Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific

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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Paciﬁc David C. Gompert C O R P O R A T I O N NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific David C. Gompert Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gompert, David C. Sea power and American interests in the western Pacific / David C. Gompert ; foreword by James Dobbins. pages cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-7890-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Sea power—Pacific Area. 2. Sea power—China. 3. Sea power—United States. 4. China—Strategic aspects. 5. United States—Relations—China. 6. China— Relations—United States. 7. Geopolitics—China. 8. Naval strategy. I. Title. V25.G65 2012 359'.030916—dc23 2013010138 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo: USS Connecticut (BB-18) running speed trials off the Maine coast, 1906. Photographed by Enrique Muller. U.S. Naval Historical Foundation photograph. © Copyright 2013 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2013 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Foreword by James Dobbins Referring to how “those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world,” Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan both described Britain’s successful blockade of Napoleonic France and sought thereby to persuade Americans that their own nation’s manifest destiny should not stop at the water’s edge. Mahan’s massively popular The Influence of Sea Power upon History was signally successful in so doing, becoming part of the intellectual backdrop to America’s acquisition of Caribbean and Far Eastern colonies and the construction of a world-class battle fleet. Unfortunately, Mahan’s thesis also impressed many influen- tial Germans and Japanese. Their aspirations were dashed at Jutland and Midway. The last of these battles gave the United States unchal- lenged mastery of the world’s oceans, a position it continues to occupy 70 years later. Today, China is emerging as a potential competitor. In this volume, David Gompert asks what these earlier contests can tell us about that which is now on the horizon. History teaches many lessons. The difficulty is picking the right one. Well aware of this, David offers herein reflections on three encounters between rising and declining sea powers. Two of these ended in war, that between Germany and the United Kingdom in 1914 and between Japan and the United States in 1941. The third, that between the United Kingdom and the United States, led to a gradual and largely amicable transfer of first regional and then global predominance from one navy to the other. None of these outcomes is particularly appealing, as David Gompert’s analysis makes clear. Must America ultimately fight for iii iv Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific or cede its naval primacy? If one projects recent Chinese and Ameri- can economic growth rates several decades into the future, it becomes hard to envisage how one outcome or the other can be avoided. How long would an otherwise preeminent China be content to see a smaller, poorer, less powerful rival dominate the world’s sea-lanes? How long would an otherwise weaker America wish to guard global trade routes for China’s trade at America’s expense? These are the questions with which this important study grapples. Of course, China may not continue growing faster than America. After all, Japan did not. Even if China does, will it inevitably choose to challenge America’s maritime superiority? Maritime competition between the United States and China is already being shaped by new cyber, space, and other technologies of which Admirals Nelson, von Tirpitz, and Yamamoto never dreamed. The geo-political and geo-economic environment in which this competition is waged has also evolved. Never in human history have the benefits of peace, in terms of rapidly improving material well-being, been so great, nor the consequences of war, in terms of nuclear devas- tation, been so catastrophic. As a result, interstate conflict has become exceedingly rare. Indeed, no two major powers have gone to war with each other in more than half a century. Great nations still compete for power, influence, and wealth, but do so upon a somewhat differ- ent set of assumptions about the risks of conflict and the rewards of cooperation. For these reasons, it would be imprudent to assume that Sino- American naval rivalry must end like any of those cited in this volume. It would be equally imprudent, however, to assume otherwise, as this study makes clear. The past may not chart the future, but it’s the only map we have. Maritime competition with China will almost certainly increase over the coming years. At the very least, China will challenge American dominance of the seas immediately adjacent to it. David Gompert illuminates herein the prospects for that contest in the light of current and future capabilities, existing American and Chinese strat- egies, and the prior experience of such great-power rivalries. Preface The idea for this book originated during research done by the author and Phil Saunders of the National Defense University on the mutual strategic vulnerabilities of China and the United States. That work, which culminated in The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability (National Defense University Press, 2012), proposed measures the two powers could take to reduce the dan- gers of conflict in the nuclear, anti-satellite, and cyber-war domains. But it left dangling one problem, arguably as important: the maritime domain—in particular, the looming competition and potential con- frontation between Chinese and American sea power in the Western Pacific and adjacent seas. Just as that region has entered a period of change, owing to China’s expanding power, so is the nature of sea power changing. As a consequence, great uncertainty surrounds the question of who will control these vital waters—a question of importance for the United States, China, the rest of the region, and the world. With global economic integration, reliance on sea-borne trade and sea-based resources is growing. So is interest in cooperative maritime security, an idea advanced by the world’s leading naval power, the United States. At the same time, technology is increasing the vulnerability of naval vessels and shipping on the oceans’ surface. If the latter development means that the maritime domain may become less secure, the former development suggests an alternative to maritime competition and confronta- tion. Indeed, the rush of technology could push rivals at sea to become partners at sea instead. v vi Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific With regard to both developments, the future relationship between American and Chinese sea power—in classical terms, the “established power” and the “rising power”—is central, especially in East Asian waters. This study explores that relationship along several dimensions: theoretical, historical, economic, geo-political, and tech- nological.

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