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Marcher Gets Close to Users by Targeting Mobile Banking, Android Apps, Social Media, and Email

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Marcher Gets Close to Users by Targeting Mobile Banking, Android Apps, Social Media, and Email ARTICLE Marcher Gets Close to Users by Targeting Mobile Banking, Android Apps, Social Media, and Email Written by: Doron Woolf Date: April 7, 2017 Marcher is an Android banking Trojan, first detected in 2013, that continually evolves to stay active. The longevity and evolution of this malware is not surprising, given that mobile banking malware is the quickest and easiest way to grab money from victims. In fact, the mobile banking malware market is so hot, it grew 400% in 2016, 81% of which targeted Android phones.i That growth is somewhat expected since Android, with over 24,000 implementations, is the most popular smartphone operating system.ii That is a huge number of devices to test and secure, made more difficult by the fact that most Android phones are behind in critical patches and thus are more vulnerable to attack.iii As with any malware campaign, attackers must continually evolve to evade detection of their C&C servers and keep the cash flowing. Marcher inspects its infected devices carefully by using a dedicated, hard-coded configuration in each Android Package Kit (APK), Google’s file format for distributing and installing application software (like mobile banking apps) on the Android OS. Each APK has the ability to target different financial institutions in specific geographical locations. F5 research conducted in March 2017 followed 153 Marcher configuration files to uncover target and activity trends in the worldwide attack campaigns. Among the 153 configuration files, 54 distinct command and control (C&C) servers were detected. Of the 54 distinct C&C servers, 12 of F5. COM/LABS 1 them were online and operational (until F5 had them shut down in March), 10 were sink-holed, and 32 were already offline. The remaining 99 C&C servers were duplicated configurations from different APKs. This is likely due to configuration files being hardcoded within the APK, and old spam campaigns infecting different users, thus, old configurations still being detected in the wild. Figure 1: Marcher configuration status (left) and status of distinct C&C servers (right) as of March 2017 Global View of March Targets Analyzing the newest configuration files, Marcher’s March targets primarily focused on banks in Europe, followed by Australia, and then Latin America. Only 2% of targets were in North America. The targets within these regions were all banks, as well as their Android mobile banking apps available for download in the Google Play Store. Australia had one exception where an online classified ad site called Gumtree was targeted. The 7% “Global” are application and platform targets that are used worldwide such as the Android platform, social network companies like Facebook, email providers like Yahoo and Gmail, the WhatsApp and Viber messaging apps, PayPal, and eBay. (See target domain details driving these geographical breakdowns in the Marcher Targets section and Appendix A.) F5. COM/LABS 2 Global North America 7% 2% Latin America 12% Australia 15% Europe 64% Figure 2: Marcher targets by regions in March 2017 The following map shows the specific countries within the regions above that were targeted. The banks within those countries are detailed in Appendix A. Figure 3: Marcher-targeted countries, March 2017 F5. COM/LABS 3 Campaigns and Targets The common pattern in the latest configuration was distinct and repeated subfolders in the C&C details, such as 012, THREEHADFOUND, or jadafire. We classified the current online campaigns via these subfolder identifications as follows: • 012 campaigns spanned different geolocations in one campaign targeting Germany, Poland, Austria, and Australia • jadafire campaigns target Austrian and German banks, as well as social network apps globally • MANUNIT campaigns targeting German banks specifically • balls51 campaigns target banks in Austria, Germany, Argentina, UK, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico • THREEHADFOUND campaigns targeting German banks specifically • MUCHTHENWERESTO campaigns targeting German and Czech Republic banks • moon campaigns targeting Australian banks specifically • TRUELESSCARBLAC campaigns target German and Austrian banks • angelkelly campaigns target banks in UK, Germany, and France • QUESTIONROADFAR campaigns target French banks as well as social network apps globally C&C Servers Detected In the following table, we’ve listed the 54 distinct C&C servers detected, 63% of which were using HTTPS. While monitoring Marcher activity in March, F5 researchers shut down 12 malicious C&C servers that were detected. No. C&C Server Status 1 hxxp://stionguz.com/012/ Sinkholed 2 hxxp://asdhjfd24.ru/mail/ Offline 3 hxxp://propsyours.com/012 Sinkholed 4 hxxp://ausrusot.net/012 Sinkholed 5 hxxp://albumwink.net/012/ Sinkholed 6 hxxp://toddypross.net/012 Sinkholed 7 hxxp://aflyatok.men/012 Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 8 hxxp://samiy.site/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 9 hxxp://chaldear.com/012/ Sinkholed 10 hxxp://glennuniat.com/012/ Sinkholed F5. COM/LABS 4 11 hxxp://joguce.info/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 12 hxxp://ciorrigh.info/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 13 hxxp://policywings.bid/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 14 hxxp://wigthsingls.bid/012/ Offline 15 hxxp://limesysleys.bid/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 16 hxxp://namessheds.bid/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 17 hxxp://bastebirk.com/012/ Sinkholed 18 hxxp://shapewhisk.com/012/ Sinkholed 19 hxxp://ahongdeash.net/012/ Sinkholed 20 hxxp://nsdas213123aa.ru/at/ Redirecting to RevDl.com 21 hxxps://soldatenccarmytriptheleader.at/jadafire/ Offline 22 hxxps://fisttheexo.at/jadafire/ Offline 23 hxxps://soldatenccarmythegaynation.at/jadafire/ Offline 24 hxxps://soldatenccarmy.at/jadafire/ Offline 25 hxxps://exofisty.at/jadafire/ Offline 26 hxxps://soldatenccarmygoldenshower.at/jadafire/ Offline 27 hxxps://consulting-center-performace.com/MANYUNIT/ Offline 28 hxxps://grapfix-desgin-ltd24.at/MANYUNIT/ Offline 29 hxxps://service-consultiong-ltd-spain.net/MANYUNIT/ Offline 30 hxxps://soulreaver.at/balls51/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 31 hxxps://divingforpearls.at/balls51/ Offline 32 hxxps://olimpogods.at/balls51/ Offline 33 hxxps://176.119.28.74/balls51/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 34 hxxps://nvah2p123.org/THREEHADFOUND/ Offline 35 hxxps://nvoa324.net/THREEHADFOUND/ Offline 36 hxxps://brkleo34.org/THREEHADFOUND/" Offline 37 hxxps://app01.at/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline 38 hxxps://app12.at/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline 39 hxxps://ap11.at/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline 40 hxxps://droidgrades.top/moon/ Offline – 404 41 hxxps://droidgrades.us/moon/ Offline – 404 42 hxxps://droidsg.pw/moon/ Offline – 404 43 hxxps://wasdashehe.net/TRUELESSCARBLAC/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 44 hxxps://wasdashehe.at/TRUELESSCARBLAC/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 45 hxxps://wasdashehe.com/TRUELESSCARBLAC/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers 46 hxxp://45.32.240.33/1f/l/ Offline 47 hxxps://track-google.at/angelkelly/ Offline – 404 48 hxxps://trackgoogle.at/angelkelly/ Offline – 404 F5. COM/LABS 5 49 hxxps://secure-ingdirect.top/QUESTIONROADFAR/ Offline 50 hxxps://playsstore.net/QUESTIONROADFAR/ Offline 51 hxxps://playsstore.mobi/QUESTIONROADFAR/ Offline 52 hxxps://i-app4.online/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline 53 hxxps://i-app5.online/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline 54 hxxps://i-app1.online/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline Table 1: C&C servers and their statuses, March 2017 The 12 C&C servers that F5 shut down in March were associated with three campaigns—012, balls51, and TRUELESSCARBLAC—that primarily targeted banks in Europe. 012 was the most active campaign targeting German, Polish, Austrian, and Australian banks, followed by TRUELESSCARBLAC that also targeted German and Polish banks. The balls51 campaign targeted Austrian, German, and UK banks, as well as Latin American banks in Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. TRUELESSCARBLAC 25% 012 58% balls51 17% Figure 4: 12 Marcher campaigns running on 12 active C&C servers taken down in March 2017 Marcher Targets We detected 172 targeted domains in March 2017. As expected, the majority (93%) were banks. A smaller but interesting portion of the targets were email providers like Yahoo and Gmail, social network and messaging apps like Facebook, Viber, and WhatsApp, and Gumtree, an Australian online classified ad app. F5. COM/LABS 6 Social / Messaging Android Platform 2% 1% Email Providers Online Classifieds 3% 1% Banking 93% Figure 5: Marcher targets by industry Most of Marcher’s domain targets are Google Play Store links where customers download the Android mobile app. In turn, most of the Google Play downloads are banking apps, but Marcher is also targeting Facebook, Viber, WhatsApp, Gmail, HTC, and Yahoo Android apps. (Yahoo, with 81 webinjects, is the biggest target outside of banks. See webinject target explanations below.) In most cases, Marcher targets a bank’s main site, mobile site, and Google Play Store Android app download collectively. (See details in Appendix A.) Email provider directly (mail.com) Google Andriod Dev API Andriod App (via Apk-Files.org) Andriod App (via ApkMonk) Bank directly Andriod App (via Google Play) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Figure 6: Marcher domain targets by Google Play Store versus bank site directly F5. COM/LABS 7 The top 5 countries whose banks were targeted included Germany, Australia, France, Turkey, and Austria. The “Global” definition
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