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UGAMUNC XXI U.S. Intelligence Community 1 Honored Delegates

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UGAMUNC XXI U.S. Intelligence Community 1 Honored Delegates UGAMUNC XXI U.S. Intelligence Community Honored Delegates, 1 UGAMUNC XXI U.S. Intelligence Community Honored Delegates, Welcome to the 2015 University of Georgia Model United Nations Conference and specifically to one of the most exciting committees of this year’s competition: The U.S. Intelligence Community. My name is Anna Nordnes Helgøy, and I will be chairing the committee along with my fantastic Co-Chair, Nicole Garcia. We are both thrilled to host what we expect to be an engaging and intriguing debate about some of the most profound questions of modern society; how far will the intelligence community be willing to go before the American (or foreign, for that matter) public protests? Before I go further into the background of the committee, I would like to assure you that you are in good hands for this competition by further introducing my Co-Chair and myself. I was born in Bremen, Germany, and I grew up in Bergen, Norway. In other words, English is not my native language, and I am easily impressed by articulation. I am a junior political science and public relations double major at UGA. This is my third year on the UGA Model UN team and my first year as a member of the Model UN Secretariat, as its PR Officer. I have previously co-chaired our SPECPOL committee and last year’s joint crisis committee of the Obama/McCain 2008 Election. I have competed at three collegiate conferences with the team and participated in mostly crisis committees. I know crisis might be new to you, but I assure you that I will move forward with the committee in a clean and clear way, and I will include detailed information on how the competition will be run in this background guide. I encourage you to read it carefully. My Co-Chair is Nicole Garcia, a freshman from Evans, Georgia. She is currently majoring in Business with a minor in Spanish. She participated in Model United Nations all four years of high school, competing at many different conferences and participating in many different committees, including the African Union, GA 1st, and the Security Council, even attending UGAMUNC herself as a delegate in the Security Council. With having been in all of your shoes before, she knows firsthand the caliber of UGAMUNC delegates and is extremely eager to see the ideas and enthusiasm that each one of you will bring to this special crisis committee to make it as enjoyable and successful as possible for everyone involved. As you dive into your research of the U.S. Intelligence Community and what they do, I highly encourage you to read through the Notes on How the Committee will be Run part of the background guide. If you have not been in a crisis committee before, this information will help you understand what you’re in for. Additionally, just in case you don’t read all the details of this background guide, I want you to take note of one thing: we have established a blog for this committee at www.usintelligencecommunity.wordpress.com that will be used during UGAMUNC weekend for crisis updates. However, Nicole and I will post interesting related articles and perhaps some additional tips and information on a running basis until February 6th. Feel free to make use of that if you feel so inclined. Another matter of interest to you is that this committee requires position papers. This means that unless you turn in a position paper before or at the beginning of the conference, you may not be eligible for an award. The paper should include some 2 UGAMUNC XXI U.S. Intelligence Community research on your character and the agency you represent in the committee, as well as your position on the opening scenario and other events you foresee happening in the committee. Furthermore, you can refer to our questions to consider listed after the description of the opening scenario for some guiding questions regarding your position paper. We expect it to be about two typed pages, but most importantly, it should just be a good paper. You can either bring a printed version of the position paper to the first committee session or you can email it to our committee’s email address listed below. I hope you feel excited after reading this background guide. I, along with Nicole and the rest of the UGA Model UN team, cannot wait to meet you and see what you are capable of in February. Until then, feel free to contact Nicole or me via our committee’s email ([email protected]) if you have any questions at all. Best, Anna Helgøy Chair, U.S. Intelligence Community 3 UGAMUNC XXI U.S. Intelligence Community Notes on How the Committee will be Run This committee is a crisis committee, as opposed to a General Assembly committee. That means that the competition will not follow standard parliamentary procedure. Now, don’t freak out – a crisis committee is also more fast-paced, fun, and a very real insight into how college Model UN competitions work. There are some rules in our UGAMUNC rulebook that still apply to our committee, so I do encourage you to still be aware of those. However, here are a few basic rules of thumb for crisis committees: 1. There will be no speaker’s list. Think about the sessions as a constant moderated caucus (although you are allowed to motion for unmoderated caucuses as well.) 2. You will not be writing resolutions. In general assembly committees, you would spend a lot of time formulating long solutions to the issue at hand, called resolutions, to be passed by the General Assembly. In a crisis committee, these don’t exist. Instead, you’ll be writing directives; these are short and precise descriptions of actions you wish the committee to take. They are usually brought to a vote immediately, without a long voting process. This is due to the fact that in a committee like this, new things are constantly happening, and you will want to pass directives as soon as a new crisis is introduced. 3. Personal directives. In addition to committee directives that are described above, you will want to try to move through crises unilaterally on the side. As you walk into the first committee session, you will be handed a portfolio with information about your personal connections, available monetary funds and military troops if applicable, etc. Everyone will have something up his or her sleeve, and everyone should reflect on what is best for the agency you are representing. To pass personal directives, simply write a note labeled clearly with “personal directive” and send the note to crisis staff or the co-chair of your committee. You will receive a personal response from crisis on whether or not the action is feasible. Within reasonable limits, I encourage you to establish your personal objectives for the committee and use the tool of personal directives. If you do this successfully, you are able to control the direction of the crises to some extent. However, I do remind you that everything that happens is at the chairs’ and crisis staff’s discretion. Things will not always go your way, and that is part of crisis – no matter how well articulated your notes are. 4. Communiqués. As mentioned above, you will be informed of certain personal connections you have in your portfolio. In order to contact these people or organizations, write a note and label it “communiqué” and hand it to a staff member or your co-chair. You will receive a personal response from staff. 5. Be prepared to improvise and think on your feet. Unlike a General Assembly committee, you will not be completely aware of what is going to happen at any point in time. We are providing you with a starting scenario. This can change or escalate very quickly. Do your research as much as you can, but be aware that all topics that apply to the U.S. Intelligence Community are fair game and can be introduced by the chair or crisis staff in various ways throughout the session. 6. Committee technology. For the purpose of this specific committee, we will take use of certain technology tools. We will not allow for you to bring your own 4 UGAMUNC XXI U.S. Intelligence Community private laptops or use personal electronic devices during committee sessions, but we will have a laptop somewhere in the room for you to make Twitter updates through passed directives to the public. We see this as an interesting and applicable tool for this committee, specifically because a lot of what you do has to be presented in a certain way to the public in order to avoid upheavals. This aspect of your debate is one of the reasons why the U.S. Secretary of State and the White House Press Secretary will be present in the committee along with the heads of the security agencies. In addition to a Twitter account, the committee has a corresponding blog. This is for the use of crisis staff and chairs only and will solely be used to portray crisis updates during the committee sessions. However, until UGAMUNC weekend, you may be able to find interesting articles and additional research opportunities of our committees, as well as this background guide and bios of your chairs on the following web address: www.usintelligencecommunity.com 7. Get excited. We guarantee you a weekend full of surprises and fun, as well as a great debate. 5 UGAMUNC XXI U.S. Intelligence Community Background: The U.S.
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