The First 100 Days of Putin's Presidency See a Tightening of The

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The First 100 Days of Putin's Presidency See a Tightening of The August 2012 7/2012 Sean Roberts Researcher The Finnish Institute of International Affairs The first 100 days of Putin’s presidency see a tightening of the screws If Dmitry Medvedev was conciliatory in his final months as president, then Vladimir Putin seems intent on a more combative approach. But the Putin administration’s confident moves to re-establish order hide a deeper fear of more protests and a possible colour revolution scenario ahead of the autumn regional elections. In fact, the fallout from the most mass-actions. These latter amend- be about to add another significant recent wave of protests, when up ments, which came into effect on point of control over society by to 20 000 took to the streets of June 9, 2012, include fines of up to discrediting sources of alternative Moscow on May 6 and 7 during 7 000 euros for individual partici- information. Putin’s inauguration, is still being pants and 25 000 euros for protest However, the ‘foreign agent’ law felt. Police continue to question organisers. is just one of several developments and hold participants, while the If protesters feel that the Kremlin affecting civil society that have ‘Memorial’ international civil rights is unfairly targeting their pockets, accompanied Putin’s May arrival group took the unusual step in July then some NGOs may share that in office. Putin’s new presidential of declaring 13 detainees ‘politi- feeling. On July 13, 2012, the State overseer of domestic politics, cal prisoners’, owing to the ‘clear Duma passed a law designed to Vyacheslav Volodin, has been em- political character’ of their arrests. clarify the sources of funding for broiled in an on-going conflict with The high profile court cases of the Non-Commercial Organisations, the Presidential Council on Civil female punk group Pussy Riot, as essentially creating a new category Society and Human Rights — the well as political activist Aleksei of ‘foreign agent’ for those NGOs body charged with advising the Navalny (charged with embezzle- engaged in ‘political activities’ and President on human rights issues. ment on July 30), indicate that the receiving financial assistance from The main source of contention is authorities are ready to use intimi- abroad. At face value, this legisla- the suggestion made by Volodin in dation and coercion in an attempt to tion will make little difference to May 2012 that the composition of quell dissent. the day-to-day functioning of the Council be decided by online However, alongside these reac- NGOs. Legislation enacted in 2006 elections. Although this suggestion tive measures to punish the May already requires NGOs to clarify their appears to dovetail well with the protesters, Putin’s return has also funding sources, while supporters e-governance and direct democ- witnessed frantic efforts on the of this new law are quick to point racy championed by Putin in his part of law-makers to strengthen out that America’s analogous 1938 presidential campaign, a number the power vertical ahead of the Foreign Agents Registration Act is of council members have expressed autumn elections. Since May 7, the much stricter in its requirements. concerns that this is a thinly veiled United Russia-led State Duma has However, if the English term ‘for- attempt to ‘filter out’ Kremlin critics. introduced increasingly repressive eign agent’ carries the more benign Although originally created by Putin legislation, including new Internet meaning of ‘foreign representative’, in 2001, this Council has not always regulations, the return of libel to then the Russian translation carries seen eye to eye with the President the criminal code and amendments a clearer and more sinister connota- and so it is little wonder that thir- to the 2004 law ‘On Assemblies, tion of ‘foreign spy’. For a general teen of the 38-strong council have Rallies, Demonstrations, Processions public that has been nurtured on resigned since May, many citing and Picketing’ that could see huge a steady discourse of foreign plots their unwillingness to work with the fines for those taking part in future and ‘spy mania’, the Kremlin may returning president. 2 Finnish Institute of Perhaps the most puzzling aspect demonstrators who participated in International Affairs of this recent clampdown is that it the post-election protests, but from Kruunuvuorenkatu 4 provides little obvious advantage a public growing uneasy at price PL 400 for the authorities, who neither lack rises and increasing economic dif- 00161 Helsinki the means, legal or otherwise, to ficulties. Interestingly, the summer stifle opposition and civil society. rush to strengthen anti-opposition Telephone The message that the authorities legislation has coincided with +358 (0)9 432 7000 are sending is one of panic as ‘raw July price rises for Housing and laws’ are rushed through parlia- Communal Services — an unpopular Fax ment — laws which are likely to measure that was deliberately +358 (0)9 432 7799 require amendments in the near delayed until after the presidential future. The law on demonstrations is election. www.f iia.f i a case in point. Despite the fact that On a final note, it is by no means a political activist from the ‘Other inconceivable that the very laws Russia’ movement was fined 20 000 designed to strengthen the position roubles in June, allegedly for carrying of the authorities may actually have a banner with the inscription ‘Russia the opposite effect. The last time without Putin’, there are serious the Kremlin seriously considered questions surrounding the ability of similarly harsh anti-protest legisla- the authorities to apply this law to tion was in 2003/2004. Then, it was larger events as well as its compat- widely rumoured that the Kremlin ibility with the Russian Constitution was about to ban protesting outside and the right to assemble. government buildings, although This begs the question of why this idea was subsequently shelved these laws are being hurried through following strong criticism from the State Duma when all signs elements of the media and a negative indicate that the protest movement public reaction. At the time, society is slowing, as politics makes way was considered unready for stricter for summer vacations. Aside from laws limiting the right to protest. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an Putin wanting to lay down an early Based on events over the past six independent research institute that produces high-level marker, these reforms indicate that months, it seems that society is still research to support political decision-making and the authorities are readying for a not ready, and it may be a dangerous public debate both nationally and internationally. more serious round of protests in move by the Kremlin to close off the the autumn and beyond. The source remaining few avenues available to The Institute undertakes quality control in editing publications but the responsibility for the views of this future instability may not the public to express their dissatis- expressed ultimately rests with the authors. necessarily come from those same faction with the regime..
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