National Security Agency (NSA) Television Center Catalog, 01-July-1991 Updated with 14 Additional Pages Released on Appeal

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National Security Agency (NSA) Television Center Catalog, 01-July-1991 Updated with 14 Additional Pages Released on Appeal Description of document: National Security Agency (NSA) Television Center Catalog, 01-July-1991 Updated with 14 additional pages released on appeal Requested date: 26-December-2007 15-December-2008 (appeal) Released date: 10-December-2008 25-February-2009 (appeal) Posted date: 01-February-2009 13-March-2009 (appeal release material added) Title of Document The National Cryptologic School Television Center Catalog, Ninth Edition – 01-July-1991 Source of document: NSA FOIA Requester Service Center: National Security Agency Attn: FOIA/PA Office (DJ4) 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6248 Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248 Telephone: (301) 688-6527 Fax: (443) 479-3612 The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000 Serial: MDR-54577 10 December 2008 This responds to your request of26 December 2007 to have the NSA Television Center Catalogue reviewed for declassification. The material has been reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requirements ofExecutive Order (E.O.) 12958, as amended and is enclosed. We have determined that some of the information in the material requires protection. Some portions deleted from the document were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with E.O. 12958, as amended. The information denied meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Section 1.4 subparagraphs (c) and (d) and remains SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL as provided in Section 1.2 ofE.O. 12958, as amended. Section 6.2 (c) ofE.O. 12958, as amended, allows for the protection afforded to information under the provisions oflaw. Therefore, the names ofNSAlCSS employees and information that would reveal NSAlCSS functions and activities have been protected in accordance with Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 402 note). In addition, information regarding other individuals has been deleted from the enclosure in accordance with the sixth exemption ofthe Freedom of Information Act. This exemption protects from disclosure information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion ofpersonal privacy. In balancing the public interest for the information you request against the privacy interests involved, we have determined that the privacy interests sufficiently satisfy the requirements for the application of the sixth exemption. Since your request for declassification has been denied you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSAlCSS MDR Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date ofthe denial letter. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority (DJP5), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6884, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6884. The appeal shall reference the initial denial ofaccess and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes the release of information is required. The NSAICSS MDR Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt ofthe appeaL Sincerely, LINDA L HUFFMAN Chief Declassification Services End: a/s The National Cryptologic School Television Center Catalog Declassified and approved for release by NSA and the U.S. Department of Defense elassified By NSAteSSM 12S'2 on 12-10-2008 pursuant to E.G. 12958, as geelll88ifJ On. Originati"g Age",,'s amended. MDR 54577. Qete'Mil'llltiel'l Aelttlirelt HANOL! VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY -sEGRE+ UNCLASSIFIED 1 July 1991 INTRODUCTION 1. This is the ninth edition of the National Cryptologic School catalog of television material available for reproduction and distribution within the cryptologic community. The catalog will be updated through periodic announcements of new productions via the "TELEGRAM" and republished entirely as necessary. 2. This catalog includes television programs produced by the NCS Television Center. Not listed are commercial productions which are copyrighted, and productions on one-of-a-kind equipments installed at Headquarters, NSA/CSS. All productions are in color unless otherwise indicated. 3. The Table of Contents is located on page iii and the index begins on page A-1. 4. ProductioDs may be obtained directly from: Director National Security Agency/Central Security Service ATTN: E23 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 5. Tapes are available in y." U-Matic, VHS and BETA formats. 6. SCE Field Units and non-NSAlCSS activities requesting material from the catalog, may submit their requests directly to the NCS Television Center (E23). Classified tapes (SI) must be ordered through the unit SSO. SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL tapes may be ordered through the unit COMSEC Custodian. Unclassified tapes may be ordered direct. Due to budgetary cODstraints, all requests for videotapes must be accompanied by new blank video cassettes. These tapes must be high quality, compatible in format to your playback equipment and of sufficient length to accomodate the running time per copy of the requested production(s). 7. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 1~=-:-:=-=----:-1968-7191(s) or 859-6629(b). To obtain copies, memo request: NCS TV Center, E23, FANX II, Attn: II Message request, Computer Mail: E23, II P.L. 86-36 OPI: E23~..... ~hiefl NCS Television Center, 968-8267s/859-4079b. STU-III Equipped UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED TABLE OF CONTENTS Page SECTIONA. EquipmentI-COMSEC _ 1-1 B. General _ 1-5 SECTION II-DATA SYSTEMS A. Equipment Operation _ ll-l B. Equipment Maintenance _ ll-3 C. General _ ll-13 SECTION II1-SIGINT A. Equipment Operation _ m-1 B. Equipment Maintenance _ C. Operations _ m-5 D. General _ m-7 m-13 SECTION IV-COMMUNICATIONS A. Equipment Operation _ IV-1 B. General _ IV-3 SECTION V-EW/ECMlECCM _ V-1 SECTION VI-LANGUAGE _ VI-l SECTION VII-PERSONNEL A. Orientation _ B. General _ VII-l VII-9 SECTION VIII-SECURITY _ vm-1 SECTION IX-LOGISTICS _ IX-1 SECTION X-ADMINISTRATIVE _ X-1 SECTION XI-GENERAL EDUCATION _ XI-1 ALPHABETICAL INDEX _ A-1 UNCLASSIFIED iii COMSEC EQUIPMENT UNCLASSIFIED COMSEC INTRODUCTION TO VINSON (U) TVC-503A 1978 Running Time: 11 :30 Classification: Confidential 1 Part (U) An overview of the VINSON Tactical Secure Voice Equipment. TSEC/KY-57 OPERATOR TRAINING (U) TVC-503B 1978 Running Time: 52:36 Classification: Confidential 1 Part (U) A four-part tape on operating the KY-57 equipment consisting of: (1) Introduction to VINSON; (2) Zeroizing KYX-15, loading KYX-15, zeroizing KYK-13, loading KYK-13, changing batteries in KOI-18, KYK-13, and KYK-15; (3) Zeroizing KY-57/KY-58, loading KY-58, changing batteries in KY-58, preparing KY-58 for operation; and (4) Operator's SARK. TSEC/KY-58 OPERATOR TRAINING (U) TVC-503C 1978 Running Time: 53: 15 Classification: Confidential 1 Part (U) A four-part tape on operating the KY-58 equipment consisting of: (1) Introduction to VINSON; (2) Zeroizing KYX-13, loading KYK-13, changing batteries in a KOI-18, .KYK-13, and KYX-15; (3) Zeroizing the KY-57/KY-58, loading KY-58, changing batteries in KY-58, preparing KY-58 for operation; and (4) Operator's SARK. NET CONTROLLER TRAINING (U) TVC-503D 1978 Running Time: 75: 18 Classification: Confidential 2 Parts (U) A four-part tape on Net Controller operations consisting of: (1) Introduction to VINSON; (2) Zeroizing KYX-15, loading KYX-15, zeroizing KYK-13, loading KYK-13, changing batteries in a KOI-18, KYK-13 and KYX-15; (3) Zeroizing the KY-57/KY-58, loading the KY-57, changing batteries in a KY-57, preparing KY-57 for operations; (4) SARK Variable Generate Operation, setting up a Net, SARK Automatic Remote Keying, SARK Manual Remote Keying. TSEC/KW-46 BROADCAST SECURITY EQUIPMENT (U) TVe-762 1980 Running Time: 27: 17 Classification: Secret 1 Part (U) The KW-46 Broadcast Security Equipment is being developed to replace the TSEC/KW­ 37 and TSEC/KG-14. The KW-46 videotape presentation consists of two parts. Part I contains a review of the operational capabilities of the KW-46 including discussions on data rates, maintainability, encryption/decryption techniques, and synchronization. The KW-46 keying concept is discussed in detail. Part II is a demonstration of the equipment initialization sequence, the single and multi-channel modes of operation, and the remote keying operation. A copy of the narrative accompanies the tape. THE UMSTEAD SYSTEM (U) TVC-778 1981 Running Time: 23:39 Classification: Secret 1 Part (U) The UMSTEAD System is a videotape presentation describing the capabilities and operation of the TSEC/CI-ll UMSTEAD system. A description of each component and an operational demonstration are also given on this tape. This presentation is intended to be distributed to major commands and/or agencies to present to them this new concept in secure communications. UNCLASSIFIED I-I Equipment UNCLASSIFIED COMSEC TSEC/KG-84 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS (U) TVC-854 1981 Running Time: 45:00 Classification: Confidential 1 Part (U) This training videotape demonstrates KG-84 setup, cold start, operation, and troubleshoot­ ing at the operator level. A module on fill devices is also included.
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