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Is Kiwisaver a Clever Scheme? Peter Harris, Head of Saving Product Working Group 2004

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Is Kiwisaver a Clever Scheme? Peter Harris, Head of Saving Product Working Group 2004 Is KiwiSaver a clever scheme? Peter Harris, Head of Saving Product Working Group 2004 I have been asked to address four topics: Origins of KiwiSaver What are the clever features? Incentives, tax and compulsion issues Lessons from public sector schemes The origins of KiwiSaver I am not going into this aspect of the presentation in much detail. KiwiSaver was a product of converging circumstances. When New Zealand switched to the tax neutral TTE regime in the early 1990s, most of the incentives for occupational superannuation schemes disappeared, and many of them closed to new entrants. At first, this made little difference: those who wanted to be in a scheme were in one. But as time went by, successive years of labour force new entrants were disenfranchised, and over ten plus years the numbers became quite substantial. An illustration is that the percentage of the employed workforce in occupational pension schemes fell from 23 percent in 1990 to 14 percent in 2002: it nearly halved in a little over a decade As with so much in the New Zealand political economy, momentum on new policy development is key person dependent. In this case the key person was Lynn Middleton, one of the national secretaries of the PSA. Lynn had done a masters thesis on women’s savings for income in retirement, and was highly motivated to create savings opportunities for PSA members. She made this a priority issue for PSA activism, and pressured two key Cabinet Ministers – Trevor Mallard and Michael Cullen, to set up a working party to examine options. That resulted in an employer subsidised scheme for the state sector; the State Sector Retirement Savings Scheme or SSRSS. In creating SSRSS, the government – perhaps inadvertently – exposed an anomaly : the absence of a robust retirement savings vehicle outside the state sector. This is where the second key person enters the scene. Michael Cullen had persistently argued that one of the structural weaknesses of the New Zealand economy was its low savings rate. He also had a personal view that individual savings were too low. These two policy objectives are not necessarily compatible – it is possible to increase national savings by running fiscal surpluses – and not necessarily best addressed through a single policy instrument. (See later). He did see economies of scale and administrative 1 convenience in focussing on the workplace as the conduit through which savings could be encouraged. The result was the establishment of the Savings Product Working Group. That working group designed what I would describe as the architecture of KiwiSaver. A different structure, and different people, designed the incentive systems that were overlain on that architecture. The incentives were introduced about three years after the working group report. So KiwiSaver has two distinct elements, with different strengths and weaknesses. The clever features of KiwiSaver The working group had tightly targeted terms of reference, and an important feature of them was that they were explicitly told not to look at tax incentives and subsidies: that would follow later. The result was that it did a very thorough survey of the literature, of schemes operating around the world, and of things that have been tried, to see what worked and what didn’t. With due respect to the Commission whose name nobody can remember, education on its own – while important - does not cut it. The working group reported one case study in the USA where employees who were not members of the 401K plan the employer was offering (there, employers must offer access to the tax advantaged savings plan but employees have to elect to join) attended a seminar on the advantages of participation. On leaving the seminar, all said they would join. Six months later only 14 percent had. I am not going to go into the findings of the working group report in detail, but the conclusions can be grouped under two headings; Administrative complexity and cost. Behavioural impediments to joining schemes. The group identified administrative inefficiencies in the savings regimes of various countries: multiple small balances, complicated rules, high fees, “gone no address” account holders and the like. The administrative complexity issue was addressed by having a single source of enrolment in a scheme, central collection of funds, a dedicated unique contributor identifier and allowing membership of only one scheme at any one time (with a right to transfer to another). The behavioural impediments were powerful. Inertia was a strong influence: people tend to do tomorrow what they are doing today. If they are saving today they are likely to be saving tomorrow and vice versa. There are also major confidence issues: people don’t know when to start saving, how much to save, where to save and so on. The report simply took all of those complications off the table: automatic enrolment at the start of employment with the right to opt out: set contribution rates: deduction of contributions at source: default providers and default investment choice. 2 My view is that this architecture is the strength of KiwiSaver. The working group believed that it would have worked even if there had been no subsidies, albeit through a slow build. Subsidies certainly accelerated uptake, but with uneven strengths and weaknesses. The literature I have seen indicates that this architecture is very close to world’s best practice. Let me put false modesty aside: it is world’s best practice. So what of the second dimension: incentives? Incentives There is a major debate in the literature on whether direct subsidies and tax advantages do actually raise the level of savings, or (a) merely redirect where private savings are made; and (b) are accompanied by equivalent (or greater) reductions in government savings, with a negative impact on net national savings. The most comprehensive review of international empirical studies that I am aware of, Antolin and Ponton (2007)1 suggests that tax incentives have very little, if any, impact on the net savings of higher income groups, but can increase savings within this group in the years near to retirement; do tend to increase savings by low and middle income groups; have a larger impact on lower income groups if they are accompanied by an extra payment from another party, be that the employer or the government; are more effective in increasing savings if they are delivered in an environment of “soft-compulsion” (such as a compulsory enrolment with an opt-out option); are significantly captured by the top twenty, or even ten percent of income earners, even when attempts are made to cap incentives or pay them as rebates. Summarising, then, incentives may increase private savings, especially through KiwiSaver type processes, but have an inequitable impact. There is no study that I am aware of that looks at whether any increases offset reduced public saving under KiwiSaver. Intuitively, the case to assume a net national increase in savings is weak. In the five years to 30 June 2013, members contributed $6.4 billion to KiwiSaver schemes, employers $3.5 billion and the Crown $5.3 billion. There was therefore a direct contribution by the Crown of 35 percent of money going into KiwiSaver. Put another way, the Crown stumped up one dollar for every two that was extracted either from willing contributors or coerced employers. More than half of all private contributions would have to have been new savings, and not just savings diverted from other sources into the tax advantaged vehicle, for there to have been an increase in national savings. Apart from the question of whether or not there should be any form of tax preference, there is the issue of whether the existing forms of preference are cost effective and equitable. In my book, a major design fault is making the kickstart available to children. 1 Antolin, P. and E. Lopez Ponton (2007): “The Impact of Tax Incentives on Retirement Savings: A Literature Review” OECD/IOPS Global Private Pension Conference Proceedings http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/20/40332454.pdf 3 333,000 KiwiSaver members are under 18: 31 percent of the eligible population. 23 percent of members have no income source. This is not saving: it is simply farming a tax benefit, and I would guess that most of those who have farmed it have fiscally aware parents who would almost inevitably be in the higher income groups. I do not buy the age discrimination argument. There are plenty of things people cannot do until they are 18: making joining KiwiSaver one of them simply adds to an already long list. Scheme stability Retirement savings and their decumulation are lifelong processes, and will benefit from some stability of policy so that people can plan with confidence. The architecture has been remarkably stable and resilient. The incentive system has been highly unstable. The table shows the changes made to incentives, which average one a year since the inception of the scheme. Announcement Effective Provisions from Budget May, 2005 1 April $1,000 “kick start”. Fee subsidy. 2007 Standard contribution rate of 4% of income, option to move to 8%. Employer contribution optional. First home subsidy if conditions met. Budget May, 2007 1 July Fee subsidy confirmed at $40 per member per 2007 annum. 100% tax credit to match member contributions up to $20 per week Budget May, 2007 1 April Compulsory matching employer contributions of 2008 1% of employee gross salary increasing by 1% each year until 4% subsidy reached in 2011/12. 100% KiwiSaver Employer tax credit up to $20 per week. 11 November 2008. Taxation 1 April Minimum employee contribution rate reduced to (Urgent Measures and 2009 2%. Annual Rates) Bill Compulsory employer contribution reduced to 2%.
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