The Bandung Ideology: Anti-Colonial Internationalism and Indonesia's

Th e Bandung ideology: Anti-colonial internationalism and Indonesia’s foreign policy (1945-1965)

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar

Abstract—In this paper, I introduce the concept of “anti-colonial internationalism” as the ideological source of Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. Th is concept has been neglected by international relations scholars in favor of the rival idea of “liberal internationalism.” I argue that anti-colonial internationalism in Indonesia’s foreign policy has been rooted in three aspects, namely 1) decolonial thought that was developed by Indonesian anti-colonial intellectuals in early 20th century, 2) the political thoughts of nationalist leaders and debates during the state formation process in 1945, and 3) the memory of the diplomatic struggle during the revolutionary era (1945-1955). Th e inauguration of the Bandung Conference exemplifi es the outreach of anti-colonial internationalism, which inspires the call for decolonization in world politics. Taking the Bandung Conference as the point of departure, this article will investigate the extent to which decolonial thought and anti-colonial nationalism works with an “internationalist” spirit in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965.

Keywords: Bandung Conference, decolonial thought, anti-colonial internationalism, Indonesia’s foreign policy, ideology

Introduction

In this paper, I propose a new concept of “internationalism” that emerged in the early 20th century and which was manifested in Indonesia’s foreign policy during 1945-1965, namely “anti-colonial internationalism.” Mainstream studies on “internationalism” in the study of international relations (IR) have been primarily identi-

Asian Review 30(2), 2017, pp. 57–78. Th e Bandung ideology fi ed with “liberal internationalism” (see, among others, Paris 1997, Ikenberry 2011, Dunne and McDonald 2012), while the alternative idea of “internationalism” that is based upon decolonial thought and anti-colonial struggle in the so-called “Th ird World” has often been neglected. However, with the recent “historical turn” and the resurgence of decolonial perspectives in international relations theories, it is important to understand how the idea of anti-colonial internationalism emerged in Indonesia’s foreign policy and what lessons can be learned from its rise and fall in world politics. To further explain the manifestation of “anti-colonial internationalism” in Indonesia’s foreign policy, I shall ask two specifi c questions. Firstly, how and under what ideological considerations did Indo- nesia formulate a specifi c anti-colonial foreign policy between 1945 and1965? Secondly, what are the historical, social, and intellectual roots of Indonesia’s foreign policy and how does this relate to the politics of anti-colonial internationalism between 1945 and 1965? What I refer to as “anti-colonial internationalism” is an ideology that was historically constructed from the early 20th century (in Indonesian nationalist thought), socially embedded within Indonesia’s struggle to gain independence before and during the revolutionary era, and internationally articulated in the emerging interstate relations in the aftermath of the World War II. To substantiate the argument, I shall off er a rethinking of Indonesia’s foreign policy after 1945 as a continuation of the anti-colonial struggle at the international level, which attempted to reconfi gure international politics amidst the growing US-Soviet rivalry. By drawing upon the Cambridge School’s approach to “ideology” (primarily from the works of Quentin Skinner and David Armitage), I propose a central argument that anti-colonial internationalism underpinned Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965 through Indonesia’s active involvement in calling for decolonization in world politics. Th e argument will proceed in four sections. Th e fi rst section will defi ne the concept of anti-colonial internationalism, its ideological and intellectual underpinnings and how it relates to the Bandung Conference, and its presence in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. Th e second section will explain the roots of Indo- nesia’s foreign policy, its prominent role during the Independence Revolution (1945-1949) and how it led Indonesia to embrace a strong

58 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar anti-colonial vision in postwar international politics. Th e third section will specifi cally discuss the Bandung Conference and the “globaliza- tion” of the anti-colonial struggle in the 1950s up to its subsequent decline in the 1960s due to a transformation in Indonesia’s foreign policy after the 1959 Presidential Decree and its reversal following the rise of Soeharto’s New Order. Th e fi nal section concludes by outlining some trajectories concerning the future of the “Bandung Ideology” in current world politics.

Ideology and international relations: defi ning anti-colonial internationalism

My fi rst step in explaining anti-colonial internationalism in Indo- nesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965 is to formulate a specifi c theoretical framework to defi ne “anti-colonial internationalism.” I do so by fi rstly juxtaposing the relationship between “ideology” and IR. According to Keohane (1988), international relations theory has been dominated by the debate between “rationalist” and “refl ectivist,” in which the former argues for the use of scientifi c-empiricist methodology to explain international politics and the latter opposes the use of any such methodology and attempts to explain what is going on in world politics through normative-critical lens.1 Recent criticisms, particularly from post-colonial theories, have been directed at this distinction for its failure to recognize non-European subjects and, moreover, for its neglect of the varieties of the so-called “refl ectivist” approach to international relations (Hobson 2012). By bringing the question of ideology, in this instance of anti-colonial internationalism, into the consideration of foreign policy I shall endeavor to contribute to overcoming the above mentioned problems. Here I do not refer to ideology simply as cultural-normative or philosophical belief that is held by policymakers to justify their foreign policy (see, for example, Dawisha 1983; Leifer 1983; Xiao, Kejin, and

1 Even though “rationalism vs refl ectivism” is not currently considered by IR scholars as one of the “great debates” in IR theory, when John Mearsheimer, a prominent “rationalist” in IR theoretical tradition launched an attack on refl ectivists in one of his well-known articles (Mearsheimer 1994) the debate came back to life. His attack has been responded to by several institutionalists, critical theorists and constructivists. See also Wendt (1995).

59 Th e Bandung ideology

Shiauhua 2003; Sukma 2003, 2004). More specifi cally, I understand ideology as the relationship between the social practice and a particular idea that historically underpins the practice of international relations. To substantiate this argument, the works of scholars associated with the so-called “Cambridge School of Intellectual History,” most notably Quentin Skinner and David Armitage provide useful catego- ries of ideology, which will be suggested as a framework to defi ne anti- colonial internationalism and its manifestation in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. Quentin Skinner’s understanding of the history of ideas will be taken as the point of departure to clearly understand what ideology is. Even though Skinner does not necessarily defi ne what ideology is, he has provided a comprehensive account on the history of ideas (see Skinner 1965, 1966, 1969).2 In his classic work, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas (1965), Skinner diff erenti- ates two modes of inquiries in the study of the history of ideas. One mode refers to internalist methodology, which traces the history of ideas merely in the “dialogue” between an idea with other ideas that emerged in the past. A second mode, in sharp contrast, refers to exter- nalist methodology, which considers a particular idea/thought as a product of change in the social-political context instead of intellectual development. Both methodologies, according to Skinner, contain weaknesses because they fail to understand the relationship between “social transformation” and “intellectual development.” Furthermore, Skinner introduces a third mode of inquiry in the history of ideas, namely contextualism, which locates ideas as a product of the inter- action between social transformation at the material level with intellectual development at the ideational level (see Skinner 1969, see also Hobson 2013, Shilliam 2009). Skinner’s contextualist approach to the history of ideas has opened a space to reconstruct a broader theory of ideology. From Skinner’s defi nition, it could be argued that ideology is contextually underpinned through a dialectic between social practice and a particular idea

2 Skinner wrote several articles on ideology, in which he identifi ed the concept of “English Ideology” in terms of Whiggism during the English Revolution. He traced how Whiggish ideology emerged victorious over the confl icting ideological positions during the English revolution. His defi nition of “ideology,” in this sense, connects to his more famous writing on the meaning and understanding of the history of ideas.

60 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar that underpins the practice. Armitage (2000) more explicitly defi nes ideology in two senses, namely: 1) as a particular understanding of how society works; and 2) as a worldview that is embedded in society but is contestable by those who do not share it. Following Armitage, I defi ne ideology in terms of interactions between the ideational aspect (ideas, interests, norms), material conditions that underpin a particular foreign policy choice and the history of that particular idea. Within this broad defi nition, ideology is neither understood in terms of a cultural-normative foundation upheld by a particular state nor derived merely from a certain philosophical foundation but is embedded in 1) the historical origins of a particular ideas related to foreign policy, 2) the “social” context within which the idea is historically formed, and 3) the “international context” within which the idea is formally articulated as a foreign policy. Th erefore, in order to iden- tify the ideological underpinning of a particular foreign policy, one needs to understand the history of the particular ideas that constitute a state’s foreign policy, trace how a particular actor articulates the idea in foreign policy practice and, fi nally, locates the ideology in the state’s interactions with other actors in world politics. Th is contextual approach to international relations is useful in defi ning “anti-colonial internationalism.” We can recall that Halliday reprised the idea of internationalism by diff erentially incorporating it into international relations theory, an endeavor that coincided with the end of Cold War (Colas and Lawson 2010; Colas 2011).3 In his famous lecture (1988), Halliday argued that “internationalism” could serve as a “bridge” between the “rationalist” approach, which empha-

3 It is important not to confl ate “internationalism” and “cosmopolitanism.” Internationalism, as Halliday explains, does not necessitate the transcendence of the “nation-state” at the expense of a “universal” order bigger than that state. It is possible to have “internationalism” that still acknowledges the existence of the nation-state, as is evident in what Halliday called “revolutionary” internationalism, which also includes the Th ird World revolutionary struggle. Th is diff ers from the arguments of “cosmopolitan” internationalism, which tends to see internationalism in the liberal normative assumption of peace and prosperity. See Halliday (1988: 194-197). In addition, there are also various forms of internationalism from diff erent ideological orientations, which do not necessarily transcend “the nation state” at the expense of cosmopolitan order. See, for example, concepts such as “socialist internationalism,” “Asian internationalism,” “fascist internationalism,” or “social democratic internationalism” (see Amrith 2005; Colas 1994; Kuisma 2007; Steff ek 2015).

61 Th e Bandung ideology sizes the role of foreign policy and interstate relations in an established international system, and the “normative” approach that puts forward the idea of “moral obligation” of states in shaping the world order. He defi nes “internationalism” simply as “the idea that we both are and should be part of a broader community than that of the nation or the state,” which refers to “internationalism” as the extension of “nationalism” in world politics (Halliday 1988, 187). Against this basic premise, Halliday distinguishes internationalism in three types: liberal internationalism, hegemonic internationalism, and revolutionary internationalism (Halliday 1988, 192-197). Emerging literature on “internationalism” shows that the concep- tualization of “internationalism” covers a specifi c ideational foundation that leads to the practice of internationalism of a state, which moreover locates the position of the state in world politics (see Steff ek 2015; McDonald and Dunne 2012). It more specifi cally means that “internationalism” should be located in the relationship between a “state’s foreign policy” and “ideology.” Following Halliday, I agree that internationalism is best understood in terms of “internationalization of the state,” which requires us to understand the “foreign policy” of a particular state (Halliday 1988: 188). However, in contrast to much of the “rationalist” literature on foreign policy analysis (e.g., Allison 1971), I argue that foreign policy should also be understood as a particular “ideology” that is held by state policy-makers or (in democratic states) the ruling party in the state.4 Understanding “internationalism” in terms of ideology will enable us to explain why a particular state embraces a particular form of “internationalism.” In addition to Halliday’s three forms of internationalism, I introduce the concept of “anti-colonial internationalism” that emerged as the prominent feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1966. Th is form of internationalism was arguably practiced by new independent states, such as Indonesia or Ghana, to articulate their ideological vision—namely “anti-colonialism” in world politics. Moreover, I defi ne “anti-colonial internationalism” as the international

4 It should be noted, however, that the ideological underpinning of particular party does not always refl ect the foreign policy choice. To avoid overgeneralisation, I shall trace “ideology” not only in a party’s formal-constitutional beliefs but also in the relationship between ideas, material condition and historical origins.

62 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar engagement of that aim to put forward the anti-colonial ideology in world politics, primarily through diplomatic means or through alli- ances with other states or non-state actors. Against the idea that Indo- nesia’s foreign policy is merely the product of technocratic rational- choice or that it refl ected a free and active foreign policy (Anwar 1994; Sukma 1995) this article seeks to show that it has been historically shaped by particular ideologies, including those of the anti-colonial nationalists, communists or even, perhaps, right-wing nationalists and the military elite. Th e clear manifestation of anti-colonial internationalism, in the case of Indonesia’s foreign policy, was the 1955 Asian- African Conference (famous as the “Bandung Conference”). I now turn to the rise of anti-colonial internationalism and its decline after the fall of Soekarno in 1965.

Anti-colonial roots of Indonesia’s foreign policy

Having defi ned anti-colonial internationalism, I shall move to trace its roots back to the development of Indonesian nationalist thought from the early 20th century. Following Skinner (1966), I shall fi rstly trace the origins of anti-colonial internationalism before contextualizing its manifestation in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965.5 I argue that there are at least three roots of anti-colonial internationalism in Indonesia’s foreign policy, including 1) the anti- colonialism that emerged in the early 20th century, 2) the debates over the making of Indonesian state in 1945; and 3) the memory of the diplomatic struggle between 1945 and 1949. Let us begin with the fi rst root of anti-colonial internationalism, namely anti-colonial thought. Indonesian public intellectuals and political activists developed a vast range of anti-colonial thought

5 Skinner’s contextual approach to the history of ideas involves two strategies: 1) studying all possible situations that serves as the background of a particular text; and 2) writing the history of a particular sentence until it constitutes a text. Whilst I do not intend to wholly employ these strategies in my analysis, Skinner’s tools provide a point of departure in explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy, which will be traced to the history of anti-colonialism and internationalism. I shall begin by tracing the history of anti-colonialism and internationalism as the ideational backbone of the Indone- sian state, before contextualizing its manifestation in Indonesia’s foreign policy in the following sections.

63 Th e Bandung ideology during the era of “national awakening” between 1908 (the establish- ment of Boedi Oetomo) and 1926 (the failed anti-colonial rebellion orchestrated by the Indonesian Communist Party) (McVey 1967). Th is anti-colonial thought was developed by Islamic Movements (particularly Sarekat Islam), Nationalists (the Soekarno-led PNI), Indonesian students in the Netherlands (Perhimpunan Indonesia), Communists (PKI) and even Javanese traditionalists (such as Tjipto Mangoenkoe- soemo and Ki Hajar Dewantoro) (Sajed 2015; Fakih 2017; McVey 1967).What made anti-colonialism emerge as the “common denomi- nator” of this vast range of ideologies was its similar objective, that is, to resist the Dutch colonizer as “the common other,” and therefore direct the political struggle to resisting Dutch colonial policy, albeit with diff erent strategies and modes of resistance. It is clear that the idea of “Indonesia” was only articulated in the early 20th century (Elson 2008). In the 19th century, no prominent anti-colonial leaders in traditional Indonesian Kingdoms (who were subjugated by Dutch authoritarian colonial rule) embraced the unifi ed idea of Indonesia as a nation-state. For example, the uprising in Central Java (led by Prince Diponegoro) did not resist colonial rule and its indigenous collaborators in nationalist terms but aimed instead to establish a unifi ed “Javanese” Kingdom. (see Anderson 1983, 2016). Th e idea of Indonesia did not emerge as a “word” until a group of students in the Netherlands encountered the word, fi rst coined by Dahlan Abdullah and his Dutch colleague, Professor van Vollenhoven in Leiden (Nagazumi 1978). Wherever the word came from, the invention of “Indonesia” to signify the native population of the people in the Dutch East Indies was then politically utilized to strengthen the nationalist spirit among Indonesian students and political activists in Indonesia, the Netherlands, and, even, the Middle East. Th e idea of Indonesia, therefore, gained political momentum with its function of diff erentiating people in the colony from the colonizers, which later was to become a common political identity prior to and after the Declaration of Independence in the 1945. However, the articulation of this idea was only formulated as a form of internationalism when Indonesian political leaders, most notably Soekarno (through his concept of “nationalism in the garden of internationalism”) and Hatta (through his idea of a free and active foreign policy) formulated the broader idea of internationalism in the

64 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar direction of Indonesia’s foreign policy after 1945. Th is activity thus constituted the second root of Indonesia’s anti-colonial internationalism. In his famous speech on 1 June 1945 before the meeting of Dokyuritsu Zunbi Cusakai (Th e Investigatory Team for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence), Soekarno forcefully argued that,

…we do not only aim to establish an independent Indonesia, but we should also move towards a family of nationhood. Th is is my second philosophical principle, which I shall suggest to you and what I refer to as “internationalism.” What I mean by “internationalism” is not similar to “cosmopolitanism,” which does not accept nationalism and says that there is no Nippon (Japanese), there is no Burmese, there is no British, there is no American, and so on. Internationalism cannot grow if it does not have a root in the earth of nationalism. Nationalism cannot grow if it does not live in the garden of internationalism… (Soekarno 1945)

In his speech, Soekarno formulated two dimensions of what he called “internationalism.” Firstly, “internationalism” is inseparable from “nationalism.” Soekarno imagined Indonesian nationalism as an “international” concept, which is embedded in the very concept of Indonesian nationalism and the historical struggle to obtain independence from Dutch colonizers and, therefore, places Indonesia in world politics. Secondly, the concept of “internationalism” should also place Indonesia in an equal position with other states (even with the British and the Americans, whom Soekarno considered to be colonizers), which obvi- ously requires decolonization. Soekarno made an interesting comparison with Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States of American that

... there are diff erences between Soviet-Russia, Saudi Arabia, Britain, America, and so on … but there is also a similarity, that is: the Saudi Arabian people can defend their country. Russians can defend their country. Americans can defend their country. It means that … when a nation can defend their country, with their own blood, that is the time that the country is ready for independence. (Soekarno 1945)

It is therefore clear from this passage that Soekarno intended to embrace a specifi c concept of “internationalism,” defi ned in an anti-

65 Th e Bandung ideology colonialist spirit.6 One might argue that Soekarno strongly espoused nationalism rather than a concrete internationalist approach. However, a contextualist reading of Soekarno’s political thought after Indonesian independence—as will be demonstrated in the next section—shows that Soekarno articulated nationalism in an internationalist way by calling for decolonization in world politics, therefore incorporating the idea of Th ird World nationalism in the changing global political order. Th is, of course, requires a clear conception of Indonesia’s foreign policy so as to make Indonesian nationalism and, by extension its internationalism, active in world politics. It was Hatta who formulated a specifi c idea about “free” and “active” foreign policy in his speech before Indonesian National Committee, the early parliament in Indo- nesia. In his speech on 2 September 1945, Hatta argued that,

... the Government suggests that the principle that we need to put into action is that we should not be an object in international political confl ict, but we should be a subject that can decide our principle, has a right to fi ght for our objective, that is: the full independence of Indonesia. (Hatta 1945)

Th ere seems to be a misunderstanding among foreign policy analysts that this speech endorses a form of “pacifi sm” or “neutrality” (see, for example Anwar 1994; Sukma 1995; Perwita 2007; Weatherbee 2005). However, if we read the following passage from Hatta’s same speech, we can reach a diff erent conclusion,

... our struggle should be related to our old slogan: believe in ourselves and fi ght with our ability. It does not mean that we do not take opportunities from international political confl icts. It is true that every political action to gain a strong state position should utilise international political confl ict itself to reach our national objective. Th e Dutch did that, and every other state does that…so why don’t we also do that? Every person among us may have some sympathetic

6 It is also important to note that what Soekarno referred as “internationalism” is diff erent from “cosmopolitanism” which tends to transcend the concept of the “nation-state.” Th is idea was later adopted in the opening of Indonesian Constitu- tion, which stated that “independence is the right of all nations, and therefore colonialism should be removed” (see Undang-Undang Dasar 1945).

66 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar

feelings to one group or another, but our national struggle should not be divided on the basis of sympathy but should also be based on reality, that is to our national interest all the time… (Hatta 1945)

Hatta was suggesting that sympathies for a particular group should not be allowed to divide Indonesia ideologically and that national interest was central to its foreign policy. Hatta thus made an important contribution to Indonesia’s foreign policy, in which he put Indonesia’s internationalist approach (through his reference to using international political confl ict to strengthen the national position) at the heart of “national interest.” He extended Soekarno’s conception of nationalism to a wider concept of “national interest” in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Th is doctrine constitutes a mixture of “realism” but put in a broader anti-colonial perspective (for example, Soekarno mentions the Dutch as an example). Th is speech, however, did not merely endorse a narrow concept of “national interest” in Indonesia’s foreign policy. If we put his speech in a wider historical context, what he refers to as “national interest” is to maintain the independence of Indonesia amid Dutch sovereignty claims over Indonesia as their colony. It is clear that Hatta’s speech was made in the context of the anti-colonial struggle and recommended that the Indonesian government and foreign policymakers did not to rely on one particular political force in world politics but rather stuck to the broader national interest to fully decolonize the nation. Th e third root of Indonesian foreign policy is the memory of the Indonesian revolutionary struggle against the Dutch that occurred between 1945 and 1949. After Soekarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on 17 August 1945, the Dutch continued to claim sovereignty over the territory. Hatta’s speech was delivered against this political crisis. Having declared independence, Soekarno and Hatta mobilized support and led the struggle to defend against all actions until the two countries met at a Round Table Conference (Konferensi Meja Bundar) in Th e Hague (23 August – 2 November 1949). Th e “revolutionary” struggle combined various forms of political mobilization, armed struggle, guerrilla warfare and, most importantly, the diplomatic struggle in various international institutions (see Kahin 1952; Fogg 2012, 2015). Following the proclamation of independence, Indonesian diplo-

67 Th e Bandung ideology macy was mobilized to gain recognition for the new state: Hatta, whose concept of a “free and active foreign policy” became the corner- stone of Indonesia’s revolutionary foreign policy; foreign minister, Achmad Soebardjo, prime minister, Sjahrir, Muslim intellectual and diplomat, Agus Salim, revolutionary leader, Tan Malaka and another Muslim intellectual, Muhammad Roem, all played important roles. (Th ussu 1990; Fogg 2015). Alongside these revolutionary leaders, others who were appointed as ambassadors in the early revolutionary era conveyed Indonesian aspirations; such as, Rashidi (Egypt), Usman Sastroamidjojo (Australia), and Sudarsono (India). Diplomacy, therefore, constituted one of the most important methods in Indonesia’s revolutionary struggle against Dutch occupation (Th ussu 1990). In the Middle East, a group of Indonesian citizens joined diplomats in campaigning for Indonesia’s recognition, whilst Indonesian diplomacy in India helped to cultivate support from Indian nationalist leaders to form a new international bloc (Fogg 2015; Utama 2015). As Th ussu (1990) has rightly pointed out, diplomatic struggle played a pivotal role in Indonesia’s attempt to gain recognition as an independent state. Th rough diplomacy, for example, Indonesia was able to utilize “Asian nationalism” as a source for support at the international level. Indonesia actively participated in the Asian Relations Conference convened by India (1947) and strongly urged Asian states to support Indonesia’s struggle against Dutch occupation (see Utama 2015). Th is deepened Indonesia’s connections with other Asian and African states and also coincided with Indonesia’s campaign in the Middle East to gain support from the Arab League (Fogg 2015). Th e central role of diplomacy in the struggle against colonialism during the revolutionary era indicates a strong connection between anti-colonialism and the formulation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. I argue that the memory of this diplomatic struggle also constituted an important anti-colonial root in Indonesia’s foreign policy, which culminated in the Bandung Conference in 1955.

Staging “anti-colonial internationalism”: Bandung Conference and beyond

According to Armitage, it is important to understand ideology in terms of how it functions in society, which implies the need for

68 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar the analysis of ideology to go beyond textual analysis to uncover the social and historical background of the ideology itself (see Armitage 2000). For present purposes, this can be done by highlighting the manifestation of anti-colonial internationalism at the Bandung Conference, which served as a “diplomatic stage” to articulate anti- colonial internationalism in world politics (Shimazu 2014). Having traced the history of anti-colonialism and internationalism in Indonesia’s anti-colonial thought, I shall move to contextualize anti-colonial internationalism in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. In what follows I shall show how anti-colonial internationalism gained momentum in international politics through the Bandung Conference (1955) and how this idea was transformed following the political change in domestic and global politics after 1955. It was followed by a series of calls for decolonization in the wider areas of Asia and Africa, as well as being promoted at the United Nations after the Conference (el-Ayouty 1971). Naoko Shimazu has forcefully argued that the Bandung Confer- ence acted as a “theatre” for Asian and African states to perform diplomacy and to spread a specifi c message to the world, which was witnessing a growing bipolar order in the wake of the “Cold War.” He analyzed how the Conference organizers (a strong generation of Indonesian diplomats) attempted to use Bandung as a symbolic venue, instead of Jakarta, of the Conference. According to Shimazu, Bandung was considered as an “historic” place, not only because the city was occupied by the Dutch during the revolutionary era (after the Renville Treaty) but also because the city was the site of the struggle against colonialism from the 1920s (Shimazu 2014, 234). Shimazu also noted how the conference program was designed to deliver an anti-colonial message to the Conference participants, such as through the historic “freedom walk” undertaken by the participants, as well as Soekarno’s revolutionary speech during the opening of the Conference. Most importantly, the Conference’s Joint Communiqué also signifi ed the “performative” element of the Conference. Th e “meaning of Bandung” has been recently debated among international relations scholar, in a manner which brings the centrality of the “Bandung Conference” as a part of decolonization in world politics into question. Most scholars seem to be sceptical about the impor- tance of Bandung, arguing that the Bandung Conference was unable

69 Th e Bandung ideology to challenge the colonial legacy in world politics (Shilliam and Pham 2016). However, if we put the Bandung Conference in a wider historical context, it is clear that it was, in fact, a continuation of a broader struggle against colonialism among anti-colonial activists around the world, which had started decades before. Th e anti-colonial connection started as a transnational network of activists that emerged in large parts of the colony in the early 20th century (Anderson 2005; Shilliam 2015a). Moreover, the “global” challenge to world colonial order was initiated in 1927 when anti-colonial leaders worldwide gathered in Brussels and showed their resistance at the heart of the colonial order (Utama 2015). Viewed from this perspective, the Bandung Confer- ence is not merely a residual element of an older colonial order but also an attempt to put forward the idea of decolonization at a more advanced level in the then emerging international order. For this reason it is important to consider the Bandung Conference in the political context of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Between 1950 and 1959, Indonesia experienced periods of parliamentary government when the ruling government was unstable and prone to “motions of no confi dence.” For example, between 1950 and 1955, Indonesia had four cabinets, which were led by Natsier (1950-1951), Sukiman (1951- 1952), Wilopo (1952-1953) and Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953-1955), respectively, until a general election was held in 1955. During this era, the parliament was divided between two coalitions: the Masyumi-PSI coalition which favored religious-based policies and PNI-PKI-NU coalition which was more traditional (Feith 1962). However, even though the cabinet was deeply divided by these ideological divisions, it is interesting to see that there were several attempts to continue a form of “anti-colonial internationalism” in Indonesia’s foreign policy. It was during the premiership of Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953-1955) that Indonesia actively participated in a series of conferences that preceded the Bandung Conference (1955). Led by Ali and his foreign minister, Soenario, Indonesia actively participated in the Colombo Conference (1953), which was followed by the Bogor Conference (1954). Ali Sastroamidjojo, who was once the leader of Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands during the 1920s, convinced parliament to take an active role with Asian and African states in world politics. In a speech, he said that the “cooperation of Asian-African countries is important because we are convinced

70 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar that close cooperation between these countries certainly strengthen eff orts towards the achievement of everlasting world peace” (see Utama 2015). Another reason why Ali and his cabinet aimed to organize such a movement was the problem of “West Irian,” a region which was still under Dutch rule in the 1950s, even though the Round Table Confer- ence in Th e Hague had instructed the Dutch government to transfer the sovereignty over the region to the Indonesian government. His eff ort was successful. He was able to convince the parliament to organize the Bogor Conference (1954) which sowed the seeds for the bigger conference in Bandung in 1955. Besides Soenario, the prominent role of a group of Indonesian nationalist diplomats, led by Roeslan Abdoelgani, was pivotal in organizing the conference. Shimazu (2014) underscored their role in transforming the Bandung Conference into “diplomatic theatre,” that brought about calls for decolonization to the heart of the Conference. Th e Bandung Conference inspired the struggle for decolonization in African states (Hongoh 2016), it broad- ened global norms of what constituted nation-state states (Acharya 2016), and it enabled the maintenance of inter-state solidarity (Weber and Winanti 2016). Th e spirit of the Bandung Conference was also arguably taken into account in the growing debates over decolonization at the United Nations, which resulted in the new UN Resolution on the New International Order in 1972 (el-Ayouty 1971; Weber and Winanti 2016; Dunne, Devetak and Nurhayati 2016). It also, I shall argue, located the Indonesian model of “anti-colonial internationalism” at the center of the on-going rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Indonesia’s foreign policy of anti-colonial internationalism did not end with the Bandung Conference. It inspired other forms of diplomacy in that decade, such as the struggle for gaining recognition over archipelagic boundaries (which was led by prime minister Djuanda, who was selected by President Soekarno after the 1955 general election). In 1957, a group of Indonesian diplomats successfully challenged the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to delineate the boundaries of an archipelagic state, which extended sovereignty over waters that otherwise would have been deemed “international” (see Butcher and Elson 2017). At that time, Indonesia also attempted to regain “West Irian” from the Dutch, which resulted in waves of nationalization of Dutch companies in Indonesia and armed struggle

71 Th e Bandung ideology in the subsequent decade. Th e “West Irian debacle” heavily infl uenced Indonesia’s critical stance towards the Dutch and other European former colonizers in the 1960s (Penders 2002). However, the dynamics of Indonesia’s foreign policy during 1960s also exposed the limits of “anti-colonial internationalism.” It was during this decade that Indonesia turned towards confrontation with some political forces which were considered “new colonials” (Bunnell 1966). Indonesia also turned towards a more left-leaning foreign policy as it moved closer to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (see Feith 1962; Sulaiman 2008; Sukma 1995). In 1964, for example, Soekarno established the Jakarta-Peking-Moscow axis that politically signifi ed Indonesia’s pro-Soviet stance in the Cold War. It was also followed by the plan to organize “Nefo,” an alternative political bloc in world politics that would consist of “new emerging forces” that would resist “old established forces.”7 Th e bloc also included the Soviet Union and China and directly confronted the United States and its allies. Th is turn marked the fi rst shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy that put “anti-colonial internationalism” further into world politics, albeit in a completely diff erent direction than that of the Bandung Conference. Soekarno’s experiments in moving anti-colonial internationalism further in world politics ended with the political turbulence of 1965- 66. On September 30 1965, a group of Indonesian military generals were abducted and a failed coup attempt was instigated in Jakarta which, in turn, gave rise to anti-communist protests and demands for political change nationwide. Th e political developments between 1965 and 1966 quickly delegitimized Soekarno’s rule in the country and provided momentum for General Soeharto assumption of power in 1966 (Anderson, McVey and Bunnell 1967), leading to a shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Soon after assuming power in 1966, Soeharto ended Konfrontasi against Malaysia, helped establish the new regional organization called ASEAN as a platform for regional cooperation and, more importantly, established the Foreign Investment Law in 1967 to provide more space for capital accumulation in the country.

7 Even though “Nefo” was considered as an anti-colonial bloc, I argue that its position in world politics is completely diff erent from that of the Bandung Confer- ence, which maintained the politics of neutrality in the wake of US-Soviet rivalry in the world politics. Nefo openly regarded Soviet and China as “new emerging forces” which render Indonesia’s relations with the United States hostile.

72 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar

It was during this era that Indonesia shifted towards a more “develop- mentalist foreign policy,” which was based upon economic and developmental interest rather than continuing anti-colonial diplomacy and propaganda at the international level (Umar 2014). Th e most obvious consequence of this shift was the changing mode of foreign policymaking process. It was during the New Order (and maintained until the present) that the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs was given greater authority to formulate foreign policy and the mi nisterial position was assigned to academics and professionals rather than poli- ticians. Previously, foreign policy was formulated by a foreign minister who came from a political background (such as, Soenario from PNI or Achmad Soebardjo from Masyumi). Consequently, Indonesia’s foreign policy became more technocratic and strongly controlled by Soeharto’s bureaucratic polity (under a centralized presidential system), which in turn reversed Soekarno’s anti-colonial foreign policy.

Concluding remarks: the future of the “Bandung ideology”

Th is article has attempted to explain the role of the “Bandung ideology” in Indonesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1965. By employing a “contextual approach” in understanding ideology and the history of ideas, it could be concluded that Indonesia’s foreign policy in this era was strongly characterized by 1) anti-colonial thought and 2) an internationalist approach to world order, which resulted in the call for decolonization in world politics. Th is pattern of internationalism can be historically traced in three forms, namely 1) anti-colonialism that emerged in the early 20th century, 2) the debates over the making of the Indonesian state in 1945; and 3) the memory of the diplomatic struggle between 1945 and 1949. Th e most prominent manifestation of this anti-colonial internationalism was the Bandung Conference, which strongly called for self-determination for Asian and African states. It is useful to recall this history of Bandung’s anti-colonial internationalism and the ideological context in which it was formed, for that history may inform the present, especially now that the Bandung ideology has been, arguably, resurrected in a diff erent form, across diff erent periods of time. Weber and Winanti (2016), for example, suggest that the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)

73 Th e Bandung ideology refl ects the political legacy of the Bandung Conference in the United Nations, given the strong “developmental” approach undertaken by the Conference participants in the Joint Communiqué (see also Nesa- durai 2008). And as Michael Hardt (2002) has noted, the “Bandung Spirit” has been transformed into new networks of resistance in “Th ird World” countries, which has been manifested in the global resistance against neo-colonialism through, for example, the World Social Forum. Some cases of indigenous resistance against growing transnational and national businesses in the “Th ird World” suggest anti-colonial internationalism is alive. In addition, the resurgence of anti-racial campaigns in the West, such as the global solidarity of “Black Lives Matters” or “Rhodes Must Fall” has shown that anti-colonial internationalism has taken a new form rather than being dissolved. To conclude, refl ecting on the Bandung Conference, and more broadly “anti-colonial internationalism” that was embedded in Indo- nesia’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1966 presents the opportunity to “decolonize” international relations as a discipline. As scholars like Michael Hardt, Robbie Shilliam, and Amitav Acharya have recently argued, the idea of “Bandung” was not exclusive to the “historic” event in Bandung sixty years ago. Shilliam (2015b), despite a degree of skep- ticism, sees a potential for the so-called “Bandung Spirit” to further problematize the Eurocentric foundations of world politics and the mainstream discipline of international relations. Acharya (2016) argues that the Bandung Conference is still relevant for making the case for a “global” international relations theory that acknowledges diff erences in world politics. In a similar vein, I would argue that if foreign policy is also a product of an “ideological (anti-colonial) choice,” which has been historically underpinned by anti-colonial thought since the early 20th century and socially embedded with Indonesia’s struggle against colonialism, there is no reason that it should not be drawn on for current foreign policy lessons now that the world confronts new forms of global hierarchy.

74 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar

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