The Passions of the Will and the Passion of Christ in Franciscantheologyfromthe Summa Halensis to Duns Scotus
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Andrew V. Rosato The Passions of the Will and the Passion of Christ in FranciscanTheologyfromthe Summa Halensis to Duns Scotus Abstract: This chapter examines how the Summa Halensis’ analysis of Christ’ssorrow was adopted and modified by later Franciscan theologians.Accordingtothe teach- ing of Jerome, which Peter Lombardmade available to medieval theologians,Christ’s sorrow arose from an involuntary reaction to his physical suffering. In order to ex- pand upon Jerome’saccount,the Summa Halensis develops an elaborate map of Christ’ssoul by drawing on psychological principles found in Augustine and John Damascene. 13th century theologians debated whether Christ could experience sor- row over his ownsuffering not justasanatural and instinctual reaction, but also as the result of freelywillingthat he not suffer.Anobstacle to asserting this would be anyimplication that Christ did not will by his human willwhat God willed him to will. Richard of Middleton, Matthew of Aquasparta, and Duns Scotus do af- firm that Christ in some wayfreelynilled his own suffering, and experiencedsorrow over it because of that.Indifferent ways they employ the account of Christ’ssoul out- lined in the Summa Halensis to avoid anyimplication that Christ fell into sin by freely nilling his ownsuffering. The GospelofMatthew reports that Jesus experienced sorrow in the Garden of Geth- semane (26:37–38): ‘he began to be sorrowful [coepit contristari]and troubled. Then he said to them, “My soul is sorrowful [tristis]tothe point of death.”’ Jerome offered an influential interpretation of this passagewhen he statedthatChrist experienced the propassion of sorrow rather than afull-fledgedform of thatpassion. One differ- ence between apropassion and afull-fledgedpassion is that apropassion does not overwhelm one’sability to use reason. Apropassion, moreover,isaninvoluntary re- action,and thus not morallyblameworthy. Peter LombardmadeJerome’sinterpreta- tion of Matthew 26:37– 38 available to 13th-century theologians, who widelyaccept- ed it.¹ Yetinthe Summa Halensis the analysis of Christ’ssorrow is not limited to Jer- ome’sidea of apropassion. While the Summa Halensis certainlymaintains that Christ’sreason is not disturbed or overwhelmed by his sorrow, it describes Christ as experiencing sorrow in ways thatgobeyond an involuntary reaction to suffering. Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae (Sententiae), bk. III, d. 15,c.2,inMagistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae,ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2vols,Spicile- gium Bonaventurianum, 3–4(Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1971– 81), vol. 2, p. 99.I thank Lydia Schumacher for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. OpenAccess. ©2021 Andrew V. Rosato, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110684827-017 240 Andrew V. Rosato The Summa Halensis identifiesasoteriologicalmotive for its wayofexploring Christ’s sorrow.Drawing on its interpretation of Anselm’s Cur Deus homo,the Summa teaches that Christ had to suffer in every part of his soul in order to make satisfaction for sin. Christ experiencednot onlybodily suffering,but alsosufferingoverthe sins of others and sufferingoverthe misfortunes that befell others. To determine how this suffering led to sorrow in Christ,the Summa provides amap of Christ’ssoul thatisbasedon psychological principles drawnfrom Augustine and John Damascene. It takes from Augustine the distinction between higher and lowerreason. Following John Damas- cene, the Summa further distinguishesbetween ratio ut ratio and ratio ut natura. While the account of Christ’ssorrow in the Summa proved influential, later Fran- ciscansalsomade various modifications to what they receivedfrom the Summa. The main area of disagreementconcerns how to explain Christ’ssorrow over his own physical suffering.Ishis sorrow over this onlythe resultofanaturalreaction to bod- ilyharmordoes it in anysense arise from areasonedjudgment about his suffering? The Franciscans considered below resolve that question by consideringhow Christ’s human will stands in relation to thatsuffering. Over time there is atransition from thinking of Christ’ssorrow over his ownbodilysufferingasarising onlyfrom anat- ural wish for union between his bodyand soul to an account that also attributes sor- row over this to Christ because of what he freelywills.Thistransition begins with Richard of Middleton’saccount of sorrowinthe lower part of Christ’swill, but Mat- thew of Aquasparta and Duns Scotus even attribute sorrow to the higher part of Christ’swill as his willisafreepower.For these later Franciscans there is asense in which Christ freelywishes not to suffer,and this becomes one of the sources for the sorrow he experiences on the Cross. Summa Halensis Accordingtothe Summa Halensis thereare three ways that Christ could experience sorrow or sadness over his ownbodilysuffering: There is sorrow [tristitia]fromawill of dispensation or accordingtopropassion, which is turned towardsensuality without adisturbance in reason, and in this waytherewas sorrow in Christ.In addition to this, as will become clear,wecan consider reason-as-nature[ratio ut natura]and rea- son-as-reason [ratio ut ratio]. If ut natura,then in this waytherewas sorrow accordingtohis rea- son; but if ut ratio,then in this waythere was not sadness in his reason.² In this passagethe Summa uses Jerome’scategory of propassion to describe one form that Christ’ssorrow can take. This form of sorrow arisesfrom pain in the sensitive Alexander of Hales, Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH), 4vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), IV,P1, In1,Tr1,Q4, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 39), Respondeo, p. 63b. The Passions of the Will and the Passion of Christ in Franciscan Theology 241 powers of the soul. ForChrist it occurs as aresult of a ‘will of dispensation’ since he freelytook on ahuman nature that could experiencephysical pain. The other forms of sorrow ascribed to Christ are described in terms drawnfrom John Damascene. His distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘nature’ roughlyamountsto the distinction between the natural appetite for certain goods and the reasoned choice to pursue certain goods.³ Reason-as-nature concerns reason insofar as it unit- ed to the body, and it is because of this union thatreason suffers when the bodysuf- fers.⁴ It is natural for reason to reacttoany bodilyharm by wishing that that harm was not occurring.⁵ This natural nillingofbodilysufferingcan give rise to passions such as fear and sorrow.The Summa does not comment on how this form of sorrow is related to the propassion of sorrow, even though the waythat each is described makes them seem to be either identical or at least closely connected. As we shall see, Bonaventure considers the connection between these two descriptions of Christ’ssorrow. Taking reason in the sense of reason-as-reason, however,istoconsider reason as it is capable of transcendingthe body. Reason in this sense includes freeacts of the will.⁶ In this way, thereisnosorrow in the reason of Christ insofar as he freelywills his own suffering for the sake of human redemption. Thus, even though the Summa frames the issue of Christ’ssorrow as aquestion of whether it is in his reason, it re- solvesthis question by reference to what Christ wills by his human will. Following Augustine, the Summa adds afurther distinction to its consideration of reason accordingtowhich reason is divided into ahigher and lower part.⁷ Augus- tine makes this distinction in his De Trinitate XII. It is alsofound in the De spiritu et anima,a12th-century work that 13th-century Franciscans often attributed to Augus- tine.⁸ The distinction between higher and lower reason is also mentioned by Peter Lombardinthe second book of his Sentences,wherethe Lombardisexamining John Damascene, De fide Orthodoxa:Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus,II.22,ed. E.M. Buytaert (StBonaventure, NY:Franciscan Institute, 1955), pp. 132–42.For moreonthe placeofthis distinction in the SH and the earlier writings of Alexander of Hales,see BoydTaylorCoolman, ‘The Salvific Af- fectivity of Christ according to Alexander of Hales,’ TheThomist 71 (2007), pp. 1–38 (esp. 20–22). SH IV,P1, In1, Tr1, Q4,Ti1,M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 40), Ad obiecta 3, p. 64b: ‘Item, timor secundum rationem est dupliciter: quia est considerarerationem ut naturam, secundum quam unitur corpori et natural- iterper hoc compatitur.’ SH IV,P1, In1, Tr1, Q4,Ti1,M2, C1,Ar3 (n. 40), Solutio, p. 64a: ‘Est enim timor naturalis per modum naturae, quo modo dicit Ioannes Damascenus quod “timor naturalis est,nolenteanima dividi acor- pore” etc., “propterquod anima naturalitertimet et agoniam patitur et refugit mortem” velutnatura morbum.’ SH IV,P1, In1, Tr1, Q4,Ti1,M2, C1,Ar3 (n. 40), Ad obiecta 3, p. 64b: ‘Et est considerarerationem ut rationem, secundum quod non se habet ad corpus, immo actum habetextra corpus. Primo modo habetnaturalem ordinem ad corpus, secundo modo est in ordine ad Deum voluntarie.’ SH IV,P1, In1,Tr5,Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo, p. 200b: ‘Dicendumsine praeiudicio,quod est considerarerationem dupliciter,secundum quod dicit Augustinus quod ratio dividet se in duo, in superiorem et inferiorem secundum duplicemcomparationem.’ De spiritu et anima 11 (PL 40:787). 242 Andrew V. Rosato the human soul. Peter Lombardcharacterizes the distinction between higher and lower reason in the following way: ‘Reason is ahigher power