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Resilient Command and Control: the Need for Distributed Control

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Resilient Command and Control: the Need for Distributed Control E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System aircraft leaves Robins Air Force Base, Georgia (U.S. Air Force/Andrew Lee) Resilient Command and Control The Need for Distributed Control By Gilmary Michael Hostage III and Larry R. Broadwell, Jr. guiding principle that has long While the relevance of this simple, We have grown accustomed to the underpinned the projection of elegant tenet is unquestionable, the benefit of an unfettered network-en- A dominant U.S. Air Force air- simplicity of centralized control and abled battlespace where our networks, power is the tenet of centralized control decentralized execution renders it datalinks, and communications operate and decentralized execution. This foun- incomplete when applied to modern without interruption. Since the advent of dational concept is deeply rooted in Air contested and denied operations. This such capabilities, U.S. and allied forces Force history and remains a cornerstone insufficiency has not and will not be have enjoyed an exclusive advantage. of its doctrine. It informs how we orga- evidenced by our experiences in Iraq, Consequently, it is preposterous to be- nize and train for combat and helps Afghanistan, or Libya as the resiliency of lieve any sophisticated future adversary prioritize the weapons systems and our networks, datalinks, and communi- would not possess at least the desire and, technologies we pursue. It has proved cations went unchallenged. However, in likely, the capability to disrupt our C2 integral to every successful contem- antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) envi- architecture. Therefore, we must be pre- porary air campaign by synergizing a ronments, the resilience of our networks, pared to synchronize and project combat single commander capable of balancing datalinks, and communications will al- airpower through distributed control tactical needs with strategic require- most certainly be contested. It is during during periods when our C2 architecture ments with tactical operators capable of these moments that distributed control, is strained by asymmetric challenges fostering initiative and flexibility. not centralized control, will provide the or saturated with intense air activity. If continued orchestration of combat air- the Combined Forces Air Component power. Stated more completely, resilient Commander (CFACC) becomes iso- General Gilmary Michael “Mike” Hostage III, command and control (C2) in an A2/ lated, the concept of distributed control USAF, is Commander of Air Combat Command. AD environment will require centralized empowers subordinate commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Larry R. Broadwell, Jr., USAF, is Executive Officer to the Commander of Air command, distributed control, and decen- organizations, operations centers, and Combat Command. tralized execution. battle management command and 38 Forum / Resilient Command and Control JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter 2014 control (BMC2) platforms to amalgam- areas of more intense fighting. Through would remain under the command ate otherwise disconnected units into the use of established protocols, BMC2 of the CFACC and should evolve as teams of synchronized combat airpower. platforms such as the E-2, E-3, E-8, or expressed in his mission intent orders Stated explicitly, the power of distributed a Control and Reporting Center could about extended periods of lost commu- control is its ability to join otherwise assume additional control activities from nications. These new organizations could disconnected and independent units, thus the AOC after being cut off for a prede- become as robust as an Air Expeditionary increasing the resilience of our overall termined period of time. Finally at the Task Force (AETF), thus husbanding airpower projection. tactical level, flight leads and mission resources from otherwise isolated A resilient C2 architecture is essential commanders regularly exercise distrib- units—fighters, bombers, tankers, and to executing the full range of military uted control by redirecting to alternate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- operations in an A2/AD environment. targets or rerolling to a secondary sance (ISR) aircraft—into a composite Resilient C2 is also foundational to mission. They do this based on their fighting force. Again, a distributed con- the conduct of parallel operations and knowledge of the commander’s intent trol construct does not necessitate reinforces the elements of operational and tactical circumstances. the transfer of additional command design—simultaneity, depth, timing, and Distributed control is the process authority from the COMAFFOR, or the tempo. While the resilience of our C2 ar- (or the how) of transitioning control CFACC, to the AETF commander. The chitecture has gone untested for decades, authority from one entity to another. commander of the ad hoc AETF would we cannot assume this will hold true in Distributed control absolutely does retain all previous command authorities, the future. Inevitably, our ability to con- not delegate command authorities or perhaps as a numbered Air Force or wing duct distributed control in the absence of command responsibilities from the commander, while also gaining responsi- or degradation in centralized control will CFACC or a subordinate commander to bility for the tactical control activities of prove essential to providing continued another. Neither the Combined Forces his newly federated forces. COMAFFOR dominant combat airpower for U.S. and Commander nor the Commander of Air command authorities would continue allied warfighters. Force Forces (COMAFFOR) would re- to be retained by the CFACC. The linquish their command authorities under AETF commander would be expected Distributed Control distributed control. Subordinate units, to advance the scope and complexity of Distributed control can be defined as operations centers, or BMC2 platforms operations following the CFACC’s intent the conditional, adaptive delegation or would be delegated or assume additional and utilizing distributed control, all the assumption of control activities through control activities dependent upon their while attempting to reestablish normal orders or protocols to synchronize individual capacity to control and when C2 links. operations, maintain initiative, and specified triggering events have occurred. achieve commander’s intent. Distrib- Distributed control could occur over The Critical Element uted control could occur explicitly or short (minutes to hours) or long (days to In addition to doctrine, organization, implicitly; the CFACC could delegate weeks) periods. For brief C2 disruptions, and technology, our Airmen are crit- some control authority to a subordinate subordinate BMC2 platforms would ical to executing distributed control. unit, or the subordinate unit could simply assume control activities normally Airmen are the ultimate source of our assume a particular level of control performed by the CFACC and continue combat capability. They possess the authority by following predetermined to execute using the guidance provided knowledge, creativity, and drive to lost-communication protocols. Distrib- in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and overcome highly complex and dynamic uted control occurs largely at the oper- Air Operations Directive. For disrup- challenges whenever and wherever ational and tactical levels of warfare. tions lasting longer than a day, BMC2 the Nation asks. They are possessed At the operational level, the CFACC platforms, in conjunction with lower of a unique air-mindedness. They are might choose to implement distributed echelons of command, could also begin creative, highly adaptive, and capable control to focus his attention on areas executing a series of preplanned ATOs of rapidly making bold decisions. They of more intense combat or, perhaps, covering several days. It is even possible, are our most precious resource and the reduce demands on limited Air Oper- if isolated for many days to weeks, for critical element of successful distributed ations Center (AOC) bandwidth. Just subordinate units to self-organize into control. The trust shared by Airmen below the AOC, subordinate operations larger, more comprehensive units using underpins the process of distributed centers and BMC2 platforms are both distributed control. control; without trust, distributed uniquely capable of executing distrib- Self-organization would only occur control fails. Trusted autonomy allows uted control. Either could be delegated in the direst of circumstances and does Airmen to act with initiative knowing additional authorities by the CFACC not include modifications to the chain of the decisions they make and the actions to control operations in an area expe- command, leaving prehostility command they take will be supported by the riencing a modest level of activity, thus authorities and responsibilities intact. commanders who have placed their allowing the AOC to focus control on Furthermore, any self-organization trust in them. The expectation that JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter 2014 Hostage and Broadwell 39 Crew chief marshals F-16 Fighting Falcon from hardened aircraft shelter in Germany in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn (U.S. Air Force/Benjamin Wilson) Airmen are empowered to operate with the F-16. There was no all-seeing AOC integral to mission success then as it will trusted autonomy is who we are and Link 16, which is the backbone of our be in the future. The battlefields of Iraq how we fight. modern tactical C2 architecture. The and Afghanistan have grown a generation During my first operational assign- real-time, unblinking
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