DOCSLIB.ORG

Global Developments

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Global Developments Tom Whipple, Editor Association for the Study of Peak Oil & Gas USA Monday, May 27, 2013 Current HEZBOLLAH SUPPORT FIRM IN FACE OF ATTACKS Developments Following the rocket attacks on Lebanese capital, residents of targeted areas rally behind Global the Shia movement. Middle East East Asia Discussion & Analysis The rockets came a day after Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech marking Liberation Day Global Developments 1. OIL FALLS BELOW $94 A BARREL BANGKOK (AP, Monday, May 27, 2013) -- The price of oil fell Monday as traders concerned about global energy demand took profits ahead of economic data from China and the United States. Benchmark oil for July delivery was down 59 cents to $93.66 per barrel at late afternoon Bangkok time in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The contract fell 10 cents to $94.15 a barrel on Friday. Analysts said traders took profits before May unemployment data is released Tuesday in Washington, which should help clarify the state of the recovery in the world's biggest economy. "We're starting to build confidence in the economic data, but that's not going to stop anyone from taking money off the table ahead of a long weekend," Carl Larry of Oil Outlooks and Opinions said in a market commentary, referring to the Memorial Day holiday in the U.S. on Monday. The global economic picture was clouded last week by a private survey showing weak Chinese manufacturing. That raised questions about the strength of oil demand in the world's No. 2 economy. Qinwei Wang, an economist with Capital Economics, said in a market commentary that recent Chinese indicators suggest that "general economic conditions remain downbeat." The more closely watched official manufacturing survey is due Saturday, Wang said. [more] 2. WTI EXTENDS LOSING STREAK AS CHINA SIGNALS IT MAY SLOW GROWTH (Bloomberg, Monday, May 27, 2013) -- West Texas Intermediate crude fell for a fifth day, the longest run of declines this year, as China signaled it may accept a slower economic growth rate. OPEC is expected to keep its supply target unchanged this week. Futures slid as much as 1 percent in New York, extending a 2 percent drop last week. China, the world's second-biggest oil consumer, won't sacrifice the environment to ensure short- term growth, President Xi Jinping said during a study session of the Communist Party's leadership on May 24. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will maintain its official output limit at 30 million barrels a day when the group meets May 31 in Vienna, according to a Bloomberg News survey. "We have slowing Chinese growth and demand and plenty of supply coming online in the U.S., so the feeling is that the market is oversupplied," Ole Hansen, head of commodity strategy at Saxo Bank A/S in Copenhagen, said by telephone today. "There is a bit of risk." WTI for July delivery declined as much as 92 cents to $93.23 a barrel in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange and was at $93.66 at 10:08 a.m. London time. The volume of all contracts traded was 53 percent below the 100-day average. Prices are little changed so far in May, after a 3.9 percent loss in April. [more] 3. IRAN TO DEFEND $100/BBL OIL PRICE AT OPEC MEETING LONDON (Dow Jones, Monday, May 27, 2013) -- ran said Sunday it will push to defend the current oil-price level of $100 a barrel when OPEC meets Friday, the second member to reiterate such views in recent days. The remarks come as delegates from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries are set to discuss competition with U.S. shale amid weak demand, when they meet this week in Vienna. "The main focus of talks in the next OPEC meeting will be an examination of supply and demand and our country will still support $100 a barrel for oil," Iran's OPEC governor Muhammad Ali Khatibi said. Mr. Khatibi was quoted as making the remarks by the country's oil ministry Website Shana. "Given the weak economic conditions of the industrial and developed countries, the global oil markets need to be managed," Mr. Khatibi said. Friday, Venezuela's oil minister, Rafael Ramirez, said the country will push to maintain the current oil production ceiling at the OPEC meeting in order to hold the price of the commodity near $100 per barrel. [more] 4. VENEZUELA TO SEEK MAINTAINING CURRENT OPEC PRODUCTION QUOTAS MORICHAL, Venezuela (Dow Jones, Monday, May 27, 2013) -- Venezuela will push to maintain current oil- production quotas at next week's meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna in order to hold the price of the commodity near $100 a barrel, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Friday. "Maintaining our commitment to 30 million barrels a day is something that we must do to defend our price," said Mr. Ramirez, who added that he was confident all OPEC members were in agreement with his government's target price. Mr. Ramirez also said he was concerned by the effect that global gas production was having on the price of oil, Venezuela's main commodity. "It's not just the U.S. [gas production] but on a general world level, there is the equivalent of more than five million barrels and that is having an effect on the global market. That displaces oil as fuel and it's an issue that needs to be discussed," Mr. Ramirez said. [more] Middle East & North Africa 5. IRAN REFORM CANDIDATE SAYS STATE TV CUTS BROADCAST TEHRAN, Iran (AP, Monday, May 27, 2013) -- The spokesman for a pro-reform Iranian presidential candidate says state television cut off his campaign broadcast unexpectedly, citing technical problems. Mohammad Reza Aref is one of two pro-reform candidates cleared by the Islamic Republic's constitutional watchdog, the Guardian Council, to run in June 14 elections. Most other approved candidates were hard-liners, while their most charismatic challengers, including centrist Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, were disqualified. Witnesses say Aref's Monday campaign pitch on the Jam-e Jam channel was stopped 15 minutes after it started, while he was saying he would make use of Rafsanjani's "experience" if he became president. Aref spokesman Hasan Rasouli spokesman said the candidate would seek "clarification" and ask that the program be rebroadcast. Jam-e Jam, which is aimed at Iranians living abroad, could not immediately be reached for comment. [more] 6. SUNNI GRIEVANCES DRIVE SPIKE IN IRAQ UNREST BAGHDAD (AFP, Monday, May 27, 2013) A feud between Iraqi Sunnis and the Shiite authorities they accuse of marginalising their community is driving a deadly spike in violence, but will stop short of all-out conflict for now, experts say. Attacks including bombings that ripped through worshippers in mosques and cut down shoppers in markets killed over 430 people in Iraq so far in May, 461 in April and 220 or more every other month this year, according to AFP figures. Crispin Hawes, the Middle East and North Africa director for the Eurasia Group consultancy, said policies of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki that have politically isolated Iraqi Sunnis are the main factor behind the spike in violence. The policies and resulting isolation have encouraged both "radicalisation" and passive tolerance of militants among Sunnis, he said. "Pretty much since the last US soldier knocked the dust from his boots as he crossed the border (in late 2011), Maliki has gone after a succession of Sunni Arab politicians," Hawes said. Maliki made an unsuccessful call on MPs to remove Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak, a Sunni who had said the premier was "worse than Saddam Hussein," the day that the last US soldiers left. [more] 7. IRAQ OFFICIALS SAYS SEPARATE ATTACKS KILL 14 BAGHDAD (AP, Monday, May 27, 2013) -- A string of attacks killed at least 14 people in Iraq on Sunday, officials said, in the latest violence of what has been a particularly bloody month in the country. Iraq has been hit by a wave of bloodshed that has killed some 300 people in the past two weeks alone, raising tensions between the country's Sunni minority and Shiite-led government. The surge in violence has been reminiscent of the sectarian carnage that pushed Iraq to the brink of civil war in 2006 and 2007. Sunday's deadliest attack took place in the northern city of Mosul, where a car bomb went off at a house early in the morning while a joint army-police unit was conducting door-to-door searches. The blast killed three policemen and one soldier, a provincial police officer said. Twenty people, including four civilians, were wounded. Also in Mosul, police said militants gunned down a policeman in his car in the city center. Authorities also found a body floating in the Tigris river, shot at close range with hands bound behind the back. Mosul, some 360 kilometers (225 miles) northwest of Baghdad, is a former stronghold of Sunni militants. In northern Baghdad's Kazimiyah district, militants in a speeding car went on a shooting spree that killed three civilians and wounded another, two police officers said. A policeman was killed in another attack in the northern Waziriya neighborhood when gunmen in two cars fired on his vehicle, wounding a colleague as well. [more] 8. IRAQI VOLUNTEERS JOIN BOTH SIDES OF WAR IN SYRIA (Radio Free Europe, Monday, May 27, 2013) No one knows precisely how many Iraqi volunteers are crossing the border to fight in Syria, but it is clear there are enough to keep a steady stream of corpses returning home for burial.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Key Actors and Abbreviations
    Key actors and abbreviations The Assad regime and its allies ‘The regime’ Bashar al-Assad, Syrian President 2000– Hafez al-Assad, Syrian President 1971–2000 Asma al-Assad (née Akhras), Syria’s First Lady 2000– Maher al-Assad, brother of Bashar al-Assad, Commander of Republican Guard and 4th Armoured Division Anisa Makhlouf, mother of Bashar al-Assad Assif Shawkat, brother-in-law of Bashar al-Assad, head of military intelligence 2005–9, deputy minister of defence 2011–12 Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Bashar al-Assad, wealthy businessman Manaf Tlass, Republican Guard General, defected 2012 Farouk al-Sharaa, First Vice President of Syria 2006– Walid al-Muallem, Foreign Minister 2006– Bouthaina Shabaan, political and media adviser to the Syrian President 2008– Ba’ath – Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the ruling party of Syria since 1963 Mukhabarat – Set of notorious regime intelligence agencies Shabiha – Gangs of irregular pro-regime thugs NDF – National Defence Force, formed 2013 Russia Vladimir Putin, Russian President 2000–8, 2012–, Russian Prime Minister 2008–12 Dmitri Medvedev, Russian President 2008–12, Russian Prime Minister 2012–20 Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister 2004– Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Foreign Minister 2011– Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran 1989– xii 5146.indd xii 19/06/20 5:00 PM KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS xiii Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranian President 2005–13 Hassan Rouhani, Iranian President 2013– Ali Akbar Salehi, Foreign Minister 2010–13 Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister 2013– Qassem Suleimani, Commander
    [Show full text]
  • Panorama Geopolítico De Los Conflictos 2013,Aborda Cator- Ce De Ellos
    Panorama geopolítico de los Instituto Español conflictos 2013 de Estudios Estratégicos MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA Panorama geopolítico de los Instituto Español conflictos 2013 de Estudios Estratégicos MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA CATÁLOGO GENERAL DE PUBLICACIONES OFICIALES http://publicacionesoficiales.boe.es/ Edita: SECRETARÍA GENERAL TÉCNICA www.bibliotecavirtualdefensa.es © Autor y editor, 2013 NIPO: 083-13-223-2 (edición papel) NIPO: 083-13-222-7 (edición libro-e) ISBN: 978-84-9781-882-7 (edición papel) ISBN: 978-84-9781-883-4 (edición libro-e) Depósito Legal: M-28185-2013 Imprime: Imprenta Ministerio de Defensa Fecha de edición: enero 2014 Las opiniones emitidas en esta publicación son exclusiva responsabilidad del autor de la misma. Los derechos de explotación de esta obra están amparados por la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual. Ninguna de las partes de la misma puede ser reproducida, almacenada ni transmitida en ninguna forma ni por medio alguno, electrónico, mecánico o de grabación, incluido fotocopias, o por cualquier otra forma, sin permiso previo, expreso y por escrito de los titulares del © Copyright. En esta edición se ha utilizado papel 100% reciclado libre de cloro. ÍNDICE Capítulo primero La evolución de los conflictos .......................................................................... 9 Introducción ................................................................................................................ 11 Los paradigmas sociopolíticos y los conflictos ................................................... 11 La evolución de
    [Show full text]
  • Has the Syrian War Entered a New Phase?
    Analysis Report 50/2013 25th September 2013 Mario Laborie Iglesias HAS THE SYRIAN WAR ENTERED A NEW Visit our Sign up for our Newsletter PHASE? website This document has been translated by a Translation and Interpreting Degree student doing work experience, IGNACIO CUEVAS MARTÍNEZ, under the auspices of the Collaboration Agreement between the Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, and the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies. HAS THE SYRIAN WAR ENTERED A NEW PHASE? Abstract: The present document offers a brief revision of the different phases of the Syrian civil war; it analyzes the possible consequences that the August 21 chemical incident in Damascus may have with a view to the future of the war; and it considers the options for his ending. Keywords: Syria, civil war, chemical weapons, Assad, political opposition Analysis report 50/2013 1 HAS THE SYRIAN WAR ENTERED A NEW PHASE? Mario Laborie Iglesias ANALYSIS The fact that the Syrian regime has agreed to destroy its chemical weapons, as a way to prevent a punitive attack by the Western powers led by the U.S., has been greeted with relief by the foreign offices all over the world1. On September 21, according to the deadlines set by the Russia- U.S. agreement signed in Geneva, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) received the initial declaration of the chemical weapons that Syria has in possession2. On August 21, the most remarkable chemical weapons incident of the war took place3. That day a rocket attack, equipped with a chemical agent (sarin gas), killed 1,429 people in a Damascus suburb4, according to the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Aleppo and the State of the Syrian War
    Rigged Cars and Barrel Bombs: Aleppo and the State of the Syrian War Middle East Report N°155 | 9 September 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. The Pivotal Autumn of 2013 ............................................................................................. 2 A. The Strike that Wasn’t ............................................................................................... 2 B. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant: from “al-Dowla” to “Daesh” .................... 4 C. The Regime Clears the Way with Barrel Bombs ........................................................ 7 III. Between Hammer and Anvil ............................................................................................ 10 A. The War Against Daesh ............................................................................................. 10 B. The Regime Takes Advantage .................................................................................... 12 C. The Islamic State Bides Its Time ............................................................................... 15 IV. A Shifting Rebel Spectrum, on the Verge of Defeat ........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Page 01 March 26.Indd
    ISO 9001:2008 CERTIFIED NEWSPAPER Tuesday 26 March 2013 14 Jumada I 1434 - Volume 18 Number 5650 Price: QR2 Cyprus bags Fulton smashes €10bn second deal century Business | 19 Sport | 28 www.thepeninsulaqatar.com [email protected] | [email protected] Editorial: 4455 7741 | Advertising: 4455 7837 / 4455 7780 Restrictions on fishing in April and May DOHA: The Fisheries Department is putting curbs on fishing during the breeding season that lasts from April to May, but officials have allayed fears of shortages which might lead to a price rise. Fishing boats and trawlers will need written permission from the Fisheries Department of the Ministry of Environment to ven- ture on fishing expeditions dur- ing the breeding period. The idea is to help protect fish reserves in the Qatari waters by introducing curbs on fishing. A boat or trawler The Emir H H Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani receiving Arab leaders at the Doha International Airport yesterday. From left: Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al Bashir, Omani Deputy Prime will not be allowed to go fishing Minister for Cabinet Affairs Fahd bin Mahmoud Al Said and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. more than thrice a month in April and May. Moreover, every trip by a boat or trawler, or stay in the waters, should not exceed four days, local Arabic daily Al Raya reported yesterday quoting head Summit may call for Syria ceasefire of the Fisheries Department, Mohamed Saeed Al Mohannadi. Al Mohannadi said that April and May are the breeding time for Arab leaders start two-day conclave in Doha today; Syria’s Alkhatib to address meeting Al Shafi and Hamour fish (both of which are in demand in the coun- DOHA: Arab leaders are set meet here on Sunday to set the The League instead provided opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • Curso 2014/2015 La Hipocresía Humanitaria Del Consejo De
    0 TRABAJO FIN DE GRADO GRADO EN DERECHO Derecho Público General Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales Curso 2014/2015 La Hipocresía Humanitaria del Consejo de Seguridad Daniel Sardá Sardá Tutor: Juan Santos Vara Junio de 2015 1 TRABAJO FIN DE GRADO GRADO EN DERECHO Derecho Público General Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales La Hipocresía Humanitaria del Consejo de Seguridad The Humanitarian Hypocrisy of the Security Council Daniel Sardá Sardá e-mail: [email protected] Tutor: Juan Santos Vara 2 RESUMEN Se analizará, en primer lugar, la Intervención Humanitaria, al constituir el antecedente de la Responsabilidad de Proteger. A continuación, el proceso de creación de esta, seguido de su evolución. En el siguiente apartado, veremos los contextos internos de Libia y de Siria al tiempo de sus respectivos conflictos. Pasamos al apartado IV y con ello al examen de la actuación del CS relativa al caso libio. Apartado V, lo mismo referido a Siria. Seguidamente, se estudiarán los diversos parámetros presentes en la comparación entre ambos supuestos. Dados los problemas y la insatisfactoria actuación del CS (tanto en el primer caso como en el otro), veremos las propuestas de modificación de la Responsabilidad de Proteger y marco normativo, con especial atención al Código de Conducta propuesto por Francia en 2013 (dado que esta iniciativa merece particular atención, al tratarse de la única ocasión en que uno de los culpables del fracaso de la aplicación de la RP muestra su intención de cambio en su actuación). PALABRAS CLAVE: Responsabilidad de Proteger, Guerra Civil Libia, Guerra Civil Siria, Consejo de Seguridad, derecho de veto, intervención militar.
    [Show full text]
  • Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria
    Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria Beginning with dates of a few key events that initiated the unrest in March 2011, this timeline provides a chronological list of important news and actions from local, national, and international actors in response to the situation in Syria. Skip to: [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [Most Recent] Acronyms: EU – European Union PACE – Parliamentary Assembly of the Council CoI – UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria of Europe FSA – Free Syrian Army SARC – Syrian Arab Red Crescent GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council SASG – Special Adviser to the Secretary- HRC – UN Human Rights Council General HRW – Human Rights Watch SES – UN Special Envoy for Syria ICC – International Criminal Court SOC – National Coalition of Syrian Revolution ICRC – International Committee of the Red and Opposition Forces Cross SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights IDPs – Internally Displaced People SNC – Syrian National Council IHL – International Humanitarian Law UN – United Nations ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant UNESCO – UN Educational, Scientific and ISSG – International Syria Support Group Cultural Organization JSE – UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy to UNGA – UN General Assembly Syria UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for LAS – League of Arab States Refugees NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization UNICEF – UN Children’s Fund OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of UNRWA – UN Relief Works Agency for Humanitarian Affairs Palestinian Refugees OIC – Organization of Islamic Cooperation UNSC – UN Security Council OHCHR – UN Office of the High UNSG – UN Secretary-General Commissioner for Human Rights UNSMIS – UN Supervision Mission in Syria OPCW – Organization for the Prohibition of US – United States Chemical Weapons 2011 2011: Mar 16 – Syrian security forces arrest roughly 30 of 150 people gathered in Damascus’ Marjeh Square for the “Day of Dignity” protest, demanding the release of imprisoned relatives held as political prisoners.
    [Show full text]
  • Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
    Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 45 Fall 2012 Issues 1 & 2 Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis Paul R. Williams, J. Trevor Ulbrick & Jonathan Worboys Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2174768 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW·VOL. 45·2012 Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis Paul R. Williams,* J. Trevor Ulbrick,† & Jonathan Worboys‡ CONTENTS I. Introduction................................................................................ 474 II. Background to the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine ........ 477 A. Kosovo ....................................................................................... 478 B. The Right of Humanitarian Intervention......................................... 479 III. Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine .......... 481 A. Content of the ICISS Report ......................................................... 481 B. UN Evolution of R2P ................................................................... 483 IV. R2P’s Third Pillar and the Use of Force ............................... 486 A. Pillar Three of the Responsibility to Protect ................................... 486 B. Libya.......................................................................................... 487 V. R2P and the Syria Crisis ........................................................... 488 A. Preventing and Halting Atrocity Crimes When the Security Council Fails to
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution Through Revolution? the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Syrian Uprising
    University of Leeds School of Politics and International Studies Evolution through Revolution? The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Syrian Uprising Sumaya Gamal El Din Nasser Submitted in accordance with the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2017 I confirm that the work submitted is my own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. © 2017 The University of Leeds and Sumaya Gamal El Din Nasser The right of Sumaya Gamal El Din Nasser to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 1 Acknowledgment First of all, I would like to reflect on the blessing of getting the opportunity to go through the experience of writing a thesis at a time when all eyes were focused on the Syrian crisis. It is a true privilege to have had the chance to examine such a sensitive and important topic at my age and using my long years of experience which I gathered through living in many different countries and integrating in different cultures and communities. I would like to extend a heart-felt thank you to my incredible husband Abdul-Malek who stood behind my achievements and continued to facilitate for me to keep going even when times getting tough. His passion to work for his beloved, war-torn Syria has never ceased to inspire me and I am so proud of the steps we have walked together.
    [Show full text]
  • Syrian-Forum-Annual-Report-2020
    Annual Report 2020 All Rights Reserved [email protected] www.SyrianForum.org Syrian Forum Content 04 Syrian Forum 04 A Message from the Board 06 About the Syrian Forum 07 Objectives 08 Departments & Programs 09 Where We Work 10 COVID-19 Pandemic 12 Syrian Forum’s Impact 19 Partnerships 20 Relief & Development 21 Accomplishments 22 How We Work 24 Support by Sector 33 Cooperation & Partnerships 34 Economic Empowerment 35 Accomplishments 36 Employment Statistics 38 Vocational Training Programs 41 Cooperation & Partnerships 2 Annual Report 42 Development & Innovation 43 Accomplishments 44 Objectives 46 Programs’ Highlights 49 Cooperation & Partnerships 50 Public Policy & Research Center 51 Accomplishments 52 Why Omran 53 Omran’s Impact 54 Highlights 65 Cooperation & Partnerships 66 Media Track 67 Accomplishments 69 Why Alsouria.net 71 Alsouria’s Impact 3 Syrian Forum Mustafa Sabbagh Ghassan Hitto Co-Founder Co-Founder Board Member Chairman of the Board Chief Executive Officer We start a new year and our greatest goal Despite the 2020’s exceptional challenges, is - as it was since the establishment of Syrian Syrian Forum’s teams continued to accumulate Forum - to employ all efforts and harness the new accomplishments, achieving most of the utmost energies to develop the capacities goals set in the past year. 2020 also witnessed of the Syrian people and create more a growth in the workforce of our programs, opportunities for Syrians to face the growing reaching more than 2,300 members of field challenges. teams, specialists and qualified calibers. We are deteremind to continue to invest in the And here we are, starting the new year, with our Syrian individual, promoting self-sufficiency and focus, as always, on building the capabilities supporting sustainable development projects.
    [Show full text]
  • “Las Rivalidades Confesionales En La Guerra Civil Siria Y El Accionar De Arabia Saudita E Irán
    UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE ROSARIO Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales Licenciatura en Relaciones Internacionales “Las rivalidades confesionales en la guerra civil siria y el accionar de Arabia Saudita e Irán. Un análisis desde sus Fuerzas Profundas” Tesina de Grado . ALUMNO: Matias Daniel Avelino Ferreyra . DIRECTOR: Mg. Rubén Paredes Rodríguez . AÑO: 2014 DEDICADO A LA UNIVERSIDAD PÚBLICA. ÍNDICE DE CONTENIDO PÁGINA CONSIDERACIONES INICIALES. 1 CAPÍTULO 1: Las fuerzas profundas de las diferentes confesiones en la estructura sociopolítica siria 1.a. La sociedad siria, un fragmentado mosaico religioso . 9 1.b. El Sunnismo sirio: Sunnismo moderado, Sufismo y Salafismo. 12 1.c. El factor Alauí. 15 1.d. El Chiismo en Siria: Imamis duodecimanos y septimanos.. 19 1.e. Los Drusos. 21 CAPÍTULO 2: La incidencia de las rivalidades confesionales en la lucha armada 2.a. Los orígenes seculares de la revolución siria. 24 2.b. La islamización del conflicto y la rivalidad sunní-alauí . 31 2.c. La rivalidad intra-sunní: Jihadismo salafista vs Sunnismo moderado. 41 2.d. Los Drusos e Ismaelitas en el conflicto. 46 CAPÍTULO 3. El conflicto confesional en siria y el accionar de Arabia Saudita e Irán. 3.a. La gravitación de Siria en el tablero regional. 52 3.b. Arabia Saudita y el exacerbamiento de las fuerzas profundas . 55 3.c. El involucramiento de Irán en la islamización del conflicto. 62 CONSIDERACIONES FINALES. 72 BIBLIOGRAFÍA . 80 ANEXOS. 1. Regiones con mayorías sunníes y chiíes 2. Composición confesional del Medio Oriente 3. Composición confesional de Siria. 4. Provincias, ciudades y distritos de Siria. 5. Divisiones, escuelas y confesiones en el Islam.
    [Show full text]
  • Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: the Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis Paul R
    Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 45 | Issue 1 2012 Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis Paul R. Williams Jonathan Worboys J. Trevor Ulbrick Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Paul R. Williams, Jonathan Worboys, and J. Trevor Ulbrick, Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 473 (2012) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol45/iss1/13 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 45 Fall 2012 Issues 1 & 2 Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis Paul R. Williams, J. Trevor Ulbrick & Jonathan Worboys CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW·VOL. 45·2012 Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis Paul R. Williams,* J. Trevor Ulbrick,† & Jonathan Worboys‡ CONTENTS I. Introduction................................................................................ 474 II. Background to the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine ........ 477 A. Kosovo ....................................................................................... 478 B. The Right of Humanitarian Intervention......................................... 479 III. Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine .......... 481 A. Content of the ICISS Report ......................................................... 481 B. UN Evolution of R2P ................................................................... 483 IV. R2P’s Third Pillar and the Use of Force ..............................
    [Show full text]