Alaska Reindeer Herdsmen

ALASKA REINDEER HERDSMEN

ALASKA REINDEER HERDSMEN A Study of Native Management in Transition

by Dean Francis Olson

Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research University of Alaska College, Alaska 99701

SEG Report No. 22 December 1969

Price: $5.00 Dean F. Olson, an associate of the Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research, is a member of the Faculty of Business, Uni versity of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada. He received his OBA from the University of Washington in 1968.

iv PREFACE Reindeer husbandry is a peculiarly circumpolar endeavor. Of the three million domesticated reindeer estimated to exist in the northernmost nations of the world, just over 1 per cent are found in North America. The Soviet Union possesses about 80 per cent, and the Fennoscandian countries contain more than 18 per cent. There are about 30,000 in western Alaska, and the Canadian government estimates that some 2,700 range the Mackenzie River basin. Domesticated reindeer are not indigenous to North America. They were first introduced to this continent in 1892, when they were brought to western Alaska from various Siberian locations. The Canadian government purchased their parent stock from an Alaska producer in 1935. In each case, the objectives for importation were to broaden the resource base of the Native populations and to provide a means for social and economic de velopment in remote areas. The present study examines the role of Alaska reindeer as a Native resource. More specifically, it concerns the historical role of the Alaska Eskimo reindeer herdsmen, and examines their functions as managers of a re source and as instruments for social and economic change among their people. Although Alaska Eskimos have herded reindeer for nearly three-quarters of a century, this study represents the initial attempt to document their experiences and to examine the effects of imported reindeer upon their way of life. Previous work in this area is limited to journal articles by Dorothy Jean Ray (1965), Margaret Lantis (1950-1952), and Froelick Rainey (1941). Each of these articles is restricted in topic and time period treated. Ray deals exclusively with the importation period that ended in 1902 and the roles played during this period by government employees. Lantis v and Rainey confine their treatments to selected causes for the industry's failure in the late l930's. In no instance prior to the present study has there been an attempt to examine the historical role of the Native herdsmen and their performance as managers and as agents for cultural change.

General Background Domesticated reindeer were introduced among the Bering Strait Eskimo by the U.S. Government in an effort to provide a resource base for the social and economic improvement of the Natives of that remote region. The animals were originally conceived of as a subsistence resource, but, with the discovery of gold on the Seward Peninsula in 1897, Native reindeer owner ship soon became an important commercial enterprise in support of local mining operations. By the early 1920's, reindeer herds had grown such that they could no longer be kept in individually owned herds. Native ownership associations were formed, with ownership shares issued to participating owners. At the same time, however, local mining operations began to slow and the number of reindeer greatly exceeded market needs. An abundance of reindeer and de clining market demand led to decreasing Native interest in the ownership and care of reindeer. Over-stocked ranges and numerous subsidiary causes re sulted in large scale reindeer losses during the late l930's and throughout the ensuing decade. During the l950's, several Eskimo herders attempted to establish them selves with herds, and interested and capable men were loaned government deer for five years in order to get their start. However, predation and losses to caribou continued to plague efforts to keep herds together.

vi Interest in reindeer as a resource base for the social and economic improvement of the Bering Strait Eskimo has revived. Individual Native ownership has been reinstituted, and reasonably stable ownership experience is being developed in several privately owned herds. Market production has increased, and shipments of reindeer products to distant Alaskan cities are becoming frequent. The feasibility of sustained commercial production is again attracting widespread private and governmental attention. Native reindeer ownership and management have not become specialized occupational categories, nor have they become agents for social and eco nomic development among Bering Strait Eskimo. Reindeer production has been fitted to the traditional annual round of activities, instead of altering these activities, and has not produced a distinctive group or class in Eskimo society. The traditional criterion defining social relations among Bering Strait Eskimo -- territorial origin -- is still the major determin ant of relations between owners. The reindeer owner is very much a man caught between two cultures -- a man in transition. He is bound by barter transactions to a frontier credit network made up of local merchants. As a member of this network he creates markets for his products largely through his own acts of consumption. He is also simultaneously bound by field processing techniques to the village interpersonal reliance network. As a member of this network he ascends in village prominence to the degree that he magnanimously channels reindeer pro ducts to village use. Herd management is greatly affected by the sometimes opposing forces emanating from the two networks. Native owners have traditionally been producers, processors, wholesalers, and often retailers of their products. The meaning of reindeer ownership is derived from these multiple functions. According to state plans, these

vii Interest in reindeer as a resource base for the social and economic improvement of the Bering Strait Eskimo has revived. Individual Native ownership has been reinstituted, and reasonably stable ownership experience is being developed in several privately owned herds. Market production has increased, and shipments of reindeer products to distant Alaskan cities are becoming frequent. The feasibility of sustained commercial production and governmental attention. Native reindeer ownership and management have not become specialized occupational categories, nor have they become agencies for social and eco nomic development among Bering Strait Eskimo. Reindeer production has been fitted to the traditional annual round of activities, instead of altering these activities, and the occupation has not produced a distinctive group or class in Eskimo society. The traditional criterion defining social rela tions among Bering Strait Eskimo -- territorial origin -- is still the major determinant of relations between owners. The reindeer owner is very much a man caught between two cultures a man in transition. He is bound by barter transactions to a frontier credit network made up of local merchants. As a member of this network he creates markets for his products largely through his own acts of consumption. He is also simultaneously bound by field processing techniques to the village interpersonal reliance network. As a member of this network he ascends in village prominence to the degree that he magnanimously channels reindeer pro ducts to village use. Herd management is greatly affected by the sometimes opposing forces emanating from the two networks. Native owners have traditionally been producers, processors, wholesalers, and often retailers of their products. The meaning of reindeer ownership is derived from these multiple functions. According to state plans, these viii will soon be separated and Native owners will soon become production special ists only. Given the near total absence of specialized activity among the Arctic Eskimo, and considering that the pleasures of ownership are realized mostly in the processing and distribution of reindeer products, it is doubt ful that Native ownership will survive this most recent challenge to its development.

Methods Employed The data that form the basis for the study come from two principle sources. Library research, including many days spent in the Archives of the University of Alaska, provides much of the background materials for Chapters I through IV. Of particular note here is the recent acquisition

by the University of Alaska of the 11 Lomen Papers, 11 containing otherwise unobtainable correspondence, ledgers, and field notes. 1 Government docu ments containing the annual reports of agencies charged with the admini stration of domesticated reindeer also proved informative. The published works of scholars such as Norman Chance, James Van Stone, Robert F. Spencer, Dorothy Jean Ray, Charles C. Hughes, Margaret Lantis, and J. Louis Giddings provided important insights and added perspective to the author's own field notes and observations.2 The field research portion of the study took place during the spring and summer of 1968. Between April and August, several weeks were spent in

1As will become evident in Chapter II, the Lomen family contributed quite importantly to the industrial environment of the Eskimo herdsmen from 1914 to 1939. 2For a partial list of works by these scholars, please see the Selected Bibliography.

ix various villages on the Seward Peninsula living with the Eskimo owners and their families. The period of time spent with a given owner varied greatly from a minimum of two hours to a maxi mum of tv10 weeks, de pending upon the owner's own schedule of activities and his willingness to enter into dis cussion. As much as possible, the author tried to assist his host in whatever type of activity he was engaged in during the day, The 1ong arctic evening was devoted to conversations ranging in topic from village life in general to the herder's interpretations of the production and marketing of reindeer. The author formed several enlightening friendships and learned how to build a corral on frozen tundra, separate a cow and her fawn from a milling herd, extract warble fly larva, and operate a fishing seine from the rocky beaches of the Bering Sea. No particular format was adhered to during discussion. The conversa tion was permitted to flow naturally from subject to subject, depending upon the herder 1 s perceived relationship between topics, with only an occa sional initiating question or observation by the writer. Whenever possible, notes were taken during discussions. In fact, this was often encouraged by the herder, who showed considerable concern over not being understood. Some of this concern was no doubt brought on by the writer returning to a pre viously discussed topic as a method of checking the herder's consistency in observation. As it happens, the most enlightening comments frequently came when least expected (i.e., when helping repair a screen door, hauling a boat ashore, or picking permafrost from a post-hole).

Dean F. Olson, November 1969. x 8 NOORVIK

.auc1

HADLEY 2,232,320 ACRES x -'•

SEWARD PENINSULA, ALASKA REINDEER AND GRAZING PERMITS APRIL I, 1968 ~ NAME AUKONGAK . . 5,000 MODEL HERD ... 600 CLARK 961 KAKARUK ..... 3,2 I 9 AREAS NOT UNDER PERMIT DAVIS. 500 KARMUN ...... 1,029 ~ OR APPLICATION GRAY. . .1,320 SAGOONIK ... 195 GOODHOPE . 2,086 KUGZRUK . . . . . 6 0 0 (ES) HADLEY. .I, 700 HENRY.... 480 TOTAL 17,690

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page. PREFACE v TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii LIST OF TABLES xv LIST OF MAPS xv CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1 Organization of the Study 1 Orientation 2 Frontier Inter-Personal Relations 2 Reindeer Behavior 5 A Brief Introduction to Alaska Reindeer History 8 PART ONE: THE NATIVE HERDSMEN IN HISTORY 17 CHAPTER II: THE EARLY PERIOD, 1892-1932 19 Introduction 19 The Introduction of Domestic Reindeer and the Question of Need 19 A New Form of Wealth and an Established Socia 1 Arrangement 21 Culture Change -- The Real Beginnings 24 The Early Apprentices and Apprentice Programs 28 Models for Change 32 A Policy of Broadened Participation 37 The Era of Reindeer Fairs, 1915-1918 41 Non-Native Ownership, Shrinking Markets, and Native Response 44 CHAPTER III: THE PERIOD OF DECLINE, 1933-1950 51 Introduction 51 The End of Integrated Export Operations 51 Reindeer Are Like "Melting Snow in the Spring" 54 The Joint Stock Company Experience 57 Marketing Patterns and a Return to Private Ownership 61 A Note on Political Representation 64 Summary 66 CHAPTER IV: THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1951-1968 69 Introduction 69 The Transition to Stable Ownership 70 Prospects for New Processing and Marketing Patterns 75 Interest Group Crystallization 77 Summary 78 PART TWO: THE NATIVE HERDSMEN AS CONTEMPORARY MANAGERS 79 CHAPTER V: THE PRODUCTION ORIENTATION 81 Introduction 81 A Generalized Annual Work Round 81 xiii Page Operating Costs and Revenues 85 Specialization -- An Arctic Rarity 89 Production Management in Proper Perspective 92 Summary 97 CHAPTER VI: THE MARKET ORIENTATION 99 Introduction 99 Information and Marketing Channels 100 Intra-Industry Relations 105 Reindeer Market Changes and the Frontier Credit Network 109 s 112 CHAPTER VII: THE VILLAGE ORIENTATION 113 Introduction 113 The Meaning of "Village" 114 The Herder and His Village 117 Summary 122 PART THREE: THE NATIVE HERDSMEN AS CATALYSTS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 125 CHAPTER VIII: THE NATIVE MANAGER IN TRANSITION -- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 127 Introduction 127 Occupational Profiles and the Nature of Commitment 129 Central Processing - A Crucial Turning Point 131 New Directions for Public Policy 134 Some Unsettled Issues 136 Conclusion 139 APPENDIX A 141 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 151

xiv LIST OF TABLES Table Title Page

I Private/Individual Herd Operations, 1948 70 II Private/Individual Herd Operations, 1958 71 II I Private/Individual Herd Operations, 1968 73 IV Range Allotments and Current Utilization 75 v Approximate Percentage Distribution of Production Costs 88

MAP Reindeer and Grazing Permits, Seward Peninsula, Alaska xi

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, a number of private and governmental spokesmen have expressed optimism concerning commercially significant reindeer production in western Alaska from Eskimo owned and operated herds. Commercial development of the reindeer resource is seen as an appropriate instrument for Eskimo self-improvement and entry into the mainstream of twentieth century economic life. This perception exists despite, or perhaps due to, the absence of an understanding of the role the reindeer historically has played in Eskimo life and is playing today. There has in the past been no comprehensive and detailed analysis of Eskimo involvement with reindeer. This study examines Alaska Eskimo reindeer herdsmen as historical figures, as members of living communities, and as focal points for the meeting of two cultures. The purpose is to evaluate the past and present role of reindeer as agents of cultural change among the Bering Strait Eskimo and to assess the probable contribution of the herdsman to social and economic development among his people.

Organization of the Study The study begins with the introduction of domestic reindeer on Seward Peninsula in 1892, the circumstances and events shaping Native involvement before and' at the turn of the century, and the leading personalities in- . volved at the time. The historical analysis of Native involvement is contained in Chapter II (1892-1932), Chapter III (1933-1950), and Chapter IV (1950-1968). The emphasis in these chapters is upon the Eskimo herdsmen and the events which shaped their involvement with domesticated reindeer. Chap ters V through VII examine the comtemporary Eskimo owner-herdsman, his con ception of production and market relationships, and his relationships with the community in which he lives. Chapter VIII contains conclusions about the role the Native owner may likely play in the future of the reindeer industry -- as a focal point for cultural change and as a manager of a commercially val le resource

Orientation

Frontier Inter-Personal Relations Doing business in a frontier environment and under arctic conditions differs vastly from doing business where the climate is less rigorous and demanding and the conveniences offered by modern technology are more widely available. In the Arctic of the 19th Century, respect was reserved for those indi viduals capable of generating surplus and possessed of sufficient generosity to distribute that surplus among their fellows in time of need. A surplus could take the form of foodstuffs, equipment, or materials. The prestige and status accorded the holders of a surplus was vicariously enjoyed by relatives -- no matter how distant -- and by extra-village associates. Thus, they had good reason to cooperate in insuring the maintenance of that sur plus. To be associated by family tie or established trading partnership with a wealth individual was tantamount to being wealthy oneself. To maintain a social position based upon material abundance required the formation and continuous reinforcement of regional economic alliances in order to reduce the risk of local resource shortages. The wealthy

2 families were correspondingly the most inter-regionally articulate, the most widely traveled, and, with the coming of extensive extra-cultural contact, the first among their people to be influenced by, and in turn to influence, the direction, content, and speed of change. In the Arctic of the 20th Century, wealth and its generous use still bring status and prestige. Although inter-village alliances have recently declined in importance ion li line defense against isolated hardships and as a means of distributing sur plus is still very much a part of life in the Arctic. Regularity and predictability in commercial relationships in the Arctic is less a product of mass subscription to abstract concepts of "good busi ness principles" than to the knowledge that a reputation for unreliable behavior has its retribution in the form of a profitless and lonely long arctic winter. Indeed, in transactions that involve cross-cultural commu nication, the absence of mutually understood business indicators (i.e., the market rate of interest) causes much of the burden of determining what is fair and reasonable to depend on knowledge of the participants' reputa tions for fair dealings. To the reader accustomed to faceless transactions, and to the investor accustomed to relying upon documented earnings reports, economics on the arctic frontier will appear inefficient and business transactions will seem slip-shod. But to arctic residents, knowledge of personality and, at cer tain times, magnanimous lack of attention to profit margins (which are vaguely defined anyway) are fundamental to business success and contribute importantly to one's place among his fellows. The visitor to the Eskimo village who promises to visit a relative in his home town upon his return there, or to check on the whereabouts of a spare part that has been delayed

3 in shipment, etc., and fails to follow through will find himself regarded immediately as untrustworthy and of little account. To the people of the Arctic, who not so long ago survived on the basis of individual integrity and interpersonal cooperation, a man's actions are not mere abstractions, but an expenditure of energy from which should follow some form of result consistent with verbal forecasts. The government field resentative who agrees to perform a given act or provide a given material only to find later that his superiors are unsympathetic, will find his use fullness greatly diminished. Finally, the greater the prestige an individual has, the more frequent are requests made of him and the more compelling is the weight of his responsibilities. He cannot refuse any reasonable request. In the Arctic, and especially among Bering Strait Eskimo, there exists no wealth unassociated with an appropriately generous nature. The person who possesses weal th beyond his own needs and develops a miserly reputation is without kin -- an "orphan. 11 Among the Eskimo, the terms for

11 orphan 11 and 11 poor 11 are the same. To be without kin in the Arctic calls for emotional strength few possess. Much of the relevance of the above comments must await later chapters. For the present it should be kept in mind that in the arctic villages which are home to the Eskimo herdsmen, personality and conduct in interpersonal relations are of great importance. Anonymity has no currency among the arctic Eskimo herdsmen. Indeed, they are unaccustomed to it and fearful Of it.

4 Reindeer Behavior The nature of the reindeer and of the range they inhabit very impor tantly affect relationships between certain herd owners, the implementation of management proqrams, and the kind and degree of Eskimo involvement. Surprisingly, little is known about the animal and its range, and few com ments along this line are necessary. Several characteristics or that affect a herder 1 s relationships with his fellow owners and which should be kept in mind throughout this study are: a. Reindeer develop a strong affection for the range they customarily inhabit and, especially during the April and May fawning season, manifest a strong urge to return to the range of their birth once taken from it. b. Reindeer spend much of their energies in the summer months seeking relief from swarms of insects which inhabit their range. Seashore grazing grounds, where the sea breeze aids in reducing insect plentitude, ascend in importance during these months, as do high and windy ridges. c. Reindeer habitually move into the wind when grazing or running to avoid insect pests. This, in conjunction with the prevailing westerlies which sweep the Seward Peninsula, cause greatest range boundary pressure to be felt on the western-most boundaries. d. Reindeer exhibit gregarious dispositons. It is correspondingly extremely difficult to separate, and keep separate, a segment of a larger herd. Reindeer will join a herd of wild caribou if given the opportunity. Caribou (wild reindeer) are native to Alaska and differ from domesticated reindeer only in size (being somewhat

5 larger) and in proportion (being longer of leg). In Asia and Europe, both are classed as reindeer. e. Reindeer become quite tame following a succession of days in close contact with men. Similarly, if permitted to roam about unherded, they quickly become half-wild. Most deer on the Seward Peninsula are not closely herded. f. In the wi usively on lichen plants, a low protien content herb which grows on arctic Tundra. Reindeer pull out the whole plant, but seldom eat all of it. Estimates for lichen recovery.periods vary from 15 to 30 years. During summer months, the lichen become dry and brittle and are easily destroyed when trampled. The summer fragility of the plant, plus the scar city of available graze during the winter because of deep snow and ice formations, cause the winter graze to be the principal factor limiting herd size for a given range. To preserve scarce winter graze, the reindeer should be kept elsewhere during other seasons of the year. g. Rutting season occurs during September and early October. A young bull can service from 10 to 15 cows, if not interfered with by older bulls. Under good conditions, a cow will calve each year, even in her first year. Multiple births are rare. The presence

on the range of unmarked adult deer, 11 mavericks, 11 makes it diffi cult to control the ratio of bulls to cows. h. In their half-wild state, reindeer are easily excited and tend to mill about when corralled. To slaughter reindeer after they have been held in a corral for several hours, or immediately after they

6 have been driven for a considerable distance produces a 11 gamey, 11

or "hot, 11 meat, in the vernacular of the range.

While the comments above describe merely a few characteristics of reindeer behavior, they are the most critical. The characteristics of good range management are evident. Winter range should be sufficiently abundant to support planned herd size. As the h increases an comes relatively scarce, optimal range utilization requires minimization of herd size during the winter month~, perhaps by slaughtering a large percen tage of the spring fawn crop. In other words, winter range should be used to support breeding stock only. In terms of feed consumed per pound weight added, six months appears to be the optimal age for slaughter. The relation ship between range utilization and production management is clear. The urge felt by reindeer to return to familiar range and, at fawning season, to return to the range of their birth causes unusually high herding expenses for the owner during the establishment of a new herd, which is frequently made up of animals from distant range lands. This high cost period comes at a time when the new owner frequently can least afford to hire needed additional help. If a range is bordered to the west by the sea or by impenetrable natural boundaries, the tendency of deer to move into the prevailing westerly wind is not a serious problem. If, however, as is the case on several ranges, there is no obstruction to westward movement and the west boundary borders another herder's range, there is clear need for additional herding atten tion, especially during the spring, summer, and early fall when the deer are most active. The herder whose range has no natural boundary to the west

7 will suffer the most from straying deer. Similarly, those herders whose ranges border the sea to the west benefit most from mavericks, but can lose control over scarce winter graze. These are only examples of the way in which animal behavior and range characteristics can and do affect Eskimo herd management from one range to another. Reindeer behavior can thus be the source of explanation for much his of reindeer in western Alaska,

A Brief Introduction to Alaska Reindeer History There were two periods of intensive Native involvement -- from about 1895 to the very early 1920's and again from the later 1940's to the present day -- and, with an intermediate period of extensive involvement. The periods of widespread, extensive Eskimo involvement occurred when Native reindeer stock companies were the prevailing form of ownership institution and during the period of greatest reindeer abundance. During the periods of in tensive involvement, private Native ownership of reindeer prevailed. Throughout the entirety of the 76 year period, or at least until very recent years, the emphasis of field administrators has been upon increasing the total aggregate of deer owned or controlled by Natives, with less concern manifested over the size of individual Native herds than about the total number of Natives owning deer. The policy emphasis, then, has been upon widespread resource dissemination, even during the periods of encouragement of private ownership.

1890: W. T. Lopp and H. Thornton arrive to establish school at Cape Prince of Whales. This is the first school on Seward Peninsula. Dr. Sheldon Jackson, Presbyterian missionary and General Agent for 8 Education in Alaska, makes his initial summar voyage into the Arctic for the U.S. Bureau of Education, aboard the U.S. Revenue Cutter, Bear, Capt. M. A. Healy commanding. Idea of transporting domestic reindeer from Siberia to Seward Peninsula, germinates during this voyage.

1891: Captain Healy and Dr J i , l . 00 co 1 "I ected from private sources, purchase and transport sixteen live deer to Aleutian Islands to test reaction of deer to the voyage. Range reconnaissance conducted on parts of Seward Peninsula by W. T. Lopp and others employed by Jackson. Lopp reports high prices charged by Wales Natives for reindeer hides imported from Siberia. Jackson seeks federal appropriations to support reindeer program.

1892: First importation of domestic reindeer onto Seward Peninsula at Port Clarence. Four Siberian Natives employed to instruct in animal husbandry. First reindeer station built at Port Clarence.

1893: Wales Natives murder Thornton during Lapp's absence. Wales Natives threaten reindeer station superintendents and Siberian instructors .

1894: Siberians return to their homes. Six Lapps imported to Alaska to instruct Native apprentices. Rev. T. L. Brevig establishes mission and school at Port Clarence. Wales school receives 118 reindeer from Port Clarence as part of distribution program. Herd to be used to train Native apprentices. W. T. Lopp in charge. Federal appropriations begin. 9 1895: Charlie Antisarlook, from Cape Rodney, receives a loan of 100 head to dispel doubts among Natives that they will ever receive deer.

1897- 1898: Several hundred whalers are stranded at Point Barrow, their ships being frozen in the ice pack. Miners on the Upper Yukon reportedly short of winter supplies. Charlie Antisarlook and Wales herds used in re 1i ef expeditions. Gold is discovered near Nome in 1897. By 1898, large numbers of miners enter the peninsula creating com mercial market for reindeer products and draft animals. On July 30, 1898, 67 Lapp, Finn, and Norwegian families arrive to care for herds, serve as mail carriers, and freighters. Contract terms call for a loan of 100 deer at the end of two years service, if desired. Eaton Reindeer Station established on north bank of the Unalakleet River. Herds taken to Barrow for relief are used to establish a mission herd at Barrow and a herd at Point Hope. Deer population in 1898 is 2,062. Three Eskimos complete their five year apprenticeship term (Tautook, Sekeoglook, and Wocksock) and receive together a herd of 186 deer.

1900: Carl Lomen, destined to become the "Reindeer King" twenty years hence, moves to Nome with father, G. Lomen, to seek gold. Popula tion of Nome is estimated at 40,000. Influenza and measles sweep the peninsula. Wocksock and Charlie Antisarlook are among those lost. Charlie's herd had been returned months earlier. A herd of 70 deer is landed on St. Lawrence Island. Of the 67 Lapp, Finn, and Norwegian families imported in 1898, 86 persons remain in Alaska.

10 Of this number, many become miners, only eight remain as herders under government employment, and five exercize their contract right to receive a loan of deer for five years, the offspring therefrom to be their private property. Six missions now have herds. Deer population is now 3,323.

1901· Ten missions h s ing from Kuskokwim River to Point Barrow. Total deer population is 4,164.

1902: Russian government ends exportation of reindeer to Alaska. From 1892 to 1902, a total of l ,280 deer were shipped to the Seward Peninsula. Of the 6,505 deer in Alaska, 2,841 head along to 68 Eskimo herders; 2,176 are on loan to or owned by eight missionary societies; l ,150 are on loan to or owned by five Lapp herders; and 338 remain under Bureau of Education control. Eskimo apprentices serve their five year term in government, mission, or independently owned Native or Lapp herds. In addition to food and shelter, the apprentice receives two female deer per year, together with ownership of the increase therefrom. At the end of five years, the new herder is loaned enough additional deer to increase his holdings to 50 head. This herd is to remain under the supervision of the government herder, mission station, or Lapp owner, for a period of twenty years. At any time during this twenty years the herder may be dispossessed for intemperance or failure to care for his herd.

1904: W.T. Lopp becomes Superintendent of the Northwest District, in charge of reindeer distribution for the Bureau of Education. 11 1905: Deer population estimated at 10,000 head. Lopp begins to move for a reduction in deer ownership by missions and Lapps. Dr. Jackson and the Bureau of Education are investigated by a special agent for the Department of the Interior who journeys to several peninsula villages during the summer of 1905.

1906- 1908: A period of little change in the field but one of considerable political scuffling in Washington, D.C. Dr. Jackson's services are ended, and he is replaced by W. T. Lopp. The U. S. Reindeer Service is fanned with reindeer distribution now largely handled by school superintendents employed by the Bureau of Education. Deer population nears an estimated 20,000 head by the close of 1908. Programs to reduce mission and Lapp ownership meet with limited success, reportedly due to lack of funds and trained Eskimo herdsmen. Federal appropriations for reindeer in Alaska drop from an annual funding of $25,000 (1900 to 1905) to $9,000 in 1908. Eskimo owning deer in 1908 number 171 with average herd size being 52 head. Five Laplanders own 2,685 head. Natives outside the Reindeer Service begin purchasing reindeer as an investment during this period.

1909: Eskimo herders begin replacing Lapps as chief herders at new rein deer stations. Salaries and supplies received by employed herders and apprentices are now in the form of reindeer. Natives owning deer number 260 by June 30. Missions begin selling deer to Natives for cash payment.

12 1910- 1913: Reindeer program continues as an integral part of the educational system, with district superintendents of schools also being super intendents of the Reindeer Service, and local school teachers serving as local reindeer supervisors. Government and mission ownership of deer declines during the period, with Lapp herds increasing in size. By 1913, 797 Natives own 30,532 deer, or 65 per cent of the 47,266 reindeer then estimated to exist.

1914: Ownership patterns have greatly changed since 1907. Whereas in 1907, 114 Native herders and apprentices owned 6,406 deer, for an average herd of 56 head, in 1914, 980 Natives owned 37,828 head, for an average of less than 39 head each. On a percentage basis, ownership changed over the period as follows: Ownership Distribution (%} 1907 1914 Government 23 7 Missions 22 10 Lapps 14 17 Natives 41 66

The Lomen family of Nome purchased l ,200 reindeer from Alfred Nilima, a Laplander living in the Kotzebue Sound area. Between 1914 and 1929, the Lomen Corporation was to buy 14,083 reindeer at a total cost of $236,156.00.

1915- 1918: The period of winter reindeer fairs and the beginning of effort by Reindeer Service employees to urge the formation of village reindeer

13 associations and cooperatives. Native owners number 1,293 by 1916. Government and mission ownership aggregate less than 10 per cent of all deer by 1918, but non-Native ownership increases due to mis sion sales to the Lomen Company. By 1918, the Lomen brothers had purchased 6,268 deer from Lapp herds and the missions at Teller and Golovin. Influenza epidemic sweeps the peninsula in 1918, taking le kimo reindeer men and W. C. Shields Superintend- ent of Schools, Northwestern District, who was extremely well liked by Eskimo deer men.

1920- 1929: A period of considerable plant investment and commercial sales by the growing Lomen interests. Severe financing problems were en contered by the Lomen Companies during this period, though over

6-1/3 million pounds of reindeer meat were sold in the 11 lower 48 11 states. The service of W. T. Lopp ends in 1925. Between 1892 and 1926, about 125,000 deer are consumed for food and clothing. By 1929, there are an estimated 400,000 deer in western Alaska. The Governor of the Territory of Alaska assumes responsibility for reindeer supervision on November 1, 1929. Native reindeer as sociations and stock companies become wide-spread during this period. Deer are allowed to roam for the most part unattended. Several thousand Natives own shares in reindeer stock companies by the early

1930 IS.

1930- 1937: The period of greatest reindeer abundance. About 640,000 deer are estimated to have existed at the start of this period, with a 14 precipitous decrease in the number of deer beginning probably in 1932. In 1940, only 250,000 deer are estimated to exist in Alaska. By 1950, only 25,000 deer are recorded. In retrospect, the most credible of the reasons advanced for the decline seem to be a combination of overstocked ranges, lack of care in herding, predation by wolves, and large losses to migrating caribou.

A series in 1 lead to the passage of the Reindeer Act on September 1, 1937. This act restricted owner ship of domestic reindeer in Alaska to Natives only, and provided the administrative machinery for the eventual declaration and pur chase of all non-Native owned deer. Non-Natives by this time are estimated to own one third of all reindeer.

1938- 1940: The period of assessment and purchase by the Government of all non Native owned deer. Winter of 1938-39 reported to reduce reindeer population by as much as 50 per cent. During this period it be comes apparent to many Native associations that stock ownership de valuation is necessary to properly reflect actual herd sizes.

1941- 1950: Reindeer herds continue to diminish; the low point is apparently reached in 1950, with 25,000 deer. In 1941, administrative super vision is transferred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, where it currently remains. Reindeer Service personnel launch vigorous campaign to do away with Native cooperatives and associations in 1941, to pave the way for reinstitution of private Native ownership. In an effort to reintroduce closer herding techniques, government funds 15 are appropriated to help defray costs of supporting herders and herd apprentices.

1950- 1960: A period of gradual selection of Native owners who have both the desire and means to become private owners of reindeer herds. Pre dation and losses to caribou continue to plague efforts to keep herds together. Several Eskimo herders attempt to establish them selves with a herd, but fail for a variety of reasons. Interested and capable men are loaned government deer for five years, to get their start.

1960- Pres.: Interest in reindeer as a commercial resource again develops. A few Eskimo herders distinguish themselves as capable herd managers and leaders. By 1968 there are 11 privately managed herds, six of which are now unencumbered by government deer loans. Private herd sizes range from a few hundred to several thousand. The private herders form an owners association during the period, and an Eskimo owned and operated slaughtering facility is initiated. The State of Alaska once again begins to manifest interest in the commercial potential of a reindeer industry. In 1967, state and federal per sonnel agree that the Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (both of the Department of the Interior) shall be responsible for range management and herd management, respectively, while the state will assume responsibilities for the processing and marketing of reindeer products. Total herd size in Alaska was esti mated at about 30,000 deer in March of 1968.

16 PART ONE: THE NATIVE HERDSMEN IN HISTORY

This part of the study treats Eskimo herdsmen as participants in a series of historical events. Chapter II examines selected aspects of herdsmen experiences from the time of introduction of the resource in 1892 to the time of greatest resource abundance in about 1932. Chapter

III pe od of resource decline, 1933 to 1950, and Chapter IV treats the period of gradual redevelopment of the resource, from 1951 to 1968.

CHAPTER II. THE EARLY PERIOD, 1892-1932

Introduction To the Bering Strait Eskimo, the domestic reindeer, much like the indigeneous seal, walrus, or whale, seems subject to forces far beyond Eskimo control In aboriginal times periods of relative resource abundance would be followed by periods of relative resource impoverishment, each having less to do with Native prowess or effort than with variations in sea currents, natural disruptions to ecological balance, or distant market conditions. Similarly, the domestic reindeer, first introduced at Port Clarence on July 4, 1892, have been, and continue to be, subject to forces beyond Native control. Periods of relative resource abundance could easily be followed by periods of resource scarcity, each having less to do with Native interest and effort than with variations in governmental ownership policies, changing range conservation programs, or the presence or absence of zealous and sensitive non-Native government field personnel.

The Introduction of Domestic Reindeer and the Question of Need In 1890, Captain M. A. Healy of the United States Revenue Cutter, Bear, who had witnessed severe starvation among St. Lawrence Island Eskimo in previous years, conceived the idea of transporting domestic reindeer from Siberia to the coast of the Seward Peninsula. He proposed the plan to Dr. Sheldon Jackson, General Agent for Education in Alaska, then a passenger on

19 the cutter. Jackson vigorously pressed for the importation of reindeer, although he lacked a clear design for the program. 3 Jackson, new to the Arctic and a visitor there during summer voyages only, launched a fund raising campaign to support the reindeer program. Ap peals were addressed to the U. S. Government and to private sources on the behalf of the Bering Strait Eskimo, who, Jackson said, were a vanishing race e of wi pread starvation~ 4 Jackson's efforts were successful and between the years 1892 and 1902 a total of 1,280 reindeer were landed on the Seward Peninsula near Port Clarence, financed almost entirely by federal appropriations. Although the issue of starvation among the Bering Strait Eskimo was no doubt used to great advantage in securing financial support, it seems probable that, because of the white man's lack of cultural familiarity, the condition was more perceived than real. In retrospect, it now seems clear that the Bering Strait Eskimo were not faced with chronic starvation, al though there is little doubt that starvation did occur on St. Lawrence Island during the late nineteenth century. Even there, starvation probably occur red for reasons other than simple lack of food resources. 5 There is no con clusive evidence that anything more than temporary food shortages, a condition characteristic of Eskimo ecology, existed among coastal villagers, and

311 Interview with Capt. M. A. Healy, U. S. Revenue Marine Service," San Francisco Chronicle, December 12, 1890. (reprinted in) Sheldon Jackson, Rej)ort QI!. Introduction of Domestic Reindeer Into Alaska. O~ashington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1893), pp. 31-2. 4u. S. Bureau of Education, Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1892-1893. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1895), pp. 1708-10. 5charles Campbell Hughes, An Eskimo Village..!.!!. the Modern World. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 7-15.

20 indeed, some evidence indicates that the population increased durinq this pen. o d . 6 That a crisis atmosphere did not exist among the Native population at the time reindeer were introduced suggests quite clearly the probable absence of recognized need for the deer by the Natives themselves. In fact, there is good reason to suspect that the reindeer were regarded by the Native popu lation as an item of wealth rather than as a food item, and therefore as something potentially disruptive of established inter-village social-economic relationships.

A New Form of Wealth and an Established Social Arrangement Port Clarence in 1892 fell well within the political-territorial in fluence of the nearby powerful village of Kingegan (now Wales). A large village of some 500 persons, Wales, in cooperation with the Diomede Islanders, held a mainland monopoly on the trade of reindeer hides imported from Si beria. The introduction of live reindeer -- by outsiders and in the absence of express need for food -- clearly representated a threat to the Wales vil lage's political and economic hegemony. During the first winter that rein deer were kept at Port Clarence (1892-3), the Wales villagers threatened to kill the four Siberians brought over to care for the deer and train Native apprentices, and to slaughter the deer and the white superintendents left in charge by Dr. Jackson. 7 These threats were not carried out, and Wales

6 (see) Dorothy Jean Ray, "Nineteenth Century Settlement and Subsistence Patterns in Bering Strait, 11 Arctic Anthropolog*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1964), pp. 62-3; Dorothy Jean Ray, "Sheldon Jackson and te Reindeer Industry in Alaska," Journal of Presbyterian History, Vol. 43, No. 2 (June, 1965), pp. 73-77; 11 Annual Report of Minor Bruce, Superintendent of Port Clarence Reindeer Sta tion," (in) Sheldon Jackson, Third Report on Introduction of Domestic Reindeer in Alaska 1893 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1894), p. 86. - 7Jackson, Third Report ... , p. 15. 21 soon became the most prolific source of Eskimo apprentices and original in dependent owners. That the original reindeer station at Port Clarence was regarded by the Native population as Wales territory was a circumstance of no small im portance in shaping the future of the Native involvement in the reindeer program. 8 Many of the youn9 apprentices during these formative years were

t en rel men r and in those cases where documentation is possible, of families that were wealthy before the introduction of reindeer. Additionally, many of these early apprentices were related, leading to the development of an incipient 11 Kingegan (Wales) Rein deer Aris tocracy 11 by the turn of the century .9 In those cases where villages from the Norton Sound area, or north of the peninsula (i.e., Point Hope), sent apprentices, they too were frequently men from families of prestige and regional importance. Once these men be came deer owners or advanced apprentices, it was almost always a brother or near relative who joined them as a sub-apprentice or new apprentice at the reindeer station.

8For an enlightening treatment of nineteenth century Bering Strait inter-village political relations, see: Dorothy Jean Ray, "Land Tenure and Polity of the Bering Strait Eskimos, 11 Journal of the West, Vol. VI, No. 3 (July 1967). There may appear to exist some disagreement between my asser tion that in 1892, Port Clarence fell within Kingegan territory and Dr. Ray's descriptions of early 19th Century Sinramiut-Kauwerak control over that area. There is little doubt that by 1892, Kingegan traders held a monopoly over the sale and distribution of imported reindeer hides in the Port Clarence region. Early reports clearly indicate that Kingegan -- not Sinramiut or Kauwerak -- Natives were the most hostile to live reindeer importation. In deed, Kauwerak was an inland village based primarily upon caribou exploitation. It is doubtful that Kauwerak hegomony long survived the disappearance of cari bou by 1880, thus creating an economic vacuum which was apparently filled by Kingegan traders. In 1892, Sinramiut is reported to have had a population of 100; Kingegan 527 to 570; and, Kauwerak, 200. 9 sheldon Jackson, Thirteenth Report on Introduction of Domestic Rein deer into Alaska 1903 (Washington: U. S.trovernrnent Printlng Office,-i904), p.65-.- -- 22 Examples of this tendency for deer ownership to reinforce previously existing regional-familial status relationships are readily documented.

Charlie Antisarlook, the first Eskimo to own deer (1895~ was well known and respected from Wales to Cape Nome. 10 Many a young apprentice received his start through this first Eskimo herd while it was owned by Charlie's widow, Mary (Sinrock Mary, Mary Andrewuk). 11 In fact, Native ownership of deer for the first two decades after introducti b fewer than ten prominent families. This evolved quite naturally through the requirement that Native reindeer men must take on sub-apprentices as their herds grew, coupled with the Eskimo disposition for maintenance of family ties and inter-family alliances. It is not surprising that the early reindeer apprentices and owners were for the most part from wealthy and respected families. In aboriginal culture, it is the oomalik (rich man) who acts as diplomat and ambassador in inter-village affairs.12 Wealth being a precarious position to maintain, widespread alliances and relationships were developed based upon reinforcing and perpetuating prestigious positions and reciprocal exchange of trade com modities in order to spread the risk presented by occasional regional

10J. Walter Johnshoy, Apaurak .:!.!!_Alaska: Social Pioneering Among the Eskimos, translated and compiled from the records of the Reverend T. L. Brevig, pioneer missionary to the Eskimo of Alaska, from 1894-1917 (Phila delphia: Dorrance & Co., 1944), p. 94 (and) field interviews. 11 charlie Antisarlook died in the 1900 measles epidemic, leaving Mary with over 300 reindeer. Mary, though herself childless, raised at least 10 children. By 1905, the following apprentices and owners were associated with her herd: Accebuck (Eaton), Amikravinik (Eaton), Angolook (Eaton), Avogook (Unalakleet), Koktoak (Eaton), Sagoonick (Eaton), Tatpan (Unalakleet). 12 Ray, Journal of the West, Vol. VI., No. 3, p. 378. (and) Robert F. Spencer, The North AlasKa""rl ESkfmo - fl ~{ud{ .:!.!!_ Ecolo}y and Society, Bulletin 171 (Washington: Bureau of American Et no ogy, 1959 , pp. 151-8.

23 resource shortages. The village oomalik 1t1ere the first to learn of the new wealth form presented by the introduction of deer and, simultaneously, to see that they had the most to lose by not insuring control by selected families. The Bureau of Education, which sponsored and guided the program during its early years, encountered considerable difficulty in achieving broad dis

e N ve population~ In view of the high social stations occupied by Native herders in their villages during this period, the conclusion that widespread dissemination was restricted by these early owners and their wealthy families seems inescapable. Although in 1905 there were over 10 ,000 deer in western Al as ka, of the more than 75 Native owners and apprentices, fewer than ten possessed more than 100 deer; only two (Antisarlook and Keok) possessed herds exceeding 300 deer. 13 By 1910, the situation was not vast_ly improved. Though Native owners numbered in the hundreds, few had herds exceeding 100 head. Only one, Keok, possessed more than 500 head, and fewer than 10 owned more than 200. 14

Culture Change -- The Real Beginnings The domination of Native ownership by a few families probably lasted well into the 1910's, but it did not remain completely intact. In his efforts to speed reindeer distribution throughout western Alaska, Dr. Jackson not only built new reindeer stations at widely scattered locations, but he also

13sheldon Jackson, Fifteenth Annual Report on Introduction of Domestic Reindeer into Alaska 1905 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1906), pp-:-20-22. -- 14u. S. Bureau of Education, Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1910 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1910-Y-: pp. LV-LXII.

24 distributed deer to various religious missions in several villages. 15 Addi tionally, Laplanders, who had been brought to western Alaska to serve as instructors to Eskimo apprentices, began receiving herds of deer (a loan of 100 head) in payment for their services. By 1910, there were five Lapp families with herds of 500 head or more. 16 These events, plus the beginning of large scale ownership by white men in the late 1910 1 s, served to reduce, albeit gradually, incipient Native control over the still new resource. Whereas in the very first years of the reindeer program there were only two owners, the U. S. Government and the Eskimo, by the early 1920's there were four distinct ownership groups whites, Eskimo, missions, and the government. With the rapid development of mining activities across the peninsula at the turn of the century, Native purchases of reindeer and the accumulation of other new wealth forms became more common and further eroded the developing Native reindeer aristocracy The absence of a chronic food shortage among mainland Eskimo at the time of the introduction of reindeer, coupled with the need for a broadened appeal to attract attention and increased governmental appropriations, led Dr. Jackson to an optimistic appraisal of the future role of reindeer in the Arctic. While the original 11 plan 11 had reference mainly to the need for securing a source of food and clothing for famished and freezing Eskimo, as early as l 895 Dr. Jackson wrote, 11 But it is now found that the reindeer are as essential to the white man as to the Eskimo. 11 17

15Jackson, Third Report ... , 1894, p. 15. 16 u. S. Bureau of Education, Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1910, pp. LV-LXII. - l?'She l don Jackson, Sixth Report on Introduction of Domestic Reindeer ..i.D.Alaska, 1896 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1896), p. 15.

25 A new view of the role of reindeer -- as a means of transportation and coJTUTiunication -- led Dr. Jackson to prophesize a unique division of labor between the Eskimo herder and the white miners and merchants that were inun- dating the peninsula by 1903. The ordinary white man is unwilling to undergo the drudgery of herding in that rigorous climate, and unwilling to work for the small compen sation that is paid for such services. He can do better. His direc tive ability can be more profitably employed as merchant and manager of transportation in employing and directing ki herders and teamsters ... it will become possible for white men to own large herds, but the men that will d? the herding and teaming will always be the Eskimos and Laplanders. 8

The use of reindeer for transportation of freight and passengers soon dominated the actions of government field personnel and the composition of Native apprenticeship programs. Each herder was required to become expert in training good sled deer, and thus herd management required the selection of the finest males -- potentially the best breeding stock -- for castration and sled training. The Lapp colony brought to Alaska in 1898 to train the Eskimo in deer care became "the most important commerci a 1 event next to go 1d discovery. 1119 The Lapps, who desired to own deer as payment for their two year contract, were viewed as the 11 backbone 11 of the young but promising transportation industry. 20 It seems clear, in retrospect, that the discovery of gold and the flood of men and materials attending its extraction provided justification for

18Jackson, Thirteenth Annual Report ... , 1903, p. 21. 19sheldon Jackson, Eithth Annual Report on Introduction of Domestic Reindeer Into Alaska 1898Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899) p. ~ - 20 rbid.

26 the reindeer program that had been lacking at the time deer were first in- traduced. As a means of transportation -- a resource for commercial enter prise -- reindeer attracted increasing non-Native attention, and Dr. Jackson, who for the first time found himself advocating a widely accepted objective, actively encouraged commercial interest. As early as 1903, in a letter to a Seattle firm, Jackson pointed out that a good herd of deer was as profit able as a gold mine, with total investment in a four year old male only $1.00, and top sales price for a good sled deer from $60 to $150. 11 1 hope your company will establish a large herd, ... any assistance ... will be gladly given. 1121 The discovery of gold near Nome in 1898, and the year-round activity of tens of thousands of miners on the peninsula by the early l900 1 s, cannot be overemphasised in terms of its effect upon the Native population. Prior to this time, Native contact with alien cultures had been limited for the most part to the summer months, when ice conditions permitted the Revenue Service and whalers to enter the Bering Strait and Norton and Kotzebue Sounds. Regular summar voyages by revenue cutters and whalers pre-date the introduction of reindeer by less than a decade in the case of the Revenue Service, and by less than fifty years in the case of the whalers. Thus, when large scale land occupation- first occurred at the turn of the century, the way of life of much of the Native population had changed but little. The fact that when the reindeer were first introduced they became quickly and easily incor porated into existing social and political relationships among the Native villagers stands in testimony to the resilience and continuing strength of these relationships up to at least 1900.

21 Jackson, Thirteenth Annual Report ... , 1903, pp. 138-9.

27 The base line for the introduction of a new way of life among much of the Native population is 1900, not 1892 when deer were first landed. In all probability, the reindeer would never have become a potential focal point of culture change had it not been for the coincident discovery of gold and the wage economy that followed soon thereafter.

The ~~}J'~f~EPI~!l~!i ce~and~_~p_r~enti ce Programs It has already been noted that the first apprentices and reindeer owners were from the wealthy and widely respected families -- oomalik -- among the Eskimo. The Apak (Constantine), the Antisarlook, Dannak, Electoona, Keok, Ablikak, Tautook, Sokweena, and Kivyeargruk families were of the most arti culate and cross-culturally capable among the Eskimo people. Many could speak and a few could write in English. This could mean, and frequently does mean in other parts of the world, that these men were not well integrated among their own people. This was not the case among the Eskimo in the late 1800's. The oomalik were active in inter-village diplomacy and played a very important role in acquiring and distributing wealth through widespread trading alliances. These men were widely traveled and were frequently employed by the early reindeer superintendents as interpreters and guides on excursions, a role in which only an oomalik could perform well. Indeed, to act as initiator and instru ment of inter-village contact was their cultural role in pre-white days. Given these great advantages of position and influence, control of the rein deer by a few families was natural and immediate. Furthermore, by the summer of 1896 such control appears to have had the support of the Native population generally, for no more apprentices were forthcoming, though

28 requests were sent to villages from the Yukon River to Kotzebue Sound. 22 Apprenticeship programs changed almost yearly during the first ten years following 1892. During the first year, Dr. Jackson decided to have the superintendent in charge select one or two young men from each village to train for a two-year period at the expense of the Government Reindeer Station. At the end of the two years, each would be given ten deer. The 23 herders could then return their home villages" In 1893,each apprentice received two deer the first year, five deer the second year, and was further urged to remain with the main herd at Port Clarence for another four years. 24 In 1894, the term of apprenticeship was extended to three years, with two deer received the first year, five in the second year, and ten in the third year. 25 In 1896, the term of apprenticeship was lengthened to five years, with no deer given during the period. Instead,

at the conclusion of his training, an apprentice 11 might 11 receive deer as a gift, not as wages. It was further required that no herder could return to his home village until his herd totaled at least 100 head. 26 Finally, in 1907, four years and fifty deer were deemed the appropriate duration and terminal herd size. It is impossible to assess the effect of these many changes upon the young apprentices. It is noteworthy that the first Eskimo to receive deer, Charlie Antisarlook, received his loan in order to dispel doubts among the Natives that they would ever receive deer of their own. 27

22Jackson, Sixth Report ... , 1896, p. 51. 23 Jackson, Report .QD_ Introduction ... , 1893, p. 28. 24Jackson, Third Report ... , 1894, p. 31. 25 sheldon Jackson, Fourth Report .QD_ Introduction of Domestic Reindeer into Alaska 1894 (Washington: 0. s. Government Printing Office 1895), p. 63. -- 26 Jacks;-:-Sixth Report ... , 1896, p. 14. 27 Johnshoy, Apaurak .i!l Alaska, p. 94.

29 The case of Charlie Antisarlook is perhaps instructional in reaching an understanding about Eskimo ownership in those early years. Charlie, who was a leading man among the Eskimo, received a loan of 100 deer on January 31, 1895. He and his young wife Mary took their herd south to Cape Nome, where in a short time a small village was established, based primarily upon reindeer herding and subsistence utilization and composed mainly of family members. The 1oan was for a term of five years, at the end of which time the government would be due the number originally loaned, with the increase to be retained by Charlie. During the fall of 1897, word reached Dr. Jackson that miners in the Upper Yukon River were in danger of starvation if supplies were not received before spring. To secure the deer, Charlie's loan was returned two years prematurely at Jackson's request. As it happened, the deer were not needed; in fact, they were never taken to the Upper Yukon. This left Charlie, and the village which had grown up around the herd, with 133 deer. 28 Weeks later, on January 2, 1898, Charlie was asked to surrender the remainder of his herd to provide relief for several hundred whalers that had been trapped by the polar ice at Point Barrow. 29 Charlie agreed, but only upon a guarantee of return given by an officer of the Revenue Service. He accompanied the drive to Barrow, about 800 miles distant. It is recorded that Mary and the other villagers almost starved that winter. 30 28 sheldon Jackson, Ninth Annual Report Q!2_ Introduction of Domestic Reindeer into Alaska 1899 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1900), p. 2'2: 29 Division of Revenue Cutter Service, Treasury Department Report of the Cruise of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Bear and the Overland Expedition for tie Relief of tnewnalers in the ARctic Ocean, from November 27, 1897 to September l:T,"" 1898 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,1899), p. 51. --- 30 I bi d. , p . 17 .

30 Nearly two years later, on December 2, 1899, the deer, plus the esti mated fawn crop for two years, were returned to Charlie. Charlie died a few months later during the 1900 measles epidemic, leaving Mary with some 328 head of reindeer. Mary later became known throughout western Alaska as 11 Reindeer Mary. 11 In his letter of instruction to the field superintendent in charge of returning Charlie's deer, Dr. Jackson writes: If you start from Eaton and go across country with sled deer and find in the herd you are driving to Charley better deer than those you have, you can make an exchange and take the best for the Eaton station. 31

One of the deer returned to Charlie was sick and had to be hauled the last 25 miles. 32 A somewhat similar experience was endured by the Wales apprentices. Several of these apprentices had served their training period by the fall of 1897 and were about to become the very first independent owners. Like the Antisarlook herd, however, the Wales herd was driven north to Barrow in early 1898 to provide relief for stranded whalers. William T. Lopp, the superintendent of the Wales station, wrote in August 1899 that, while the drive to Barrow had been valuable experience for the apprentices, they were quite disappointed in beginning their sixth year without the deer they had been promised. 33 Without deer, they had been compelled to subsist on flour, molasses, and tea.34 It is impossible to assess the effect of these events upon Native atti tudes. To be sure, they came at an unfortunate time. In all likelihood, to the Eskimo, long accustomed to alternating periods of resource scarcity

31 Jackson, Ninth Annual Report ... , 1900, pp. 136-7. 32 Ibid., p. 139. 33 Ibid., pp. 108-9. 34Ibid.

31 and abundance and in possession of the seemingly endless patience which the Arctic inculcates, the unpredictable reindeer program now seemed much like the rest of their ecological environment.

Models for Change

The selection of imitative 11 models 11 is a critical factor in introducing a new way of life. The problems involved in seeking out persons kno1,11- ledgeable about reindeer and then retaining them through the complete iso lation and physical discomfort of eight-to-nine months of arctic winter proved nearly insurmountable to Dr. Jackson. The reindeer station at Port Clarence proved brutally hard on superintendents, with a new employee placed in charge almost yearly for the first five years. 35 Likewise, the Siberian herders, who were to serve as teachers to the Eskimo apprentices, returned to their homes, some of them concerned about their physical welfare. An example of the great importance of personality among white residents living in close relationships with the Eskimo is clearly illustrated by the following series of events. 36 During the 1860's, several t..Jales villagers had attacked a whaler, with hopes of using the vessel in trading and hunting. The attack failed, but the village of Wales acquired a reputation of suffi cient durability that intercultural contact was curtailed until 1890, when two young teachers, W. T. Lopp and a person by the name of Thornton, arrived and started a school. Lopp and Thornton differed greatly in personality. Thornton wore side- arms -- which is anathema among the Eskimo -- and was reportedly abusive

35see Annual Reports for 1892 through 1896. 36 Johnshoy, Apaurak ~Alaska, pp. 43-48.

32 and authoritarian in relationships with the Natives. Lopp, who learned the language and customs of his hosts, was the more sensitive of the two. Thornton was murdered by three young villagers in the fall of 1893. Mr.

Lopp went on to become "Tom the Good 11 to the Natives, working with them continuously as teacher and reindeer superintendent until 1925. * The early successes of Eskimo involvement with reindeer are more at- tributable to the efforts of Lopp than to any other single individual. Lopp traveled to Barrow with the 1897 relief expedition. The Revenue Ser vice officer in charge of that expedition wrote that Lopp was 11 indispens able11 and far more capable in his dealings with the Eskimo and the reindeer than any other person in the country.37 In the first ten years of the reindeer program, 35 Eskimo herders were graduated from the Wales Reindeer Station herd under the able and ambitious Lopp. 38 Given the regional impor tance of the village of Wales and the initial attitude of these villagers toward reindeer, the future of reindeer as a Native resource clearly rested upon Lapp's capacities to interpret and clarify in the Native tongue the meaning of this new form of wealth. It is noteworthy that Lopp steadily refused to have a Laplander at Wales. 39 *Eskimo given names are often an insight into the contributions of the receiver, as perceived by the Eskimo. Dr. Jackson was known to the Eskimo as "the needle man, 11 because he always gave sewing needles as gifts on his annual visits. Captain Healy was known as 11 the man who winks, 11 because when excited his eye twitched nervously. T. L. Brevig, a missionary at Port Clarence from 1894 to 1917, became known as Apaurak, "Father of All, 11 and his wife became Amerora, "Mother of All , 11 due to their work with orphans created by the 1900 measles epidemic. W. T. Lopp became Tom Gorrah, 11 Tom the Good. 11 To some, this writer is known as Anuktooyoonik, after a mythical Eskimo who, in his curiosity, violated the secrecy of a midget peoples living in the rocky peaks of the Kigluaik Mountains. 37 Division of Revenue Cutter Service, Report of the Cruise of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Bear ... , 1899. 38sheldon Jackson, Eleventh Annual Report~ Introduction of Domestic Reindeer into Alaska 1901 (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1902), p. l 8. 39 rbi d. 33 The role of the Laplanders as models for cultural change among the Eskimo is somewhat ambiguous. Here, again, personality differences surely played a great part. It is clear, however, that the Lapps received much better treatment than did the Native herders. They received a larger quan tity of rations when herding or on excursions and were permitted to slaughter deer for subsistence, which, in the first few years, the Natives were not permitted to do. 40 Due to the nature of their relationship to the govern ment as employees under contract, the Laplanders early acquired larger per capita herds than did most Eskimo. In 1902, the average Laplander herd num bered 100 head, the average Eskimo herd 59. 41 By 1905, due to the growing number of Eskimo herders and the relatively few Lapp owners, the average Lapp owned 238 head, with per capita Eskimo own ership at 49 head. 42 In 1905, there were five Lapp and 78 Eskimo owners. 43 In the villages that housed Lapp ovmers, the relative ownership distri bution was striking indeed -- and at a very observable and therefore important level. At Kotzebue, the Laplander, Nilima, owned 363 head. The largest Eskimo herds v1ere owned by Ohgoaloak and Minungon, each with 11 deer. At Golovin Bay, distribution was somewhat improved, with Nils Klemetsen owning 287 head and Tautoak owning 193 head. At Unalakleet, Ole Bahr owned 332 head and Tatpan had the largest Eskimo herd at 129 head. Sara and Spein, at Bethel, together owned 698 deer, vJith the largest Eskimo ownership at 25 head. 44 40 sheldon Jackson, Twelfth Annual Report on Introduction of Domestic Reindeer into Alaska 1902 (Washington: U. S. GOvernment Printl"tlg Office, 1903) p. 138. -- -- 41Ibid., p. 11. 42 Jackson, Fifteenth Annual Report ... , 1906, p. 11. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., pp. 20-25. In those villages without Lapland owners, the largestESkimo owners were: Pt. Barrow, Ahlook, 193 head; Kivalina, Electoona, 172 head; Deering, Keok, 327 head; Shishmaref, Sokweena, 119 head; Wales, Ootenna, 273 head, Kivyeargruk, 136 head; Teller, Ablikak, 221 head; Eaton, Mary Andrewuk, 317 head. (All 1905 figures.) 34 By 1910 the only Eskimo owner whose herd equalled the size of the Lapp herds was Keok at Shishmaref, where there were no Lapp owners. 45 Social relations between the Laplander and his fellow villagers dif fered from village to village. Residents of Golovin tell of a Lapp town well separated from the Native village itself, and at Buckland Lapp homes and Eskimo homes were on opposite sides of the river. Intermarriage did occur; however, the pure-blooded Eskimo, when asked about possible Lapp patrilineage is quick to deny it. Much of the respect accorded the Lap- lander in today's memories relates to their hardiness and their willingness and ability to live off and with their reindeer through all seasons. In 1894, Jackson mentioned his strong desire to bring Laplanders to Alaska as a colony to go into reindeer husbandry on their own account. 46 That year he hired William Kjelmann, a Laplander then living in Wisconsin, to superintend the Port Clarence reindeer station. Again in 1895,Jackson wrote of the need for "many more Lapps to be freighters," for it would surely be many years before Eskimo "can be trusted to freight on their own account. 1147 With the shift in emphasis from reindeer as a subsistence item to a commer cial resource in arctic transportation, the Laplander's importance as agent of cultural change became secondary to their role as breeders and trainers of sled deer from large herds that they themselves owned. The significance of the Laplander as a teacher of the Eskimo apprentice was greatly reduced. By 1908, of a total of 99 apprentices working in Lapp herds, only five were

Eskimo. It had, by then, become the stated policy of the Reindeer Service

45 u. S. Bureau of Education, Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1910, pp. LV-LXII. 46 - Jackson, Third Report . . ' 1894' p. 20. 47 Jackson, Sixth Report . . . ' 1896, pp. 17-18.

35 to reduce the number of reindeer owned by Lapps. 48 Regrettably, by that time the prolific reindeer were increasing much more rapidly than the capa city of graduating apprentices to absorb them, and it was proving difficult enough to distribute those deer under government control, let alone find new homes for Lapp and mission-controlled herds. 49 In fact, by 1910, less than 20 years after introduction, a characteristic of the nature of reindeer their high rate of annual increase -- had already surpassed bureaucratic abilities to institutionalize orderly means of utilization and control. There is some indication that, during the brief period when the Lap landers were used as teachers (about 1895 to 1901), they were less than com pletely effective. In his diary, T. L. Brevig mentions that although he and his vJife were initiated and became 11 Eskimo, 11 William Kjelmann was dis allowed -- 11 We do not regard him as trustworthy. 1150 The Laplander who had been sent to St. Lawrence Island is said to have feared for his life. 51 In the words of the teacher at that station, 11 Living alone among a thieving, lying lot of Natives whom you had never seen before ... might upset a hardier nature than the mild-tempered, home-1 ovi ng Lapps. 1152 Those Eskimo living today who had extensive contact with Laplanders in these early years unanimously seem to hold them in high esteem. This they do with most anyone who, like themselves, can endure the Arctic without emotional disintegration. The factor of greatest importance in determination of status, and thus effectiveness in inducing change among the Eskimo,

48u. S. Bureau of Education, Report on the Alaska School Service and on the Alaska Reindeer Service (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Of fi ce,-1909) , pp. 1046- 1056. 49 Ibid. 50 Johnshoy, Apaurak .!.!!. Alaska, p. 70. 51 Jackson, Twelfth Annual Report . . . , 1903, pp. 80-1. 52 Ibid. 36 is stability and dependability in inter-personal behavior. Any individual, regardless of cultural heritage, whose word becomes his bond, who develops a reputation of trust and confidence, and who can be relied upon to share with others in times of need is a welcome asset to the Eskimo home and village. The "friendly Arctic" is friendly only to those who are indi vidually productive and socially cooperative. The leader among the Eskimo, in pre-white times and today, is one who possesses both wealth and genero sity. Perhaps one reason why the Eskimo has preserved much of his tradi tional social-familial organization more or less intact throughout a gener ation of directed culture change is because those carriers of change least like the Eskimo have found the Arctic personally unendurable.

A Policy of Broadened Participation By 1907, fifteen years after introduction of reindeer, there were 114 Native reindeer owners, including 79 apprentices owning small numbers of deer. Excluding the apprentices, who were in various stages of their four year program, the independent Native owners owned herds averaging 112 deer (6,406 head). 53 Between the years 1905 and 1907, however, Dr. Jackson fell under political attack for his handling of the school system and the reindeer program, particularly his wide use of missions as institutions for distribution of government deer. During 1907 several important policy changes occurred that were to greatly effect future Native involvement. Under W. T. Lopp, who had led the attack against Jackson and mission involvement and who succeeded Jackson as General Agent for Education in Alaska, the distribution and custody of reindeer became an integral part of

53 u. S. Bureau of Education, Report on the Work of the Bureau of Educa tion for the Natives of Alaska 1915-1916 \Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1917}, p. 18. 37 the then existing school system. District superintendents of the schools and local village school teachers assumed the dual role of educators and Reindeer Service Administrators. In 1907, a campaign was launched to distribute thereindeer owned by the government, missions, and Lapps much more rapidly than ever before. The program was successful, with government and mission ownership falling from 45 per cent of all deer in 1907 to 10 per 54 cent in 1916. By 1916, there were 1,293 Native deer owners, 145 of whom were apprentices. Average herd size among non-apprentice owners had dropped to about 50 deer. 55 The policy of broadened Native participation was implemented by a va riety of techniques. The number of government reindeer stations was rapidly increased by breaking up government herds. Each new station was obliged to find and begin training new apprentices in the local area, thus greatly broadening the sources of young men who were to participate in the program. That the reindeer herds had to be taken to the Natives in order to achieve greater participation is instructive. It was no longer possible to interest a sufficient number of young men greatly enough for them to leave their home village to learn reindeer herding. In all likelihood, this reluctance was due to the growing number of alternative activities (mining and trapping), to a desire not to change existing activities (fishing and hunting), and be cause of urgings by village leaders who were being pressured by existing Native owners. For whatever reasons, the herds were moved to distant villages. It soon became apparent, however, that rapid dissemination of deer among the Natives could not be achieved through the apprenticeship system. 56 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56u:-5. Bureau of Education, Report on the Alaska School Service and on the Al as ka Reindeer Service (Washington: U.s. Government Printing Uf:" ITce;-1908), p. 1055. 38 Thus, by 1908,reindeer superintendents were actively encouraging individual Native investment in deer ownership. Indeed, several missions, in order to reduce their holdings and help support mission operations, sold deer to Na- tive buyers for cash. Reindeer were also distributed as payment to Native helpers in return for services rendered the government in connection with the Alaska School Service and the Alaska Reindeer Service. Native apprentices and chief herders at government reindeer stations received their salaries in reindeer, which they could in turn butcher and sell as meat or train and sell as sled deer to local gold prospectors and other consumers. Graduating Native apprentices were required to support new apprentices in their herds,with the number of required apprentices increasing with the size of the owner's herd to a maximum of four. By 1916, Native owned herds supported far more apprentices than govern ment, mission, or Lapp owned herds combined. Though the Lapps and the mis sions had much larger herds per capita than did most Native owners, Lapp and other white owners supported only three Native apprentices and missions only 20 in 1916. Native herds supported 84 apprentices in the same year. 57 In fact, by 1909, when new government herds were established, they were placed under the direction of Native chief herders, whereas formerly the chief herder was almost always a Laplander. This was necessitated by the small number of Lapps still in government employ. Also, herd management costs were substantially reduced, for the Natives were paid in reindeer. In retrospect, the results of the po 1icy of broadened Native parti ci pation were largely unfavorable to Native involvement. As has already been mentioned, up to about 1910 when this policy began having effect, few Natives

57 u. S. Bureau of Education, Report on the Work of the Bureau of Educa tion for the Natives of Alaska 1915-1916,p.18.----

39 owned deer herds of over 100 head. That wealth was concentrated in a few families and was distributed through familiar traditional channels, quite in keeping with the Eskimo way of living. Now, great many Natives owned herds and thus they were no longer necessarily economically compelled to relate politically to their more wealthy village oomaliks. This provided the seeds for the destruction of relationships that until then had provided a sense of community identity (i.e., around a few wealthy families of high status). Correspondingly, the individual Eskimo's source of self-identity was made more ambiguous. The presence in a given village of many owners of small herds loosened the ties that formerly bound the village together precisely at the time greater cooperation between village residents became necessary. Cooperation between owners of herds sharing the same range soon became of paramount im portance in the determination of ownership of newly born fawns of unmarked mothers or of appropriate recompence for the killing of another owner's deer. Whereas in former times resolution of conflict was achieved by consulting an oomalik, to whose advice both participants were informally obliged to listen, or by simply moving to another village, such remedies were of de clining effectiveness. Movement to another village was restricted because of the habit of deer of becoming attached to their fawning ground and home range, because of a herder's obligation to his apprentices not sharing his desire, and because of the absence of suitable range near another village. The relative immobility that attends reindeer ownership and the corresponding need for greater inter-personal cooperation as herds grew in number and size in the 1920 1 s and 1930's produced great stress among the highly individual istic Eskimo. While it is often believed that the Eskimo herder could not

40 adapt to the nomadic life required by reindeer ownership, it is this writer's view that, while this may be nominally true, the far more important influence operates in reverse order. The reindeer is behaviorally bound to a given range, thus reducing the Eskimo's former intervillage mobility, and this behavior reduces his latitude of choice in seeking out a village in which he can secure social recognition. rev To review, the policy of broadened participation simultaneously enlarged the forum for conflict among the Eskimo, while reducing the availability of traditional methods of its resolution. As will become more apparent later in this chapter, this contradiction between reality and administrative policy led to the adoption of Native ownership associations. These associations were an attempt to reinstitute Eskimo leadership, which had become thoroughly confused as a result of widespread deer ownership.

The Era of Reindeer Fair~ 1915-1918 From the winter of 1915 to the influenza epidemic of 1918 can be regarded as the time of greatest successes for the reindeer program. This is the per iod of the reindeer fairs, still much talked about today, fifty years later. A song was developed describing the fairs. 58 (See Appendix A.) The fairs were held during the first months of the year at centrally located villages to which the Eskimo owners and herders journeyed. Each vil lage sent at least two delegates to the fairs in their region, and non-dele gates came as well. The fairs were seven days long and ended in a grand parade for which participants would dress in their finest winter clothing and drive their best

58The Eskimo, December 1916, p. 10.

41 sleds and deer. Daytime activities ranged from competitive shooting matches and men 1 s and women 1 s snowshoe races to lassoing, butchering, and racing reindeer. 59 Many of the activities emphasized reindeer as draft animals, reflecting the bureau 1 s continued fascination with transportation potentials. Indeed, delegates were instructed to make the trip to the fairs with sled deer or risk not being allowed to participate. 60 The evening hours were spent going over reindeer business, discussing the future, and listening to speeches given by bureau employees, Eskimo owners, and others. One evening was reserved for discussion among Eskimos only -- no white persons were allowed to attend. The fairs were a great success insofar as they attracted leading Eskimo personalities -- Tautuk, Kivyearzruk, Ootenna, Keok, Electoona, Okok, Karmun and stimulated interest in reindeer through competitive events stressing deer strength and herder dexterity and imagination. In retrospect, it is regrettable that so much energy and time was consumed by the draft animal aspect of the reindeer, for much of this usage disappeared with the departure of large numbers of miners. Indeed, many Eskimos today point out that as a draft animal the reindeer loses its usefulness after two or three days of continuous use, largely because it must forage for feed at night and gets little rest. The traditional dog team is much faster. The fairs provided a forum for discussion between Eskimo reindeer men and between the Eskimo owner and the emerging Lomen family owners. Carl Lomen is reported to have relieved great anxiety among Eskimo owners, when, in a speech given at the first fair in 1915, he indicated that his company

59 A schedule of activities for the 1917 fairs is in Appendix A. 60The Eskimo, December 1916, p. 5.

42 would leave local markets to the Eskimo and concentrate on developing new markets in the States.61 Bureau of Education employees used the fairs suc cessfully to urge the Native owners to band together in reindeer associations. As will be pointed out later, the earliest associations were launched during the last years of reindeer fairs. The fairs were less successful in providing solutions to everyday herding problems. A pressing problem of the day, and indeed one which existed for some years, was the clear reluctance of some herd owners to pro vide food, clothing, and shelter to their hired herders and apprentices.62 There are insufficient data to tell precisely how widespread this problem was, but it does reappear on a vast scale during the 1930's and 1940's. The circumstances during the more recent period were sufficiently different to provide little insight as to why the problem existed 20 years earlier. In 1916, the going wage for hi red herders was one dollar per deer per year. This is a rather imprecise standard, especially for herders who worked less than a year at herding for any given year. Many young men by 1918 were employed during the spring, summer, and fall as miners, and worked at herd ing, only during the winter months, if at all. Trapping, which was fast becoming a very lucrative winter occupation by this time, may well have led to a conflict of interest -- the hired herder spending more time checking his trap line than herding. If this was the case, it may well have contributed to owner-herder conflict. As for care of apprentices, by 1916 the bureau itself was paying apprentices in deer as a cost saving measure. This involved dependency upon a nearby market in order for it to be an appropriate

6111 Report on the First Reindeer Fair" (in) U. S. Bureau of Education, Re~ort on the Work of the Bureau of Education for the Natives of Alaska 19 4-19T5 (Washington:-u. s. Government Printing Office, 1917}, p. 81. 62 The Eskimo, January 1917, pp. 3 and 6; The Eskimo, November 1916, p. 6; and field interviews conducted by the author:- 43 form of payment. It is possible that some Native herds were sufficiently distant from a market that apprentices were unable to sell deer in enough quantity to support themselves. In the final analysis, the reindeer fairs were very popular among the Eskimo, and undoubtedly represent the period of greatest interest in reindeer achieved through administrative design. If continued, these annual meetings may well have produced more tangible solutions to problems sur rounding Eskimo involvement. Unfortunately, the epidemic of 1918 ended the services of W. C. Sheilds, the bureau employee most active in promoting the fairs, and they were never reinstituted.63

Non-Native Ownership, Shrinking Markets, and Native Response

As has been previously mentioned, non-Native ownership of deer, exclud ing government owned herds, had its inception as early as 1894, when mis sionary societies first were given deer. Large scale -Laplander ownership was based upon herds loaned by the government when Lapp employment contracts expired in 1901. Ovmership by non-Natives for the express purpose of de veloping a livestock industry for the sale of meat products did not begin until 1914. In that year, the Lomen family of Nome purchased from Alfred Nilima, a Laplander in the Kotzebue Sound area, a herd of l ,200 deer. In the years that followed, the Lomen family purchased two mission herds (Golovin and Teller) and other white owned herds. Total purchases by 1929 came to 14,083 deer. 64 Reindeer Service employees objected vigorously to 63Mr Shields was well respected among the Eskimo. A tour through the Nome graveyard revealed his to be the most expensive headstone -- purchased with donations from several Eskimo villages. The two government men most frequently remembered by elderly reindeer ovmers are W. T. Lopp and W. C. Shields. 64 oeclaration of ownership of Reindeer in Alaska of Alaska Livestock and Packing Company, August 29, 1938, in Carl J. Lomen papers (Archives, University of Alaska). Cited hereafter as Lomen Papers. 44 the mission sales on the grounds that the reindeer had been brought to Alaska for Native use only. But they were ineffective in seeking a reversal of a distribution scheme that they themselves had set in motion twenty years earlier. Carl Lomen and his father, G. J. Lomen, first came to Nome in June 1900. The elder Lomen, who had been a practicing attorney in St. Paul, Minnesota, quickly developed a brisk business sorting out conflicting mining claims in what was at that time a bustling, rich frontier town. 65 Son and father soon became inextricably caught up in the contagious atmosphere, and the rest of the family of eight joined them in Nome. As large and active families will, the Lomens became engaged in a variety of activities -- from prospecting to launching a drug store and photography studio -- the latter proving quite successful. The family was of Norwegian ancestry. The elder Lomen spoke the language well and became good friends with, and a source of legal counsel to, several Scandanavian deer owners, and to many Swedish and Norwegian gold miners, some of whom became very wealthy in the gold fields. These personal relationships later proved extremely helpful. In 1914, when the family made its initial purchase of deer, Jafet Lindeben,1, a Norwegian miner who was one of the first to become wealthy (in 1898) provided financial support. Indeed, Mr. Lindeberg continued to be the company's most valuable stock- holder until 1921, when, as president of Nome 1 s Miners and Merchants Bank, he encountered financial reverses. As a profit generating enterprise based on the raising, processing, and marketing of reindeer products, the Lomen operations were destined never

65 These and the following data referrinq to the Lomen family are derived from: Carl J. Lomen, Fifty Years in Alaska {New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1954). 45 to succeed. The only activities (excluding the drug store and photography studio) entered into by the family that ever produced earnings on a steady and dependable basis were those limited to freighting and lighterage. When local finances became impaired in 1921, Carl Lomen was forced to seek capital support from outside Alaska. With energy few possess, Lomen tried to secure adequate funding; from 1921 to 1927, the company tried to float debt instruments and failed, reorganized to issue new ownership shares and succeeded only marginally, and even sought federal support as a Native employer. Only once, in 1927, did the company manage to attract sufficient capital, but this proved to be too late to overcome problems developing in the field. It is instructive to note that when financing was arranged, it was not on the basis of an analysis of expected return, but as a philan thropic gesture by personal friends. 66 From the beginning, it was Lomen policy to leave local markets to the Eskimo. 67 While this served to help calm the Native owners and bureau employees for a brief time, when the mass out-migration of miners and sup portive merchants began in the 1910's, what had been a very lucrative local market ceased to exist. This occurred at a time when Natives owned more reindeer than ever before. 68 In fact, much of the Bureau of Education's 66 Those remarks are in no way intended tp reflect poorly upon the Lomen family. It is doubtful that anyone given the absence of earnings attraction, the lack of widespread knowledge of the resource, and the cor responding absence of comparable experiences, could have done better. This is a brutally short treatment of an exciting, if troubled, arctic enterprise. 67Mayor G. J. Lomen, 11 Views on the Development of the Reindeer Industry, 11 The Eskimo, November 1917, pp. 5-6. ~ 68rhe decennial rates of change for the white population in Northwest Alaska adequately shows these very important market fluctuations. 1880 - 0.0% 1910 - (193.1)% 1940 - 13.3% 1890 - 4514.3% 1920 - ( 69.2)% 1950 - 27. 1% 1900 - 3020.6% 1930 - 0.9% 1960 - 18.0% SOURCE: George W. Rogers and Richard A. Cooley, Alaska's Population and Economy, Vol. II. (College: University of Alaska, l963), p. 32. 46 reindeer program relied upon the presence of a large and steady local market for meat and sled deer sales. Apprentices and herders were paid in deer, and many owners depended heavily upon sales of deer meat and sled deer to support themselves and their traditionally large followings. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, the reindeer and the Eskimo herders had been systema tically prepared to serve as a supportive industry since the turn of the cen tury. By 1918, it became apparent to even bureau personnel that the young industry was in for troubled times and that Eskimo reindeer men would have to cooperate with each other much more than at any previous time. 69 In the face of shrinking markets and growing Native ownership, the reindeer fairs of 1917 and 1918 became the forum for the formation of Native reindeer cooperatives. At first, the Native owners formed loose associations or clubs, as they were called, to set prices and to allocate portions of the shrinking market among themselves. As herds grew in the decade of the 1920's, the difficulties in keeping herds separate and in even marking an individual owner's deer became insurmountable. With individual herd isolation no longer physically possible or economically warranted, these owners' clubs incorpor- ated as joint stock companies or ovmership cooperatives, in most cases issuing one share of stock per deer owned to each member-owner. It should be noted that the reindeer associations were an inevitable outgrowth of fast- growing reindeer herds occupying common range, which made observable, physically separated herds no longer possible. The relationship between this inevita bility and the bureau's previous policy of broadened participation, which created many herds, is clear.

69walter C. Sheilds, "Eskimo Reindeer Men Get Together, 11 The Eskimo, September 1917, p. 1.

47 By the late 1920's, with local markets a fraction of their former size and Native owned deer numbering several hundred thousands, the Lomen oper ations began to take on new meaning for the Eskimo owner. By 1929,the La mens, as a natural outgrowth of servicing state-side markets, had a virtual monopoly on commercial slaughtering facilities, lighterage, and ocean freighting services. What had seemed more than reasonable 15 years earlier, a division of local and outside markets, now seemed an arrangement extremely unfair to the Natives. The Lomen brothers began buying Native-owned deer, or rather, began acquiring Native owned deer in exchange for credit advanced at Lomen-owned trading posts at Teller, Buckland, Golovin, Unalakleet, and Nome. But limitations on the size of their operations, as previously noted, prevented them from using more than a fraction of deer available for slaugh ter. The pressure weighing on Native owners, whose reindeer herds were rapidly multiplying themselves out of grazing range, to get some return from their resources resulted in widespread use of deer meat for trap bait. In 1930 and 1931, small shipments of Native deer were sent to state-side mar kets aboard Department of Interior vessels. Sales by both the Lomens and by the Department of Interior amounted to less than 5 per cent of the esti mated 640,000 deer existing in the early 1930's. To the Native owner, who from 1900 forward had been encouraged to re gard his reindeer as a valuable commercial resource in transportation and meat products markets, the effect of seeing his herd grow in numbers yet actually decline as a source of realizable income was an immesurably de structive influence on his attitude toward reindeer ownership. When ques tioned about the events of the 1920's, many Natives who owned deer at the time have trouble recalling their feelings and thoughts. Yet when asked

48 about the period of reindeer fairs and strong local markets, they smile knowledgeably and talk at length about 11 the good old days. 11

By 193~ the Lomen interests became the logical, and to the Eskimo owner, the only target for the mounting bitterness and disappointment felt by Bur eau of Education field personnel and Eskimo deer men alike. As mentioned previously, the Lomen family owned the only slaughtering and cold storage facilities on the Seward Peninsula. Apart from limited service by Department of Interior vessels and a Seattle-based steamship line, the family also con trolled ocean freighting services and, more importantly, the lighterage fa cilities, so crucial to handling perishable meat products in the absence of any natural harbors. 70 The elder Lomen was the district's appointed federal judge during this period, and he therefore had the authority to appoint the Clerk of the Court in Nome -- an official of great importance in sorting out land lease disputes to be heard by the court. Finally, the company oper ated a chain of trading posts. Through these mercantile outlets, the family acquired deer from Eskimo owners, who, in turn, were advanced credit. By 1933, Eskimo deer men were indebted to Lomen trading posts for advances made to the amount of $45,000. 71 These widespread activities were later to bring the Lomen family under personal and administrative attacks, which climaxed in 1939 and 1940 with their exit from the reindeer business.

70 rn the shall-;;-w Bering Strait, ocean-going vessels must lay from 3 to 12 miles off shore, depending upon the location. Only at Port Clarence is there a known natural harbor. 7111 Memorandum of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation," February 2, 1933, Lomen Papers, R.F.C. file.

CHAPTER I II : THE PERIOD OF DECLINE,1933-1950

Introduction Although it is virtually impossible today to find a middle-aged Bering Strait Eskimo male who did not at some time in his youth own 11 many 11 reindeer, it should come as no surprise to find that it is difficult to get a definite idea of the exact number owned or what eventually happened to them. The period of the early l930's was a time of great reindeer plentitude, and also a time when reindeer ownership produced a minimum of emotional and material reward. In 1933, there were an estimated 640,000 deer; by 1950, there were an estimated 25,000 deer -- a decline of 615,000 over 17 years. 72 This chapter is concerned with changing herd and range management poli cies during the period and with Native participation with and reaction to large scale commercial operations by the Lomen Corporation, as well as their reactions to their own joint stock ownership associations. Information in this chapter was derived from correspondence written during the period, field interviews, and stock company ledgers examined in the field.

The End of Integrated Export Operations By 1933, it was clear that the Lomen Companies were in trouble. 73 In January of that year, the New York banker who had carried the company

72 The word, 11 estimated, 11 though perhaps boring to the reader, is used for the good reason that there was no precise field counting during this period. The figures used are from: Herbert C. Hanson, 11 Importance and De velopment of the Native Reindeer Industry in Alaska," (l~ashington: The Catholic University of America, 1952), p. 9. (Mimeo.) 73The Lomen "Companies" is used to refer to the Northwestern Livestock Corporation and its subsidiary organizations: Alaska Livestock and Packing Company, Nunivak Development Coropration, Lomen Commercial Company, Arctic Transportation Company.

51 financially since 1927 passed away, leaving the Lomens without stateside support. The company president, Carl Lomen, began again his search for funds, this time through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (R.F.C.). In a letter to the R.F.C. in support of the Lomen request, Secretary of Interior Ray L. Wilbur wrote: The Natives have no capital and rely largely on employment by Northwest Livestock Corporation or through the sale of reindeer to the company.74

The Eskimo owners did rely upon deer sales to the company, for they had little alternative. Local markets for reindeer products were miniscule. But the Lomen interests, too, were faced with problems. In 1931,the firm exported only 602 deer carcasses; in 1932, less than 2,000. From 1933 to 193~ the firm exported an average of 3,000 carcasses per year, a mere fraction of deer available for slaughter. 75 Requests were made to the R.F.C. for $750,000, of which $200,000 were to be used for advances to Native deer owners through the company's mercantile outlets. The firm eventually received only $100,000 from R.F.c. 76 The Lomen brothers were under growing pressure from Native producers with surplus deer at home, while facing depression markets and capital shortages in their export out lets. In short, they were caught between two forces, neither of which they could control. By 1935, Lomen stores were offering to purchase Native owned deer in exchange for $2.00 credit. To the Native owners, many of whom could well remember selling their deer for as much as 40¢ per pound, such a proposition

74 Letter of Ray L. Wilbur to Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Feb ruary 25, 1933, Lomen Papers, R.F.C. file. 75 oeclaration of Ownership, August 29, 1938, Lomen Papers. 76 Bank Draft, May 12, 1933, Lomen Papers, R.F.C. file.

52 was tantamount to dishonesty. By this time, however, many deer owners were al ready in debt to Lomen stores for credit advances, were faced 1t1ith badly crowded ranges, and had no alternative use for their surplus animals. In a meeting held to discuss the offer, the Eskimo owners at the village of vJales agreed to allow individual owners to sell for the purpose of reducing indebtedness and range pressure. 77 Many 01tmers sold deer. Keok and Ootenna, large owners since the turn of the century, so 1 d severa 1 hundred head each. Ootenna was reportedly in substantial debt to the Lomen store, a circum stance ill befitting one of the first Eskimo apprentices to own deer. 78 The Lomen Company and the government field men who supported these transactions bore the brunt of Native owner disappointments, the seeds for which were planted thirty years earlier when a reindeer business was developed predicated upon the presence of a local market. In the words of one Wales owner, writing to W. T. Lopp, who had retired in Seattle: We are in great need of Government's help before it is too late. As long as Lomen's men are allowed to stay in the Reindeer Service the Natives will be forced to sell a deer for $2 in trade. As Geo. Ootenna and o;~ers are already done it will never stop this selling (sic) .... To this owner, it appeared the Lomen Enterprises had taken over even govern ment field personnel. Indeed, circumstances must have seemed little short of hopeless during this period. Pressure from these quarters were added to those emanating from congressmen and from the Indian Rights Association,

77 Minutes of the Cape Reindeer Company, in Anthony J. Diamond Papers (Archives, University of Alaska), Box 30. cited hereafter as Diamond Papers. 78 Ibid. 79 Letter from Louis Tungwenuk, President of the Cape Reindeer Company to William T. Lopp, September 19, 1925, Diamond Papers, Box 30.

53 which, through the efforts of vJ. T. Lopp and others, had become articulate concerning the problems facing Native producers. In September of 1937, Congress passed the Alaska Reindeer Act, which directed the Secretary of Interior to acquire all non-Native owned reindeer and equipment in Alaska and to establish a self-sustaining industry for the benefit of Alaska Eskimo and other Natives. By the summer of 1940, the former objective had been achieved, and the Lomen name passed from reindeer range lands. Thus, in a short span of thirty years, Eskimo owners witnessed the growth and decay of local markets and of integrated export operations. To them, the reindeer and the value it produces in exchange seemed as un controllable and undependable as any other aspect of Native environment - probably more so.

Reindeer Are Like 11 Melting Snow in the Spring"

It had become increasingly difficult during the middle l920's for the Eskimo owner to exercise year-round herding over his deer. With the shrink age of local markets, few owners could afford to provide the supplies neces sary to make winter on the barren tundra physically attractive. Addition ally, few young men were eager to 1tJOrk as herders in exchange for payment in deer, which were by then fast becoming an economic burden to the Eskimo. By the late l920's, most herds were unattended throughout much of the year. What had become impossible for the individual owner during the 1920's proved exceedingly difficult for groups of owners by the l930's. Community and association ovmers were soon likewise compelled to forego constant, year round herding habits. Thus, by the mid-1930'~ many herds had not been con stantly herded for several years and had reverted to their wild state. In

54 the words of one herd manager, "vie need herders, but no money to sup port them in grub During the years of local markets, the Eskimo owners had kept their herds as close as possible to coastal population centers. This worked quite well when herds were relatively small and constantly herded, and the deer became accustomed to the range they inhabited. The tendency to use coastal range lands exclusively, or during most of the year, was further reinforced during the period of Lomen export operations. Slaughtering facilities were located on the coast because of the absence of transportation to and from interior ranges. In short, the Eskimo-owner operation had a distinct coastal orientation. The habit of the deer to seek seashore breezes for relief from bugs and for salt during the spring and summer rendered much interior penin sula graze of little use. From 1932 to about 1937, when several hundred thousands of deer were estimated to exist from the Kuskokwim River basin to Point Barrow, the lack of constant herding and the natural and built-in coastal bias of the industry began to result in large areas of overgrazed range lands. Starvation, pre dation by wolves on untended herds, and large scale straying were other con sequences of herding inadequacies. There exists today substanti a1 disagreement as to the pri nci pa 1 cause

for the vast disappearance of reindeer during the late 1930 1 s and the following decade. The Eskimo owner is likely to mention starvation, predation, or straying as the cause. Many who owned deer at the ti me say the reindeer

"just went away. 11 It seems a valid observation that to many owners the

80 Letter from Chester Sevick, Manager of the Kivalina herd, to William T. Lopp, September 1937, Diamond Papers, Box 30.

55 reindeer ceased playing a vital role as a significant contributor to the well being of their homes and villages in the l920 1 s, when the deer lost their value as instruments for the acquisition of consumer products. Rein- deer care requires considerable effort. This effort produced significantly important rewards to the Eskimo owner only during the time reindeer were valued commercially. It should be noted in passinq that some writers attribute the decline in reindeer abundance to: (1) a failure on the part of Eskimo owners to acquire the Laplander 1 s nomadic life style; 81 (2) the movement away from constant year-round herding -- this being usually referred to as Eskimo reluctance to live away from his village;82 and, (3) a loss of interest by 83 Na t i. ve owners as a resu l t o f d. 1 ff use assoc1. a t 1. on-s t oc k owners h1 . p. As for the Native not acquiring the nomadic pattern, it was pointed out early in the last chapter that the Lapps were brought to Alaska pri marily as freighters -- and instructors in freighting -- not as models for cultural change. The Laplander, like the Eskimo owner, had an occupational role as an appendage to a mining economy. There was no attempt to system atically introduce nomadic behavior among the Eskimo. Indeed, the reindeer was far less mobile than were his Eskimo owners, who were accustomed to changing regional residence with some frequency. In all probability, if an attempt had been mad~ to change life styles according to Laplander design, it would have failed, not because the Eskimo resists change, but because his

81 11 Froelich Rainey, 11 Native Economy and Survival in Arctic Alaska, ~- plied Anthropology, October - December 1941. 82 Margaret Lantis, 11 The Reindeer Industry in Alaska, 11 Arctic, Vol. 3, No. l (April 1950), pp. 27-44. 83Margaret Lantis, 11 Eskimo Herdsmen: Introduction of Reindeer Herding to the Natives of Alaska, 11 Human Problems j__Q_ Technological Change -- fl Case book, Ed. by Edward H. Spicer (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952~ PP:-127-148. 56 culture was far richer in variation of experiences and resources than that of his supposed model. As for the movement away from close herding and loss of interest due to di ff use stock ownership, it should come as no surprise that a resource of no value as a producer of revenue should suffer in terms of care and in terest. The Eskimo owners' only experience with reindeer had been as an exchange commodity. Why, then, anticipate perception of some form of inherent value sufficiently strong to encourage care and interest that are economically unwarranted? Why try to curb "melting snow in the spring," when snow is no longer useful to you? 84 In this, the Eskimo culture is similar to the western enterprise system in which the degree of project po tential determines effort.

The Joint Stock Company Experience Eskimo owners began forming ownership clubs as early as 1918 in their efforts to provide a forum for settling range disputes caused by mixing herds and to set prices and allocate market shares. Membership in these early clubs was open to owners of herds above a certain minimum size. Regu- lar meetings were held to elect officers, and special meetings could be called when a dispute arose between members. As the size of herds grew and the difficulty of keeping herds in some areas apart increased, the clubs became more formally organized. These ownership groups were encouraged by Reindeer Service employees. By the middle 1920's, reindeer stock companies began making their appearance over much of Seward Peninsula and other parts of western Alaska.

8411 Me lti ng snow in the spring" very appropriately describes the futi 1- i ty felt by the Eskimo in watching the deer decline in number and importance. Sevick to Lopp, September 1937, Diamond Papers, Box 30. 57 In 1933, it is reported there were 78 Native reindeer associations, with a total of 5,878 members. 85 Some associations were limited to the owners of one village, others were composed of members from several villages, depending upon range contiguity. Though records and recollection of actual association operations are scarce, they apparently functioned somewhat as follows. 86 The herds of the association members were combined and placed under the supervision and care of a chief herder appointed by the members Actual day-to-day operations were under the complete control of the chief herder. An individual owner who desired to replenish home meat supplies, or had promised a local miner a carcass or two, had to secure a permit to slaughter a stated number of deer within a given period of days. Oftentimes, the chief herder himself was required to be present and select the deer to be slaughtered in an effort to prevent the selection of another owner 1 s deer. The chief herder, with the advice and consent of association officers and members, also hired young herders to assist him with the herd. The number of assistants varied with herd size and range characteristics. Payment to the chief herder and his assistants was subject to negotia tion. The form of payment was normally in ownership shares, each share representing one deer. Apparently, no distinction was made among shares as to the sex of the deer. In several instances the chief herder acquired be tween 30 to 50 shares per year. Additionally, the chief herder and his

85 Hanson, 11 Importance and Deve 1opment of the Native Reindeer Indus try in Alaska, 11 p. 7. These figures were regarded by at least one writer as being too high. See Ben B. Mozee, The Reindeer Problem in Alaska (Nome: privately printed, 1933). 86 These data are derived from association field ledgers and notes ex amined by the author. Ambiguous entries were defined with the help, in some cases, of the Eskimo owner who had made the entry thirty years earlier. Ledgers of the Deering Reindeer Stock Company and the Unalakleet Native Com pany provided most of the material used.

58 assistants were supplied with groceries and equipment purchased through the sale of association 11 treasury stock. 11 Each herd owner to join the association was issued a share for each deer in his herd. There were no stock certificates as such, simply a jour nal entry under the owner's name corresponding to the number of shares owned. Each owner was assessed a tax to pay for herding expenses that amounted to 10 per cent of his total stock ownership. Each year, usually during April fawning season, each co-owner's share total was increased by a selected percentage to reflect spring increases. In nearly all instances examined, the increase was computed by adding 50 to 60 per cent to the owner's previous share total. Again, there was no distinction between animal sex among shares owned; one share represented one deer. To cover expenses, the association had a treasury account composed of shares taxed from owners. The elected board of directors of the associa tion presided over the sale of the deer represented by treasury stock and used them to acquire groceries and materials to support operations. When a corral needed repair, each owner contributed food and labor. If he could not be present himself, he was obliged to arrange another's presence in his stead. In the event of a member's death, his or her shares were divided evenly among immediate family dependents. In some cases, treasury stock was used to pay family debts when the head of the family died. The era of stock associations among the Eskimo owners covers a period of about 25 years (1925-1950). The effectiveness with which these organi zations functioned varied throughout the period. For the first few years, most of the herds were cared for, or at least there were herders and chief herders on the payroll. During the late twenties, however, it became in creasingly difficult to interest herders in acquiring more deer through herding, 59 and -- there being no alternative source of wages -- herding on a constant basis declined. Without accurate herd counts, the high yearly percentage increases attributed to spring fawn crops were perpetuated, even into the period when herds began declining in size. There is clear indication that the transition from observable and countable herd ownership to ownership on the basis of ledger entries was never effectively made. Ideally, an owner of a share of stock participates in a stream of income being generated by the issuing organization according to the extent of his subscription. In the case of the reindeer associations, the identity of one share of stock with one reindeer (one unit of observable asset) was maintained. The Eskimo owner owned a given number of reindeer, not a given percentage of corporate income. The effort, in other words, was to avoid the abstraction required by equity ownership. The one-share-to-one-reindeer perspective led to considerable owner disappointment when it was found that ownership shares had become greatly over-valued. As previously mentioned, fawn increases were computed on the basis of the total shares owned by a given member. A moment of thought will reveal that to apply a percentage increase of the magnitude used (50- 60 per cent) to the total number of shares owned greatly overstated the actual fawn crop. The net annual herd increase for a well managed herd can run as high as 33-l/3 per cent, or 50-to-60 per cent of the adult female 87 popu l a t ion.. By increasing. . mem ber s hare owners h.ip as muc h as 60 per cent may have been an appropriate expectation from the adult female population, but certainly not the entire herd. Net annual herd increase during the 87 Lawrence J. Palmer, Raising Reindeer~ Alaska, miscellaneous publi cation number 207 (l1ash i ngton: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1934), pp. 4-5

60 1930's was estimated at 20 per cent. 88 It is entirely probable that, had there been some distinction between stock shares (i.e., 11 female 11 and 11 male 11 shares), this disasterous error could have been avoided. More realistically, the very concept of share ownership, and the abstraction it necessarily requires, was completely unadoptable. By 1940, many associations were operationally out of control. By this

> i t owners r were physically disappearing and that share ownership was greatly over-valued. Periodic reductions to total shares owned by members effected rapid devaluation of recorded herd sizes. In the records of the Unalakleet Native Company, Mary Andrewuk, the aging heir and widow of Charlie Antisarlook, 11 owned 11 over 5,000 deer in January of 1939. By November 1945 she owned 234, and by April of 1951, 194. 89 Simi- larly, in 1944, when Eskimo owners decided to return to individual ownership at Deering, they could find less than one-tenth of their recorded herds.

In 1944, Reindeer Service emp 1oyees were urged to work 11 ceaseless ly 11

against association ownership in their efforts to create 11 Lapp-like 11 indi 90 vidual herds. In so doing, they returned to an official policy first launched in 1892.

Marketing Patterns and a Return to Private Owners hi~ In the late 1930's, the Reindeer Service operated 39 local reindeer of- fices, employing village teachers as local reindeer superintendents. These local stations fell under the supervision of five regional managers, whose

88 I bi d . , p . 5 . 89 Ledgers of Unalakleet Native Company, pp. 190-191. 90J. Sidney Rood, Memorandum to Unit Managers, dated October 17, 1944 (in the files of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Nome, Alaska). (Mimeo.)

61 91 activities were in turn coordinated by a reindeer superintendent in Nome. When it became clear that the widespread lack of constant herding was due primarily to the absence of means among Eskimo owners to support and pay an adequate effort, the Reindeer Service began increasing its efforts to locate markets for reindeer products. In a circular letter to regional and local managers in 1936, the general superintendent encouraged his field men

d coo nate efforts to sel 1 reindeer products in "outside markets. 1192 Beginning about 1936, reindeer hides were shipped aboard Department of Interior vessels to Seattle for auction. Still-born and new-born fawn skins were sold for 75¢ each (F.O.B. Seattle), and winter skins for as high as 90¢ each. Reindeer tails and 11 bells 11 (a tuff of hide which hangs beneath the 93 animal's neck) brought from 2¢-to-5¢ and from 5¢-to-15¢ each. This opera

tion led to \!Jidespread killing of deer by Eskimo herdsmen, who possessed many surplus deer and greatly desired to realize some income from them. With out a parallel market for reindeer meat products, deer carcasses were left on the range to rot or were used for fox bait.94 By 1939, there were suffi cient numbers of Natives with skins thus acquired that it became necessary

91 J. Sidney Rood, Statement to the Alaska Planning Council Regarding Reindeer in Alaska, 1938 (in the files of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Nome, Alaska). -C-Mimeo.) 92 J. Sidney Rood, Circular Letter to Local Reindeer Su~ervisors and Unit Managers, No. 23, November 25, l93~(in the files oft e Bureau o:r Indian Affairs, Nome, Alaska). (Mimeo.) 93J. Sidney Rood, Circular Letter to Local Reindeer Supervisors and Unit Managers, Nos. 20, 31, and 36, August 26, 1936, February 20, 1937, and November 3, 1937 (in the files of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Nome, Alaska). (Mimeo.) 94 Letter from Albert Bernhard to Anthony J. Diamond, May 19, 1937, Diamond Papers, Box 32; also letter from Emilie B. Anderson to Anthony J. Diamond, June 27, 1940, Diamond Papers, Box 31.

62 for regional managers to set a maximum limit on the number of fawn skins shipped. 95 It is important to note that the best hides are produced by those deer in the best condition, potentially the best breeding stock. If the appearance of an animal was important in selecting those to be shot for their hides, and indications are that it was a criteria, this resulted in generally weaker herds. A weaker herd has quite clearly less chance of surviving the arctic winters, which permit the survival only of the fittest. It is also important to note that the Eskimo owner responded to the market for skins with zeal and with little thought for the future. To the Eskimo, a surplus of deer had worth only insofar as it was of value in exchange, and exchange value had proved itself to be of ephemeral significance. In 1940, in the absence of any substantial success in developing mar kets for reindeer products, the Reindeer Service returned to its policy of earlier years of subsidizing herding expenses. It was not recognized that live reindeer were no longer a sufficiently attractive wage for herders and that Eskimo owners had no alternative wage payment fund. Most Eskimo by this time had acquired fixed habits that required a continuous supply of commercially made products, and, with no market for reindeer products, there was little reason to care for or to own reindeer in excess of subsistence needs. In an effort to encourage constant herding, the Reindeer Service em ployed herd assistants and apprentices for $45.00 and $20.00 per month, respectively, thus sharing in herding costs. The Eskimo owner was obliged to contribute subsistence products of at least equal value. 96 Though marketing

95 J. Sidney Rood, Circular Letter to Local Reindeer Supervisors and Unit Managers, No. 44, April 26, 1939 (111 the files of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Nome, Alaska). (Mimeo.) 96J. Sidney Rood, Circular Letter to Reindeer Owners, December 22, 1939 (in the files of the Bureau of Inaian Affairs, Nome~a). (Mimeo.)

63 conditions changed little, this form of herding subsidy lasted only a few years in most herds. By 1950, the few remaining herds were under government control again and were serving as a basis for loans to individual Eskimo owners. 97 Depending upon the number of deer left and the attitudes of association members, the return to private ownership was effected differently from regi on to region. In those cases where herds sti 11 existed the owners were urged to sign an agreement to loan their deer to the government or to a selected individual who had manifested an interest in continuing in the business. In one case, a herder was still "paying off association members" until

the early 1960's. The government herds formed f~om association herds served as a source of deer loans to individual Eskimo -- a practice still in exist ence today.

A Note on Political Representation The period from 1930 marks the real beginning of political education among most Eskimo reindeer owners. In no previous time did Native owners write notes to congressmen, government committees, and employees in the volume and lucidity as they began to do during the events leading to the demise of the Lomen interests. Previously, the Natives' persuasive efforts were almost exclusively on the personal, face-to-face basis at which they were extremely competent. It was, however, fast becoming clear to many owners that government field personnel were themselves very sensitive to influences other than those in their immediate environment. Similarly, the value of

97 There exist today two "community owned herds" that were carried over from the association period of reindeer ownership. These are known as the Stebbins and St. Lawrence Island herds. Remnants of another community herd are located on Kodiak Island.

64 reindeer in exchange for commercial products now very clearly depended upon

little understood forces emanating from 11 outside. 11 When federal investigations of the reindeer industry were initiated in 1931, the hearings were held in Washington, D. C. No Eskimo owners were present there -- but simultaneous meetings were held by the owners themselves in Nome, and telegrams in support of the Washington hearings were drawn up and dispatched, Later, in 1933 -- when Ben Mozee, a highly respected employee of the Reindeer Service, was fired -- letters from many villages, one con taining over fifty signatures, were sent to Alaska's congressional delegate arguing for Mozee's reinstatement.98 Some villages held meetings when the Reindeer Act of 1937 reached them, again writing letters to their delegate expressing positions on sections of the bill. This is not to suggest that Native ovtner opinion became a unified, mean ingful political force overnight. Most of the Eskimo initiated correspondence was sent to persons with whom the Eskimo had previously met in the field and had learned to know and trust. W. T. Lopp, Ben Mozee, and C. L. Andrews were teachers and Reindeer Service employees for many years on the peninsula, and it was to these men that most Eskimo owners wrote about their feelings and problems. Until his death in 1939, Lopp remained active as a communication link for the Eskimo. All three of these men were instrumental in initiating and directing the anti-Lomen sentiment that led to the end of non-Native ownership. The Native response to Mozee's removal in 1933 testifies to the important communication and mobilization roles played by a few trusted spokesmen.

Trust in a few articulate 11 links 11 with the 11 outside 11 indicates in part that, as is true today, the Eskimo owners did not view themselves as a unified

98 Political Correspondence Files, Diamond Papers, Box 32. 65 force capable of exerting political will together. Indeed, as has always been the case, a few known personalities may serve as a far greater catalyst for opinion formation and mobilization than a fragile agreement among poli tically equal Native owners. As has been previously noted, the Eskimo is culturally accustomed to tend to his own daily pattern, leaving diplomatic affairs to· a relatively few individuals. This works well only when the diplomat thinks and acts according to commonly shared values and norms.

Hhen the need for representation 11 outs i de 11 became increasingly important, the number of individuals capable of being both culturally representative and articulate with outside forces was few indeed. In the early 1930's, the role of the diplomat was filled by a few sen sitive government field personnel whose tenure in office was less a function of Native support than of agility in handling successive administrative attacks from ~~ashington and the territorial government. Native trust and intensity of dependence proved far more durable than occupancy of a given government field office. The very nature of political affiliation among the arctic Eskimo -- the fundamental reliance upon personal contact and eventual confidence through intimate knowledge of behavior -- proved anti thetical to the years of frequent governmental field personnel changes inau gurated by the events of the l930's. From the late l930 1 s to the late l950 1 s, when Native leadership began to emerge, the Eskimo owner 11rns for the most part without inter-cultural representation.

Summary The years 1933 to 1950 were ones of sweeping changes and consequent ad justments for the Native reindeer owners. The period began with the decline and eventual cessation of integrated export operations by the Lomen Companies. 66 Later, the Native owners were exposed to stock company operations while, at the same time, the reindeer herds were rapidly disappearing. The period culminated with largely unsuccessful attempts by the Office of Indian Affairs to seek new markets for reindeer products, and with the reintroduction of individual ownership. These were the years during which optimism about the commercial develop ment of a reindeer industry was exposed as the unreliable excess of partially organized planners. Reindeer ownership and reindeer as a production resource became known as concepts that yield to cyclical market forces controlled by someone 11 outside 11 the Eskimo realm of influence.

CHAPTER IV. THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1951-1968

Introduction This chapter describes the major events shaping Native reindeer owner ship from 1951 to 1968. It is organized to include treatment of the changes that occurred over the period in the number and location of privately owned and operated Native herds, the effect of new processing and marketing tech niques, and the evolution of interest in reindeer as a commercially signi ficant regional resource base. There are important differences between the period covered in this chapter and the two earlier periods. Novel events seem to reach rural Eskimo owners with greater frequency than before and are initiated by a greater number of sources than previously. Whereas during the previous period of private ownership (1895 to about 1925) the Eskimo owner had for the most part contact with only one government agency, he now has sporadic and largely uncoordinated dealings with many agencies, both private and governmental. Potentially usable marketing channels have multiplied, as have some supply channels. Additionally, while the passage of time tends to blur individual differences among Native ovmers, it is a gross oversimplification, when examining responses to current day events, to give the impression that Eskimo owners share common opinions about a given event. As suggested in the introductory chapter, individual behavior is of great importance in the Arctic. It will become increasingly apparent to the reader that differences in individual owner behavior exist and are an important influence on the general nature of Native involvement with reindeer.

69 The Transition to Stable Ownership The return to private, individually owned herds was not effected im mediately, or even within a few years. The transition period was one of trial and error, a process which is still underway. Entry into the industry during the late 40 1 s and throughout the following decade was controlled by Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) field representatives. During the present decade, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) began actively to supervise ilization and allocation, but until this time the BIA exercised exclusive entry supervision. There appears to have been no explicit pro cedure for the implementation of individual ownership. Experienced reindeer men, often government herders who manifested interest, were loaned a herd for a specified period of years if both deer and range land were available in sufficient quantity. In a few instances, individual 011mers emerged from the ranks of association membership, borrowing the remnants of association herds. In 1948, there were nine individual operations in varying stages of development toward private (non-borrowed) ownership status. (See Table I.)

TABLE I. Private/Individual Herd Operations, 1948 Years in Estimated Vi 11 age or Region Native Operator Opera ti on Herd Size Golovin Sigfried Aukongak 2 1 ,542 Kiwa llk Mickey Thomas 2 600 Kotzebue Henry Weber and York Wilson 4 2,600 Se 1awik Charles Smith 3 1,332 Shungnak Lawrence Gray 3 400 Barrow Vi 11 age Albert Hopson 2 600 Point Barrov1 Tommy Brower 44 1,250 Cape Halkett Steven Reuben 2 400 Teller Fred Topkok 4 650 SOURCE: Charles Rouse, C. R. Montjoy, and D. M. Belcher, Reindeer Survey - 1948, made jointly £y_ the Fish and Wildlife Servic~ and the Alaska Native Service (July-September 1948), pp. 1-16. (Mimeo.)

70 By 1958, herd ownership and the regional distribution of herds had changed greatly. Herds to the north and east of Kotzebue Sound had encoun tered a variety of problems with caribou and wolf predation. The prevalence of caribou on reindeer ranges not only creates considerable difficulty for the herder in keeping his deer separate from caribou herds, but also reduces the market value of, and Native interest in, a herd of reindeer. With herds of bou within hunting distance of northern villages, there was little incentive to herd reindeer, and especially to exercise the constant control necessitated by predator proximity. As Table II shows, by 1958, there were no herds north of Noorvik or east of Selawik. (See Table II.) The high failure rate among operators whose herds were east and/or north of the Seward Peninsula continued into the past decade. The Cammack (Noorvik),

TABLE I I. Private/Individual Herd Operations, 1958 Years in Estimated Vi 11 age or Region Native Operator O~erati on Herd Size Golovin Sigfried Aukongak 12 5,231 Candle Charlie Cl ark 7 3,500 Deering Ed Karmun and El mer Thomas 1 , 100 Cape Es penberg Harold Dimmick and Fred Goodh ope 1/2 1 ,562 Buckland Paul Hadley 5 1 ,500 Selawik Lawrence Gray and John Keats 13 1 ,537 Selawik William Sheldon 1 1,000 Selawik Andrew Skin 3 1 ,800 Noorvik Louis Cammack 2 900 Unalakleet John Kotongan 3 650 Noatak Ross and Johnson Stalker 2 1 ,097 Tell er Johnny Kakaruk 8 2,250 SOURCE: Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annual Land Operations Report, 1958, pp. 11-12.

71 Stalker (Noatak), Sheldon, and Skin (Selawik) herds were each lost to mi grating caribou and wolves. The period from 1958 to 1968 also proved de structive to Native partnerships. The Karmun-Thomas, Dimmick-Goodhope, Gray-Keats, and Stalker cooperative efforts all succumbed, primarily because of inter-partner tensions, though caribou and predator losses were important factors in the case of the Stalker partnership. The Stalker herd declined from 1 100 in 1961 to 85 in 1965. Sheldon lost 700 r b 1961 1962. In 1961, Harold Dimmick dissolved his partnership with Fred Goodhope, taking a herd of 550 deer from Cape Espenberg several hundred miles south east to Koyuk. The herd returned to Cape Espenberg in 1961 and 1963. In the fall of 1963 Dimmick quit. By 1968, all 11 private herds were either on the Seward Peninsula or in close geographic proximity. No active partnerships existed among the ONners, and the only remaining community herds -- St. Lawrence Island and Stebbins -- were commercially inoperative. The BIA now operates a large herd on Nunivak Island and a smaller herd near Nome. As is evident from Table III, the size of individual herds vary greatly, from about 200 to about 5,000. Only three herds are managed by owners or family members under 50 years of age. None of the present owners or actual managers served as apprentices in government herds, although one owner, Charlie Clark, served an appren ticeship term from 1917 to 1921 in the herd of Native owner Thomas Sokweena. Another owner, Alfred Karmun, who was born in 1910 on the tundra near his father's herd, was raised, as were several of the current owners in reindeer camps. Fred Goodhope worked as herder for the Deering Reindeer Stock

Company during the late 1920 1 s, as did Alfred Karmun. Sigfried Aukongak

72 TABLE I I I. Private/Individual Herd Operations, 1968* Years in Estimated Village or Region Native Operator Opera ti on Herd Size Golovin Sigfried Aukongak 22 5,000 Deering Alfred Karmun 5 1 ,029 Buckland Paul Hadley 15 1'700 Cape Espenberg Fred Goodhope 10 2,086, Se 1awik Lawrence Gray 2 I ) Candle Charlie Clark 17 961 Unalakleet-Shaktolik Gustoff Sagobnick 1 195 Tell er Kakaruk Estate 18 3,000 Brevig Mission Ra 1ph Kugzruk 3 600 Koyuk Archie Henry 7 480 Nome Lawrence Davi es 1-1/2 500

*It should be noted that this table does not include two government herds (Nunivak and Nome) and two community herds (St. Lawrence and Stebbins). SOURCES: (1) Herd estimates - BLM; (2) Years in operation - BIA; (3) Field interviews by author.

and Lawrence Gray can both boast of the longest continuous ownership periods, exceeding twenty years in each case. The reindeer industry has a pool of experienced reindeer men, but there is an age gap of nearly a quarter of a century between the older, more experienced and the younger, more flexible ovmers. Ownership has become stabilized in several herds in recent years, but, because of the advanced ages of many owners, a transition to younger manage rrent is underway. The Aukongak and Kakaruk herds are now passing to sons of the original operators. The Clark and Hadley herds will soon follow this general pattern, and, within five years, assuming family retention of herds,

73 the age distribution of ownership will have changed markedly. To date, the transfer of ownership from father to son has not been a smooth one. Docu mentation of desired distribution upon death is still infrequent, and some confusion among heirs has resulted. The total acreage of an individual range differs considerably depending upon BLM determination of seasonal forage abundance and the presence in some cases of natural boundaries, Table IV shows the range size for each owner under BLM permit, and the range acreage per animal in April 1968. There is no commonly accepted general guide to an appropriate range-per-deer ratio. Each range differs in the quantity and quality of seasonal forage. The BLM has set a temporary maximum to the total herd size for each range, but these figures are only rough approximations and are under continual review. It is impossible to state with certainty an appropriate range-per-animal ratio because of the absence of precise range knowledge and also because the avai 1- ability of forage depends considerably upon the severity of each winter. Some winters are far more severe than others, and late fall rains can cause ground ice formations that prevent access to winter graze. Actual deer range allowances would thus change from year to year and season to season. To the writer's knowledge, only the Aukongak range has been thought of as over-stocked in recent years. In summary, the years 1951 to 1968 are characterized as a period of trial and error, during which relatively stable ownership experience has been accumulated in several of the larger herds. At present, the majority of reindeer owners are over fifty years of age and several have been in more or less constant contact with reindeer for several decades. A younger group of owners is now beginning to emerge through family inheritance and (in the case of Lawrence Davis) through original acquisition. There is no precise 74 TABLE IV. Range Allotments and Current Utilization Approximate Number Herd Total Acreage of Acres/Deer* Aukongak 1,009,280 201. 86 Clark 814,080 847. 12 Davis 658,944 1,317.89 Goodhope 1 '15 7 '120 554.71 Gray l, 1 9 ' Hadley 2,232,320 1,313.13 Henry 760,960 1 ,585.33 Kakaruk 784,000 261. 33 Karmun 689 ,280 667.91 Kugzruk 416,000 693.33 Sagoonick 421,000 2,158.97

*Computed using herd sizes from Table III. SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management.

knowledge of appropriate seasonal range acreage per deer as yet, and herd sizes and range characteristics vary considerably from operation to operation.

Prospects for New Processing and Marketing Patterns Since the early l960's, the processing and marketing of reindeer products has attracted local and state-wide attention in magnitudes comparable to the Lomen era 30 years earlier. With the demise of Lomen export operations in the late 1930 1 s, Native owners competed for small local markets, and, as men tioned previously, sold reindeer by-products with the help of government trans portation and marketing channels. During the 1950's, government sales of reindeer products from the Nunivak Island herd to markets within Alaska and to the "lower 48" became increasingly significant, and that herd soon was the

75 principal regional producer. Most Native-owned herds continued to service local village markets, with sporadic sales to extra-peninsula villages whose demands were not met by the Nunivak Island operation. Without explicit plan or design, a division of markets between private owners and the government's Nunivak Island operation evolved. Private sales were limited primarily to markets on the Seward Peninsula and northern villages, while Nunivak products were sold in villages in the Kuskok1,11im River area, urban concentrations such as Fairbanks and Anchorage, and to a lesser extent in "lower 48" markets. As late as 1963 and again in 1965,Nunivak operations amounted to nearly one half of all deer butchered for sale in western Alaska. Native operators have traditionally slaughtered on the range near their home village. Slaughtering occurs almost exclusively in the winter months when spoilage presents no problem. Carcasses thus obtained are held at the operator's home village for shipment by air to retailers in Nome or Kotzebue as required. In 1966,a Nome Eskimo businessman established the Northwest Reindeer Processing Company, with slaughtering house facilities at Solomon, and began serving as processing and marketing agent for the herd owner at Golovin. The Golovin herd at the time was estimated to contain nearly 8,000 deer, and the accelerated output from the herd upset the precarious division of markets existing at that time among Native owners and between Native owners and the government. The Northwestern Reindeer Processing Company represents a substantial departure from traditional peninsula reindeer operations. Conceptually, it has an intermediary function, a radical innovation to Native producers who have grown accustomed to -- and are in most cases inseparably committed to themselves serving as producer, processor, and wholesaler. Until the advent of the new firm, intermediation was unknown except with reference to the 76 Lomen operations, a rather burdensome heritage to overcome. The company is still the center of much local controversy, while the new departure in mar keting it represents has proven to be just a few years in advance of feder ally imposed processing requirements in the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967. 99 Marketing channels are destined for further change. In 1967, the state began assuming an active role in marketing reindeer products in urban areas.

By 1969 the Nunivak Island herd output, as well as all private herd produc tion, may be marketed by state agents. Thus, in less than a decade, Native operators have been placed in the position of soon having to radically adjust behavior patterns that have, in some instances, accumulated over a period of forty years of actual experience. To several of the older owners, these changes are tantamount to revolution. To the younger owners, they simply represent "too much politics."

Interest Group Crystallization The fast moving events of recent years have produced new organizations and have stimulated interest and attention among existing organizations. All Native owners are members of, and participate with varying degrees of interest in, a loosely structured organization, the Northwest Alaska Reindeer Herders Association, which is based in Nome. In August 1967, the Bureau of Land Manage ment, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Governor of Alaska agreed to a division of labor and responsibility in matters relating to the reindeer industry. The BIA agreed to continue its management of ranching aspects, the BLM agreed to supervise range utilization, and the state assumed respon sibility for the guidance and promotion of the processing and marketing of

99 U.S. Congress, Wholesome Meat Act of 1967, Public Law 90-201, 90th Congress, 1967.

77 reindeer products. The Northwestern Reindeer Processing Company continues to enter as an important force into questions surrounding future processing facility locations and marketing channels. The city management of Nome has emerged as an active force seeking to foster a municipal role in the indus try's future. The University of Alaska has initiated a variety of research programs, independently and in cooperation with government agencies. Activity from such a variety of sources is a new experience for the Native owners. The Reindeer Herders Association is more than anything else a manifestation of Native owner desire to avoid being swept aside or carried along in another ill conceived and overly optimistic industry adventure that is doomed to failure. Native interest in proposed processing and mar keting enterprises is uniformly expressed as a desire to retain as much con trol over operations as is physically and economically possible. Aside from fears of losing control over the disposition of their resource, much recent interest group activity produces an indifferent shrug of the shoulders.

Summary The major events affecting Native involvement with reindeer from 1951 to 1968 were changes in range and owner industry composition, radical alter ations in slaughtering and marketing processes, and a brief suggestion of interest group proliferation. A relatively stable production sector evolved, and most attention was directed toward product preparation and marketing.

78 PART TWO: THE NATIVE HERDSMEN AS CONTEMPORARY MANAGERS

This part of the study examines the Eskimo reindeer owner as a resource manager. Chapter V is devoted to an analysis of owner attitudes toward pro duction of reindeer products and the place of production in current life styles. Chapter VI examines the market environment of the Native owner, and Ch r VII explores the peculiar role played by the owner's village in Native resource management.

CHAPTER V: THE PRODUCTION ORIENTATION

Introduction This chapter analyzes the role reindeer production plays in the annual activities of the Eskimo reindeer owner. The generalized annual work round, the income generating characteristics of present herding operations, the possibilities for a specialized owner-herder occupation are examined, and a general analysis is made of production manaqement problems facing present owners.* The following discussion is of fundamental importance to an understanding of Native involvement in reindeer herding. Domesticated reindeer are not indigenous among Bering Strait Eskimo. Reindeer are a transplanted resource. As such, the activities surrounding the use to which the resource is put necessarily reflect a way of life that developed independent of that re source. Reindeer production and utilization have been superimposed upon the host culture, and, as is usually true in such cases, the resultant pattern of utilization is unique and is a product of the degree of fit between the resource and the production orientation of its new owner. This chapter, like Chapters VI and VII, analyzes the degree to which reindeer and the occupa tional role of the reindeer owner adjust themselves to the needs of the Bering Strait Eskimo society.

A Generalized Annual Work Round

No Eskimo owner herds his reindeer on a year-round basis. The extent to which Native-owned reindeer are herded varies from one owner to another, but seems to adhere to a general annual pattern. During the winter months, *The data for this chapter are from the writer's field notes and ob servations.

81 when snow-cover improves the herder's mobility and reduces that of the rein deer, herding is exercised relatively continuously. During the late spring, summer, and early fall, herder mobility is at its least precisely at the time reindeer travel rapidly over considerable distances in their efforts to avoid the swarms of tundra insects. Spring and summer are also periods in which a variety of traditional activities compete for the owner's atten tion and ene es All herd-owning families participate to some degree in subsistence hunting and fishing. As spring breakup commences and summer approaches, hering, trout, and white fish become available. Salmon are actively ex ploited during July and August, in some instances as a commercial endeavor. Seal and beluga whale hunting are important spring-time pursuits for several reindeer-owning families. Wild fowl provide a source of meat and eggs, and late summer berries are preserved in large quantities. All of these acti vities are of traditional importance to the Bering Strait Eskimo. The meats and oils produced by spring and summer hunting and fishing are still funda mental in the diet and consumption preferences of reindeer-o\.'ming families. Even Eskimo who have for years lived away from their home village manifest a strong desire for Native foods. As it happens, reindeer fawning season (April 15 to about June 15) fre quently conflicts with spring subsistence activities. Fawning season is without question a most critical period for a herd of reindeer. Weather con ditions and the frequent presence in the area of predators such as wolves, bear, lynx, fox, ravens, hawks, and eagles can combine to greatly reduce fawn survival rates. If the adult female is frightened from its newly born fawn, the fawn will often perish in the sub-zero spring temperatures. Continuous

82 care and protection is therefore required during these critical weeks. A few herds are rounded up for marketing and castrating during the 1as t few weeks of July. Others are "handled" during March, and a few have not been rounded up for several years. The choice of which time of year to handle the deer seems to be a function of owner preferences, which are in turn directly related to the timing of conflicting activities. In some cases, summer handlings are restricted by the absence of available, in r ested manpower. BIA field representatives are often instrumental in sched uling major handlings and in assisting in the acquisition of supplies and men. Logistics and communication call for equipment frequently not pos sessed by the herd owner. Indeed, corrals and field cabins are in some cases constructed from BIA acquired and transported materials. Butchering usually occurs in November or December and in January or February, depending upon the owner, available manpower, weather conditions, and market needs. The deer are generally driven to within easy traveling distance of the village and slaughtered on the range. In only one instance in 1968 was a slaughtering facility used. Activities attending the care and utilization of reindeer are thus al most exclusively limited to the winter months, from September to May. Dur ing these months fewer conflicting subsistence activities exist, and the many village men who spend their summer mining, fire fighting, or working as construction or fish cannery employees have returned home. Winter slaugh tering, marking, and castrating round-ups are important village events with both social and economic ramifications. These handlings are frequently at tended by almost all village residents, and provide a forum for the distri bution of reindeer meat products and hides to village members. Wage payment

83 is typically in the form of reindeer meat, though the wage itself may be denominated in currency values. The nominal valuation used is 40¢ per pound Herders with their own dog team or snow machine receive about $10 per day, covering the period from their departure to their return to the village. Herders without their own transportation receive about $7.00 per day. Labor payments for handling are the same as those for herding. Wages for slaugh teringvary, but average out to about $2 per hour, Ten hours of slaughtering will thus yield 50 pounds of reindeer meat. Villagers who participate in the roundup and winter slaughter activity can, and frequently do, procure their winter meat supply in this way. For those villagers drawing unemploy ment compensation on summer earnings, wage-meat payment is clearly preferable to wage-cash payment. Those villagers whose meat requirements are exceeded by wage-meat payments can arrange to receive groceries from the herd owner's supply stock as partial payment. More frequently, surplus carcass meat ac quired as wages are exchanged for a line of credit at the village store. In such cases, the real value of wage earnings is greatly reduced insofar as the credit advance at most stores is denominated at retail prices, which are phe nomenally high in the Arctic. Slaughtering time has about it a holiday atmosphere. For the owner, it is the most important social event of his year. Production for market is nearly equalled by reindeer slaughtered to pay labor expenses and to feed families and dog teams. The winter day is short -- only five to six hours and there is no sense of temporal urgency. It is not uncommon for fewer than twenty deer per day to be slaughtered. The cost per carcass produced for market is accordingly quite high. In review, Native reindeer owner annual activities generally adhere to the following pattern: 84 From May to September, herding is abdicated in favor of hunting and fishing. This is in accordance with traditional diet requirements and annual activities.

From October to A~ril, more or less constant herding is performed. During this period, t e nerder has a mobility advantage over the rein deer that he does not enjoy during summer months. Production for market occurs during this period, as does most local consumption of meat products.

The above distinctions are admittedly crude, but they do point out the single most important characte stic concerning ve rein ovme h p not a specialized occupation. The Native owner engages in a variety of activities, only one of which is reindeer herding. There are four primary interrelated reasons that ex plain the lack of specialization. Two of these, the pull of traditional sub sistence activities during the summer and spring months and the greatly en hanced mobility of the reindeer on snow-free tundra, have been mentioned. The other two reasons are the lack of sufficient income from operations to justify specialization, and a lack of responsiveness on the part of Eskimo culture to permit specialization in occupations.

Operating Costs and Revenues Eskimo managed herds producing for commercial sales miqht appear at first to be a profit generating enterprise. The owner pays nothing for the graze land, makes no research and development expenditure, pays no interest on the government deer loaned to him for breeding stock, and, according to some ob servers, can keep expenses down by paying his helpers in reindeer meat. In addition to low operating costs, those herders whose range lands are located in the western-most portion of the peninsula can profit from the seemingly endless supply of mavericks that drift onto their ranqe.

85 What appears to be true at first blush is merely a mirage caused in part by the appearance of relative material abundance of the owner as com pared with his village peers, the magnanimity with which Native owned rein deer are distributed and consumed during winter handlings, and the unbridled optimism which seems generic among peripheral observers. In the few in stances where field accounts of operating expenses are maintained with some accuracy and completeness, however, reindeer ownership under current operating conditions is not a dependable profit producing enterprise. This is due less to owner mismanagement than to the curious mixture of subsistence and commercial production attitudes held by the ovrners and village residents. Reindeer are simultaneously a source of village subsistence and owner income. The degree to which a herd of reindeer generate profit for the owner depends primarily upon the degree to which the owner is committed to the use of his herd for village consumption. The Native owner must try to maintain a pre carious balance betv1een personal and community benefits. He is socially and genetically related to most of the village population and cannot, without risking censure, economically out-distance his village fellows too greatly. The desire to increase income from operations, which is frequently voiced to non-Eskimo listeners, is greatly inhibited by the owner's economic and social responsibilities to his home village. As mentioned previously, winter handlings for slaughtering are at the least village-wide events, and are, in some cases, events of regional im portance involving more than one village. The owner is obliged to feed par ticipating families and their dog teams. Reindeer thus consumed, plus deer slaughtered for wage-meat payments, frequently equal the number of carcasses that eventually reach retail outlets. In one case, an owner of a herd of about 1,000 reindeer slaughtered 306, but marketed only 183, the remaining 86 5. Freight charges. Computed at 5¢ per pound shipped.

The approximate percentage breakdown for each cost category in relation to total cost is shown in Table V. There appear to be few economies of scale under present operating con ditions. The largest cost factor, range slaughtering, maintains its rela tive proportion to total costs in herds ranging in size from 1,000 to 3,000 deer. Accounting profit or loss is computed by reducing sales revenue to the extent that expenses are incurred. Although several Eskimo owners have in recent years slaughtered from 25-to-30 per cent of their herds, only slightly over half of the carcasses slaughtered produce sales revenue for the owner. In one instance, 23,300 pounds reached markets, while 15,744 pounds were consumed locally in wages and herd operations. In this case, per pound costs at Nome totaled 46¢, and the meat was sold for 40¢ per pound. This is not an atypical example.

TABLE V. Approximate Percentage Distribution of Production Costs Cost Category Percentage of Total Costs 1. Direct labor and camp meat consumption 55.40% 2. Operating plant and equipment 18.30 3. Financing costs 5.46 4. Miscellaneous expenses 9.88 5. Freight charges 10.96 T 0 T A L 100 . 00%

88 123 being distributed as wage payment or consumed as herd operating expenses. In another instance, the deer consumed by dog teams nearly equalled the num ber actually sold. Those herders who keep records do not compute the cost of the deer used in this way as operating expenses. To many owners, it is a social obligation from which they derive non-financial rewards. Inclusion of n~at payments and deer consumed for herd operations as relevant cost items reveals that production costs per pound sold frequently exceed per-pound revenue. Most herders currently price their carcass meat at 40¢ per pound at Nome or Kotzebue. Air freight charges to those urban centers differ from village to village, but can be approximated at 5¢ per pound. The principal production cost categories are as follows: 1. Direct Labor and camp meat consumption. Labor scale is put at $2.00 per hour for slaughtering activity and is paid in carcass meat at 40¢ per pound. Herding and corraling wages are $7.00 or $10.00 per day, depending upon employee-employer transportation arrangements, with payment again in meat at 40¢ per pound. Camp meat used is assessed in these computations at 40¢ per pound. 2. Operating plant and equipment. Initial purchase price, gas and oil and maintenance charges for snow machines and other vehicles, power saw expenses, and maintenance of corrals and range cabins. 3. Financing costs. Payments of interest and principle on bank loans, and in a minimum of cases, on federal loans. 4. Miscellaneous expenses. Camp supplies such as cooking utensils, food stores, ammunition, and saw blades. These supplies are appro priately valued at retail prices extant at Nome or Kotzebue, plus transportation charges to the village. 87 The above data are not intended to mean that under changed circum stances a reindeer herd could not be profitably operated. They do point out that existing production techniques used by Native owners are village, rather than owner, oriented. The critical cost generating activity is field slaughtering. It is no accident that slaughtering activities are likewise the forum for distribution of meat products among village residents. It should be noted in passing that it is precisely in the area of slaughtering -- or meat processing -- that most changes to established habit are underway. A central slaughtering facility was planned for the fall of 1969 at Nome. Financed with state and city funds, it is intended that herders from several ranges will separate the deer they plan to slaughter each year and drive them to the central facility. There does not appear to have been much consideration given to the social and economic meaning of range slaughtering at the village level. As pointed out above, range slaugh tering is a costly operation, but it is also the only means village residents have of reducing owner income. Given existing merchant-herd owner credit agreements, it is also the only means currently open to the herder to acquire labor resources.

Specialization -- An Arctic Rarity It seems generally true that industrial development requires a cadre of individuals willing to become occupational specialists and able to abandon the multiplicity of activities usually required for economic self-sufficiency. Being able to specialize requires at a minimum a dependable and rewarding market for specialized production and functional balance among a variety of specialists in a given society. Neither condition is satisfied on the arctic frontier, or, for that matter, on any frontier. 89 The occupational specialist is exceedingly rare in an Eskimo village, and it is doubtful if he would exist at all if unassociated with federal employment. Most middle-aged males have worked at a variety of summer jobs, ranging fron construction laborer to fire-fighter, with changes in employ ment as frequent as each new year. In addition to yearly occupational var iance, there exists substantial variance in the range of productive endeavor within a given year -- as has been mentioned already with reference to the reindeer owner. No single occupation -- including reindeer ownership - seems sufficiently rewarding of itself to support the village Eskimo and his family. Even if this were not the case, it is doubtful specialization would occur. Few arctic Eskimo would be willing to forego the seasonal diversity of activity to which they are accustomed and the economic flexibility which at tends this diversity. Fears of economic vulnerability due to year-round specialization are well justified among reindeer owners, many of whom can easily recall less stable ownership patterns. It should come as no great surprise, in view of the cyclical history of commercial rewards from rein deer ownership, that reindeer production retains a strong short-term orien tation. Reindeer ownership is a high risk endeavor, especially in the absence of year-round herding practices. In advanced industrial societies, occupational specialization seems to lead to an emotional commitment of no small intensity. Indeed, it is not uncommon for an individual to identify himself to others and to himself by his particular occupational niche in the industrial complex. Accord ingly, it not infrequently occurs that an individual's sense of value with respect to himself and others becomes inseparably merged with specialized occupations and the degree to which a given specialty is centrally 90 related to perceived industrial progress. In an industrial society, the question, 11 l~hat are you? 11 more often than not produces an occupational category. Among the arctic Eskimo, the same question produces either confusion or the response, 11 I am an Eskimo. 11 Further questioning in an industrial society frequently moves from occupational category to corporate identity. For the Eskimo, the conversation moves to family ties and village residence~ Few Eskimo reindeer owners are either willing or able to reduce their

range of supportive activities, or to permit the category 11 reindeer owner 11 to subsume their village and family identity. To do so would require first a clear and stable conception of what it means to be a reindeer owner. This in turn requires, at the very least, an obvious functional relationship between reindeer ownership and other local industry. This has not existed since the disappearance of large-scale year-round mining operations. Cor respondingly, few Eskimo reindeer owners are willing to submit, economically or emotionally, to the rigidity of specialization. This is especially true in that the resource and the market are largely controlled extra-culturally and extra-regionally. Family and village cooperation have proven themselves superior to any single enterprise in meeting the vicissitudes of arctic life. The degree of estrangement from these personal relations, which occupational specialization under frontier conditions would inevitably produce, is a cen tral obstacle to the co-existence of Native ownership with commercially vi ab le reindeer production. It is doubtful that reindeer production under existing circumstances can be greatly increased apart from simultenaous de velopment of complementary local industry. Only then can the web of person to-person interdependence that typifies frontier 1i fe-styl es be rel axed enough to permit individual commitment to any single productive endeavor.

91 Production Management in Proper Perspective Domesticated reindeer have roamed for centuries across the northern reaches of Asia and Scandanavia. It would seem that, given the antiquity of the resource, it would be possible to set down with reasonable certainty a few basic principles of sound production management. This is not the case for several reasons. First, although domesticated reindeer are an ancient resource they have not until the last tv1enty years been regarded as a vehicle for regional, social, and economic development in the Soviet Union or among the Scandanavian countries. Concern for regional development among remote peoples, as manifested in concrete programs and demonstrative research, is generally a post-World War II addition to the political respon sibilities of national governments. Second, reindeer herding peoples are generally among the most geograph ically and culturally isolated of groups. The traditionally nomadic char acteristic of the occupation inhibited, until quite recently, continual con tact with basic institutions of culture change, such as church and school. Third, the use of reindeer as a basis for industry and an instrument for culture change originated with the introduction of deer into western Alaska. In spite of the fact that Alaska reindeer were the first to become regarded as a regional resource base, there has been no attempt to systema tically study production management among Eskimo herdsmen. Production methods developed during the Lomen era, as well as range and husbandry research car ried on during this period, were for the most part discredited by the large scale failure of the industry during the 1930's and l940's. In addition, it seems generally true that production recommendations resulting from range and husbandry studies give little serious consideration to herder implementa tion. 92 The Norwegian and Lapland reindeer experience in Alaska provides an im portant insight as to why some reindeer management principles, when developed, were of short duration and limited applicability. Before the period of wide spread industry decay, these herders proved themselves capable of success fully adapting to Alaska range conditions. Their herds quickly outdistanced those owned by the Eskimo and were apparently herded on a year-round basis in those years when market proximity provided justification. There were significant differences in the range and technology used by the Norwegian and Lapland owners. None of them agreed to settle on range lands that are entirely treeless, though these range areas were offered to them by Dr. Jack son. Instead, each new owner selected range that contained a distinct tree line -- Nilima at Buckland, Klemetsen at Golovin, Bahr and Bango at Unalakleet, and Sara and Spein at Bethel. When asked about underlying reasons, family members replied that the trees serve as important land marks for herders and provide protective cover to both herder and reindeer from winter winds. Landmarks were used to recall previously examined winter pasturage and to reduce the dangers of becoming lost while herding. Stands of willows were also used by the deer to reduce summer insect annoyance by pressing closely together inside the willow thickets. The Lapp and Norwegian owners also made considerable use of skis con structed of birch sapplings. Most Eskimo continued to use snow-shoes, re portedly finding the speed of skiing totally unacceptable. Trained herding dogs, an invaluable addition to production technology, were widely used by Lapp and Norwegian owners. Most Eskimo have never succeeded in integrating and making continuous use of this production aid. The bond of affection ex isting between herd dog and herder, so crucial in training the animal to

93 obey arm movements by the herder, is an alien concept to most Eskimo, who are accustomed to using dogs only as beasts of burden. The Lapp and Norwegian herders tied bells to selected reindeer as an early warning device against night predators and as an aid in locating the deer. They spent considerable time taming selected reindeer for use as draft animals and also as a means to reduce the wildness of the herd. Taming a few key herd leaders can ly ce ral h an L owner reports having a barn near his home in which he kept sled deer. The technology used by Lapp and Norwegian owners did not survive the generation of young men who came to Alaska in 1898. Herds grew to unman ageable size and invalidated many herding techniques that were designed for herds of fewer than 3,000 deer. Sled deer and dog teams proved behaviorally incompatible, with the latter eventually becoming the sole survivor, though reduced need for draft animals was an important factor here. In more recent years, snow machines provide the principle means of winter conveyance for herd owners, though dogs still sometimes outnumber village residents. To the writer's knowledge, no Eskimo owner uses herd dogs as a systematic herd ing aid. There is no attempt currently to tame key herd deer as a means of reducing general herd anxiety. It seems clear that part of the reason for the limited duration of Lapp Norwegian production technology in Alaska was the decline in market utiliza tion of reindeer products and services, and the consequent increase of herd sizes beyond levels to which the technology was adaptable. It succumbed, in other words, to the same forces that destroyed Eskimo herding techniques, which were far more labor intensive and therefore more fragile in the face of market adversity. It should be noted, then, that reindeer production man agement in Alaska, as a forum for the application of an industrial technology, 94 has no historical guidelines of proven flexibility. Each Native owner manages his herd according to his own particular views toward and know ledge of reindeer behavior and his particular income requirements and general style of living. Government field men report a hesitancy to pro pose this or that production technique as being superior to current prac tices, primarily because established management principles are non-existent. There does seem to be general agreement among herders, and between the herders and government personnel, that year-round herding is a neces sary precondition to dependable production. A herd that is left untended for much of the year is more wild than domestic; virtually impossible to locate in its entirety for marking, castrating, and slaughtering; and selects its own range. Few roundups in recent years have succeeded in locating all deer estimated to inhabit a given range. This makes it impossible for a herder to attempt to achieve a bull-to-cow ratio he may desire, or to slaughter on the basis of complete knowledge of herd composition. With herds as small as they now are, lack of control over winter range due to summer abdication of herding is not a pressing problem. If herds should continue to increase in size, protection of winter range from the hoofs of insect crazed reindeer will become a critical production requirement, as will the minimization of herd size during winter months. Occupational specialization -- that is, year-round herd management -- appears to be cen tral to a successful institution of orderly production. It is precisely in the area of specialization that the Eskimo owner is least open to change. Reindeer herding is far more capital intensive now than ever before. The initial cost of a snow machine varies from $1 ,000 to $1 ,500. Mainten ance costs for machinery are quite high in the Arctic, given the rough ter raine and extremely cold temperatures. One enlightened owner, after keeping 95 account of snow machine costs over several years, pointed out that it would be cheaper to purchase new machines each year than to try to use 11 01 d ones. Similarly, while in years past winter herders dressed in reindeer hide boots and clothing and slept in reindeer sleeping bags, the modern Eskimo herder buys commercial products. None of the herders own airplanes, but it is not infrequent that government field personnel aid considerably in locating a stray herd from the air. Finally, in those villages that are favored with a local road network, the Eskimo owner makes use of a pick-up truck or similar vehicle for the few months roads are free of snow. In one rare case, an old 04 catepillar provides slow but dependable cross tundra conveyance for the owner, his family, and equipment. The trend toward a more capital intensive herding technology has not been paralleled by similar changes in slaughtering techniques. Field slaugh tering retains its labor intensive character. But then, field slaughtering provides the means for village distribution of benefits from an occupation that would otherwise lead to an untenable accumulation of wealth by the village reindeer owner. Field slaughtering also provides the forum for most owners to display the generosity that must attend positions of economic importance. In other words, field slaughtering performs other functions in addition to preparing market products. It is "inefficient" in the sense that it drives costs up to levels which restrict owner herding efforts. Several owners indicate a clear need to institute year-round herding, but are at a loss to find ways of competing with summer wage \IJOrk available to village men, or to offer enough incentive for young teenagers to forego their summer vacations at home. It should be mentioned in closing that reindeer seem to possess little inherent value for the Eskimo. That is to say, there is little value to 96 reindeer unassociated with market price or village need. Indeed, it is only in association with market or village consumption that reindeer are of currency in meeting the challenge of arctic living.

Summary In the analysis of the role reindeer production plays in the annual activities of the Eskimo reindeer owner, two basic contradictions that per meate Eskimo production methods become apparent. First, rudimentary mana gerial control requires year-round specialization, yet specialization con tradicts the basic style of frontier life. Second, commercial exploitation is far more capital intensive than at any time in the past, yet production remains institutionally bound to village subsistence requirements. Few his torically validated production management principles exist. The one manage ment requirement that receives unanimous agreement is the need to institute year-round herding. But year-round herding cannot be separated from the annual activities of arctic living, and it is basically at odds with them. In the final analysis, reindeer herding is closely tied to a pattern

fitted to the Eskimo 1 s annual production cycle -- a cycle which necessarily exploits a diversity of resources -- and is not typified by specified divi sion of labor. Similarly, the organization of range slaughtering takes a form dependent upon, and derived from, other forms of social life.

CHAPTER VI. THE MARKET ORIENTATION

Introduction Close adherence to schedules attends much of the routine of carrying on business in industrial societies. Careful attention to the sequence of activities, from production to consumption, and to the time allocated to each phase of activity are major preoccupations of many business managers. Indeed, in closely competitive industries, profit may hinge upon inventory minimization through precision scheduling of stock flows. In the arctic frontier, scheduling is also sometimes critically impor tant, but precision is not to be found. There are no all-season roads con necting producing firms with market customers. Also, there are no communication channels or air-flight schedules not subject to the vicissi tudes of weather. Summer cold storage facilities are extant on only one producer's range, and retail merchant storage facilities are too small to accommodate volume reindeer meat product purchases. With rare exception, reindeer are an economically exploitable resource during winter months only, and the arctic winter imposes its own schedules. Production and marketing in arctic Alaska require a great deal more attention to patience than pre cision, and preclude the low-margin, high volume operator. This chapter examines the market orientation of Native reindeer owners. Included are a description of information and product channels, an examina tion of intra-industry relations, and an analysis of the social role of mar kets for reindeer products. The division of production and market orientations into separate chap ters is more a matter of convenience than a reflection of actual fact. As 99 has been pointed out, the Eskimo owner performs both functions. Indeed, Eskimo owners are producers, processors, wholesalers, and, in a significant number of cases, retailers of their product -- carcass reindeer meat. Only recently has there been an interruption of these highly integrated opera tions, and it has been accompanied by no small amount of attendant systemic shock. It appears that many owners have become heavily committed to their multi-functional role. As was shown to be the case in combined production processing operations, market interaction also takes its form and complexion from other, perhaps more fundamental, social forces. This means that mar keting channels are more rigid than is perhaps true elsewhere, for they carry other burdens in addition to the flow of products. Like all arctic institutions, market channels themselves perform a variety of functions, i.e., they are not specialized.

Information and Marketing Channels

The Native he~d owner distributes his product through a variety of channels. Each owner uses more or less the same channels, though frequency of use and volume differ depending upon herd size, availability of inter ested village stores, and the owner's own credit-cash needs. The products from one herd (Golovin) are processed and marketed by the Northwest Reindeer Processing Company (NWRPCo). This represents a significant and recent de parture from the historical pattern of non-intermediated product flow. At the village level, the most important distributive technique has already been mentioned -- wage-meat payments. It is by virtue of the herd owner's role as processor, and thus large scale village employer, that village

100 residents for the most part acquire their meat supplies. Those wage earners whose meat payments exceed their needs exchange the surplus for credit at the village store at the value of 40¢ per pound. The herd owner also sells carcass meat to village residents who did not participate for meat payments. Here again, the price is nominally 40¢ per pound, though payment can be in the form of future services, and va 1ue quanti fi ca ti on is rarely adhered to in fact Sales to village stores make up another distributive channel. Village store management differs greatly. Some stores are owned and managed by Cau casians, others are village-owned and managed by appointment. Whereas meat acquired through individual purchases from the herder or through wage payments is stored and consumed as need dictates, the stores cut and wrap the meat. The usual transaction pattern is for the owner to exchange carcass meat at 40¢ per pound for credit. Retail prices for the meat vary according to own ership and management philosophy, but average between 50¢-to-60¢ per pound. Individual herd owner distribution and village store sales, when they occur in the same village, are clearly competitive, and this is not lost to either village residents or store management. Some store owners complain of Native herd owner lack of appreciation for wholesaler-retailer price and quantity relationships, pointing out (with tongue in cheek) that village residents can buy carcass meat at the 11 same 11 price the store pays. Store owners also complain of supply shortages. The herd owner, dependent upon the village population for labor and bound to many by familial ties, has both social and economic obligations that provide him with strong incentive to deal directly with village residents. For the herd owner to deal exclusively with the village store would be tan tamount to an abdication of his village responsibilities and would also be a

101 significant breach with traditionally strong networks of inter-personal co operation. Meat products sold through the intermediary of the village store become abstract and are not useable by the herder as an instrument with which to fulfill village obligations or to reinforce his community position. Existing barter arrangements, though clearly profitable for the mer chant, impose obvious obstacles to smooth product flow. On the one hand, few village stores can entirely and continuously me most h r sumption requirements. Merchant acquisition of reindeer prod~cts clearly hinges upon merchant abilities to continually stock a growing variety of products. On the other hand, merchant demand for a particular herd owner's products depends upon that herd owner's particular need for credit. In one case, one herd owner, whose operating methods are far more nomadic and less capital intensive than is generally true, finds his market greatly restricted by his minimal credit needs. This should be instructive for those industry observers who are bothered by the Eskimo's lack of adaptation to the stereo typed, nomadic, labor intensive reindeer herding style. Until very recently, and to a great extent even today, a herder creates his market through his consumption habits. That a herd-owner creates his market through acts of consumption places him in a precarious position with reference to his village society, and to Eskimo society generally. The distribution of wealth by wage-meat payments is well founded in the cultural tradition of mutual cooperation. The village oomalik of the last century distributed part of his wealth among those who participated in its maintenance. But there are no cultural guidelines among his own people or among the peoples of his adopted culture that instruct the herder in how to distribute a line of credit that bears his name without it seeming more like charity than payment for services rendered. 102 Nome and Kotzebue are the two largest urban-like population concen trations in western Alaska. Distribution from outlying villages to these market centers is entirely by air transport, in small quantitie~ and on a sporadic basis, depending upon winter's whim. The largest buyers are the mercantile stores in each center, three in Nome and two in Kotzebue. Re tail credit advanced at the stores is the prevailing mode of payment, nominally at 40¢ per pound A given herder will customarily deal with more than one merchant, de

pending upon his experiences with each store. 11 Experiences 11 here frequently means not only the range of products available through the merchant, but

al so merchant wi 11 i ngness to 11 carry 11 a herder through production de 1ays. The herder's reputation for dependable quality is also a consideration in some cases. Either the herder or the merchant may initiate a given trans action for, say, 15 or 20 carcasses, though the merchant seems to be the most frequent to do so. A herder in need of cash can arrange for part pay ment accordingly, again at 40¢ per pound. A bush pilot or banker, in his concern over payment for services advanced to a herder, may arrange with the merchant a credit-cash combination paid to the herder. In such cases, the merchant may pay the pi lot or banker directly. In one case, a herder

is 11 carrying 11 a merchant until the spring ocean-going freighter arrives and shelves are again well-stocked. In short, marketing patterns between Nome and Kotzebue merchants and their herders reflect the mosaic of frontier personalities and the patchwork of frontier budgeting by both participants. Each transaction may differ ac cording to the immediate needs of either merchant or herder. The arrangement is at once highly flexible and, given the general movement toward increased use of cash in other transactions to which the herder is party, highly rigid.

103 Hithin the last two years, several herders have made sales to distant Alaska towns and villages, often with assistance in communication of orders and scheduling of transportation from the Northwest Reindeer Processing Company and/or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. These sales are large-- from 100 to 200 carcasses each and clearly by-pass the frontier credit network. Under present slaughtering conditions and with existing herd sizes, large sales of this i ent ales seve N owned herds. 100 Sales terms on these large orders differ somewhat, but normally the herder pays all charges to the retail establishment, resulting in an effective price at his village of 25¢-30¢ per pound. Some herders rely quite heavily upon sales to individual families living in Nome, Kotzebue, Selawik, or Noatak. In some cases, the herder journeys to these market centers and sells half or quarter carcasses on a door-to- door basis. Sometimes, village residents request one or more carcasses to be shipped on the next available plane and then distribute carcass portions among family members. Less frequently, the pilot himself may distribute the meat and collect payment for the herder. The larger population centers such as Nome and Kotzebue relieve the herder of much of the tension surrounding his relations with merchants in his home village. These larger markets are more heterogeneously populated, containing families from several regional villages, and the social obligations placed on the herder's use of reindeer at his home village are less a factor.

lOOAnnual sales crop under existing conditions can be approximated by assuming 30 per cent of the entire herd is slaughtered, minus 40 per cent of that figure for field consumption and wage-meat payments. Thus, a herd of 1,000 head will produce for sale 180 carcasses. This is but a crude approxi mation technique and uses estimated (read disputed) herd size figures. It does approximate actual production in recent years for most herds.

104 The observation that a herder creates his own market through his con sumption patterns remains valid for merchant-herder relationships in the market centers. Until the last few years, large sales to Fairbanks, Anchor age, Bethel, or Barrow were extremely rare. Excepting these extra-peninsula transactions, the herder is even today largely committed to the credit bound aries of Nome-Kotzebue merchants.

Intra-Industry Relations The most important development affecting relationships among Native owners in recent years has been the initiation of attempts to introduce systematic slaughtering and marketing operations. In 1966, the Northwestern Reindeer Processing Company entered into an agreement with the Golovin herd owner to slaughter and market that herd's surplus deer. In its first year of operation, the company produced from its Solomon slaughtering facility over 1 ,000 carcasses, primarily for the Nome market. Production in such quantity exceeded Nome demands and merchant facilities and mobilized con siderable resentment against the company among those herders who customarily serviced Nome merchants. The rigid credit network, which has characterized local marketing channels for nearly three-quarters of a century, was thrown into almost total disarray. The company further instituted wage-cash pay ments for processing employees, which represented another radical departure from traditional patterns and necessitated cash payment for at least a part of total production. Some of the local censure directed toward the company has subsided. It now actively pursues markets in the Kuskokwim River basin and in northern Alaska, and thus does not compete so obviously with smaller herd owners for peninsula markets. Most herders manifest an ambivalence toward the company. 105 A few of them have approached company management for assistance in marketing surplus deer, and employees of other herd owners have asked for help in ironing out disagreements with their employers. The ability to market large volume orders is at once an enviable position for the company and a source of much of the distrust that attends its operations. The majority of herder experience is with relatively small shipments (15 to 30 carcasses) to merchants in Nome or Kotzebue. In other words, their experience is within the credit network, which places a primacy on inter-personal involve ment. The presence in the industry of a single combined herder-processor operation capable of again disrupting established marketing channels has revealed to many herders the rigidity attending their own processing and marketing arrangements. Though several herd owners seem to take a dim view of the publicity that has attended company operations, regarding it as too boastful on management's behalf, they are themselves beginning to contemplate and in some cases implement changes in their own operations. As pointed out in Chapter IV, the Northwest Reindeer Processing Company has proved to be an advanced model for changes now being planned by state and municipal authorities. Field slaughtering for market appears at this point to be officially unacceptable under the wholesome Meat Act of 1967. Plans for processing and cold storage facilities located at Nome are currently being implemented. For the herder, this means abrupt changes to established relationships in his home village and between himself and merchant contacts. By fall of 1969, it appeared that herders will be producers only, driving their stock to a central processing point for sale on the hoof, much like the cattle industry of the early 20th Century in the western states. Another not so new problem permeates intra-industry relations -- the apparent absence of conflict-resolving mechanisms among Native owners. The 106 most frequent occasion for inter-herder disagreement relates to range tres passing. As mentioned earlier, reindeer tend to run into the wind in their efforts to escape summer insects, and to graze into the wind as well. Those herders whose range lands are not bounded to the west by natural obstruc tions to reindeer travel are constantly faced with widely straying herds. This is especially true in the absence of summer herding. Winter round-ups can be, and sometimes are, events of intense emotive display by neighboring herd-owners who gather together to separate and ear-mark the deer. In one case, slaughtering on one owner 1 s range was temporarily suspended when a neighboring herder complained to state police that his deer were in danger of being slaughtered. When asked why disputes among herders are not settled at herder association meetings, herders indicate a fear that conflicts ar

bitrated by association members will favor 11 the other11 herder. Common village background seems of fundamental importance in the actual eruption of disputes over range trespass. Those herd owners who claim the same village as their childhood home rarely have observable disagreement, even though range contiguity would normally produce such conflict. Being from the same village produces a fund of shared experiences between owner families not available otherwise. Inter-family marriages, which still tend to follow regional-village patterns, also result. The strong identification with village domicile and its importance in 19th Century regional relation ships is well documented. lOl In inter-herder relations, conflicts or dis agreements that are referred to extra-cultural adjudication are rarely between herders who share a common village background.

101 Ray, Journal of the West, Vol. VI, No. 3, pp. 371-394.

107 It is interesting to note that the reindeer range boundaries of the 1960's resemble with only minor differences the territorial boundaries ex isting between peninsula villages during the last century. 102 Current range perimeters were established by the Bureau of Land Management in 1962 after consultation with several herd owners. The degree to which the territorial demarcations of three-quarters of a century ago were reinstituted by those herd owners is indeed striking. Six of the herders who were active in 1962 were occupying range lands that corresponded with lands of their ancestors. Trespass on these range lands not only violates 1962 boundaries, but in some cases, and for some herders, violates village ter ritorial integrity. Territorial violations by extra-village residents in the context of the last century were serious infringements. Incidents of poaching, and the clear reluctance of herd owners to prosecute violaters who reside within territorial boundaries, support the more traditional de finition of boundaries, as do the more widely publicized infringements by extra-territorial individuals. Disputes arising between herders of varying village backgrounds were adjucated by extra-cultural techniques, i.e., through the efforts of the BIA field representative. One final element of importance in intra-industry relations is the role played by BIA field personnel in allocating markets and guiding change among the herders. Large volume orders for 100 or more reindeer carcasses from market centers such as Anchorage or Barrow are frequently communicated to the Nome BIA field office. This places field personnel in the sensitive position of allocating these orders to selected herd owners. In the absence 102 For 19th Century territorial demarcations between villages, see Ray, Ibid., p. 372. For Bureau of Land Management reindeer range boundaries established since 1962, see Figure 1, this study.

108 of policy guidelines, apart from their general responsibility for orderly industry progress, BIA personnel generally try to give these orders to herders undergoing difficulties in marketing surplus animals. The general effort is to keep market shares among the larger herd owners (l,000 or more deer) more or less equal. This has not seriously damaged inter-herder relations. Indeed, it has proved to be generally favored by most herders, who seem to prefer a rough balance of market shares over the monopoly-like industry structure introduced by the Northwest Reindeer Processing Company. The technique used by BIA field personnel for introducing changes in production practices has generally been that of setting examples. Change, through imitation of proven techniques, is consistent with Eskimo prefer ence for indirect supervision. However, because of differing regional-village backgrounds among the herders, the method is limited, and efforts to introduce change throughout the whole of the peninsula have been inhibited. The attempts to set examples for imitation by the herders have seemed to reinforce industry factionalism and have produced cries of 11 favoritism 11 and "paternalistic meddling. 11 In an effort to depersonalize change, the BIA established a "model herd 11 at Nome in 1966.

Reindeer Market Changes and the Frontier Credit Network In 1966, the Northwest Alaska Reindeer Herder's Association verbally established a minimum wholesale price of 40¢ per pound for reindeer carcass meat sold at Nome or Kotzebue. As previously suggested, this minimum price has been generally adhered to by most herd owners. There are no quan tity specifications attending the price floor. This is characteristic among

109 Eskimo herd owners, who have traditionally taken a dim view of price reduction for quantity orders. To Eskimo owners, the credit-exchange value of a reindeer carcass does not diminish during a given transaction merely because the purchaser decided to buy more carcasses. Indeed, credit ad vanced at retail prices provides value diminution enough, a fact not lost to the herders. The minimum price agreement among current herd owners is important for two reasons. First, it establishes a common pricing policy for the

owners and greatly discourages actual or imagined 11 dumping 11 by the larger owners. Second, it reflects an emerging conception among owners that they can act effectively as a group to change their operating environment. For

some owners, 40¢ per pound is a substantial increase in price. It is an increase they would not have adhered to without association support. Group responsibility for an unpopular decision provides a certain kind of individual comfort. It is interesting to note that in 1943 BIA field personnel urged the Office of Price Administration not to designate ceiling prices F.O.B. Nome, pointing out that 20¢ per pound for carcass meat at Nome would deprive dis tant herds of the Nome market. 103 Twenty cents per pound was proposed at that time to be the minimum price that would provide herd owners with suf ficient income for sales to encourage them to actively manage their herds.

Actual prices during the l940 1 s fluctuated from 6¢-to-15¢ per pound for most

sales of carcass meat. 104 11 Dumping 11 by herd ovmers needing credit was a

103 Letter from J. Sidney Rood, General Reindeer Superintendent to the Office of Price Administration, Juneau, Alaska, April 17, 1943 (in the files of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Nome, Alaska). (Mimeo.) l0 4Ibid.

110 severe problem twenty years ago. 105 Forty cents per pound is regarded by many peninsula merchants to be far too high, both in terms of historical vJholesale prices and their under standing of the herders' cost structure. It is difficult to justify this view in either case. Close attention to the high costs of production at the herder's village reveals that 40¢ per pound under existing circumstances

l V) P t esale p ces refle a riod of peninsula merchant market control no longer extant. The events of the past two years have greatly reduced the degree to which Nome and Kotzebue mer chants can reduce local wholesale prices through bargaining. The herders, through their association, and by periodic sales to extra-peninsula markets, are breaking out of the local credit network that many of them now see as inequitable. Merchant discontent is more a manifestation of the frustration attending the erosion of their relative bargaining power than an appeal to business principles. Market channels are changing. Most of this change has encouraged a broadening of the geographic perspective with which the herder views him self and his resource. Regularly scheduled village air service permits herd owners to buy directly from Fairbanks or Anchorage. Mail order catalog purchases and bulk food stores are in evidence in several herders' homes. In short, the frontier credit system grew out of an earlier period. It is no longer tailored to the needs of the village herder, and correspondingly must change or submit to gradual decay. 105 rbid., p. 6 (and) J. Sidney Rood, Circular Letter to Local Reindeer Supervisors-and Unit Managers, July 17, 1941 (in the filesof the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Nome, Alaska). (Mimeo.)

111 Summary An examination of the market orientation of the Eskimo reindeer owner reveals that existing peninsula markets and the attending relationships between herders and local merchants are the product of an environment now beginning to undergo rapid change. The frontier credit network which simul taneously smoothed out seasonal fluctuations in herder income and tied production quantities to herder consumption is beginning to give way to the broadening economic perspective of herd owners. The rudiments of herder price consciousness have reappeared, having been hidden in credit-exchange values since the departure of large-scale peninsula mining operations. Intra-industry relations are strongly patterned according to the vil lage-regional identities of herd owners. The territorial demarcations which existed between peninsula villages in the last century have been almost com pletely reinstituted in the form of reindeer range boundaries established since 1962. Knowledge of the 19th Century political-economic alliances be tween peninsula villages helps considerably in seeking to understand the presence or absence of inter-herder conflict over range trespass.

112 CHAPTER VII. THE VILLAGE ORIENTATION

Introduction This chapter examines the Eskimo herd owner as a member of his village community. Two aspects of the topic are treated: (1) the territorial per spective of the herder and the ramifications this has in establishing and maintaining cross-boundary ties; and (2) those herder-village relationships that are clearly related to reindeer ownership. The territorial perspective of the Eskimo herder enters as a deter minant force into his daily thoughts and behavior. It, more than any other single factor, restricts his ability to effectively administer his resource when such administration requires extra-regional cooperation. It similarly inhibits his effectiveness as a general agent for cultural change when in contact with residents of other regions. As such, it is a highly relevant topic for this study. Economic importance alone does not always produce social status and prestige in the herder's village. The chief variable seems instead to be personal conduct -- in other words, personality. A precise analysis there fore requires an in-depth treatment of village expectations and individual herder response, but this must in turn be generalized to preserve informant anonymity. It is necessary, when faced with considerable diversity in herder personalities and village environments, to obscure important details in generalities -- with the ever attending knowledge that precision has to some extent been sacrificed.

113 The Meaning of "Vi 11 age" In 19th Century western Alaska legends, there exists the Inyukutak, or "hiding man, 11106 an Eskimo who has for one reason or another become separated from his home village and its surrounding territory, and, knowing no one in the area he finds himself, hides to avoid the severe treatment accorded strangers among Bering Strait Eskimo. Only in the company of a guide with an established reputation could an Eskimo of one village territory visit another, unless on previous visits he had established his identity by forming reciprocal agreements regarding trade or hospitality. Between Norton and Kotzebue Sounds -- that is, among the Bering Strait Eskimo -- there were twelve territorially distinct village units. Each re gion contained within it a capital village in which could be found the Kazgi, or ceremonial houses for that region. Regional identity was achieved by allegiance to the capital village, and designated by attaching the suffix, 11 -miut, 11 meaning "people of" that village. Residents of Kingegan territory thus regarded themselves as Kingingmiut, although they might actually reside in one of the lesser villages in that territory.107 Alliances between contiguous territories permitted inter-regional trade and, to some extent, common use of regional resources, when the ecology of one territory was complimentary to that of its neighbor. Thus, Wales, with its sea mammal subsistence pattern, developed economic alliances with Kauwerak, where caribou were the predominant resource. For the most part, however, annual production activities were subject to territorial boundary limitations. 106 Ray, Journal of the West, Vol. VI, No. 3, p. 380. 107The twelve regional areas were: Buckland River (Kangyik), Deering (Inmachuk and Kiwalik Rivers), Shishmaref (Tapkak), Wales (Kingegan), Little Diomede Island (Ingalik), King Island (Ukuivuk), Port Clarence (Sinramiut and Nook), Kauwerak, Nome (Ayasayuk at Cape Nome), Golovin (Chinik), Fish River (Irathluik), and Koyuk. (Ray, Ibid., p. 376.)

114 Most capital villages were located at the mouths of rivers. Spring and summer activities centered on the sea and the river, while during winter months much of the population would move up the river and its tributaries in search of caribou and other land game. The annual round of activities could therefore be accomplished in most cases without the need to infringe upon neighboring territories. The island economies were clearly an exception, requiring access to mainland caribou and river fishing grounds.

The annual migratory route followed by herds of caribou until about 1880 brought them through peninsula territories during the fall and winter months. These herds were exploited by territorial inhabitants on an indi vidual-stalking basis and through cooperative corralling efforts while they were within territorial boundaries. Permission was required to hunt on neighboring lands, even on those subject to alliance. Generally, residents of one territory did not follo\'1 caribou herds to another territory as they travelled through the peninsula. Indeed, one of the most frequent causes of inter-village friction appears to have been over caribou territory trespass. 108 Vestiges of the 19th Century territorial ordering of annual activities are still retained by village Eskimo. Buckland River inhabitants still journey to the river's mouth each spring to hunt beluga whale. Salmon fish ing campsites along the major rivers are still retained by family members, these having been family 11 property 11 for generations. The river basin bias of territorial perspectives remains generally intact. The "hiding man" legend is still quite apparent in the uneasiness with which an Eskimo contemplates a visit for the first time to a village

1081bid., pp. 381-382; (and) Ray, Arctic AnthropolO!J.Y, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 86. --

115 with which he has no known contact relationships. His first thought upon arrival is to seek out a distant family member, whom he may not have known to exist before. Once this is accomplished, his identity in that village is assured, for he assumes his place as a member of his host's family. In the larger population centers of Nome and Kotzebue, the dis tinctiveness of regional backgrounds is clearly evidenced by the existence of residences grouped together according to territorial origins, Whereas in an industrial society we might expect to find urban neighborhood resi dence a function of occupational category, in the Eskimo towns choice of residence site is a function of regional-village background, and is fre quently coincident with the residence sites of relatives. The village orientation permeates Eskimo life. It is a fundamental ordering mechanism that categorizes individuals otherwise unknown to one another. This is true for the Eskimo reindeer owner as for all other Eskimo. Reindeer ownership does not produce a shared conception of anticipated be havior. Reindeer owners are residents of a particular village and region first, and an occupational group only secondly, if at all. In the absence of commonly accepted management practices and year-round commitment to a specialized occupation, this should come as no great surprise. Reindeer ownership is not a category superior to that provided by territorial iden tity, i.e., it does not cut across regional boundaries to form a distinct class or group. The strong and dependable local markets that encouraged specialized ownership and an incipient reindeer aristocracy at the turn of the century have not existed in more recent decades. Mutual confidence in inter-personal relations is normally forthcoming from the predictability of behavior produced by adherence to commonly shared

116 norms. In the absence of distinct occupational categories among the Eskimo, expectations about another's behavior are formed on the basis of territorial residence. Each village-region apparently has a distinct reputation for peculiar modes of behavior, some having been more aggressive in trade and territorial infringement in the past than others. 109 It is not infrequent today to hear casual comment about the generalized personality of a rural village population in reference, for example, to honesty or drinking propensity. To the Eskimo reindeer owner, to be from a particular village calls to mind a rather distinct group of people and a particular region. He relies upon his village identity in sorting out familial connections between himself and other Eskimo and in his choice of temporary residence and companionship while away from home. When in contact with the non-Native banker, merchant, or government representative, his identity as a reindeer owner-herder may provide him with a forum for communication. But among the Eskimo, he is primarily of a certain family and from a certain village.

The Herder and His Village Reindeer owners are not always men of importance in village affairs. Nor are they necessarily well liked. Those who have acquired a reputation for stinginess in paying for labor rendered at handlings or at butchering time find themselves short of help when periods of intense activity arise. Owners who do not begrudge the large amounts of deer consumed for herd

109 rt is interesting to note in this connection that both T. L. Brevig and W. T. Lopp comment on the 11 vJales 11 reputation for aggressiveness in both trade and warfare. Wales appears to have been the last village on the penin sula to curtail Kazgi ceremony, the traditional forum for expression of village-regional unity and territorial distinctiveness. Ray mentiones a history of rivalry and animosity in Wales-Kauwerak alliance relationships.

117 operations and wage-meat payments seldom complain of winter labor shortages. This suggests that a man's standing is more dependent upon his realization of his responsibilities to the village as opposed to his interest in pri vate benefits from reindeer herd operations. As previously pointed out, herd owners -- with a few exceptions - create their own product markets through the act of merchant-credit consump tion. Consumption among most owners still retains its winter-to-winter time horizon. There is no saving in the form of consumption restraint. Indeed, the credit network emphasis is upon immediate consumption. Investment in plant and equipment is on an "as needed" basis -- namely, when a snow machine becomes more a mechanical burden than asset, or a corral no longer withstands the press of a contained herd. Private herd owner credit require ments are therefore not stable from year to year, nor do they grow at a stable rate. The need to slaughter for sale correspondingly varies from year to year and from owner to owner, depending upon the vagaries of credit requirements. Labor requirements for field slaughtering are relatively fixed. Field slaughtering is labor intensive and is not responsive to economies of scale. In years that a herd owner's merchant credit needs are unusually high, more labor is used and a correspondingly large amount of wage-meat payments is allocated to village consumption. In years when herder credit needs are re duced, less labor is required and this avenue of village acquisition is like wise diminished. The degree to which a given village realizes benefits from

11 its 11 herd in the form of wage-meat fund is clearly dependent upon the indi vidual owner. To non-owners, reindeer are of fluctuating economic relevance and can be a source of frustration. The non-owning village resident benefits

118 for the most part only vicariously -- through herd owner consumption patterns -- from a herd of reindeer which grazes on 11 village 11 territory. Those cases of poaching that become known to non-Native authorities are rarely vigorously pursued by the herd owner. One young owner pointed out that he 11 fed 11 the vi 11 age from January to March, but refused to go into detail. The evidence suggests that, if wage-meat distribution is insufficient to provide enough village meat, other avenues of acquisition are called into play, with little fear of outside -- or herder -- sanction. It should be noted that it is traditional among the Eskimo that a man who is able to lend part of his property to another has more than he needs and should abstain from requesting its return. 110 It is also traditional that in times of game scarcity the best hunters might go hungry, for they could not refuse to share their catch with other village residents. 111 These and other aspects of custom suggest that 11 poaching 11 is an inappropriate term for use among the Eskimo. Those smaller herd owners who slaughter on a sporadic basis, often using the labors of immediate family members only, seem less the focus of village criticism than larger herd owners who slaughter once or twice during the year on a large scale and employ several village residents. Those owning families that are able to strike an acceptable balance between village and private utilization of reindeer uniformly seem to be of greater village prominence in matters not relating to reindeer. To meet both village and individual consumption responsibilities requires, in most cases, herds of 2,000 deer or more. Owners whose herds

110 L. Fainberg, 11 0n the Question of the Eskimo Kinship System, 11 Arctic Anthro~ology, Vol. IV, no. 1 (1967), p. 245. l 1Ibid.

119 number less than 1,000 are not generally expected to support large handling or slaughtering events. Herd owners with between l ,000 to 2,000 deer are in a transitional phase from minimum to maximum pressures for greater pri vate and village consumption. These herds are large enough to require the employment of large numbers of village men for handling and slaughtering, but are not large enough to support both private and village consumption requirements and still preserve growth-oriented herd sex composition. Vil lage expectations about owner responsibilities are not formed without gen eral attention to herd size, and it is the intermediate size herd (1 ,000 to 2,000 deer) which produces most herder-village tension. Herd owners who manage to pass through this critical developmental phase do not do so with out alienating a few village members. Once an owner's herd reaches and ex ceeds 2,000 deer, he can more easily produce sufficient carcasses for sale to answer his own consumption needs, while simultaneously permitting more liberal village allocation. Village residents will not, within limits, dis parage increased owner consumption if it is not at their expense. Private owner benefits from reindeer herds are of a residual nature. Once herd sizes reach levels that necessitate organized labor-intensive handling and slaughtering activities (about 1,000 head), the village dis tribution mechanism is set into motion and greatly restricts herd growth beyond that point. With the increasing cost associated with more capital intensive herding methods, i.e., snow machines, the private consumption residual left for an owner of a herd of 1,000 to 2,000 deer has become less and less satisfactory. An owner with a strong sense of obligation to vil lage members clearly stands little chance of enjoying herd growth beyond this intermediate range, given the interrelationship existing between his

120 consumption and the perceived general welfare of the village. One means which owners use to limit slaughtering and improve chances for herd growth is to reduce their own consumption of market products through subsistence hunting and fishing. But, as has been mentioned, to abstain from year round herding for these activities in turn reduces the chances for herd growth. There are, then, three general strata of herd sizes. The village re spons i bi 1i ti es that attend herd ownership vary according to the strata occupied. Herds under 1,000 head are almost entirely of a subsistence category and rarely serve as wage-meat fund for the village families. Herds of intermediate size, from 1,000 to 2,000 head, require but cannot support

(in the 11 style 11 necessary) both private and village needs. Herd owners in this range comment about combined village-private expectations exceeding herd production possibilities. These herders may desire to increase herd size, but find that doing so often requires an attention to herd use which is inconsistent with general village requirements. Herd owners with above 2,000 head have achieved a production plateau in the sense that the annual slaughter can easily permit simultaneous satisfaction of village and private demands. Most of the magnanimity customarily associated with distribution of "surplus" resources finds expression at this level of herd size. The personality of the herder can considerably influence his ability to provide the conditions necessary for herd growth. Modesty, an aura of quiet emotional strength, and, above all, a propensity for generosity in re source distribution seem of substantial importance in village expectations about a herder's role in village life. Most herders -- especially those with intermediate and large herds -- have a resource base sufficiently large

121 to secure obligations from the entire village population. The web of inter personal cooperation that makes arctic life bearable also provides the basis for the exchange of deer products for services rendered or promised. Field slaughtering is a part of this 11 reliance 11 network and is the herd owner's most fundamental link with the network. Owner behavior -- as asses sed by his fellow village inhabitants -- depends upon his ability to recon cile the sometimes contradictory pressures emanating from the 11 reliance 11 network on one hand and the credit network on the other. These pressures are most contradictory when herd size simultaneously demands attention to increases in village and individual consumption. As an individual consumer, the owner participates in the credit network, which places a primacy upon increased consumption. As a village resident, the owner participates in the reliance network, which places a primacy upon generosity in village distribution. Success in the imaginative reconciliation of these opposing forces never seems complete.

Summary While non-Natives regard all herd owners as members of an occupational group, the- primary identity reference for the individual herd owners is in relation to a particular village population and territory. The herder is a central figure, balancing the often contradictory forces presented by the frontier credit network (the herder-merchant-market-price relationship) and the reliance network (the web of inter-personal cooperative relationships that bind the herder to his home village). The degree to which reindeer owners are highly regarded in their village is directly related to their ability to reconcile these forces without sacrificing village benefits from the herd. The owner who develops a reputation for parsimonious behavior in wage-meat payment transactions finds the village labor market unresponsive.

122 The plateau for herd size in terms of profitability in the practical sense of minimal restrictions to village and herder consumption seems to be about 2,000 deer.

123

PART THREE: THE NATIVE HERDSMEN AS CATALYSTS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

This part of the study summarizes and develops certain conclusions about the ro 1e of reindeer as a Native owned resource fo'r s oci a 1 and eco nomic development.

125

CHAPTER VIII. THE NATIVE MANAGER IN TRANSITION SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction The present chapter provides a concluding assessment of the probable future role of Native reindeer ownership as an agency of social and economic change. First, the nature of commitment to herding by present and future ownership groups is considered. The potential importance of a younger group of owners, mentioned briefly in Chapter IV, is examined here. Second, the probable effects of central processing upon ownership commitment and the village role of reindeer are considered. It is observed that central proces sing changes the very nature of ownership and will unquestionably produce some measure of owner alienation. Third, a new direction for public policy is proposed, assuming Native ownership survives the challenges of central processing. The chapter closes with a commentary on some unsettled issues, and a statement of conclusions. Part One (Chapters II-IV) of this study examined the Native herdsman in his historical role. It was observed that Native ownership has been sub jected to three destabilizing forces over its 76-year history. First, private-individual herd ownership was interrupted for about a 25-year period (1920-1945) during which cooperative joint-stock companies were instituted and then collapsed. During the early period of privately owned herds, government programs implemented a policy of broadened Native participation -- understood to mean increased numbers of Native owners - without consideration for the ultimate conflict between private ownership

127 and possession of the resource by all Natives. Government policy appears to have been subsistence oriented, when in actual fact production and owner ship were market oriented. Shrinking local markets and an inability to institutionalize resolution of conflicts flowing from many small owners occupying common range lands served to destroy private ownership. It was not fully re-established until after World War II. Second, the number of reindeer has decreased substantially. Domesti cated reindeer are estimated to have numbered over one-half million in the late 1930's and roamed from Point Barrow to the Aleutian Islands. Current herds total less than one-tenth that amount, and all privately owned herds are located on or near the Seward Peninsula. Third, the early association with local markets -- as a supportive in dustry to mining operations -- proved to be a destabilizing force acting upon Native reindeer ownership. Additionally, the rudiments of production tech nology developed during the period of Lomen Company activities were large volume, export market oriented, and are of limited applicability under cur rent circumstances. Local market demand continues to be the most pervasive force operating on the Native owners, but sales to distant villages are growing in significance. Part Two (Chapters V-VII) examines the Native owner as a business man ager and member of a particular village. Reindeer ownership has not caused the formation of an integral group whose occupation transcends traditional patterns of annual activities, nor has it opened new avenues of communication. The Native owner is seen as a central figure in his efforts to achieve a workable balance between the demands of those to whom he is bound territor ially and communally (the reliance network) and the demands of those to whom he is bound as a producer and consumer (the credit network). Field

128 slaughtering links the owner to his village mates, while his own consumption habits link him to local merchants. The present chapter seeks to forecast Native owner response to the most crucial element of change with which he has been confronted -- central processing facilities. The immediate result of the facilities will be to move the herd owner out of both slaughtering and marketing. Both the re liance and credit networks -- extant since 1898 -- will necessarily be radically altered or will be destroyed, and it is these networks which have defined reindeer ownership for the Eskimo herder.

Occupational Profiles and the Nature of Commitment As previously mentioned, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs began to re-institute private ownership of reindeer in the l940's, the criteria for selection necessarily stressed previous herding experience. The experience criterion continued to be emphasized up to the present decade, when the establishment of the model herd at Nome provided for apprenticeship train ing of younger men. The majority of present herders acquired their herding experience prior to the period of industry decay in the late 1930's. This factor has produced an industry in which there is a rather high average herd owner age -- about 49 years. Only three of the 11 herds are now man aged entirely by men in their early 30's. However, two of the three are the largest herds. Within two years, this cadre of younger managers will have doubled and average owner age will drop to about 40 years. An industry in which the majority of owners are in their 30's will react differently in its response to change than will an industry in which

129 the majority of owners are in their 50 1 s and beyond. While owner attitudes in the past have clearly reflected the belief that little of lasting rele vance can be produced by Native owner decisions, the younger herders just as clearly share a growing desire to have some measure of control over in dustry matters. The possibilities for durable consensus on matters of general importance to reindeer ownership seem far greater among the younger herders who share a need for greater income from operations. As a conse quence, they are each more cognizant of common production problems. Younger, more completely dependent families and the pull of diverse services and activities in the larger villages combine to reduce the marginal contribu tion to income of subsistence hunting and fishing and to emphasize the need for closer attention to seeking cash returns from herding operations.

Common ~roduction problems and recognition of a common political en vironment -- much of it originating from extra-ethnic sources -- has begun to produce a sympathy for united herder organization. The recent increase in activity on the part of federal, state, and city officials in matters concerning development of the industry has served to emphasize similarities among herd owners and has obscured traditional hinderences to inter-herder agreement. This is not to say that the territorial identity referent is no longer operative. It is simply being enlarged to embrace all Eskimo herders when they are in opposition to non-Native formulated policies and programs. An example of the tendency toward greater herder solidarity is evidenced in the nearly total adherence to the minimum price level established by the

Reindeer Herder 1 s Association two years ago. The younger herders represent a Native perspective of recent origin. Several of these younger men have traveled more extensively out of the region than have their elder counterparts. Military service, summer jobs away from 130 the home villages, and participation in Native relocation programs to the

11 lower 48 11 states are more typically found in the occupational profiles of the new managers. The peer group of the new manager may stretch from Nome to Chicago to California, and visits to these distant relatives are not un known. Thus, while the older herder typically spent much of his youth on the Seward Peninsula, mining in the summer and herding, trapping, or hunting in the winter, the younger herder can often claim a more geographically and occupationally diverse experience. The younger group is more attuned to minority group tactics being employed throughout the United States and has some conception of opportunities for development as a political force. In short, a new breed of reindeer owner is making its appearance. The young owner is far more likely to view himself in relation to a broadened inter-ethnic perspective than in relation to intra-ethnic territorial groups. He is capable of agreement with his peers on issues requiring common oppo sition toward 11 outsiders. 11 His knowledge of political processes and his desire to more actively determine his own destiny is encouraging group approaches to common problems. Increased governmental interest in resource development is accomplishing what 76 years of common occupations could not bring about, namely, an inter herder dialogue and sense of shared determination not obscured by differences in village background. The territorial perspective is being enlarged to embrace the category 11 Nati ve owners. 11 Simultaneously, and as a natura 1 part of the new perspective, the Native owner is beginning to assess himself as a resource manager.

Central Processing - A Crucial Turning Point During the period of this study, a slaughtering facility was being planned at Nome. There has been no systematic attempt on the part of the initiating 131 city and state planners to promote Native support for the facility. Never theless, the plans for the use of the facility call for coordinated round up and driving programs in rural areas. Deer for slaughter are to be driven to Nome and sold by the herd owner on the basis of live weight. Federal legislation, and state interpretation thereof, forbids the sale of field slaughtered reindeer carcasses by the winter of 1969-1970. All meat products sold at retail must be butchered in a facility that meets federal and state inspection standards. Thus, Native owners will no longer slaughter in the village fields or market their own meat products. They will instead, at a designated time each year, separate those deer selected for market and drive them to Nome. Past chapters have emphasized the lack of specialization among Native owners, the role of reindeer as a village resource, and the nature of owner-credit network relations. What effect is the newly instituted separation of functions likely to have upon Native ownership? The degree to which production, processing, and marketing are integrally related to arctic life has been mentioned several times. Field processing provides tre channel for distribution of benefits from the herd to village inhabitants. Reindeer occupy village territory and consume village graze lands. Recompence is through participation in vilage slaughtering and liberal wage-meat payment. Also, slaughtering time is the owner's high point for the year. Those owners who have achieved the herd size plateau described in Chapter VII mention slaughtering activity in a holiday spirit. It is an event that in some cases takes on ceremonial significance. The owner ful fills obligations he has accumulated throughout the summer and obligates others to him during slaughtering activity. Field slaughtering is the prin cipal foundation upon which rests the reliance network that links the herder

132 to his fellow villagers. For several herders, the justification for en gaging in production is found in field processing. These herders may well suffer a serious decline in interest under the new program. Village inha bitants who find their traditional wage-meat fund no longer extant are likely to rely upon more direct procurement, in a fashion very familiar to a hunting society ("poaching"). The credit network as it now operates is clearly doomed under the new program. Merchants will procure meat supplies on an as-needed basis direct from the processing plant's cold storage facilities. House-to-house sales, road-side sales, and, of course, all forms of barter exchange by the owner will become extra-legal. In all probability, the owner will still be credit worthy, but more indirectly and on radically different terms of trade. The proposed live weight per pound price at the slaughter house is approximately 12-1/2¢. State planners state that field slaughtering is the most costly item for the owner, and, once this burden is removed, most owners will make a profit on 12-1/2¢ per pound by selling a greater quantity (that portion previously used as wage-meat payment would now be income producing). To the owners, who have never regarded wage-meat payment as a cost item, the logic of state planners is not clear. To those herders who slaughter sporadically, often using family members only, the argument is irrelevant. The logic that specialization in production is more efficient might be quite valid if production were conceptually an end in itself. To the Eskimo herdsmen, production is largely the job of nature. The burden of man is exploitation, and among reindeer men this means slaughtering. Pro duction of live reindeer is not conceived as an occupation, but as a prelude to direct utilization of reindeer products in both the credit and reliance networks.

133 Specialization is antithetical to arctic life. Only with complementary development of a number of functionally interrelated industries can special ized activity lose the appearance of abstraction and rigidity that it now has for most Eskimo. The proposition advanced by some that the Eskimo herdsmen can find functional complementarity by indirect sales to distant markets misses the central nature of arctic self-containment and inter-reliance. I cen si facility although quite justifiable in the abstract, has slim chance of Native support in the near future. But then, the course is set and there seems little chance for serious reconsideration. The best hope now is that some thought be given to transitional effects of the new program, assuming some measure of even tual success.

New Directions for Public Policy As mentioned in Chapter IV, those government agencies concerned with reindeer have agreed upon a division of labor. State personnel are charged with processing and marketing, Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel will con tinue to supervise and develop deer production methods, and the Bureau of Land Management has assumed complete responsibility for range land utili zation. Such functional separation is not paralleled in the world of the Eskimo owner. To the owner, it appears that there simply has been an increase of government people involved with reindeer. That some people specialize in an area of range control or marketing appears impractical to the herder in that one thus learns only a part of the job. The Eskimo owner does not burden himself with the fine distinctions that he is now told separate a range-use problem from a production or slaugh tering problem. For him, there is no distinction to be drawn. The herding,

134 marking, processing, and marketing of reindeer form a single package of activities that cannot be discussed at length separately or apart from himself or his village. The possibility of informative communication be tween the Eskimo generalist and the government specialist is exceedingly remote. The inundation of government specialists, each bearing the fruits of isolated inquiry and imbued with the certainty that his expertise will re move the obstacle to industrial expansion, has produced little more than confusion and uncertainty among the Eskimo herders. Some herders, fearing that the unbridled optimism of the specialists will carry them once again to a Temperate Zone picture of reality, are encouraging discussion among themselves in an effort to hold on to their own sense of what is workable in the Arctic and what is not. Several forces will converge over the next two years to encourage greater inter-herder cooperation and may eventually promote an 11 industry 11 self-perception. The new processing program is by far the most abrupt and radical change the Eskimo owner has yet had to face. Those owners whose herds are in the intermediate size range (1 ,000 to 2,000 deer) and whose consumption needs are most compelling may welcome the breakdown of the reliance network that will necessarily attend initiation of new processing techniques. The North west Reindeer Processing Company has carried the burden of innovation and has illustrated that destruction of credit network ties can be rewarding. It is entirely conceivable that, once freed of both networks, this class of owners will tend toward greater inter-herder cooperation. Smaller herd owners will find the new program more a burden than an advantage, having insufficient numbers of surplus animals to obtain minimally

135 rewarding annual volume. The large herd owners stand to benefit the most under the new program, but are more closely bound to reliance responsibilities than either of ·the other two ownership groups. An owner of 1 ,000 deer can with some degree of acceptance justify partial abdication of the reliance network with fellow villagers. An owner of 2,000 deer or more would find village consumption unabated, though the avenue of acquisition would be more direct and less rewarding to the owner himself. Within a very few years after initiation of the program, assuming retention of private Native own ership, most herds would number from 1,000 to 2,000 deer. Given the more uni. f orm her der age an d experience . cr1 . t er1a . men t 1one. d ear 11er, . 112 th e possi-. bility of similar management problems with herds of similar sizes should encourage herder-group identity. The need to coordinate or combine drives to central facilities should also increase contact between some herders. In other words, the new program will produce a more homogeneous group of herders and herd sizes. It is suggested here that this should encourage an 11 industry 11 perception on the part of the herders. Complete specialization in activity is highly unlikely even under these new circumstances but the first step in this direction is the quest for identity through occupation. Central processing should initiate this first step. Given that events transpire as here described, the most important observation for policy makers is that group Native determination ought not to be further molded by outsiders, but permitted to take its own course.

Some Unsettled Issues The precise role of Native ownership of reindeer in western Alaska has been the subject of almost continual evaluation since 1892. Originally

112 Above, pp. 156-8. 136 conceived as a subsistence industry, this policy view has been brushed aside each time the possibility of a supportive, semi-commercial ownership role has presented itself. After the discovery of gold in 1897, the reindeer industry entered a commercially oriented policy era from which it did not emerge until non-Native ownership was ended in 1939. Since that time there has been no clear definition of policy objectives. Native ownership has been both a subsistence and a commercial endeavor as is indicated by the substantial variation in herd sizes. All herd owners, to the extent that their resource base permits, respond to both subsistence and commercial own ership criteria, and federal government programs have also reflected this same ambiguity with regard to ownership objectives. This has been more the result of the exigencies of arctic life than lack of clear purpose on the part of Bureau of Indian Affairs administrators. As has been pointed out several times in this study, there are few clear-cut use categories in the Arctic; each resource is called upon to perform a variety of functions. Government programs, until quite recently, have reflected the reality im posed by a multi-use resource. The measurement of 11 progress 11 is, of course, obscured by the absence of a single objective or policy orientation. The year 1968 bears a close resemblance to the year 1897. Once again commercial exploitation was emphasized, this time as a part of state efforts to achieve industrial development in remote regions. Federal requirements for processing, which were formulated without reflecting the Eskimo owner's novel environment, provided state personnel with the platform from which they launched changes designed to yield a specialized objective for Native ownership, namely, the production of a cash crop. Just how effectively a multi-use resource can fit the abstract model of state planners is unknown,

137 but it could well mean the end of exclusive Native ownership. State plans do not consider the effects of the withdrawal of the wage-meat payment fund role of Native ownership. Village reaction to reduced benefit flow and the damaging effect this might have upon village welfare, as well as village attitudes, is not a variable in the new model for change, yet this variable alone may determine success or failure of state plans for a commercial in dustry. It is highly unlikely that traditional allocative channels can be changed like the flow of an irrigation ditch. In all probability, new chan nels of distribution will be instituted, of a kind not anticipated by, and running counter to, state development plans. Another unsettled issue is precisely how much interest or attraction specialization in production will provide for Native owners. Production is now perceived as largely a natural process. The attraction in reindeer own ership had traditionally taken the form of control over exploitation and distribution. These latter functions will soon no longer be a part of own ership. Without an elaboration of the importance of production itself, owner interest and motivation will likely suffer substantially. The owner will simply become a part of a larger mechanism, and his functional relationship to the larger scheme will produce few rewards of local relevance. He will still be a member of a remote village, but his ownership activity will provide him with little opportunity for village sharing through the cooperative act of processing. His income from operations will greatly outdistance average village income without this traditional avenue of distribution. Herding is the one aspect of ownership that has become more capital in tensive, and it cannot be expanded enough to compensate for the absence of field slaughtering. Handlings for marking and castrating will necessarily become more labor intensive, i.e., more village men will be utilized and, 138 probably will be paid in live deer. This is to say that production will become more elaborate, for it will carry the burden of village responsi bilities formerly resolved by cooperative processing. Production will cor respondingly become much more costly, and, if the criteria of "efficient" resource use is to be carried to its logical conclusion by state developers, Native management of production will then become the obstacle to industrial progress The eventual resolution seems to lie in an abdication of Native ownership in the interests of efficiency. The year 1970 will then resemble the year 1914, when large scale non-Native ownership was initiated in the interest of more efficient exploitation. It seems advisable to ask: In whose interests and for which accounts are the fruits of cost reduction being tabulated when the cost is loss of village consumption and possible disruption of communal relations?

Con cl us ion Reindeer as a Native resource, and the Native herdsmen as managers of that resource, have not been and in all probability never will be instruments of social and economic change among Bering Strait Eskimo. The history of Native ownership has been far too erratic and the role of ownership itself far too supportive of other change agents to constitute of itself a basis for change. Reindeer ownership has not basically altered Eskimo society but instead been fitted to it. Reindeer ownership has not produced an occupa tional identity and does not provide a forum for communication between Eskimo of differing village residence and territorial backgrounds. Although a "new breed" of younger, more po 1iti ca lly sensitive owner is now emerging, and the possibility of a strong occupational identity is now more likely, the very

139 scope and meaning of ownership activity is itself undergoing abrupt and radical change. This new definition of Native ownership grows out of a conceptual, framework which is basically antithetical to traditional arctic life. Central processing and specialized production will most likely destroy both the reliance and credit networks, and hence, the social pleasures of ownership. It is doubtful that Native reindeer ownership will long survive this newest challenge

140 APPENDIX A

141

PROGRAM FOR REINDEER FAIRS

THE FIRST DAY will be devoted to getting settled and adjusting things around the camp, and there will be no field events. A short meeting con sisting entirely of announcements, and appointments of committees and Judges. These committees will meet immediately after the meeting. Second Day EXHIBIT KILLING AND DRESSING DEER. Teams to be selected. Whole operation to be timed and passed on by the judges. FIVE MILE RACE R DEER s rn s . 1st . ass i be given driver after start. Record 19 minutes, 30 seconds--by Sugayok, of Teller, driving 11 Gray. 11 CONTEST MELTING SNOW. Each man to be given a few sticks, lard pail, belt knife and one match. He must make a fire out of doors, and melt enough snow to make two full cups of water. Timed.

SHOOTING MATCH 50 YARDS. Each man will have five shots with rifle at a ptarmigan target. He must shoot standing up. If his bullet knocks the target down it counts. SLED-LASHING CONTEST. The load to be grub box, stove, clothes sack, a sleeping-bag, rifle and snowshoes. Sled rope, sled cover and load to be the same for each man. Man can arrange load, rope and cover alongside the sled before starting. Shoes and rifle must be on top. Lashing must be tight and cover secure enough to keep out snow. Record, 1 minute, 7 seconds--by Henry Pukennuk of Nome. LONG THROW WITH LASSO. Each man to have two throws with any lasso. Record, Thomas Sokweena of Buckland, 66 feet, 6 inches. Third Day LASSO CONTEST. At least 20 bulls are to be marked by collar and by hair mark on hind quarters. For half an hour each morning the con testants will try to catch these bulls. No catch is scored until the nearest judge signals. The lasso must be taken off before scored. No help to be given any man unless he is in danger, and in that case he is ruled out. If a lasso is lost it will have to be secured by owner before he can continue. A broken lasso will put the man out for the rest of the morning unless he can fix it. If two men catch the same bull the judges will have to give decision. If unable to decide they will call if no score. No man can catch the same bull twice in succession. Winners last year, Wilson of Noatak and Kushogok of Shishmaref.

143 HARNESSING CONTEST. Each man to start with his deer tied securely to a willow, nigger-head, or stake. Deer to be harnessed, hitched to sled, and driven around a stake 100 yards off and return to starting point; then deer to be unhitched and tied securely. Each man to use two lines, and harness must be on sled before starting. No help to be given at any time. Record, Okok of Noorvik, l minute 21 seconds. TWO DEER RACE FIVE MILES. Record, Kuppok of Igloo, 14 minutes 55 seconds driving "Kikalik" and 11 Tiplik. 11 SNOW SHOE RACE LEADING TWO DEER ONE MILE. Each man to lead two deer in any manner he wishes. Course to be half mile and back. WOMEN'S RACE, NATIVE AND WHITE, HALF MILE. Winner last year, Mrs. Mary Mosquito of Igloo--1 minute 14 seconds. EXHIBIT of methods of making fire without matches or any other arti ficial lighter. Any Ipanee style. Fourth Day LASSO CONTEST -- Second Half Hour. FIVE MILE RACE, FOUR DEER--Sled to be loaded with 200 pounds of sand. Record made by Seveck of Kivalina, driving his deer four abreast, 35 minutes. SNOW SHOE RACE, ONE MILE -- Record Kuslogok of Shismaref, 6 minutes and 50 seconds. SHOOTING MATCH, 100 YARDS -- Each man to shoot five times with rifle, from any position at a rabbit target. HARNESS SHOW -- The judges will work over the harnesses while the shooting match is going on in another part of the grounds. The harnesses are to be spread out in the snow as the judges direct. The judges will first go over the harnesses by hand and arrange them according to the different classes. Before decision, each harness to be tried on deer. No harness will be admitted that was made before 1915, or any part of which was made by anyone other than an Eskimo. One harness may compete in any number of different classes. The following are the different classes: Deer hide, seal skin; ooguruk hide; other native material--of leather, or webbing, (all of these harnesses are to be single-tree style). Lapp style harness of any material. Best decorated harness--of any native material, of any outside material. (In judging the harness the collar counts as much as the harness}. COLLARS -- Best all around collar, decoration not counted; best decorated collar. HALTERS -- Of any material. Old style and new styles.

144 NEW STYLE HARNESSES AND NEW STYLE COLLARS -- All other new style features of harness, halter or collar. Fifth Day LASSO CONTEST -- Final Morning. TWO DEER RACE, TEN MILES -- Record, Oquillok of Igloo, 41 minutes, 40 sec., driving "Judge" and "Company." WHITE MAN'S RACE, ONE MILE -- Open to all visitors. Guaranteed deer will be cheerfully furnished all Nuhmuits (white men) who wish to enter. The rules will be made by the Chief Herders. Winner last year, Alfred Lomen of Lomen Company. SHOOTING MATCH, 200 YARDS -- Each man to have five shots at a fox target, from any position. SLED SHOW -- The judges will work over the sleds while the shooting match is going on in another part of the grounds. Sleds must be made entirely by Eskimos. Paint and trimmings will not figure, but strength and careful workmanship will be insisted upon. No sled will pass which has any break or crack that the judges consider makes it actually weaker. A little crack around a mortise that does not weaken the sled will not matter. To get first prize a sled must have brake and fender. The following are the different classes. Racing sled, of hardwood, birch, and any other kind of wood. Any new style sled. The sled that has most reindeer horn material. Any new equipment for a sled. Sixth Day WILD DEER RACE. HALF MILE. Each contestant will lasso a bull, one of those marked; harness and hitch it to sled and drive half mile. No assistance given any man except by pushing his sled after he has thrown his deer. The man can use any method to make his deer and sled finish the course. No brutality will be permitted. Record, Salemeo of Wain wright, 23 minutes, 18 seconds. STEPLE CHASE RACE. FIVE MILES. In this race each man is to trail one deer and sled. Sleds to be empty. Course to be over a specially staked trail covering the worst ground available. Record, Enunalook of Kotzebue, 25 minutes, 33 seconds. FIVE MILE RACE. TRAILING TWO DEER AND SLEDS. Each sled must have a load of 50 pounds. This race, or the one proceeding may be omitted. Record, Kunuk of Igloo, 23 minutes 32 seconds. HEAVY PULL. A dog sled, or any long sled to be used. Load to be sacked sand and increased as judges determine. Deer to have no assistance in starting load. Driver to handle deer in any way, but can never touch sled. Record, Peter Garfield of Noorvik, driving "Jink", load 2242 pounds.

145 TEN MILE RACE ONE DEER. The record for this distance is held by Louis Tungwenok of Wales, driving "Little Negro" time 37 minutes 8 seconds. FUR SHOW. To include parkies, pants, mukluks, (short, long and extra long); mittens, (lined and unlined); gloves, and sleeping bags. All of reindeer. All clothing will be scored on five points--tanning, sewing, (stitches) all sinew sewed, trirrming and quality of skins. Only reindeer trirrming counts. BANNERS. Of outside material, of reindeer skin, and of any other native material. TANNED REINDEER HIDE with the hair off. OTHER MISCELLANEOUS SHOWS. Including snow shoes, tow lines, braided lassos, and halter lines. Models of sleds and traveling outfits. These are to be not more than fifteen inches long. Best sharpened knife. Best kept old rifle which was used in the shooting matches. Any new thing that a reindeer man can use. Articles of reindeer horn. Seventh Day EIGHT DEER RACE FIVE MILES. Shall we allow t\IJO men, or make each man handle his team alone? Record, Igloo team, 27 minutes, 24 seconds. Mosquito and Ouklouwok driving. Parade This is to be the biggest thing at the fair. Each delegation should plan to do something special in the parade. Drive 10 deer, ride your deer, etc. All banners and fancy harness should be used. Decorate your deer and sleds. Try to show the white people of Alaska what a fancy ap pearance werreindeer men can make. Make the people say AKEKA'. AREGA. Evening Program FIRST EVENING -- Will be devoted to the awarding of badges to the regular and special delegates from each station. Addresses of welcome by representatives from each station, followed by an address by the Hon orable J. R. Tucker, Judge of the U.S. District Court, 2nd Division, a song "Nancy Lee" by Mr. Frank Klesele, and an address by Mrs. Esther Bird sall Darling of Nome. (This program special at Igloo only.) SECOND EVENING--Discussions on methods of killing and dressing meat. Use of sled deer for traveling. Care of sled deer while traveling. Special feed for sled deer; to be followed by an address by Carl J. Lomen. (Special at Igloo.) THIRD EVENING--Methods of breaking sled deer. Rules for selecting deer for breaking. Points of a good sled deer. Some experiences with sled deer on the trail. Are they as intelligent as dogs? Do they "savve" trail and can they take you home in a storm? Do bulls or females make good sled deer? At Igloo there will be an address by Or. D.S. Neuman:

146 "Why There is Less Consumption Among Reindeer Men than Other Eskimos; What Makes Rickets Among Children. 11 (Rickets is that sickness that keeps children thin and prevents their growth.) Also on the proper way to feed children. FOURTH EVENING--Discussions of every feature of harness-making and fitting. The selection of apprentices. The future for an apprentice in the reindeer business. The help an older herder can be to an apprentice by word and example. FIFTH EVENING--This meeting will be given over entirely to the Eskimos. No white man will be present. The assistants to the superin-tendent will h 11 b up topi i The are to keep careful minutes of this meeting, giving in brief the ideas of the speaker. This meeting should be very important. SIXTH EVENING--General discussion of all matters connected with breed ing, improving stock, etc. Diseases of deer and treatment. SEVENTH EVENING--Plans to organize an Eskimo Reindeer Association. Your relation to the white men who will soon be in the business. Your plans for future of the industry. There will be other things to discuss and other things that are not mentioned in this program. Any man who has any ideas for the Fair should be sure to tell the Superintendent or any of his assistants about it. The rules may be changed later. One thing all should remember. If any man at any time hurts a deer, or is brutal to a deer, or is unfair to the other men, he will be put out at once, even if he is a Number One. We have had no trouble of that kind so far, and we do not want it now. These fairs belong to the Eskimos. You have your own Judges. If things are not right it is your own fault.

147 Reindeer Fair Song

11 Rei ndeer men came from the North, They drove a 1ong, 1ong way, Reindeer men came from the South, They drove for many a day; Reindeer men from all around, They traveled to the Fair And when they got to Igloo They shouted to them there; orus It's a long way to Igloo village, It's a long way to go, It's a long way to Igloo village, To the Reindeer Fair's big show, Good-bye superstition, farewell dog teams too. It's a long, hard trail to Igloo village, But we drove right through.

- 2, - Herders and apprentices, And owners were on hand, Halters, harness, sleds, and mukluks, But when all the people saw The great long-legged deer, The delegates began to shout And sung out loud and clear; -Chorus-

\~e don 1 t carry any dog feed, We don't push on the sled, We don't cook for these sled deer, They rustle moss instead Good-bye Kimoogens, farewell dogfeed stew We have driven deer to Igloo village, And we drove right through.

- 3 - Foxes, seal and walrus, Polar bears may soon be gone, But the reindeer every year, Gives Eskimo a fawn Reindeer men are happy and Contented everywhere, Just listen to the song they sing So loudly at the Fair; 148 -Chorus- They had nothing in the poke-sack A 1ong time ago They left nothing for their children The Ipanee Eskimo. Good-bye old Ipanee! We are going to the Fair All the Reindeer men shall be Oomaliks! Kyuanna! Reindeer! 11

11 11 (Adopt the tune from Ti pperary )

SOURCE: The Eskimo, December 1916, p. 10.

149

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156