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Lead World's Navies T-Bo- Our New Battleships and ats Lead World's Navies Vessels of the North Carolina Class When Completed Will Put United States in Ad- THE NORTH CAROLINA CLASS vance of Any Nation When Major Fighting Six Ships Length, 684 feet; beam, 105 fei Craft tonnage, 43,200 Are Considered Submarines COST, $22,000,000 EACH Under Construction Completely Over- Arrow points 10 heavily armored funnel. shadow Famous Deutschland in Size and Speed, Besides Possessing Latest Man els in Mechanical Equipment EREWITH is another chapter in the series describing the expansion JLJlff f the United States Navy. Previous chapters have described the forty knot battle cruiser, to cost $23fl00fi00 ; the mammoth dirigible R-3- 8, and the remrakable new flying boat, G B-- l. A recently published cable article, from our Berlin correspoundent, describing a new German in- vention by means of which submarines of 10,000 tons and capable of sup- porting armor may be possible. The announcement of this invention has a di(ct bearing upon the submarine programmes of the nations. The fol- lowing article and the accompanying illustration tell just where the United States stands in this respect. The article also makes public the details of six battle ships of the North Carolina class, which are to cost $22000,000) each. WASHINGTON. T). c.. Saturday. neer, Thomas Doughty, constructed a pert-scop- e first of the new fleet submarines from a piece of three inch steam pipe for the United States and bits of looking glass, by means of which THE building was to Navy, which are the most the warship's commander able look biggest, over the high banks of the river and re- Improved craft of their kind now actually NEW STATES SUBMARINE! pulse an attack by 3.000 Confederates by under construction in the world, are called THE UNITED fire from the monitor's 11 inch guns, di- the T type, probably because a use had been Twelve Ships Length, 300 feet; beam, 27 rected through fhe periscope. So crude was the periscope, however, that foun previously for other letters of the feel; tonnage, about 2,000 as late as 1900 John P. Holland refused to alphabet. Three other fleet submarines now EACH pdopt it for his submarines. To the Ger- building at the Portsmouth Navy Yard and COST, $5,000,000 mans belongs the credit for bringing it to six for which now considera- its present efficiency. The three periscopes bids are under on the new will be American undersea boats will tion known as the enable them to keep a lookout in all direc- Though the new vessels contain many tions at once and will also provide "spares" noel features of design, the most striking in case one should be damaged. advance with to their construction The first were equipped with only regard one periscope, until, after the sinking of Is their speed and great cruising radius. the 5, the Germans began putting more Nearly 100 .feet longer than the best types on their vessels. During the early stages of German they are swift enough of the war the U-1- 5 attacked a British of squadron, but revealed herself by the wake to keep up with the main body the fleet, of her periscope, and a well aimed shot from and their huge oil tanks give them a cruising the cruiser Birmingham smashed the pro- radius equal to that of the most modern truding "eye." The U-1- 5 dived blindly to have a of 300 feet, safety. A few moments later she attempted battleship. They length a quick "porpoise dive" up to the surface a beam of 27 feet and a tonnage of about and down again in an effort to locate her 1. 000 tons (not official). They will carry 100 enemy. This time the Birmingham gave nen. her a broadside and a shell tore a great hole her deck. In speaking of the "most modern battle- through ship, '" It may fittingly be said that the United Scope of the Submarine's Work Gtates now has under construction six craft Shows Gain and Is Still Growing which, when completed, will be superior to Owing to the comparative recency of the any ship of their type afloat. They are the development of the oceangoing submarine, six battleships of the North Carolina class, longer and of nearly on thousand tons a careful study of all existing types of for- as to provide for a radiu3 of action or the gasolene motor are that it gives more particularly of a type of sufficient speed and authorized under the greater displacement than the Deutschland eign craft. approximately 10,000 miles, the vessel being power, uses a cheaper grade of fuel and is cruising radius to accompany the fleet, a building programme arc also The system of tactics had not been of 1916. but several knots faster. propelling machinery for surface entirely during that time. much less dangerous. Three out of every yet completely The operations consists of two main Diesel en- Though an American built the first prac- four strokes of the piston of a gasolene worked out. The original function of the present programme contemplates was tor- Battleship Still the Fleet's Backbone. twelve fleet submarines, three to be known gines, located in the after part of the hull, tical submarine and Americans have been motor waste power instead of producing it, submarine to serve as a "daylight as and nine a -- ooats. The first driving directly on the main shafts, and two foremost in its development, the Diesel en- while the Diesel is a two cycle engine, gain- pedo boat:" that is. to accomplish in broad In Opinion of U. S. Naval Experts in the forward of the which made the modern, ocean- on second stroke. daylight that which surface torpedo boats three ere being built by tt Electric Boat auxiliary engines part gine, possible ing jiower every were Though Secretary Daniels and his advisers of New York ant tV.ree of the boat, driving electric generators, which in type of submersible, is the invention Three of the latest expected to do under cover of darkness, Company to going periscopes improved fog or to close to an agree that the submarine proved in the world are being built by cne United States turn supply electric current two main of a German. The German Navy refused to pattern will form part of the equipment of smoke, namely, creep motors, one on each main shaft. the submarine so as there was fleet each vessel will enemy and launch a torpedo unobserved. war that it has a field in nazal warfare Government nt the Portsmouth Navy Yard, adopt long the submarines, and With the work having been started on them early in When operating submerged the vessel will only gasolene to propel it on the surface. be provided with the latest type of radio development of greater speed, which can be filled no other character of U-- l, armament of by 1920. August bis were opened for the bo propelled by the two main electric motors, The forerunner of the long line of telegraph outfit, both for surface and sub- and range action, however, the ship and are convinced that the American now current which was the of the seas work. The idea of the scope of their operations has heen broadened. remaining six, and these bids arc under taking from a powerful storage scourge merged periscope to Navy cannot afford to be without an ade- consideration. Th are to battery. It is estimated that the surface during the early part of the war. was not dates from the middle of the nineteenth cen- Owing their low visibility they are now ships expected ex- of on quate number of the most cost in the neighborhood of $5,000,000 each. speed under full power will exceed twenty launched until 1906. after Dr. Diesel had got tury, when French and Dutch inventors becoming utility in night attacks the improved types, his motor condi- them. the civil surface, though are useless for under still believe the is The designs for all the fleet submarines knots an hour and that nearly half that into practicable working perimented with During they they that battleship the D. W will be in con- tion. war, when the monitor Osage had run water attack after nightfall because tho backbone of were prepared by Admiral Taylor, speed attainable submerged - the fleet. chief constructor of the navy, who has made dition. The fuel capacity of the ship is such The advantages of the Diesel engine over aground in the Red River, her chief engi- periscope is practically blind nt night. The battleship North Carolina and her The increase in the number of torpedo five will be 6S4 105 tubes and the greater power of torpedoes sister ships feet long, with beam carried, together the larger giin power, feet and will have a displacement of has also tended to increase their utility in 43,200 tons. Her speed will be twenty-thre- e engagements with surface. ships. knots an hour and she will have an arma- ritish Clash Over of Var Craft The fleet submarines of the United States Types never a can be built Navy carry guns, which are larger ment of twelve and sixteen Washington. ExpertsI). C. Saturday. proved weapon. Ships guns those view of decision to pro- to resist this by no means effectively directed than ordinarily placed on submarines, guns. The contract price for the hull the American the British said to a Vice-Admir- al weapon." though navy is have and of each of ceed with a naval pro- ot machinery these giant craft IX giant building Sir Scott Holds War Rear Admiral Sir S.
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