Haiti a Choisi (DIPLOMATIE / P
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Voting for Hope Elections in Haiti
COMMENTARY Voting for hope Elections in Haiti Peter Hallward ate in the night of 29 February 2004, after weeks of confusion and uncertainty, the enemies of Haitiʼs president Jean-Bertrand Aristide forced him into exile Lfor the second time. There was plenty of ground for confusion. Although twice elected with landslide majorities, by 2004 Aristide was routinely identified as an enemy of democracy. Although political violence declined dramatically during his years in office, he was just as regularly condemned as an enemy of human rights. Although he was prepared to make far-reaching compromises with his opponents, he was attacked as intolerant of dissent. Although still immensely popular among the poor, he was derided as aloof and corrupt. And although his enemies presented themselves as the friends of democracy, pluralism and civil society, the only way they could get rid of their nemesis was through foreign intervention and military force. Four times postponed, the election of Aristideʼs successor finally took place a few months ago, in February 2006. These elections were supposed to clear up the confusion of 2004 once and for all. With Aristide safely out of the picture, they were supposed to show how his violent and illegal expulsion had actually been a victory for democracy. With his Fanmi Lavalas party broken and divided, they were intended to give the true friends of pluralism and civil society that democratic mandate they had so long been denied. Haitiʼs career politicians, confined to the margins since Aristideʼs first election back in 1990, were finally to be given a chance to inherit their rightful place. -
Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns
Order Code RL32294 Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns Updated January 25, 2008 Maureen Taft-Morales Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Clare Ribando Seelke Analyst in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns Summary Following the first free and fair elections in Haiti’s history, Jean-Bertrand Aristide first became Haitian President in February 1991. He was overthrown by a military coup in September 1991. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands that Aristide be restored to office. In September 1994, after a U.S. military intervention had been launched, the military regime agreed to Aristide’s return, the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S. troops, and the resignation of its leadership. President Aristide returned to Haiti in October 1994 under the protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops, and disbanded the Haitian army. U.S. aid helped train a civilian police force. Subsequently, critics charged Aristide with politicizing that force and engaging in corrupt practices. Elections held under Aristide and his successor, René Préval (1996-2000), including the one in which Aristide was reelected in 2000, were marred by alleged irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition boycotts. Efforts to negotiate a resolution to the electoral dispute frustrated the international community for years. Tension and violence continued throughout Aristide’s second term, culminating in his departure from office in February 2004, after the opposition repeatedly refused to negotiate a political solution and armed groups took control of half the country. -
Haiti En Marche # 27
Haïti en Marche, édition du 29 Juillet au 04 Août 2009 • Vol XXIII • Nº 27 Mort de Ti Kouto et condamnation de Ti Blan mais le mystère reste entier PORT-AU-PRINCE, 25 Juillet – Deux anciens chefs de gang sont revenus dans l’actualité. Bien entendu avec un impact différent et bien moindre qu’autrefois dans les années 2004-2006 quand ils faisaient trembler la capitale. Il s’agit de William Baptiste dit Ti Blan, condamné à 14 ans de détention, et de Evens Jeune (alias Ti Kouto) dont on a annoncé le décès au Pénitencier national vendredi. Aristide est renversé le 29 février 2004 sous une pression conjuguée nationale et internationale. A l’intérieur, un mouvement plus de déstabilisation que de subversion conduite par les partis traditionnels et l’élite économique avec comme bras armé quelques dizaines de paramilitaires venus de la République dominicaine voisine. Tandis que c’est un avion militaire américain qui embarquera pour l’exil le président arraché de sa résidence au beau milieu de la nuit en même William Baptiste, alias « Ti Blan », condamné à 14 ans de prison Dread Wilmé, tué en juillet 2005, par les forces onusiennes temps que des troupes canadiennes et par le tribunal criminel (AlerteHaiti) (photo parue sur une banderole) françaises investissaient également le pays. Mais coup de théâtre. Contrairement à toute attente, les quartiers populaires développent une stratégie inconnue jusque-là : la prise d’otages. Du moins c’est de ces bidonvilles, que jusqu’alors l’on pouvait fréquenter presque sans danger, que surgissent des gangs armés qui vont mettre la capitale en coupe réglée. -
Spoiling Security in Haiti
SPOILING SECURITY IN HAITI Latin America/Caribbean Report N°13 – 31 May 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE SPOILERS AND THEIR INTERESTS .............................................................. 2 A. A RETROGRADE SYSTEM WHICH FUELS THE VIOLENCE .......................................................2 B. THE NEED FOR A NEW MODEL..............................................................................................3 C. THE SPOILERS.......................................................................................................................3 D. DRUG TRAFFICKING..............................................................................................................4 III. NEUTRALISING THE ARMED GROUPS AND THE FORMER MILITARY .... 6 A. THE LATEST WAVE OF VIOLENCE.........................................................................................6 B. THE URBAN ARMED GROUPS................................................................................................7 C. THE MINUSTAH/HNP RESPONSE.......................................................................................8 D. THE FORMER MILITARY........................................................................................................8 E. THE ABSENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY ..................................................................9 -
Haiti at a Turning Point
Update Briefing Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°8 Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 3 August 2005 Can Haiti Hold Elections in 2005? I. OVERVIEW elections in a way that still permits the new government to take office, as planned on 7 February 2006. However, even that date should not be considered absolute if Massive technical, political and security obstacles must be conditions are so poor that elections would be forced overcome very quickly or Haiti's elections -- municipal and badly flawed. and local in October, parliamentary and presidential in Security. Sufficient security must exist to permit the November -- will have to be postponed. In particular the political process to unfold in relative safety throughout UN mission (MINUSTAH), other international actors the country. Criminal but also political kidnappings by and the transitional government need to move faster at urban armed gangs have reached historic highs. There registering voters, persuading the failed state's citizens have been almost 800 killings, including the victims that the exercise is meaningful, and disarming both urban of political, drug-inspired, and turf-related battles, gangs and former military. Otherwise, turnout is likely since September 2004. Citizens do not feel safe in to be unsatisfactory, credibility of the outcome will suffer, most neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, which contains and the government's legitimacy will be in question. almost a third of all voters. Eighteen months after former President Aristide was MINUSTAH should continue its recent more active forced out of the country, Haiti remains insecure and tactics to counter and confront -- but in a more targeted volatile. -
Country Fact Sheet HAITI June 2007
National Documentation Packages, Issue Papers and Country Fact Sheets Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada www.irb-cisr.gc.ca ● Français ● Home ● Contact Us ● Help ● Search ● canada.gc.ca Home > Research > National Documentation Packages, Issue Papers and Country Fact Sheets Country Fact Sheet HAITI June 2007 Disclaimer 3. POLITICAL PARTIESF Front for Hope (Front de l’espoir, Fwon Lespwa): The Front for Hope was founded in 2005 to support the candidacy of René Préval in the 2006 presidential election.13 This is a party of alliances that include the Effort and Solidarity to Build a National and Popular Alternative (Effort de solidarité pour la construction d’une alternative nationale et populaire, ESCANP);14 the Open the Gate Party (Pati Louvri Baryè, PLB);15 and grass-roots organizations, such as Grand-Anse Resistance Committee Comité de résistance de Grand-Anse), the Central Plateau Peasants’ Group (Mouvement paysan du plateau Central) and the Southeast Kombit Movement (Mouvement Kombit du SudEst or Kombit Sudest).16 The Front for Hope is headed by René Préval,17 the current head of state, elected in 2006.18 In the 2006 legislative elections, the party won 13 of the 30 seats in the Senate and 24 of the 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.19 Merging of Haitian Social Democratic Parties (Parti Fusion des sociaux-démocrates haïtiens, PFSDH): This party was created on 23 April 2005 with the fusion of the following three democratic parties: Ayiti Capable (Ayiti kapab), the National Congress of Democratic Movements (Congrès national des -
12.514 Yvon Haiti 14 Diciembre 2006 ENG.Pdf
0 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Application filed with the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in the case of Yvon Neptune (Case 12.514) against the Republic of Haiti DELEGATES: Clare K. Roberts, Commissioner Santiago A. Canton, Executive Secretary ADVISERS: Elizabeth Abi-Mershed Juan Pablo Albán A. Ariel E. Dulitzky Ismene Zarifis December 14, 2006 1889 F Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1 II. PURPOSE OF THE APPLICATION ................................................................................. 2 III. REPRESENTATION ..................................................................................................... 3 IV. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.................................................................................... 3 V. PROCESSING BY THE COMMISSION ............................................................................ 3 VI. THE FACTS ............................................................................................................... 5 A. THE VICTIM ...................................................................................................... 5 B. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................... 5 C. ARREST OF MR. YVON NEPTUNE ............................................................................ 6 D. JUDICIAL PROCESS AGAINST MR. YVON -
On the Articulation of Multiple Modernities in Benin and Haiti
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kohnert, Dirk Book Part — Accepted Manuscript (Postprint) Common roots, shared traits, joint prospects? On the articulation of multiple modernities in Benin and Haiti Suggested Citation: Kohnert, Dirk (2007) : Common roots, shared traits, joint prospects? On the articulation of multiple modernities in Benin and Haiti, In: Schuerkens, Ulrike (Ed.): Globalization and transformations of local socio-economic practices, ISBN 978-0-415-96090-8, Routledge, Oxford, pp. 151-173 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118682 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in -
The Coup: Journalism at Its Worst by Isabel K
National Association of the Haitian Media Covering (Up) the Coup: Journalism at its Worst By Isabel K. Macdonald nent right-wing think tank called the Aristide from Haiti’s airwaves. “[W]e New Haitian Foundation (NHF), decided,” he said, “to put an embargo he National Association of the which—like ANMH—was a member on all communications coming from the Haitian Media (ANMH) has a of the G184. The NHF and G184 were National Palace and from the Presi- Tlongstanding relationship with both funded by CIDA.4] dent.”6 Freedom Network (RL), a CIDA- funded Canadian NGO whose staff in- Richard Widmaïer: Anne-Marie Issa: cludes CBC and Radio Canada journal- According to ANMH co-founder, Ri- ANMH media owners admitted that ists. [See pp.26-33.] According to chard Widmaïer, this influential media their support for overthrowing the CIDA, its funding of RL sowed the owners’ association was forged as “a democratically elected Haitian govern- seeds of “professional journalism,” common front” to “defend our common ment guided their journalistic practices. which is a supposed cornerstone of the interests” from “assaults against the ANMH’s priorities were rationalized Canadian government’s promotion of press” by Aristide’s government.5 with the same rhetoric used by anti- “democracy” in Haiti. Thanks to CIDA, Widmaïer, the director of Radio Aristide activists. For instance, the Canada is pushing the kind of “profes- Metropole, said these assaults included owner and director of Radio Signal FM, sional journalism” needed for “democ- an ultimatum from Aristide’s govern- Anne-Marie Issa—ANMH’s vice presi- racy” by supporting the Haitian equiva- ment telling radio companies to pay dent and a member of both the Steer- lents of Conrad Black. -
Keeping the Peace in Haiti?
KEEPING THE PEACE IN HAITI? An Assessment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti Using Compliance with its Prescribed Mandate as a Barometer for Success March 2005 Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights, Cambridge, Massachusetts & Centro de Justiça Global, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil March 2005 Keeping the Peace in Haiti? TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________ 1 INTRODUCTION __________________________________________________________________ 2 I. RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________ 2 II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HAITI _____________________________________________________ 4 III. RESOLUTION 1542: THE MINUSTAH MANDATE __________________________________ 12 III.A. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration_____________________________ 12 III.B. Institutional Strengthening: Police Reform and the Constitutional and Political Process _______________________________________________________________ 13 III.B.1. Police Reform________________________________________________________ 13 III.B.2. The Constitutional and Political Process __________________________________ 14 III.C. Human Rights and Civilian Protection _____________________________________ 15 III.C.1. Human Rights________________________________________________________ 15 III.C.2. Civilian Protection____________________________________________________ 19 IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ______________________________________________________ 21 IV.A. Methodology ___________________________________________________________ -
Political Will for Decentralization in Haiti
Political Will for Decentralization in Haiti by Glenn R. Smucker with Marc-Antoine Noël Craig Olson Pharès Pierre Yves-François Pierre May 2000 Prepared for USAID Haiti Mission Office of Justice, Democracy, and Governance Delivery Order No. 806, Contract OUT-AEP-I-806-96-00008-0 Development Alternatives, Inc. 7250 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 200, Bethesda, Maryland 20814 i Some Comments on Political Will Relations between central and local government “The central government is a festering sore for the mayor’s office.” - Mayor of a secondary city “Relations between central government and communes are a calamity.” - Mayor of a rural commune Governance “Currently, no institution operates according to the constitution.” - Senator Wesner Emmanuel (Independent, Ouest) “We are living a virtual democracy in a backward society.” - Leslie Manigat, ex-President of Haiti (RDNP) “We’re in transition to correct governance; Haiti has been in transition since 1804.” - Coordinator of a communal sectional council (CASEC) Political Parties “We don’t want to be at the tail end, never seeing face to face with party leaders.” - A CASEC coordinator “They want to decide in the name of the people rather than with the people.” - Municipal Delegate, Jacmel Decentralization “The biggest thing that could happen in this country.” - A CASEC coordinator “Civil society is an indispensable instrument of decentralization.” - Gérard Pierre-Charles, General Coordinator, OPL “Decentralization is a necessity for the development of the country, via participation.” - Yvon Neptune, Spokesperson, Fanmi Lavalas ii Preface The five-member team generated this report primarily from open-ended interviews, documents, the team’s synthesis and joint reflections between January 17 and February 19, 2000, and some additional input and feedback on earlier drafts, received in April and May. -
Byografi Youn Powèt Ileus Papillon
Haïti en Marche, édition du 09 au 15 Novembre 2011 • Vol XXV • N° 42 UN POUVOIR QUI SE RESPECTE Les coupables doivent partir d'eux-mêmes et le chef de l'Etat s'assumer PORT-AU-PRINCE, 5 Novembre – Nul n’est dent de la République parce qu’il était à l’étranger en voyage de une cérémonie dans un autre coin du pays. Le ministre de responsable ! Une faute majeure est commise au niveau de santé. Le premier ministre parce qu’il ne voulait pas interférer l’Intérieur et de la Défense nationale accompagnait son l’action gouvernementale. Tout le monde se défile. Le prési- dans le processus judiciaire. Le ministre de la Justice présidait (POUVOIR / p. 4) Les responsables de la sécurité publique convoqués au Sénat : de la droite, le chef de la police Le président Michel Martelly (le bras gauche en écharpe) rentre prématurément de son séjour Mario Andresol, le premier ministre Garry Conille, le ministre de l’intérieur Thierry Mayard-Paul, aux Etats-Unis où il a été opéré à l’épaule (photo Robenson Eugène/HENM) et le secrétaire d’Etat Réginald Delva (photo Georges Dupé/HENM) Arnel Bélizaire ENVIRONNEMENT avait refusé Un miracle en accomplissement d’assassiner Yvon Neptune dans le Sud-est (DEVELOPPEMENT / p. 8) pour le gouvernement Latortue PORT-AU-PRINCE, 6 Novembre – Dans un article publié le 13 Mai 2005, Arnel Bélizaire explique les circonstances de son évasion du Pénitencier National comme le résultat d’une requête par un membre du gou- (BELIZAIRE / p. 6) Les montagnes (et les réalisations entreprises après le séisme) vues de la route de Jacmel (photo Haïti en Marche) PRESIDENCE – PARLEMENT Une lutte au finish dont Haïti est la seule perdante PORT-AU-PRINCE, 3 Novembre – Au point l’international, qui permettrait d’assurer une collaboration où nous en sommes, seul un pacte de gouvernement qui plus ou moins viable entre l’exécutif et le législatif en Haïti.