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The Battleship Holiday: the Naval Treaties and Capital Ship Design Naval War College Review Volume 71 Article 19 Number 3 Summer 2018 The aB ttleship Holiday: The aN val Treaties and Capital Ship Design James P. McGrath Robert C. Stern Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation McGrath, James P. and Stern, Robert C. (2018) "The aB ttleship Holiday: The aN val Treaties and Capital Ship Design," Naval War College Review: Vol. 71 : No. 3 , Article 19. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/19 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. McGrath and Stern: The Battleship Holiday: The Naval Treaties and Capital Ship Desig BOOK REVIEWS 161 of the coach’s dynamic personality on topics all add value and make this book the field� Cameron makes the point that a must-read for football fans across the “[i]f Ken Niumatalolo is your neighbor, country � Cameron has shined a spotlight you think he’s a great guy� But if you on Navy’s football program through its play football for Navy, in an instant, he highs and lows, with colorful com- can be your worst nightmare” (p� 107)� mentary that makes it an enjoyable read� Cameron does a superb job recounting THOMAS J� GIBBONS the intense rivalries that Navy has with not only Army and Air Force but Notre Dame � He describes the 2007 win over Notre Dame—after forty-three consecu- tive losses—as follows: “The night ‘the The Battleship Holiday: The Naval Treaties and Streak’ died—the longest streak in Capital Ship Design, by Robert C� Stern� Annapo- NCAA history—eighty thousand fans at lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 272 pages� Notre Dame Stadium watched in stunned $42�95� silence as Navy let go of forty-three years Robert Stern, a writer of more than of misery, embarrassment, and frustra- twenty books on naval matters over tion” (p� 136)� He details the joy—and three decades, opens his latest effort by other emotions—of football games with admitting that he is tackling a subject on Army and Air Force, with the overall which much has been written already� winner receiving the Commander in The Battleship Holiday explores the Chief’s Trophy� Few other writers can history and technical design of capital match Cameron’s insights into and ap- ships that the five signatories to the preciation of the distinctive qualities of 1922 Five-Power Treaty—Great Britain, the Army-Navy game� “The annual bit of the United States, Japan, France, and military theater, greater than any other Italy—plus Germany built during and game, makes the Army-Navy legacy a lit- after the “battleship holiday” that the tle sweeter� The nation’s game” (p� 106)� treaty imposed� His fresh approach Nonetheless, I struggled somewhat to analyzing capital ship design and with the book� I found it difficult that construction during this period Cameron seems to be telling two stories, addresses the ships and their innova- in that as he writes about the chronol- tions chronologically rather than along ogy of Navy football he intersperses national lines� Throughout this chronol- the story of Navy’s fierce rivalries with ogy, he explores three major threads: Army, Air Force, and Notre Dame� diplomacy, technology, and operational At times the story was challenging to performance� Stern offers that, while follow because I was reading about other treatments address one or two of things from two different perspectives: these threads, his assessment of all three one that portrayed a chronology, and provides “more complete insight into another that recounted memorable the interplay of factors that led different games with Navy’s leading rivals� nations to build different ships” (p� 10) to achieve their respective national goals� The appendices highlighting Navy’s unforgettable games, unforgettable Divided into two parts, the book first seasons, GOATS (read the book), play- explores how capital ships evolved to the ers, coaches, and a potpourri of other point at which the world’s naval powers Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018 1 NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 161 5/1/18 11:11 AM 162 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval REVIEW War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 19 decided to limit them� Beginning with political ramifications involved� He gives the 1862 battle of Hampton Roads, Stern equal coverage to all the navies building traces the evolution of capital ships capital ships, including their decisions up to the 1916 battle of Jutland� His on whether to follow the constraints the threads run through ship design and Washington Treaty system imposed� He construction as each nation emphasized also includes significant discussion of characteristics important to its vision ships not built, and why� The chrono- of the battleship’s role� Stern steers logical approach demonstrates how the clear of analyzing strategy and tactics different design decisions responded to except where necessary to show how or ignored the efforts of other nations� different technical decisions combined Stern’s assessment culminates with an with tactical developments, such as to analysis of the effectiveness of these produce Jutland’s outcome� The chapter battleships’ offensive and defensive “The Art and Practice of Main-Battery capabilities in combat� Direct com- Fire Control in 1916” demonstrates parison is nearly impossible, since only Stern’s in-depth analysis of technological three engagements occurred that pitted advancements by the various bel- new-generation battleships against each ligerents� In addition to gunnery and other � The German battleships Bismarck fire control, each country drew from and Scharnhorst succumbed to their Jutland different lessons on armor, peers HMS Prince of Wales and HMS propulsion, and machinery—many of Duke of York, respectively, in battle at them incorrect� Stern concludes the sea, but those actions included other first section by describing the tension vessels or aircraft that prevented a “fair between liberal politicians and naval fight�” The other direct action between leaders as they attempted to curtail the new-generation battleships consisted of exorbitant cost of maintaining a fleet USS Massachusetts (BB 59) battering the of modern battleships� The resulting incomplete French battle cruiser Jean Washington Naval Treaty system placed Bart, holed up in Casablanca’s harbor� specific restrictions on capital ships� The Stern assesses other surface actions, in- subsequent battleship building holiday cluding the battleship duel in which the succeeded in preventing unconstrained post-Jutland battleships USS Washington shipbuilding, but it did not inhibit (BB 56) and USS Alabama (BB 57) sank ambitions to build better battleships� the Japanese pretreaty battle cruiser The second half of the book tracks Kirishima, and the cornering and scut- capital ship design and construction tling of the German Graf Spee by British from 1922 to 1946� The idea of naval cruisers at the Río de la Plata� In almost disarmament began to fray less than five every case, whether they resulted in years after its initiation, slowly at first sinking or survival, battleship-protection and later accelerating to the point of dis- schemes underperformed� Surface action solution� During the intervening years, was no longer the norm—the majority naval architects fought to design ships of battleship damage and losses in the that maximized war-fighting capability Second World War resulted from air within the treaty’s 35,000-ton restriction� attack, especially with aerial torpedoes� Stern spends significant time discussing Stern provides a fresh and highly the technical details of various designs, technical assessment of the pinnacle including the sacrifices, benefits, and https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/19 2 NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 162 5/1/18 11:11 AM McGrath and Stern: The Battleship Holiday: The Naval Treaties and Capital Ship Desig BOOK REVIEWS 163 of naval warship design� But in doing reconcile Islam and democracy� Early in so he demonstrates the futility of this his tenure Recep Erdoğan gave a speech construction� Bent on applying the at Harvard in which he quoted Thomas lessons of Jutland to ensure victory in Jefferson, praised democracy, and the next great naval battle, nations built extolled the virtues of Turkey’s eventual the ultimate dreadnoughts, only to see European Union (EU) accession� As re- them relegated to convoy protection and cent as 2011, Erdoğan delivered a speech antiaircraft duty, untested in the fleet in Cairo that emphasized democracy actions for which they were designed� and secularism as qualities intrinsic to While America, Britain, France, and Turkey � Yes, things can change in a hurry Italy continued to operate battleships in the Middle East, but why and how after the Second World War, the design did the esteem in which Turkey was held and construction costs of battleships around the world recede so quickly? proved exorbitant in relation to their The author provides an engaging utility in the era of the aircraft carrier� picture of all the factors at play, many of JAMES P� MCGRATH which are rooted in domestic politics� He traces Turkey’s history since World War II, focusing particularly on the period since the Gezi Park protests in 2013� Turkey has banned consumption Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled
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