SHAH OF

Could the Shah of Iran have forestalled the of 1977-1979?

Viewpoint: Yes. The Shah of Iran could have stayed in power had he won the support of the bazaaris (small merchants) and the clergy and promoted democratization. Viewpoint: No. The Shah of Iran's ouster was inevitable because of his ambivalent policy toward protesters and the charisma of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The term revolution has been used often to describe changes of regime in various lands and countries throughout history, but few are actually true revolutions in the modern sense—most are simply coups d'etat, in other words, a change of regime essentially within the ruling class. A revolution denotes something much more dramatic, including a change of power from one class to another and the adoption of an entirely new political ideology. Most revolutionary movements, especially the successful ones, are marked by much death and destruction from years of sustained guerrilla warfare by the opposition in its attempt to overthrow the existing regime and uproot its political, economic, and sociocultural structures and representations. Govern- ments tend to fight back, oftentimes with brutal efficiency, in an attempt to remain in power and crush the opposition. Unlike other twentieth-century revolutions in China, Cuba, Vietnam, or Nicaragua, there was no systematic guerrilla offensive against the govern- ment in the Iranian Revolution (1977-1979). Blood was, indeed, spilled, and some violence occurred during the revolutionary period, but it was episodic and usually the result of unplanned encounters and even misunderstandings between opposition and government forces. The revolutionary movement typically manifested itself in strikes, demonstrations, and protests; mobiliza- tion was made primarily through the mosques as it developed. As such, some of the questions remain regarding the Iranian Revolution. Could the ruler of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, have used the formidable repressive appara- tus at his disposal, the U.S.-supplied and -trained military and security ser- vices, more effectively in order to repress the opposition movement and stay in power? Did the nature of the movement itself, in combination with the fact that the Shah of Iran was terminally ill, obviate the apparent necessity and willingness to unleash the repressive structures of the state against the revo- lutionary forces marshaled by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini? Would it have made a difference in terms of the final outcome had the Shah acted more forcefully?

228 of recession, inflation was high, and the level of productivity was decreasing. This downturn was the result of both an anachronistic power Viewpoint: structure and a corrupt administration, which Yes. The Shah of Iran could have was partially responsible for the deteriorating stayed in power had he won the socio-economic situation. The political realm support of the bazaaris (small was not any better—institutions of the Iranian merchants) and the clergy and system had not developed or had been turned promoted democratization. by the Shah into mere instruments of the regime. In order to improve conditions, it was In early 1978 Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, necessary to carry out a series of structural eco- the Shah of Iran, was regarded as one of the nomic, social, and political reforms, assuring richest and most powerful monarchs in the rational and orderly economic development. world. Since 1941 he had ruled an oil-rich On 26 January 1963 the Shah launched country that was also strategically important. the White Revolution. He wanted to use the Since the first National Development Plan philosophy of revolution and the reform pro- (1949) the Shah committed himself to develop- gram as an instrument for the transformation ing Iran's economy and changing its social and cul- of Iran from a poor, socially feudal-driven, and tural foundations. Nationalism and modernization politically corrupt country into a progressive, characterized his kingdom: in fact, during World industrialized, independent country, following War II (1939-1945) the Shah had committed him- the Western example. In implementing this self to oppose secessionist attempts in the north of kind of system, the Shah asserted that "as a the country and face down the communist threat. nation we must demand steady progress, but He tried to reduce Iran's economic dependence on we must also realize that the achievement of Great Britain and to limit British supremacy in the political, economic and social democracy per- oil sector. In order to achieve this goal, he asked for force takes time. It requires education and psy- a third power's help, the United States, in an chological development, the reconciliation of attempt to balance Anglo-Soviet influence in his individual wishes with social responsibility, the country. He also tried to transform Iran into a rethinking of moral values and individual and modern country, a regional power with a social loyalties, and learning to work in strong industry and a powerful military, relying co-operation more than ever before." However, once again on American help. His reform pro- Westernization, according to the Shah, had to gram in the early 1960s, known as the "White be "selective and judicious" and had to "help us Revolution," embodied agrarian and cultural [Iranians] towards the goal of democracy and reform as well as modernization. Together with shared prosperity" without abandoning "our his unparalleled buildup of the military, it was great heritage." ultimately a self-defeating effort that under- mined the Shah's power. On 17 January 1979 In this context the Shah became the guard- he was obliged to flee his country. His repres- ian of Iran's great tradition, the identity of a sive policy, starting in the 1970s, from industri- sovereign nation with a glorious past and a rich alization to pseudodemocratization, resulted in the cultural heritage. The Shah's reference to Iranian Revolution, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah pre-Islamic Persia and the spread of a pro-West Khomeini. The Ayatollah had returned to Iran culture provoked tenacious opposition by the after a fourteen-year exile, having managed to Iranian clergy. In 1971 impressive celebrations coalesce the diverse opposition to the Shah. in Persepolis honoring the 2,500th anniversary In the second half of the 1950s, thanks to of the Persian Empire were particularly criti- cized when the Shah "linked himself directly to the nationalization of the oil industry and sub- sequent oil-export income, there had been tre- Cyrus the Great." The Shah urged the popula- mendous economic growth, although it was tion to pray for "our Noble Land" and for him, who had been elected by God as "Custodian of uneven. This process was changing Iranian the Land of Iran." Despite his rhetoric, how- society, still organized in a feudal way, espe- ever, the population had grown restless and felt cially in the countryside. A new Iranian middle ignored. class—professionals and skilled technicians who had studied economics and management The White Revolution program included abroad—was created. There were also plenty of land reform, nationalization of forests, public foreign professionals, particularly Americans. sale of state-owned factories, profit sharing in These conditions had already caused an industry, electoral power for women, and the increase in tension within the country and rep- formation of a literacy corps. It was a project resented a threat to the political stability of the designed within the political elite to change . The situation worsened in the early radically the face of Iran, turning it into a pow- 1960s when the Iranian economy was in a state erful, modern, and Western-type state.

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 229 Iran, however, was structurally almost 1960s, 56 percent of the land was owned by 1 entirely feudal. Most of its population was percent of the population. The reform limited dependent on agriculture and lived in isolated the ownership of land in each village; surplus small villages. It was at the mercy of its land- land was to be sold to the state to be, in turn, owners and had little political consciousness. resold to the peasants. By eliminating large Among the projects planned by the Shah, land landed estates, the power of important social reform was the most significant. He was intent classes, such as the bazaaris (small merchants) and on changing the feudal structure of society, the clergy, who were powerful opponents of the redistributing land, and encouraging landown- reform policy of the monarchy, was circum- ers' investment in the industrial sector. The scribed. In fact, according to the Shah, buzaaris landowners were powerful; indeed, in the represented a backward-looking social class, and

230 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES their fanatic resistance to any kind of change in the economic and industrial growth promoted creating a modern country had to be elimi- by the Shah. So, there was a close alliance nated. With regard to the clergy, the Shah among this new Iranian industrial middle class, decided to wage a frontal attack on its institu- the state (represented by the court, the armed tions. Besides severely penalizing them finan- forces, SAVAK, and state bureaucracy), and for- cially, the Shah also tried to deprive them of eign investors, most of whom were American, their religious role. In fact, in 1971 he ordered which only added to the alienation of tradi- the formation of the Sepa-e Din (Religious tional Iranian social classes. These elite ele- Corps) and the Religious Propagandists with ments benefited most from the reform plan the task of spreading a conservative and nonpo- imposed by the Shah, as opposed to the major- litical version of Shiism, showing the compati- ity of the population. bility of the monarchy with Shiite religion and The Shah tried to modernize the economy testifying to the commitment of the state to and the society without changing the nature of religion. Not requesting the bazaar merchants' the Persian political system. Although in 1961 cooperation and his unsuccessful frontal attack he had declared that "if ever I felt that Persia's on the clergy were two of the Shah's major monarchy had outlived its usefulness, I would political mistakes. In fact, bazaaris and the be happy to resign as King and would even join clergy represented two important protagonists in helping to abolish our monarchical institu- of the Iranian social reality: they were the main tion," he affirmed, at that particular moment, constitutional actors dating back to the Consti- that Western-type democracy was not a good tutional Revolution (1906), and in the 1970s fit for Iran. He distinguished between "appar- they still played an important role as interpret- ent" and "true" democracy and highlighted ers of the needs of the Iranian population as a that the latter required education and intellec- whole. They became the mouthpieces of the tual maturity. In fact, the Shah was mainly working class following the industrialization interested in legitimizing the monarchical insti- program imposed by the Shah. tution and the Pahlavi dynasty. The concept of The industrialization process brought an modernism was often confused and replaced alteration to class structure, rapid urban with that of "Pahlavism," his vision of political, sprawl, and a decline of the agrarian sector. social, and economic progress. The Shah With the growing industrialization and urban- wanted to become a democratic, progressive, ization, a significant working class emerged, and benevolent monarch—to guarantee a cer- initially in three main Iranian towns: Teheran, tain well-being for most Iranians—as well as be Isfahan, and Tabriz. It was a fragmented and a revolutionary monarch, to represent left-wing heterogeneous class, which had not developed nationalism and the leftist National Front. a class consciousness yet, and consequently, at During the Shah's reign the political sys- first it did not threaten the Shah and his tem, state machinery, and politics in general regime at all. The fact that it had spread only to strictly remained under his personal supervi- three towns made it easily controllable by the sion and control. Basic civil freedoms, neces- secret police (SAVAK or Sazeman-e Ettela' at va sary for a gradual democratization, were denied Amniyat-e Keshivar). Most of this new middle to the Iranian people. After the dissolution of class were young immigrants coming from the the Majlis (Iranian parliament) in 1961, the countryside who, attracted by the towns, were Shah ruled through decrees until 1963. In catapulted into a situation quite different from order to gain the largest popular consensus, he that which the Shah promised. They often suf- reintroduced the plebiscitary system. A referen- fered under terrible living conditions, packed dum was sponsored in order to enact his White in unauthorized and rundown boroughs of Revolution (the Shah gained 99 percent of sup- towns. For them, as for the bazaaris, the mod- port for his program), but above all, it high- ern and earthly ideology promoted by the lighted the fact that the monarchy was the regime was incomprehensible. They under- supreme authority. He did not hesitate to use stood the world and their role within society his repressive apparatus, the powerful home- through religious categories. The mosque security organization SAVAK, in order to remained their bedrock, representing at the assure the implementation of his program: not same time a place of cultural identification and only were protest marches put down harshly, reinforcement. but any kind of criticism and opposition was Undoubtedly, the most significant result also forbidden. Since 1964 the two-party par- of the industrialization process was the devel- liamentary system had been abolished in favor opment of a new kind of middle class, formed of a one-party system, Iran-e Novin (New Iran), by skilled technicians, bureaucrats, and profes- the composition of which was supposed to rep- sionals who had studied and graduated mostly resent the spirit of the White Revolution. The in Europe and had the task of implementing lack of a democratization process in Iran was

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 231 THE NEWS FROM IRAN

Writer VC S. Naipaul, a Trintdadtan-born writer of Indian ber of people in Khuzistan Province.*5 Khuzistan was the descent, visited Iran after the Revolution and made the Arab province in the southwest, where the oil was following observations: On Revolution Avenue, formerly Shah Reza, oppo- In August of 1979, six months after the overthrow site the big iron-railed block of Tehran University, were of the Shah, the news from Iran was still of executions. the publishers (mingled with men's shops) and the pave- The official Iranian news agency kept count, and regu- ment book-sellers and cassette-sellers and print-sellers. larly gave a new grand total. The most recent execu- The cassettes were of speeches by Khomeini and other tions had been of prostitutes and brothel-managers; the ayatollahs; they were also—in spite of Khomeini's ban on Islamic revolution had taken that wicked turn, The Aya- music—of popular Persian and Indian songs. Some tollah Khomeini was reported to have outlawed music. booksellers had books in Persian about the revolution, its And Islamic rules about women were being enforced ideologues and its martyrs. Some had solid piles of com- again. Mixed bathing had been banned; Revolutionary munist literature—Persian paperbacks, and hardback Guards watched the beaches at the Caspian Sea sets of Lenin or Marx in English, from Russia, One revo- resorts and separated the sexes— lution appeared to flow into the other. After all that I had heard about the Shah's big And there were photograph albums of the revo- ideas for his country, the airport building at Tehran was lution. The emphasis in these albums was on death, a disappointment. The arrival hail was like a big shed, blood, and revenge. There were photographs of peo- Blank rectangular patches edged with reddish dust- ple killed during the Shah's time; photographs of the ghost pictures in ghostly frames—showed where, no uprising: blood in the streets, bodies in the morgues, doubt, there had been photographs of the Shah and his with slogans daubed in blood on the white tiles; gal- family or his monuments. Revolutionary leaflets and leries of people executed after the revolution, and caricatures were taped down on walls and pillars; shown dead, page after page, corpse upon corpse. and—also taped down: sticky paper and handwritten One corpse was that of Hoveyda, the Shah's prime notices giving a curious informality to great events— minister: the black bullet hole tn Hoveyda's old man's there were colored photographs of the Ayatollah neck was clear in the photograph. Khomeini, as hard-eyed and sensual and unreliable and roguish-looking as any enemy might have por- Alt the buildings in the university block—founded trayed him. by the Shah's father—were disfigured with slogans. The university was the great meeting place of Tehran, The airport branch of the Melli Bank—rough tables, and even on a day like this, a day without any sched- three clerks, a lot of paper, a littered floor—was like an uled event, it was full of discussion groups. Behzad Indian bazaar stall. A handwritten notice on the counter said, It goes on all the time.'* What did they talk said; Dear Guests. God is ttw Greatest Welcome to the about? He said, "The same things. , commu- of Iran. Bits of sticky brown paper dot- nism, the revolution." It looked a pacific campus ted the customs notice boards that advised passengers scene; it was hard to associate these young men in of their allowances. The brown paper did away with the jeans and pretty shirts with the bloodiness celebrated liquor allowance; It was part of the Islamic welcome..,, in the books and albums across the road. In the pavement kiosks there were magazines of the revolution. The cover of one had a composite photo- But violence was in the air, and just after we came graph of the Shah as a bathing beauty: the head of the out through the main gate we saw this incident. A student Shah attached to the body of a woman in a bikini—but in a white shirt, small and with glasses, inexpertly and the bikini had been brushed over with a broad stroke of with some comic effort taped a leaflet onto the iron rails black, not to offend modesty. \n another caricature the of the gate. The leaflet was a protest about the closing Shah, jacketed, his tie slackened, sat on a lavatory seat down of Ayandegan, the paper of the left. A workman with his trousers down, and with a tommy gun in his near a food stall at the edge of the pavement walked hand. A suitcase beside him was labeled To /srae/and slowly over, drew a red hammer and sickle on the leaflet, Bahama; an open canvas bag showed a bottle of whis- crossed the whole sheet with an X, slapped the student key and a copy of Time magazine— twice, in the middle of the pavement crowd; and then, without hurry, taped up the defaced leaflet more securely. Khomeini received and preached and blessed; Khalkhalli hanged. He was Khomeini's hanging judge, The student had ducked to save his glasses and It was Khalkhalli who had conducted many of those his eyes. No one moved to help him. Even Behzad did swift Islamic trials that had ended in executions, with nothing. He only said, as though appealing to me for jus- official before-and-after photographs; men shown tice, "Did you see that? Did you see that?'* before they were killed, and then shown dead, naked The two revolutions appeared to flow together, the on the sliding mortuary slabs. revolution of Khomeini, and what Behzad would have Khalkhalli had recently been giving interviews, seen as the true revolution of the people. But they were emphasizing his activities as judge, and a story in distinct The previous weekend Behzad and some of his Tehran was that he had fallen out of favor and was try- group had gone to a village to do "constructive" work. ing through these interviews to keep his reputation alive. They had run into trouble with the Revolutionary Guards: He told the Tehran Times fiat h@ had "probably" sen- every village had its komiteh, young men with guns who tenced four hundred people to death in Tehran; "On were now the law in parts of Iran. The Guards, Moslems, some nights, he said, bodies of 30 or more people didn't want communists in the village. would be sent out in trucks from the prison. He claimed Source: V, S. Naipauf, "Among the Believers/'Atlan- he had also signed the death warrants of a large num- tic Monthly, 250 (July 1981): 28-4S.

232 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES another political mistake committed by the latter's undeniable social role. Together with Shah. Therefore, the opposition was forced to them he could have successfully implemented adopt revolutionary struggle. the complex socio-economic processes in Iran, thus giving voice to a real Persian identity. The complete lack of freedom of expres- sion in Iran obstructed the spread of a demo- Moreover, had he managed to promote more democratization, thus allowing the political cratic culture within the middle class, particularly among liberal and social intellectu- opposition to express its dissent, he would have prevented the spread of popular unrest, which als. This democratic void favored the develop- later became the mainstay of the revolution's ment of radical political doctrines, such as success. In this case, the protest would have Marxism and socialist Shiism, especially among been absorbed within the political system, and university students. Many young intellectuals the population could have been represented in were drawn to Islam, interpreted from a revolu- the monarchy's institutions. However, the tionary point of view and the peculiar Messi- Shah's policies were a total failure, and he fled anic expectations of Marxism. This socialist Teheran: his monarchy collapsed, and by Feb- Shiism, in its most radical form, found expres- ruary the Islamic Republic of Iran was born. sion in the mujahideen (holy warriors) who, together with the fedayeen (guerrillas), -VALENTINA VANTAGGIO, launched an armed struggle against the Shah. UNIVERSITY OF LECCE They criticized the modernization program, contested the authoritarian features of the monarchy, and exposed the excesses of SAVAK, which forbade any kind of political debate. In June 1963 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was arrested and exiled for having criticized land reform, women's emancipation, and the Viewpoint: announcement of immunity for U.S. personnel No. The Shah of Iran's ouster was based in Iran. Khomeini's anger focused on inevitable because of his this latter point, believing that this serious ambivalent policy toward question, together with the coup organized protesters and the charisma of against Muhammad Mussadiq by the Central Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1953 in order to restore the Shah's power, highlighted the con- In the second half of the 1970s the growing tradictions in the Iranian sovereign's reform intensity of the protest movement left Muham- program. mad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, in a difficult political situation. The government had managed The recession in the second half of the neither to quell the riots nor to reach a compro- 1970s caused economic and social tensions. mise with moderate factions of the opposition. Protests against the Shah's policy arose in the In the last two years of his reign (1977-1979) main Iranian towns. The urban working class the Shah showed himself to be more confused, and bazaar merchants were the protagonists of hesitant, and weak than ever: his strategy vacil- these protests, as they were clearly penalized by lated between a reconciliation policy and forceful measures the Iranian state took in order to deal repression of riots. The protest movement with the economic crisis. Broad popular against the Shah's regime was becoming stronger unrest, spreading all over the country within a and more widespread among the Iranian people. few years, was cleverly organized and led by Ira- Under influence from the Americans, in 1977 nian clergy. In fact, the lack of success in mod- the Shah initiated a liberalization program by ernizing the country could be seen in the promising to create "a free political atmosphere," miserable economic and social conditions of assure free elections, end censorship, and allow most Iranians. A large part of the population, greater political freedom. This new situation oppressed and outcast, found in religion the engendered the growth of the popular protest answer to its problems. Hence, Islam increas- movement that emerged with a reformist, anti- ingly became the only effective mouthpiece of violent focus, backed by lay intellectuals and stu- the people's frustration. The Shah did not dents. The Shah's attitude was ambivalent offer a valid ideological alternative to that prof- toward these protests: on one hand, the popular fered by Shiite clergy. He also could not limit movement was legitimated when he promised the mullahs' activities and did not gain the sup- Iranians he would "hear the voice of your Revo- port of any other Iranian religious faction. lution" and "not repeat the past mistakes," such The Shah could have successfully remained as "lawlessness, oppression and corruption"; on in power had he pursued cooperation with the the other hand, the Shah had no scruples about bazaar merchants and the clergy, recognizing ordering the army to repress protests, introduc- the former's important economic role and the ing martial law, and virtually forbidding demon-

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 233 strations. In fact, although there never was a real that he could rework so as to legitimize revolu- improvement in the political atmosphere, the tion, republicanism, and rule by a top clerical Shah was not willing to share his authority with leader." Khomeini emerged as the sole leader of anyone else, least of all with the opposition. In the Iranian Revolution (1977-1979) and the November 1978 the Shah, in a desperate attempt only alternative to the Shah. The entire opposi- to save his crown, formed a military government, tion rallied around the clergy and Khomeini: lib- thus entrusting his destiny to the armed forces, erals, laity, religious liberals, left-wingers, and the only loyal ally upon which he believed he guerrillas. Huge differences among them were could rely. overcome in the name of the only element they had in common: opposition to the Shah. The However, the situation became irreparable extreme diversity of the movement, comprising after the bloody riots of 8 September, known nearly the entire population, also contributed to as "." Thousands of demonstra- the success of the Revolution. Men and women tors, not realizing martial law was in force, had from every walk of life, young and old, intellectu- gathered in Teheran, and, following their als and illiterates, students and professors, profes- refusal to disperse, soldiers opened fire and sionals and civil servants, workers and bazaaris killed hundreds of people. The rioting turned (small merchants), all proclaimed the end of the into a battle between the demonstrators, who Shah's regime and the formation of a just gov- put up barricades and burned buildings, and ernment that respected Islam's precepts. The the police, who responded with tanks. The clergy, headed by Khomeini, believed an open entire country was in disarray: oil workers confrontation with the government was neces- went on strike; opposition guerrilla groups sary even if repression and a bloodbath were threatened government officials; students inevitable. This stance was supposed to highlight knocked down a statue of the Shah in front of the atrocities of the Shah's regime, leading to the the University of Teheran; and opposition consequent radicalization of the movement. forces stormed the British embassy, as well as offices of several U.S. companies. These pro- Actually, the Shah had two alternatives: to tests expanded to include the middle class, pro- pursue an iron-fist policy or to submit to the fessionals, and civil servants. The popular opposition and leave the country, thus favor- movement had changed, becoming more orga- ing a political solution of the crisis. The nized and violent, and it spread to major Ira- former alternative, which was not supported nian towns. The Iranian clergy became by the Americans, would play into Khomeini's involved by putting religion at the forefront of hands. The latter possibility seemed more real- the political struggle. Mosques, theology istic. Because of U.S. support over the years, schools, and all Islamic centers became vital the Shah believed that the Americans would points of mass mobilization, and the use of intervene and save his regime, as it had in Shiite symbols and rituals gave the political 1953, but this time his fall was inevitable. In January 1979, while trying to reach a belated struggle a sense of sacredness against the agreement with the opposition, the Shah pro- Shah's blasphemous and profane regime. This mass mobilization undoubtedly led to the suc- posed that Shahpour Bakhtiar, leader of the National Front, form a new government, and cess of the Revolution. he agreed to leave the country until a solution In early December 1978 Ayatollah Ruhol- to the crisis was found. Believing that his lah Khomeini, from his Parisian exile, ordered absence would be "no more than a matter of the population to demonstrate against the days but of hours," the Shah was overwhelmed Shah's regime on the occasion of the holy repre- by the revolutionary forces and could not sentations and processions in honor of Ali's son, return to Iran. At the same time, Khomeini, Husayn, the fourth Imam of the Twelver Shiites, "in accordance with the rights conferred by during the Islamic month of Muharram. These the law of Islam and the basis of the vote of celebrations commemorated Husayn's martyr- confidence given me by the overwhelming dom. Some people, ignoring the curfew, paraded majority of the Iranian people," announced through towns wearing white clothes, a symbol the formation of a Council of the Islamic of martyrdom, while others yelled slogans Republic, with the task of coordinating activi- against the Shah. It was a brilliant manipulation ties of the opposition to the Shah. In the of the Shiite religion for a political purpose. meantime, Bakhtiar was trying to calm the rev- Imam Husayn seemed to lead them into battle olution: he released political prisoners, dis- on the day of his commemoration, and mantled SAVAK (secret police), reduced Khomeini seemed to lead them from afar, like a military expenses, and refused to sell oil to kind of hidden imam. One of the crucial ele- Israel. It was, however, too late. People clam- ments for Khomeini's seizure of power was, as ored for Khomeini's homecoming and invited Nikki R. Keddie states, the revival of the "ideo- him to become Iran's new leader. Acknowledg- logical Shi'i tradition that contained elements ing the people's will, on 1 February 1979, the

234 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES Bakhtiar government allowed the Ayatollah to trayed as Moses, the Shah as the Pharaoh, return to Iran. His comeback was triumphant. while Carter was portrayed as the idol whom A poem written for the event by Taha Hijazi the Pharaoh worshiped. America had cor- well interprets the widespread popular mood rupted the Shah, and Khomeini represented and the hope for his return to mark the begin- the only religious alternative to the profane ning of a new and just society: "this broken, dictatorship. According to the clergy, the wounded mother / will be liberated forever / unsuccessful attempts at modernizing the from the shackles of tyranny and ignorance / country, industrialization, and consequent and from the chains of plunder, torture and mass urbanization had led to economic and prison." social misery with growing inequalities. The Like Ali, Husayn, and other imams of Shi- attempted imposition of Western ideology and ism, Khomeini had been oppressed by an culture pushed the population toward Islam, unjust sovereign, forced into exile, and from which became, in their eyes, the only possible there obliged to fight with all his strength solution to their problems. Hence, ayatollahs, against a tyrant. He had not accepted any com- opposed to cultural and political models promise with the "satanic tyrant," and, like imported from outside, became the voice of most Iranians, he lived an austere life, in con- the Iranian people's frustrations. In the Revo- trast to the politicians who were corrupt and lution, the enemy was certainly the Shah, as a living in luxury. He seemed sincere, defiant, bearer of Westernization and a culture of lay and, above all, incorruptible. He was a "man of and secular elements at the expense of Islam God," not interested in achieving power but and Iranian traditions, and he was seen as a rather being the highest spiritual authority. servant of Western governments. Khomeini He promised to liberate the country from for- argued that Islam and politics were two sides eign domination, grant participation to politi- of the same coin: the Prophet Muhammad was cal parties, safeguard the rights of religious at the same time head of the state, commander minorities, and guarantee social justice—partic- of the army, and spiritual leader of the commu- ularly to bfrza,aris, intellectuals, farmers, and, nity. After his death, according to Shiite Islam, more generally, to the mostazafin (deprived these responsibilities were conveyed to his masses). cousin and son-in-law, Ali, and from him to his descendants. With the death of the twelfth In Iran the bond between politics and Imam, the Imamate's cycle was over, and until religion is of paramount importance, and to his return, according to Khomeini, the clergy realize this bond allows one to understand the bore responsibility for leading the community. social and political changes characterizing the The Shiite ulema (clergy), economically and history of this country. In fact, the Iranian politically independent, played a crucial role in Revolution was not only political. Certainly, the Revolution. the Shah's tyrannical and repressive regime Another pivotal factor for the success of and the serious economic crisis contributed to the Revolution was undoubtedly represented incite the uprising. It was also, above all, a reli- by the charismatic personality of Khomeini. gious revolution. Iranians rose up against the He had been the only true antagonist to the secular ethos imposed from above and against Shah, a persistent opponent of monarchy and their will that attempted to exclude religion of foreign cultural influence and domination. from their lives. The Shah had often talked He was certainly wise to gather around him- about the greatness of pre-Islamic Iran, and he self the whole revolutionary movement and lavishly celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of impose his absolutist and fundamentalist con- the founding of the Persian Empire, changing ception of Islam. His Manichaean vision of the starting date of the Iranian calendar from the world, divided between oppressed Mus- the Prophet's hijm (migration) to the founda- lims and oppressor Westerners, also found a tion of the pre-Islamic monarchy. receptive audience among left-wing secular ele- According to most Iranians, the Shah's ments and the Shiite socialists in the revolu- strength basically derived from unconditional tionary movement. As Keddie observes, "the U.S. support. Additionally, the United States fusion of modern, secular Manichaeism, tradi- brought to Iran its political culture of strictly tional Islam, and uncompromising hostility to separating religion and state. This concept was monarchy, dependence, and imperialism cre- incomprehensible to most Iranians. For them, ated a revolutionary ideology that distin- living a hedonistic and materialistic life was guished the revolutionaries from Western and inconceivable. Similarly, it was untenable for westernized oppressors." It was a true ideol- U.S. president Jimmy Carter, a defender of ogy of mobilization, gathering, under the aegis human rights, to continue to support the Shah, of Khomeini, bazaaris and the lower classes, who had started killing his own people. In a yearning for the creation of an ideal society series of wall paintings, Khomeini was por- following the Prophet Muhammad's and

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 235 Imam All's community. This ideology had a References tremendous influence on the Iranian popula- tion, and Khomeini convinced the masses of Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolu- his righteous path. In fact, he gained almost tions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, total popular support. The middle class 1982). regarded him as a defender of private property, Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Con- as a backer of its business interests, and as the temporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the only one able to abolish the monarchy and put Pahlavi Period (Albany: State University of an end to the excessive foreign influence in the New York Press, 1980). country. The working class and peasantry backed him, since they were attracted by his James Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and commitment to social justice, agrarian reform, Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, and the construction of schools and public 1972). works. The Iranian masses, relying only on Nikki R. Keddie, Iran and the Muslim World: their religion, overthrew the Shah's dictatorial Resistance and Revolution (New York: New regime without the aid of weapons. Instead of York University Press, 1995). paralyzing the Iranian population, the Shah's repression caused the opposite effect, inciting Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran's Islamic people to riot. After years of terror and repres- Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Repub- sion, through the Revolution the Iranian pop- lic (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988). ulation gained control of their own country's Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History political life—and there was nothing the Shah (New York: Stein & Day, 1980). could have done about it. -GALIA VITALI, Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Prince- TARANTO, ITALY ton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

236 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES