E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System aircraft leaves Robins Air Force Base, Georgia (U.S. Air Force/Andrew Lee)

Resilient Command and Control The Need for Distributed Control

By Gilmary Michael Hostage III and Larry R. Broadwell, Jr.

guiding principle that has long While the relevance of this simple, We have grown accustomed to the underpinned the projection of elegant tenet is unquestionable, the benefit of an unfettered network-en- A dominant U.S. Air Force air- simplicity of centralized control and abled battlespace where our networks, power is the tenet of centralized control decentralized execution renders it datalinks, and communications operate and decentralized execution. This foun- incomplete when applied to modern without interruption. Since the advent of dational concept is deeply rooted in Air contested and denied operations. This such capabilities, U.S. and allied forces Force history and remains a cornerstone insufficiency has not and will not be have enjoyed an exclusive advantage. of its doctrine. It informs how we orga- evidenced by our experiences in Iraq, Consequently, it is preposterous to be- nize and train for combat and helps Afghanistan, or Libya as the resiliency of lieve any sophisticated future adversary prioritize the weapons systems and our networks, datalinks, and communi- would not possess at least the desire and, technologies we pursue. It has proved cations went unchallenged. However, in likely, the capability to disrupt our C2 integral to every successful contem- antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) envi- architecture. Therefore, we must be pre- porary air campaign by synergizing a ronments, the resilience of our networks, pared to synchronize and project combat single commander capable of balancing datalinks, and communications will al- airpower through distributed control tactical needs with strategic require- most certainly be contested. It is during during periods when our C2 architecture ments with tactical operators capable of these moments that distributed control, is strained by asymmetric challenges fostering initiative and flexibility. not centralized control, will provide the or saturated with intense air activity. If continued orchestration of combat air- the Combined Forces Air Component power. Stated more completely, resilient Commander (CFACC) becomes iso- General Gilmary Michael “Mike” Hostage III, command and control (C2) in an A2/ lated, the concept of distributed control USAF, is Commander of Air Combat Command. AD environment will require centralized empowers subordinate commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Larry R. Broadwell, Jr., USAF, is Executive Officer to the Commander of Air command, distributed control, and decen- organizations, operations centers, and Combat Command. tralized execution. battle management command and

38 Forum / Resilient Command and Control JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter 2014 control (BMC2) platforms to amalgam- areas of more intense fighting. Through would remain under the command ate otherwise disconnected units into the use of established protocols, BMC2 of the CFACC and should evolve as teams of synchronized combat airpower. platforms such as the E-2, E-3, E-8, or expressed in his mission intent orders Stated explicitly, the power of distributed a Control and Reporting Center could about extended periods of lost commu- control is its ability to join otherwise assume additional control activities from nications. These new organizations could disconnected and independent units, thus the AOC after being cut off for a prede- become as robust as an Air Expeditionary increasing the resilience of our overall termined period of time. Finally at the Task Force (AETF), thus husbanding airpower projection. tactical level, flight leads and mission resources from otherwise isolated A resilient C2 architecture is essential commanders regularly exercise distrib- units—fighters, bombers, tankers, and to executing the full range of military uted control by redirecting to alternate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- operations in an A2/AD environment. targets or rerolling to a secondary sance (ISR) aircraft—into a composite Resilient C2 is also foundational to mission. They do this based on their fighting force. Again, a distributed con- the conduct of parallel operations and knowledge of the commander’s intent trol construct does not necessitate reinforces the elements of operational and tactical circumstances. the transfer of additional command design—simultaneity, depth, timing, and Distributed control is the process authority from the COMAFFOR, or the tempo. While the resilience of our C2 ar- (or the how) of transitioning control CFACC, to the AETF commander. The chitecture has gone untested for decades, authority from one entity to another. commander of the ad hoc AETF would we cannot assume this will hold true in Distributed control absolutely does retain all previous command authorities, the future. Inevitably, our ability to con- not delegate command authorities or perhaps as a numbered Air Force or wing duct distributed control in the absence of command responsibilities from the commander, while also gaining responsi- or degradation in centralized control will CFACC or a subordinate commander to bility for the tactical control activities of prove essential to providing continued another. Neither the Combined Forces his newly federated forces. COMAFFOR dominant combat airpower for U.S. and Commander nor the Commander of Air command authorities would continue allied warfighters. Force Forces (COMAFFOR) would re- to be retained by the CFACC. The linquish their command authorities under AETF commander would be expected Distributed Control distributed control. Subordinate units, to advance the scope and complexity of Distributed control can be defined as operations centers, or BMC2 platforms operations following the CFACC’s intent the conditional, adaptive delegation or would be delegated or assume additional and utilizing distributed control, all the assumption of control activities through control activities dependent upon their while attempting to reestablish normal orders or protocols to synchronize individual capacity to control and when C2 links. operations, maintain initiative, and specified triggering events have occurred. achieve commander’s intent. Distrib- Distributed control could occur over The Critical Element uted control could occur explicitly or short (minutes to hours) or long (days to In addition to doctrine, organization, implicitly; the CFACC could delegate weeks) periods. For brief C2 disruptions, and technology, our Airmen are crit- some control authority to a subordinate subordinate BMC2 platforms would ical to executing distributed control. unit, or the subordinate unit could simply assume control activities normally Airmen are the ultimate source of our assume a particular level of control performed by the CFACC and continue combat capability. They possess the authority by following predetermined to execute using the guidance provided knowledge, creativity, and drive to lost-communication protocols. Distrib- in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and overcome highly complex and dynamic uted control occurs largely at the oper- Air Operations Directive. For disrup- challenges whenever and wherever ational and tactical levels of warfare. tions lasting longer than a day, BMC2 the Nation asks. They are possessed At the operational level, the CFACC platforms, in conjunction with lower of a unique air-mindedness. They are might choose to implement distributed echelons of command, could also begin creative, highly adaptive, and capable control to focus his attention on areas executing a series of preplanned ATOs of rapidly making bold decisions. They of more intense combat or, perhaps, covering several days. It is even possible, are our most precious resource and the reduce demands on limited Air Oper- if isolated for many days to weeks, for critical element of successful distributed ations Center (AOC) bandwidth. Just subordinate units to self-organize into control. The trust shared by Airmen below the AOC, subordinate operations larger, more comprehensive units using underpins the process of distributed centers and BMC2 platforms are both distributed control. control; without trust, distributed uniquely capable of executing distrib- Self-organization would only occur control fails. Trusted autonomy allows uted control. Either could be delegated in the direst of circumstances and does Airmen to act with initiative knowing additional authorities by the CFACC not include modifications to the chain of the decisions they make and the actions to control operations in an area expe- command, leaving prehostility command they take will be supported by the riencing a modest level of activity, thus authorities and responsibilities intact. commanders who have placed their allowing the AOC to focus control on Furthermore, any self-organization trust in them. The expectation that

JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter 2014 Hostage and Broadwell 39 Crew chief marshals F-16 Fighting Falcon from hardened aircraft shelter in Germany in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn (U.S. Air Force/Benjamin Wilson)

Airmen are empowered to operate with the F-16. There was no all-seeing AOC integral to mission success then as it will trusted autonomy is who we are and Link 16, which is the backbone of our be in the future. The battlefields of Iraq how we fight. modern tactical C2 architecture. The and Afghanistan have grown a generation During my first operational assign- real-time, unblinking eye provided by of Airmen accustomed to leveraging a ment, I flew one of the earliest versions our modern ISR platforms could only robust, unparalleled C2 architecture: of the F-16. The avionics aboard that be found in the imaginations of George communications, datalinks, navigational Viper were archaic in comparison to Orwell and H.G. Wells. systems, and sensors. Because future the F-16 of today, never mind our most From my time as a young wingman, conflicts are unlikely to afford the same advanced fighters, the F-22 Raptor and the expectation that our rudimentary unfettered access, these Airmen must be F-35 Lightning II. The Block 10 Viper’s avionics would not compensate for the prepared to deal with a momentary or radar could only acquire and track targets complexities of aerial combat drove prolonged interruption of some or all of just beyond what could be seen by the our tactics, techniques, and procedures that C2 architecture. They must be ready naked eye. It did not carry a beyond-vi- (TTPs), and also our attitude. More to overcome varying levels of isolation or sual-range missile and was limited to six important than being prepared to confusion associated with fighting in an primitive AIM-9 infrared missiles. It had “chattermark” to a clear radio channel, A2/AD environment. The incorporation no advanced communication equipment, we were prepared to alter our TTPs or of distributed control into our daily train- and it could not import data from outside change the plan in real time without ing, TTPs, and exercises will prepare the airborne or ground-based platforms; guidance or permission from above. Our force to fight through these challenges datalinks had yet to be incorporated into attitude of bold, calculated initiative was rather than be relegated to inaction.

40 Forum / Resilient Command and Control JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter 2014 Airmen empowered with trusted au- tonomy are more likely to seize initiative by assuming control authorities implicitly rather than waiting for those authorities to be delegated explicitly. The ability to maintain initiative and act in the throes of combat is key to putting combat airpower over friendly forces or taking it to the enemy. To enable this initiative, the com- mander must have clearly expressed his intent to subordinate commanders and their units. From this initial direction, subordinate commanders and units are able to intelligently conduct distributed control as well as decentralized execution in support of the commander’s principal goals and objectives and in the absence of direct contact. The following exam- ples are provided to further clarify this Pilots briefed in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn (U.S. Air Force/Benjamin Wilson) concept. technologies. Because doctrine presents should be exposed to a variety of training Preparing for considerations on how to accomplish and exercise opportunities that hone and Distributed Control military objectives, the Nation’s rebalance evaluate their capability to conduct dis- Distributed control exists in the Air to the Pacific should drive a critical review tributed control. Air Combat Command Force today to some degree. All flight and adaptation of existing doctrine in a has already embarked on just such a leads and mission commanders have highly contested environment—on scale program. been trained to think for themselves, with the past decade’s renewal of coun- Readiness Program–2 (RP-2) is a know the mission, and make decisions terinsurgency doctrine. comprehensive approach to the ACC within guidelines to achieve success. Organizational adaptability is essential ability to conduct operations in an A2/ However, the past decades of intense to effective operations under distributed AD environment. The program enhances counterinsurgency operations, coupled control. The ability of an AETF, Air and normalizes training in a highly with pervasive networks and high-level Expeditionary Wing, or Expeditionary contested environment and ensures our command visibility of combat situations, Operations Group commander to assume Airmen routinely practice how to deal have muted some Airmen’s instincts for control authority of otherwise indepen- with the momentary or prolonged inter- independent operations. The intensity dent or isolated forces is fundamental to ruption of unique communication and of peer-adversary conflict will bring the concept of distributed control. The datalink systems. RP-2 forces operators challenges that require tactical leaders gears of distributed control are lubricated to practice existing—as well as develop who can exercise judgment and achieve by the proper delegation and assumption new—TTPs aimed at expanding tactical mission success despite disrupted C2. of control authorities. Fundamental to expertise operating in a contested envi- In addition to rekindling this concept executing distributed control is a clear ex- ronment. Reinvigorating this skillset not at the tactical level, the institutional- pression of commander’s intent and the only prepares the force to operate in an ization of strategic and operational triggers to achieve it. Distributed control A2/AD environment but also prepares distributed control in our force will requires subordinate commanders to be it to operate under distributed control. require changes in Service doctrine, or- prepared to initiate or fulfill new control Building on tactical level efforts, we ganization, TTPs, training and exercises, authority relationships—an arduous task should expand RP-2 into operational and the technologies we pursue. Evolving that must be codified and exercised well exercises (for example, Red Flag, an the central tenet of centralized control before being put into practice. Every advanced aerial combat training exercise and decentralized execution to cen- foreign-based or expeditionary unit, hosted at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, tralized command, distributed control, operations center, or BMC2 platform and Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska) and and decentralized execution will likely should have established distributed con- incorporate distributed control into our encounter significant institutional inertia. trol TTPs and routinely practice them. practice of peer-adversary air combat. Doctrine is formed by critical analysis and The CFACC should also tailor unit Our adversaries should know that attacks military experience and evolves through predeployment preparation messages to on our C2 architecture will not stop the incorporation of contemporary think- prioritize distributed control training us and that we will continue to bring ing, new experiences, and cutting-edge scenarios. Lastly, while in garrison, units lethal combat airpower. Our adversary’s

JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter 2014 Hostage and Broadwell 41 U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters fly in formation off right wing of KC-135R Stratotanker following aerial refueling mission along Florida coast (U.S. Air Force/John R. Nimmo, Sr.) calculus must account for our advancing vital node or nodes exist, eliminating the countless bits of false data, sophisticated doctrine, TTPs, skills, and technology. single-point weakness of a central reposi- algorithms would continuously resolve We must aggressively pursue technologies tory. As nodes are added or disconnected contrasting data—true, false, or inac- and TTPs that will enable or enhance from the combat cloud, its information curate—into a consortable and fused resilient C2. steadily builds or gracefully degrades, solution. Outlying data, whether con- While never a panacea, technical with the latter being an acute advantage. tributed by friendly (inaccurate) nodes solutions can certainly aid in the im- Graceful degradation allows the combat or enemy (false) nodes, would simply plementation of distributed control. cloud to propagate dormant information be pruned from the combat cloud—a The concept of a combat cloud is one where an information void would other- machine-to-machine wiki-approach to technical solution that offers much wise exist. This benefit, however, brings ensuring authenticity of the cloud’s data. promise. The strength of the combat with it the first potential challenge of a cloud is in its pervasiveness. The combat combat cloud: data latency. Data distrib- Explicit Distribution of cloud would use a federation of airborne uted by any cloud must include protocols Control Authorities and ground-based systems (nodes) that that allow the user, or more accurately, The CFACC, through the AOC, gather, process, store, and disseminate in- the user’s system, to filter or flag data possesses tremendous capacity both in formation. As opposed to a hierarchy, the deemed too old. In addition to latency, bandwidth and in manpower to provide combat cloud is constructed more like a data authenticity is a concern emblematic effective C2 during major combat heterarchy, where connected nodes op- of a heterarchic system such as the com- operations. Yet as the U.S. Central erate independently from any associated bat cloud. Command CFACC, I established and ranking. Information imported to the The combat cloud’s multinodal and practiced procedures for operating with combat cloud from a strategic system, for amorphous nature makes it susceptible to constrained bandwidth. We established example, would not necessarily obviate injections of corrupt or malicious data. In rules for prioritizing all users, thus or overwrite information from a tactical addition to requiring secure and reliable ensuring the most critical communica- system. The combat cloud propagates connections between each node, algo- tion would continue during periods of information discretely without present- rithms capable of fusing, updating, and limited bandwidth. A CFACC could ing finite, targetable nodes. Because pruning voluminous information offer choose to lower excessive C2 band- a plethora of contributing nodes port an effective counter to inauthentic data. width demands by explicitly distributing information into the combat cloud, no Rather than identifying and removing control authorities to lower echelon

42 Forum / Resilient Command and Control JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter 2014 commanders or control centers. In tinue to orchestrate regional air oper- exercises. Sophisticated platforms have addition to bandwidth, effective C2 ations until the CFACC regained C2 the ability to attack targets previously of large-scale, intense combat opera- connectivity at the AOC or, potentially, thought to be too complex, elusive, or tions requires substantial manpower. relocated to an alternate control center. well defended. Tremendous political A CFACC might choose to delegate Again, the key to this process is estab- sensitivities and risk surround these types control authorities to commanders or lishing and practicing detailed protocols of operations; therefore, the authority to control centers in sectors with lower for when and how to assume control initiate them is seldom delegated from operations tempo to focus the AOC authorities as well as clear guidance as the most senior civilian leaders. The F-35 staff on areas experiencing intense to commander’s intent. Without such package commander would do much combat. Whether to manage human direction, subordinates would be forced of the same preparation for this type of or computer bandwidth or to focus to wait for direction from the CFACC. mission. In addition, she would likely attention, explicitly distributing control receive additional training (simulations authorities is a viable option in manag- Control Authorities at and exercises) focused on the orches- ing C2 demands. the Tactical Level tration and integration of a specialized Tactical operators must have a clear tactical problem. In stark contrast to the Implicit Assumption of understanding of the authorities they previous example, she would most likely Control Authorities possess as well as the CFACC’s intent not be authorized to conduct the mission BMC2 platforms and operations centers before flying their missions. The clear absent the go call. She would marshal her provide a critical linkage between expression and understanding of these forces airborne in preparation for combat, the CFACC and tactical airpower in authorities and intent would promote anticipating the command to execute combat. Because of their significant C2 mission success and save lives. A strike at a predetermined time. She would capacity, they are delegated sufficient package commander flying an F-35 know that a go command is required control authorities to allow them to must understand authorities to induce to conduct offensive strike operations manage portions of the ATO. They are or forestall major combat operations. regardless of the presentation of enemy uniquely capable of providing timely, If the sparring between two belligerent forces. She would be prepared, however, dynamic direction to tactical airpower nations has made combat inevitable, the to retrograde if attacked, reserving the to assist with attacking complex prob- strike package commander would likely use of deadly force to defend herself, her lems and better achieving the CFACC’s launch with authorities delegated by the flight, and other friendly forces. As the intent. Despite this delegation, the CFACC to initiate combat operations. CFACC, I placed tremendous trust in CFACC retains needed control authori- Well before reaching prestrike orbit, the Airmen operating at the tactical level. I ties under normal operating conditions. strike package commander would have was confident in their ability to use the In a near-peer fight, it is possible for internalized the CFACC’s intent and training and authorities they were given the AOC, and therefore the CFACC, objectives, the master air attack plan, the to achieve their mission and drive toward to be cut off abruptly from subordinate ATO, special instructions, and rules of my intent whether a go command was elements of the C2 architecture before engagement. She understands her role needed or not. having an opportunity to delegate in the strategic picture and becomes The mantra of centralized command, control authorities explicitly (as in a tactical extension of the CFACC. distributed control, and decentralized the previous vignette). Under these She does not require an explicit “go” execution is not a change from our past, circumstances, BMC2 platforms and command; she is entrusted with employ- but a healthy adaptation to the realities operations centers have to be ready to ing her flight of F-35s as the situation of contemporary warfare. The keys to implicitly assume control authorities. unfolds and without necessarily being effective use of distributed control are the Without doing so, combat airpower told when or how. Sometimes, however, clear articulation of intent and standing will rapidly lose the initiative and slowly the road to combat operations follows directions for when and how to assume devolve into disparate, isolated units a less predictable path—a narrow one this action. However, the linchpin of trying to defend themselves. In con- shrouded in uncertainty where the success in any fight will be the ingenuity, trast, a BMC2 platform or operations stakes are high and authorities are aggressiveness, and fighting spirit of our center could continue to synchronize retained at the highest levels. Airmen. Execution of distributed con- airpower regionally by assuming control The Air Force’s tremendous capa- trol, whether intentional or as a result of activities normally executed by the bility to hold any worldwide target at enemy activity, hinges on a force that is CFACC—given that the CFACC had risk affords our nation’s leaders unique conditioned to deal with contested envi- provided suitable commander’s intent options to deal with national security ronments and empowered with doctrine and a standing set of protocols for such threats. Global precision attack capabili- that ensures that America’s Airmen will an assumption. With designated author- ties are continuously enhanced through not be deterred by asymmetric attacks on ities, a BMC2 platform or operations acquiring advanced technologies and by our command and control architecture or center would have the ability to con- conducting scenario-based integrated leadership nodes. JFQ

JFQ 74, 3rd Quarter 2014 Hostage and Broadwell 43