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Inequality and the 2014 New Zealand General Election

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Inequality and the 2014 New Zealand General Election A BARK BUT NO BITE INEQUALITY AND THE 2014 NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION A BARK BUT NO BITE INEQUALITY AND THE 2014 NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION JACK VOWLES, HILDE COFFÉ AND JENNIFER CURTIN Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Creator: Vowles, Jack, 1950- author. Title: A bark but no bite : inequality and the 2014 New Zealand general election / Jack Vowles, Hilde Coffé, Jennifer Curtin. ISBN: 9781760461355 (paperback) 9781760461362 (ebook) Subjects: New Zealand. Parliament--Elections, 2014. Elections--New Zealand. New Zealand--Politics and government--21st century. Other Creators/Contributors: Coffé, Hilde, author. Curtin, Jennifer C, author. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU Press This edition © 2017 ANU Press Contents List of figures . vii List of tables . xiii List of acronyms . xvii Preface and acknowledgements . .. xix 1 . The 2014 New Zealand election in perspective . .. 1 2. The fall and rise of inequality in New Zealand . 25 3 . Electoral behaviour and inequality . 49 4. The social foundations of voting behaviour and party funding . 65 5. The winner! The National Party, performance and coalition politics . 95 6 . Still in Labour . 117 7 . Greening the inequality debate . 143 8 . Conservatives compared: New Zealand First, ACT and the Conservatives . 165 9. The gender dimension of inequality . 189 10. Against the tide? Māori in the Māori electorates . 215 11 . Inequalities in participation . 241 12. The unequal election . 269 References . 281 Appendix: Methods and tables . 335 List of figures Figure 1.1: Eligible voters and their ratings of the National and Labour parties on the left–right scale, 1990–2014 ........10 Figure 1.2: Party positions, New Zealand general election of 2014 ...11 Figure 1.3: Issue most important in 2014 election as reported by respondents. .13 Figure 1.4: Percentage of respondents directly referring to inequality, poverty, rich and poor, or wealth distribution ...............15 Figure 2.1: Net disposable income Gini, market Gini and difference between net and market Gini (redistribution) in nine countries, 2008 ...............................31 Figure 2.2: The net Gini index for New Zealand, 1960–2013 ......31 Figure 2.3: Tax changes, 1984–2010 .........................34 Figure 2.4: Union membership in New Zealand (percentage of wage and salary earners) ...................39 Figure 4.1: Class voting in New Zealand, 1963–2014 ............68 Figure 4.2: The social and demographic correlates of structural inequality and vote for the National Party .................72 Figure 4.3: The social and demographic correlates of structural inequality and vote for the Labour Party ..................73 Figure 4.4: The social and demographic correlates of structural inequality and vote for the Green Party ...................74 Figure 4.5: The social and demographic correlates of structural inequality and vote for the New Zealand First Party ..........75 Figure 4.6: Parental partisanship and voting choice, 2014 election ...76 vii A BARk BuT No BITE Figure 4.7: Income and assets interaction and Labour vote (with 95 per cent confidence intervals) ....................79 Figure 4.8: Perceptions of economic security or insecurity .........80 Figure 4.9: Confidence in getting a new job, National and Labour vote choice. 81 Figure 4.10: Perceptions of loss of income and vote choice .........82 Figure 4.11: How baseline social structure, security and aspirations affect left–right positions ..............................83 Figure 4.12: Left–right position, relative income and assets ........84 Figure 4.13: Campaign expenditure 2014 election by party (in NZ Dollars) . 88 Figure 4.14: Donations to political parties, 2012–2014 ...........89 Figure 5.1: Quarterly economic growth (annual, on previous quarter), 2002–2014 .................................97 Figure 5.2: Economic confidence, 2003–2014 ..................98 Figure 5.3: Effects of previous vote and perceptions of the economy on the probability of voting National ............101 Figure 5.4: Perceptions of John Key and the National-led government .......................................104 Figure 5.5: Effects of government performance evaluations, conditioned by previous vote, on the probability of voting National ....................................105 Figure 5.6: The effect of liking John Key, conditioned by assessment of truth in Dirty Politics on the probability of voting National ..................................108 Figure 5.7: Most unpopular party (percentage disliking) .........113 Figure 5.8: Mean score party popularities .....................113 Figure 5.9: The effect of (dis)liking the Internet Party on the probability of voting National ....................114 Figure 6.1: Less or much less government expenditure wanted on various items of public policy .......................121 viii LIST oF FIGuRES Figure 6.2: Average scores on expenditure dimensions by party vote 2014: Targeted benefits. 122 Figure 6.3: Average scores on expenditure dimensions by party vote 2014: Universal benefits. .123 Figure 6.4: Raising the age of eligibility for New Zealand superannuation and socio-demographic variables ...........125 Figure 6.5: Age and Māori/non-Māori and raising the age of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation .............126 Figure 6.6: Social structure, ideology and opinions on a capital gains tax ................................128 Figure 6.7: The effects of age on support for capital gains tax, conditional on ownership of a business or rental property ....129 Figure 6.8: The Treaty should not be part of the law by party vote ..131 Figure 6.9: Support among Māori and non-Māori that the Treaty should be part of the law .............................132 Figure 6.10: Probabilities of believing that the Treaty should be part of the law ...................................133 Figure 6.11: Attitudes towards inequality by party votes in 2011 and 2014 (averages) ................................136 Figure 6.12: Correlates of attitudes opposing inequality (predicted probabilities) ..............................137 Figure 6.13: Probability of Labour vote by pension age reform .....139 Figure 6.14: Probability of 2014 Labour vote by support or opposition to the Treaty conditioned by Labour vote or otherwise in 2011 ................................140 Figure 6.15: Probability of Labour vote by capital gains tax attitudes. 141 Figure 6.16: Probability of Labour vote by attitudes to inequality ...141 Figure 7.1: Left–right positioning of NZES respondents, 2014 election. .149 Figure 7.2: Probability of voting Green by subjective social class ...152 Figure 7.3: Left–right and liberal–authoritarian attitudes as predictors of voting Green, 2014 election ...............153 ix A BARk BuT No BITE Figure 7.4: The interactive effects of libertarian–authoritarian positions and left positions on the probability of voting for the Green Party. .154 Figure 7.5: Environment versus economic development (comparison of means) per party choice ..................157 Figure 7.6: The interactive effects of environmental opinions and preferences about reducing inequality on the probability of voting for the Green Party . .158 Figure 8.1: Authoritarian–libertarian attitudes by party voting groups (standardised scale) ............................170 Figure 8.2: Correlates of authoritarianism–libertarianism by socio-demographic groups ..........................172 Figure 8.3: Attitudes towards the number of immigrants by party vote (in percentage) ..........................176 Figure 8.4: Inequality attitudes and immigration attitudes ........178 Figure 8.5: Correlates of immigration attitudes by social groups, aspirations and security ..............................179 Figure 8.6: Abortion is always wrong by party vote, 2014 .........180 Figure 8.7: Attitudes towards abortion by social groups and the authoritarian–libertarian dimension .....................181 Figure 8.8: Vote choice for New Zealand First or not ............183 Figure 8.9: Vote choice for the Conservatives or not .............184 Figure 8.10: Liking or disliking the ACT Party: Baseline social, demographic and group variables: Model I. ...............186 Figure 8.11: Liking or disliking the ACT Party: Model II ........187 Figure 9.1: Percentage party votes for women and men ..........195 Figure 9.2: Percentage support that the Treaty of Waitangi should be part of the law by gender .....................197 Figure 9.3: Preferences concerning inequality and gender .........198 Figure 9.4: Preferences for expenditure on universal benefits by gender and age ..................................199 x LIST oF FIGuRES Figure 9.5: Preferences for expenditure on targeted benefits by gender and age ..................................200 Figure 9.6: Means of protecting the environment versus economic development by gender ..............................201 Figure 9.7: Interest in politics by gender ......................202 Figure 9.8: Percentage support for an increase in the number of female MPs by gender .............................207 Figure 9.9: Percentage support for an increase in women’s representation by age and
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