BRIDGING THE GAP FROM COORDINATION (Briana Jones) U.S. Air Force TO INTEGRATION

By Curtis V. Neal, Robert B. Green, and Troy Caraway

Legacy AC2 [airspace command and control] elements buy airspace today for tomorrow’s war. Airspace control measures (ACM) such as Restricted Operating Zones . . . do not inte- grate airspace users . . . ACMs deconflict users via exclusive volumes of airspace. Because airspace is a finite resource, as the number of airspace users increases, AC2 elements run out of airspace. To effectively put more users in a given volume of airspace, AC2 elements must provide real time separation from other users and fires. Real time control of a volume of airspace, whether positive or procedural, requires communication with all users, a common reference system, and authority to direct/control the users without affecting their flexibility and freedom of maneuver.1

Colonel Curtis V. Neal, USAF (Ret.), is a Air Ground System Senior Advisor in the Joint Integration (JID) of Air Combat Command. Colonel Robert B. Green, USA (Ret.), is a Joint Special Operations Forces Senior Advisor in JID. Lieutenant Colonel Troy Caraway, USMC (Ret.), is a Marine Air Ground and Naval Senior Advisor in JID.

Airmen participate in Tactical Air Control Party training mission

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 / JFQ 97 FEATURES | Bridging the Gap from Coordination to Integration RUBEL

n the past, when faced with a large of a joint campaign, executing operational- ments integrate organizationally and procedur- number of competing airspace users level actions to achieve strategic effects.2 ally to conduct operations in a more efficient, and limited command and control To maintain responsiveness and flex- linked, and situationally aware manner. I capabilities, it has generally been easier ibility, the Air Force, in coordination with Unlike most military capability to deconflict competing demands for airspace the , made a decision to increase the improvements based on new systems and by implementing procedural control methods number of Air Support Operations Centers technology, the JAGIC is based on organiza- that placed heavy emphasis on the increased (ASOC) from 6 Cold War–legacy ASOCs tional and procedural changes that emphasize use of airspace and fire support coordinat- aligned with each Army to 10 ASOCs, proximity and teamwork by collocating ing measures. Prior to Operations Enduring aligned and collocated with the 10 active Theater Air Control System (TACS) person- Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, military opera- Army divisions. Each ASOC is responsible nel with their ground element counterparts. tions demonstrated little need for the much for the coordination and control of air com- By doing so, the JAGIC builds -Airman more difficult real- or near real-time decon- ponent missions requiring integration with relationships, improves communication effec- fliction and integration of airspace and fires. other supporting arms and ground forces.3 tiveness, and increases situational awareness Beginning about 2004, emerging mili- Three additional ASOCs will remain non- and understanding. Essentially, the JAGIC tary capabilities and ongoing operations in aligned. While still functionally unique, the creates a joint decision-oriented command Iraq began to provide insight into how future aligned ASOCs are being integrated with the and control organization resulting in faster military operations would increasingly chal- division Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) decisions based on better information that lenge our current airspace control abilities. as part of each division’s Air Support Opera- increases effectiveness while decreasing risk. These included large numbers of manned tions . The ASOC realignment is The JAGIC is neither a staff nor a plan- military, civil aviation, other government scheduled to be complete by fiscal year 2015. ning cell, but is composed of those personnel agency, special operations, and coalition air- directing and monitoring the current fight craft, as well as rapidly expanding numbers A New Approach through the arrangement of operators per- of unmanned military aircraft of all sizes. This new ASOC alignment makes it forming related functions in close physical In addition, combat operations demanded possible to improve the integration of joint proximity. Such an arrangement not only inte- increasingly large volumes of responsive airspace control and joint fires at the division grates the air and ground component opera- ground-based fires that had to be integrated level through an organizational concept called tors, but also collocates the decisionmaking into the airspace. the Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC). authorities from the land and air components In a 2007 Joint Urgent Operational The JAGIC is the result of a 6-year Army–Air with the highest levels of situational awareness, Need Statement, Lieutenant General Force Integration Forum effort, spearheaded that is, the senior air director and deputy fire Raymond Odierno, Commander, Multi- by Air Combat Command’s Joint Integration support coordinator, while building habitual National Corps–Iraq, stated, “The joint com- Division and the U.S. Army Training and relationships to support the maneuver com- munity and the U.S. Army are not equipped Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Fires Center mander’s concept of operations. This arrange- to manage or adequately deconflict airspace of Excellence Joint and Combined Integration ment also ensures support of joint forces air component commander (JFACC) objectives to maintain responsiveness and flexibility, the Air Force, in and intent and requirements of joint force commander (JFC)-designated authorities such coordination with the Army, made a decision to increase the as Airspace Control Authority and area air number of Air Support Operations Centers defense commanders. While procedural control methods will of high-traffic density.” As a result of these Directorate. It has been exercised in multiple remain a mainstay of airspace and fires inte- challenges, the way the U.S. military controls Army–Air Force warfighting experiments and gration for the foreseeable future, the integra- airspace during joint operations began to exercises and resulted in increased air-ground tion of personnel from both Services who are fundamentally change. In 2006, the Army effectiveness during each event.4 directing and monitoring ongoing operations began fielding an organic airspace command The JAGIC is created by organizing the permits dynamic coordination, activation, and control (AC2) capability comprised of ASOC operations crew, division TACP person- and deactivation of airspace and fire support over 1,600 trained operators with dedicated nel, the Division Fires Support Element, AC2, coordination measures rather than “buying AC2 cells at corps, division, and air and missile defense, and aviation personnel airspace today for tomorrow’s war.” When levels, all linked through the tactical airspace into a single integrated cell within the division the JAGIC is empowered with the means integration system. In 2007, the Army also Current Operations Integration Cell.5 The and authority to pass control instructions began a migration from a division-centric important point is that the JAGIC is simply directly to the airspace users, mutually sup- force toward a more expeditionary brigade- an integrating cell6 created from Air Force porting operations can rapidly be integrated, centric force, with the Brigade Combat Team and Army personnel already supporting, or conflicts can be resolved on the fly, and real- becoming the primary combined arms assigned to, the division headquarters (HQ). No time coordination of competing requests can building block unit of the Army. Today, the additional manpower is required to form the either be resolved through the use of flexible, divisions employ to fight battles and JAGIC, and it does not replace any current divi- informal control measures or by direct coor- engagements while corps conduct large-scale sion cells or command and control nodes. Quite dination requiring no control measures at all. land operations, employing divisions as part simply, the JAGIC improves the way these ele- For the airspace user, the JAGIC provides a

98 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu neal, green, and caraway single “center” for coordinating requests and recent major combat operations. The first was subsequently briefed at the Army–Air resolving joint airspace conflicts within the was the development of air coordination ele- Force Warfighter Talks in February 2009, division area of operations. ments by U.S. Air Forces Central and special where it was well received. While the overarching function of operations forces during early operations In the interim, a JAGIC concept of the JAGIC is to fully integrate joint airspace in Enduring Freedom.9 The second was the employment containing detailed TTP has control and joint fires at the division level, it integration of a joint air coordination element been developed by the Air Force Command executes integrated tactics, techniques, and with a special operations joint fires element and Control Integration Center, working procedures (TTP) to support numerous joint during early operations in Iraqi Freedom, together with Air Combat Command’s Joint processes including direction and monitoring which resulted in a small JAGIC-like cell Integration Division and the TRADOC Fires of fires and effects, command and control integrating air operations and joint fires in Center of Excellence Joint and Combined of some volume of airspace overlying the real time.10 The third was the V Corps and Integration Directorate. division area of operations, rapid attack of 4th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Relocation and alignment of ASOCs emerging targets, interdiction coordina- Center experience in Iraqi Freedom during with 25th Infantry Division and 1st Infantry tion, improved friendly force identification, early 2003, in which the V Corps commander, Division is complete, and the 82nd Airborne increased situational awareness for air Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, Division ASOC alignment is happening in defense, and synchronization and integra- noted, “The critical ingredient in successful fiscal year 2012. As the ASOCs relocate to tion of tactical intelligence, surveillance, and focusing of joint fires lay in the organization their aligned divisions, Air Combat Com- reconnaissance, electronic warfare, informa- of the main command post to place the [all mand’s Joint Integration Division and tion operations, and airlift assets. The design and manning of the JAGIC is such that a subset of the JAGIC, called a the Tactical Operating Concept is currently in final coordination Joint Air Support Element (JASE), can be at the Air and Army staff task-organized and sent forward to extend control and integration of air operations source collection element], the [Fires and TRADOC Fires Center of Excellence Joint in High Density Aircraft Control Zones, Effects Coordination Cell] and the ASOC in and Combined Integration Directorate are support displacement operations, or extend close proximity for current operations.” contributing a joint training team to provide support to a subordinate maneuver unit Just as the Army has evolved over time, education, training, and exercise support for for named operations of limited duration. so has the TACS. Prior to 1965, ASOCs were JAGIC implementation. The JASE will normally be provided in aligned with each headquarters, An ongoing revolution in military coordination with an Army tactical aviation but over time close air support coordination operations has transformed airspace into the control team. The JASE and Army control and control problems became apparent. In new high ground. All the Services are rapidly team effectively extend the JAGIC capability September 1962, a new concept for improved fielding new and more dynamic capabilities forward of the division when needed. joint air-ground coordination was approved to exploit this environment. Past practices of As noted earlier, corps conduct large- in principle and the respective Army and Air deconflicting operations primarily through scale land operations, employing divisions Force chiefs of staff approved the new system procedural control methods are proving to be as part of a joint campaign, executing opera- in 1965.11 Among the revisions to the TACS, insufficient for current and future operations tional-level actions to achieve strategic effects.7 the ASOC was renamed the direct air support as both the use of and the users of airspace The corps TACP will remain the JFACC’s center (DASC) and located at the corps proliferate and often limit and restrict, rather primary liaison for providing advice, planning, level. During the Vietnam War, up to six of than enable and enhance responsive, inte- synchronization, and integration of airpower these centers supported the American and grated operations. While new systems and at the operational level in support of corps Vietnamese corps, each working directly for technologies will enhance airspace and fires operations. When a corps is designated as a the 7th Air Force Tactical Air Control Center integration in the future, today the JAGIC joint force land component command or joint collocated with the Military Assistance is demonstrating a very real capability to task force, it may receive an Air Force Joint Air Command, Vietnam. improve integration at the division level using Component Coordination Element, in addition existing personnel and systems. JFQ to the corps TACP, to better integrate joint air The Way Ahead operations with corps operations.8 In September 2008, the Army–Air As the Services have moved forward Force Board, General Officer Steering Com- Notes with JAGIC development and implementa- mittee, approved development and staffing 1 tion, some have questioned its origins and of the JAGIC Tactical Operating Concept Center for Army Lessons Learned, Air Force Office of Lessons Learned, Operation Iraqi purpose. The most common criticism is that for the Air Force and Army chief of staff sig- Freedom–Operation Enduring Freedom Airspace the JAGIC was developed as a solution for natures. The Tactical Operating Concept is Command and Control Collection and Analysis the challenges the TACS faced as it adapted currently in final coordination at the Air and Team Initial Impressions, 2006. to irregular warfare operations and therefore Army staff. The October 2008 CORONA (Air 2 Field Manual (FM) 3-94 (initial draft), Ech- does not have universal application. Force four-star conference) approved JAGIC elons Above Brigade (Washington, DC: Headquar- The JAGIC concept actually evolved development as one of a series of measures ters Department of the Army, October 28, 2011), out of three experiences that occurred during designed to enhance the TACS. The concept 3-2, paragraph 3-1 [sic]. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 / JFQ 99 FEATURES | Bridging the Gap from Coordination to Integration RUBEL

3 Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Close Air Support (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 8, 2009). 4 Warfighting experiments include the Fires Battle Lab Earth, Wind, and Fire 08 and 09, AFCIE (Air Force Capabilities Integration Envi- ronment) 10, AGILE (Air Ground Integrated Layer NEW Exploration) Fire I, II, and III, Fort Leavenworth from NDU Press Mission Command Battle Lab Joint Forcible Entry for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Warfighting Experiment, and Austere Challenge Institute for National Strategic Studies 11. 5 FM 5-0, The Operations Process (Washing- ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, March 2010), para. 5-22. 6 Ibid., para. A-24. 7 FM 3-94, 3-2, para. 3-1 [sic]. 8 The Joint Air Component Coordination China Strategic Perspectives, No. 5 Element is a component-level liaison that serves as the direct representative of the joint forces air Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval component commander. Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New 9 Jody Jacobs, Gary McLeod, and Eric V. Avenues of Approach Larson, Enhancing the Integration of Special Oper- ations and Conventional Air Operations—Focus By Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders on the Air-Surface Interface (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, July 2007). 10 The United States and China have a Robert B. Green, “Joint Fires Support, the complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relation- Joint Fires Element, and the CGRS [Common Grid Reference System]: Keys to Success for CSJOTF- ship where substantial areas of cooperation West,” Special Warfare, April 2005. coexist with ongoing strategic tensions and suspi- 11 Concept for Improved Joint Air-Ground cions. One manifestation involves disputes Coordination (Revised Tactical Air Control and incidents when U.S. and Chinese military System), signed by the chief of staff, U.S. Air Force, forces interact within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Three high-profile March 19, 1965, and chief of staff, U.S. Army, April incidents over the last decade have involved aggressive maneuvers by Chinese 28, 1965, 2. military and/or paramilitary forces operating in close proximity to deter U.S. surveillance and military survey platforms from conducting their missions. Why do these incidents continue to occur despite mechanisms designed to prevent such dangerous encounters? Could new or different procedures or policies help avoid future incidents? According to authors Mark Redden and Phillip Saunders, if U.S. policymakers seek a change in Chinese behavior, they need to understand the underlying Chinese policy calculus, how it may change over time, and potential means of influencing that calculus. U.S. policymakers have several broad avenues of approach to alter the Chinese policy calculus and thereby influence Chinese behavior, but given the importance that China places on sovereignty, no single option is likely to be sufficient. A mixed approach, particularly one that influences a larger number of Chinese decisionmakers, may maximize the probability of success. Cooperative approaches require time for the benefits of cooperation to accrue and for normative arguments to be heard and heeded, both in China and internationally.

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