ISSN 1392-1126. PROBLEMOS 2015 88

ARGUMENTATION, R. PAVILIONIS’S MEANING CONTINUUM AND THE *

Elena Lisanyuk St. Petersburg State University Mendeleevskaya liniya 5 199034 St Petersburg, Russia E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract. In this paper, I propose a logical-cognitive approach to argumentation and advocate an idea that argumentation presupposes that intelligent agents engaged in it are cognitively diverse. My approach to argumentation allows drawing distinctions between justification, conviction and persuasion as its different kinds. In justification agents seek to verify weak or strong coherency of an agent’s position in a dialogue. In conviction they argue to modify their partner’s position by means of demonstrating weak or strong cogency of their positions before a ‘rational judge’. My approach to argumentation employs a ‘light’ version of Dung’s abstract argumentative frameworks. It is based on Stich’s idea of agents’ cognitive diversity the epistemic aspect of which is argued to be close to Pavilionis’s conception of meaning continuum. To illustrate my contributions I use an example based on the Kitchen Debate (1959) between Khrushchev and Nixon. Keywords: abstract argumentation frameworks, cognitive diversity, Pavilionis’s meaning continuum, the Kitchen Debate

Introduction1 tinuum, and the Kitchen Debate. One of the narratives depicts how the four issues are This paper has four focal issues and sug- combined together conceptually; the other gests two narratives in which these issues narrative is rhetorical and it tells how this may be shaped into a storyline. The focal paper is organized. The conceptual narrative issues are the formalized logical-cognitive expresses my key idea: verifying the coher- theory of argumentation which was pro- ency and the cogency of agent’s position posed in my other works (Lisanyuk 2013, in a dialogue is a core cognitive objective Lisanyuk 2014a)2 and is based on the idea of argumentation, where agents’ cognitive of agents’ cognitive diversity, Rolandas diversity provides a firm ground for these Pavilionis’s conception of meaning con- objectives to be successfully achieved. Re- garding agents’ knowledge and beliefs, the * The support from the Russian Foundation for Hu- idea of agents’ cognitive diversity amounts manities (project # 14-03-0650) is kindly appreciated. 1 I am grateful to D. Cohnitz, D. Tiskin and es- to two aspects: epistemic and epistemologi- pecially to my anonymous reviewers for their helpful cal. The two aspects taken together provide comments to the earlier versions of this paper. the necessary conditions for the agents 2 For a concise presentation see van Eemeren et al. 2014: 739–746. to achieve their cognitive objectives in a

95 dialogue. The epistemic aspect makes the The conceptual narrative evolves in the agents realize the need of argumentation of following way. As a conceptual foundation a definite kind in order to get to know what for the formalized logical-cognitive theory arguments are acceptable or admissible of argumentation, the cognitive approach for some or all agents in the dialogue. The to argumentation is based on a broadly epistemological aspect helps them to iden- understood idea of cognitive diversity of tify the reasons why these arguments are so agents launched by Stich and his followers evaluated in this dialogue. There is another (Weinberg et al. 2001). Pavilionis’s con- angle from which the epistemological as- ception, if taken not in the perspective of pect can serve as a necessary condition for its primary linguistic or semantic aspects, agents’ engagement into the argumentation but rather in the aspect of their pragmatic dialogues. It has to do with the ways agents, and logical implications, may be seen as whenever they agree on the procedures of an independent repercussion of the idea justifying or convincing in the dialogue in of cognitive diversity. According to the which they are participating, can benefit logical-cognitive theory of argumentation, from the disagreement between them with the key objective of argumentation dialogue respect to achieving their cognitive goals. amounts to the issue of whether an agent’s Example of the Kitchen Debate, apart from position is defensible against other agents’ being an illustration for the technical part of critical arguments to it. In the formalized the paper, demonstrates that rational agents theory of argumentation, the notion of are able to pursue their cognitive goals agent’s defended position is defined on the regardless of their emotional and psycho- basis of a “light” version of Dung’s abstract logical benevolence to each other given the argumentation framework (Dung 1995) epistemic diversity in their beliefs and the with respect to two kinds of argumentation, epistemological diversity of acquiring them, justification and conviction. In a justifica- to which such procedures belong. tion dialogue, agents seek to determine if The paper proposes two minor contri- the set of arguments expressing her position butions to the discussion of Pavilionis’s in the dialogue can be defended either from legacy. The incorporation of Pavilionis’s the inside (weakly coherent), or from the conception of meaning continuum into the outside (strongly coherent). In a conviction context of the cognitive diversity explic- dialogue, weak and strong cogency of the itly supports the idea expressed by Dagys agent’s position argument set are at stake, (2014) that matching this conception to for these notions represent the extension the analytic tradition in philosophy is not to which the agents’ positions are (weakly that obvious as it may be prompted by or strongly) convictive and are capable of the clearly analytical discourse in which being admitted by other agents. The no- Pavilionis develops it. Another impact of tions of coherency and cogency are based the incorporation suggests a perspective on the credulous and the sceptical modes in which a reply to the second question of defeasible semantics respectively. An (of ‘the lack of discussion of the epistemic example of conviction dialogue based on aspects of meaning’) of Gilaitis (2014: 37) the Kitchen debate (1959) between Richard may be found. Nixon and illustrates

96 how sharp confrontation of the opponents paign against John Kennedy (Nixon 1990). in argumentation dialogue employs both the However, the debate about the values also idea of cognitive diversity and the notions left an impression that Nixon had been hop- of coherency and cogency of an agent’s ing to win it by means of a contest includ- position. ing military weapons competition as well, The paper is designed as follows. I start something that might have been read as a with a brief story of Kitchen debate and message of unsafety and thus could have present an example of dialogue based on been one of the reasons of Nixon’s defeat it. In section 2 I give a concise overview of to Kennedy, who, in contrast, looked as a my tripartite distinction of kinds of argu- “soft touch” (Safire 2009). mentation. Section 3 suggests an outline of In the , the impact of the the idea of agents’ cognitive diversity and Kitchen Debate was also diverse. On the transfers its epistemic aspect to Pavilionis’s one hand, the very fact of live debate be- conception of meaning continuum, which tween the leaders of the two confronting is then discussed in Section 4. In Section countries was one of the repercussions of 5 the example of conviction dialogue is “Khrushchev thaw” during which the ideo- analyzed on the basis of my formalized logical atmosphere became less suffocative. logical-cognitive theory of argumentation. Since the discussion touched many issues of family household, it helped to pave the 1. The Kitchen Debate: way to several significant developments in How It Happened. the Soviet economy indicating a consumer turn, such as mass production of television In 1959 the then US Vice-President Nixon sets, house refrigerators, washing machines, opened the American National Exhibition etc. It also boosted the mass construction in Moscow as a part of his official visit of the low-cost apartment housing called to the USSR. At one of the exhibition’s “khrushchevki’”, which had been launched showpieces – a fully equipped modern about a decade before it. On the other hand, kitchen – the famous Kitchen Debate in 1961-2 the world saw the sudden erec- between him and the then Soviet leader tion of the Berlin Wall and the deployment Khrushchev has started. The debate among of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the events the two has continued in a television studio which some experts tend to interpret as an and later its record was broadcast both in the implication of Khrushchev’s wrong evalua- USA and in the USSR. In the home coun- tion of both Nixon’s readiness for a missile tries of the discussants, the assessments of shirtfront clearly articulated in the Kitchen the political impact of the Kitchen Debate Debate and Kennedy’s adherence to the idea were controversial. of diplomatic negotiations. Khrushchev’s Some experts pointed that the US spec- subsequent decisions directed towards the tators had been presented with Nixon’s discharge in the Cuban missile crisis were strong willingness to advocate capitalist regarded by many in the Soviet political values against the communist ones, the idea elite as surrender to the US initiative, which that very likely would have earned him yet eventually led to his removal from the office more votes in his 1960 presidential cam- (Fursenko and Naftali 1998).

97 Anyhow, before the Cuban missile cri- collaborate in a dialogue with other agents sis, the Kitchen Debate, in which neither for the sake of making her own cognitive of the discussants succeeded in convincing objective feasible regardless of her personal the other, nor did they show up themselves emotional or psychological evaluation of as seeking for some strategic compromise, the dialogue partners, provided that each of highlighted the possibility of a nuclear con- the partners realizes two key issues, neces- frontation between the USSR and the USA. sary and sufficient: (i) that the other agent However, at the same time it gave a clue possesses definite knowledge or beliefs for overcoming it by means of cooperation which are different from those of her own; between the two countries. The opponents’ (ii) that her cognitive task may not be ac- explicitly tough rhetoric seems to have complished without acquiring some of the made the idea of the two countries’ com- other agent’s knowledge or beliefs. The key issue of the Debate was the petitive collaboration yet clearer, though question which of the two political and perhaps not to the discussants themselves, economic systems is better, American or but rather to their audience, who may be Soviet. Khrushchev argued that progress regarded a ‘rational judge’ of the debate. in science and technology, manifest in the Had the need of a dialogue cooperation USSR, provides Soviet people with better not been recognized by both parties of the opportunities, which is the main reason Kitchen Debate, neither of them could have why not only the Soviet people but also benefited from this unique opportunity many people in other countries support to advertise his country and his system communist ideas. Nixon countered to this of values in the opponent’s country and that in the USA the impact of new tech- worldwide, to advance the evidence in their nologies implementation in the consumer favour and thus to contribute significantly to production as well as the average level of the support of his position. This is the reason living are higher than in the Soviet Union, why I have picked the Kitchen Debate as an “for Americans can afford private housing, example illustrating two significant aspects sophisticated household equipment and lots of argumentation as cognizing activity. On of other goods – something that Soviets the one hand, it demonstrates that argumen- had never even heard of, and because of tation is an intentional and purpose-oriented that people rather are afraid of communists 3 activity of cognitive, or intelligent, agents than support the communism”. The fol- who perceive each other to be carriers of lowing dialogue is based on the transcript distinct knowledge and beliefs. On the other of the Kitchen Debate and is meant to be hand, it suggests that, for the effectiveness an example of an argumentative dialogue of the dialogue cooperation, it is irrelevant between two parties. Here I will preserve the name of the Kitchen Debate to refer to my whether dialogue participants are well- or example, which otherwise is neither a re- ill-disposed to each other, and what really construction of the real debate nor pretends matters is that they thoroughly employ their to be an analysis of the discussion between cognitive and communicative competences Nixon and Khrushchev. The names of the and supply their positions with sound argu- ments organized in a certain way. To put 3 Cf. a transcript (http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/de- it in other words, an intelligent agent can fault/files/document_conversions/16/1959-07-24.pdf).

98 two discussants will be employed as the suing only one of those, namely, whenever names for the respective intelligent agents they engage themselves in a dialogue in in the example. order to advance their position concerning Khrushchev (K): The Soviet political and some issue, provide evidence in its favour economic system is the best (K1), for this is with the help of arguments or criticize demonstrated by its progress in the standard the positions of their dialogue partners by of living (K2) and its high output in science means of counter-arguments. This is what and technology (K3). It enjoys high support we normally call argumentation. in many counties outside the USSR (K5). There are two trends in contemporary Nixon (N): The American system is bet- argumentation research that can be called ter than the Soviet one (N1), because Ameri- dialectical and formal. Analysts belonging cans have more money and we live better than to the dialectical trend pursue social, com- the Soviets (N2). We eat meat, and you eat municative and pragma-linguistic aspects cabbage (N3). Average Americans can afford private housing, sophisticated household of argumentation. They treat argumentation equipment and lots of other goods – some- either as a dialogue activity of a special kind thing that the Soviets had never even heard (Walton 2006), as a specific intellectual ac- of (N4), for instance, color television sets tivity in the form of a dialogue (Blair 2012), or such kitchen (N5), and this is the reason or as a speech activity aiming to convince or why the Soviets and lots of people outside the persuade (van Eemeren et al. 2014). These USSR are rather afraid of communists than three approaches – the dialectical, the one they support communism (N6). connected to informal logic and critical Khrushchev (K): Well, we also don’t kill thinking, and the pragma-dialectical – are flies with our nostrils(K4) . The USSR exists the most influential in the dialectical trend for less than one century, whereas the USA but they do not exhaust the whole research dates back for almost three centuries and this is the reason why many of the things landscape where a remarkable variety of Americans can afford are still unaffordable still developing conceptions deserve to for the Soviets. Right now we are working to be included into the general picture. The make all these affordable for our people, and approaches belonging to dialectical trend soon we will get not only this done, we will share the idea that investigating the ways also catch up and overtake you, Americans. in which argumentation evolves in a dia- Let’s compete and let win the system which logue provides an in-depth understanding will perform better in providing its citizens of what argumentation essentially amounts with better opportunities (K6). to. Authors who contribute to the formal trend abstract from the dialogical or speech 2. Argumentation: forms of argumentation and instead focus Two Trends and Three Kinds either on its inferential aspects, both deduc- People often disagree with each other and tive (Barth and Krabbe 1992, Besnard and they make their disagreements explicit Hunter 2008) and defeasible (Baroni and through speech communication: negotia- Giacomin 2009), or on its computational tion, information seeking, education, eristic aspects (Dung 1995, Gordon et al. 2007). quarrel, etc. There are many reasons why The key idea of the formal trend is that ar- they do so, but here I confine myself to pur- gumentation is a kind of ordering imposed

99 on the arguments as its atomic or molecular the formal trend from that of analyzing the elements. In this trend, up to the last decades ways in which argumentation can be closed of the 20th century, argumentation was un- just under some consequence-like relation derstood mostly in the vein of application between the arguments and the contention of logical theories the scope of which was towards a broader look on the ways of argu- seen as modelling the arguments on their ment ordering which also presupposes the propositional level both from the inside of classical deductive orderings, though it does them and from the outside. Consequently, so whenever special rationality postulates argumentation was treated as a collection are met (Amgoud and Caminada 2007). of inference-like transitions from the ar- The two trends intersect in many ways. guments to the contention, or, to put it in First of all, they do so conceptually, for there traditional logical terms, from the premises is a permanent interchange flow between to the conclusion. Dung’s seminal idea of them when the ideas proposed in one of abstract argumentation framework opened them get developed in the other (Krabbe and a perspective of modelling argumentation Walton 1995, Woods 2004). Another meet- as a framework in which arguments were ing point is historical, for they both rely on understood as entities unanalyzed from the similar historical background which dates inside that were ordered and reordered from back to Plato’s dialectical disputations, the outside in certain ways that resulted Aristotle’s logic and topics, ancient Greek in identifying of definite argument sets and Roman rhetoric, and Euclidean math- exhibiting different formal properties. The ematics. Last, but not least, there is also a semantic counterpart of Dung’s formalism practical aspect of this interrelationship, for is construed by means of the argumenta- there are authors contributing to both trends. tion framework’s set-theoretical extensions Argumentation is social and intellectual based on the definite kinds of ordering of activity of intelligent agents, which is aimed the argument sets which correspond to the at verifying coherency or cogency of agents’ different notions expressing the idea of how positions put forward in a dialogue. The an argument set can be defined as defended tasks of verifying coherency and cogency of against the attacks of the counterarguments. agents’ positions may be described as epis- Abstract argumentation frameworks were temological, since in argumentation agents designed to model how rational agents can focus their efforts on three key objectives, modify their positions by amending them each of which can be called epistemologi- with new arguments in order to make their cal, though in a different way: positions resistant to the attacks. Dung (1) to justify (the coherency of) an called such modifications extensions, and agent’s positions, including doing so he distinguished stable, preferred, complete with respect to counter-arguments; and grounded extensions, or ordered subsets (2) to convince the dialogue partner, of the argument sets, depending on two is- which amounts to verifying (the sues: on the kind of the semantics employed, cogency of) agents’ positions before sceptical or credulous; and on the type of a ‘rational judge’; argument ordering imposed in the set of (3) to persuade the dialogue partner arguments added to the initial set. Dung’s to act in a certain way by means of approach expanded the research focus of adopting a definite line of behaviour.

100 I will call the kinds of argumentation, arguments in the argumentation framework. in which agents pursue these goals justifi- Clearly, the sceptical mode of evaluating ar- cation, conviction and persuasion respec- guments holds also for the credulous mode tively. Justification and conviction differ but not vice versa. Therefore, the borderline from one another in the following way. In between justification and conviction may a justification dialogue, an agent questions be drawn in two ways: structurally, or with and investigates her own position and does respect to the agent’s positions, or function- so either by means of exploring its internal ally, with respect to the “rational judge”. In coherency, or by means of defending it the first case, justification is a kind of argu- against critical arguments. In a conviction mentation in which only one position of the dialogue, an agent seeks to modify the posi- agent is at stake, whereas in conviction there tion of her dialogue partner. To this end, the are at least two positions of distinct agents agent outlines her position in such a way confronting each other. In the second case, as to demonstrate its cogency before the so only in conviction there is a need of a ‘ra- called “rational judge” – an abstraction used tional judge’, since the cogency of agents’ to describe the function of an autonomous positions may be assessed in many ways referee, whose task is to independently as- from a variety of standpoints belonging to sess arguments of the discussants. This uni- the agents involved in the dialogue, but in versal evaluation function points to the sets order to be convictive it has to be assessed of arguments, if any, which are cogent to a in a universal way which would be ac- definite extent to all agents in the dialogue. cepted by all of them. Consequently, in the The idea of defeasibility of arguments in conviction the sceptical mode seems to be the course of the argumentative dialogue, more reliable candidate for providing a firm in the vein of which Dung-style semantics semantic background in the argumentation is construed, suggests that the agents can framework than the credulous mode, which evaluate someone’s beliefs in two ways: provides the same for the justification. Jus- credulously or sceptically. Regarding their tification and conviction, on the one hand, own beliefs, I assume that the agents argue and persuasion, on the other, are distinct in the credulous mode and they try to defend with respect to their objectives which are at their positions in the dialogue by justifying stake when agents argue in these dialogues. them on the basis of the maximal coherent The borderline between them amounts to subsets of their beliefs expressed by means whether the disagreement in the agents’ of the arguments belonging to the agent’s positions has to do with evaluating their position. Contrary to this, other agents’ be- beliefs which are on the agenda in justifica- liefs and the arguments expressing them in tion or conviction, or it is concerned with the dialogue are evaluated in the sceptical assessing their intentions and reasons to act mode so that the positions of other agents deliberated in persuasion dialogues. are considered defended and thus convictive In real dialogues, people seldom draw on the basis of the minimal cogent subsets sound distinctions with respect to whether of the arguments. This idea lies behind the they are intended to argue about what notion of the ‘rational judge’ function aimed values they should accept or disregard, to select the minimal defended subsets of which statements are true and which are

101 not, or which means fit better to the ends ing about what is (possibly) true and how in question. To a large extent this is due to to demonstrate this (Lisanyuk 2014b). In the fact that whatever is considered in each this paper, I will focus on justification and of these issues in one way or another has to conviction as kinds of argumentation and do with the agent’s cognitive profile, which I will not discuss persuasion, or practical can be observed in its manifold details as argumentation. well as from a variety of angles. Thus, to discriminate whether in fact discussants 3. Cognitive Diversity argue about what they believe to be the case The idea of cognitive diversity in its original or about what is vitally important or should Stich’s setting amounts to two hypotheses be done under certain circumstances means to divide the agent’s profile into two distinc- (Stich 1988) which will be called the epis- 4 tive parts: conceptual “data base”, which, temic and the epistemological aspects of it. apart from knowledge and beliefs, also The epistemic aspect proposes that agents includes value judgments, moral principles, differ in what they know or believe to be etc., and practical “data base”, which is in true, the epistemological aspect claims that many aspects connected to the first one and the ways in which they are able to assess which embraces agent’s activities, planning, their knowledge and beliefs are manifold. goals, concessions, obligations, desires The epistemic aspect suggests that agents and the like. The idea to divide agent’s may seek to cognize each other inasmuch profile into the conceptual, or theoretical, as they cognize anything else. This aspect and the practical part, responsible for the explains why an agent’s strategic decision agent’s behaviour, is far from new. It has to engage herself into an argumentation been substantially observed since antiquity dialogue aims to achieve the cognitive goal up to today and I will not go into details of acquiring information concerning the here, but just point to two issues pertaining knowledge and beliefs of other agents in especially to argumentation. The first one the dialogue. The epistemic aspect serves is the idea of cognitive diversity which as a necessary conceptual reason showing roughly amounts to saying that different why agents start arguing. The epistemo- agents possess different knowledge and logical aspect supports the decision to start beliefs. I consider it to be a repercussion of arguing by providing an efficient tool for Pavilionis’s idea of meaning continuum, evaluating the arguments in the dialogue, though perhaps in a somewhat unexpected and it amounts to the rational character of context of argumentation. The other one is the ways of expanding or modifying agent’s the idea that since it is not possible to infer beliefs advanced as the arguments. In other deductively the agent’s intention to act in words, this aspect helps agents to perform a definite way from her knowledge or be- 4 liefs, as John Searle convincingly argues Stich advances his idea of cognitive diversity in the context of cultural and ethnic variety and develops (Searle 2001), practical argumentation, mostly the epistemological aspect of it which he labels which amounts to reasoning about what as properly cognitive. Since I would like to reserve the term ‘cognitive’ for the whole of his idea, I introduce and how to do, is manifestly distinct from the term ‘epistemological’ to refer this aspect and thus theoretical consideration, which is reason- escape from confusing the whole with its part.

102 their argumentation successfully, for it says The epistemological aspect proposes that since all cognitive agents are rational that agents have different inferential and and reasonable, they are capable of means- computational abilities (van Benthem ends considerations as well as of weighing 2003), that the way they use them varies pros and cons. in ethnic or cultural communities (Wein- The epistemic aspect of the idea of cog- berg et al. 2001) and that they are unequal nitive diversity claims that there are some with respect to the effectiveness of their propositions which are known or believed to brain activities output and regarding the be true by some agents, and at the same time capacities of their memory (Churchland there are other agents who are yet unaware and Sejnowski 1992). These observations that these propositions are in fact true, or imply that for agents the availability of the they believe, perhaps mistakenly, that these modes of belief revision and of the ways are not so. This leads us to an epistemic of knowledge is diverse (Ditmarsch et al. observation that despite the fact that only 2008). In other words, agents are not only true propositions are eligible to form up different in what they know or believe but cognitive agent’s domain of knowledge, they are also unequal in how they can get to not all true propositions are known to each know something or in how they can come cognitive agent. This trivially implies that to believe in this or that. Consequently, the agents, if they wish or need to, may inves- ways in which they acquire their knowledge tigate whether a set of propositions they and beliefs are not just contingently diverse believe to be true, are in fact so, and that but they are necessarily so. The latter state- they may undertake such investigation not ment endorses the idea that, on the one hand, only with respect of their own knowledge cognitive diversity when taken epistemo- and beliefs, but also regarding to the beliefs logically, saves argumentation studies from of other agents. the logical omniscience problem (Hintikka The epistemic aspect of the idea of 1975), and, on the other hand, it invites cognitive diversity has been studied in to investigate itself not only in cognitive agent-oriented trends of computer science research, ethnology or neuroscience, but (Shoham 1993), in the AGM belief revision also in logic by means of applying differ- trend (Alchourron et al. 1985), and in the ent logical theories to tackle the distinctive theory of conceptual space (Gårdenfors agents (Liu Fenrong 2006). 2000). These trends search for an in-depth Contemporary definitions of what intel- understanding of how knowledge and be- ligent, or cognitive, agents are originate liefs arise, change and get organized in in- either in research on artificial intelligence telligent agents or in knowledge data-bases. (AI), or in computer science (Russell et Pavilionis’s conception of the non-verbal al. 2003: 48–50). In the former, intelligent meaning continuum out of which agentive agents are kinds of software used to process belief propositions spring up and develop input information usually coming from into a system of meanings seems to explore different sources and to produce output the domain which comes very close to the results by means of accomplishing the epistemic aspect of the idea of cognitive goals, which in highly sophisticated cases diversity. may include learning or further agentive

103 activities’ planning. Since in AI intelligent istrative, as at that time he was Vice-Rector agents are assumed to be capable of ‘be- of Vilnius University, as well as his wise having’ independently or in coordination trust in my vague research outline became with other agents and are bound to do so a pledge that eventually the research would according to certain models of rational- be carried out. ity, they are often called autonomous, or The conceptual reason for considering rational agents. In the latter case intelligent Pavilionis’s conception in the framework of agents are defined in a more technical way. argumentation analysis has to do with the For computer scientists, intelligent agents idea of cognitive diversity of agents which are just data processing programs used for his conception abuts and which provides definite practical tasks such as information a substantial background for my tripartite searching, viruses or software assistance distinction of kinds of argumentation. agents. Intelligent agents of this sort may In 1970-80s Pavilionis has developed his be provided with some intelligence in a conception of meaning continuum which technical sense, which normally does not emerged out of his considerations of three go beyond their feedback capacities. In aspects of how a meaningful linguistic this paper I rely on the AI-related notion unit can be constructed, transmitted and of an intelligent agent. I also assume that analysed. Since he outlines these aspects in distinct dialogues one human being acts on the basis of thorough discussions of the as distinct intelligent agents which may ideas of generative grammar and other for- coincide by chance. malized linguistic theories, logical systems and philosophical approaches to language, I 4. Pavilionis’s Meaning Continuum will use the terms ‘linguistic’, ‘logical’ and and the Idea of Cognitive Diversity. ‘philosophical’ to refer to the corresponding There are two good reasons why I con- segments of his considerations. Pavilionis’s sider Pavilionis’s conception of meaning key idea is that continuum in the context of argumentation a subject is a carrier of a definite conceptual studies given that, as far as I know, Pavil- system, and it is him who outlines identifica- ionis himself has never shown his interest in tion as well as discrimination of the objects this area of research. One of these reasons on the basis of information about them he is personal and the other one is conceptual. possesses in the form of concepts, i.e., as A personal reason has to do with a fact pieces of knowledge or beliefs about these from my research career which makes me feel grateful and proud at the same time. It longs to the body of standard sources to be referred to in was Pavilionis with whom I was happy to research papers in philology and cognitive linguistics. discuss my devotion– quite shaky at that The database of dissertations (in Russian, from approx. 1980) http://www.dissercat.com/ gives more than 2000 time in the beginning of 1990s – to study references, most of them belong to these two research logical aspects of language use. His sup- areas and are mentions of (Pavilionis 1983) and (Pavili- port, both conceptual, him being one of onis 1986) in their references lists; less than 1% are ref- 5 erences found in dissertations on logic; approx. 20% of influential analysts in the field, and admin- 1990–2002 references provide at least a brief mention of his conception in the body of the text. In the last decade 5 In contemporary Russian academic community the number of references has decreased, with only one Pavilionis’s conception of meaning continuum still be- of the authors mentioning his conception in the text.

104 objects which he traces verbally by means determines their meaning with respect to of definite descriptions or proper names. Ac- both their truth value and their sense, and cording to this, a concept is a meaning of a since the propositions of beliefs have to be singular term which, for a definite language treated as distinct from the propositions of speaker, generates the definite object in a knowledge, the logical forms of the former universe of objects relative to the definite conceptual system, and does so not for the and of the latter should be carefully dis- meaning of a singular term in some absolute criminated from each other. Here I intend objectivist view or in the ‘semantics of lan- to consider his conception’s minor aspect guage’. Just because this meaning is relative which follows from the major. The minor to a definite conceptual system, it serves as aspect proposes an explanation of how an the criterion of object’s identification and agent’s conceptual system emerges out of this is exactly to what intensional nature of the agent’s meaning continuum. If we take meaning amounts to. (Pavilionis 1983: 166) the logical form of propositions to be a kind The linguistic aspect of his idea suggests of definite compositional ordering imposed that the fact that agents are able to transfer on either conceptual or linguistic entities their meaningful messages from one to meant to be expressed by this proposition another is grounded on two significant is- (Mikirtumov 2013), this will lead us to the sues. One of them is that agents generate conclusion that ordering within the mean- these meanings in the frameworks of their ing’s continuum plays an important role. conceptual systems which are distinct. The In a system of meanings, the ordering of other presumes that what makes this transfer different meaningful units matters not only successful is that the meanings thus gener- with respect to how the fine-grained atomic ated refer to the universal conceptual system units of meaning are organized inside the created by the two communicating agents propositions, but it also matters with respect in the dialogue. In terms of the cognitive to how the molecular propositions bearing diversity of agents this amounts to saying definite meanings are put together into a that the fact that agents possess different hard-grained conceptual system. conceptual systems is a necessary condition The minor logical aspect of Pavil- for the sound transfer of their meaningful ionis’s conception implies that transferring messages. What makes this idea represent meaningful messages between agents is the linguistic aspect of Pavilionis’s concep- necessarily based on the orderings that can tion is that the universal conceptual system and should be imposed on the continuum through which such transfer is implemented of meanings of an agent in order for it to is expressed in the language spoken by the become her conceptual system. Therefore, agents. the agent’s conceptual system can be There are two logical aspects in Pavil- viewed as a continuum of meanings which ionis’s conception of meaning continuum is organized by the agent in a certain way which may be called major and minor whenever she starts communication with with respect to the academic attention another agent. In this way, for every next given to them so far. The major aspect communication, the agent’s continuum of says that since in formal logical theories meanings gets organized anew and then the logical form of propositions normally accordingly reorganized, which implies that

105 once the agent enters a dialogue with other vanced against their position concerning agents, she construes a definite conceptual some issue. What then would enable them system as a certain subset of her continuum to do so? The epistemological aspect of the of meanings. This newly built conceptual idea of cognitive diversity, which in the subset is in two ways correlative to those form of orderings imposed on their epis- of other agents in the dialogue: formally, temic positions put forward in a dialogue for it exhibits a certain ordering of meaning provides intelligent agents with a rational which is correlative to the orderings of the pledge for this. conceptual systems put forward by other agents, and materially, since in the dialogue 5. The Kitchen Debate Analyzed agents advance their positions concerning Each of the two positions in the Kitchen a certain topic which they are going to dis- Debate consists of 6 arguments, or debate cuss. Pavilionis argued that “the linguistic moves, and together they make up an argu- units acquire their meaning and can be con- mentation framework of 12 arguments ar- strued as meaningful only in the framework ranged in a special way. Let us take a closer of a set of concepts which is characteristic look on how these arguments are related to of a person’s world view and which is cor- each other in the argumentation framework relative to what may be roughly called an of the debate. ‘objective system of beliefs’. These units of We will say that an agent has a position meaning can be comprehended as certain in an argumentation dialogue, if she has verbal or speech units and are capable of put forward a nonempty set of arguments being translated or transmitted in commu- related to each other in a certain way which nication from one person to another in no will be called a position ordering. From the other way than when they are presented as a viewpoint of logic, agentive position order- conceptual system” (Pavilionis 1983: 258). ing in argumentation is maintained by two The philosophical aspect of his concep- correlative properties of the propositions tion is prompted by its logical and linguistic included in it. It is their truth value that aspects and it has been already touched in determines the initial ordering in a set of the above discussion of the epistemic as- propositions, and the logical consequence, pect of the idea of cognitive diversity. Let which establishes what propositions should me underline it once again. The epistemic be added to the initial set or eliminated from aspect of the idea of cognitive diversity sug- it. In the face of the idea of the agents’ cog- gests that “there are significant and system- nitive diversity neither of the two properties, atic differences in the epistemic concepts, taken as they are, is eligible for being an judgements, and practices different people appropriate candidate for the way of agen- employ in evaluating cognition” (Bishop tive position ordering in argumentation dia- 2009: 114). Epistemic diversity of agents, logues, since the epistemic aspect of the idea thus understood, proposes that different questions the former and its epistemological agents not only may wish to cognize each aspect doubts the latter. This observation other, but they may also wish to investigate implies that formal logical theories based on themselves by means of critical arguments the notion of truth value and closed under a that are advanced or might have been ad- definite notion of logical consequence can-

106 not serve as formal tools for such ordering Another definition of an agent’s position in the argumentation framework. Instead, I ordering is its cogency, the notion by which propose to treat agentive position ordering I refer to a rationally determined extent to correlatively to one another in the argumen- which the agent’s position at question is tation framework. To this end, I will use capable of being accepted by other agents binary relations and employ some elements in the dialogue. The notion of cogency is of Dung-style extension semantics. based on the sceptical semantic mode. In Depending on two issues, on the way of a conviction dialogue, the agent’s position ordering imposed in the agent’s position and ordering also plays a significant role. In on the way such agent’s position ordering these dialogues the effectiveness of convic- relates to the critical arguments to it, it is tion is determined by the “rational judge” said to be coherent in a weak or in a strong function which is defined in two ways so as sense respectively. Both notions of coher- to point to weakly and strongly convictive, ency are based on the credulous semantic or cogent, sets of arguments picked out of mode. Note that in a dialogue critical argu- the positions of the discussants. A weakly ments against an agent’s position can be cogent argument set is a minimal set of advanced either by the agent herself, when- arguments capable of being defended in ever she tries to take a critical stand with the debate; a strongly cogent argument set respect to her own position, or by another is a maximal set of such arguments. Since agent. In the latter case, it is significant for argumentation in our view has to do with distinguishing between justification and verifying the coherency and the cogency of conviction that such critical moves refer agent’s position in a dialogue, it becomes to the agent’s position in question and they clear why the issue of how to identify the do not introduce another agent’s position respective kinds of orderings of agent’s into the dialogue. Therefore, a strongly position plays a crucial role. Another signifi- coherent position presupposes its ordering cant contention about the agent’s position is from the outside which is relative to the that in order to be viably presented in both counterarguments. In contrast, a weakly coherent position is defined with respect justification and conviction argumentative to its ordering from the inside, for such a dialogues any such position requires some position implies that its elements are organ- ordering imposed on it. That is to say, any ized in relation to each other in a definite such position is necessarily a certain system way. A weakly coherent position is also of arguments. able to confront counterarguments, though Let us consider our example and define it does so by means of random attacking the notions of coherency and cogency in or counterattacking them, if there are any a proper way. Khrushchev’s and Nixon’s critical moves from the outside, and not positions consist of the two sets of argu- by means of total defence against them. In ments K = {K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6} and this respect, weakly coherent and strongly N = {N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6} respectively. coherent agents’ positions show how the I will call K-set and N-set argumentative ordering imposed on them determines the sets. I also employ the term argumentative extent to which the position can be justified framework (of the debate) for the total set of in a dialogue. arguments put forward in the debate by both

107 discussants. Our Kitchen Debate example viewpoint. Observe that the debate is con- represents a finite argumentative framework stituted by two kinds of orderings: attack

AFKD, and it consists of the following which organizes all arguments in the debate 12 arguments: on the argumentative framework AFKD, and support which imposes a partial ordering in AF ⊆ {K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, N1, KD the argumentative K- and N-sets. N2, N3, N4, N5, N6} I write attack [A; B] and say that argu- Words ‘debate’, ‘discussion’ and ‘dia- ment A attacks argument B, if there exists logue’ will be used informally as synonyms a non-empty argumentation framework AF to point to a course of an argumentative to which both arguments A and B belong: dispute. A, B ∈ AF, and A is critical to B. The targets Three types of binary relations between of the attacks by means of which an ordering pairs of arguments can be observed in AF : KD on the argumentation framework AFKD is attack, a fundamental relation by means imposed give a better understanding of how of which one argument in the pair defeats K- and N-sets are criticized and defended another argument, and two derivative bi- in the debate. Given that there are two nary relations – rebuttal6 which amounts arguments such that A, B ∈ AF and attack to an attack on the attacking argument, and [A; B], and that there is an argument support which signals that arguments in C ∈ AF which in turn attacks A: attack the agent’s position are organized in such a [C; A], we say that C rebuts A. For such way as to endorse the whole of the agent’s arguments A, B, C ∈ AF, argument C is a rebuttal of attacking argument A, if and 6 The notion of rebuttal is widely used in argumen- only if attack [A; B] and attack [C; attack tation analysis and has two major ‘faces’, formal and [A; B]]. We will also say that B is defended informal. The informal account of rebuttal was perhaps best given by (Toulmin 2003). According to him, a re- within the argumentation framework AF, if buttal is just a counter-argument which is included in the and only if reasoning and is observed as a plausible default to its (i) there is attack [C; attack [A; B]]; conclusion. A rebuttal, if it eventually proves to be true, is able to defeat the conclusion. K6, counter-attacking and on N1, is an example of such rebuttal which relies on an (ii) there are no other unrebutted at- implicit premise that it is fair to compare only the sys- tacks on B within the framework tems existing within a comparable length of time. In the formal account of rebuttal, it is a kind of attack on the AF; and key contention of the reasoning, and thus it is distinct (iii) the arguments which attack C are from the other two kinds of attacks: from undercuts, or attacks on the inference rules, and from undermines, or either rebutted within the frame- attacks on the premises of the reasoning (Prakken 2012). work AF, or the set of such argu- Discriminating among the three types of rebuttal is pos- ments is empty. sible on the level of an argumentative set only, provided that the inside structure of the arguments is also taken In the Kitchen Debate there are 11 at- into account. In the argumentative framework all three tacks, 5 of which also rebut other attacks (cf. types of rebuttal appear just as the attacks on the con- Scheme 2). However, only arguments K1, tention. If we were to analyze the inner structure of the arguments, then N6, N1 and N5 would be the examples K2 and K3 are defended in it. It is natural of undercut, rebuttal and undermine respectively. Here to say that in an argumentative dialogue a I use the term ‘rebuttal’ as an umbrella name for its for- position is defended, if each of the argu- mal account, but I will not discriminate among these three kinds of rebuttal. ments belonging to it is defended against

108 K5 K1

a) K2 K3

K6 K4

N1 N3 N2 b) N4 N5

N6

Schemes 1a and 1b. Support in Khrushchev’s and Nixon’s positions

K5 K3 K2 K1

K6 K4

N6 N5 N4 N3 N2 N1

Scheme 2. Attacks in the Kitchen Debate all attacks. Consequently, an argument B is N6 is unrebutted. Secondly, since there are defended with respect to an argumentative no attacks or rebuttals with respect to K4 set S ⊆ AF, if and only if all arguments at- and K6, this implies that these cannot be tacking B in AF are rebutted. In this respect, called defended either. The second observa- neither Khrushchev’s nor Nixon’s positions tion makes Nixon’s position in the Kitchen are defended, though for different reasons. Debate also not defended, for there are no Khrushchev’s position cannot be called rebutting attacks in his position. defended in the above-mentioned sense For two arguments C, D belonging to because of the following two observations. an argumentative set S (which may in turn Firstly, despite the fact that the attacks on be a subset of an argumentative framework K1, K2, K3 are rebutted, K5 attacked by AF: S ⊆ AF) we say that C supports

109 D: support [C; D], if and only if neither set corresponds to what Dung calls a set of attack [C; D], nor attack [D; C] holds in admissible arguments (Dung 1995: 328). S. We will also say that an argumentative Such argumentative set has the preferred set S is attack-free7, if there are no such extension in the framework, if and only pairs of arguments [C, D] in it that attack if it is a maximal subset of the defended each other. Consequently, to say that an arguments in it. In this sense, neither K argumentative set S is attack-free is just nor N is strongly coherent, and there is the same as to say that all the arguments in no preferred extension in the framework. S support each other in the above-defined This also implies that neither K nor N are sense of support. This also means that in successfully justified in the strong sense in the attack-free argumentative set there are the dialogue. In other words, if Khrushchev no rebuttals, since there are no attacks, and and Nixon had advanced their K- or N-sets all its arguments support each other. in a justification dialogue composed of the Every attack-free argumentative set is moves they made in the Kitchen Debate, weakly coherent, for in such a set all the neither of the two would have succeeded arguments included in it support each other. in the strong sense. N and K are examples of weakly coherent Now let me turn to conviction. Note agent positions in the Kitchen Debate. Note that according to my approach the Kitchen that K4, K6 and N6 belong to K and N re- Debate is a conviction dialogue, though in spectively, and they can be said to support the above discussion I used certain debate K1 and N1 in our sense of support, but just moves from it to illustrate justification. Let because the content of K4, K6 and N6 may us introduce a characteristic function of a be treated as irrelevant to that of K1 and N1, ‘rational judge’ FKD within our argumenta- it is not clear if they can be considered as tive framework AFKD: supporting K1 and N1 in a traditional sense N,K N,K of how arguments are supposed to support FKD: 2 → 2 ; FKD(S) = the standpoint in argumentation. Thus, ac- = {A|A defended with respect to S}8 cording to my approach, the arguments are considered to support the standpoint in a The “rational judge’” function F picks dialogue whenever they either support or KD the defended in AF arguments out of the support, or an argument set is attack-free. argumentative sets N and K and verifies if This setting of the structure of the agent’s the argument at issue has a defence in AF position in a dialogue provides a good provided by another argument belonging perspective for analysing the fallacies of to the same argumentative set. Observe that argumentation (Lisanyuk 2008). In contrast the defended argument picked out by F to a weakly coherent argumentative set, an KD is so with respect to the argumentative set attack-free argumentative set is strongly co- to which the attacking argument belongs. herent if it is defended in the dialogue. The This implies that despite the fact the result- notion of a strongly coherent argumentative ing subset S is formed up by the defended arguments only, in practice F marks out 7 Dung’s conflict-free argumentative set [Dung KD 1995, 328] is also attack-free, though the reverse does not hold, strictly speaking, for the former has no sup- 8 I use S as a variable for pointing to a nonempty port-ordering defined in it. subset of N or K sets in AFKD.

110 the ordered pairs of arguments belonging to Conclusion the same argumentative set, and such pairs Our analysis of justification and convic- consist of the attacked and the counter- tion in terms of coherency and cogency of attacking arguments. Clearly, S is formed agents’ positions in argumentation shows up by the first members of these pairs. that there are four ways in which the or- An argumentative set S ⊆ AF is weakly derings of the positions (can be said to) cogent, if it is a minimal argumentative set contribute to how intelligent agents are defended with respect to the ‘rational judge’ function defined in AF. S isstrongly cogent, able to cognize themselves or other agents if it is a maximal set defended in this way. in argumentation. Weakly and strongly co- The notion of strongly cogent argumenta- herent positions demonstrate how a set of tive set implies that such set has a grounded arguments can be organized into a system extension in AF what means that S as the of arguments capable of being defended set of all defended arguments in AF has no against counter-arguments. The coherency proper non-trivial subset which includes evaluates the internal and the external or- all the defended arguments belonging to S. derings of an agent’s position. The cogency Such set S is the complete extension in AF, does so with respect to the position of an- if and only if it defends all arguments be- other agent, for weakly and strongly cogent argument sets maintain how agent positions longing to it in AF. It is easy to see that FKD gives several minimal non-trivial results come to be convictive before (the function including {K1}, {K2}, {K3}. Observe that of) a “rational judge”. The idea of agents’ each of their nonempty intersections is also cognitive diversity, which underlies my formalized logical-cognitive approach to weakly cogent. FKD gives only one maximal result: {K1, K2, K3}.9 Apparently, the most argumentation, suggests a broader look into convictive agent’s position is the one in epistemic, or extensional, and epistemologi- which the maximal subset of the defended cal, or intensional, disagreements between arguments is the complete extension in AF. human beings. In its extensional aspect In this respect, neither K nor N is convic- this idea echoes Pavilionis’s conception of tive. However, the notions of weak and meaning continuum. As for the practical strong cogency provide us with somewhat output of the considerations of all the three less obligatory idea of what a convincing issues, kinds of argumentation, coherency position might amount to. Neither K nor and cogency of agent positions and agents’ N is strongly cogent as well, though K is cognitive diversity, it seems evident in the weakly cogent. In terms of conviction as a Kitchen Debate example and amounts to special kind of argumentation, this means saying that intelligent agents can cognize that only three arguments in Khrushchev’s themselves and other agents in an argumen- position are in fact convictive: K1, K2, and tative dialogue regardless of their attitude K3, and this is so due to K4 and K6. to each other. The conclusion drawn by the technical analysis of the Kitchen Debate suggests that since agents are cognitively 9 Note that FKD can select the defended arguments diverse, there is always a need for a ‘rational from any argumentative set in AFKD, so that it is not necessary that all the selected arguments come from one judge’ to be maintained for the success of and the same set, as it by chance happens in AFKD. convictive argumentation between them.

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ARGUMENTACIJA, R. PAVILIONIO PRASMĖS KONTINUUMAS IR VIRTUVĖS DISKUSIJA Elena Lisaniuk

Santrauka. Straipsnyje pateikiamas loginis-kognityvinis požiūris į argumentaciją ir teigiama, kad argumentacija suponuoja, jog į ją įsitraukę protingi veikėjai pasižymi kognityvine įvairove. Autorės prieiga leidžia įvesti skirtis tarp pagrindimo, įtikinimo ir įkalbėjimo kaip skirtingų argumentacijos rūšių. Pagrindimo atveju veikėjai siekia verifikuoti savo pozicijos dialoge stiprų arba silpną koherentiškumą. Įtikinimo atveju veikėjų tikslas yra pakeisti parnerių poziciją įrodant savosios pozicijos silpną ar stiprų įtikimumą idealizuoto „racionalaus teisėjo“ akivaizdoje. Autorės prieiga pasitelkia P. M. Dungo abstrakčių argumentacinių struktūrų versiją. Ji paremta St. Sticho kognityvinės įvairovės idėja, kurios episteminis aspektas yra artimas R. Pavilionio prasmės kontinuumo koncepcijai. Dėstomas požiūris iliustruojamas pavyzdžiu, paremtu virtuvės diskusija, vykusia tarp N. Chruščiovo ir R. Niksono 1959 metais.

Pagrindiniai žodžiai: abstrakčios argumentacinės struktūros, kognityvinė įvairovė, prasmės kontinuumas, virtuvės diskusija

Įteikta 2015 m. kovo 30 d.

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