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Description of document: National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) United States Cryptologic History, Special Series Crisis Collection Volume 2, The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History, 1988 Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) appeal 2013 ISCAP release date: 05-March-2018 Posted date: 14-May-2018 Source of document: Mandatory Declassification Review Request National Security Agency NSC/CSS MDR Appeal Authority DJ5 National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road STE 6881 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881 The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. 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Reid Washington, D.C. 20408 INFORMATION SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Telephone: (202) 357-5250 OVERSIGHT OFFICE Lionel Kennedy DEPARTMENT OF STATE Fax: (202) 357-5907 Eric F. Stein E-mail: [email protected] OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Patricia M. Gaviria NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION David Mengel NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL John P. Fitzpatrick, Chair March 5, 2018 Reference: ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-117 NSA MDR No. 68546/Appeal 3756 Please be advised that the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has concluded its consideration of the mandatory declassification review appeal number 2013-117 filed by you and that the 60-day period during which an agency head may appeal an ISCAP decision to the President has expired. Enclosed is a copy of the document and a chart that outlines the ISCAP decision. With the exception of any information that is otherwise authorized and warranted for withholding under applicable law, we are releasing all information declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you have questions about this appeal, please contact William C. Carpenter at (202) 357-5250. Sincerely, f'fn ~A. p,,Jly MARK A. BRADLEY Executive Secretary Enclosures Cc: Mr. Steven E. Thompson; Chief, Strategy, Plans and Policy; National Security Agency special series TOP SECRET crisis collection .. volume 2 united states cryptologic history The Suez Crisis: A Bri.ef Comint History (U) DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-117, document no. 1 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 05, 2018 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS Classified By NSAJCSSM 123-2 Declassif-tOn: Originating Agency's Determination Required national security agency central security service TOP SECRET a Contents o( this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminated outside the U.S. Intelligence Community without the pennisaion of the Director. NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be direct.eel to the Office of Cryptologic Arebives and History, T64. "f8P SECRET UMBRA UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Special Series Crisis Collection Volumie2 The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History (U) Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36) OFFICE OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 1988 TOP SECRET UMBRA NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATJONALS a UNCLASSIFIED Table of Contents Page Foreword -------.. -----'----------.. ---------·---------------------------- 'V Background ------------------------------------------------------------------------- L The Rise of Nasser --------------------------------------------- :3 A Search for Weapons ------------------ 4 The Soviet Factor - ------------------------------- 8 Soviet Surprise and Vacillation ------------------ 11 Nasser's Answer to Superpower Ambivalence 11 Israel Grows Anxious ----- ----------- ----------------- 12 British-French Fears - Real and Imagined ----------------------------------------------- 12 Eisenhower as Peacemaker ----------------------------------- 1:-1 NSA Spots a Plot ---------------------------------------------- 16 The Plot Thickens ----------------------------------------- 17 Contradiction ---------------------------------------- 19 Attack ----·------------------- ______________ _ 20 Not with a Bang, But a Wimper --------------------------- 28 Suez: A Sobering Reflection for Politics and Intelligence ------------------ 24 Shift in Perspective -- ---------------------------------------------------- 24 NSA's Performance ---------------------------------------------- ·------------------. --- 28 A Diligent, Delicate Endeavor -------------------------------- ----------------- 29 Lessons Learned, Lessons Ignored -------------------------------------------- 31 Notes --------------- ---------------------------------------------- 33 iii UNCLASSIFIED T6P SECRET UMBRA Withheld from public release under the Foreword National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. ( 3605 (P.L. 86-36) ~-NF) The Suez Crisis is another addition to the Special Series Crisis Collection published by the NSA History and Publications Division. The Suez crisis of 1956 is an interesting study of U.S. intelligence, especially its Sigint aspect, during a "brushfire" situation. The crisis prei;ented United States policymakers with a unique intelligence dilemma. Two U.S. allies, Britain and France, opposed American policy objectives, Working with Israel, they conspired to take the Suez Canal and preserve their influence in the area. This. study, by I I provides remarkable insights into Anglo American relations, U.S. relations with Egypt, France, and [srael, and American concerns over the· Soviet Union and its reaction to the crisis; The study is based c,n a review of over three thousand intercepted messages. ~-NF) Ms.! !traces the crisis from its historical roots with the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869 through the rise of Nasser to negotiations over arms and aid in constructing the Aswan Dam, to Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, to British-French-Israeli plots, to the actual invasion. She clearly shows that "the attack • occurred without our knqwledge and came as a complete surprise to 4s" - despite President Eisenhower's public statements to the contrary. U.S. intelligence, especially Sigint, provided key clues to the coming offensive: U.S. Comint closely followed the allied invasion and closely monitored Soviet reaction. ! !study also reveals that despite British-United States estrangement, the United States was dependent on British collection efforts on most Middle East targets and that the close working relationship between the Anglo poseurs in the Sigint area was never seriously threatened. In fact, during the height of the crisis U.S. and British elements continued to exchange the most sensitive information. I !study is an important contribution to our understanding of the Second Party relationship and to the use of Sigir;it in a brushfire situation. Henry F. Schorreck NSA Hist.orian v TOP SECRET UMBRA NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS l'6P 51:CRl:'f UMBRA • The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36) (U) The Suez crisis of 1956, which- erupted only days before the S011iet in11asion of Hungar;y on 4 November, was the first major test of the National Security Agency (NSA) during a short-term, "brU8h/iren crisis. The war for Suez also presented th~ United States with. a uniqtU political and intelligence dilemma: two close U.S. allies, Britain and France, opposed American policy objectives. The Suez crisis raised many provocative questions about wh€n and how m1.1Ch the United Stat.es knew about British, French, and Israeli plan.a for the invaswn of Egypt and how U.S. officials reacted to these.plans. Jn addition, the Suez war provided a fascinating case study of the role of Communications Intelligence (Comin.t) in tlu! U.S. decision-making process. Finally, the battle for Suez served as a model for e~mining the effect of political dissension and conflict on the intimat.e Anglo-American. intelligence relation.ship. How this strange and troubling crisis developed, what role Comint played in U.S. planning and policy, and how the S1.Uz conflict a/fecte!/, Anglo-American relations are the issues this poper addresses. f,f{.CCO) Before and dwing the Suez crisis, NSA analyzed more than three thousand dipltmwlic and se11en hundred military messages from Near and Middle Eastern nations as well as from other countries worldwide.1 Even coMidered