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American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory Robert B Naval War College Review Volume 70 Article 8 Number 2 Spring 2017 American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory Robert B. Watts Angus Ross Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Watts, Robert B. and Ross, Angus (2017) "American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory," Naval War College Review: Vol. 70 : No. 2 , Article 8. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/8 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Watts and Ross: American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory BOOK REVIEWS CAPITAL THINKING American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory, by Robert B� Watts. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2016� 232 pages� $45 (paperback)� Even though this book is arguably not breaks down naturally into three distinct a comprehensive study, it deserves to sections: a short, theoretical analysis be read by all naval professionals and of Mahan and his effect on U�S� naval anyone with a casual interest in the thought a century ago; an examination U�S� Navy and how it historically has of how the U�S� Navy has evolved this defined its mission� I say this up front thinking to meet the momentous events because, although this review will be of the twentieth century, specifically critical in some areas, such observations the two world wars and the Cold War; must never be allowed to diminish the and finally a look at how the Navy intrinsic value of works such as this: has fared in the post–Cold War era, a advocacy pieces that set out to challenge period characterized by increasingly the prevailing (twentieth-century) naval complex irregular conflicts on land� orthodoxy, with all its emphasis on plat- The second section is the largest, forms and technology� This orthodoxy is forming the backbone of the book and the proverbial elephant in the room that containing a very useful summation of is rarely challenged in naval circles—and the various iterations of naval thinking yet it should be� In this reviewer’s and all the official strategic utterances mind, therefore, it is absolutely healthy since 1945, right up to the modern-day for naval professionals to be exposed “air-sea battle�” Throughout it all, Watts’s constantly to such variations in thinking premise is that the U�S� Navy, for a and to be pressed continually to justify variety of bureaucratic and cultural their long-standing beliefs, even if only reasons, has remained overinvested in to force a more coherent exposition of what he calls the “capital ship theory,” a the prevailing service position� For this focus on high-end, expensive platforms� reason alone, authors such as Watts While these may offer flexibility in provide immense value to the service� a variety of scenarios, they may in Watts writes in an engaging and readable fact be something of a liability in this style that makes this slim paperback new age of irregular warfare� an easy and enjoyable read� The book Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017 1 NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 145 2/22/17 9:32 AM 146 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval REVIEW War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 2, Art. 8 Watts himself is eminently qualified is truly dead and the distinction is no for this work� A retired captain in the longer valid or recognized today, where Coast Guard and an acknowledged would Watts’s argument be then? It also author on naval topics, he can call on weakens the assertion he makes later some thirty years of observing how the on that other navies have done a better services have grappled with the strategic job of letting go of the capital ship than changes in the post-Vietnam era, not the U�S� Navy� While I can think of a to mention his firsthand experience number of navies that have abandoned with what some would call the more aircraft carriers and battleships, on “irregular” missions of naval life� Not account of the expenses involved, very surprisingly, he is at his best in describ- few, I think, have abandoned the DDG ing the difficulties facing the naval or the advanced FFG as the prime services in the post–September 11th era� movers of global influence� If, using his This is not to say there is no awkward- logic, these are in fact capital ships, then ness in the logic Watts employs� For most navies would seem to be following one thing, he is rather nebulous when it a trajectory remarkably similar to that comes to the actual meaning of the term of the United States� Interestingly too, “capital ship�” In the text he variously Watts seems not to include nuclear refers to battleships and aircraft carriers submarines in this mix, yet I know of at but also on occasion to “cruisers and de- least one navy—the United Kingdom’s stroyers” (p� 110) and, even more specifi- Royal Navy—that has often equated cally, the DDG-51 class (and equivalent) these vessels to the capital ships of yore (pp� 120, 171) as being capital ships� on account of their immense power- While in terms of raw combat power projection and antifleet capabilities� this may be somewhat understandable, The second difficulty is the author’s this is not a trivial matter in this case� assumption that Mahan’s theories on The normally accepted definition of a decisive battle and his capital ship theory capital ship would be “one of the largest are synonymous and interchangeable� and most heavily armed ships in a fleet, Mahan, of course, was writing about the usually understood to be battleships, preindustrial age and in an era when battle cruisers, and aircraft carriers,” the only threat to that determinant of or words to that effect� The problem: naval power, the battleship, was another including everything from the DDG-51 battleship� Under those circumstances, on up in the definition means there are the possession of the most up-to-date precious few USN vessels today that are and powerful fleet of battleships that not capital ships! While superficially one could afford made a lot of sense, this may seem to strengthen Watts’s as did the exhortation to keep the fleet case, it actually weakens his argument concentrated� The advent of the indus- in a number of important ways� Most trial age changed all this, however, in obviously, it might be construed that it two important ways� First, the extreme is the very notion of a “capital” ship, as mobility conferred on smaller ships by distinct from any other, that is obsolete turbine propulsion and the development in this case, not the U�S� Navy’s long of new weapons such as the Whitehead adherence to the principles of a theorist torpedo made the battleships vulnerable writing in an era in which there was a to smaller platforms that cost a fraction clear distinction� If the capital ship idea of a battleship’s cost� This was perhaps https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/8 2 NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 146 2/22/17 9:32 AM Watts and Ross: American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory BOOK REVIEWS 147 the first time in naval history when a “sensors and shooters” in a discrete third-rate navy might threaten the larg- package if each can draw what it lacks est fleets in the world effectively� Second, from the others in the network� This the industrial powers’ need for resources again makes it something of an antithe- and markets on a global scale widened sis of capital ship theory, considering the the scope of naval strategic responsi- latter’s focus on the platforms involved� bilities immeasurably� This navies were As such, the NCW concept is worthy of slow to appreciate, but (to cut a long inclusion here, if only to explore why story very short) the likes of Admiral the U�S� Navy supposedly rejected it Fisher in Britain with his battle cruiser (although aspects of it have survived in ideas in 1905 and Admiral Fournier the current “distributed lethality” idea)� in France with his general-purpose In the end, this reviewer was not cruisers (“bon à tout faire”—able to persuaded by the arguments as do anything) a few years earlier slowly presented, but this in no way should but inexorably moved the focus away be taken as a rejection of the book’s from a defensive clash of battle fleets core idea itself� Watts’s volume is around the point of decision toward valuable insofar as it encourages the the use of offensive power-projection reader to think of alternative organiza- fleets around the periphery to ensure tional strategies for the U�S� Navy; it is, protection of these wider strategic however, incomplete, in that formulating interests� This offensive approach was a comprehensive conclusion requires taken up most notably by the carrier the three objections discussed above to power-projection fleets of the U�S� Navy be addressed at some point� The book in the post–World War II era� In other also does not offer any defense for words, the “capital ship theory” that the the generalist position and the many U�S� Navy has held dear through all these virtues of capable, multipurpose ships years is this offensive power-projection across the range of military operations, version, not the original Mahanian nor any alternative to this force, which ideas of a half-century earlier� Watts presumably would have to include a does not make this distinction clear� larger number of specialist
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