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National Security Agency (NSA) - Central Security Service Records - Record Group 457 - Holdings Management System - October 2017

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National Security Agency (NSA) - Central Security Service Records - Record Group 457 - Holdings Management System - October 2017 Description of document: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) National Security Agency (NSA) - Central Security Service Records - Record Group 457 - Holdings Management System - October 2017 Requested date: October 2017 Released date: October 2017 Posted date: 06-November-2017 Source of document: Military Textual Records Reading Room National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) College Park, MD (NARA II) The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. Hierarchical Reference Report by Record Group RECORD GROUP : 0457 National Security Agency/Central Security Service FINDING AID : ENTRY #: SEC CLASS: Classified ARC ID#: TITLE : NND 81609 CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 0630A : 021/001 /00 - 021/001 /00 7 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 7 A2 : 0630A : 021/002 /00 - 021/002 /00 7 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 8 - 25 A2 : 0630A : 021/003 /00 - 021/003 /00 6 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 26 - 31 1 Legal Archives Box Narrow (15 5/8 x 2 5/8 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 32 - 32 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 10.332 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 8.96875 Related Record Entry: UD15D 19; P 16; FINDING AID : ENTRY #: SEC CLASS: Unclassified ARC ID#: TITLE : JFK Collection:National Security Agency/ Central Security Service 1964 1993 CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 650L1 : 068/011 /03 - 068/011 /04 3 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 3 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 1.512 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 1.3125 COMMENTS:Records are in controlled access area. Contact Special Access/FOIA Division for reference FINDING AID : A1 ENTRY #: 9000 SEC CLASS: Declassified in Full ARC ID#: 5952548 TITLE : {Study Of The} "Historical Background Of The Signal Service (1776-1939)" 10/1944 04/1948 CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 00190 : 036/009 /01 - 036/009 /01 1 Letter Archives Box, Standard (12 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 1 A2 : 00190 : 036/011 /02 - 036/011 /02 2 Letter Archives Box, Standard (12 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 2 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 1.02 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 1.3125 COMMENTS:Partially duplicated in UD 9000. Vol.3 on microfilm; see ZZ entry 5 Transactions:NC3-457-77-1; NND 947022 FINDING AID : A1 ENTRY #: 9001 SEC CLASS: Declassified in Full ARC ID#: 5952551 TITLE : Summaries Of Intercepted Japanese Messages ("Magic" Far East Summaries), February 1944 - October 1945 02/1944 10/1945 CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 00190 : 036/013 /04 - 036/013 /05 7 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 7 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 3.528 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 3.0625 COMMENTS:See also A1 9000 A, UD 9001 and UD 9001 A. Transactions:NND 947022 Related Record Entry: A1 9001A; Relocation ID:RL1-139959551 FINDING AID : A1 ENTRY #: 9001-A SEC CLASS: Declassified in Full ARC ID#: 5952551 TITLE : Summaries Of Intercepted Japanese Messages ("Magic" Far East Summaries), March 20, 1942 - July 31, 1942 03/1942 07/31/1942 CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 00190 : 036/013 /05 - 036/013 /05 4 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 4 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 2.016 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 1.75 COMMENTS:This series was formerly part of A1 9001. See also UD 9001 and UD 9001 A Transactions:NND 947022 Related Record Entry: A1 9001; FINDING AID : A1 ENTRY #: 9002 SEC CLASS: Declassified in Full ARC ID#: 5952556 TITLE : Studies on Cryptology 1917 1977 CONTEXT INFORMATION: National Security Agency A2 : 00190 : 036/008 /06 - 036/011 /02 1 Legal Archives Box, 4.6 inch (15 1/8 x 4 5/8 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 104 - 104 67 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 103 38 Letter Archives Box, Standard (12 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 102 1 Letter Archives Box, Narrow 2.5 inch (12 5/8 x 2 5/8 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 1 A2 : 00190 : 036/009 /01 - 036/009 /07 1 Letter Archives Box, Narrow 2.5 inch (12 5/8 x 2 5/8 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 48D - 48D 3 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 48B 1 Legal Archives Box Narrow (15 5/8 x 2 5/8 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 25A - 25A 3 Letter Archives Box, Standard (12 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 48C A2 : 00190 : 036/010 /02 - 036/010 /06 1 Letter Archives Box, Narrow 2.5 inch (12 5/8 x 2 5/8 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 85A - 85A 2 Letter Archives Box, Standard (12 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 65A - 87A 1 Suit Box, Small (Pizza Box) (18 3/8 x 18 3/8 x 4 1/4) CONTAINER #s: 67A - 67A A2 : 00190 : 036/011 /02 - 036/011 /02 1 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 95A - 95A TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 55.315932 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 52.6666667 COMMENTS:See notes. Transactions:NW 37612; NW 32832; E.O. 13526; NN3-457-11-001; NN3-457-12-001; NN3-457-13-002; LTI-0457-2015-0001; NW45006; NND 947022; NN3-457-95-000 Related Record Entry: P 1; P 11; UD14D 1; UD15D 71; A1 9002; Notes:Since 2011, unredacted copies of the SRH reports have been accessioned by the National Archives. As original copies are accessioned, they have been interfiled in this record entry. Where the document that had been in this series was a non-record copy, and the original has been accessioned, the original has replaced the non-record copy.|Formerly shared boxes with A1 entry 9000, (box 1); A1 entry 9007 (box 13); A1, entry 9008 (box 9); and A1 entry 9010 (boxes 13 and 14); for partial duplicates see ZZ entries 1 and 6. FINDING AID : A1 ENTRY #: 9003 SEC CLASS: Declassified in Full ARC ID#: 5952558 TITLE : German Navy Reports Of Intercepted Radio Messages (B./X.B.) Berichte 09/08/1939 03/23/1945 CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 00190 : 036/032 /05 - 036/032 /07 12 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 9 3 Microfilm Box, Multiple Reels (13 3/8 x 4 1/2 x 4 1/2) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 3 1 Suit Box, Small (Pizza Box) (18 3/8 x 18 3/8 x 4 1/4) CONTAINER #s: 10 - 10 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 7.349 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 7.90625 COMMENTS:Boxes are numbered 1-3, 1-10, and 1-3. Series includes 375 neg. Microfiche. Some of these records are unavailable to researchers. REPRODUCED IN MICROFORM?:Y Microform: Transactions:NND 947022 FINDING AID : A1 ENTRY #: 9004 SEC CLASS: Declassified in Full ARC ID#: 5952559 TITLE : Japanese Army Attache Messages Translations {Translation Reports Of Intercepted Japanese Army Attache Messages} 08/25/1941 08/1945 CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 00190 : 036/011 /03 - 036/011 /06 24 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 24 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 12.096 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 10.5 Transactions:NND 947022; NC3-457-79-002; NC3-45-79-014 FINDING AID : A1 ENTRY #: 9005 SEC CLASS: Declassified in Full ARC ID#: 5952560 TITLE : Translation Reports Of Intercepted Japanese Army Messages 1942 1945 CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 00190 : 036/013 /07 - 036/017 /03 168 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 168 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 84.672 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 73.5 COMMENTS:For partial duplicates see ZZ entries 2 and 7 Transactions:NC3-457-78-005; NN3-457-79-001; NN3-457-79-007; NN3-457-79-009; NN3-457-79-008; NN3-457-79-010; NN3-457-79-015; NN3-457-79-021; NN3-457-79-023; NND 947022 FINDING AID : A1 ENTRY #: 9006 SEC CLASS: Declassified in Full ARC ID#: 636254 TITLE : "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries, Jan. 1, 1943 - Nov. 3, 1945 {Redacted Electrostatic Reference Copy} CONTEXT INFORMATION: A2 : 00190 : 036/017 /03 - 036/017 /06 19 Legal Archives Box, Standard (15 5/8 x 5 1/4 x 10 5/8) CONTAINER #s: 1 - 19 TOTAL CUBIC FEET: 9.576 TOTAL LINEAR FEET: 8.3125 COMMENTS:For partial duplicates on microfilm see ZZ entry 8; for redacted security copy see UD entry 9006; for full original records see A-1 entry 9030.
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