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Political Will for Decentralization in Haiti

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Political Will for Decentralization in Haiti Political Will for Decentralization in Haiti by Glenn R. Smucker with Marc-Antoine Noël Craig Olson Pharès Pierre Yves-François Pierre May 2000 Prepared for USAID Haiti Mission Office of Justice, Democracy, and Governance Delivery Order No. 806, Contract OUT-AEP-I-806-96-00008-0 Development Alternatives, Inc. 7250 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 200, Bethesda, Maryland 20814 i Some Comments on Political Will Relations between central and local government “The central government is a festering sore for the mayor’s office.” - Mayor of a secondary city “Relations between central government and communes are a calamity.” - Mayor of a rural commune Governance “Currently, no institution operates according to the constitution.” - Senator Wesner Emmanuel (Independent, Ouest) “We are living a virtual democracy in a backward society.” - Leslie Manigat, ex-President of Haiti (RDNP) “We’re in transition to correct governance; Haiti has been in transition since 1804.” - Coordinator of a communal sectional council (CASEC) Political Parties “We don’t want to be at the tail end, never seeing face to face with party leaders.” - A CASEC coordinator “They want to decide in the name of the people rather than with the people.” - Municipal Delegate, Jacmel Decentralization “The biggest thing that could happen in this country.” - A CASEC coordinator “Civil society is an indispensable instrument of decentralization.” - Gérard Pierre-Charles, General Coordinator, OPL “Decentralization is a necessity for the development of the country, via participation.” - Yvon Neptune, Spokesperson, Fanmi Lavalas ii Preface The five-member team generated this report primarily from open-ended interviews, documents, the team’s synthesis and joint reflections between January 17 and February 19, 2000, and some additional input and feedback on earlier drafts, received in April and May. This final version of the report has been updated somewhat following the first round of elections carried out in May; however, the team’s overall analysis still holds, and its basic findings and recommendations remain current. Glenn Smucker served as primary author of the present report; however, its findings and conclusions are very much the product of a team effort. Pharès Pierre and Craig Olson contributed notes on the legal framework for decentralization and interviews with political leaders. Yves-François Pierre contributed brief texts on communal government and traditional sources of leadership. Marc-Antoine Noel and Craig Olson served on the team on a part-time basis. Craig Olson served on the team between January 17 and February 3.1 The DAI team is deeply appreciative of the forthright responses of interviewees and their patient collaboration in this tour of decentralization and political will. People contacted in the course of this study constitute a fascinating cross-section of opinion makers in Haitian society (see Annex A). Without exception, interviewees demonstrated a high degree of tolerance in responding to difficult questions; however, the team assumes sole responsibility for findings and conclusions in this study. 1 DAI fielded an initial local government and civil society assessment team in November and December of 1999 on behalf of the USAID Haiti Mission. Four contributors to the present report had served on the earlier team (Marc-Antoine Noel, Craig Olson, Pharès Pierre, and Glenn Smucker). One member was not a part of the initial assessment team (Yves-François Pierre). iii Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................1 BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................................1 TOUR OF DECENTRALIZATION .....................................................................................................2 II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DECENTRALIZATION ............................................................4 FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES ...................................................................................................4 LAWS......................................................................................................................................4 FINDINGS ................................................................................................................................8 III. PARLIAMENT ...................................................................................................................9 T H 46 LEGISLATURE ....................................................................................................................9 DISPERSING POWER ...............................................................................................................10 FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................................12 IV. EXECUTIVE BRANCH ...................................................................................................13 POLICY REFORM.....................................................................................................................13 OPERATIONS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ...................................................................................14 FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................................16 V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ...................................................................................................18 FINANCES..............................................................................................................................18 LOCAL POLITICS .....................................................................................................................20 FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................................23 VI. POLITICAL PARTIES .....................................................................................................25 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................25 ORGANISATION FANMI LAVALAS (OFL) .......................................................................................27 ORGANISATION DU PEUPLE EN LUTTE (OPL)...............................................................................29 ESPACE DE CONCERTATION (EC)..............................................................................................31 PARTI LOUVRI BARYÈ (PLB).....................................................................................................32 RASSEMBLEMENT DES DÉMOCRATES NATIONAUX PROGRESSISTES (RDNP)....................................32 MOUVEMENT POUR LE SAUVETAGE NATIONAL (MPSN).................................................................33 MOUVEMENT POUR LA RECONSTRUCTION NATIONALE (MRN)........................................................33 MOUVEMENT CHRÉTIEN POUR UNE NOUVELLE HAÏTI (MOCHRENA) ..............................................34 FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................................35 IV. CIVIL SOCIETY..............................................................................................................36 CURRENT TRENDS ..................................................................................................................36 THE PRIVATE SECTOR.............................................................................................................37 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS ................................................................................................42 FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................................44 V. DESIGN OPPORTUNITIES ..............................................................................................46 POINTS OF ENTRÉE.................................................................................................................46 ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM DESIGN..............................................................................................48 REFERENCES .....................................................................................................................51 ANNEX A. LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED ........................................................54 ANNEX B: CURRENT LAWS ON GOVERNMENT .................................................................58 ANNEX C: PROPOSED LAWS ON DECENTRALIZATION ....................................................59 I. Introduction Background This is the second report prepared by Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) under the terms of a contract with USAID Haiti to assess local government and civil society, and to support Mission redesign for these sectors. Local government and civil society are critical components of the Mission’s Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP) and its Strategic Objective for democracy and governance in the period 1999-2004 (see text box).2 The overall objective of the Strategic Objective DAI contract has been to assist in More Genuinely Inclusive design of a program of support grounded in lessons learned from Democratic Governance project experience since 1995, current Intermediate Results political realities, and a Haitian vision 1: Civil society organizations positively for civil society and local government.
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