IPCS No. 51, March 2008 SPECIAL REPORT Afghan-Pak Joint Peace Jirga Possibilities and Improbabilities Mariam Safi INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES B 7/3 Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi110029, INDIA Tel: 91-1141652556-9; Fax: 91-11-41652560 Email: [email protected]; Web: www.ipcs.org IPCS Special Reports aim to flag issues of regional and global concern from a South Asian perspective. All IPCS Reports are peer reviewed. IPCS SPECIAL REPORT No 51, March 2008 THE AFGHAN-PAK JOINT PEACE JIRGA POSSIBILITIES AND IMPROBABILITIES MMMAAARRRIIIAAAMMM SSSAAAFFFIII Research Intern, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies An Overview In a significant move towards the The four-day peace talks, the result of an beginning of a peace process between initiative by President Hamid Karzai and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and his Pakistani counterpart, Pervez the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, leaders Musharraf on 27 September, 2006, of the two countries met in Kabul, primarily focused on threats posed by Afghanistan, from 9-12 August 2007, to Taliban, terrorism, and the narcotics discuss the declining security climate in trade in the region. both states. The resulting joint peace jirga, reflects the desire on both sides to The recommendations drawn up by the build a holistic and transparent approach delegates at the conclusion of the talks to political dialogue and cooperation. are to be followed through during the second round of peace talks expected to The Afghan-Pak Peace Jirga is based on be held in Pakistan after the January the tribal code of Pashtunwali, which is 2008 elections. not only a legal system of settling disputes, but also a code of behavior The recommendations included among and form of government, autonomous of others, making counter-terrorism the state. Recognizing its potential in initiatives a critical priority of the combating the Taliban insurgency and national policies and security strategies fighting global terrorism, US President of both countries; selecting a smaller George W. Bush expressed his support jirga comprising 25 members from each to President Hamid Karzai and President country; and ensuring that the process of Pervez Musharraf in a meeting held in dialogue and reconciliation with Washington in October 2006. The opposition forces would continue peace talks brought to the table 700 unhindered. In addition it was agreed “members of the parliaments, political that the two countries would adhere to parties, religious scholars, tribal elders, the principle of “mutual respect, non- provincial councils, civil society, and the interference, and peaceful coexistence” business community”1 from both nations. in their relations with each other. The The Jirga Declaration juxtaposes the recommendations also highlighted the patronage and determination of both facilitating correlation between narcotics countries as the foundation for and terrorism, and the jirga members “sustainable peace in the region.”2 mutually agreed that the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of poppies in 1 “Text of Pak-Afghan Peace Jirga addition to other illegal substances must Declaration,” Daily Times, 13 August 2007, be denounced. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?p age=2007%5C08%5C13%5Cstory_13-8- Lastly, it was agreed that both President 2007_pg7_48 Karzai and President Musharraf, in collaboration with the international 2 Ibid. community, must devise economic and 2 AFGHAN-PAK JOINT PEACE JIRGA social sector infrastructural projects in year reign reveals that he has been areas that are dependent on poppy continuously inconsistent in his approach cultivation and trafficking. to religious extremism, evidenced by his decision to side with pro-Taliban groups Pakistan’s Interests in the Peace Talks in Waziristan in 2006, and also the On the concluding day of the jirga, killing of scores of militants in an assault President Musharraf addressed the by Pakistani forces on Lal Masjid in delegates stating that “peace and unity, 2007. Many argue that the trust and cooperation” were the only talibanization of Pakistan, and an viable options for both countries, if they increasing American pressure to were to succeed in tackling cross-border crackdown on militant activity in the terrorism. President Musharraf, who in tribal areas, are reasons that might the past has firmly held that the Taliban prevent Pakistan from following through is a creation of the Pashtuns, with the declaration of the peace-jirga. acknowledged that the Taliban did receive protection and resources from its If Pakistan does not begin to cooperate supporters in Pakistan. He proclaimed in the war against terror however, it may that the resurgence of the Taliban was lead to a unilateral decision by the US to wreaking havoc in Afghanistan, by send its troops into Pakistan. America has obstructing reconstruction and cautioned Pakistan of the threat of humanitarian efforts. widespread militancy as well as the talibanization of its border-belt. Rising Despite denouncements by Pakistani domestic opposition to Musharraf's officials of Musharraf's affirmation of friendly relations with the US is starting clandestine Pakistani support to militant to weigh heavily on the state groups in Afghanistan, the entire episode administration. The threat posed by finally put to rest enduring accusations in religious extremists through protracted this regard by the Afghans. While it is conflicts involving suicide bombings and difficult to elucidate Pervez Musharraf’s kidnappings, seem to have sucked perception of and hopes from the jirga, Pakistan into a bottomless pit. The his support for the peace process can be danger of talibanization of Pakistan has seen as a desperate attempt on his part the US re-examining its relations with to deal with the evolving security crisis in Pakistan. his country, as well as address the concerns of Pakistan’s chief ally -- the Once viewed as a close ally in the war United States. Balancing on a tightrope, against terror, Pakistan is now perceived Musharraf seems eager to please as a “source of Islamic extremism,”3 Washington, while retaining the support explains John McConnell, US Director of of Pakistani radicals, in the fight against National Intelligence. Many scholars the Taliban and al Qaeda. His deem Pakistan’s Inter-Intelligence Service contradictory stance on fighting aka ISI (run by serving military extremism in Pakistan however, leads personnel) as the architect of the one to question his interest in the peace militancy and religious extremism that jirga. Pakistan presently finds itself grappling In 1999, in his first national speech, Musharraf had vowed to eradicate 3 Robert Hathaway, “The Devil’s Brew in Islamic extremism and sectarianism from Pakistan,” World Policy Journal, Spring Pakistan. Yet, a close look at his nine- 2007, vol. 24, no., p.89. 3 IPCS SPECIAL REPORT No 51, March 2008 with. In the light of this supposition, any al Qaeda training camps in Waziristan serious move by President Musharraf and moved into Afghanistan. Arguably, targeting Islamic extremism would the Waziristan Accord has facilitated the translate into a civil war because the movement of Islamic fighters into country would inescapably be at war Afghanistan, thereby weakening the with itself. The logical question to ask state’s security and reconstruction efforts. then, is whether Pakistan’s changing stance on fighting extremism is a Pakistan’s failure to curb the reflection of its incapacity or simply a mushrooming of terrorist cells in the lack of will? Ground realities in Pakistan NWFP continues to destabilize suggest that President Musharraf is Afghanistan and obstruct NATO's military essentially, for lack of a better phrase, gains in Taliban strongholds in provinces faced with a double-edged sword. such as Farah, Helmand, and Kandahar. Musharraf’s support for the peace jirga Despite admitting that the Taliban “are could inadvertently place him in a tight crossing from the Pakistan side and spot, subjecting him to greater scrutiny causing bomb blasts in Afghanistan”4, by both homegrown religious networks President Musharraf continues to argue and the international community. that yielding authority to the tribal leaders under the Waziristan Accord US Interests in the Peace Talks was the best solution to the problem. The United States and other NATO Since Waziristan has been recognized members seem to be getting impatient internationally as a base for al Qaeda with Pakistan’s reluctance to tighten its operatives, lending authority to tribal control over militant activity across its leaders clearly meant ceding power to tribal border belt, recognized by the extremist cells. This became strikingly international community as one of the evident as numerous anti-Taliban clerics most dangerous “gray zones” in the and tribal leaders were beheaded and world today. The hundreds of madrassas government officials kidnapped and in the NWFP, it is believed, provide murdered by extremist fighters after the breeding ground for the Taliban and cessation of authority under the accord. serve as a refuge for Osama bin Laden and his forces. US-Pak relations started With Musharraf’s indecisiveness to target becoming tremulous in 2006 when extremism in Pakistan and Karzai’s Pakistan virtually surrendered South reliance on the US and NATO to fight the Waziristan to the Taliban and al Qaeda Taliban, the US fears its interests in the in an agreement known as the region might be severely hit, a fear Waziristan Accord. Initially supported by expressed succinctly in a report by