View That Gender (In a Sense to Be Specified) Is Unreal And/Or the Normative View That Gender (In a Sense to Be Specified) Ought to Be Purged from Our Social Dealings
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Debating Gender Eliminativism in Feminist Metaphysics by Eloy Francisco Rodriguez LaBrada A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Philosophy University of Alberta © Eloy Francisco Rodriguez LaBrada, 2017 Abstract In this thesis, I give critical consideration to gender eliminativism, or the metaphysical view that gender (in a sense to be specified) is unreal and/or the normative view that gender (in a sense to be specified) ought to be purged from our social dealings. I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of eliminativist proposals for contemporary feminist theory and activism (with particular implications for scientific and healthcare contexts). I ask whether, and why, a certain theory of gender eliminativism and practice of gender abolitionism might ever be serviceable for feminist purposes: In which contexts might eliminativism be effective as a “regulative ideal” for our theorizing and acting (and why)? In which contexts would it be normatively important to endorse eliminativism (and about what)? In short, were we to endorse eliminativism, which kind of eliminativism should—and could—we? While I contend that the metaphysical component of eliminativism is philosophically question-begging and politically impractical, I float the idea that the normative component of eliminativism—called “abolitionism”—might be defensible as a “regulative ideal” for some feminist theorizing about gender talk (Hussein). Following what Sally Haslanger calls an “ameliorative approach,” I suggest that understanding gender eliminativism/abolitionism in terms of our “pragmatic” political objectives—rather than in terms of their conceptual or metaphysical truth—might yield a resource for feminist theorizing and activism. A plausible, defensible version of eliminativism/abolitionism, I argue, would center on selective contexts and particular manifestations of hetero- and cissexist, objectifying gender talk and habit (Butler, Bettcher). In Chapter One I show why metaphysical eliminativism is philosophically implausible on conceptual grounds. In Chapter Two I demonstrate why metaphysical eliminativism sheds no light on the normative and ethical considerations any study of gender must include. In Chapter Three I explore how a regulative, normative, and abolitionist version of eliminativism could ii be plausible and useful in a medical, health-care context in the service of precluding trans*exclusion. I substantiate the claim forwarded by Matthew Andler and Talia Bettcher that, in a medical context, it is not always requisite to gender bodily organs, even while acknowledging physical differences (e.g. we can say that this “person” “has ovaries” without saying “this woman has ovaries,” to avoid cissexism). A part of the thesis is thus “deconstructive,” showing why metaphysical eliminativism is unjustified, while the other is “reconstructive,” examining the kind of normative eliminativism or abolitionism which might be defensible, if not useful. iii Preface Select portions of the Introduction, Chapter One, Chapter Two, and Chapter Three originally appeared in abridged and altered form in LaBrada, Eloy. 2016a. “Categories We Die For: Ameliorating Gender in Analytic Feminist Philosophy,” PMLA 131 (2): 449-459 and LaBrada, Eloy. 2016b. “Unsexing Subjects: Marie de Gournay’s Philosophy of Sex Eliminativism.” In Claudia Brodsky and Eloy LaBrada, eds. Inventing Agency: Essays on the literary and philosophical production of the modern subject. New York: Bloomsbury. 51-79. Some formulations of eliminativist and fictionalist claims reprise phrasings originally appearing in abbreviated, altered form in LaBrada, Eloy. 2016c. “Unlivable Loves: Hélisenne, Nietzsche, and the Metaphysics of Love.” JNT 46 (1): 1- 38. iv Acknowledgements I wish to express my profound gratitude to Dr. Cressida Heyes for her supervision of this project, for her incisive commentary, and for her professional guidance. Dr. Chloë Taylor deserves my heartfelt thanks for her exceptional collegiality and wisdom, as does Dr. Marie-Eve Morin for her counsel and support. The scholarship and mentorship of these philosophers have both inspired and clarified my thinking about feminist ontology and meta-ontology. Dr. Taylor in particular has shown me what it is to be a mentor: both professionally and personally, I would never have survived here without her consistent support, aid, and teaching. Stephanie “Eeden” Dover, my friend and colleague, made the trip to this frozen tundra worth the while: I continue to learn from, and enjoy, the philosophy and practice of questioning gender that this “top-shelf human” undertakes. This work was funded by a Recruitment Scholarship from the Department of Philosophy. I have Dr. Amy Schmitter to thank, both for the award and for supporting my candidacy all throughout. I would also like to thank the Department of Women’s and Gender Studies for which I was both a visiting scholar and contract instructor. I am especially grateful to Dr. Taylor’s assistance in obtaining the visiting scholar position and for her unwavering encouragement. The students of my Fall 2016 seminar on social ontology and the philosophy of gender and sexuality (WGS440: “Body Politics”) are also deserving of my warmest thanks for their insights, curiosity, and enthusiasm. Dr. Catherine Kellogg also offered insightful, intelligent critique as well as precious aid when it was most needed. For sharing their drafts and forthcoming material, I’d like to thank Christine Overall, Rima Hussein, Marguerite Deslauriers, Charlotte Witt, and Esther Rosario. I owe special thanks to Christine for discussing the philosophy of gender with me, to Margot Challborn and Renee McBeth for our discussions regarding gender and politics, and to Esther for our discussions concerning Roughgarden and sex concepts in biology. For their magnanimity, care, and “soul sustenance,” I wish to thank Helena María Viramontes, Carolyn Marie Sinsky, Stephanie Dover, Eloy Rodriguez, Jane Wiley, Genevieve Arlie, Xavier Fontaine, Daniel Hoffman, and Timothy DeMay. To borrow from Judith Butler: this work, as all my work, is for you, as this writing, and this writer, “could never be without you.” v Table of Contents 0. Introduction 0.1 Feminist Ontology……………………………………………………………………...1 0.2 Eliminativism and Abolitionism …………………………………………………………5 0.3 Regulative Eliminativism, Pragmatic Abolitionism……………………………………….12 0.4 Methodology…………………………………………………………………………..15 0.5 Structure of the Analysis………………………………………………………………..18 1. Against Gender Eliminativism: Metaphysical Problems 1.1 Deflationary Metaphysics……………………………………………………………….23 1.2 The Metaphysics of Eliminativism……………………………………………………….24 1.2.1 Defining Gender…………………………………………………………….25 1.2.1.1 Folk Conceptions…………………………………………………26 1.2.1.2 Feminist Conceptions…………………………………………… 30 1.2.1.3 Problems for Defining Gender…………………………………….40 1.2.2 Defining Sociality and Reality……………………………………………….. 41 1.2.2.1 Conceptions of Sociality…………………………………………..42 1.2.2.2 Conceptions of Reality…………………………………………….44 1.3 Rejecting the notion of “gender per se” ………………………………………………….46 2. Against Gender Eliminativism: Political Problems 2.1 Metaphysics and Politics………………………………………………………………...49 2.2 Politicizing Ontology…………………………………………………………………...47 2.3 Political-Ontological Problems………………………………………………………….52 2.3.1 Representation Problems…………………………………………………….54 2.3.2 Property Problems…………………………………………………………..54 2.3.3 Contestability Problems……………………………………………………...56 2.3.4 Group Problems……………………………………………………………..58 2.3.5 Practicality Problems………………………………………………………...59 2.4 Wittig …………………………………………………………………………………60 2.4.1 Wittig………………………………………………………………………61 2.4.1.1 Exegesis………………………………………………………….62 2.4.1.2 Implications and Objections……………………………………….71 3. Regulating Eliminativism 3.1 Defending Abolitionism……………………………………………….………………..77 3.2 Evaluating Extant Arguments……………………………………………………………78 3.2.1 Conceptual Argument (Gilbert)………………………………………………78 3.2.2 Value-Theoretic Argument (Overall)…………………………………………81 3.2.3 Critical Realist Argument (Haslanger) 3.2.3.1 Exegesis………………………………………………………….85 3.2.3.2 Implications and Objections……………………………………….90 3.3 Defending Mikkola’s “Trait/Norm” Model………………………………………………96 3.3.1 Gender Concepts and Terms…………………………………………………97 3.3.2 Gender “Traits” and “Norms” ………………………………………………..99 3.4 Regulative Eliminativism and Pragmatic Abolitionism in Action………………………….102 3.4.1 Trans*feminism and Objectifying Gender Talk……………………………….102 3.4.2 Objections and Responses: Phenomenology of Gender……………………….110 4. Conclusion and Consequences………………………………………………………………118 vi 0. Introduction 0.1 Feminist Ontology Contemporary analytic work on the ontology of gender has explored “what grounds gender”—that is, what social and metaphysical dependence relations must be in place for something like gender to be what it “is” (Griffith forthcoming; Jenkins 2016b; Schaffer 2016; Mikkola 2016b, 2015b; Barnes 2014; Haslanger 2012, forthcoming; Ásta Sveinsdóttir 2013; Witt 2011; Haslanger and Ásta 2011). 1 Broadly construed, these feminist metaphysical investigations have sought to explain in virtue of what gender “is,” or in what gender “consists,” by asking whether gender has an essence or not (Witt 2010 and 2011; Ásta 2013; Mason 2016; Griffith forthcoming); whether gender “ontologically depends” solely on “social conventions” or not (Mikkola 2011; Butler 1999; Bach 2012, 235); whether gender is elected by free will or predetermined by biology or culture (Behrensen