The Bandung Ideology: Anti-Colonial Internationalism and Indonesia's

Th e Bandung ideology: Anti-colonial internationalism and Indonesia’s foreign policy (1945-1965) Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar Abstract—In this paper, I introduce the concept of “anti-colonial internationalism” as the ideological source of Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. Th is concept has been neglected by international relations scholars in favor of the rival idea of “liberal internationalism.” I argue that anti-colonial internationalism in Indonesia’s foreign policy has been rooted in three aspects, namely 1) decolonial thought that was developed by Indonesian anti-colonial intellectuals in early 20th century, 2) the political thoughts of nationalist leaders and debates during the state formation process in 1945, and 3) the memory of the diplomatic struggle during the revolutionary era (1945-1955). Th e inauguration of the Bandung Conference exemplifi es the outreach of anti-colonial internationalism, which inspires the call for decolonization in world politics. Taking the Bandung Conference as the point of departure, this article will investigate the extent to which decolonial thought and anti-colonial nationalism works with an “internationalist” spirit in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. Keywords: Bandung Conference, decolonial thought, anti-colonial internationalism, Indonesia’s foreign policy, ideology Introduction In this paper, I propose a new concept of “internationalism” that emerged in the early 20th century and which was manifested in Indonesia’s foreign policy during 1945-1965, namely “anti-colonial internationalism.” Mainstream studies on “internationalism” in the study of international relations (IR) have been primarily identi- Asian Review 30(2), 2017, pp. 57–78. Th e Bandung ideology fi ed with “liberal internationalism” (see, among others, Paris 1997, Ikenberry 2011, Dunne and McDonald 2012), while the alternative idea of “internationalism” that is based upon decolonial thought and anti-colonial struggle in the so-called “Th ird World” has often been neglected. However, with the recent “historical turn” and the resur- gence of decolonial perspectives in international relations theories, it is important to understand how the idea of anti-colonial internationalism emerged in Indonesia’s foreign policy and what lessons can be learned from its rise and fall in world politics. To further explain the manifestation of “anti-colonial internationalism” in Indonesia’s foreign policy, I shall ask two specifi c questions. Firstly, how and under what ideological considerations did Indo- nesia formulate a specifi c anti-colonial foreign policy between 1945 and1965? Secondly, what are the historical, social, and intellectual roots of Indonesia’s foreign policy and how does this relate to the politics of anti-colonial internationalism between 1945 and 1965? What I refer to as “anti-colonial internationalism” is an ideology that was historically constructed from the early 20th century (in Indonesian nationalist thought), socially embedded within Indonesia’s struggle to gain independence before and during the revolutionary era, and internationally articulated in the emerging interstate relations in the aftermath of the World War II. To substantiate the argument, I shall off er a rethinking of Indonesia’s foreign policy after 1945 as a continuation of the anti-colonial struggle at the international level, which attempted to reconfi gure international politics amidst the growing US-Soviet rivalry. By drawing upon the Cambridge School’s approach to “ideology” (primarily from the works of Quentin Skinner and David Armitage), I propose a central argument that anti-colonial internationalism underpinned Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965 through Indonesia’s active involvement in calling for decolonization in world politics. Th e argument will proceed in four sections. Th e fi rst section will defi ne the concept of anti-colonial internationalism, its ideological and intellectual underpinnings and how it relates to the Bandung Conference, and its presence in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. Th e second section will explain the roots of Indo- nesia’s foreign policy, its prominent role during the Independence Revolution (1945-1949) and how it led Indonesia to embrace a strong 58 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar anti-colonial vision in postwar international politics. Th e third section will specifi cally discuss the Bandung Conference and the “globaliza- tion” of the anti-colonial struggle in the 1950s up to its subsequent decline in the 1960s due to a transformation in Indonesia’s foreign policy after the 1959 Presidential Decree and its reversal following the rise of Soeharto’s New Order. Th e fi nal section concludes by outlining some trajectories concerning the future of the “Bandung Ideology” in current world politics. Ideology and international relations: defi ning anti-colonial internationalism My fi rst step in explaining anti-colonial internationalism in Indo- nesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965 is to formulate a specifi c theoretical framework to defi ne “anti-colonial internationalism.” I do so by fi rstly juxtaposing the relationship between “ideology” and IR. According to Keohane (1988), international relations theory has been dominated by the debate between “rationalist” and “refl ectivist,” in which the former argues for the use of scientifi c-empiricist methodology to explain international politics and the latter opposes the use of any such methodology and attempts to explain what is going on in world politics through normative-critical lens.1 Recent criticisms, particularly from post-colonial theories, have been directed at this distinction for its failure to recognize non-European subjects and, moreover, for its neglect of the varieties of the so-called “refl ectivist” approach to international relations (Hobson 2012). By bringing the question of ideology, in this instance of anti-colonial internationalism, into the consideration of foreign policy I shall endeavor to contribute to overcoming the above mentioned problems. Here I do not refer to ideology simply as cultural-normative or phil- osophical belief that is held by policymakers to justify their foreign policy (see, for example, Dawisha 1983; Leifer 1983; Xiao, Kejin, and 1 Even though “rationalism vs refl ectivism” is not currently considered by IR scholars as one of the “great debates” in IR theory, when John Mearsheimer, a prominent “rationalist” in IR theoretical tradition launched an attack on refl ectivists in one of his well-known articles (Mearsheimer 1994) the debate came back to life. His attack has been responded to by several institutionalists, critical theorists and constructivists. See also Wendt (1995). 59 Th e Bandung ideology Shiauhua 2003; Sukma 2003, 2004). More specifi cally, I understand ideology as the relationship between the social practice and a particular idea that historically underpins the practice of international relations. To substantiate this argument, the works of scholars associated with the so-called “Cambridge School of Intellectual History,” most notably Quentin Skinner and David Armitage provide useful catego- ries of ideology, which will be suggested as a framework to defi ne anti- colonial internationalism and its manifestation in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. Quentin Skinner’s understanding of the history of ideas will be taken as the point of departure to clearly understand what ideology is. Even though Skinner does not necessarily defi ne what ideology is, he has provided a comprehensive account on the history of ideas (see Skinner 1965, 1966, 1969).2 In his classic work, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas (1965), Skinner diff erenti- ates two modes of inquiries in the study of the history of ideas. One mode refers to internalist methodology, which traces the history of ideas merely in the “dialogue” between an idea with other ideas that emerged in the past. A second mode, in sharp contrast, refers to exter- nalist methodology, which considers a particular idea/thought as a product of change in the social-political context instead of intellectual development. Both methodologies, according to Skinner, contain weaknesses because they fail to understand the relationship between “social transformation” and “intellectual development.” Furthermore, Skinner introduces a third mode of inquiry in the history of ideas, namely contextualism, which locates ideas as a product of the inter- action between social transformation at the material level with intellectual development at the ideational level (see Skinner 1969, see also Hobson 2013, Shilliam 2009). Skinner’s contextualist approach to the history of ideas has opened a space to reconstruct a broader theory of ideology. From Skinner’s defi nition, it could be argued that ideology is contextually underpinned through a dialectic between social practice and a particular idea 2 Skinner wrote several articles on ideology, in which he identifi ed the concept of “English Ideology” in terms of Whiggism during the English Revolution. He traced how Whiggish ideology emerged victorious over the confl icting ideological positions during the English revolution. His defi nition of “ideology,” in this sense, connects to his more famous writing on the meaning and understanding of the history of ideas. 60 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar that underpins the practice. Armitage (2000) more explicitly defi nes ideology in two senses, namely: 1) as a particular

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