Contents 1. Joint Communications for Enabling Conventional Kinetic Operations Maj Gen C Mani and Lt Col Vikrant Sharma 11 2. Emerging Platforms for Control in Joint Networks Harpreet Singh 24 3. Conflict in the Instantaneous Age Brig Ashish Chhibbar and Brig Vivek Verma 29 4. Achieving Synergies in Defence Forces Through Network Centric Warfare System Deepika Gupta, Rupesh Rawat, Devesh Mishra and Nitin Gera 40 5. Collaborative Defence R&D: Indian and International Perspective Gopal Bhushan and M Madhusudan 48 6. Systems Approach Imperatives for Designing the Unified Secure & Resilient Digital Communication Infrastructure to Empower the Joint Operations N Kishor Narang 58 7. Spectrum Management for Tactical Battle Field Networks Brig Navjot Singh 75 8. Reorganisation of Indian Spectrum Administrator Maj Gen LB Chand, VSM (Retd) 80 9. Cyber and Electronic Warfare: Technology Enablers and Challenges Maj Akhilesh Singh 96 10. Tri Services Training in Joint Environment Col Deven Makhija 105 11. Computational and Correlational Data Analytics for Increased Military Effectiveness Brig A Shridhar 112 12. The Role of SDR as an Enabler in Joint Operations Col Rohit Nandan Prasad 117 13. Threatscape Segmentation: Network Invigilation for Realizing Vulnerable Assets using Neural Analytics (NIRVANA) to Mitigate Zero Day Attacks Lt Col Vivek Bardia, Lt Col Gaurav Upadhyay, Lt Col Raja Vijit, Lt Col Akshay Sati and Lt Col Yogesh Sati 123 14. SATCOM—Last Mile Secure Connectivity to Difficult Terrains of Tactical Battle Area MR Sujimol, Anita Panday and K Shahana 132 15. Mobile Communications using Modified 4G LTE and Futuristic 5G for Joint Operational Environment Col A Oberoi 139 9 Contents Vol. 4 No. 1 2019 16. Developing Synergy and Jointness in Cognitive and Social Domains Col K Pradeep Bhat (Retd) 151 17. A Framework for Implementation of Smart Documents for Armed Forces Maj Kunal Pal and Dr CRS Kumar 155 18. Technology for Standardization of Sensor Data from Legacy Heterogeneous Sensors in Tactical Surveillance Application for Joint Operations Vandana, Sanjay Motia, Pradeep and Anoop Kumar Rai 169 19. Private LTE Networks for Defence Critical Communications and Digital Defence 4.0 Philippe Agard, Public Safety and Defence Segment Leader 179 20. Communication as a Decisive Catalyst for Jointness Lt Col Prabhmeet Singh Manik, SM 186 21. Machine Type Communication & Internet of Everything (IoE) Col Rajesh Kapoor 193 22. Joint Framework for Integrating Disparate Security Solutions Col Munish Tuli and Lt Col Aashish Joon 197 23. Joint Enterprise Cloud for Armed Forces Lt Col Sumit Gupta, SM 202 24. Unified Cyber Security Risk Management Framework for Enhancing Jointness of Operations Lt Col Sudipto Roy 208 25. Enhancing Cyber Security Posture by Leveraging Technologies Like Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Block Chain Technologies Lt Col Apurva Bhatnagar 219 26. Practical Solution for Secure Network in a Quantum Computing ERA Anindita Banerjee and M T Karunakaran 232 27. Future of Cryptography: Quantum Key Distribution through Micro-Satellites Col Kapil Jaiswal 247 28. High Performance Network Forensics and Anomaly Detection on Commodity Hardware Kunal Sadalkar, M Hemavathy and M Akila 256 29. HR Strategies in Support of Joint ICT Structures Brig Ramesh Balan 261 30. Utilizing Decentralized Technology for HRM Advancement Avnish Singh Jat, Rajkumar Pandey and Akshay Singh 268 10 : A Journal on Defence Information and Communication Technology Vol. 4 No. 1 2019 Joint Communications for Enabling Conventional Kinetic Operations Maj Gen C Mani and Lt Col Vikrant Sharma Abstract—As the armed forces strive to modernise, paucity of resources will necessitate optimising through first deciding on the capability needed to be achieved to meet the threat environment. Capability based planning will need to supplement and eventually supplant the current threat based planning paradigm. The acquisition of a network centric warfare capability that seamlessly integrates the sensor-decision maker- shooter grid must therefore be a national priority. Relevant scenarios for joint operation/mission range from low intensity operations, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Operations to high-intensity combat operations like Amphibious operations, Air Land Operations (ALO) / Battle, Air Transport Operations, partMaritime in operations Air Operations coordinate (MAO) all etc activities against broadacross spectrum all instruments of adversaries of power ranging from fromthe earliest organised stages militaries of the to belligerent regional powers to violent extremist organizations. It is important that services/ agencies taking preparatory build up and planning process. 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1.2 1.1 General This decision is expected to give an impetus 1.1.1 serviceespecially cooperation to jointness is andweak integration and efforts among for Warfare at the national level consists armed forces. The existing structure for cross- of coordination, orchestration and in duplication of efforts, wastage of resources synchronisation demanding complete jointmanship are proceeding slowly, resulting 1.1.3and delay in decision making. integration of all elements of national power. world, where civilian control over the armed Modern warfare calls for simultaneous In most of the advanced democracies in the and seamless application of all elements of a single point military advisor to the highest warfare, kinetic or otherwise, synergising the politicalforces is decisioncompletely making established, entity ofthe the role state of capabilities and resources of the three services. is institutionalised. Peace loving India has NewAll five and domains emerging – land, concepts, air, sea, technologies space and cyber and succumbed to the realities of its extremely space are to be exploited with maximum effect. volatile neighbourhood and the political hierarchy has finally approved appointment techniques must also be employed to use force of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the three cohesively and in an orchestrated manner. coordination,services. The ideaeconomical to have usea CDS of isresources essential and for Joint planning & application, joint training, defence reforms, jointness, multi-disciplinary joint doctrines, compatibility in equipment & procedures and last but not the least joint standardised procurement. 11 communication is a prerequisite. : A Journal on Defence Information and Communication Technology Vol. 4 No. 1 2019 1.1.4 again proven their mettle in military as well Next step required to make CDS effective is as non-military actions in local, regional and creation of Integrated & Joint Commands. multi-lateral operations and exercises. The Theatre commands are the key to transforming Indian Army had covered itself with glory the armed forces as joint forces. Same name, Kennedyduring World was quiteWar-II, right but whencould henot stated repeat that its same regions but different HQ leads to performance in 1962. Galbraith in his letter to diverging strategies. This prevents jointness and seamless performance in times of conflict Indian tactics had not evolved from World War- or war. Without Integrated or Joint Commands II and was ineffective against a China steeped ofthe commands services would will notfurther be able lead to transformto creation into of in guerrilla warfare. The Chinese had perfected a single, war fighting machine. Theaterisation the art of guerrilla warfare after fighting with the Kuo-Min-Tang for 22 long years. The Indians a HQ with joint communications, intelligence, performed exceedingly well when facing frontal 1.2surveillance Aim and air defence systems. attacks as at Bum La, Nuranang, Gurung Hill or Rezang La. The lack of high angle artillery 1.2.1 weapons affected the quality of fire support. openAmmunition or landed which in gorgeshad to andbe resuppliedcrevices from by air using reusable parachutes mostly failed to To establish the requirement of joint communication as an enabler for conduct of where they were almost impossible to recover. joint operations. 1.3 Scope mostThe Chinesecritical factor on the was other the lack hand of offensive were well air equipped with howitzers and mortars. The 1.3.1 all the advantages for employment of air was support. Keeping the IAF out of the war when overwhelming qualitative and quantitative This paper has been laid out in the following forceheld bysuperiority India was andill considered. the quantum However, difference the parts:- in infrastructure development on the two sides (a) Part-I: The Indian Experience of Inter Services Cooperation. (b) Part-II: Communication Planning For 2.2could have had only one result. Joint Operations. (c) Part-III: Barriers To Joint Communication. In 1965, suboptimal utilization of air assets reflected the lack of joint planning and the (d) Part-IV: Way Ahead- Integrated Management ineffectiveness of joint organisations for tactical Communication & Communication air support on the battlefield. Indian air support 2. PART - I : THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE first arrived at 5.30 PM on 01 Sep almost 12 OF INTER SERVICES COOPERATION hours after it was demanded by the Chhamb Brigade Commander, by when it was impossible 2.1 to distinguish friend from foe. The demand for air support was itself inexplicably delayed. Ideally, air support should have been available The Indian Armed Forces have time and 12 Vol. 4 No. 1 2019 Joint Communications for Enabling Conventional Kinetic Operations at dawn, since the attack had commenced at Jaisalmer air base. Better force application