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Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan And UNCLASSIFIED RReeppoorrtt oonn PPrrooggrreessss TToowwaarrdd SSeeccuurriittyy aanndd SSttaabbiilliittyy iinn AAffgghhaanniissttaann Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended aanndd UUnniitteedd SSttaatteess PPllaann ffoorr SSuussttaaiinniinngg tthhee AAffgghhaanniissttaann NNaattiioonnaall SSeeccuurriittyy FFoorrcceess Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) April 2010 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Table of Contents Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 5 Section 1 – Strategy ............................................................................................................................ 11 1.1: NATO Strategy ...................................................................................................................... 11 1.1.1: ISAF Campaign Strategy and Strategic Objectives ...................................................... 12 1.1.2: ISAF Command and Control (C2) ................................................................................. 13 1.1.3: NATO ISAF Forces ........................................................................................................ 16 1.1.4: Civilian Organizational Structure .................................................................................. 18 Section 2 – Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) ............................................................ 20 Section 3 – Security ............................................................................................................................ 21 3.1: State of the Insurgency .......................................................................................................... 21 3.1.1: Insurgent Strategy ........................................................................................................... 21 3.1.2: Afghan Insurgent Areas of Operation............................................................................ 23 3.2: ISAF Military Operations ...................................................................................................... 24 3.2.1: COMISAF COIN Directives .......................................................................................... 24 3.2.2: ISAF Concept of Operations .......................................................................................... 25 3.3: Operations ............................................................................................................................... 26 3.3.1: Regional Command-Capital ........................................................................................... 26 3.3.2: Regional Command–East ............................................................................................... 27 3.3.3: Regional Command-South ............................................................................................. 29 3.3.4: Regional Command-West .............................................................................................. 31 3.3.5: Regional Command-North ............................................................................................. 31 3.4: Afghanistan–Pakistan Regional Cooperation ....................................................................... 32 3.5: Population Security ................................................................................................................ 34 3.6: Violence and Kinetic Events ................................................................................................. 39 3.6.1: IED Events ...................................................................................................................... 41 3.7: Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) .............................................................................................. 43 Section 4 – Governance ...................................................................................................................... 44 4.1: Population Perception of the Government............................................................................ 45 4.2: Anti-Corruption Efforts ......................................................................................................... 46 4.3: Elections ................................................................................................................................. 47 4.4: Government Reform .............................................................................................................. 48 4.4.1: Civil Service Reform ...................................................................................................... 48 4.4.2: Civilian Technical Assistance Plan (CTAP) ................................................................. 50 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 4.4.3: Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) ............................................... 51 4.5: Reconciliation and Reintegration .......................................................................................... 51 4.6: Rule of Law and Criminal Justice Reform ........................................................................... 52 4.7: Local Defense Initiative .......................................................................................................... 54 Section 5 – Reconstruction and Development .................................................................................. 55 5.1: United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA) ............................................. 56 5.2: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ............................................................................ 56 5.3: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) ................................................................ 57 5.4: Economic and Social Development Capacity ...................................................................... 59 5.4.1: Economic Development ................................................................................................. 59 5.4.2: Key Border Crossing Points ........................................................................................... 62 5.4.3: Task Force Business Stability Operations (TFBSO) .................................................... 64 5.4.4: Infrastructure ................................................................................................................... 65 5.4.5: Agriculture....................................................................................................................... 66 5.4.6: Mining ............................................................................................................................. 68 5.4.7: Telecommunications ....................................................................................................... 68 5.4.8: Land Reform ................................................................................................................... 68 5.4.9: Host Country Contracts .................................................................................................. 69 5.4.10: Local Procurement ........................................................................................................ 69 5.4.11: Health and Education.................................................................................................... 70 5.4.12: Women’s Issues ............................................................................................................ 71 5.4.13: Civil Society & Media .................................................................................................. 72 Section 6 – Counternarcotics ............................................................................................................. 73 6.1: Strategy and Priorities ............................................................................................................ 73 6.2: Progress to Date ..................................................................................................................... 75 6.3: Efforts to Improve Afghan Capacity..................................................................................... 78 6.4: International Coordination ..................................................................................................... 80 Section 7 – Regional Engagement ..................................................................................................... 80 7.1: Pakistan ................................................................................................................................... 80 7.2: India ........................................................................................................................................ 81 7.3: Central Asian States ............................................................................................................... 82 7.4: Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 83 7.5: China ....................................................................................................................................... 83 7.6: Russia .....................................................................................................................................
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