DOCSLIB.ORG

Kremlin Kontrol

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Kremlin Kontrol Cover The cover focuses on the three faces most responsible for the institution of control measures over civilian and military affairs in Russia: President Vladimir Putin, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The title of Kremlin Kontrol is used to stress two things, that it is from leadership directives that everything of significance in regard to Russian national interests is decided or acted upon; and that the system of control over civilian and military issues is designed to help neutralize feelings of insecurity or vulnerability among Kremlin elites. Cover image attribution: Vladimir Putin: Kremlin.ru [CC BY 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0) or CC BY 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons General Gerasimov: By Министерство Обороны Российской Федерации [CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons Sergey Shoygu: By Vitaly V. Kuzmin (http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/512) [CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0) or CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) is a component of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 that does guidance-driven, unclassified research and analysis of the foreign perspective of the operational environment. The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US government. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................... v INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1 PART ONE .............................................................................................. 5 CHAPTER ONE: THE NATIONAL GUARD: PUTIN’S PALACE GUARD OF CONTROL ........................................................................ 7 Introduction .......................................................................................... 7 Russia’s National Guard or Rosgvardiya ............................................. 8 Reasons for the NG’s Creation ............................................................. 9 NG Weapons ...................................................................................... 13 Personnel Selections for the NG ......................................................... 18 The NG’s Organization and Duties .................................................... 20 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 28 CHAPTER TWO: CADRE CHANGES AND SISTEMA ................ 31 Introduction ........................................................................................ 31 Putin’s Cadre Changes ....................................................................... 31 Sistema: The Unique Russian Operating Environment ...................... 43 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 47 CHAPTER THREE: MEDIA CONTROL VIA MANIPULATION AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE HALF-TRUTH ................ 49 Introduction ........................................................................................ 49 Manipulating Objective Reality ......................................................... 50 The Methodology of the Half-Truth ................................................... 55 Russian Social Media and Those Cyber Attacks ................................ 58 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 61 CHAPTER FOUR: RUSSIAN CONTROLS OVER NATIONAL AND INFORMATION SECURITY: STRATEGIES, DOCTRINE, CONCEPTS .......................................................................................... 63 Introduction ........................................................................................ 63 The NSS: What Should be Followed Closely? ................................... 65 The ISD: What Should be Followed Closely? .................................... 74 The STDS and CRFP: What Should Be Followed Closely ................ 79 An Assessment ................................................................................... 83 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 84 PART TWO .......................................................................................... 89 v CHAPTER FIVE: RUSSIA’S METHODOLOGICAL CONTROL OVER FUTURE WAR PLANNING: THE THEORY ..................... 91 Introduction ......................................................................................... 91 Contemporary Russian Thought ......................................................... 93 Trends and Forecasting ....................................................................... 96 Military Strategy ................................................................................. 98 Forms and Methods........................................................................... 100 Operational Concept/Design and the COFM .................................... 102 CHAPTER SIX: RUSSIAN OFFICERS DISCUSS METHODOLOGICAL CONTROL ................................................. 109 Introduction ....................................................................................... 109 Learning from Experience ................................................................ 109 Examining the Thoughts of Important Authors ................................ 110 Trends/Foreign Trends ...................................................................... 111 Forecasting/Foreign Forecasting ....................................................... 116 Military Strategy/Correlation of Forces ............................................ 122 Forms (Organizations) and Methods (Weapons and Military Art) ... 127 Operational Design ........................................................................... 132 Major Concepts ................................................................................. 133 Results of the Military Thought Process ........................................... 141 Conclusions ....................................................................................... 144 CHAPTER SEVEN: CONTROL FEATURES OF ‘THE GERASIMOV LECTURES’.............................................................. 147 Introduction ....................................................................................... 147 2013 Presentation .............................................................................. 148 2014 Presentation .............................................................................. 154 2015 Presentation .............................................................................. 163 2016 Presentation .............................................................................. 167 2017 Presentation .............................................................................. 170 Conclusions ....................................................................................... 172 CHAPTER EIGHT: REFLEXIVE CONTROL ............................. 175 Introduction ....................................................................................... 175 Definitions......................................................................................... 176 A Closer Look at the 1990s: Leonenko and Chausov....................... 181 21st Century Tactics, Analogies, and Ukraine: A Theoretical Discussion ......................................................................................... 186 Russian RC in Modern Operations ................................................... 196 Conclusions ....................................................................................... 197 vi CHAPTER NINE: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MANAGEMENT CENTER AND KAVKAZ-2016 ........................................................ 199 Introduction ...................................................................................... 199 National Defense Management Center ............................................. 199 Kavkaz-2016 ..................................................................................... 204 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 207 CHAPTER TEN: RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN SYRIA ....................... 209 Introduction ...................................................................................... 209 Russian Equipment Used in Syria: Russian and Western Sources ... 212 Forms and Methods of Terrorists: Two Russian Reports ................. 217 First the Pullout, then the Declaration to Stay Indefinitely .............. 222 September 2016 to January 2017: A Few Notes .............................. 224 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 227 CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSIONS ......................................... 231 Introduction ...................................................................................... 231 Control Accomplishments ................................................................ 232 Putin and Shoygu Summarize 2016: Where is Russia Heading? ..... 239 What Does it all Mean? .................................................................... 242 APPENDIX ONE: RUSSIA’S GENERAL STAFF/COMMANDERS ON THE WAR IN SYRIA ................................................................. 245
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Unsuccessful Orthodoxy in Russian Heartlands
    Religion, State & Society, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000 Unsuccessful Orthodoxy in Russian Heartlands FELIX CORLEY The Russian Orthodox Church may be the dominant and most visible religious group in the Russian Federation, but its performance in different regions of the country has been patchy. Even in regions that share common features - geographic, ethnic, economic and social - the Church has made a big impact in some, but little headway in others. Here we look at how the Church has fared in the postsoviet era in four Russian heartland provinces - Astrakhan', Yekaterinburg, Saratov and Omsk. I In all these regions the Orthodox Church has failed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the end of restrictions on religious activity a decade ago and it is now suffering because of what many perceive as the authoritarian and backward-looking leadership offered by the local bishops. The article looks at what common features the Orthodox Church in these regions has and examines the consequences of failure to present a dynamic witness. Saratov1 Saratov had a vibrant circle of Orthodox intellectuals by the end of the 1980s, thanks in part to the benign influence of the local hierarch, Archbishop Pimen (Khmel­ evsky). Consecrated bishop in 1965 and appointed to the diocese of Saratov and Volgograd (as it was then), Pimen had had a chequered career, joining the Zhirovitsy Monastery in Belorussia during the Nazi occupation. In the 1950s - in a sign of trust from the Soviet authorities - he served in the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem. On his return to Russia he served in the Trinity-St Sergius Monastery in Zagorsk, for some of the time as deputy head.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology Or Internal Dissent?
    The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology or Internal Dissent? Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Eileen Marie Kunkler, B.A. Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies The Ohio State University 2010 Thesis Committee: Goldie Shabad, Adviser Trevor Brown Copyright by Eileen Marie Kunkler 2010 Abstract In 2008, three political clubs were officially formed within the United Russia party structure: the Social-Conservative Club, the Liberal-Conservative Club, and the State-Patriotic Club. Membership of these clubs includes many powerful Duma representatives. Officially, their function is to help develop strategies for implementing the government‟s Strategy 2020. However, a closer examination of these clubs suggests that they also may function as an ideology incubator for the larger party and as a safety valve for internal party dissent. To answer the question of what the true function of these clubs is an attempt will be made to give: a brief overview of Unity‟s and Fatherland-All Russia‟s formation; a description of how United Russia formed; a summary of the ideological currents within United Russia from 2001-2009; a discussion of the three clubs; and a comparative analysis of these clubs to the Christian Democratic party of Italy and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Based on this evidence, it will be argued that primary purpose of these clubs is to contain intra-party conflict. ii Dedication Dedicated to my family and friends iii Acknowledgements I wish to thank my adviser, Goldie Shabad, for all of her help, advice, and patience in working on this project with me.
    [Show full text]
  • Accountability for Killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016 Contents
    Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016 Contents Paragraphs Page Executive summary ............................................................................................ 3 I. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1-5 5 II. Legal framework ................................................................................................ 6-18 5 A. Applicable international law ...................................................................... 6-17 5 1. International human rights law ........................................................... 6-13 5 2. International humanitarian law............................................................ 14-15 7 3. International criminal law .................................................................. 16-17 8 B. National legislation .................................................................................... 18 8 III. Killings and violent deaths in the context of assemblies ...................................... 19-28 8 A. Violence of January–February 2014 during the Maidan events .................... 20-24 9 B. Violence of 2 May 2014 in Odesa .............................................................. 25-27 10 C. Other assemblies marked by violent deaths ................................................ 28 10 IV. Killings in the context of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine ................................ 29-57
    [Show full text]
  • Observation of the Presidential Election in the Russian Federation (4 March 2012)
    Parliamentary Assembly Assemblée parlementaire http://assembly.coe.int Doc. 12903 23 April 2012 Observation of the presidential election in the Russian Federation (4 March 2012) Election observation report Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau Rapporteur: Mr Tiny KOX, Netherlands, Group of the Unified European Left Contents Page 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 2. Political and legal context ....................................................................................................................... 2 3. Election administration and voter and candidate registration .................................................................3 4. The campaign period and the media environment.................................................................................. 4 5. Complaints and appeals ......................................................................................................................... 5 6. Election day ............................................................................................................................................ 5 7. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 6 Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee.................................................................................... 8 Appendix 2 – Programme of the pre-electoral mission (Moscow,
    [Show full text]
  • Annex E.4.15
    ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15-Corr 06-11-2015 1/35 EC PT Annex E.4.15 Public Corrected Version of ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15-Corr 06-11-2015 2/35 EC PT SOUTH OSSETIA: THE BURDEN OF RECOGNITION Europe Report N°205 - 7 June 2010 lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE GEO-OTP-0001-1242 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15-Corr 06-11-2015 3/35 EC PT TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS i I. IN.TRODUCTION 1 II. POST-RECOGNITION DEVELOPMENTS 2 A. THEPOPfilJ\TION 2 B. TIIE Soc10-EcoNOMIC SITUATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 4 l. Local conditions .4 2. Russian aid and corruption 6 C. RUSSI/\ '8 MILITARY PRR8F.NCE-SOOTH 0SSETIJ\ '8 STRJ\ TRGTC V /\LUE 7 Ill. LOCAL POLITICS 9 A. CoMPr:rnroN FOR RlJ8SIJ\N RRSOlJRCKS 9 B. Tl IE RULE OF LAW ANI) HUMAN RIOI ITS 12 C. FUTURE PROSPECTS 13 IV. GEORGTAN-OSSETTAN RELATIONS 15 A. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 15 B. Dt-:TENTTONS 16 C. DISPLACEMENT ISSUES 17 V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 19 A. THE GENEV J\ T /\LKS 19 B. FIELD PRESENCE 20 C. TIIE EU MONITORINGMI SSION 21 VI. CONCLUSION 23 APPENDICES A. MAP OF G.EOROlA 24 B. MAP OF Soun 1 OssHTIA 25 C. MAP OF sotrra 0SSETIA SHOWING VILLAGES UNDER GEORGIANAND 0SSETIAN CONTROL PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 26 D. AnOUTTIIEINTERNATIONALCRl SIS GROUP 27 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRll:FINGS ON ElJROPli SINCE 2007 28 F. CRJSlS GROUP BOAR!) OFTRUSTEES 29 GEO-OTP-0001-1243 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15-Corr 06-11-2015 4/35 EC PT lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE Program Report N°205 7 June 2010 SOUTH OSSETIA: THE BURDEN OF RECOGNITION EXECUTIVE SUlVIMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS South Ossetia is no closer to genuine independence now threats on its own North Caucasus territory, Moscow than in August 2008, when Russia went to war with has preferred to work with Kokoity and his entourage, Georgia and extended recognition.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Elections in Russia: the Kremlin Is Tackling Previous Challenges While Facing New Ones
    SEPTEMBER 2019 10 Jussi Lassila, Senior Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of Intenational Affairs REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA THE KREMLIN IS TACKLING PREVIOUS CHALLENGES WHILE FACING NEW ONES The Kremlin is trying to learn lessons from old problems regarding its electoral authoritarian system, but new ones are constantly emerging. At the heart of these is the Kremlin’s party system. This year, Russia’s regional elec- regime’s candidates, as well as of which provides a clear indication tions were a follow-up to the ones those candidates who receive protest of the spirit in which the Kremlin held in 2018. In 2018, the principal votes. The reputation of the main foisted its favourites into power. focus was on the re-election of Mos- opposition parties in the Duma, the In St. Petersburg, President Pu- cow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, which Russian Liberal Democratic Party tin’s trusted Alexander Beglov, the played out according to the Krem- and the Communist Party, as genu- highly unpopular governor, proved lin’s script. By contrast, candidates ine political alternatives is also weak. to be a headache for the Kremlin from the Kremlin’s ruling party, However, in the regional elections, it until election day. In polls, Beglov’s United Russia, lost as many as four was the Communist Party’s “too op- strongest contender, the Commu- gubernatorial elections. Primorsky positional” candidates in particular, nist Party’s 73-year-old Vladimir Krai in Russia’s Far East witnessed and candidates who might gather Bortko, stood a good chance of tak- the biggest scandal when Commu- protest votes that appeared to pose ing the race to the second round, nist Party of the Russian Federation a risk to the regime.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights Impact Assessment of the Covid-19 Response on the Territory of Ukraine
    HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE COVID-19 RESPONSE ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE July 2020 Cover photo: © Міністерство охорони здоров’я України / CC BY-SA (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0) Table of contents I. Introduction 3 II. Executive Summary 5 III. Methodology 8 IV. Brief Country Information 9 V. Incidence of COVID-19 in Ukraine 12 VI. The Ukrainian Authorities’ Response to COVID-19 and Its Impact on Human Rights 14 VII. The Occupying Authorities’ Response to COVID-19 in Russian-Occupied Crimea and Sevastopol and Its Impact on Human Rights 42 VIII. The so-called DPR/LPR Authorities’ Response to COVID-19 and its Impact on Human Rights 46 IX. Summary of Key Findings 49 X. Recommendations 53 2 I. Introduction In December 2019, a new type of viral respiratory infection was recorded in Wuhan – a city in the eastern Hubei province of China. By the end of January 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) had confirmed that a new type of coronavirus – named 2019-nCoV or COVID-19 – had emerged and was capable of human-to-human transmission. At the start of February 2020, COVID-19 had already spread to 18 countries, infecting nearly 8000 people, leading the WHO to declare a ‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’. By 11 March 2020, COVID-19 had infected 118 000 and killed 4 291 people across 114 countries, and was declared a global pandemic. On the same day, the WHO Director General instructed all countries to prepare hospitals and public health infrastructure, clearly explain the risks and mechanics of transmission to the public, protect and train health workers and reduce transmission by effectively testing, tracking, tracing and isolating.1 At the time of writing, nearly 12 million people have tested positive for COVID-19 worldwide, leading to 550 000 deaths.2 Governments around the world have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by imposing restrictions on movement, banning public gatherings, closing educational institutions and imposing varying forms of quarantine or self-isolation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections
    Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper REP 2011/01 The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections Andrew Monaghan Nato Defence College June 2011 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication. REP Programme Paper. The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections Introduction From among many important potential questions about developments in Russian politics and in Russia more broadly, one has emerged to dominate public policy and media discussion: who will be Russian president in 2012? This is the central point from which a series of other questions and debates cascade – the extent of differences between President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and how long their ‘Tandem’ can last, whether the presidential election campaign has already begun and whether they will run against each other being only the most prominent. Such questions are typically debated against a wider conceptual canvas – the prospects for change in Russia. Some believe that 2012 offers a potential turning point for Russia and its relations with the international community: leading to either the return of a more ‘reactionary’ Putin to the Kremlin, and the maintenance of ‘stability’, or another term for the more ‘modernizing’ and ‘liberal’ Medvedev.
    [Show full text]
  • S:\FULLCO~1\HEARIN~1\Committee Print 2018\Henry\Jan. 9 Report
    Embargoed for Media Publication / Coverage until 6:00AM EST Wednesday, January 10. 1 115TH CONGRESS " ! S. PRT. 2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 115–21 PUTIN’S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY A MINORITY STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JANUARY 10, 2018 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations Available via World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 28–110 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5012 Sfmt 5012 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER seneagle Embargoed for Media Publication / Coverage until 6:00AM EST Wednesday, January 10. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey TODD WOMACK, Staff Director JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk (II) VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN.
    [Show full text]
  • Putin's Syrian Gambit: Sharper Elbows, Bigger Footprint, Stickier Wicket
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 25 Putin’s Syrian Gambit: Sharper Elbows, Bigger Footprint, Stickier Wicket by John W. Parker Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, and Center for Technology and National Security Policy. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, August, 2012 (Russian Ministry of Defense) Putin's Syrian Gambit Putin's Syrian Gambit: Sharper Elbows, Bigger Footprint, Stickier Wicket By John W. Parker Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 25 Series Editor: Denise Natali National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. July 2017 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S
    Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests Jim Nichol, Coordinator Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs November 4, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33407 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests Summary Russia made some uneven progress in democratization during the 1990s, but according to most observers, this limited progress was reversed after Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999-2000. During this period, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) came to be dominated by government-approved parties and opposition democratic parties were excluded. Putin also abolished gubernatorial elections and established government ownership or control over major media and industries, including the energy sector. The methods used by the Putin government to suppress insurgency in the North Caucasus demonstrated a low regard for the rule of law and scant regard for human rights, according to critics. Dmitriy Medvedev, Vladimir Putin’s chosen successor and long-time protégé, was elected president in March 2008 and immediately chose Putin as prime minister. President Medvedev has continued policies established during the Putin presidency. In August 2008, the Medvedev-Putin “tandem” directed wide-scale military operations against Georgia and unilaterally recognized the independence of Georgia’s separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia, actions that were censured by most of the international community but which resulted in few, minor, and only temporary international sanctions against Russia. Russia’s economy began to recover from the Soviet collapse in 1999, led mainly by oil and gas exports, but the sharp decline in oil and gas prices in mid-2008 and other aspects of the global economic downturn put a halt to this growth.
    [Show full text]
  • 1245 Th Meeting
    Information documents SG-AS (2016) 01 18 January 2016 ———————————————— Communication by the Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly at the 1245th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies1 (20 January 2016) ———————————————— 1 This document covers past activities of the Assembly since the meeting of the Bureau on 26 November 2015 (Sofia) and the future activities up to the meeting of the Bureau on 25 January 2016 (Strasbourg). I. First part-session of 2016 (25-29 January) On 14 December 2015, the Bureau updated the preliminary draft agenda. It decided to propose to the Assembly to hold a debate under urgent procedure on Combating international terrorism while protecting Council of Europe standards and values, to be held on Wednesday 27 January in the afternoon, and to refer the matter to the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy for report and to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights for opinion. On 14 January 2016, the chairpersons of four political groups (EPP/CD, SOC, ALDE, UEL - on behalf of their respective groups) made a request for a debate under urgent procedure on The functioning of democratic institutions in Poland. The appended draft agenda has been updated, under the authority of the Secretary General of the Assembly, to reflect the modifications to be proposed to the Bureau on 25 January 2016 (Appendix 1). A list of events to be held during this part-session is appended to this communication (Appendix 2). On 18 January 2016, the President of the Assembly, Anne Brasseur, received a letter signed by Ms Valentina Matvienko, Chairperson of the Council of Federation of the Russian Federation, and Mr Sergey Naryshkin, Chairperson of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, informing her that “the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation does not consider it possible (…) to approach the PACE for ratification of Russian delegation credentials during the January 2016 Assembly session (…).” II.
    [Show full text]