FETÖ AS an INTERNATIONAL THREAT.Pdf

AS ANINTERNATIONAL REPORT FETÖ THREAT FETÖ AS AN INTERNATIONAL THREAT FETÖ AS AN INTERNATIONAL THREAT Turkish National Police Academy 2nd International Security Symposium Report

Prepared by: Prof. Dr. Mehmet Şahin Asst. Prof. Murat Tınas Asst. Prof. Buğra Sarı Asst. Prof. İbrahim İrdem Res. Asst. Yakup Şahin Res. Asst. Hakan Kıyıcı Res. Asst. Müberra Öztürk

COPYRIGHT © 2019 Turkish National Police Academy Presidency All rights reserved and owned by Turkish National Police Academy. Not for reproduction, distribution or commercial use unless otherwise specified by Turkish National Police Academy. The content of this publication does not reflect the official views of UTGAM. The data and views presented in the report are owned by the writer(s).

Turkish National Police Academy Press: 73 Report No: 25 ISBN: 978-605-7822-02-4 June 2019

Turkish National Police Academy Presidency The International Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (UTGAM) Necatibey Caddesi No: 108 Anıttepe 06400 Çankaya-Ankara/Turkey Tel: +90 (312) 4629085-92-93 / +90 (312) 4629075 / +90 (312) 4629035 www.pa.edu.tr Contents

Executive Summary 5

Introduction 11

The History, Characteristics And Aims of FETÖ 15

A Brief History of FETÖ 15

Primary Characteristics of FETÖ 17

FETÖ’s Objectives 21

Media and Education Networks of FETÖ 25

FETÖ’s Media Network 25

FETÖ’s Education Network 29

FETÖ’s Terrorist Identity and Attacks 37

FETÖ as an International Threat 45

FETÖ in the U.S. 45

FETÖ in the Balkans 54

FETÖ in the Middle East 57

FETÖ in Africa 60

FETÖ in Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus 63

Conclusion: The Fight Against FETÖ 73

Endnotes 76

FETÖ as an International Threat 5

Executive Summary

The Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) is one of the greatest threats to Tur- FETÖ constitutes key’s national security due to its sui generis organizational structure. Un- a new generation doubtedly, Turkey regards every terror organization as a threat. However, one could suggest that FETÖ poses the biggest and most substantial threat terror group that to security since it presents an array of socio-economic, socio-political has a potential and socio-psychological threats, has an esoteric and cultist structure, can to threaten easily cooperate with other terror groups or foreign intelligence organiza- international tions for its own interests. Moreover, the organization has demonstrated peace and willingness to go to any lengths to realize its goals, meanwhile its mem- security and affect bers can turn to sleeper cells as crypto operatives with their extreme dedi- intergovernmental cation to the organization as a result of the masterful conduct of FETÖ’s deception method. relations along with the risk it poses to Having such characteristics, FETÖ also constitutes a new generation Turkey considering terror group that has a potential to threaten international peace and secu- its regional and rity and affect intergovernmental relations along with the risk it poses to Turkey considering its regional and global impact. FETÖ diverges from global impact. other international terror groups in terms of radicalization processes as the terror group’s radicalization process dates back to more than 30 years, constituting one of the oldest and most violent examples of global-scale modern cultist radicalization. However, FETÖ masks its criminal nature by misrepresenting itself as an interfaith dialogue or education/humanitarian aid movement. By covering up its unlawful activities and creating a false public image for itself, FETÖ can easily run its illegal operations in different areas and gain ground by acting as an apparatus of international intelligence organizations. With the methods and strategies it employs, the terror group can undermine the countries it operates in from the inside, rendering them vulnerable to external interventions. Departing from this point and viewing FETÖ’s potential of posing a global threat, it is obvious that the terror group poses a threat to all the countries it operates in alongside Turkey.

Since FETÖ is an international terror organization, it is significant to clarify the organization’s international networks in different sectors. Ac- 6 FETÖ as an International Threat

Shedding light cordingly, the Turkish National Police Academy organized the II. Inter- national Security Symposium entitled “FETÖ as an International Threat” on FETÖ’s with the participation of academics, politicians, members of the judici- international ary, law enforcement representatives, journalists and non-governmental structuring is organizations interested in the subject in order to reveal and discuss FE- crucial not only TÖ’s international terrorism networks. Opinions and recommendations for Turkey’s expressed by the participants during the symposium comprise the general national framework of this report. The leading subjects discussed during the sym- security but for posium are as follows: »» Methods and strategies FETÖ resorted to for decades in Turkey in or- international der to infiltrate state apparatuses are also practiced in other countries peace and FETÖ operates in. By infiltrating critical positions and strategic ins- security. titutions in the countries they are active, FETÖ members can manipulate state apparatuses of these countries and sabotage their national interests. »» FETÖ’s most common type of action in other countries is running anti-Turkey propaganda. Through this propaganda, FETÖ attempts to sabotage natural course of international relations by driving a wedge between Turkey and the countries it operates in. For this reason, shedding light on FETÖ’s international structuring is crucial not only for Turkey’s national security but for international peace and security. »» FETÖ concentrates its activities in education, business and media sectors while infiltrating key positions and strategic institutions in the countries it operates in. After infiltrating these structures, it exploits resources of these countries to maintain its organizational activities and enhance its influence. »» Increasing its activities in the three sectors mentioned above, FETÖ firstly forms a network for lobbying activities that comprises politicians and businessmen and then places its operatives in critical positions through this network, and infiltrates strategic institutions. »» FETÖ does not confront any difficulty in recruiting new militants in different countries as it uses its education and media activities as extensive indoctrination tools. Therefore, it is important to reveal FETÖ’s covert structures in different countries organized according to local dynamics. FETÖ as an International Threat 7

»» FETÖ engages in organized unlawful activities and forms parallel state The U.S. is structures in the countries it operates in as the group members can mas- currently the center terfully disguise themselves. Considering acts of other modern cultist organizations and the fact that FETÖ is formed on the basis of a mo- of FETÖ’s activities dern cultist mindset, the threat FETÖ poses to these countries can be around the globe. better understood. Besides, FETÖ has »» The U.S. is currently the center of FETÖ’s activities around the globe managed to build a due to the permanent residence of the leader of the organization Fethul- strong presence in lah Gülen in the country. The organization has extensive networks of many EU member schools and businesses in the U.S., as well as an economic volume of states. billions of dollars. As part of these networks, there are more than 140 FETÖ schools in the U.S. More than 60 thousand students receive an education in these schools every year. At the same time, through economic activities FETÖ has an overall annual revenue exceeding 500 million dollars in the U.S. Thanks to its networks in the U.S., FETÖ is able to contact the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate members and engage in anti-Turkish activities. »» In parallel to Turkey’s close relations with the EU, FETÖ has now also managed to build a strong presence in many EU member states . It has been FETÖ’s aim to use the close relations Turkey has developed with the EU as well as the EU’s political influence in international politics for its own purposes. Moreover, especially after the 2016 coup attempt, the willingness of the EU to firstly shelter FETÖ members, both those already living in their countries as well as those fleeing from law enforcement in Turkey, and secondly providing them with any aid they require for their organization, have been the primary reasons for the terrorist organization’s decision to choose Europe as one of the important centers for its global network. »» FETÖ has been active in the Balkan countries and has built an effective organization in the region over the years. The organization is active in fields such as education, tourism, media and publishing, and has significant influence in the bureaucracies of the region due to the presence of graduates from FETÖ schools now working in the public sectors in Balkan countries. According to reports from different sources, the 8 FETÖ as an International Threat

As part of its number of students receiving an education in schools operating under the control of FETÖ in the Balkans is around 20.000 in total, most new strategy, of whom are in Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Romania. FETÖ maintains Along with activities in the field of education, the presence of FETÖ in its unlawful the Balkans also aims to reach its target audiences and gain new mem- activities through bers through its non-governmental organizations. Around 33 non-go- crypto-schools vernmental organizations are known to be under FETÖ’s control in the and associations Balkans. located in various »» FETÖ, just like in all other regions it is active in, has engaged in media activities with the purpose of spreading its ideology and reaching large countries. masses in the Middle East. The most prominent organizations of FETÖ in this context are Zaman Arabic, Gulen Arabic and the Hira Magazine. »» Having started its activities in the field of education in Africa in 1994, by 2016 FETÖ already had 110 educational institutions at primary and secondary school levels and a university under its control in Africa. The language of education in these schools is generally the native language of the country they are located in, and this greatly aids the organization both in finding students and in its propaganda efforts. »» The Russia-based entrepreneurs who want to engage in economic investment or trade activities with Kyrgyzstan, China or Taiwan can easily boost their business volume through FETÖ-affiliated companies or consulting firms. This economic network is maintained with the work force recruited in the region, which demonstrates the crypto structuring FETÖ has achieved to build, even in Russia. »» In many countries, FETÖ runs its unlawful activities through cryp- to schools or associations as part of its new strategy. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan, where FETÖ has a very strong presence, the organization owns a large number of associations and companies as well as a university and 27 schools, and the number of students receiving an education from these institutions has grown to 10 thousand. The organization maintains its unlawful activities through these crypto schools. In the newly opened crypto schools, school principals, teachers and students consist of the Kyrgyz and no name with Turkish origin is used in school records. Hence, most families in the county assume that they are sending their children to Kyrgyz schools. FETÖ as an International Threat 9

»» As a result of the efforts exerted by Turkish authorities, FETÖ’s inter- Since FETÖ is national structuring has been suffering major blows. Important operati- an international ons were conducted to address FETÖ’s network in Kazakhstan and the residence permits of the businessmen that provided financial support terror group, the to FETÖ were revoked, leading to their deportation. In Turkmenistan, fight against the many methods, including bribery, were employed for years to ensure group can only the capture of important positions by those that graduated from FETÖ be successful if it schools, but 14 schools operating around the country were shut down is maintained on by the authorities. In Georgia, FETÖ-linked schools were regulated an international and the licenses of some of those schools were canceled. In Afghanis- level. At this point, tan, FETÖ schools were raided whereas the school administrators were arrested. The schools taken over from FETÖ around the world were studies focusing on assigned to Turkey’s Maarif Foundation. raising awareness »» One of the most important elements in the fight against FETÖ is to in other countries analyze the organization accurately and develop strategies according- on the subject are ly. Even though FETÖ identifies itself as a religious organization, so- required. cio-economic, political and cultural factors that led to the emergence of FETÖ must also be taken into account within the fight. To that end, it is of vital importance for institutions such as the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the National Education Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry and Coordination Agency of Public Diplomacy work together. Considering FETÖ’s relations with foreign intelligence organizations, it becomes evident that diplomatic and intelligence-related tactics are also vital in this fight. »» Since FETÖ is an international terror group, fight against the group can only be successful if it is maintained on an international level. At this point, studies focusing on raising awareness in other countries on the subject are required. Turkey needs to explain the FETÖ threat through an analytic perspective encompassing all the dimensions of the issue. The methods employed to explain the threat might vary according to the local aspects of different countries. All available means and methods must be used in this respect in order to yield productive results.

FETÖ as an International Threat 11

Introduction

The Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ), which constitutes the main focus of As the secretive this report, is a new generation terrorist organization that has a potential and sui generis to threaten international peace and security along with the risk it poses to Turkey considering its regional and global influence. FETÖ diverges from structure of the other international terror groups in terms of radicalization processes as organization is the terror group’s radicalization process dates back to more than 30 years, viewed, FETÖ constituting one of the oldest and most violent examples of global-scale can be observed esoteric/modern cultist radicalization. However, FETÖ masks its criminal to have a great nature by misrepresenting itself as an interfaith dialogue or education/hu- deal of similarities manitarian aid movement. By covering its unlawful activities and creating with left-wing and a false public image for itself, FETÖ can easily run its illegal activities in different areas and gain ground by acting as an apparatus of international ethnicity based intelligence organizations. With the methods and strategies it employs, terror groups or the terror group can undermine the countries it operates in from the inside, Shia terror groups. rendering them vulnerable to external interventions. Departing from this point and in consideration of FETÖ’s potential of posing a global threat, it is obvious that the terror group poses a threat against all the countries it operates in alongside Turkey.

One of the primary problems addressed as part of this new subject of study is whether FETÖ was initially founded as a terror group or evolved into a terror group after going through certain stages over time. It is commonly believed that FETÖ originally emerged as a civil society and social service organization but then evolved into a criminal organization as it gradually strengthened. However, the research conducted on this question has proved this common assumption wrong. Founded by Fethullah Gülen, the organization was originally designed as a clandestine cult movement ever since its formation. As the secretive and sui generis structure of the organization is viewed, FETÖ can be observed to have a great deal of similarities with left-wing and ethnicity-based terror groups or Shia terror groups. In line with its founding purposes, FETÖ has engaged in various illegal activities over time. In the process leading to the atrocious July 15 coup attempt in 2016, in which FETÖ militants targeted people with the 12 FETÖ as an International Threat

state’s weapons and means, FETÖ engaged in numerous unlawful activities in a long and wide ranging process that involved business fronts and assassinations, which must be analyzed and studied meticulously. So, in retrospect, studies focusing on FETÖ are to be made in order clarify characteristics that make FETÖ a new generation terror group.

Based on the fact that FETÖ is a new generation terrorist organization due to its sui generis character, the group needs to be examined through a different lens from other terror groups. FETÖ has a secrecy and deception based radicalization method. During this process, which can be defined as cultist radicalization, the group operatives wait to obey orders after infiltrating state apparatuses and different social segments after a decades-long radicalization period motivated to accomplish the group’s ultimate goals. Therefore, the terror group can find new and seemingly legitimate life spaces and easily engage in ostensibly legal activities in the realms of politics, law and civil society that actually pose serious risks to the national security of the countries FETÖ operates in. Of course, this does not mean that the terror group does not resort to armed attacks. FETÖ takes down its targets through methods like assassination and blackmailing when it fails to eliminate its targets through its ostensibly legitimate political, judicial or civil society activities. In this respect, FETÖ shows important parallel to the “Assassins” or “Hashashins”, a terror group with religious motives that operated between the 11th and 13th centuries.

To discuss its sui generis features and the measures required to be taken in order to tackle the international threats posed by FETÖ, the Turkish National Police Academy organized the II. International Security Sympo- sium entitled “FETÖ as an International Threat” between November 23 and 25 in Antalya, Turkey. As part of the symposium, many academicians, politicians, journalists and various other professionals from relevant fields working on the subject both at home and abroad gathered to discuss the international threats FETÖ poses and to offer solutions for fighting the group. During the first session of the eight-session symposium, the report entitled “New Generation Terror: An Analysis of FETÖ”, which was rele- ased by the Police Academy, was introduced and discussed. Discussions FETÖ as an International Threat 13

in the following sessions focused on FETÖ’s methods of gathering human FETÖ takes down resources and training militants through educational means, the role of its targets through media in the fight against FETÖ, and FETÖ’s offshoots in different regions including the Caucasus, Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, Europe methods like and America. In this scope, opinions and recommendations stated in this assassination and report with regard to the threats posed by FETÖ will be a considerable blackmailing when reference guide for both national and international policymakers. it fails to eliminate its targets through its ostensibly legitimate political, judicial or civil society activities.

FETÖ as an International Threat 15

The History, Characteristics And Aims of FETÖ

A Brief History of FETÖ

During 1962 and 1963, FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen was among the Within the activities founders of the “Anti-Communist Association” based in Turkey’s Erzu- aiming to recruit rum province, and actively worked in the association throughout these years. Subsequently, in Edirne and İzmir provinces, where he worked as militants, children an Islamic cleric, a Koran teacher and a student dormitory manager, he aged between laid the groundwork for FETÖ and formed its core team. During this pe- 13 and 18 were riod, FETÖ embarked on a series of activities based on exploitation in designated as the the guise of helping people, especially those individuals migrating from main target group. rural to urban areas for economic reasons as well as students moving from small towns to cities for educational purposes, which increased the organization’s popularity and created a positive public image.1 While growing in popularity thanks to its ostensibly humanitarian aids, the organization began its indoctrination activities by distributing tapes and video records of Gülen’s sermons.

This indoctrination has been a cultist radicalization process that continued for several decades during which the FETÖ leader was represented as a sacred figure. Within the activities aiming to recruit militants, children aged between 13 and 18 were designated as the main target group. As it will be explicated further in the report, radicalizing this age group by im- posing psychological pressure is facilitated as this period coincides with adolescence years. Hence, the terror group managed to recruit a great deal of militants as a result of the specific focus on this age group.

The underlying reasons for the emergence and rising popularity of FETÖ can be summarized as the political instabilities and overthrowing of politicians with schemes as part of the power struggle in Turkey at the time. Using this already distressed political arena to expand the organization, FETÖ initially gained significant strength through its educational activities and had the opportunity to address large masses with this method.2 Gülen has been a very influential figure in producing systematic 16 FETÖ as an International Threat

FETÖ has lies, believing in the organization’s own lies in a schizophrenic way and relaying them to people. Employing the tactic once articulated by Adolf managed to Hitler’s propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, who said: “If you tell a lie represent itself big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe under different it”, the FETÖ leader fabricated ideas in the name of society and obtained a guises in cult leadership status by using very effective means in conveying his lies. accordance with As his speeches are examined, it can be observed that he presents himself the spirit of as a Muslim who is almost a friend of the Prophet and who can give orders every period to angels. With this authority created by abusing religious references, the terror group leader Gülen gained an unquestionable leadership identity.3 and successfully This identity attributes a sense of unity to FETÖ members as if they were a created a social chosen group. In this sense, the organizational structure of the terror group base that has stands out as an elitist and racist one. sympathy for the Following its formative years, the organization started publishing a organization while magazine named “Sızıntı” in 1979, so the publishing and propaganda ac- also appealing tivities became one of the main focuses of FETÖ, which made important to the Western contributions to forming a social sphere of influence for the organization.4 circles and NATO With the release of the daily newspaper “Zaman” and magazine “Aksi- by serving their yon”, their publishing and propaganda activities gained momentum. Up interests. until the July 15 coup attempt, the secret messages implying the prepara- tions for the coup were delivered via these newspapers and magazines.5

Furthermore, it is quite evident that the international context has also had a major role in FETÖ’s rising power and popularity. The activities to monitor and control the country from the outside under the name of the “Anti-Communist Association” during the Cold War period continued under the guise so-called “moderate Islam” as opposed to “radical Islam” in the aftermath of the Cold War and such activities paved the way for organizations like FETÖ in Turkey.6 Consequently, FETÖ has managed to represent itself under different guises in accordance with the spirit of every period and successfully created a social base that has sympathy for the organization while also appealing to the Western circles and NATO by serving their interests. So, Gülen’s strong adherence to the interfaith dialogue project is an important indicator of the organization’s ability to FETÖ as an International Threat 17

maneuver its own conjecture and act as a convenient apparatus for the dominant powers of the international system. In this sense, it is seen that FETÖ has been supported by the dominant powers of the international system since the 1960s, which has allowed the terror group to spread its activities across the globe.7

Primary Characteristics of FETÖ

Defining itself as a “service movement”, “congregation”, and “commu- Representing nity”, the latter being the latest definition, FETÖ is one of the greatest itself as a religious threats against Turkey’s national security due to its sui generis organi- movement or zational structure. Among its characteristics, FETÖ’s deception method, meaning that its members can turn to sleeper cells as crypto operatives a civil society with their extreme dedication to the organization, comes to the fore.8 In organization, this respect, disguising and assuming another identity is very important FETÖ is in fact a for FETÖ. Viewing the indictments and reports issued on FETÖ, it is clandestine illegal seen that the organization defines such acts as caution. To prevent being organization. subjected to inquiry or prosecution, Gülen defined cheating, disguising, putting burden on others’ shoulders, disregarding religious prohibitions and commandments, circumventing laws and disregarding ethical rules as caution and indoctrinated his disciples in this direction. According to Gülen, lying, casting aspersions, stealing, committing offenses and indul- ging in acts forbidden by religion such as consuming alcohol, gambling and prostitution are permissible as long as they are performed to protect the organization. He went so far as to argue that even disavowing the God is possible in this respect. Concisely, every sin or wrongdoing of the organization are presented under the guise of cautionary acts. Accordingly, the organization legitimizes acts like disobeying the pillars of the religion, growing goatee, wearing earrings, not wearing hijab, staying away from all kinds of acts and behaviors that will give the impression that the person belongs to a religious group, representing oneself as a nationalist or social democrat, reporting religious persons not related to FETÖ as FETÖ proponents and causing them to face charges, and building trust by concealing links to FETÖ. The organization has neither seemed as it is nor acted as it seems. Accordingly, FETÖ can also be defined as a Machiavellianist 18 FETÖ as an International Threat

Pro-FETÖ judges organization since it uses every means possible and will go to any extreme to achieve its goals. Therefore, the fight against FETÖ must be versatile. and prosecutors In other words, alongside the criminal and intelligence-related aspects of who seemed the fight, a multi-directional, coordinated and determined approach that unrelated and encompasses sociological, psychological, economic and political aspects were in different of the issue must also be undertaken. units contacted As FETÖ’s purposes are briefly considered, it can be seen that the or- the same phone ganization has mainly aimed to seize control over the Turkish state by numbers abroad. opening educational institutions at home and abroad with the donations it collects under the name of “himmet” by abusing people’s religious sentiments, gathering human resources who serve FETÖ’s interests and then using these people to infiltrate state apparatuses. To achieve this end, the terror group has seized control of strategically important state positions and institutions and become organized as a parallel state. Presenting itself as a religious movement or a civil society movement, FETÖ is actually a clandestine illegal organization.

It was revealed that the terror group used secret communication programs within its closed network, resorted to forming cells, codenamed its operatives and employed various methods of disguise to maintain the secrecy of the organization. It was also revealed that many FETÖ-linked judges and prosecutors contacted the organization members in the U.S., Spain, Germany, Austria, Britain, Indian Ocean, Sudan and France through secret methods whereas pro-FETÖ judges and prosecutors who seemed unrelated and were in different units contacted the same phone numbers abroad.9 On the other hand, given that the organization takes out adversaries through pressure, blackmailing or conspiracy and establishes contacts with foreign intelligence organizations, the organization can also be regarded as a typical intelligence network.10

In addition, FETÖ has a strict hierarchical structure. Just as is the case in every cultist structure in which an authoritarian leader steers the members with faulty religious beliefs in a strict top-down hierarchy, Gülen enjoys an unquestionable leadership position within the organization. As FETÖ as an International Threat 19

already known, FETÖ was founded under Gülen’s leadership and has continued to be led by him ever since its formation. A messianic discipline is indoctrinated among FETÖ members. Accordingly, militants of the organization see Gülen as a messiah and believe that he can directly speak to the God and Prophet Mohammad. For this reason, FETÖ militants believe that a hidden wisdom lies under every word uttered by Gülen and his words must be unquestioningly accepted. As a result, they describe Gülen as “the imam of the universe” due to all these characteristics attributed to him.

In this sense, the intra-organizational operation is run with a top-down FETÖ members totalitarian mindset and this operation turns FETÖ adherents into zombies lose their sense who unconditionally obey his orders. The unconditionally fulfilled orders of the intra-organizational totalitarianism are presented under the guise of of self and charity work conducted in almost every field including media, internatio- individuality as nal networks and various key institutions of the state and civil society. It a result of the is seen that injecting the organization’s doctrine and activities into young organization’s minds is possible through various educational tools by creating a religi- indoctrination. on-based legitimacy under the pretext of charity.

Another important factor that has contributed to the effective progress of FETÖ’s activities in Turkey and abroad is the one-on-one communication method that is constantly controlling its members. The activities are coordinated and organized by specific ranks called “abi” (meaning big brother in Turkish), “abla” (meaning big sister in Turkish), or “imam”. The general structure of the organization also determines its specific branches.

Esotericism has a significant role in FETÖ’s messianic religious doctrine. Esotericism can briefly be defined as keeping true knowledge and secrets only within the organization and making these secrets only accessible to organization members through metaphysical means under the control of a master. The mysticism and secrecy stemming from esotericism has kept the intra-organizational dynamics of FETÖ strong. This is mainly due to the sharp distinction between “we” and “others” in the organization’s mindset, which corresponds to competent and incompetent individuals in 20 FETÖ as an International Threat

FETÖ attaches terms of accessing the knowledge and secrets in this context. In this distinction, “others” are represented as enemies who must be annihilated and utmost importance who are doomed to hell while “we” refers to the ones having unlimited to symbols similar privileges and sharing the group identity. Consequently, the organization to the “Society sees it as legitimate to annihilate others via conspiracies, psychological of Jesus” and methods and weapons.11 other masonic As a result of this long-standing cultist radicalization, an individual organizations and who joins the cult ends up turning into a character that loses all his indivi- conveys serious dual features and only obeys orders in accordance with the behavioral pat- messages through terns and organizational activities practiced in FETÖ. Thus, the individual symbols. loses his identity within the organization. It was revealed that during the process leading up to the July 15 coup attempt, many pro-FETÖ judges and prosecutors, senior police officers and generals received orders from people with lower social status, such as teachers and shopkeepers. This example illustrates that FETÖ members lose touch with reality and that social status does not mean anything to them.

It must be underlined that almost all the FETÖ members have a dual life. It has been found that the group members live a different life outside the organization while they have another life, status and social relations within the organization that is unrelated to the life they lead outside. For instance, some FETÖ members may lead a secular lifestyle in the outside world as a reflection of their dual life although they shape their intra-organizational relations according to so-called religious references. Some also act as members of other organizations to hide their links to FETÖ. Thus, FETÖ’s ability to lay low in society is very high. A perfect illustration of this situation is the assassination of Andrei Karlov, the Russian ambassador to Turkey. The perpetrator of the assassination, who is actually a FETÖ-affiliated police officer, tried to pass ofas an Al Nusra adherent.

Besides, FETÖ attaches utmost importance to symbols similar to the “Society of Jesus” and other masonic organizations and conveys serious messages through symbols. “Aksiyon” (Action), “Sızıntı” (Leak), “Sa- manyolu” (Milky Way), “Küre” (Globe), “Herkül” (Hercules) are the na- FETÖ as an International Threat 21

mes of some of the FETÖ-owned outlets, which shows that they sought to create an image of encompassing the ideas of eternity, grandeur and universe.

Another important character of FETÖ is its high adaptability to the FETÖ’s ultimate changing conditions of every period. Thanks to this, the terror group has goal is to seize the protected itself against all the odds in every period and consolidated its state and obtain power whenever the circumstances allow. FETÖ’s coming into promi- nence after the 1980 coup d’état and growth during the February 28th economic, social process, when all other religion-based groups were in decline, are among and political ruling the noteworthy examples of that. Going to all lengths to achieve its goals, power. FETÖ has also adapted its religious rituals and rules to the circumstances of the period. For instance, Gülen suggested during the 1970s that women should wear an enveloping cloak and face veil, but in the following years, he claimed that the hijab is nonessential and gave fatwas suggesting that the deeds that are strictly forbidden by Islam, such as stealing, conspiring, smirching, fornicating and being unfair, cannot be regarded as sins as long as they serve to achieve a certain aim.12 So, it would not be wrong to argue that the organization does not have an ethical, moral or religious code toward their objective of infiltrating state apparatuses and seizing control of the state.

FETÖ’s Objectives

As the indictments issued on FETÖ and FETÖ’s own sources are viewed, it can be observed that Gülen’s primary objective is to reach the ideal political order he fancies. In the indictments and other relevant documents, FETÖ’s ultimate goal is stated as “to seize control over all the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Turkey (legislation, execution and juris- diction), to redesign the state, society and citizens in line with FETÖ’s ideology after seizing the state, and to obtain economic, social and political ruling power through a class with oligarchic features.” There are three main underlying ideological motivations here:

»» Political Ideology refers to seizing all the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Turkey on the basis of oligarchy and transforming into a 22 FETÖ as an International Threat

As part of grand and influential political power in the international arena as well. »» Economic Ideology refers to establishing a parallel taxation system th- its infiltration rough the donations named “himmet”, which are collected by abusing activities, FETÖ religious sentiments of society as indicated above. In this system, the mainly focused on elite class at the top of the ladder can benefit from all the means and op- forming secretive portunities available while the lower classes hardly benefit from them structures based on the motivation of commitment. The most significant tools to especially within reach the political goals are human and financial resources. the Turkish Armed »» Social and Cultural Ideology refers to the idea of spreading the human profile sketched by Gülen, which urges people not to have any indivi- Forces (TSK), the dual personality but instead be shaped by a culture of submissiveness Turkish Security and obedience. Directorate, Based upon these three ideological motivations, FETÖ has turned into the National a terror group that has global ties and networks, partnerships and offsho- Intelligence ots. Therefore, it cannot be contended that FETÖ is only detrimental to Organization Turkey. As the following sections will explicate, it is obvious that FETÖ (MIT) and judicial aims to have social and political power on a global-scale economic, through an oligarchic class by seizing control in different countries of the world bodies. with similar methods.

Parallel to its political ambitions, FETÖ first became organized in educational institutions. As the following sections will show, education is of vital importance for FETÖ since it is both seen as a source for economic profit and as the most crucial mechanism of recruiting members and placing them in state institutions. In a speech he made in 1984, FETÖ leader Gülen said: “I firstly suggest students to become primary and secondary school teachers, and secondly to become military officers, police officers or lawyers.”13

As part of its infiltration activities, FETÖ mainly focused on forming secretive structures especially within the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the Turkish Security Directorate, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and judicial bodies. Along with the institutions of security, judiciary and bureaucracy, FETÖ also aspired to infiltrate all other institutions and organizations of Turkey.14 Turning into an armed terror group with FETÖ as an International Threat 23

infiltration activities in security bureaucracy, FETÖ has engaged in both With the economic political and armed acts by establishing secretive networks within these gain earned institutions. Attributing vital importance to operational units, the FETÖ leader has said pertaining to the infiltration activities: “The presence of through illegal our friends in judiciary, civil service or any other crucial establishment avenues, the should not be regarded as individual presences. They guarantee our future terror group in these units. In a sense, they are the guarantee of our presence. You must solidified its go deep into the main veins of the system by laying low until you reach the networks in power centers. Every step until the moment you attract powerful cliques in education and Turkey into your front is early.”15 media as well as its Given that FETÖ has managed to infiltrate every sphere of life, inclu- human resources, ding education, judiciary, security bureaucracy and the arts, it is not hard as a result of which to predict that the terror group will not overlook the economic sphere. The infiltration activities terror group gained a great deal of unjust profit through “himmet” dona- have soared. tions, the funds from educational institutions, and by damaging the state economy.16 With this economic gain earned through illegal avenues, the terror group solidified its networks in education and media as well as its human resources, as a result of which infiltration activities have soared. Having a parallel state mechanism in Turkey through this strategy, the terror group today maintains the same strategy in more than 100 countries it operates in. So, it can be predicted that the FETÖ operatives infiltrating the state mechanisms of other countries might also seize control of these states by forming parallel states as they have already attempted to do in Turkey. With the aim of raising awareness in the world against the international threat posed by FETÖ, this report examines the organization’s education and media networks as well as its structures in a variety of regions and countries.

FETÖ as an International Threat 25

Media and Education Networks of FETÖ

FETÖ’s Media Network

With the dissemination of mass media, terror groups have seen the extent Considering the to which they are able to gain respect and legitimacy, instill fear, attract at- significance of tention, remain on the agenda, show their power or acquire deterrence through media more effectively. Newspapers, magazines, books, brochures, media for terror television channels and social networks are the platforms actively used by groups in today’s terror groups. So, society can easily follow the actions and propaganda of world, it can be terror groups via visual and print media and interact with them. Especially contended that with the rise of internet media, terror groups have started using this realm, media has become which is one of the leading focuses of studies conducted on modern day an indispensable radicalization and terror. tool for terror Considering the significance of media for terror groups in today’s wor- groups. ld, it can be contended that media has become an indispensable tool for terror groups. One of the leading features of terror groups is to use violence to reach their goals or instill fear of violence. One of the easiest and quickest ways to create an atmosphere of fear in society is the use of media outlets since media enables the formulation of the available data in line with the intended message and reaches large masses. Thus, terror groups target to use media to make propaganda, create a psychology of fear in target groups, manipulate minds, mobilize masses, gain legitimacy on national and international platforms by justifying their actions, gather proponents and bolster the morale and motivation of militants.17 Another primary target of terror groups while using media is to represent counter-terror activities of security forces as unlawful and anti-democratic practices that lead to the violation of rights. In this scope, FETÖ’s links to media as a new generation terror group stand out as an unprecedented set of relations that has a wide-ranging and complex structure and does not comply with the classifications made so far.

It has been revealed that FETÖ has exerted utmost effort in the field of media and managed to maintain a broad media network. The organizati- 26 FETÖ as an International Threat

FETÖ’s links to on’s activities in the media sphere, including both directly and indirectly controlled ones, need to be examined. Having a broad media organization media constitute that includes publications for children, newspapers and news agencies, the a sui generis organization brought a storm that began with the release of Sızıntı maga- structure that zine. Aware of the media’s role of reaching, influencing and shaping the is beyond the minds of large masses, the organization has also steered the media outlets, typical media- it could not directly control, by presenting the information they obtained terror links. from their crypto members in different formats. Therefore, media outlets that became susceptible to indirect manipulation fulfilled some important duties at the point of meticulously evaluating news materials.

In addition, it has been observed that the terror group attempted to build a systematic discourse with the information and publications leaked by the organization to different media groups in the international arena. So, FETÖ’s links to media constitute a sui generis structure that is beyond the typical media-terror links. To comprehend how media is used against laws and legitimacy, it is necessary to understand the links between terror groups and media and to examine the tactical use of this realm by intelligence organizations.

FETÖ has used its capacity to shape minds by institutionalizing media for its propaganda activities. In this sense, the terror group acted like a typical intelligence organization. As the intelligence services’ employment of media is viewed, it is evident that this employment particularly mani- fests itself in periods of steering the targeted society’s perception or the policies of decision-makers in cases where states could not realize their ambitions through diplomatic channels or when a direct declaration of war would bring heavy costs. Beginning with propaganda activities, such processes involve further stages such as financial plots, assassinations and fortification of paramilitary forces. Intelligence agencies developed such systems particularly during the Cold War period in accordance with their goals. With its media network, FETÖ developed an eclectic strategy of using the media in which it combined basic characteristics of terror-media links and covert operation rules and norms particular to intelligence agencies. FETÖ as an International Threat 27

The infiltration of FETÖ members in various institutions, -organiza tions and ranks has facilitated the flow of all kinds of legal and illegal information that can be used by the media. Within this flow, one could come across testimony records, confidential judicial documents, records After FETÖ-owned of private talks between politicians and intelligence information. Along media outlets with infiltrating television channels, magazines, newspapers, social media were shut down, networks, publishing and printing houses, advertising companies, supp- they focused on liers and news agencies, FETÖ also exploited public facilities. Given that the media, which has also been used as a source of income and a tool for social media as legitimacy, is a strategic field for terror groups, it becomes clear to what a communication extent the media links supported FETÖ. After FETÖ-owned media outlets mean and source were shut down, they focused on social media as a communication mean of information. and source of information. As an affordable, quick and highly effective real-time communication mean, social media has become one of the primary focuses of the FETÖ.

Viewing the general framework of the organization’s operations, FE- TÖ’s media structuring can be summed up with five main characteristics.

»» The first character is hybridity, which refers to FETÖ’s eclectic use of media that is in line with the methods of both terror groups and intelligence agencies, the latter of which is known as covert operations, in which propaganda activities are highly influential whereas the violence factor is low. »» The second one is FETÖ’s symbiotic feature.18 FETÖ shares the technical capacities and means it owns and the information it obtains through foreign powers which it considers allies and demands protection, secure zones and a special set of relations from them in return. »» Thirdly, FETÖ’s media ties are in synchrony with all the other networks within the organization. The presence achieved in the media sector is only meaningful as long as it is seized as an opportunity to reach FE- TÖ’s ultimate goals. Consequently, for FETÖ, media is of critical importance at the point of conveying illegally leaked information and documents to masses as part of the discourse the organization strives to build rather than being a professionally conducted endeavor within 28 FETÖ as an International Threat

For FETÖ, media the democratic order. All media tools have been systematically used in relevant formats as components of a central goal and within a hierarc- serves to convey hical order. illegally leaked »» The fourth character is the organization’s extensiveness. This feature information and points out that media tools are managed on the basis of social engine- documents to ering efforts. In the process of representing fabricated stories as facts, masses as part everything has been planned and managed in integrity, including the of the discourse procurement of material, the determination of printing houses, selecti- the organization on of persons who would be in editorial boards of academic journals, and deciding on which articles would be published in journals. strives to build. »» The fifth main characteristic is the organization’s stratified structure. This stratification exemplifies the method observed in the conflicts of the Cold War period, which targets to incorporate the parameters aiming to change societies’ perceptions, behaviors, mentalities and opinions without necessitating armed conflict. Alongside those directly working on behalf of the organization, there is a group benefiting the system of the organization although they do not have any economic or ideological relation to the organization. Due to all these interwoven and stratified structures, FETÖ’s hybrid structure, symbiotic relations, synchronization with other sectors, central structure, extensiveness, and integrative and stratified working technic reflect on both its media organizations and other activities aiming to influence and control other media outlets. Because of these interwoven and stratified structures, a special strategy focusing on media links is required in the context of the fight against FETÖ. At this point, the state has an important role in formulating the information in an accurate way and relaying it to citizens.

Today, the shutdown of the media outlets used for the abovementioned motivations and illegal targets is regarded as a dictatorial act in the international arena. For this reason, it is essential to consider the national and international studies on FETÖ as a specific field of study and qualified publications are urgently needed in this respect. It is a fact that FETÖ still cooperates with the dominant forces in the international system such as the U.S. in the international arena. The Halkbank trial, which is current- FETÖ as an International Threat 29

ly ongoing in the U.S. on the allegations that Turkey breached the U.S. It is a fact that the embargo imposed on Iran, stands as one of the clearest examples of this. dominant forces Targeting Halkbank in his statements to the Turkish media on Turkey-Iran relations as of 2009, David Cohen was in charge of tracing terrorist finan- of the international cing as the U.S. Treasury Department Under Secretary. Throughout the system such as December 17-25 judicial coup attempt process, the indictments claimed to the U.S. cooperate be used by Turkish prosecutors were translated from Turkish to English, with FETÖ. illegally-obtained tapes and other records were transported from Turkey to the U.S. during the same period, and Turkish politics was attempted to be restructured with these methods.

In brief, Gülen introduced himself to the hegemonic West as a “moderate” character from the religious conservative wing. He was presented as a ”moderate spiritual leader” endeavoring for “interfaith dialogue” and a “moderate” name in an era in which radical movements were on the rise in the Islamic world. He was also misrepresented as an “educationist”, which contributed to his moderate image. So, the sovereign powers of the West considered Gülen an Islamic scholar who searches for the middle ground between radical Salafi movements and radical Shia movements.

The real identity of Gülen was hidden behind this moderate public image although he stayed focused on his targets by setting his conscience aside and constituted even a greater threat than Osama bin Laden as a radical cult figure. It must be noted that Gülen’s organization assassinated the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink to provide a basis for the Ergene- kon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) coup plot cases that stirred Turkey’s political agenda, which is enough to demonstrate the true color of this radical organization. The organization finally waged war on the Turkish state with the weapons it seized from the Turkish Armed Forces on July 15, 2016.

FETÖ’s Education Network

Education is one of the most prominent fields that FETÖ has used to recruit militants and create financial sources for the organization. In this manner, FETÖ raised human resources it needed for its global-scale structure through the educational institutions it controls. In so doing, they recruited 30 FETÖ as an International Threat

People they wanted for the organization through education and aspired to create FETÖ-affiliated cadres in the state by placing them in the institutions they wanted. In particular, ışık (light) houses, which were organized as cell houses, had an important mission in the militarization and radicalization of the group members.

FETÖ built a The establishment of Işık houses, which ultimately aimed to create a uniform type of adherents through the indoctrination of the organization’s terror group ideology, was one of the first orders of Gülen. He gave the order in 1966 through in Izmir, under the pretext of helping less fortunate students. But instead educational of helping less fortunate students, the houses raised children of socio-e- instruments and conomically disadvantaged families as militants. Human resources of the used education organization were provided through these houses, which generally appea- as a tool for led to children of low-income conservative families going to primary/secondary school or university. The students enrolling in the FETÖ-owned reaching its associations, study centers, private courses, schools and universities were goals. generally trapped and separated from their families, and used in line with the organization’s goals.

In other words, FETÖ built a terror group through educational instruments, demonstrating that the organization has employed education not as a goal but as a tool for reaching its ultimate goals that are irrelevant to education. Besides, given that most of the ones targeting the nation with weapons during the July 15 coup attempt went to FETÖ’s educational institutions, it can be argued that FETÖ’s educational structure sets a perfect example for the mankurt motif (used to refer to a person who has forgotten his past, is brainwashed and enslaved, and has lost touch with his own values to be appreciated by some circles) described in Chinghiz Aitmatov’s novel The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years.

FETÖ has developed various methods and strategies to attract primary school, secondary school and university students. They tried to smear successful state schools and manipulate opinions against these schools. They falsely claimed that cases of violence, prostitution and substance abuse are seen in these schools and that the schools are not well administered FETÖ as an International Threat 31

in order to disrupt the popularity of the schools not affiliated with FETÖ. The main They opened FETÖ-affiliated private schools and employed “voluntary motivations of teachers” from a variety of cities and countries. So, they built an education system that is based on pretending to be qualified rather than being genu- FETÖ’s particular inely qualified, and recruited and raised militants through this method. focus on education are to The FETÖ members assigned as the regional operatives responsible have access to for students, targeting both high schools and universities, were answerable to the educational counselors under the command of provincial imams and human resources, referred to by their code-names within the organization. They designated gain legitimacy the students they wanted to recruit by organizing events in schools they at home and were responsible for. The organization also provided vocational and te- abroad by means chnical high school students with internship opportunities and promised of educational them job guarantee after graduation in order to attract them to FETÖ. The activities, and to organization also placed FETÖ-affiliated students in dormitories provided generate income by the state’s Student Loans and Dormitories Institution as a strategy to attract students staying in state dormitories. Students adhering to FETÖ from these then tried to communicate with the targeted students to convince them to activities. join the organization.19

The main motivations of FETÖ’s particular focus on education are to have access to human resources, gain legitimacy at home and abroad by means of educational activities, and to generate income from these activities. With the substantial amounts of income it gained over time, the organization offered free education in its schools to the children of judges, prosecutors, governors, politicians and senior bureaucrats in Turkey and abroad, effectively trapping their parents through this method.

FETÖ’s educational structure adopted the mission of acting as a so-called “spiritual envoy”, and has maintained its efforts on the international platform through its education institutions opened abroad by concealing the true motivations of its activities. Having opened more than 2000 education institutions in 160 countries, FETÖ has shown great care in compl- ying with the inner dynamics and legal statutes of the countries it operates in with a focus on the notions of “humanitarian/ethical considerations”, “lenience”, “reconciliation” and “dialogue” and developing good relations 32 FETÖ as an International Threat

with the countries’ ruling powers and lobbies. By means of the schools opened abroad, FETÖ has aimed to increase its influence in socio-economic and political terms in these countries by gaining popularity through the acceptance of the children of senior bureaucrats, politicians and other decision-makers in their schools.

The method Having formed the teaching staff of the schools abroad among the teachers going overseas as of the 1990s, FETÖ established a cadre consis- FETÖ developed ting of teachers from Turkey and other relevant countries by including for the students graduates of its schools within this cadre. School principals have been studying abroad leading group contacting the administrators of the countries in which they is built on the opened schools in order to create job opportunities and resources for the accommodation organization. The teachers who were assigned as FETÖ imams in various issue of these provinces and districts of Turkey and then assigned as school principals students and by the organization have also become FETÖ imams responsible for the operations abroad. Consequently, school principals are directly in charge enabling the of all the activities in the countries they were assigned to.20 students to enter reputable The method FETÖ developed for the students studying abroad is built universities. on the accommodation issue of these students and enabling the students to enter reputable universities. FETÖ carried out a recruitment strategy by solving the accommodation problems of its operatives and enabling them to enter good universities abroad. One of the strategic aims of FETÖ was to recruit the students who were sent to study abroad on the condition of accepting to do mandatory service in Turkey that is equal to twice the time they have spent abroad as part of the National Education Ministry scholar- ship. The group organized and conducted all the required correspondences and procedures with the universities it is affiliated with for the admission of these students and received a portion of the money sent from the Natio- nal Education Ministry to universities as per diem payments.

Furthermore, FETÖ has hampered the future of millions of young people by stealing the exam questions over the past 15 years. FETÖ has provided remote access to the computer in “sır oda” (mystery room) that is only entered with the eye scanning system with a pirated software, and FETÖ as an International Threat 33

stolen copies of all the exams coordinated by the Student Selection and Placement Center (ÖSYM) for the past 15 years.21 Also, it has been revealed that questions of military school entrance exams were also stolen by the organization and shared with FETÖ members. The stolen questions were used in line with the organization’s ultimate goals. FETÖ distributed the questions to its members towards its aim to place its operatives in key state institutions. And rather than giving their members all the questions, they shared a certain portion of them in an effort to prevent casting doubt on the exam results. But as the organizational structure, operations and other secrets of the organization have been revealed, they could no longer succeed in this.

The first step taken has been to dissolve the educational structure of Before the FETÖ by shutting down their private study centers. This educational stru- shutdown of cture is complex, and performs all its activities through its operatives recruited from its education institutions where students are brainwashed. Be- private study fore the shutdown, around 60 percent of study centers in the country were centers, around 60 owned by FETÖ in terms of student number. After the shutdown of study percent of study centers, which were used by FETÖ to recruit new members and obtain centers in Turkey financial sources, a series of reforms have been marked in education. To were owned by that end, 1472 study centers were turned into regular education instituti- FETÖ in terms of ons whereas the National Education Ministry provided support to private student number. education institutions. Founded in 2016 on the basis of the law No. 6721, Maarif Foundation reduced FETÖ’s international lobbying power by re- gulating many FETÖ-affiliated schools abroad. As a result, the international leg of the strategic fight against FETÖ run by the National Education Ministry since 2014 has been maintained by Maarif Foundation.

Aside from the National Education Ministry, Maarif Foundation is the only entity entitled to open education institutions abroad on behalf of the Republic of Turkey, with the aim of providing and developing formal and non-formal education services on the basis of common values of humanity. Being a non-profit foundation with a public interest, Turkey’s Maarif Foundation was established to conduct effectual activities in every phase of education, from preschool to university education, in every country. 34 FETÖ as an International Threat

The terror group Since its formation, the foundation opened representation offices in 34 countries and signed protocols with 23 countries. Maarif Foundation is has resorted retrieving the schools FETÖ opened abroad by using Turkish people’s to conceal its money and with the credibility and support of the Republic of Turkey, and activities by handing them over to the Turkish nation, the true owners of these scho- assigning their ols. The foundation, which predominantly focuses on the regions that are schools to strategically important for Turkey such as Balkans, Africa, Caucasus and other persons Central Asia, has been opening a variety of education institutions in the 22 in non-Western countries having citizens of Turkish descent. societies. Thanks to Turkey’s endeavors made through the Maarif Foundation, many countries do not allow FETÖ to open schools in their territories whereas intelligence units of many countries take necessary measures regarding the graduates of FETÖ-linked schools in job placements. Due to FETÖ’s activities, some problems have occurred in the education institutions of the U.S. as well. Nevertheless, although the political authority assigned FETÖ schools to Maarif Foundation, the assignment is deemed invalid by the judiciaries of some countries due to the laws in effect or the presence of “power gaps” instead of separation of powers. Stuck in a tight corner as a result of Turkey’s initiatives, the terror group has resorted to conceal its activities by assigning their schools to other persons in Balkans and many non-Western societies.

FETÖ as an International Threat 37

FETÖ’s Terrorist Identity and Attacks

The attacks and other violent actions so far perpetrated by FETÖ are a ma- FETÖ has nifestation of its identity as an international terror and crime organization. code-named its However, it must be noted that due to its sui generis structure, FETÖ dif- militants as seen fers from conventional terror groups such as the PKK, Daesh, Al Qaeda, DHKP-C, ETA and IRA in many respects. The idiosyncratic characteris- in international tics of FETÖ render the group a new generation terror organization. The terror groups and characteristics of FETÖ give considerable insight about its activity types maintained intra- and crime profile. organizational

Looking at the sui generis traits of FETÖ, it can be observed that the communication organization has an esoteric, messianic and cultist structure, as previously with hidden indicated in the report. Due to its esoteric structure, FETÖ was shaped as communication a secretive and intricate network that is closed to the outside world. The channels. intra-organizational knowledge, ideas and practices laden with symbols and secret meanings have been disseminated within the group. They have maintained intra-organizational communication through symbols to hide their activities from the outside world. For instance, in the process leading up to the coup attempt on 15 July 2016, many subliminal messages, only making sense to FETÖ members and alluding to the impending resurrecti- on were covered in TV series, newspapers and magazines of FETÖ-linked media outlets. This esoteric networking mechanism and mode of communication has consolidated the secrecy of FETÖ, thanks to which the organization has managed to conceal its identity as an international intelligence, terror and crime organization. FETÖ, who is supposed to be open and transparent in all its networking activities since it presents itself as a service and education movement, has code-named its militants as seen in international terror groups and maintained intra-organizational communication with hidden communication channels. 23

Aside from its esoteric character, FETÖ also has messianic and cultist traits. Considered a messiah and “universal imam”, who is assumed to be vested with the kinds of knowledge that no one else even has a grasp of, FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen is unquestionably obeyed within the organization. 24 This factor enhances FETÖ operatives’ dedication to the groups 38 FETÖ as an International Threat

and its leader. With a leader regarded as a messiah, the organization has turned into a dangerous cultist movement that controls the minds of its militants.

Within FETÖ, The messianic role assumed by the FETÖ leader leads the militants to act in intra-organizational behavioral patterns that only serve the esoteric problematic structure of the organization as the militants grow away from rationality behaviors in terms and ethical, religious, conscientious or legal concerns. As a result of bra- of ethics and inwashing activities, FETÖ militants believe that they serve an absolute other conventions and divine truth. In this framework, a closed group image based on a di- are legitimized in chotomy of “we” and “they” is built in the minds of FETÖ militants with the militants’ the effect of the esoteric structuring of the group. So, within the radicalization process in FETÖ cult, problematic behaviors in terms of ethics and rationalization other conventions are legitimized and even encouraged in the militants’ processes on the rationalization processes on the pretext that they serve an absolute and pretext that they divine truth, or the identity of “we”. Thus, the concept of crime is appro- serve an absolute ached in a radically different way within the organization, as a result of and divine truth. which is that the militants can commit offenses, as long as they serve the group’s interests without any qualms.

Within these lines, whenever the so-called “absolute and divine truth” FETÖ believes in is at odds with any national or international values and principles, FETÖ militants can easily define a state, a nation or an international organization as “the enemy”. As a result, the militants of the organization are capable of conducting terrorist acts against any such national or international structure that they deem as an adversary without hesitation.

The following are some of the crimes FETÖ has committed within Tur- key in line with the organization’s cult character: attempting to destroy the constitutional order, creating an armed terrorist organization, attempting to destroy the public authority or prevent it from partially or wholly conducting its duties via force and violence, acquiring information and documents that were made confidential in order to protect the state’s internal and external security by means of spying, fraud, stealing exam questions, murder. FETÖ as an International Threat 39

Examining the murders committed by FETÖ will be especially helpful in providing examples of criminal activities directly related to the characteristics of the terrorist organization. FETÖ has murdered thinkers and intellectuals such as academicians Necip Hablemitoğlu and Haydar Meriç who conducted investigations into the true nature of the organization as well as journalists such as Hrant Dink whose murder the organization predicted would create disturbance both within and outside Turkey. Further- more, Dr. Necip Hablemitoğlu, lecturer at Ankara University Faculty of Languages, History and Geography, was assassinated in front of his home on December 18, 2002 by FETÖ. FETÖ had started targeting Dr. Hable- mitoğlu in the early 2000s. Hablemitoğlu’s studies into FETÖ were used in the preparation of the accusation dated August 11, 2000 which accuses the leader of FETÖ, Fethullah Gülen, of creating and leading an illegal organization. This was due to the fact that Hablemitoğlu had at the time successfully deciphered FETÖ’s organizational structure, with the “universal imam” Fethullah Gülen positioned at the top, beneath him “continental imams” and under those “organization imams”. But the prosecutor of the case at the time was removed due to a tape scandal fabricated by FETÖ, and Hablemitoğlu’s research was not included in the case contents.25

Following this, Hablemitoğlu started working on a book named “Kös- tebek” (Mole) to announce the results of his research to the public. Hab- lemitoğlu was to write in this book that the terrorist organization led by Fethullah Gülen aimed to create a parallel state by infiltrating strategic state organs while operating under the guise of a movement providing public service and education. But before the book could be published, Hablemitoğlu became a victim of FETÖ and was assassinated. Following this, for a long time the Hablemitoğlu murder case was manipulated by FETÖ militants that had infiltrated the judiciary. But after the 2016 coup attempt, the murder was included in the FETÖ/PDY case that was being held in İzmir. The mark of FETÖ in the assassination was also noted in the official reports prepared by the Parliamentary Research Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly following the 2016 coup attempt.26

Similar to Hablemitoğlu, journalist Haydar Meriç was also assassinated while conducting research on FETÖ and its leader Fethullah Gülen in 40 FETÖ as an International Threat

preparation of a book he was planning to write about the terrorist organization. Meriç disappeared on the night of May 31st, 2011, and his body was found on June 18th 2011 in the sea, with his hands and feet tied. Media organs linked to FETÖ at the time published news speculating that the murder of Meriç may have occurred due to treasure search activities with the intention of distorting public perception of the case.27 But former police captain S.D., as part of the effective remorse law, shared important information regarding the murder of Haydar Meriç. S.D. stated that after Meriç had started his research into FETÖ leader Gülen, he was subjected to physical and technical surveillance by FETÖ militants that had infiltrated law enforcement, but these physical and technical surveillance attempts conducted by FETÖ members failed to access the documents Meriç possessed on FETÖ. S.D. stated that, the surveillance cameras placed along the roads Meriç commonly used were either brought offline or rotated to view other angles by the intelligence bureau personnel and strongly emphasized that after Meriç was murdered FETÖ militants within the police intelligence unit attempted to cover up the murder.28 As a result of S.D’s testimony of, FETÖ militants that were within the police intelligence unit at the time were arrested on the decision of the Kırklareli 2nd High Criminal Court due to their involvement in the murder of Haydar Meriç.

On the other hand, the assassination of the editor-in-chief of Agos newspaper Hrant Dink on January 19, 2007 carries special significance in this context due to the fact that it shows how FETÖ assassinates or facilitates the assassinations of thinkers and intellectuals as a means of creating and amplifying tensions both inside and outside Turkey as well as deepening sociological fault lines. Due to the claims from the family of the victim that certain public officials had prior knowledge of the assassination, and despite this did not take any actions to prevent the assassination, the family argued that they should be held accountable for the murder. The Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of Istanbul opened an investigation and as a result drafted the accusation no. 2015/47335 dated December 4th, 2015. The accusation states that FETÖ militants that infiltrated the law enforcement agencies such as the former Police Intelligence Bureau Sec- retary Ramazan Akyürek and former Istanbul Police Intelligence Bureau FETÖ as an International Threat 41

Chief Ali Fuat Yılmazer had obstructed the flow of information regarding FETÖ used the the plans obtained for the assassination of Hrant Dink and in this way blo- Dink assassination cked any preventive measures that would be taken if the information had reached the required departments. The accusation also found that FETÖ as a means intended to use the Dink assassination as a means to launch investigations to launch such as Ergenekon and Balyoz which were later revealed to be conspira- investigations cies to purge military officers within the Turkish Armed Forces not linked which were later to FETÖ.29 revealed to be Another event that requires special emphasis within this context is conspiracies the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, due to the fact that it illustrates how to purge military FETÖ acts as an armed terrorist organization. This event clearly proves officers within the that FETÖ is capable of carrying out deadly terrorist acts similarly to other Turkish Armed terrorist organizations such as the PKK and Daesh, and does not hesitate Forces not linked to target civilians with such acts. What is different about FETÖ is that to FETÖ. it has obtained its armed capabilities by infiltrating the military and law enforcement agencies via illegal means such as stealing the questions for the acceptance exams, manipulating promotion and assignment procedures and purging those not linked to the organization. In other words some divisions of the armed forces and law enforcement agencies, which are supposed to serve and protect the nation, were instead infiltrated by FETÖ militants and transformed into armed capabilities of the organization. The fact that FETÖ prioritized the infiltration of armed security agencies of the state shows that the organization aimed to become a hegemonic power by using arms and violence. And on July 15, 2016, the organization used its armed capabilities to threaten the existence of the Turkish state and the Republic of Turkey, to damage and take control of the state authority and to disrupt both the internal and external security of the state. On the night of July 15, 2016, with the weapons and equipment it had captured from the state, FETÖ bombed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Bospho- rus bridge, several law enforcement buildings and even opened fire at civilians gathered in protest. As a result of these events 249 people were killed and 2,301 were wounded, that majority of which were civilians. In this aspect FETÖ is equivalent in nature to other terrorist organizations that employ violence for political purposes, target civilians and seek to 42 FETÖ as an International Threat

damage and destroy the rightful state authority just as other terrorist organizations such as the PKK, Daesh, Al-Qaeda, DHKP-C, ETA and the IRA.

In addition to the above, FETÖ also maintains contact with other ter- FETÖ maintains rorist organizations such as Daesh that pose a threat to humanity and de- contact with mocracy, another reason that the organization is a legitimate and serious other terrorist threat to international peace and security. One such event that illustrates organizations this point is as following: it was learned through the interrogation of a such as Daesh Daesh militant of Syrian origin code-named “Abu Haydar”, real name that pose a threat Muhammal Al-Suleiman, who was caught in Turkey with high amounts to humanity and of explosive equipment on July 8, 2016 (two fully equipped suicide bom- ber vests that were ready to explode on the press of a button, two AK-47 democracy. rifles, 2 silenced pistols, six sticky magnetic bombs to be used by placing them under vehicles) that he had brought the mentioned equipment into Turkey on the directives of Daesh and a Turkish intelligence operative code-named “Captain Elvan” had knowledge of this act. As a result of investigations conducted into the matter it was learned that the person referred to by the Daesh militant as “Captain Elvan” was a FETÖ member who had infiltrated the Turkish Armed Forces namedİrfan Çetinkaya who at the time was serving at the Şanlıurfa Provincial Gendarmerie Command Intelligence Bureau as a senior master sergeant. This person was found to have been in close contact with the aforementioned Daesh member. İrfan Çetinkaya was arrested on July 28, 2016, following the coup attempt as a result of the investigations against FETÖ. Moreover, the bombs that could not be delivered to this FETÖ militant, and thus did not reach Abu Haydar, were brought to Istanbul and used at the İstiklal Avenue bombing. Bombs similar to the ones captured from Abu Haydar were again detected to have been used in the 2016 Atatürk Airport attack, which took 44 lives and was claimed by Daesh.30

As a result of the above discussion it can be concluded that FETÖ militants both facilitate and provide logistic support for terrorist acts such as the suicide bombings Daesh had planned to conduct in Turkey. FETÖ, due to its nature as a “new generation” terrorist organization that poses a threat to international peace and security, does not hesitate to enter into FETÖ as an International Threat 43

cooperation with other terrorist organizations such as Daesh when such a cooperation is deemed beneficial for itself.

In conclusion, as evidenced from the aforementioned illegal activities As part of and murders, FETÖ is an organization that sees legal and democratic authority as its enemy has attempted to destroy the constitutional order and the broader has employed violence against civilians. FETÖ is a “New Generation Ter- international fight rorist Organization” because in addition to this, it is organized under an against terrorism, esoteric structure where code-names are used under the guise of a move- international ment of education and public service and special communication channels cooperation is a are employed, it bases its ideology on messianic beliefs, is led by a cult necessity in the leader and has armed capabilities. This organization has conducted its blo- fight against FETÖ. odiest attacks on Turkey. But considering that the organization either has a similar presence to the one it had in Turkey or is in the process of building up such a presence in the countries it currently operates in, the nature of FETÖ as an international terrorist organization becomes evident. For this reason, as part of the broader international struggle against terrorism, international cooperation is a necessity in the struggle against FETÖ.

FETÖ as an International Threat 45

FETÖ as an International Threat

FETÖ in the U.S.

The U.S. is currently the center of FETÖ’s activities around the globe due to the permanent residence of the leader of the organization Fethullah Gülen in the country. The organization has extensive networks of schools and businesses in the U.S, with net worth in billions of dollars. Making up these networks are more than 140 schools of FETÖ in the U.S. where over 60 thousand students are enrolled every year. At the same time through economic activities, FETÖ has an overall annual revenue exceeding 500 million dollars in the U.S.

A close examination of FETÖ’s organization and activities in the U.S. The U.S. refuses to reveals strong indications that the organization is being protected by either the United States government or certain institutions belonging to the extradite Fethullah government. The leader of the organization, Fethullah Gülen, has been Gülen despite residing in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania since 1999. Gülen’s U.S. resi- the “Treaty on dency permit application included names from American intelligence and foreign affairs communities among its references. Some of the prominent Extradition and names among those are as follows: former Director of the CIA Analysis Mutual Assistance Department George Fidas, former Chief of CIA’s Turkey bureau and for- in Criminal mer U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Morton Abromowitz. All of these names Matters”. praised the academic successes of Gülen’s schools around the world and referred to Gülen as an important scholar in the field of interfaith dialogue in their references.31

Another indication is the United States’ refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen, the prime perpetrator of the 2016 coup attempt to Turkey, despite the “Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters” between the countries. But article 1, paragraph 1 and article 2, paragraph 1, clause A of the treaty clearly indicates that the U.S. is obliged to extradite Gülen. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the article is as follows:

The Contracting Parties undertake to surrender to each other, in accordance with the provisions and conditions laid down in this Treaty, all persons who are found within the territory of the Requested Party and who are being prosecuted for or have been charged with an offense, or convicted of an offense, or are sought 46 FETÖ as an International Threat

by the other Party for the enforcement of a judicially pronounced penalty for an offense committed within the territory of the Requesting Party.

And the following is article 2, paragraph 1, clause a of the treaty:

1. Extraditable offenses, pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty, are: a) Offenses, regardless of whether listed in the Appendix to this Treaty or not, which are punishable under both the federal laws of the United States and the laws of Turkey by deprivation of liberty at least for a period exceeding one year or by a more severe penalty.

According to these terms, a penalty that deprives a person of liberty for at least a year or a situation where a person is being prosecuted for serious offenses should lead to an extradition of the subject between the countries.

The officially statements included in the officially written accusation regarding the coup attempt of Fethullah Gülen clearly indicate that Gülen is accused of crimes that in case of conviction would result in a penalty entailing deprivation of liberty for at least one year. Among those crimes are crimes such as being a member and the leader of a terrorist organization and attempting a coup to overthrow a legally elected government. These accusations are made based on statements from former Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar who was taken hostage at the night of the coup attempt and statements from soldiers who have participated in the coup attempt. Despite these facts, the United States does not abide by the undertakings it is legally bound to follow by the aforementioned treaty, refuses to extradite Fethullah Gülen to Turkey and continues to shelter other FETÖ members. The most well-known of these members are: Cevdet Türkyolu (Leader of FETÖ Covert Imams), Aydoğan Vatandaş (Leader of the Fuatavni twitter account), Şerif Ali Tekalan (rector of Fatih University which is now shut down due to FETÖ links), Ekrem Dumanlı (editor in chief of Zaman newspaper which is now shut down due to FETÖ links), Abdülhamit Bilici (editor in chief of Zaman newspaper which is now shut down due to FETÖ links), Emre Uslu (media propagandist of FETÖ), Tuncay Opçin (media propagandist of FETÖ), Kemal Öksüz (brother of Adil Öksüz), Furkan Koşar (President of Turkish-American Associations affiliated with FETÖ) and, Ahmet Yayla (FETÖ member, former chief police officer). FETÖ as an International Threat 47

In addition to the points mentioned above, it can be seen that authori- For FETÖ’s ties in the United States have allowed FETÖ to organize and develop its presence in the country. Due to this reason, FETÖ’s presence in the United U.S. presence, States is active in fields such as education, culture, business, and politi- political lobbying cs. The activities in the education field are mainly conducted via charter activities have schools. The number of these schools is over 140 and they are present in numerous states across the U.S. These schools have pronounced presence vital importance. in states such as Texas, California, Nevada, Arizona, Oklahoma, Arkan- Representatives sas, Missouri, Illinois, Florida, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and many and senators are more. Every year around 60 thousand students receive education in these frequently taken on FETÖ-linked schools, which change their names occasionally. Hundreds of Turks are working in these schools via H-1B visas, which allow U.S. all-expenses-paid schools and businesses to employ foreign workers in specialty occupati- culture tours. ons. Via this method, many FETÖ members from Turkey are taken to the United States.32

Another field of activity of the organization in the U.S. is cultural activities conducted under the name of interfaith dialogue studies. The coordination center for this field of activity is the Raindrop Turkish House, also called the Raindrop Foundation, founded in 2000 in Houston, Texas. This center in the following years opened offices in five other states of the U.S., namely in Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Ok- lahoma. The center of the foundation in Houston also contains a few other foundations and institutes. Amongst those, two prominent names are “the Turquoise Center” and “the Institute of Interfaith Dialogue”. Using such institutions, FETÖ attempts to present itself as a movement dedicated to global peace and tolerance, and builds connections with local and national politicians.33

For FETÖ’s U.S. presence, political lobbying activities have vital importance. Representatives and senators are frequently taken on all-expenses-paid culture tours. The most-discussed one of such tours in the American media is the Istanbul trip of Texas Senator Leticia Van de Putte in 2010. Putte is also known for her speeches in the American Senate praising Fethullah Gülen.34 Along with such activities, it is important to take note of the donations FETÖ makes during United States presidential elections. In this context, FETÖ members made large donations to Obama’s election campaign. Two examples of such large donations made to Oba- ma’s campaign by FETÖ members are Burak Yeneroğlu’s donation of 652 48 FETÖ as an International Threat

thousand dollars and Furkan Koşar’s donation of 500 thousand dollars. In the last elections, persons and institutions linked to FETÖ contributed approximately 2 million dollars to Hillary Clinton’s campaign.35

FETÖ intends to employ these lobbying capabilities it builds in the U.S. over time via donations, bribes, and cultural tours as a means of opp- ression on Turkey. The last manifestation of these intentions is the Hakan Atilla trial which was executed in the U.S. in a manner that violates Tur- key’s rights of sovereignty. The trial was based on testimonies from the perpetrators of the 2013 judicial coup attempt in Turkey as well as documents taken outside Turkey via illegal means. The case was also opened by former New York prosecutor Preet Bharara who is closely linked to the legal firm Steptoe & Johnson, which has provided consulting services to FETÖ, and FETÖ’s umbrella organization in the U.S. named Turkish-A- merican Union. Based on these relations, the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of Istanbul has launched an investigation into the FETÖ-links of Bharara and other prominent names in the U.S.

FETÖ in Europe

Europe is an extremely important region of the world for Turkey in terms of economic, political and socio-cultural relations. Economic statistics indicate that 42.75% of Turkey’s total international trade in 2016 was conducted with the European Union (EU).36 Politically, Turkey is a candi- date member for the EU. Socio-culturally, there are currently millions of Turkish citizens living in EU member states that have migrated to these countries for work beginning in the early 1960s, and still live in those countries to date.

In parallel to Turkey’s close relations with the EU, FETÖ has built a strong presence in some EU member states. It has been FETÖ’s aim to use close relations Turkey has developed with the EU as well as EU’s political influence in international politics for its own purposes. Along with this, especially after the 2016 coup attempt, the willingness of the EU to firstly shelter FETÖ members, both those already living in their countries as well as those fleeing from law enforcement in Turkey, and secondly almost provide them with any aid they require for their organization, have been the primary reasons for the terrorist organization’s decision to choose Europe as one of the important centers of its global network. FETÖ as an International Threat 49

Just like other countries around the globe, the presence of FETÖ in EU Just like other countries was first established through education and then consolidated via media and business activities. The organization sought to solidify its countries around presence in these countries by supporting these activities with relations- the globe, the hips built with locals who are influential in bureaucracy and politics. Whi- presence of le attempting to build such relationships, FETÖ avoids presenting itself as FETÖ in EU a religious community and conducts its activities via obfuscated networks of foundations operating under the guise of seeking to aid in the integra- countries was tion of Turks in European societies as well as promoting inter-religious first established and inter-cultural dialogue. In this manner, FETÖ also hides its esoteric through education organization structure. and then FETÖ’s strong presence in European countries is not only a result of consolidated the organization’s own strategies, but also a result of the support it has via media and received from European countries since they considered the organization a useful element that can be employed against Turkey. The strongest indi- business activities. cation of this is the refusal of EU countries to recognize FETÖ as the perpetrator of the 2016 coup attempt, and furthermore the hesitance they have displayed in condemning the coup attempt. In this context, EU member states, in particular Germany, Austria, Netherlands, and Greece, continue to host large numbers of FETÖ members who have fled prosecution in Turkey, and refuse to extradite them.

Member of the Turkish parliament and representative of Istanbul Metin Külünk said the following about how EU countries employ FETÖ as a tool against Turkey:

Upon examination of the foreign operations being conducted against Turkey, the activities of European countries is revealed as a subject that needs considerable attention. European member states such as Germany, France, United Kingdom and Austria attempt to control local Turkish populations and use them against Turkey by focusing their activities in places where Turks, including FETÖ members, heavily live. Especially Germany seeks to monitor Turkey by employing Turks for its intelligence purposes and conducting “zero-cost intelligence activities”. Unfortunately, this is a strategy that has been employed on Turks. They have infiltrated NGO’s and organizations such as FETÖ have been instrumental in these purposes. Ultimately, via these organiza- 50 FETÖ as an International Threat

FETÖ is an tions, operations against Turkey were conducted, continue to be conducted and will be conducted in the future. organization without FETÖ has an important place within this plan of acquiring religious sympathizers. This is why foreign intelligence agencies are maintaining nationality that relationships with FETÖ and protecting the organization. In exchange, executes anti- FETÖ conducts anti-Turkey activities such as promoting the recogniti- Turkey plans on of the so-called Armenian genocide and the headscarf issue in Bel- in coordination gium. FETÖ is an organization without nationality. This organization is capable of allying itself with anyone against Turkey. FETÖ members with foreign and foreign intelligence agencies execute anti-Turkey plans in coordi- intelligence nation. The organization attempts to recruit and employ Turks living in agencies. Europe against Turkey. Later they conduct operations against Turkey with them.

Supporting Külünk’s statements, Ozan Ceyhun, who served as a member of the European Parliament during its 4th and 5th terms, states that especially in Germany Turks who oppose FETÖ are “excommunicated”. Ceyhun continues his words as follows: “Turkey is sincere about fighting global terrorism, if a German person living in Turkey was to report to the police the activities of a terrorist organization operating in Germany, the Turkish police would do what is necessary; but when Turks living in Germany and Belgium notify the police about the activities of FETÖ and FETÖ members, they are accused of being spies.”

As mentioned above, being supported by the governments and parlia- ments of Europe, the presence of FETÖ in Europe focuses its activities in two main fields, media and education. Media has been a vital propaganda tool for the organization, with the purpose of building its own reality by and for its own members. Persons and institutions who have close relationships with the organization or those that support it are praised, while those who are opposed to it face smear campaigns the organization runs against them to detract from their credibility. The primary media tools of the organization in Europe have been the Germany-based “Zaman Av- rupa”, following this “STV Avrupa”, “Ebru TV” or QLAR and “Deuts- ch-Türkisches Journal”.37 The education network of the organization consists mainly of primary and secondary schools, language schools, study centers, dormitories, and student houses spread around Europe. The main target of these education institutions run by the organization is Turks li- FETÖ as an International Threat 51

ving in Europe. While FETÖ refuses that there are organic links between FETÖ receives a any of these education institutions, it is obvious that they all serve the purpose of acquiring FETÖ sympathizers and indoctrination. significant amount of monetary Evaluating FETÖ’s presence in European countries individually reve- support from the als a clearer picture of the organization’s network in Europe. At this point, the European countries with the strongest FETÖ presence are Germany, German state Austria and, Netherlands. as a result of Germany being engaged in educational According to a report produced by the State of Baden-Württemberg Secu- activities in rity Bureau, there are approximately 24 schools and 150 study centers that Germany via are either close to or directly linked with FETÖ in Germany. Such institutions started to emerge in the early 1990s and over time have gradually foundations. increased their numbers. Following the 2016 coup attempt, it is known that half of the study centers and 3 of these schools stopped operating. Alongside the field of education, FETÖ has 300 foundations and more than 3000 businesses in Germany.

FETÖ’s educational institutions in Germany are operated under foundations with different names such as BIL-Schulen, Tüdesb and Diyalog, depending on the state they are situated in. Via these foundations, FETÖ receives a significant amount of monetary support from the German state as a result of being engaged in educational activities in Germany. In addition to this, the organization takes a monthly tuition fee of about 300 euros from the students registered in its schools.38

Filiz İşler, Chief Accountant of the Union of European Turkish De- mocrats, has stated that Turks living in Germany exhibit a preference towards schools run by FETÖ. According to İşler, the main reason Turks want to send their children to these school is that in German schools Tur- kish children are treated as second-class students. Having succeeded in drawing Turks to its schools for this reason, FETÖ has also gained the backing and support of German bureaucrats and politicians by claiming that they are providing lessons towards aiding societal integration in their schools. At the same time, via the education it offers to Turkish students, FETÖ can exert influence on families and maintain a strong “himmet” network in Germany. 52 FETÖ as an International Threat

Germany has Other than the field of education, the civil society activities of FETÖ in Germany are also coordinated via Stiftung Dialog und Bildung founda- become a tion. The foundation deserves extra attention due to their high importance shelter for FETÖ in conducting the organization’s lobbying and public relations activities. members who In addition to this, another institution named Bund Deutscher Institutio- are escaping the nen administers the connections between FETÖ’s many foundations in Germany.39 law in Turkey. There are The activities of the organization in the media sector are split into several sections such as TV program production, marketing, printing-dist- testimonies from ribution and publishing under the World Media Group name. The various the members of companies associated with these sections are: “Peyk Media GmbH” with the organization the production of TV programs, “Tuwa Media GmbH” with marketing, in which they “Sun Print & Vertriebs GmbH” with printing-distribution, “Zukunft Me- dien GmbH” and “World Media Akademi” with publishing. Alongsi- claim that de these, the organization also has an online newspaper named “Deuts- Germany has ch-Türkisches Journal”.40

become the new FETÖ’s activities in the business world are conducted through an umb- center of the rella organization named “Bundesverband der Unternehmervereinigung” organization (BUV). This institution coordinates the activities of more than 3000 small and medium sized businesses and companies.

On the other hand, Germany has become a shelter for FETÖ members who are escaping the law in Turkey. There are testimonies from the members of the organization in which they claim that Germany has become the new center of the organization. It is known that members of the organization who have fled to Germany are contacted by the organization immediately after their entry to the country, given moral and material support, and aided in their process of integration in the country.41

Austria

Upon examination of the FETÖ presence in Austria it can be seen that the person positioned at the top of the organization’s presence in the country is Numan Gülen, the son of Fethullah Gülen’s uncle. Similar to Germany, main activities of the organization in Austria are in the fields of education, media and business. In the education field, the organization has more than 50 kindergartens and daycare centers throughout the country. But the FETÖ as an International Threat 53

main institution of the organization in the country is “the Phönix Schools”, The business founded in 2007. Phönix Schools have their center in Vienna and offices activities of the spread out across seven states in total. Aside from the above, the organization also has many study centers and a coordination center named “Anato- organization lian Culture Center”. The activities in the field of education are supported in Austria are by an institute named “Friede-Institüt für Dialog”, the current president of conducted which is Yasemin Aydın. This institute is in fact a propaganda production via the Vienna center and is FETÖ’s main tool to reach senior politicians in Austria.42 Businessmen’s The business activities of the organization in Austria are conducted via Foundation, the Vienna Businessmen’s Foundation, which has some considerably we- which has some althy businessmen as members. In the media field, the weekly newspaper considerably “Zaman Avusturya” is a prominent tool of the organization.43 wealthy Netherlands businessmen as FETÖ has 2 high schools, 7 primary schools and 1 study center in the members. Netherlands. The names and locations are as follows: “Cosmicus College (Rotterdam)”, “Metis Montessori Highschool (Amsterdam)”, “Roos Isla- mic Primary School-IBS De Roos (Purmerend and Zaandam)”, “Inpoint study center (Meerdere)”, “Witte Tulp Primary School (Amsterdam)”, “Cosmicus-Impuls Primary School (Amsterdam)”, “Cosmicus Primary School (Rotterdam, Lahey and Arnhem)”.44

The business activities of the organization in the Netherlands are collected under businessmen foundations that are present in almost every city. These are: “Den Haag Businessmen Foundation”, “Utrecht Young Businessmen Foundation”, “Brabant Young Businessmen Foundation”, “Twente Businessmen Foundation”45, “Rotterdam Young Businessmen Foundation”, “Amsterdam Young Businessmen Foundation”, “Veluwe and Overijssel Young Businessmen Foundation” and “Gelderland Busi- nessmen Foundation”. In the media sector, the organization’s local newspaper named “Zaman Vandaag” continues its activities under its new name “Kanttekening”. FETÖ continues its anti-Turkish propaganda activities via this newspaper.

On the other hand, following the 2016 coup attempt, FETÖ’s presence in the Netherlands has begun facing significant troubles. Immediately following the coup attempt, more than 600 students withdrew from FETÖ 54 FETÖ as an International Threat

FETÖ’s schools in the Netherlands, and today this number has doubled. “Roos Islamic Primary Schools-IBS De Roos” mentioned above was announced network in the to be closed by the end of the year due to a lack of students. FETÖ had Netherlands to rename its schools to prevent them from shutting down. “Roos Islamic suffered a huge Primary School-IBS De Roos” was renamed as “IBS De Horizon Primary blow after the School”, “Witte Tulp Primary School” was renamed as “De Wereldbur- ger” and “Cosmicus College” was renamed as “Lyceum Kralingen”.46 July 15 coup attempt. The FETÖ in the Balkans

organization FETÖ has been active in the Balkan countries and built a very effective changed the organization in the region over the years. The organization is active in names of its fields such as education, tourism, media and publishing, and has significant influence in the bureaucracies of the region due to the presence of schools to those educated in FETÖ schools in the public sectors of Balkan countries. save them from According to reports from different sources, the number of students re- shutting down. ceiving education in schools operating under the control of FETÖ in the Balkans is around 20.000 in total, most of whom are in Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Romania. Along with activities in the field of education, the presence of FETÖ in the Balkans also aims to reach its target audiences and gain new members with non-governmental organizations. Around 33 non-governmental organizations are estimated to be under FETÖ’s control in the Balkans.47

Many of FETÖ schools are currently continuing to operate in the region comprised of the following countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Monte- negro, Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia. Within this region, FETÖ is heavily active especially in the countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Al- bania and Macedonia. FETÖ has been operating in the education field in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1998 under the name of “Sema Education Institutions”, and also owns “the International Burch University”. Along with the above, FETÖ pays special attention to maintaining an active propaganda operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, using the translated books of the organization’s leader which are being distributed by “Hikmet Publis- hing” in the country.48

FETÖ started its operations in Albania with the Gülistan Foundation founded in 1993 and has 2 universities, around 15 schools and 10 dormitories in the country. Via the capacity of these institutions, FETÖ provides FETÖ as an International Threat 55

education to more students in Albania than any other country, which are Out of all Balkan around 6500 students annually. FETÖ conducts propaganda for the organization in the country via “Prizmi Publishing House” and also conducts countries Albania is similar activities via its websites in the Albanian language.49 Out of all the country where Balkan countries Albania is the country where FETÖ has the strongest FETÖ has the presence; FETÖ has built relationships with high-ranking bureaucrats in strongest the country by providing their children with large amounts of funds via scholarships; and compared to other schools in the country FETÖ-linked presence. schools provide a comparatively better education. FETÖ aims to build a FETÖ has built strong network effective in the areas of business, politics and economy in relationships Albania via providing education to the children of the leading businessmen and politicians in the country in the aforementioned schools. Along with high-ranking with the above, the organization has penetrated journalism departments bureaucrats in of some public universities in Albania, and also attempted to establish the country by influence in the country’s media by employing effective names from the providing their Albanian media sector in its private universities. In this perspective, it is worth noting that the first online newspaper established in Albania, “Ga- children with large zeta Start”, is also a FETÖ media organ. amounts of funds

FETÖ has considerable influence in the country of Macedonia, and via scholarships. along with its business activities in the country it provides an education to around 2000 students in five different cities annually via “Yahya Ke- mal” and “Mehmet Akif Ersoy” education institutions under its control.50 Due to the visa exemption agreement between Turkey and Macedonia, FETÖ members can enter the country without facing any controls. The members of the organization use Macedonia as a transit country in order to travel to other countries of Europe. The organization is active in the Macedonian media via its newspaper named “Makedonya Zaman”, and distributes its newspapers published in Albanian and Macedonian to the public via municipalities. The FETÖ schools in Macedonia can be seen to be experiencing financial problems, as the fight against FETÖ in Turkey has impact on an international level since the organization’s financial activities in Turkey have now ceased. At the end of 2016, two FETÖ schools in Macedonia were shut down due to Turkey’s initiatives, but by the end of 2017 seven schools under the organization’s control remained active. However, during the period of contact between the Turkish embassy and the Macedonian authorities, the fact that FETÖ is a national security threat not only to Turkey but also to other countries they operate in, is an im- 56 FETÖ as an International Threat

Balkan countries portant a point that is not adequately appreciated in the country. But Tur- kish authorities have done extensive work to communicate this point and have a special as a result of this ongoing effort, the Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran importance in Zaev called FETÖ a terrorist organization during the Turkish Education Turkey’s foreign Festival held on December 21, 2017. Moreover, after the revelation of relations as a FETÖ’s nature as a terrorist organization, the demand for FETÖ’s schools experience a noticeable drop. It is known that the FETÖ-linked “Yahya result of being Kemal College” has stopped using some of its buildings due to a decrease very close to in students enrolled.51

Turkey both FETÖ also has a presence in Kosovo and conducts its activities in the historically country via “Gülistan Educational Foundations” and “the Atmosfer Edu- and culturally. cation and Culture Foundation”, which are under its control. These institutions have schools operating at the kindergarten, primary school and high school levels in Prizren, Yakova, Liplan and Prishtine, and some of these schools are known to provide dormitories for male and female students.52

Unlike other Balkan countries, FETÖ has a limited presence in the countries of Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary. For example in Greece, both due to the intensive inspections of Greek public institutions as well as the lack of interest shown towards them by Turks living in Western Thrace, FETÖ has failed to establish a sizeable presence. On the other hand, while FETÖ started its activities in Bulgaria in 1992, its presence in the country is limited to some private tutoring centers and language schools in the cities of Sofia and Plovdiv.53

In conclusion, Balkan countries have a special importance in Turkey’s foreign relations as a result of being very close to Turkey both historically and culturally. Turkey’s interactions with the Balkan countries increased in the 2000s due to Turkey’s effective initiatives, and in this era the FETÖ presented itself in the region also increased as a natural extension of Tur- key. In this way, the organization was capable of finding supporters among locals who had sympathy for Turkey. The propaganda of FETÖ presents the organization as an equivalent and natural extension of Turkey and the Turkish presence, and due to the fact that this propaganda has been going on for years, a comprehensive and well-planned initiative is required to erase this false impression that exists among certain populations living in the Balkans. In this context, the fight against FETÖ must be - multi dimensional. This struggle cannot be won solely with the efforts of the FETÖ as an International Threat 57

Turkish state, it also requires the support of more think tanks, civil society Eyeing Arabic/ organizations and private institutions. Within this framework, an important responsibility lies on the shoulders of universities and think tanks to Islamic world as an correct the deceptive positive impression that FETÖ has built up over the important target, years among the Balkan people. one of FETÖ’s Based on the above points, it can be seen that the struggle against aims in the Middle FETÖ in the Balkans has special importance both in the struggle of our East is to spread nation against the terrorist organization and in reducing FETÖ influence, the influence of the which is an international threat, outside our nation. The reason for this is that Balkan nations are the most important base for FETÖ after Turkey. United States as Within this ongoing struggle, the dismantling of FETÖ’s presence in Bal- an alternative to kan countries will deeply hurt the organization, the financial sources and French and British presence of which in Turkey have been addressed. Security and intelligen- influences. ce agencies aware of this are now carefully conducting their work regarding FETÖ’s presence in the Balkans in coordination with corresponding institutions abroad. Within this context, in an operation that the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) conducted together with Kosovan authorities on March 29, six high-ranking members of the organization, wanted by law in Turkey were caught, brought to Turkey and handed over to judicial authorities.54 FETÖ in the Middle East

The Arabic/Islamic world is an important target for FETÖ, especially considering the relationships the organization has with foreign intelligence agencies. In this context, one of its aims in the Middle East is spreading the influence of the United States as an alternative to French and British influences. FETÖ, proving itself with a useful tool, has used- the“mo derate Islam” discourse effectively in its efforts to grow its presence in countries across the Middle East. According to this, in the Middle East and especially in the Arab world, three different types of mainstream Islamic movements can be described:

a. The first one of these has its roots in Sufism and does not involve itself with politics;

b. The second type is the movements known as political Islam in the literature. These are movements that have developed and spread as a response to the administrations founded with the influence of the West in 58 FETÖ as an International Threat

FETÖ has the Middle East which have attempted to implement social and political changes in their countries via top down reforms. These groups, generally engaged in similar to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, are movements that media activities in aim to get directly involved with politics and refuse to resort to radical the Middle East methods in their actions. with the purpose c. The third type of mainstream Islamic movements in the Arab world of spreading its is the Salafi or Wahhabi movements. These movements generally receive ideology and financial support from Gulf countries and do not have real criticisms against administrations. Thus, these movements can be qualified as apolitical reaching large but radical. masses in the Recently, the moderate Islam discourse has been popularized as an al- region. ternative to the three other types of mainstream Islamic movements in the Arab world mentioned above. Groups that have adopted the discourse of moderate Islam support a reformist rather than a revolutionary approach regarding changes in their countries, and have managed to find significant support in the region. FETÖ has adopted support for this stance as its narrative and sought to take advantage of Turkey’s popularity in the Arab world as a result of Turkey’s increasing engagement with the region. During a time when Turkey had strengthened its relations with Middle Eastern country, members of the organization who presented themselves as natural representatives and ambassadors of Turkey, the organization opened schools in the countries they operated in and created a market for companies providing financial support for the organization. Within this context, they have been especially active in Egypt, Iraq, Yemen and Mo- rocco. However, during the period mentioned, it was observed that FETÖ had trouble in establishing and growing its presence in the Gulf countries.

FETÖ, just like in all other regions it is active in, has also engaged in media activities with the purpose of spreading its ideology and reaching large masses in the Middle East. The most prominent FETÖ organizations in this context are “Zaman Arabic”, “Gulen Arabic” and “the Hira Magazine”. Especially “Hira Magazine”, has become a well-known media organ among the intellectual communities of the Middle East. The organization has used the magazine as a propaganda tool and also used it to establish relations with Arabic intellectuals by featuring them in the magazine, some of those featured later became members of the organization. Also, all books of FETÖ leader Gülen were translated to Arabic and FETÖ as an International Threat 59

distributed, and graduate students and doctoral theses from universities The rising tensions in Arab countries that were in favor of the organization’s arguments were financially supported. between Egypt and Turkey following On the other hand, it should be noted that the media organizations un- the removal of der control of or at least close to the administrations of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt were observed by many to have presen- Morsi with the ted the failure of the 2016 coup attempt perpetrated by FETÖ as a negative coup led by el- development. Moreover, in the following period, TV channels such as Sky Sisi have provided News or Al Arabiya aired interviews with Gülen and allowed him to conduct propaganda for his organization and its activities. FETÖ with room for expansion. Upon examination of FETÖ’s presence and activities in Egypt, it can be seen that the organization, which was founded as a Messianic cult, is being used to conduct intelligence operations against not only Turkey but many other countries. The initial focus of the organization’s activities in the country was education, via educational institutions the organization raised militants and expanded its social base, later its activities were diversified by the creation of civil society institutions and media organs spreading the organization’s propaganda. The above mentioned model was employed in Egypt and FETÖ today maintains a strong base in the country.

The activities of FETÖ in Egypt intensified in the 1990s, it is known that during this period some members of the organization from Turkey and Central Asian Turkish Republics were moved to Cairo. Starting its activities in the country this way, the organization chose Egypt as an important coordination center for its international activities. The reason for this is the high potential the country has in opening the doors of both Africa and the Middle East to the organization. “The Hira Magazine” published in Arabic is prepared and printed in Cairo. Similarly, an institution in Cairo named “Nil” giving language education in Arabic has long been active. Students from Turkey as well as the Al Azhar University participate in the courses provided by this institution. The activities of FETÖ in Egypt are not limited to Cairo, and the organization also maintains student houses as well as a language tuition centers and a school in Alexandria.55

The rising tensions between Egypt and Turkey following the removal of Egypt’s elected president Mohamed Morsi due to the coup led by 60 FETÖ as an International Threat

As a result then-minister of defense and commander in chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on July 3, 2013, have provided FETÖ with room for expansion. FETÖ, of Turkey’s taking advantage of the aforementioned tensions, provided intelligence diplomatic and information to Egypt and solidified its relations with the Sisi regime. In civilian efforts, light of this, it cannot be considered a coincidence that Egypt was the only some African abstaining country at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s session held on October 19, 2016 where the inclusion of FETÖ within the list of countries terrorist organizations was discussed.56 have started Today FETÖ maintains a close relationship with the intelligence agen- considering cies of Egypt as a result of its long-standing activities in the country. Inde- FETÖ as an ed, the rumors that Gülen may seek asylum in Egypt in case the U.S. takes internal security action against his presence in the country are not entirely baseless. Also threat and supporting these rumors, it is known that FETÖ members active in the Middle East and Africa have been organizing meetings in Egypt following begun limiting its the failure of the 2016 coup attempt to discuss and develop new strategies activities in their for their activities in their respective regions.57 All of these rumors and countries. claims are also in line with the increasing number of FETÖ members in Egypt who conduct propaganda against Turkey via appearing on local TV channels that aired content supporting the 2016 coup attempt. FETÖ in Africa

Turkey, within the framework of the multi-dimensional foreign policy approach adopted in the early 2000s, has sought to strengthen its bilateral relations with countries in different regions around the world. The “Africa initiative” of Turkey started in 2003 should not be thought of as an initiative only relating to the establishment and development of diplomatic relations. Aside from the political and diplomatic dimensions, the initiative was also aimed to be supported with economic and social policies. Upon examining the process today, it can be seen that the initiative has brought concrete positive results, and Turkey’s relations with African countries, both political and economic, have significantly improved. While the total export volume of Turkey to Africa was 2.1 billion U.S. dollars in 2003, this number reached 13.7 billion U.S. dollars by 2014. On the other hand, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute’s (TÜİK) data, the total volume of the trade between Turkey and African countries has surpassed 20 billion U.S. dollars as of the beginning of 2016.58 The improvement of cultural and humanitarian relations constitutes an important dimension of FETÖ as an International Threat 61

this policy of closer relations with African countries. Within this scope, Turkey has provided basic health services and humanitarian aid to many countries across the continent, and the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) has intensified its activities in the region. The intensifying political and economic relationships between Afri- can countries and Turkey have made the establishment of new diplomatic missions and Turkish Airlines offices in different countries a requirement. The number of embassies Turkey had in Africa rose from 12 in May 2009 to 39 in 2015.59

The foremost reasons for this success that Turkey has achieved in such a short period are Turkey’s lack of a colonial past, the historical and religious links between Africa and Turkey, multi-dimensional relationships FETÖ has used and the coordinated work of non-governmental organizations in the field. It can be seen that these multi-dimensional relationships continue in many Turkey’s strategy fields such as education, hygiene (the building of new water wells, finding of building closer new clean water sources etc.), socio-cultural activities, economic invest- relationships in ments and the expansion of trade. Africa as a financial Aspects of Turkey’s Africa initiative, which has been underway since opportunity for the early 2000s, such as humanitarian aid, educational activities and eco- itself and built up nomic investments have been areas that saw significant participation and activity from non-governmental organizations. By infiltrating these fields its presence in of activity, FETÖ has used Turkey’s strategy of building closer relations- African countries. hips in Africa as a financial opportunity for itself and built up its presence in African countries. The presence of FETÖ in Africa, which has spread to almost every country in the continent, has three main fields of activity: i) educational institutions, ii) investment, trade and financial activities, iii) foundations and associations. FETÖ is active, primarily in the educational, economic and socio-political areas, in the following countries: Al- geria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda.

Having started its activities in the field of education in Africa in the year 1994, by 2016 FETÖ had 110 educational institutions at the primary and secondary school levels and one university under its control in Africa. The language of education in these schools is generally the native langua- 62 FETÖ as an International Threat

ge of the country they are situated in, and this greatly aids the organization both in recruiting students and in its propaganda efforts. Some of FETÖ’s educational institutions in Africa include: “the Light Academy” in Kenya, “Galaxy International School” in Ghana and “the Nile University” in Ni- geria. FETÖ has not restricted its activities to the field of education, instead working to expand its socio-cultural presence and influence via foundations and associations. Some of these institutions that aim to expand the organization’s influence with the interfaith dialogue narrative can be named as “the Turquise Harmony Institute”, “Ufuk Dialogue Foundation” and “the Atlantique Turquie-Sénégal Association”. Aside from these, the organization has also engaged in press and media activities in the countries it operated in to spread its ideology and reach wide audiences. Within this context, their most prominent operations in Africa include “The Foun- tain”, “Hira Kanalı”, “Tughra Books” and “Ebru Television”.

As a result In conclusion, FETÖ started its activities in Africa in the 1990s and in of Turkey’s the 2000s, via infiltrating Turkey’s strategy of intensifying relations with Africa and aimed to spread its activities mentioned above to the entire diplomatic and continent. As a result of these operations, at the stage we are in today, civilian efforts, FETÖ’s network in Africa is both large enough to be considered to span some African the entire continent, as well as deep enough to have a significant area of countries influence. FETÖ is capable of capturing popularity in African countries, especially among the middle class. It has made a certain amount of in- have started vestments dedicated to building relationships with future administrative considering FETÖ elites of the region, and can create influence capabilities by providing the as an internal children of high-level politicians and bureaucrats with scholarships. security threat Following the traitorous coup attempt of 2016, Turkey has begun ta- and begun limiting king measures against FETÖ not just on a national level but also on the its activities in international level. Since one of the most active and effective areas of operation of FETÖ, which is an international threat, is undoubtedly Africa, their countries. and since FETÖ’s networks in African countries pose a severe security threat to these countries as well as Turkey, Africa has been named as one of the centers of the fight against FETÖ by Turkey. In this process, as a result of Turkey’s diplomatic and civilian efforts, some African countries have started considering FETÖ as an internal security threat and begun limiting its activities in their countries. Within this framework, countries such as Angola, Gambia and Morocco have stopped the operation of FETÖ schools within their countries; communications with other countries are FETÖ as an International Threat 63

ongoing to ensure similar results in other regions of Africa. Via the work of the Maarif Foundation, the transfer of FETÖ-linked schools have been completed in Guinea, Niger, Somalia, Congo and Sudan, and agreements were made with 14 other countries regarding the transfer of schools under the control of the organization.60 On the other hand, Turkish security and intelligence agencies continue to engage in important work against the FETÖ presence in Africa. For example, the FETÖ network in the African country of Gabon was brought down, and the organization’s top three lea- ders in the country were brought to Turkey.61 FETÖ in Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus

For around seventy years, the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus were administered by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Within this span of time, the USSR implemented policies restricting the practice of Islam both to spread its communist ideology and to maintain its control Following the over the important natural resources situated in these regions. But fol- collapse of the lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. sought to entrench its Soviet Union, the military interests as well as political and socio-economic policies in the U.S. sought to region in an attempt to take advantage of the newly created power vacuum.62 Within this context, Western values were actively popularized in all entrench its military ex-communist countries, especially Russia. This way, the political stances interests as well as of the governments of these newly-independent countries were directed to political and socio- be in close contact to the United States. economic policies FETÖ’s first attempts to establish a strategic presence in the regions in the region in an of Central Asia and the Caucasus were made under the influence of the attempt to take new political conjecture that came to be following the fall of the Soviet Union. The organization, starting to build an area of influence in the regi- advantage of the on by opening educational institutions, later initiated its activities in the newly created economic field by taking advantage of the fast liberalization process in power vacuum. the region. Upon examination of the schools and companies opened by FETÖ in this period, some of the prominent names among them are as follows: “Çağ Educational Enterprises” in Azerbaijan, “Feza Inc.” in Nakhc- hivan, “Feza Publications Inc.”, “Eflak Inc.” and “Turk-Kazakhstan High Schools General Directorate” in Kazakhstan, “Sebat Inc.” in Kyrgyzstan, “Slim Inc.” in Uzbekistan, “Başkent Education Inc.” in Turkmenistan, and “Çağlar Education Goods LLC” in Georgia. 64 FETÖ as an International Threat

During this period, FETÖ played an important role within the “moderate Islam” project of the United States in the regions of Central Asia and In 2002, Russian the Caucasus, and in this way the organization found immense room to intelligence grow. The organization, providing secular education in its schools, provided guises to intelligence operatives carrying U.S. passports by hiring agency FSB them as English Teachers in its schools; and via its companies aimed to determined that bring the rich natural resources of the region to Western markets by han- FETÖ schools ding out bribes to local administrations. By giving Western-style educa- were conducting tion, FETÖ managed to make a name for itself in the countries it operated in during this period, and day by day became a more useful actor for intelligence Western countries. But the fact that the organization was being used as an operations operational base for the U.S. in the regions it was active in was revealed against Russia’s in the following years. The Russian Federation and Uzbekistan were the national interests first countries in the region to determine this fact with their intelligence operations, and they later banned the activities of FETÖ in their countries. on behalf of the CIA. Russia Starting from the 1990s, FETÖ began conducting well-coordinated activities in ex-Soviet countries with the nature of a sophisticated intelligence agency. Within this context, in some of these regions FETÖ-controlled schools and companies started their operations even before the establishment of Turkish embassies and missions. Furthermore, the organization’s members even managed to gain the sympathy of the Turkish state by providing support to Turkish missions that were established after them.

FETÖ initiated its operations in Russia in the early 1990s by opening educational institutions under the name of Turkish schools in many places around the country such as the autonomous republics in the Northern Caucasus, Tatarstan, and other republics within Russia using Turkic languages, St. Petersburg, Siberia and Khakassia. At the beginning of the 2000s, Russia ensured its internal political unity, and with Vladimir Pu- tin’s rise to power the intelligence and security agencies of the country were redesigned, which in time led to the revelation of FETÖ’s close links with foreign intelligence agencies. In the year 2002, Russian intelligence agency FSB determined that FETÖ schools were directly linked to U.S. intelligence agencies and were conducting intelligence operations against Russia’s national interests on behalf of the CIA. They were found to be employing an education system detached from Islam with the purpose of FETÖ as an International Threat 65

producing graduates and organization members opposed to the traditional values of Russia and Central Asia. Furthermore, some of the students and teachers in these schools were discovered to be military and intelligence operatives. Upon these conclusions, a significant number of these schools were closed by the order of the Supreme Court of Russia.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan was the second country in the region to address the threat imposed by FETÖ in Central Asia. The organization infiltrated Uzbekistan using the same methods in the 1990s and some time later attracted the at- Uzbekistan has tention of the Uzbek state and intelligence. It was determined that with the distorted education given in their schools, they were engaging in activities been the second opposed to the unity of the Uzbek public and the teachers and graduates country in Central of these schools were aiming to protect U.S. interests. Furthermore, in the Asia to address the year 1999, following the revelation that FETÖ was linked to the assassination attempt towards Uzbek leader Islam Karimov during the first coup threat imposed by attempt in Uzbekistan, schools run by the terrorist organization were shut FETÖ in the region. down and its members were deported. Some of the intelligence operatives that were behind the assassination attempt were arrested and jailed. But due to the fact that during that period the leader of the opposition Mu- hammad Salih was protected by Turkey and not extradited to Uzbekistan, bilateral relations between the two countries were severely damaged and came to the point of stopping almost entirely, meaning that FETÖ had orchestrated its first coup attempt in Uzbekistan, and it failed just like the 2016 coup attempt. But the coup attempt in Uzbekistan was enough to severely damage Turkey-Uzbekistan relations.

Kyrgyzstan

Unlike Russia and Uzbekistan, in Kyrgyzstan FETÖ members have found the opportunity to operate freely and expand their presence. The opening ceremony of the FETÖ-linked Sebat Foundation’s schools in 1992, attended by Turkish and Kyrgyz presidents, marked the beginning of the organization’s operations in Kyrgyzstan. The organization continues its operations in the country today, with numerous schools and commercial corporations under its control. FETÖ, with the tens of thousands of graduates that have received an education in their schools, has firmly embedded itself in the administration, business world, economic balances and furt- 66 FETÖ as an International Threat

The Kyrgyz state hermore the public consciousness of Kyrgyzstan. In this way, the organization today uses Kyrgyzstan as a base of operations, and the continued acts as if the warnings Turkey has made to Kyrgyzstan following the atrocious coup schools owned attempt of July 2016 have been met with an unpleasant response from the by FETÖ have country’s administration. The schools of the terrorist organization were been seized not shut down despite the risk of ending economic relations with Turkey, and instead the country continued to fully support FETÖ and the organi- due to pressure zation’s activities. from Turkey after FETÖ has been operating in Kyrgyzstan ever since the Kyrgyz state the 2016 coup was founded, and the presence of FETÖ in this country is growing every attempt. But the day. The foundation of the FETÖ presence in Kyrgyzstan consists of a schools have university and 27 schools, and the number of students receiving educa- 63 merely been tion from these institutions has grown to 10 thousand. Furthermore, the fact that the organization has infiltrated even the remotest branches of the renamed. country’s administration can be seen simply by examining the region’s media. The presence of FETÖ within the Kyrgyz bureaucracy is theorized to have grown to a point where the organization is now capable of appo- inting people it deems as useful for its operations to very important positions. It has also been observed that the organization is capable of abusing the weaknesses of the Kyrgyz state, such as by bringing its militants to the positions they desire or getting things that are in the interests of the organization done via bribes. Within this context, it is also known that just like in Turkey, the organization employs the strategy of stealing exam questions as a means of infiltrating the state in Kyrgyzstan, and in this way the Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies have been significantly compromised.64

The Kyrgyz state acts as if the schools owned by the organization have been seized due to pressure from Turkey after the 2016 coup attempt. But in reality, the schools have merely been renamed, and continue to be a part of FETÖ’s presence in the country. For example, educational institutions named “Sebat” were renamed as “Sapat” and the schools are now passed off under the guise of public schools. Also, “the Association of Young Ent- repreneurs” (JIA) operating in Kyrgyzstan is entirely composed of Kyrgyz FETÖ members that have been raised by FETÖ in its educational institutions since the 1990s. İskender Ormon Uuli is still the president of this association.65 FETÖ is also working towards infiltrating the official religious institutions of Kyrgyzstan, via establishing influence over names such as the former president of the Kyrgyzstan Directorate of Religious Affairs FETÖ as an International Threat 67

Çubak Kajı Jalilov as the organization attempts to establish control over In Kazakhstan, other religious groups within Kyrgyzstan. FETÖ members Ormon Uuli and Kajı Jalilov frequently visit the Gülen, the leader of the organization. just like in other After returning from his last visit to Pennsylvania, Jalilov made several countries, FETÖ statements praising Gülen. Jalilov said: “I wish I also was a student of Gü- deluded len. I used to consider myself a peer to great intellectuals. But after seeing families and gained him I wished I was his student.”66 their appreciation The activities of FETÖ in Kyrgyzstan continue not only in the fields of with the education education, business and bureaucracy but also in the art scene. It is known that FETÖ, by creating a production company in Kyrgyzstan, has come given in their to cooperate with almost half of the local artist community in the country. schools, which The artists that cooperate with FETÖ are given extra opportunities such were attended by as concerts or movie roles. But artists skeptical towards FETÖ are pressu- the children of the red and threatened out of the market in a variety of ways. Kyrgyz artists writing poems supporting and praising the leader of the terrorist organiza- country’s elite. tion of Fethullah Gülen, following the 2016 coup attempt is an important example that shows the influence of FETÖ within the Kyrgyz art scene.67

The media presence of FETÖ in Kyrgyzstan continues to operate actively. The organization, conducting propaganda and perception operations against Turkey and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan via their newspaper published under the name “Zaman” and other media outlets, continued its terrorist propaganda operations through a website named “7/24” following the closure of “Zaman”. Aside from newspapers and news sites, the organization also has a radio channel named “Maral FM”.

Kazakhstan

FETÖ started its operations in Kazakhstan by employing methods similar to the ones it employed in Kyrgyzstan, and solidified its presence in the country with the schools it opened and the privileges it obtained in the business world. In Kazakhstan, just like in other countries, FETÖ deluded families and gained their appreciation with the education given in their schools, which were attended by the children of the country’s elite. Today, more than 30 FETÖ-linked schools continue operating within the country and the Kazakhs associated with FETÖ that have graduated from these schools have infiltrated many critical organs of the Kazakh state such as judiciary, intelligence, military and law enforcement.68 68 FETÖ as an International Threat

In Turkmenistan, But many important steps have been taken regarding the presence of FETÖ in Central Asia which became a central topic of attention during many methods, President Erdogan’s visit to Kazakhstan. Important operations were con- including bribery, ducted to address FETÖ’s network in Kazakhstan and the residence per- were employed mits of the businessmen that provided financial support to FETÖ were to ensure revoked, leading to their deportations. High-ranking FETÖ members were arrested and extradited to Turkey. Some of these FETÖ members fled to the capture Kyrgyzstan before they could be arrested. It is also expected that Kazakhs- of important tan will conduct new operations to address the problem of FETÖ members positions by who have graduated from the organization’s schools and then went on to infiltrate the bureaucracy of the country. The process of seizing FETÖ’s those who have schools in Kazakhstan is ongoing. These schools are planned to be brou- graduated from ght under the umbrella of the Maarif Foundation following this process.69 FETÖ schools, Currently, members of FETÖ are banned from working at schools in Ka- but the true nature zakhstan. of the organization Tajikistan and Turkmenistan

was revealed. Having entered Tajikistan in the mid-1990s via educational institutions and investments, FETÖ went on to establish influence over the local po- pulation in a short time and attracted the government’s attention with its CIA-supported successes in the business world. The schools and companies linked to the organization in the country still continue to operate. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, is another country that has realized the threat posed by FETÖ following Russia and Uzbekistan. In Turkmenistan, many methods, including bribery, were employed to ensure the capture of important positions by those who have graduated from FETÖ schools, but the true nature of the organization was revealed with the attention of the Turkmen authorities. As a result, 14 schools operating around the country were shut down by the authorities in 2011.

Afghanistan

The investigations conducted by the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of Istanbul have determined that Afghanistan, which has entered a rebuil- ding period following the U.S. invasion in 2001, has also had an important role within FETÖ’s network in Central Asia. Today, FETÖ has moved its financial capital in Central Asian countries to Afghanistan and is working to implement an organizational structure similar to its regional presence FETÖ as an International Threat 69

in the 1990s in the country. Within this context, it was revealed that the As a result of the terrorist organization had selected Afghanistan as a satellite state within its international lobbying efforts in 2008.70 work of Turkish authorities, According to the news reflected in the media, FETÖ started its activities in Afghanistan via opening educational institutions. Starting with significant only two schools, today FETÖ has increased its presence in the country blows were made to 15 schools in total. Alongside these schools at the primary and middle against FETÖ’s education levels, the organization has also worked heavily to infiltrate the presence in universities in the country. In this way, FETÖ has come to establish an effective foundation in Afghanistan. The education of security personnel Afghanistan and is another field the organization’s Afghanistan presence has focused its 12 schools were influence on. FETÖ created a specialized division within the framework handed over to of its strategy of infiltrating security and law enforcement agencies in Turkey’s Maarif Central Asian countries. This division ensured that pro-FETÖ education was given to the hundreds of policemen from the Afghan National Police Foundation. Force that were brought to Turkey in 2011 for training within a NATO project in Turkish police schools. The organization has also given specialized training courses to groups of Afghan, Uzbek and Kyrgyz policemen in Mazar-i-Sharif and Sheberghan in Afghanistan and Naryn in Kyrgyzstan. With these policemen trained and educated by FETÖ itself, the organization has managed to infiltrate the law enforcement agencies of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.71

On the other hand, as a result of the work of Turkish authorities, significant blows were made against FETÖ’s presence in Afghanistan. A recent example of this is a raid conducted by Afghan security forces on a FETÖ owned high school in the city of Herat in western Afghanistan. The administrators of the school were arrested and the process to officially hand the school over to the Maarif Foundation began. Moreover, according to an announcement issued by the Maarif Foundation, an agreement was made between Turkey and the Afghan government regarding the handover of another 12 schools linked to FETÖ to the foundation.72

Azerbaijan

Forming an organizational model in Azerbaijan that is very similar to the one it has in place in Turkey, FETÖ can more easily and smoothly maintain its activities in Azerbaijan thanks to the similarities between Azerba- 70 FETÖ as an International Threat

Azerbaijan ijani and Turkish languages. With the activities organized in Azerbaijan under the guise of preserving national unity and culture, FETÖ has made is of critical progress in infiltrating the country through education institutions and importance for commercial activities whereas the graduates of FETÖ-linked education FETÖ since the institutions were placed in key state positions. Several warnings on the country acts as subject were issued to Azerbaijan before the coup attempt, but Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev expressed that shutting down those schools would a gate to Central be detrimental to Azerbaijan’s education policy and insisted that problem Asia and Russia. should be resolved through reconciliatory methods. Realizing the seve- Therefore, it is rity of the issue after the July 15 coup attempt, Azerbaijani administrators implemented counter-terror strategies against FETÖ to prevent a similar the first country case in their country. In this scope, the FETÖ-owned schools were closed that the and some FETÖ operatives were arrested and deported. It is also impor- organization tried tant to note that Gülen once insolently said that he would throw Aliyev to take root in into the Caspian, which reveals how far the terror group had gone in in Azerbaijan.73 after Turkey. Azerbaijan is of critical importance for FETÖ since the country acts as a gate to Central Asia and Russia. Therefore, it is the first country that the organization tried to take root in after Turkey. Although some considerable steps have been taken against FETÖ, the overall results are still far from being sufficient or satisfactory. Currently, Aliyev is facing significant iso- lation as a result of the fight against FETÖ just as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once experienced in Turkey. The most important decision Aliyev took concerning the anti-FETÖ fight was the assignment of his wife Mehriban Aliyeva as the Vice-President. This critical assignment is significant since it indicates that Aliyev does not have any other name he could trust in the fight against FETÖ in Azerbaijan.

Today, most of the ones in key positions of Azerbaijani state bureaucracy have still not understood the severity of the FETÖ issue. The majority of those who are in charge of lucrative areas, including the energy sector, do still sustain relationships based on mutual interests with this bureauc- ratic structure. So, considering FETÖ’s activities in Azerbaijan, it can be observed that students and businessmen going from Turkey to Azerbaijan constitute the primary target of FETÖ. To pave the way for the FETÖ operatives in Azerbaijan, the organization has tried to defame persons heading to Azerbaijan who are not affiliated with FETÖ. Also, it has been revealed that a number of Turkish businessmen winning major tenders received FETÖ as an International Threat 71

death threats from the subcontracting firms of the organization. Clearing FETÖ enjoys the way through such methods, the terror group has tried to intervene in important government institutions in Azerbaijan just as the organization political support has done in Turkey and achieved it to some extent. from the Armenian Georgia diaspora and cooperates with Following the July 15 coup attempt, Georgia has been one of the leading escape routes used by FETÖ operatives in their efforts to flee Turkey. Be- the diaspora on ginning from 1991, the organization has formed a network in Georgia th- the subject of so- rough education and trade institutions. Those education institutions played called Armenian a major role in the formation of the current Georgian elite. But following genocide. the then Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım’s visit to Georgia in May, 2017, the operations against FETÖ were expedited in the country. As a result of the operations, the Georgian government seized control of the FETÖ-linked schools and canceled the licenses of some of these schools.74

Today, 16 schools adhering to FETÖ, a businessmen association named “GÜRSİAD” and a university named “International Black Sea Uni- versity” are still active in Georgia. FETÖ does still have strong ties with senior politicians and their families in the country. For instance, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s mother Giuli Alasania works as the vice rector of the International Black Sea University.75 However, as a result of the efforts exerted by Turkish authorities, the assets of the university were confiscated. According to an announcement issued by the Georgian Ministry of Education, the university was banned from admit- ting new students for a year.76

Armenia

Another South Caucasus country that FETÖ has utilizing for its unlawful activities is Armenia. In this manner, FETÖ enjoys political support from the Armenian diaspora. Turkish Heritage Organization President Alı Çınar stated that FETÖ engages in anti-Turkey efforts in the U.S. Congress and Senate, adding: “We have seen that [FETÖ] cooperates with the Armenian diaspora on the subject of so-called Armenian genocide and gives covert support to the bills against Turkey.”77

FETÖ as an International Threat 73

Conclusion: The Fight Against FETÖ

One of the most important points in the fight against FETÖ is to analyze The methods and the organization accurately and to develop appropriate strategies in the strategies that fight in this respect. Even though FETÖ identifies itself as a religious organization, the socio-economic, political and cultural factors that led to FETÖ has resorted the emergence of FETÖ must also be taken into account within the fight. to for decades in To that end, it is of vital importance for institutions such as the Turkish Turkey to infiltrate Directorate of Religious Affairs, the National Education Ministry, Foreign state apparatuses Ministry and Coordination Agency of Public Diplomacy to conduct their are also practiced work in a joint effort . in other countries it Considering FETÖ’s psychological control exercised on group mem- operates in. bers and the opinion-shaping efforts in the public through various means, it is obvious that the psychological and sociological aspects of the fight against FETÖ are crucial. It is also widely known that FETÖ exercises a psychological control method through esoteric symbols and practices that revolve around cult leadership, which constitutes the primary method of controlling the group members. As a result of this control method, those joining the organization go through a long-standing cultist radicalization process and turn into brainwashed persons who could easily perform acts that cannot possibly be undertaken by anyone bearing a certain degree of ethical values.

Besides, considering FETÖ’s relations with other countries and foreign intelligence organizations, it becomes evident that diplomatic and intelligence-related methods are also vital in the fight. Official state reports, the statements in confessions of former FETÖ operatives and expert opinions often underscore that foreign intelligence organizations play a considerable role in the formation and consolidation of FETÖ.

On the other hand, FETÖ does not only pose a threat against Turkey, but against other countries in international arena with its global-scale threat potential. The methods and strategies that FETÖ has resorted to for decades in Turkey to infiltrate state apparatuses are also practiced in other 74 FETÖ as an International Threat

Shedding light countries FETÖ operates in. Through these methods, FETÖ has infiltrated key positions and strategic institutions in these countries and formed on FETÖ’s parallel state structures by focusing its activities on education, business international and media sectors. FETÖ firstly forms a network for lobbying activities structuring is that comprises politicians and businessmen and then places its operatives crucial not only in critical positions through this network, and ultimately seizes control of for Turkey’s these strategic institutions. national While engaging in all these activities, the organization does not con- security but for front any difficulty in recruiting new members in different countries as international it uses its education and media activities as extensive indoctrination and peace and radicalization tools. Therefore, it is important to reveal FETÖ’s covert security. structures in different countries organized according to local dynamics.

Infiltrating critical positions and strategic institutions in the countries they operate in, FETÖ members can manipulate the state apparatuses of these countries and sabotage their national interests. Reminiscent of an intelligence organization with its secret meetings in various countries and newly recruited operatives, FETÖ organizes parallel state structures in these countries through the sources and positions it holds in the fields of education, culture, trade, judiciary, law enforcement, armed forces and bureaucracy.

The most common type of action undertaken by FETÖ in other countries is running an anti-Turkey propaganda. Through this, FETÖ attempts to sabotage the natural course of international relations by driving a wedge between Turkey and the countries it operates in. It is clear that the organization might do the same for other countries, as well. For this reason, shedding light on FETÖ’s international structuring is crucial not only for Turkey’s national security but for international peace and security.

FETÖ, which serves foreign intelligence organizations under the name of the “Hizmet (Service) movement” with its leader residing in the U.S., can also create cadres within national intelligence agencies fighting against FETÖ, as in the case of Turkey. In so doing, the organization renders the fight against itself ineffective and uses the state authority against those FETÖ as an International Threat 75

78 defending the state. At this point, FETÖ stands out as an international FETÖ, which is espionage network in view of the fact that the group members are trained a kind of Gladio in an exceptionally clandestine way and equipped with techniques to defy intelligence units.79 The cells of the terror group, which are organized on organization, does the basis of a crypto line of action, sometimes resort to causing social in fact comprise polarizations and conflicts in the targeted locations and regions by abu- a certain form of sing various identities in society. Since the failed coup attempt on July tutelage. Foreign 15, 2016, the secretive structure of FETÖ has been gradually brought to intelligence light whereas its operational capacity has suffered a major blow. However, organizations FETÖ is currently seeking to recover its power through its structures and strive to discard networks abroad. In this respect, Turkey’s diplomatic and political initiatives aiming to raise awareness about theFETÖ threat continue in relevant the national will countries. Meanwhile, FETÖ uses every means available to maintain its through groups like whitewashing activities at an international level. FETÖ.

In conclusion; FETÖ, which is a kind of Gladio organization, does in fact comprise a certain form of tutelage. Foreign intelligence organizations strive to discard the national will through groups like FETÖ. This poses a threat against all the countries FETÖ operates in since FETÖ is an international terror network which has infiltrated the mechanisms of more than a hundred states. This terror network can pacify state structures by infiltrating most critical state institutions. More importantly, it is capable of turning the key state institutions against the state by allying with foreign intelligence organizations leaving the state vulnerable to foreign threats.

As all of these aspects are evaluated within the framework of activities undertaken by modern cultist movements, the severity of the threat posed by FETÖ, which is certainly a modern cultist movement, can be better grasped. For this reason, the states where FETÖ operates in must cooperate in a collective effort to fight against this international terror threat in order to protect their national sovereignty, integrity and stability. 76 FETÖ as an International Threat

Endnotes 1. Fethullahçı Terör Örgütünün (FETÖ/PDY) 15 Temmuz 2016 Tarihli Darbe Girişimi ile İlgili Bu Terör Örgütünün Faaliyetlerinin Tüm Yönleri İle Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kuru- lan Meclis Araştırma Kurulu Raporu (Turkish Parliamentary Investigation Committee Report on FETÖ’s Activities Regarding the 2016 Coup Attempt), pp. 41-44. Also see. FETÖ indictment docket no. 2016/24769 of 6 June 2016 issued by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office; C. Duran, M. H. Akgün and H. Yücel, “İddianamelerde 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi ve FETÖ” (July 15 Coup Attempt and FETÖ in Indictments), SETA Report, 2017. 2. Birol Akgün, “Türkiye Maarif Vakfı: Eğitim yoluyla FETÖ mücadelesi,” Star Gazetesi Açık Görüş, 15 July 2017. 3. Kendi Dilinden FETÖ: Örgütlü Bir Din İstismarı, DİB Yayınları, Ankara, 2017. 4. It must be noted that Sızıntı magazine sided with the military coup before and after the 12 September 1980 coup d’état. The editorial entitled “Sol- dier” in the June 1979 issue of Sızıntı reads: “Their bayonets ceased our wailing for a hundred times and alleviated our fire. Even in our recent history, we have seen their bravery and visage that evokes the memories of the past. Had they not averted the dark intentions schemed for years, we would be lamenting in tears. We salute the commander and the flag.” In the Oc- tober 1980 issue of the magazine following the 1980 coup attempt, a piece entitled “The Last Police Station” reads: “We again salute our soldiers, who came to our rescue at the point where we lost all our hopes,” giving overt support to the coup. As the following sections of the report indicate, a similar support was also provided to the post-modern coup on February 28, 1997. Cited from C. Duran, M. H. Akgün and H. Yücel, “İddianamelerde 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi ve FETÖ,” p.13. 5. “Yeni Nesil Terör: FETÖ’nün Analizi” (New Generation Terror: An Anal- ysis of FETÖ), Turkish National Police Academy FETÖ Workshop Report, 2017. 6. “Amerika-Gülen-15 Temmuz İrtibatları,” Al Jazeera Türk, 24 September 2016; İrfan Bozan, “Gülen Kendini Batı’ya Nasıl Sevdirdi?” Al Jazeera Türk, 25 July 2016; “Darbeler ve ABD,” Al Jazeera Türk, 24 August 2017. 7. See. Reşat Petek, İhanet ve Direniş, Istanbul: Hayat Yayınları, 2017. 8. According to key operatives of FETÖ: “The organization often underlines that anything to prevent a possible harm to the organization is considered permissible. Therefore, the organization members act with the philosophy ‘cheating is permissible’. They can justify all their wrongdoings as cautionary acts with this mindset” (quoted from an interview conducted with an anonymous security officer). This statement of Gülen is a good example portraying that the organization abuses religion to cover its unlawful activities: “The Prophet saw better than anyone that showing courage and defiance in the absence of a balance of power would result in defeat and He always organized his strategy with caution. In the cases when defeat is inevitable due to the disregard of balance factor, showing heroism means FETÖ as an International Threat 77

betrayal.” FETÖ indictment docket no. 2016/24769 of 6 June 2016, p. 288. 9. Kemal Gümüş, “Bir İstihbarat ve Suç Örgütü Olarak FETÖ,” Kriter Dergi, July 2017. 10. Ibid, pp. 13-14. 11. See. “Yeni Nesil Terör FETÖ’nün Analizi”. 12. Turkish Parliamentary Investigation Committee Report on FETÖ’s Activi- ties Regarding the 2016 Coup Attempt, p. 44. 13. Duran, Akgün and Yücel, “İddianamelerde 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi ve FETÖ,” p. 21. 14. Turkey’s Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors General Board Decision Dated 5.10.2017 and Numbered 2017/770, pp. 8-12. 15. Turkish Parliamentary Investigation Committee Report on FETÖ’s Activi- ties Regarding the 2016 Coup Attempt, p. 201. Also see. FETÖ indictment docket no. 2016/24769 of 6 June 2016. 16. Şafak Ertan Çomaklı and Deniz Turan, “FETÖ Bağlamında Terör Amaçlı Kullanılan Kamusal Mal ve Hizmetler,” Report, Ankara: Turkish National Police Academy Press, 2017. 17. Paul Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 9/2, 1997, pp. 56-57. 18. Saadet Oruç, “Terör, Darbe, Medya ve Simbiyotik İlişkiler,” Star, 26 Febru- ary 2017. 19. “Fetö’nün Öğrenci Devşirme Yöntemleri İddianamede,” Sabah, 25 Septem- ber 2017. 20. “FETÖ’nün Yapılanması, FETÖ’nün Amacı ve Örgütün Stratejisi,” Habertürk, 28 September 2017. 21. “FETÖ Son 15 Yılın Tüm Sınav Sorularını Çaldı,” A Haber, 14 January 2017. 22. Birol Akgün, “Türkiye Maarif Vakfı: Eğitim Yoluyla FETÖ Mücadelesi,” Star, 15 July 2017. 23. Turkey’s Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors General Board Decision Dated 5.10.2017 and Numbered 2017/770, p. 6. 24. Turkey’s Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors General Board Decision Dated 5.10.2017 and Numbered 2017/770, p. 7. 25. “Bir Gecelik Zevk Uğruna,” Hürriyet, 22 October 2002. 26. “Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Fethullahçı Terör Örgütünün (FETÖ/ PDY) 15 Temmuz 2016 Tarihli Darbe Girişimi ile Bu Terör Örgütünün Faaliyetlerinin Tüm Yönleriyle Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu” (Turkish Parliamentary Investigation Committee on FETÖ’s Activities Regarding the 2016 Coup Attempt), TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 7th Meeting, 25 October 2016, p. 92; “Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Fethullahçı Terör Örgütünün (FETÖ/PDY) 15 Temmuz 2016 Tarihli Darbe Girişimi ile Bu Terör Örgütünün Faaliyetlerinin Tüm Yönleriyle Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu” TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 8th Meeting, 26 October 2016, p. 148; “Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Fethullahçı Terör Örgütünün (FETÖ/PDY) 15 Tem- muz 2016 Tarihli Darbe Girişimi ile Bu Terör Örgütünün Faaliyetlerinin Tüm Yönleriyle Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi 78 FETÖ as an International Threat

Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu” TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 11th Meeting, 2 November 2016, p. 43. 27. “Meriç’in sırrı definede mi,”Taraf , 22 August 2011. 28. “Gazeteci Haydar Meriç’in FETÖ elebaşı Gülen aleyhine kitap yazma hazırlığındayken öldürülmesine ilişkin davada ilginç anlar,” Güneş, 26 December 2017. 29. “Gazeteci Haydar Meriç’in FETÖ elebaşı Gülen aleyhine kitap yazma hazırlığındayken öldürülmesine ilişkin davada ilginç anlar,” Güneş, 26 December 2017. 30. For details, see. Fethullahçı Terör Örgütünün (FETÖ/PDY), pp. 287-289. 31. Sedat Ergin, “Fethullah Gülen ABD’de Oturma İznini Nasıl Aldı?”, Hürri- yet, 09 May 2014, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/fethullah-gulen-abd-de-oturma-iznini-nasil-aldi-26381961. 32. Amsterdam & Partners LLP, Empire of Deceit: An Investigation of the Gülen Charter School Network, Washington, DC: Amsterdam & Partners LLP, 2017, pp. 41-48. 33. Christopher Holton and Clare Lopez, The Gulen Movement: Turkey’s Islam- ic Supremacist Cult and its Contributions to the Civilization Jihad, Wash- ington, DC: The Center For Security Policy, 2015, pp. 36-38. 34. Stephanie Saul, “Charter Schools Tied to Turkey Grow in Texas,” The New York Times, 6 June 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/education/07charter.html. 35. “FETÖ’nün ABD Yapılanması,” TR Diplomacy, http://trdiplomacy.com/ haber/fetoenuen-abd-yapilanmasi_634. 36. “Foreign Trade Statistics by Country Groups,” Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046. Turkey’s overall foreign trade volume for the year 2016 is 341.147 billion dollars. The trade activities with the European Union comprise 145.845 billion dollars of this volume. 37. See. Kemal İnat et al., “Almanya’da FETÖ Yapılanması ve Almanya’nın FETÖ Politikası”, SETA Report No. 79, Istanbul: SETA, 2017, pp. 29-34. 38. “FETÖ’nün Almanya Yapılanması”, Anadolu Agency, 30 July 2016; “FETÖ’nün Yeni Merkezi Almanya,” Anadolu Agency, 15 July 2018. 39. “FETÖ’nün Almanya Yapılanması,” Anadolu Agency, 30 July 2016. 40. Ibid. 41. Kemal İnat et al., “Almanya’da FETÖ Yapılanması ve Almanya’nın FETÖ Politikası,” p. 67. 42. “FETÖ’nün Avusturya Yapılanması,” Anadolu Agency, 5 August 2016. 43. Ibid. 44. “FETÖ’nün Hollanda Yapılanması,” Anadolu Agency, 29 August 2016. 45. Ibid. 46. “Hollanda’da FETÖ Okulları Tutunamıyor,” TRT Haber, 10 July 2018, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/hollandada-feto-okullari-tutunamiy- or-374464.html. 47. Abdullah Karakuş, “Balkanlar’da FETÖ Etkisi,” Milliyet, 2 October 2016. 48. “FETÖ’nin Batı Balkanlar’daki Yapılanması,” Anadolu Agency, 28 July 2016. 49. Ibid. FETÖ as an International Threat 79

50. Ibid. 51. “FETÖ ile Mücadele Balkanlar’da,” Sabah, 13 July 2018. 52. “FETÖ’nin Batı Balkanlar’daki Yapılanması,” Anadolu Agency, 28 July 2016. 53. “FETÖ’nün Yunanistan, Bulgaristan ve Macaristan Yapılanması,” Anadolu Agency, 10 August 2016. 54. “Balkanlar’da FETÖ’ye Darbe,” Sabah, 29 March 2018. 55. “FETÖ’nün Kahire’yi Karargah Olarak Kullanacağı İddiası,” Anadolu Agency, 28 July 2016. 56. Ersin Arslan, “İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı, FETÖ’yü Terör Örgütü İlan Et- ti,”Hürriyet, 19 October 2016. 57. “FETÖ üyeleri Mısır’da Toplanıyor,” Hürriyet, 28 July 2016. 58. Turkish Statistical Institute, “Foreign Trade Statistics,” http://www.tuik.gov. tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046. 59. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri” (Turkey-Africa Relations), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri. tr.mfa. 60. “Maarif Vakfı FETÖ’nün Afrika’daki Lobi Gücünü Kırdı,” Anadolu Agen- cy, 21 September 2017. 61. “MİT’ten Gabon’da Büyük Operasyon! 3 İsim Türkiye’ye Getirildi,” Hürri- yet, 10 April 2018. 62. Boris Guselotov, “Post-Soviet Space: Prospects for Transformation and Impact on International Security System,” NanoWorld Journal. 1/2, 2015, pp. 62-70. 63. Burhanettin Duran, “Bişkek’te Bir Öneri, Bir Uyarı”, Sabah, 4 September 2018. 64. “FETÖ Kırgızistan’ı Rehin Almış,” Sabah, 22 August 2017. 65. “FETÖ, Kırgızistan’da Kamu Kurumlarından İş Dünyasına Her Alanı Hakimiyetine Aldı,” Güneş, 22 August 2017. 66. See. “FETÖ Kırgızistan’ı Rehin Almış”. 67. Ibid. 68. Aydın Ünal, “Kazakistan’da FETÖ Tehdidi,” Yeni Şafak, 3 July 2017. 69. “Kazakistan’da FETÖ’ye Büyük Operasyon,” Sabah, 16 November 2017. 70. “Orta Asya İşgali”, Sabah, 12 June 2017. 71. Ibid. 72. “Afganistan’da FETÖ Okuluna Operasyon”, Sabah, 13 November 2018. 73. “İşte FETÖ’nün Dünya Yapılanması”, Sabah, 22 August 2016. 74. Davit Kachkachishvili, “Gürcistan FETÖ Okulunun Lisansını Yenilemedi,” Anadolu Agency, 30 August 2017. 75. Fuat Uğur, “Gürcistan FETÖ Okullarını Ne Yapacak?” Türkiye, 2 February 2017. 76. “FETÖ’cülere Gürcistan’da Şok,” Sabah, 21 August 2018. 77. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/feto-ermeni-diasporasiyla-yakindan-calisiy- or/994457 78. Necip Hablemitoğlu, Köstebek, 11th Edition, Istanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, p. 13. 79. Yağız Aksakaloğlu, FETÖ Kıskacında Askeri Okullar, Ankara: Galeati Yayıncılık, 2018, pp. 42-47.