Contesting Gender Concepts, Language and Norms: Three Critical Articles on Ethical and Political Aspects of Gender Non- Conformity
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Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 8-24-2015 12:00 AM Contesting Gender Concepts, Language and Norms: Three Critical Articles on Ethical and Political Aspects of Gender Non- conformity Stephanie Julia Kapusta The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Prof Carolyn McLeod The University of Western Ontario Joint Supervisor Prof Richard Vernon The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy ©Follow Stephanie this and Julia additional Kapusta works 2015 at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Feminist Philosophy Commons, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Studies Commons, Philosophy of Language Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons Recommended Citation Kapusta, Stephanie Julia, "Contesting Gender Concepts, Language and Norms: Three Critical Articles on Ethical and Political Aspects of Gender Non-conformity" (2015). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 3040. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3040 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CONTESTING GENDER CONCEPTS, LANGUAGE AND NORMS: THREE CRITICAL ARTICLES ON ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF GENDER NON-CONFORMITY (Thesis format: Integrated Articles) by STEPHANIE JULIA KAPUSTA Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada © Stephanie J. Kapusta 2015 Abstract My thesis considers ethical and political aspects of gender non-conformity. Prominent in all three articles is the idea of contestability: conceptual (semantic), moral, and political. In my first article, I present two arguments related to resemblance accounts of the category WOMAN . First, I critique some contemporary family-resemblance approaches to the category WOMAN , and claim that they do not take sufficient account of dis-semblance, that is, resemblances that people have in common with members of the contrast category MAN . In the second argument, I analyze how the concept of WOMAN is semantically contestable, that is, resemblance/dissemblance structures give rise to vagueness and to borderline cases. Borderline cases – for example, transgender or intersex persons – can either be included in the category or excluded from it. The factors which incline parties in a dispute about membership to include or exclude such persons depend on metaphysical, ethical, or political background assumptions. In my second article, I begin by considering the harms suffered by transgender persons through “misgendering”, that is, the intensional or extensional deployment of gender terms which inflict psychological harms upon transgender persons, place them in situations of injustice, or diminish their self-respect. Such deployments are morally contestable, that is, they can be challenged on ethical grounds. Several characterisations of the term ‘woman’ proposed in the feminist literature are critiqued from this perspective. These characterisations possess two defects in the context of political struggle: they either exclude at least some transgender women, or else they implicitly foster hierarchies among women, marginalising transgender women in particular. In my third article, I elaborate a broadly liberal approach to gender pluralism. The approach involves: i) the public toleration of gender practices and beliefs which contest prevalent gender expectations and modes of gender ascription; and ii) state-gender neutrality. Public toleration allows gender practices and beliefs within public space that do not conform to socially prevalent norms regarding gender and its expression. State gender-neutrality consists mainly in the removal from law and government policy of provisions which assume compliance with prevalent conceptions of gender. Together, public toleration and state gender-neutrality help ensure the contestability of prevalent gender norms. Keywords : Contestability, gender non-conformity, transgender, definitions of ‘woman’, family-resemblance, vagueness, misgendering, hermeneutical injustice, public toleration, state neutrality, social norms, contestatory vigilance. ii Acknowledgments I am extremely grateful to Carolyn McLeod and Richard Vernon, the joint-supervisors of this dissertation, for their hard work and patience in guiding my research, stimulating my thinking and, of course, providing me with detailed comments and suggestions. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Samantha Brennan, the third member of my Supervisory Committee for insightful comments on the thesis, for encouragement and support. I gained valuable knowledge about transgender experiences of marginalisation from numerous discussions with many transgender folks and allies from the trans community in London, Ontario. I can say that this research was inspired by their testimonies. Many of the ideas contained in this dissertation have been commented upon by various people, and I have benefited greatly from their insights. Parts of the work were presented at conferences, such as at the Canadian Philosophical Association annual meeting at Brock University in 2014, at the Society of Women in Philosophy (UK) panel at the Joint Session of the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society, University of Cambridge, in 2014, and at the Association for Legal and Social Philosophy Annual Conference at Leeds University in 2014. I would like to thank all those who took the time to come to my talks and discuss my work, both at Western and at other venues. In this regard, I would particularly like to thank Reuven Brandt, Katharine Jenkins, Sune Lægaard, Kathleen Okruhlik, Jennifer Saul, and Meghan Winsby. I thank those current and former members of the philosophy department at the University of Western Ontario who have engaged me philosophically, and offered moral support. Thanks are due to Saad Anis, Veromi Arsiradam, Gillian Barker, Shawn Bartlett, Andrew Botterell, Eric Desjardins, Jennifer Epp, Ashton Forrest, Cameron Fenton, Tracy Isaacs, Lori Kantymir Moir, Robert Kantymir Moir, Molly Kao, Dennis Klimchuk, Henrik Lagerlund, Rebecca MacIntosh, Nick McGinnis, Steven Pearce, Boyana Peric, Cristina Roadevin, Emma Ryman, Lauren Sidlar, Anthony Skelton, Chris Smeenk, James Southworth, Maité Cruz-Tleugabulova, Michael Walschots, and Amy Wuest. Corey Dyck hired me over three summers on projects related to Kant and the German Enlightenment. I am grateful for that opportunity to employ my language skills, for the opportunity to learn much about Kant, his predecessors and contemporaries, as well as for the financial support to survive until the subsequent fall semesters. This work was generously supported by successive Ontario Research Scholarships for the years 2012 through 2015. I would like to express my gratitude to the late Mrs. Margot Barnard for the award of the Barnard Scholarship in Political Philosophy (shared with Dmitri Pisartchik) in 2014. iii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iv List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 The Unity of the Three Articles ..................................................................................... 5 A Characterisation of Transfeminist Philosophy ........................................................... 8 Summaries of the Three Articles ................................................................................. 10 References .................................................................................................................... 27 Chapter One: Disputes over ‘Woman’ – Resemblance, Dissemblance, and Contestability .................................................................................................... 30 1.1 Family Resemblance Concepts ............................................................................. 32 1.1.1 Family Resemblance ................................................................................. 32 1.1.2 Contrast Categories and Dissemblance ..................................................... 38 1.1.3 Interactions between Resemblance and Dissemblance: Combinatory Vagueness and Degree Vagueness............................................................ 41 1.1.4 Contests over Category Membership ........................................................... 44 1.2 Two Family-Resemblance Accounts of Woman .................................................. 47 1.2.1 Jacob Hale’s Family-Resemblance Account ............................................ 48 1.2.2 Natalie Stoljar’s Family-Resemblance Account ......................................