IPCS No. 51, March 2008 SPECIAL REPORT

Afghan-Pak Joint Peace Jirga

Possibilities and Improbabilities

Mariam Safi

INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

B 7/3 Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi110029, Tel: 91-1141652556-9; Fax: 91-11-41652560 Email: [email protected]; Web: www.ipcs.org

IPCS Special Reports aim to flag issues of regional and global concern from a South Asian perspective. All IPCS Reports are peer reviewed. IPCS SPECIAL REPORT No 51, March 2008

THE AFGHAN-PAK JOINT PEACE JIRGA POSSIBILITIES AND IMPROBABILITIES MMMAAARRRIIIAAAMMM SSSAAAFFFIII Research Intern, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

An Overview In a significant move towards the The four-day peace talks, the result of an beginning of a peace process between initiative by President Hamid Karzai and the Islamic Republic of and his Pakistani counterpart, Pervez the Islamic Republic of , leaders Musharraf on 27 September, 2006, of the two countries met in Kabul, primarily focused on threats posed by Afghanistan, from 9-12 August 2007, to , terrorism, and the narcotics discuss the declining security climate in trade in the region. both states. The resulting joint peace jirga, reflects the desire on both sides to The recommendations drawn up by the build a holistic and transparent approach delegates at the conclusion of the talks to political dialogue and cooperation. are to be followed through during the second round of peace talks expected to The Afghan-Pak Peace Jirga is based on be held in Pakistan after the January the tribal code of Pashtunwali, which is 2008 elections. not only a legal system of settling disputes, but also a code of behavior The recommendations included among and form of government, autonomous of others, making counter-terrorism the state. Recognizing its potential in initiatives a critical priority of the combating the Taliban insurgency and national policies and security strategies fighting global terrorism, US President of both countries; selecting a smaller George W. Bush expressed his support jirga comprising 25 members from each to President Hamid Karzai and President country; and ensuring that the process of Pervez Musharraf in a meeting held in dialogue and reconciliation with Washington in October 2006. The opposition forces would continue peace talks brought to the table 700 unhindered. In addition it was agreed “members of the parliaments, political that the two countries would adhere to parties, religious scholars, tribal elders, the principle of “mutual respect, non- provincial councils, civil society, and the interference, and peaceful coexistence” business community”1 from both nations. in their relations with each other. The The Jirga Declaration juxtaposes the recommendations also highlighted the patronage and determination of both facilitating correlation between narcotics countries as the foundation for and terrorism, and the jirga members “sustainable peace in the region.”2 mutually agreed that the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of poppies in 1 “Text of Pak-Afghan Peace Jirga addition to other illegal substances must Declaration,” Daily Times, 13 August 2007, be denounced. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?p age=2007%5C08%5C13%5Cstory_13-8- Lastly, it was agreed that both President 2007_pg7_48 Karzai and President Musharraf, in collaboration with the international 2 Ibid. community, must devise economic and

2 AFGHAN-PAK JOINT PEACE JIRGA

social sector infrastructural projects in year reign reveals that he has been areas that are dependent on poppy continuously inconsistent in his approach cultivation and trafficking. to religious extremism, evidenced by his decision to side with pro-Taliban groups Pakistan’s Interests in the Peace Talks in in 2006, and also the On the concluding day of the jirga, killing of scores of militants in an assault President Musharraf addressed the by Pakistani forces on Lal Masjid in delegates stating that “peace and unity, 2007. Many argue that the trust and cooperation” were the only talibanization of Pakistan, and an viable options for both countries, if they increasing American pressure to were to succeed in tackling cross-border crackdown on militant activity in the terrorism. President Musharraf, who in tribal areas, are reasons that might the past has firmly held that the Taliban prevent Pakistan from following through is a creation of the Pashtuns, with the declaration of the peace-jirga. acknowledged that the Taliban did receive protection and resources from its If Pakistan does not begin to cooperate supporters in Pakistan. He proclaimed in the war against terror however, it may that the resurgence of the Taliban was lead to a unilateral decision by the US to wreaking havoc in Afghanistan, by send its troops into Pakistan. America has obstructing reconstruction and cautioned Pakistan of the threat of humanitarian efforts. widespread militancy as well as the talibanization of its border-belt. Rising Despite denouncements by Pakistani domestic opposition to Musharraf's officials of Musharraf's affirmation of friendly relations with the US is starting clandestine Pakistani support to militant to weigh heavily on the state groups in Afghanistan, the entire episode administration. The threat posed by finally put to rest enduring accusations in religious extremists through protracted this regard by the Afghans. While it is conflicts involving suicide bombings and difficult to elucidate Pervez Musharraf’s kidnappings, seem to have sucked perception of and hopes from the jirga, Pakistan into a bottomless pit. The his support for the peace process can be danger of talibanization of Pakistan has seen as a desperate attempt on his part the US re-examining its relations with to deal with the evolving security crisis in Pakistan. his country, as well as address the concerns of Pakistan’s chief ally -- the Once viewed as a close ally in the war . Balancing on a tightrope, against terror, Pakistan is now perceived Musharraf seems eager to please as a “source of Islamic extremism,”3 Washington, while retaining the support explains John McConnell, US Director of of Pakistani radicals, in the fight against National Intelligence. Many scholars the Taliban and al Qaeda. His deem Pakistan’s Inter-Intelligence Service contradictory stance on fighting aka ISI (run by serving military extremism in Pakistan however, leads personnel) as the architect of the one to question his interest in the peace militancy and religious extremism that jirga. Pakistan presently finds itself grappling

In 1999, in his first national speech, Musharraf had vowed to eradicate 3 Robert Hathaway, “The Devil’s Brew in Islamic extremism and sectarianism from Pakistan,” World Policy Journal, Spring Pakistan. Yet, a close look at his nine- 2007, vol. 24, no., p.89.

3 IPCS SPECIAL REPORT No 51, March 2008 with. In the light of this supposition, any al Qaeda training camps in Waziristan serious move by President Musharraf and moved into Afghanistan. Arguably, targeting Islamic extremism would the Waziristan Accord has facilitated the translate into a civil war because the movement of Islamic fighters into country would inescapably be at war Afghanistan, thereby weakening the with itself. The logical question to ask state’s security and reconstruction efforts. then, is whether Pakistan’s changing stance on fighting extremism is a Pakistan’s failure to curb the reflection of its incapacity or simply a mushrooming of terrorist cells in the lack of will? Ground realities in Pakistan NWFP continues to destabilize suggest that President Musharraf is Afghanistan and obstruct NATO's military essentially, for lack of a better phrase, gains in Taliban strongholds in provinces faced with a double-edged sword. such as Farah, Helmand, and Kandahar. Musharraf’s support for the peace jirga Despite admitting that the Taliban “are could inadvertently place him in a tight crossing from the Pakistan side and spot, subjecting him to greater scrutiny causing bomb blasts in Afghanistan”4, by both homegrown religious networks President Musharraf continues to argue and the international community. that yielding authority to the tribal leaders under the Waziristan Accord US Interests in the Peace Talks was the best solution to the problem. The United States and other NATO Since Waziristan has been recognized members seem to be getting impatient internationally as a base for al Qaeda with Pakistan’s reluctance to tighten its operatives, lending authority to tribal control over militant activity across its leaders clearly meant ceding power to tribal border belt, recognized by the extremist cells. This became strikingly international community as one of the evident as numerous anti-Taliban clerics most dangerous “gray zones” in the and tribal leaders were beheaded and world today. The hundreds of madrassas government officials kidnapped and in the NWFP, it is believed, provide murdered by extremist fighters after the breeding ground for the Taliban and cessation of authority under the accord. serve as a refuge for and his forces. US-Pak relations started With Musharraf’s indecisiveness to target becoming tremulous in 2006 when extremism in Pakistan and Karzai’s Pakistan virtually surrendered South reliance on the US and NATO to fight the Waziristan to the Taliban and al Qaeda Taliban, the US fears its interests in the in an agreement known as the region might be severely hit, a fear Waziristan Accord. Initially supported by expressed succinctly in a report by Alan the US, the accord was later considered Kronstradt of the US Congressional a huge mistake, as there was an Research Service, entitled “Pakistan and unprecedented rise in insurgency-related Terrorism.” In the report Kronstradt notes violence in Afghanistan. After the signing that Pakistan’s unwillingness to demolish of the accord, Taliban and al Qaeda domestic extremism raises uncertainty forces began consolidating in more areas about Pakistan as a strategic ally of the in Waziristan under its authority. The situation was further aggravated by the release of 2,500 foreign fighters by 4 Bill Roggio & Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Musharraf who were linked to Taliban “Pakistan Surrenders: The Taliban control the and al Qaeda networks. Upon their border with Afghanistan,” The Weekly Standard, 2 October 2006, p. 12. release they reorganized themselves in

4 AFGHAN-PAK JOINT PEACE JIRGA

US. Tired of fighting an insurgency in same time as the Taliban resurgence Afghanistan and extremism in Pakistan, gained momentum, narcotics trade the US sees the peace jirga as a vital doubled. Furthermore, in 2006, at the step towards consolidating efforts to rid height of the Taliban insurgency narcotics the region of religious zealots. Many trade increased by 49 per cent believe that American pressure coerced amounting to an annual 5,700 metric ton. Pakistan to participate in the Afghan-Pak Joint Peace Jirga. The conclusion seems The phenomenal profit from drug reasonable, especially in view of trafficking has allowed the Taliban to President Bush’s assertion that he would remobilize and reorganize their send US forces into Pakistan to find operations. The narcotics economy Osama bin Laden and other senior consequently, has undermined militants if he had reliable intelligence.5 government efforts of reconstruction and After having invested billions of dollars in its anti-corruption initiatives. An obvious military and reconstruction efforts, Bush question is why after eradicating poppy has intensified his pressure on Pakistan to growth in 2000, calling it un-Islamic, the take more responsibility in rooting out Taliban is now using the same to sustain extremism from its territory. The warnings its insurgency? Barnett Rubin and notwithstanding, it’s clear that unaided Humayun Hamidzada provide a the US cannot accomplish this task. On its plausible answer in their article “From part the US is coercing Pakistan to Bonn to London: Governance Challenges engage in dialogue, presumably to and the Future of State building in prove that it is an indispensable ally in Afghanistan.” They articulate that the the . Taliban have adopted an “ends-justify- the-means” policy on drugs, under which Afghanistan’s Interests in the Peace they seek to legitimize their insurgency as Talks an anti-government movement that seeks Afghanistan is witnessing a precarious support from poppy farmers in return for resurgence of the Taliban, a booming their protection from the corrupt drug economy, and corruption at all “puppet” regime of the Karzai levels of the government. These events government and his infidel supporters. combined, are threatening to negate the The Taliban’s alliance with drug progress made in Afghanistan over the traffickers in opium centers in southern past five years due to the collaborative Afghanistan has become a key source of efforts of President Karzai and the US. domestic support for its insurgency. Mounting insecurity, a spurt in poppy cultivation and expanding narcotics Rubin and Hamidzada explain that trade are destabilizing Afghanistan. In Afghanistan’s security and stability are 2004, two years after the overthrow of dependent on its capacity to integrate the Taliban regime, Afghanistan was politically and economically with the faced with an increase in narcotics trade region. Both scholars acknowledge the constituting almost half of its domestic Afghan and US sentiment to cooperate economy. Subsequently, in 2005, at the with Pakistan. However, they caution, such cooperation will “require sustained 5 Missy Ryan, “Musharraf rejects U.S. action efforts to de-escalate and eventually on militants,” Reuters, 9 December 2007. resolve the country’s long-standing http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/id conflict with Pakistan over relations with USN0936931020071209?feedType=RSS& feedName=topNews

5 IPCS SPECIAL REPORT No 51, March 2008

India, ethnic issues, and transit trade.”6 puppet of the “infidel invader.”7 While The revival of the Taliban insurgency in the recruitment of new members for the the last two years has been contingent on insurgency took place in southern a host of factors both within and outside Afghanistan, the ideological, monetary, Afghanistan. The lack of development in and defense support were provided by areas outside Kabul coupled with poor Pakistan. government performance, lawlessness, an expanding drug economy sustained by The Waziristan Accord is considered an warlords, and the constant threat of impudent attack on Afghanistan by its instability, are causing a decline in people. Kabul alleged that the accord, in popular support for the government. accordance with US thinking, granted President Karzai is losing support, Taliban and al Qaeda members particularly amongst his own pashtun unrestricted safe havens where they tribes in southern Afghanistan, who feel received training and arms before alienated from the state. Feelings of venturing back into Afghanistan as foot neglect and under-representation have soldiers. Coincidentally, during the year contributed significantly to protracting of signing of the accord, Afghanistan the Taliban insurgency. faced the worst insurgency-related attacks since 2001. In addition the vicious cycle of insecurity and impoverishment has thwarted the Afghanistan looks to the US for security, development process in southern infrastructure, and resources, without Afghanistan. Thus, residents of Kandahar which its state-building efforts could and Helmand see themselves as being weaken significantly. Similarly, America’s left in despair, uncertain of receiving the national security is dependent on same development aid and services that Afghanistan’s future political stability Northern provinces are receiving. The because a failed Afghanistan would Taliban have reinforced these feelings of pose a direct threat to US strategic and abandonment and disappointment by economic interests. Additionally, both preventing aid and development projects Afghanistan and the US view Pakistan as in these areas. With no government an indispensable strategic partner in structure, tax-collection system or courts fighting the extremists and securing the in place, these residents are subjected to region. constant fear of corrupt local officials and NATO air bombings. Consequently, Without Pakistan’s cooperation as support for the government declined Afghanistan’s fight against the Taliban in the south, the Taliban moved in to fill insurgency will become redundant. this vacuum by recruiting disheartened Pakistan must be pressurized to target local men “preying on feelings of terrorist sanctuaries, located chiefly political betrayal and Islamic along the tribal border in Balochistan, righteousness by casting Karzai as a Waziristan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the NWFP. As long as extremism breathes on Pakistani soil the insurgency will continue to 6 Barnett Rubin & Humayun Hamidzada, “From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of State building 7 Pamela Constable, “A Wake-Up Call in in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping, Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, April January 2007, vol.14, no. 1, p.10. 2007, vol. 18, no. 2, p. 90.

6 AFGHAN-PAK JOINT PEACE JIRGA

destabilize Afghanistan. For this reason credibility of the jirga’s decision, and President Karzai views the peace talks wanted to know “how the with Pakistan as a vital step towards accept the outcome of a jirga stacked reconciling regional differences which with government touts and elements who would establish security in Afghanistan always assailed them?”8 In Pakistan, and lead to legitimizing Karzai’s pashtun tribal clerics in Fata, NWFP, and Government. A secure Afghanistan would Balochistan have also either condemned permit the government to continue its the jirga for excluding the Taliban from centralization policies and state-building the talks, or have expressed minimal initiatives. Presently, Karzai’s authority expectations of its success. Elders from largely extends to only within the FATA had announced their boycott of the boundaries of Kabul. jirga days before its commencement, on the premise that it excluded opposition Shortcomings in the Afghan-Pak Joint forces, thereby rendering the joint jirga Peace Jirga Declaration meaningless. Afghanistan and Pakistan initiated the joint peace jirga with US support, to curb On the question of how regional terrorism and religious extremism in the insecurity could be addressed in the region. Notwithstanding the existing absence of the engagement of main conflictual relationship between Pakistan interest groups in the dialogue process, and Afghanistan, the jirga anticipates a Mehmood Khan Achakzai, a Member of progression towards regional the National Assembly for the reconciliation and peace. Opposition Puktoonkhawa Milli Awami Party and a from pashtuns in both states and from the respected pashtun Nationalist in international community however, Balochistan suggested that the Taliban surfaced during the jirga proceedings. should be invited to the peace talks. He added that if Pakistan’s government Pashtun opposition groups in Afghanistan, could provide representation to Islamist such as Gulbadin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i- leaders such as Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Islami Afghanistan (HIA) claimed that presently serving as the opposition they would support the jirga only if leader in the National Assembly of foreign troops withdrew and the people Pakistan, then Afghanistan could also of Afghanistan were left alone to select grant representation to Islamist groups in their leadership. HIA also argued that its government. the joint peace jirga did not reflect the practices of a traditional jirga process. Suspicion and accusations ran high in Asserting that participants should not both Kabul and as the peace have been hand-picked by governments talks began. During the talks, the issue of and that the main parties in the conflict Pakistan’s adherence to Islamic such as the Taliban should have been extremism as a foreign policy tool in represented in the jirga, HIA concluded Afghanistan came to the fore. This that the possibility of effective solutions prescription of Pakistani foreign policy emerging from this jirga was slim as it had not taken into account ground 8 Javed Hamim & Mudassir Ali Shah, realities, which would eventually cause “Hekmatyar conditionally backs Regional the jirga process as a whole to falter. Peace Jirga,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 9 August 2007. The HIA spokesman told Pajhwok Afghan http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/new News that Hekmatyar had refuted the s/2007/august/aug92007.html#3

7 IPCS SPECIAL REPORT No 51, March 2008 has deepened mistrust and suspicion The intent of this article is not to between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the undermine the palpable need to past decades. The jirga however, is not reconcile the political disparity between designed to solve historically-seated both states, but provide an assessment of hostility between the two nations. Instead, the main interests involved in the Khalid Aziz a member of the delegation formation of the jirga, in addition to told the Daily Times, the greatest outlining the possible shortcomings of the achievement of the jirga would be the of the joint peace talks. A traditional settlement of controversial issues and an tribal committee, rife with mistrust is likely agreement to continue dialogue until a to end up as a futile attempt to achieve mutually-approved decision could be regional peace and reconciliation. arrived at. Afghanistan and Pakistan have the political capacity to establish trust and The least one could expect the jirga to dialogue, but only when their political achieve he said, would be the variances have been settled. improvement of bilateral relations and security matters. Grievances of the The development towards regional Afghan Ministers about ISI’s affairs in reconciliation is dependent on the Afghanistan also became points of determination of Afghanistan and the discussion. As Afghani delegate Haji international community to address the Naeem Kochey illustrated by citing root causes of Pakistan’s motivation in Pakistan’s willingness to join Afghanistan encouraging extremism in Afghanistan. in its war against the Taliban, yet With a hostile social and political simultaneously engage its army and the environment amidst a state of ISI to espouse the Taliban as their only emergency, Pakistan too has reached its leverage in Afghanistan. tipping point. The rejection of the idea of a steady rise in fundamentalism in The Daily Times reported that at the end Pakistan by the government is beginning of the peace talks, delegates from both to look hollow as every suicide attack on sides appeared divided over important Pakistani soil serves a cautionary issues. Some suggest that a lack of reminder. international representatives in the jirga raises the question of implementation of Consequentially, this leaves Pakistan with decisions taken. There are concerns that two options - either to mend its since no implementation mechanism has relationship with Afghanistan, or face been devised nor is there a provision for political deterioration and turmoil from an international monitoring group, some within and without. The fate of the of the decisions taken may not be Afghan-Pak jirga is yet to be executed. These are concerns that have determined, but the outcome is emanated from parties involved in the fragmented and holds little, if any, scope jirga and those who have vested for constructive reconciliation. Many have interests. Whether or not the concerns deemed the Afghan-Pak Joint Peace listed above become barriers to the Jirga a positive move that will transpire mandate of the joint peace jirga remains into realized ambitions; but that remains to be seen. to be seen as Pakistan prepares to hold the second phase of peace jirga meetings in January 2008.

8