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Why the U.S. Mistrusts Pakistan's Powerful Spy Agency

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Why the U.S. Mistrusts Pakistan's Powerful Spy Agency SPECIAL REPORT REUTERS/MOHSIN RAZA WHY THE U.S. MISTRUSTS PAKISTan’S POWERFUL SPY AGENCY The killing of Osama bin Laden exposes just how dysfunctional the relationship between U.S and Pakistani spies has become. BY CHRIS ALLBRITTON AND Abbottabad in northern Pakistan. There, Pakistan's powerful and mysterious Inter- MARK HOSENBALL the agents determined that the courier Services Intelligence agency, known as the ISLAMABAD/WASHINGTON, MAY 5 would make contact with one of the world's ISI, raided a house but failed to find al-Libbi, most wanted men, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, who a senior Pakistani intelligence official told N 2003 OR 2004, PAKistani intelligence had succeeded Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Reuters this week. agents trailed a suspected militant courier Sheik Muhammad as al Qaeda operations Former Pakistan President Pervez Ito a house in the picturesque hill town of chief a few months earlier. Agents from Musharraf later wrote in his memoirs that MAY 2011 ISI MAY 2011 HIDING PLACE: Aerial views, released by the United State Department of Defense May 2, 2011, shows before (L) and after (R) views of the compound that Osama bin Laden was killed in on Monday in Abbottabad, Pakistan. REUTERS/DEPArtmeNT OF DEFENSE/HANDOUT an interrogation of the courier revealed that who U.S. officials say has been living with al-Libbi used three houses in Abbottabad, his family and entourage in a well-guarded which sits some 50 km (30 miles) northeast compound for years? of Islamabad. The intelligence official said The answer to that question goes to the that one of those houses may have been in heart of the troubled relationship between the same compound where on May 1 U.S. Pakistan and the United States. Washington special forces killed al Qaeda leader Osama has long believed that Islamabad, and bin Laden. especially the ISI, play a double game on It's a good story. But is it true? Pakistan's terrorism, saying one thing but doing another. foreign ministry this week used the earlier operation as evidence of Pakistan's MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE commitment to the fight against terrorism. SINCE 9/11 THE United States has relied FRIENDS: U.S. President George W. Bush (C) makes a You see, Islamabad seemed to be pointing statement as Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf (L) on Pakistan's military to fight al Qaeda and out, we were nabbing bad guys seven years and Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai listen at the Taliban forces in the mountainous badlands ago in the very neighborhood where you got White House Rose Garden in Washington September along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. 27, 2006. REUTERS/JOSHUA ROberts bin Laden. President George W. Bush forged a close But U.S. Department of Defense satellite personal relationship with military leader photos show that in 2004 the site where There are other reasons to puzzle. Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf. bin Laden was found this week was nothing foreign ministry says that Abbottabad, home But U.S. officials have also grown frustrated but an empty field. A U.S. official briefed on to several military installations, has been with Pakistan. While Islamabad has been the bin Laden operation told Reuters he had under surveillance since 2003. If that's true, instrumental in catching second-tier and heard nothing to indicate there had been an then why didn't the ISI uncover bin Laden, lower ranked al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, earlier Pakistani raid. and several operatives identified as al Qaeda 2 CONTEXT U.S. forces finally found al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden not in the rugged nmountains of Afghanistan’s border, but in a million-dollar compound in an upscale suburb of Pakistan’s capital, with his youngest wife, U.S. officials said on Monday ISI MAY 2011 BIN LADEN FOUND IN UPSCALE SUBURB Pakistan Military Academy Abbotabad Kabul Osama’s compound reportedly sits within stone’s throw of the AFGHANISTAN Islamabad academy in an upscale suburb Aw PAKISTAN INDIA ami Rd Kakul Rd 200 miles 400 km Karachi 1 km radius Arabian Sea Line of control Mosques Abbotabad Hospitals What is known so far Schools/ ay Universities Bin Laden, along with youngest wife and son, lived with two brothers, 0.5 mile 500 m one of them bin Laden’s TOP BRASS: Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in a January 20, 2011 file photo. trusted courier REUTERS/STRINGER oram Highw Three-storey building is eight Karak times the size of nearby houses Few windows face Find more Reuters special reports at outside compound our blog The Deep End here: 3.6m-5.5m outer walls are topped http://link.reuters.com/heq72q with barbed wires "number threes" have either been captured Property valued at approximately or killed, the topmost leaders - bin Laden Abbotabad $1 million but has no telephone or and his Egyptian deputy Ayman al Zawahiri town centre Internet service connected -- have consistently eluded capture. The ISI, which backed the Taliban when Source: ReutersGraphic: Fabian Chan the group came to power in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, seemed to turn a blind eye -- or perhaps even helped -- as Taliban and the Mumbai attacks and often points to the chairman of the U.S. Military's Joint Chiefs al-Qaeda members fled into Pakistan during hundreds of troops killed in action against of Staff, accused the ISI of maintaining links the U.S invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, militants as proof of its commitment to with the Taliban. according to U.S. officials. fighting terrorism. As the CIA gathered enough evidence Washington also believes the agency But over the past few years Washington to make the case that bin Laden was in protected Abdul Qadeer Khan, lionized as has grown increasingly suspicious-and ready Abbottabad, U.S. intel chiefs decided that to criticize Pakistan. The U.S. military used Pakistan should be kept in the dark. When the "father" of Pakistan's bomb, who was Graphic BINLADEN-MAP/UPDATE Date 02 / 05 / 11 arrested in 2004 for selling nuclear secrets association with the spy agency as one of U.S. Navy Seals roped down from helicopters to Iran, Libya and North Korea. theStor issuesy theyBINLADEN/COMPOUND would question Guantanamo into the compoundRepor whereter -bin Laden was And when Kashmiri militants attacked BaySiz eprisoners10 about x 13 to cmsee if they had links to hiding, U.S. officialsResear insist,ch Pakistan's- military militants, according to WikiLeaks documents and intel bosses were blissfully unaware of the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008, killing Artist Fabian Chan Code VIO made available last month to the New York what was happening in the middle of their 166 people, New Delhi accused the ISI of © Copyright Reuters 2011. All rights reserved. controlling and coordinating the strikes. A key Times. country. militant suspect captured by the Americans http://thomsonreutersU.S. Secretary of State.com/products_ser Hillary Clinton saidvices/media/media_products/g Some suspect Pakistan knewraphics/ more than later told investigators that ISI officers last July that she believed that Pakistani it's letting on. But the Pakistani intelligence had helped plan and finance the attack. officials knew where bin Laden was holed official, who asked to remain anonymous Pakistan denies any active ISI connection to up. On a visit to Pakistan just days before so that he could speak candidly, told the Abbottabad raid, Admiral Mike Mullen, Reuters that the Americans had acted alone 3 ISI MAY 2011 PAKISTANI ANGER: Supporters of Pakistan's religious and political party Jamaat-e-Islami shout slogans as they take part in a protest against the release of CIA contractor Raymond Davis in Karachi March 16, 2011. REUTERS/AKHTAR SOOMRO and without any Pakistani assistance or for years in a town an hour's drive from ISI chief. permission. Islamabad has U.S. congressmen demanding A slight man who wastes neither words nor The reality is Washington long ago learned to know why Washington is paying $1 billion movements, Pasha speaks softly and is able to to play its own double game. It works with a year in aid to Pakistan. Many of the hardest project bland anonymity even as he sizes up Islamabad when it can and uses Pakistani questions are directed at the ISI. Did it his companions and surroundings. In an off- assets when it's useful but is ever more know bin Laden was there? Was it helping the-record interview with Reuters last year, he careful about revealing what it's up to. him? Is it rotten to the core or is it just a few spoke deliberately and quietly but seemed to "On the one hand, you can't not deal with sympathizers? enjoy verbal sparring. There was none of the the ISI... There definitely is the cooperation What's clear is that the spy agency America bombast many Pakistani officials put on. between the two agencies in terms of must work with in one of the world's most Pasha, seen by U.S. officials as something personnel working on joint projects and volatile and dangerous regions remains an of a right-wing nationalist, and CIA Director the day-to-day intelligence sharing," says enigma to outsiders. Leon Panetta, who was in the final stages Kamran Bokhari, Middle East and South of planning the raid on Osama's compound, Asia director for global intelligence firm GENERAL PASHA had plenty to talk about in Washington. Joint STRATFOR. But "there is this perception on ISI CHIEF LIEUTENANT General Ahmed intelligence operations have been plagued by the part of the American officials working Shuja Pasha visited Washington on April 11, disputes, most notably the case of Raymond with their counterparts in the ISI, there is the just weeks before bin Laden was killed.
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