the CEC to deem the presidential elections invalid in case of violations during the election process, voting declared invalid in polling stations accounting for not less than twenty five percent of the total number of voters or in accordance with a decision of a court (cf. PEL article 85). Another situation that would require repetition of the election process is if the voter turnout is less than 50 percent, in which case a new date will be set for election within four months. If a candidate withdraws from the election after the ballot papers have been printed, the lowest level election commission, the precinct election commissions (PEC), may be instructed to remove the name from the ballot paper by crossing it out on every ballot. State and municipal bodies are not permitted to participate in the campaign for any candidate or to intervene in the work of the electoral commissions. The administrative bodies are however expected to provide adequate resources to the election commissions. The separation between the local administration and election commissions were unclear in a number of instances observed as local government officials often held important positions in election commissions.

The Electoral Administration

The election of the president of the Russian Federation is administered by four levels of election commissions. Given the exceptional scale of the operation, the election administration was generally efficient and well coordinated. Parallel elections were however a cause of concern as this increased the work of the election commissions.

3 Political party can appoint additional 100 proxies if they have nominated the candidate. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 6

Commissions have both voting members and non-voting members. The presidential candidates may nominate one non-voting member to every election commission.4 The non-voting members have the right to participate in commission meetings and to inspect documents and voting materials. The four levels of electoral administration involved in the presidential elections.5 ELECTION COMMISSION NUMBER OF VOTING MEMBERS The Central Election Commission (CEC) 15 89 Subject Election Commissions (SEC) From 8 to 14 (dependent on relevant Russian Federation Subject Law) Approximately 2,750 Territorial Election From 5 to 9 Commissions (TEC) Approximately 95,000 Precinct Election From 3 to 15 (dependent on the number of Commissions (PEC) voters). In case of parallel elections, the number of PEC members may increase.

The first three commissions are permanent bodies (appointed for a term of four years), while the PEC is appointed anew for each election. The CEC consists of 15 members, five members being appointed by the presidential administration, five by the Council of the Federation (upper chamber) and five by the State Duma (lower chamber) of the national legislature. The executive and legislative branches of government at the federal subject level appoint the SEC. Nominees are proposed by political parties with representation in the relevant legislature. TECs and PECs are appointed by the superior election commission. Political parties, local organisations and local administration are entitled to nominate members. A political party or bloc is allowed to have only one member in any election commission. Administrative officials cannot constitute more than one third of the total number of commission members and election commissions should be not be influenced by the local administration. However, the lack of separation between the local administration and the election commissions, both TEC and PEC, was evident. In many cases the chair of the TEC was a senior employee of the local administration. Data on the degree of actual influence on the election commissions is however difficult to establish.

Voter and Civic Education

The Russian electorate is well acquainted with the election procedures. There were no particular campaigns or educational efforts in the way of information on electoral procedures. However, as the voter turn out was crucial to conclude the electoral process,

4 This in addition to the proxies and observers, see Legislative Framework. 5 In the 7 December 2003 elections for the State Duma, an additional election commissions was in place, the District Election Commission, between the SEC and the TEC. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 7 the election commissions paid attention to counteracting the growing voter apathy. Posters and other material emphasizing the importance of participating in the election were distributed both by election commissions and local administration. The election commissions also used local information gazettes as a channel for urging people to take part in the presidential election.

Voter Registration

The CEC announced on 10 February a figure of some 109.1 million registered voters. The exact number of voters of 108,064,281 was announced with the final results. PEL article 26 regulates the compilation of the voter list. The voter lists are compiled by the relevant election commission for each electoral precinct and is based on information supplied by local authorities and branches of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Article 26 requires the voter list to be compiled by the TEC not later than 26 days prior to election day and therafter handed over to the relevant PEC. The PEC check the list and do necessary updates. The voter list holds information on the voter’s surname, first name and patronymic, year of birth and address. The voter list has spaces for the voter’s signature and the passport number,or other identification documents produced. PEL article 27 stipulates the requirements for inclusion in the voter list. Voters are included in the voter list on the basis of residence in an electoral precinct. Voters who do not find themselves on the voter list on election day can request to be included by producing proof of residency in the area of the electoral precinct. Students are registered in the electoral precinct of the university. Polling stations are also created in hospitals, detention centres and military units to include voters of these institutions. Early voting may be organized for voters who live in remote areas, for ship crew members at sea and for military personnel in isolated locations. Voters unable to vote in the electoral precinct in which they are registered may apply for an Absentee Voting Certificate (AVC) issued by the PEC. An AVC allows voting at any polling station. The PEC keeps record of certificates as part of the election material. The numbers of received, issued and unused AVCs are stated in the protocol of the PEC. In general the voter list was of good quality and there were no reports of people being denied to vote because of not being on the voter list. On election day, however, STOs reported on a lenient practice of including voters in the voter list.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 8

Candidate registration

Seven presidential candidates were registered by the CEC. Only two of these were registered on the basis of nomination by parties in the State Duma.6 The other five candidates were registered following collection of minimum 2 million signatures. The nomination of self-nominated candidates started with submitting the necessary nominating documents to the CEC within the deadline of 1 January 2004. After acception of the nomination, the nominee had to collect the required signatures, with not more than 50,000 coming from any one federal subject, and submit these to the CEC within the deadline of 28 January. The CEC had until 8 February to check the authenticity of the signatures, along with documents of the nominee before approving the registration of the candidate. The signature collection proved in many cases to be a hurdle that caused malpractice. In the course of signature authentication the CEC found that agents for some of the nominees had fraudulently collected or falsified signatures. However, the proportion of such signatures was below the threshold (25 percent of the sample) that would have led to registration being refused. Nevertheless, the CEC referred the matter to the office of the prosecutor for further investigation. The incumbent president, Vladimir Putin announced his candidacy on 18 December 2003, stating that he would not be seeking the formal backing of any political party. Hence, Vladimir Putin was self-nominated and officially non-partisan, although openly supported by United Russia. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) fielded Nikolay Kharitonov as its candidate and enjoyed automatic registration. In the 2000 presidential election the party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov was the party’s candidate, winning 29.2 percent of the vote. Kharitonov represented the CPRF in the presidential race at a time when the party’s electoral prospects looked increasingly bleak. The December 2003 election result was the CPRF’s worst ever performance in a State Duma election. The party’s share of the vote was down to 12.62 percent in the federal proportional contest, a significant decrease from the 1999 elections. The decision of Gennadiy Zyuganov not to put himself forward as presidential candidate may only be interpreted as CPRF recognising the incumbent president’s clear lead in the presidential contest. Zyuganov’s own political career within the party would probably not survive yet another defeat in a presidential bid. Kharitonov was chosen as candidate at a party plenary meeting on 27 December 2003, in preference to Gennadiy Semigin. An internal party squabble evolved between Kharitonov and Zyuganov on one side and Semigin on the other, with Kharitonov accusing Semigin of trying to disrupt the party. The dispute over control of the party probably hampered Nikolay Kharitonov’s presidential campaign. Sergey Glazyev was self-nominated, not the candidate of the Rodina (Homeland) bloc, which he co-chaired at the time of the nomination process. The Rodina bloc is composed of the Party of Russia’s Regions, the United Socialist Party and the People’s Will Party. To some degree Rodina appealed to those wanting to cast a protest vote against the

6 If the party nominating a candidate is not elected to the State Duma on the federal constituency list, i.e. passing the 5 percent threshold, the nominee must follow the same procedure of signature collection as the self-nominated candidates. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 9 current party of power, but at the same time Rodina is considered to be largely pro-Putin. Sergey Glazyev failed to gain the support of the Rodina bloc for his candidacy. A leadership struggle eventually developed and took away some of Glazyev’s organized support base affecting the operational capacities of his presidential campaign. Irina Khakamada was the most clearly identifiable opposition candidate. Khakamada was until January 2004 one of four chair persons of the liberal centrist party Union of Right Forces (SPS), and a State Duma deputy until December 2003. The SPS failed to pass the 5 percent threshold on the federal proportional list and all four party leaders resigned in January 2004. Oleg Malyshkin was the candidate of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and enjoyed automatic registration. Oleg Malyshkin took the place of LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky as the party’s presidential candidate. The LDPR is largely considered a pro-Kremlin party. Sergey Mironov is chairman of the Federation Council (upper chamber of the parliament) and founder of the Party of Life. Although Mironov was nominated by the party, his registration required the collection of signatures as the party did not pass the 5 percent threshold in the 2003 State Duma elections. Mironov clearly supported the incumbent president and the motivation for contesting the election was far from clear. However, Mironov at one point expressed that the rationale for standing as a candidate was to contribute to ensuring a multi-candidate electoral field. Ivan Rybkin was a self-nominated candidate financed by the oligarch and Putin opponent, Boris Berezovskiy. Under unclear circumstances Rybkin went absent from his home on 5 February. He reappeared in Kiev, Ukraine on 10 February, initially announcing that he had been on a private trip. Later, Rybkin made various claims including that he had been kidnapped by the security services. Rybkin announced that he would continue his campaign from London where Berezovskiy is based. On 5 March, however, Ivan Rybkin withdrew from the presidential race. Several of the initial nominees failed to secure registration. Most significant of these was the case of Viktor Gerashchenko, a sitting State Duma deputy. Gerashchenko attempted to claim automatic registration but this was refused on the grounds that his nominating party, the Party of Russia’s Regions, was only a constituent part of the Rodina bloc, and not a State Duma party in its own right. Gerashchenko was nevertheless accepted by the CEC as a party nominee with the requirement to collect 2 million signatures, but he rejected and instead challenged the CEC refusal of his automatic registration by appealing to the Supreme Court. The appeal was rejected on 6 February 2004.

The Election campaign

Very little campaign activities were observed. The low-key campaign and apparent predictability of the election outcome caused concerns about voter turnout, and consequently a vigorous campaign to increase the turn out was put in place by the electoral administration and the local authorities. The election campaign begins with formal registration of the candidates, and ends 24 hours before the election (local time). Candidates are entitled to use public and state RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 10 owned spaces for campaigning, provided the necessary requests are made to state or local administrative bodies. Detailed provisions in the PEL regulate fair allocation of both paid and free air time and space in the print media. The PEL prohibits any involvement in campaigning by state and local authorities, persons holding local authority offices, military officers and election commission members. In contrast to several candidates, who were either little known, had no particular agenda or were caught up in intra-party controversy, Vladimir Putin enjoyed a genuine popular support in the electorate. In a televised speech to his proxies on 12 February 2004, Putin stated that his achievements over the last four years speak for themselves and that he would therefore not engage in campaign activities. Putin chose not to utilize free airtime and not to participate in televised debates among candidates, hence the other candidates lacked the opportunity to question the incumbent president on his performance in office. Added to this, the electronic media did not take up it role as a critical analyst of the president’s performance. In the pre-election period, Putin in his function as president of the Russian Federation focused much on the military and was frequently featured in the media as leader of the armed forces. It was expected that the loss of life in the 6 February 2004 bomb explosion on the Moscow metro could give rise to a campaign focused on Chechnya and the need to fight terrorism. However, neither the war in Chechnya nor terrorism became major campaign issues. Among the key powers of the president is the power to appoint the prime minister. On 24 February 2004 president Putin dismissed prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov and his cabinet. The deputy prime minister Viktor Khristenko served as acting prime minister until the new prime minister, Mikhail Fradkov, was appointed 1 March 2004. President Putin explained this draw with the necessity to outline his intentions after the presidential election. There was clearly a concern among the election commissions at all levels that the turnout could fall below the critical 50 percent that would require to repeat the entire election process within four months. The concern was primarily that people would be so complacent about Putin’s victory that they would simply not bother to vote. There was however no expectations of a second round run-off as Putin was expected to achieve significantly more than 50 percent of the votes if the turnout was above the required minimum. The main threat to Putin’s re-election appeared therefore to be voter apathy rather than any of the rival candidates.

The Media

State-controlled television in the Russian Federation represents a dominant source of public information. In its current shape electronic media does not serve as a forum for the exchange of opinions, public debate, investigation and commentary that would offer the public fully informed views of candidates seeking elected office. The PEL includes detailed provisions governing the conduct of electronic and print media during the pre-election campaign, providing for free and paid broadcast time and print space to all registered political parties and blocs on equal conditions. The PEL also RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 11 prohibits preferential treatment. On 9 February 2004, the CEC distributed free time among six candidates making use of the opportunity. Only 5 of the candidates participated in the TV debates as Putin declined to participate and Ivan Rybkin’s request to take part in televised debates by video link from London was turned down by the CEC. Three television stations have national outreach. The State-controlled First Channel and TV Russia reach more than 95 percent of the population. The privately owned NTV reaches approximately 72 percent of the population. Other significant TV channels reaching most of the regions include TV Centre and Ren TV. There are also local and regional TV stations in almost all the regions of Russia. After the closure of two independent TV channels in the past years the national television broadcasters largely appear to be pro-government. Media coverage in the campaign period was dominated by extensive reporting on the activities of the incumbent president. By displaying clear favouritism towards Mr. Putin, the state controlled media failed to meet its obligation to provide equal treatment to all candidates. While Putin received coverage far beyond what would be reasonably proportionate to his role as head of state, all other candidates combined received a rather insignificant coverage. However, some private broadcasters monitored by the EOM provided more balanced coverage and offered a greater diversity of views. Private enterprises have replaced the state as the principal controller of the print media and several of the most powerful financiers are in command of the most important national newspapers. The print media tend to show strong bias either in favour of or against the incumbent president. Overall, the Russian media does not serve as a forum for exchange of opinions and public debate. The CEC and other supervisory bodies should ensure that all State- controlled media provide coverage of election campaigns in a neutral and equal manner.

Observation on the Polling Day

IEOM observers made a positive assessment of voting procedures in 95 percent of polling stations visited. However, breaches of secrecy of the vote occurred to a significant extent. Open voting was observed in 20 percent of the polling stations. Counting and tabulation were problematic and deviations from the prescribed procedure were found in a large percentage of the observed polling stations.

Procedures before opening a polling station The PEC receives election materials not later than four days before election day. Before opening the polling station, PEC members ensure that there is no campaign material within 50 metres of the polling station. Unused absentee voting certificates (AVC) are counted. Information material, including a poster size blank results protocol is displayed. At 0800, the polling station is declared open by the PEC chairperson. Voters are allowed to enter at this stage and may witness the rest of the opening procedures, including the RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 12

PEC showing all ballot boxes to be empty before sealing. The polling station stays open for voting until 2000.

Persons authorized to be present in a polling station In addition to voters and PEC members, the following are authorized to be present in a polling station: members of higher-level election commissions, candidates and their proxies, candidate-appointed observers, nominating party or bloc observers, journalists and domestic and international observers.

Accepted identification documents The following documents are accepted as proof of identity: a valid Russian Federation passport (all such passports have a stamp certifying the holder’s residency registration), an official identification document, e.g. military ID card or a Soviet Union passport (validity extended by law until June 2004) with an inserted document certifying that the holder of the passport is citizen of the Russian Federation.

Ballot papers The voter receives the ballot paper after having his/her identity checked against the voter list. The number of the ID document is recorded in the voter list and the voter signs for having received the ballot paper. In federal subjects with additional official languages the ballot papers are multi-lingual. Where parallel elections take place, voters also receive ballot papers for these elections. The voter marks the ballot paper by putting a mark in the box next to the name of the candidate of choice. There is no requirement for marking with a particular symbol, provided that the voter’s intention is clear. Voters may also choose to vote against all candidates as a separate option on the ballot paper.

Closing and counting procedures The CEC operates an automated database system, known as the GAS Vybory that connects with all SECs and TECs. The system enables preliminary results to be tabulated and published. The polling station closes at 2000 and only voters already inside the polling station are allowed to vote. The closing and counting procedures should be continuous, i.e. with no breaks, and should be completed as quickly as possible. Before opening the ballot boxes unused ballots are counted and cancelled. The numbers are announced and entered into the protocol. The voter list is reviewed and the number of voters who voted is recorded in the protocol. Mobile ballot boxes are opened, the number of ballot papers determined and recorded in the protocol. The ballot papers from the mobile ballot boxes are placed with the ballots from the stationary ballot boxes before counting starts. The prescribed procedure for counting the ballot is that the name of the marked candidate is read out loud for each ballot paper. The ballot papers are sorted, with separate stacks for votes against all candidates and invalid ballot papers. Once all the ballots have been sorted, the ballots in each stack are counted. A ballot paper may be deemed invalid if there is no mark in any of the boxes or if more than one box is marked. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 13

After counting and filling of the protocol, several checks are made on the figures entered into protocol to ensure that the data tally. The protocol is valid if signed by the majority of voting PEC members present. All present during the count, including the international observers, have the right to obtain certified copies of the PEC protocols. The PEC chairperson and an authorized voting PEC member take the protocol to the TEC. The results should also be entered into the poster size version of the protocol on display in the polling station.

Tabulation procedures at the Territorial Election Commission (TEC) At the TEC, the PEC protocols are received and results tabulated. The PEC protocol is entered into the GAS Vybory system and a receipt for each protocol is issued to the PEC. The TEC compiles a protocol with the tabulated data from all PECs falling under the TEC. The TEC is entitled to decide on whether to recount votes in case of inaccuracies in the protocols. Recounting should be conducted when mistakes or omissions are discovered, or when there is reason to doubt the correctness of the compilation of the PEC protocol. Recounting may be done by the PEC in the presence of TEC voting members or by the TEC itself.

Establishing the overall election results Not later than five days after election day the SEC establishes the results of voting on its territory based on the protocols of the TECs. The SEC results are transferred to the CEC for compilation and official announcement of the elections results. In practice, however, the CEC was able to announce preliminary results within hours of closing of the polling stations.

Observation of the opening In Moscow North, the STOs generally reported that opening procedures were carried out according to the prescribed procedures, although in some polling stations the poster size protocol was not filled in with the required numbers before voting started. In Kalmykia, the STOs did not observe any particular irregularities in the opening of polling stations. However, one team reported on poor sealing of ballot boxes.

Observation of the polling In Moscow North, many STOs reported on tables set up in the middle of the polling stations and that this layout increased the level of open voting as it encouraged marking the ballot paper sitting by the table instead of marking it in secret in the polling booth. In some areas of Moscow this layout were found in the majority of the polling stations. In other areas the STOs reported on a less frequent occurrence of this practice. Family voting was reported in one third on of the polling stations. Police officers were present in almost all polling stations and polling took place without any known incidents of disturbance. Overcrowding, however, was reported in some RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 14 polling stations. Allowing too many voters into the polling stations at the same time raised the concern that the secrecy of the vote would be compromised. In many cases in Moscow, all or almost all of the PEC members were from the same work place, school, factory etc. In such cases the pre-existing set of relations between the PEC members may have impact on the work of the PEC, and there were concerns that this could reduce the transparency. In the weeks leading up to the election voters applied for absentee voter certificate (AVC). This document proves that the voter is permanently registered with a certain electoral precinct but is allowed to vote elsewhere because of travel or temporary residence elsewhere. In most electoral precincts however, it was reported that only a relatively small percentage of the received AVCs had been used. In Moscow, a special PEC was set up to deal with cases of people not having the necessary documents for voting. An important feature of the election was mobile voting. Voters not able to make it to the polling station could apply for voting at home. Requests for mobile voting were accepted up to 1600 on election day. Ballot papers, certified extract of the voter list and the mobile ballot box was brought to the residence of the voter by at least two voting members of the PEC. The STOs following mobile ballot boxes reported on lack of secrecy of the vote as the PEC members generally had full view of how the voter marked the ballot paper and made no attempts of allowing the voter to vote in secrecy. Voters may be added to the voter list on election day by producing proof of residency in the geographical area of the PEC. STOs reported on flexible procedures in some polling stations for adding people to the voter list. Such practices obviously helped increasing the turnout, but caused concern about multiple voting. It is however difficult to assess whether this favoured any of the candidates. STOs observed a number of closed PECs. Voting in these PECs was generally carried out in an orderly manner. Military personnel were bussed or marched to the polling station. In some cases the STOs reported on a notable lack of secrecy. In practice the voting procedure for military personnel might have exerted some kind of pressure on these voters. In Moscow, scanning machines were used in 11 TECs, including approximately 300 polling stations.7 Although being very effective in establishing the results, the scanners posed another problem. The marked ballot paper could be fed into to the scanner either face up or face down. The STOs reported that in most cases this was done face up and thereby comprised the secrecy of the ballot. The PEC members were generally well trained and many also worked on the PECs in the December 2003 elections. The political parties most frequently represented on the PECs were United Russia, CPRF and LDPR.

In Kalmykia the voting process was reported to be generally good and the procedures were followed. Some instances of family voting were nevertheless reported. Federal Security Service (FSB) officers were present in many polling stations, often checking the passports and accreditation of the international observers. One FSB officer

7 In St. Petersburg, approximately 200 scanning machines were in use. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 15 informed STOs that this was an anti-terrorist measure. As far as the STOs could judge, the FSB personnel did not interfere in the voting process. There was also a massive presence of uniformed police inside polling stations, one to four police officers per polling station. Also police officers in plain clothing were present in some polling stations. There was an extensive use of mobile voting in rural areas. One STO team reported that police accompanied mobile ballot boxes. The LTOs reported that in the polling stations they visited, voters filled in forms stating that their sons/daughters were absent and had temporary registration elsewhere. The PECs made decisions on whether to accept these statements, and if accepted, delete the voters’ name from the voter list. In effect this raised the turnout figure. The PECs justified this practice with the fact that these people were able to vote in their place of temporary residence. LTOs found that in one polling station five such statements were handed in during the space of 30 minutes. In another polling station it was reported that 35 people were deleted from the voter list in this manner. In one polling station, a Kharitonov observer complained to the STO team that his count of the turnout differed from the numbers given by the PEC. This candidate’s observer reported that his figure of voters was 500 less than the PEC figure. In many polling stations in Elista, the administrative centre of Kalmykia, sample ballots were posted on the wall showing how to mark the ballot paper. To illustrate the correct way of marking the ballot paper, the box with the ordinal number 4 was marked. Although there were no names on these sample ballots it could be questioned whether using the fourth candidate, which was the incumbent president, to illustrate correct marking of the ballot paper was a random selection.8 To illustrate incorrect marking other ordinal numbers than 4 were used.

Observation of the closing and counting In Moscow North, half of the STOs reported on problems with the counting procedures. In general, the prescribed procedure of checking each ballot paper was not followed. The STOs reported that the ballot boxes were emptied on large table and that all PEC members took part in sorting and counting without the required organisation of the work. The hasty process lead to lack of transparency and the STOs generally rated the counting procedure as bad (see observations forms in appendices). Some PECs with a large number of voters and parallel contests delivered the results to the TEC as early as 2200, only two hours after the polling stations closed. It seems unlikely that the correct and time consuming procedures for counting the ballots had been followed. The complicated protocols and the speed of counting the ballots inevitably caused errors in the protocols. Several STO teams reported on such problems and that in some cases the PEC resorted to the easy and fast solution of correcting the figures in the protocol instead of recounting the ballots. Despite the breaches of the procedures, the STOs did not report that the PECs tried to manipulate the results in favour of any particular candidate.

8 The candidates appeared on the ballot paper in alphabetical order, i.e. Sergey Glazyev, Oleg Malyshkin, Sergey Mironov, Vladimir Putin, Ivan Rybkin, Irina Khakamada, Nikolay Kharitonov. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 16

The STOs obtained copies of the protocols in many polling stations. However in some cases, for unknown reasons, the PEC chairs were hesitant to provide this document.

In Kalmykia, the STOs did not report particular problems and the counting process was done effectively, although some procedural problems occurred. In one polling station there was one ballot less in the ballot box than signatures on the voter list. This discrepancy was solved by adding one vote to the protocol to make the numbers tally. It is not known which candidate was given this extra vote. Observers received copies of the protocols, however in one polling station only a computer printout of the protocol was given to the STOs. In another polling station the copy of the protocol the STOs received, though stamped and signed by the PEC, contained errors. However, the correct result had been filled in on the original form. In a third polling station, there were two ballots less than signatures on the voter list. The discrepancy was recorded in the official protocol. However, in the STOs’ copy of the protocol it was indicated two invalid ballots while there in fact were no invalid ballots.

Observation of the tabulation In Moscow North, one STO team was deployed to three TECs, all located in the same building. The STO team was tasked to observe the work at the TEC throughout the night. A total of 63 PECs delivered their protocols to the three TECs. No particular errors with the PEC protocols were reported. This is probably indicative of the results being checked thoroughly before transfer to the TEC. PECs were handled in an orderly fashion and the TECs seemed capable of managing their tasks. The STO team was only allowed into the GAS Vybory room in one of the TECs but was able to conduct checks on a number of protocols going to the other TECs. In general, STOs in Moscow reported that they were allowed into the GAS Vybory room in around half of the TECs. In Hamnoviki TEC in central Moscow, the TEC members representing the local administration excluded the political party nominated TEC members from the work on election day. A new TEC office was set up in a separate room into which only the chair, deputy and secretary of the TEC, all representatives of the local administration, were allowed access. This in effect excluded the majority of the TEC from the new TEC office. In Horoshevo Mnevneki TEC in Moscow the GAS Vybory system crashed when the first results were entered. This caused severe delays and the system was only made working again next morning.

In Kalmykia, there were no reports on problems with transport of voting materials to the TEC and procedures were properly followed as far as the international observers could judge. The STOs encountered a long queue of PECs in front of Elista TEC. In the two other TECs observed, the process went smoothly. Only one of the STO teams was allowed into the GAS Vybory room. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 17

The review of Complaints Process

The PEL provides tightly regulated deadlines for pre-election complaints. Article 12(7) states that a decision of an election commission can be appealed to a court or to a superior commission. The commissions must rule on the complaint in writing within 5 days, unless it requires further investigation in which case the commission must rule within 10 days, or at the latest the day before election day (PEL Art 12(4)). Complaints received on election day should be considered without delays. The courts have three days to determine pre- election complaints. On election day the courts should consider complaints without delays. In the case of complaints being lodged both with the court and with a superior commission, consideration by the superior commission is suspended to avoid different decisions on the same case. Should an election commission not agree with a decision of a lower commission, it has to return the decision to this commission for further steps. Candidates Irina Khakamada and Nikolay Kharitonov separately complained to the CEC about the broadcast of president Putin’s meeting on 12 February with his campaign proxies. The meeting was shown live on one of the State-funded channels and received significant coverage especially in the subsequent news broadcasts on state controlled channels. The CEC rejected both complaints. Irina Khakamada appealed the CEC decision to the Supreme Court, which on 1 March returned the case to the CEC for further consideration.

Conclusions and recommendations

The CEC announced the official results 23 March 2004:9 Vladimir Putin 71.31 % Nikolai Kharitonov 13.69 % Sergey Glazyev 4.10 % Irina Khakamada 3.84 % Oleg Malyshkin 2.02 % Sergey Mironov 0.75 % The official turn out was 64.39 percent, or a total of 69,581,761 voters of 108,064,281 registered voters (see CEC protocol in appendices for further information). The turnout figure was significantly higher than the required 50 percent and approximately 10 percentage points higher than in the December 2003 Duma elections. This figure shows that the Russian electorate proved responsible in participating in the presidential election. The result for president Putin was close to 20 percentage points higher than in the 2000 presidential election. The Communist Party with its candidate Kharitonov came second with 13.69 percent, less than half of the percentage won by the party’s candidate in the

9 The Moscow Times 24 March 2004. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 18 previous presidential election. Sergey Glazyev probably suffered from the internal split in the Rodina bloc leaving him with only 4.1 %. Irina Khakamada, being one of the few candidates in clear opposition to the incumbent president, got 3.84 %, probably below her expectations. The organizational weakness and lack of an identifiable political agenda of some parties and candidates, in particular the two candidates coming last in the race, may suggest that the purpose of standing for election was to create an appearance of a competitive democracy. The election results show Russian electorate’s preference for continuation of president Putin’s political agenda. However, the election did not meet the criteria deemed necessary for a healthy democratic election process. The vibrant political discourse and meaningful pluralism were lacking. The recorded problems can be summarized in the following recommendations: • The CEC should ensure that the state media provide coverage of election campaigns in a neutral and equal manner. Coverage of the activities of the incumbent president should be carefully separated from election campaign coverage. • The federal and regional authorities should ensure that administrative bodies do not interfere in the work of the election commissions. Administrative resources should not be used for the purpose of favouring any candidates. • The CEC should issue specific instructions to require PEC officials to prevent open voting and group voting. • The CEC should issue revised guidelines to ensure the secrecy of the ballot when using mobile ballot box and the newly introduced scanning machines • The CEC should issue clear instructions on the procedure of counting the ballots to ensure the necessary transparency in this work.

Comments on the election observation mission

The EOM was set up in Moscow early February with the LTOs arriving on 13 February. The EOM was professional and worked effectively under the leadership of Julian Peel Yates. The two Norwegian LTOs were well received and were impressed by the professionalism of the core team. Before the arrival of the STOs the core team was strengthened with additional ODIHR staff. The management of the large number of STOs was professional and the briefings were of high quality. The majority of the STOs proved very capable of managing their task and were willing to work the long hours required for a successful observation. Several teams of the locally recruited STOs also proved to be very dedicated to the work.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 2004 19

Appendices

(Not published in pdf) Observing organisation’s statement/preliminary report Copy of observers’ reporting form CEC protocol and final results, 23 March 2004