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Richard Nixon, Dtente, and the Conservative Movement, 1969-1974

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Richard Nixon, Dtente, and the Conservative Movement, 1969-1974 Richard Nixon, Détente, and the Conservative Movement, 1969-1974 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts By ERIC PATRICK GILLILAND B.A., Defiance College, 2004 2006 Wright State University iii WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES 12/13/06 I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Eric Gilliland ENTITLED Richard Nixon, Détente, and the Conservative Movement, 1969-1974 BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts. ______________________________ Jonathan Reed Winkler, PhD Thesis Advisor ______________________________ Edward F. Haas Department Chair Committee on Final Examination ________________________________ Jonathan Reed Winkler, PhD. ________________________________ Edward F. Haas, PhD. ________________________________ Kathryn B. Meyer ________________________________ Joseph F. Thomas, Jr., Ph.D. Dean, School of Graduate Studies iv ABSTRACT Gilliland, Eric Patrick. M.A., Department of History, Wright State University, 2006. Richard Nixon, Détente, and the Conservative Movement. This work examines the relationship between President Richard Nixon and the American conservative movement (1969-1974). Nixon’s anti-communist persona proved pivotal in winning the 1968 Republican Party’s and winning over the conservative base. The foreign policies orchestrated by Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, however, which sought to reduce tensions with China and the Soviet Union, infuriated the conservatives. In 1971-72, they suspended their support of the administration and even drafted their own candidate, the Ohio congressman John Ashbook, to challenge Nixon in the 1972 primary campaign. Although the Ashbrook campaign had a minimal impact, it set a precedent for conservative opposition to détente in the 1970s and 1980s. The Watergate scandal that cut Nixon’s second term short also revealed the strained relationship with the right, which decided to withdraw support of Nixon. The conservative reaction to détente also led to a convergence with neoconservatives, an alliance of anti-communist liberals, who united behind Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. The thesis argues that Nixon and the conservative developed fundamentally different approaches to diplomacy. Although both regarded communism as the gravest threat America ever faced, they disagreed on the proper means to deal with the threat. Nixon realist outlook on world affairs allowed the United States to make substantial v progress in relations with China and the Soviet Union, on the belief that all sides had mutual interests. Conservatives saw communism as a monolithic forces intent on curbing America’s influence in the world made them favor a more aggressive foreign policy. The work concludes that anti-communism remained a major force in American politics in the post-Vietnam era, largely in response to détente, which is evident in the strong conservative reaction to the policy. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction . 1 II. From the Sixties to the Seventies: Nixon and An Age of Transition . 7 III. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Quest for a New Balance of Power, 1969-1972 . 22 IV Détente and the Conservative Movement . 41 V A Growing Alliance against Détente, 1973-1974 . 65 VI Conclusion . 83 VII Selected Bibliography . 86 1 I – INTRODUCTION Richard Nixon’s (1913-1994) relationship with the postwar American conservative movement directly shaped the domestic foreign policy debate in the 1970s. The relationship merits far more than a mere footnote to recent American history since it changed the course of its politics in the final quarter of the 20th century. Americans of all political persuasions agreed upon the need to confront the Soviet Union and the spread of communism, but often disagreed on the proper means to deal with the threat. This internal debate elevated to an intense level during the Nixon presidency (1969-1974). Détente, the term given to the approach to world affairs formulated by Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger (1923- ), that aimed to reduce cold war tensions, alienated the administration from conservatives. The main argument of this thesis is that détente drove the conservatives away from Nixon and led to a resurgence of anti-communism in the 1970s that manifested itself in the convergence of the conservative and neoconservative movements. Almost every aspect of the Nixon administration has undergone scrutiny from journalists and historians. Many of these accounts, however, barely mention or completely ignore Nixon’s troubled relationship with the conservative movement. The main reason for this consistent omission is that the differences seemed trivial. The disagreements, however, are relevant to the era. Détente triggered a fierce debate that changed the course of American foreign policy. The words and actions of conservative leaders, and their decision to challenge Nixon in 1972, and their rejection of the 2 administration during Watergate, all attested to their dissatisfaction. Nixon and détente led to a new political alignment in American politics.1 This thesis poses and offer answers to the following questions: How did Nixon’s relationship with the conservative movement evolve in the 1960s and 1970s? Why did the two sides drift apart in the first term and seperate in the second term? What did the term détente mean to Nixon, and how did his definition differ from that of the conservative movement? The key to answering those questions is in the foreign policy of Nixon and Kissinger. Their shared belief in a realistic approach to international relations to build a balance of power perplexed the conservatives who distrusted any accord with communist nations. Détente brought anti-communism back to the forefront of American politics in the post-Vietnam era. The second chapter, “Nixon and an Age of Transition: From the Sixties to the Seventies,” examines the era and the complex relationship between Nixon and the conservative movement. Many Americans began to vote conservatively in response to the counterculture. While the counterculture challenged fundamental American values in foreign policy and civil rights, conservatives held fast to their anti-communism. The Vietnam War (1964-1973) did much to destroy the bipartisan consensus of foreign policy and divided the country along generational lines. Nixon’s 1968 election and the rise of conservative politics were in direct reaction to the counterculture. 1Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962-1972 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989),Nixon: The Ruin and Recovery of a Politician, 1973-1990 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); John Robert Greene, The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Ford administrations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999). 3 The third chapter, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Quest for a New Balance of Power,” is an appraisal of the strategy behind détente, and the important breakthroughs it achieved during Nixon’s first term. Nixon and Kissinger had two foreign policy objectives: The short term objective was to end the Vietnam War and, on a much grander scale, forge a new global balance of power. A bipolar world, one with two superpowers, had guided the thinking of American policymakers since the onset of the cold war. By the 1970s, however, Nixon and Kissinger believed the world had become multipolar, with more than two dominant superpowers. Nixon believed that Europe, Japan, and China all had then achieved great power status. While the Nixon administration never broke entirely with the cold war framework, they did begin the process.2 The administration’s endeavor to connect détente with ending Vietnam met with mixed results. Nixon and Kissinger were both determined to extend the conflict to save America’s credibility. Linkage, the method applied by the administration to end the war, involved offering rewards and punishments to North Vietnam’s main benefactors, China and the Soviet Union. Linkage had little success in settling the Vietnam War, but did change the dynamics of cold war diplomacy. Despite their failure to achieve a lasting settlement in Vietnam, the opening of relations with China and signing of SALT I with the Soviet Union served the nation well. Ironically, Nixon’s momentous achievements in great power diplomacy estranged him from the Republican Party’s conservative base. 2 Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism:American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin, 1997); H.W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1993); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War. (London: Oxford University Press, 1982,2005); John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005); Walter Lefeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002). The above works are all general histories of the Cold War that offer differing viewpoints on Nixon and détente. 4 The fourth chapter, “Détente and the Conservative Movement,” establishes the historical framework of the conservative movement’s opposition to détente. Conservative opposition to the containment policies adopted by the United States
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