••••• United Nations • Nations Unies
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.. UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES ~ NEW YORK CA.LE ADDRI£ •• ' U NATIONS NEWYORK • ADRI£ •• 1£ TI:LI:OIIIIIAPHIQUII: P'ILIE Na .~ TR 300 PORI' ••••• and bas the honour to draw his attention to the attached resolutio:a (document S/5380 and Corr.l) adopted by the Security CouncU at its 1649th meeting on 31 July 1963 in connexion with tbe situation in the Territories under Portuguese Adll:tnistration. In particular, the resolution in its operative parasraph 6 requests "tbat all States should refrain f'orthvith from of'f'erine the Portucuese GoTernmea.t any assistance which wuld enable it to continue ita repression of' the peoples of' the Territories under i 'ts administration, and take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of' arms and military equipment f'or this purpose to the 'Por't'quese Government". Further, operative paracraph 7 of' the resolution requests the Secretary- General "to eD.8Ul"e tlle imple~~entation of' the provisions of' this resolutiOD, to 1"urnish such assistance as he -.y deem necessary ani. to report to tlae Security CouncU by 31 October 1963•. .• UNITED NATIONS t,~~~\ NATIONS UNIES ~ -2- The Secretary-Gene~ would appreciate reeeivinS information on .tb.e steps alread¥ taken and those proposed to be taken by His Excellency's Government, in tbe context of the provisions of tbe resolution as a whole, to ensure tbe implementation of the prov18ions of its operative paraaraph 6 which is directed to all Member States. ~s 1Dfor-.tion is neeclad to enable tbe Secretary-General to c~~ ....aate &i,.n to him in operative pa.I'86r&ph 7 of the resolu~ and the Secretary-Gene:r&l. would appreciate it i:t this intormation c~~eeived by hia, at the latest, by 25 September 1963. "--J (j • • :_;' ~ ~ -.+ £ ~ .,., t ·"'· ~~ ~~~~. ~ C.c.--~· TO: THROUGH: FROM: SUBJECT: The African countries we discussed are as follows: i\1 ~ L 14 y! Ghana- ~ )"'f ff/1° Guinea -;r Liberia-~ "(I" it 1..~ 0 1-fli I J;ff'O Morocco -~JU H I (; Nigeria -.Ni) y G( (/, g 7 1 (} Sierra Leone - v;-J 11 "/' I t.. r, I"?J Sudan -pt) y ~ r 1 t0 Tunisa. -r GKJA/m SECRET UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES INTEROI=I=ICE MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary-General oate: September 17, 1963 FIL.E NO . :-~~------- THROUGH: FROM: Godf'rey K. J. Amachree ~ SUBJECT: Some observations on mY recent ta1ks. as the representative of the Secretary-General, with the Portuguese Government 1. Even though the Portuguese Government indicated its rejection of the Security Council resolution of 31 July 1963 (S/5380) on legal grounds, it was interesting to note that the Foreign Minister, Mr. Franco Nogu.a, 'f- exmnined the resolution in detail, paragraph by paragraph. 2. He admitted that operative paragraph 4 of the resolution is within the competence of the Security Council and that his Government is ready to provide all relevant info:nnation. He, in fact, provided the relevant information and, as I have indicated in my report, he tried to show that the disturbance to peace and security in Africa was not the outcome of any conduct on the part of Portugal, but that certain African countries were directly responsible for the situation. 3. Detailed info~tion on the Portuguese comments on the ter.ms of the resolution are contained in my report. Mr. Nogu.a had no comments to make on operative paragraph 7, which empowers the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the resolution, to furnish such assistance as he may deem necessary and to report to the Security Council by 31 October 1963. 4. Prior to the full meeting, Mr. Nogul§lra and I had a private dis- '{ cussion in his office. He told me that his country is still willing to discuss with the African countries the problems relating to the Portuguese Territories in Africa, without any intervention from non-African countries. In this conneotion, he reiterated the fact that his country is in possession of documents ~ich prove conclusively that the terrorist activities in Angola and Portuguese Guinea have the backing of certain foreign powers, and that Portugal would not give up its territories to any foreign power. 5. Mr. Nogu}dra referred especially to the United States as the most Y.. guilty of the mischief-making countries. In my conversation with Prime Minister Salazar he, too, expressed his concern over the interest shown in Portuguese Territories by countries such as Egypt and Algeria that were neither contiguous to any of these Territories, nor had any ethnic affinities with the indigenous peoples. This was an indication to me •••••/2 • -2- that, should the Secretar,y-General decide to intervene by arranging for a meeting between Portugal and the African countries to discuss this whole question, the presence of certain African countries lmown for their radical views would be unacceptable to Portugal. Indeed, at lunch on 12 September , Mr. Nogul.dra infonned me that if any such meeting were contemplated, Portugal would have no objection to seeing a country like Morocco as one of the participants. I asked him if Tunisia would be acceptable and he said it would. 6. The Portuguese Government, to me, has its back to the wall, but will only yield to reason if the fact is realized that it cannot, for political and other reasons, suddenly agree to alter a position it has adhered to for a good many years. My impression is that the Portuguese Government would welcome the intervention of someone not personally interested in its dispute with the African countries. It is for this reason that both Prime Minister Salazar and Foreign Minister Nogu3:Wra would welcome such assistance as you may see fit. In the words of Mr. Nogu~a, if both sides can get talking, "the conversations may lead to the unexpected". 7. I may be mistaken, but I am of the view that the Portuguese are beginning to feel the effects of the pressures being brought to bear on them to change their policy towards their African territories. Their greatest difficulty is how to accede to world opinion without losing face. They also want time in which to carry out refonns which they have recently announced. More important, they want to ensure that if the territories became independent Portuguese influence will not disappear. 8. As I see it, the invitation by the Portuguese Government was care- fully thought out. I do not think, as same people do, that the invitation was extended for propaganda purposes. The Portuguese Government is well aware of the e:xplosi ve situation in Africa and realizes that should the present skinnishes in Portuguese Guinea and Angola spread, it will be fighting wars on several fronts against thirty-two African countries. Portugal is also aware of the fact that there will be active intervention by powers f rom outside Africa should there be a con.f~agration, and that it will be fighting without any ally. No matter how long such a .fight may l ast, Portugal will ultimately lose. The after effects of any such fighting will be disastrous, both to the Salazar Government and the entire Portuguese nation. In short, Portugal realizes that if she persistswith her present attitude the consequences will be grave. In this connection I attach a copy of a leading article in the "London Times" of September 12, captioned 11Dr. Salazar Changes His Line in Africa". 9. The Portuguese Government, to say the least, is most unhappy with the United Nations. It feels that it is being discriminated against. 10. You cannot, of course, accept the Portuguese rejection of the Security Council resoluti on, and t his fact I made absolutely clear to Prime Minister Salazar and Foreign Minister Nogu~a. I also made it clear that you will 'fJ proceed, not only to ensure the implementation of the resolution, but that you would also attempt to furnish such assistance as you might deem necessary• •••• /3 . - , • -3- At no stage during our meetings did t he representatives of the Portuguese Gove~ent ever question your competence to carry out your mandate under operative paragraph 1 of the Security Council resolution of July 31, 1963. ll. I suggest, as one of the "assistance" you may wish to render, your inviting representatives of the African countries and Portugal for talks with you on the subject of "the threat to peace and security on the African Continent". The subject for the talks is, in my opinion, wide enough to enable both parties to raise the various problems which are of "interest" to them. It should be pointed out that you cannot ignore the cODIIlents of the Portuguese Government on operative paragraph 4 of the resolution. They are, in effect, saying to you that they are not responsible for the threat to peace and security in Africa, but that certain African countries that have allowed their territories to be used as bases for terrorist activities against Portuguese Guinea and Angola are, on the contrary, the culprits. 12. It is my opml.on that the Portuguese Government will welcome any meeting call~d, by you. From info:nna.l discussions with some of the African Ambassadors 11 I have been assured that they will give you every co-operation should you wish to summon a meeting. One of the Ambassadors said to me t hat 11we must exploit any openings the Portuguese may offer and not continue to adopt a tough line11 • All the Ambassadors agree, however, that the init iative should come fran you. They feel that if you consult with them and infom them of your intention to arrange for the talks there will be no opposition from their Governments.