Protest Politics in Iran: Late 1800S and Early 1900S Versus 1979

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Protest Politics in Iran: Late 1800S and Early 1900S Versus 1979 Protest Politics in Iran: Late 1800s and Early 1900s versus 1979 Armaan Sahgal Introduction a significant impact throughout the late Qajar Dynasty yet succeed in 1979? More The Islamic Revolution that took specifically, I would like to address how place in Iran in 1979 is often viewed in the level of support among the peasantry the Anglophone world with a mixture of and the Ulama made it possible for the contempt and confusion underscored by 1979 Revolution to overthrow the monar- an aura of unfamiliarity. It stands seem- chy despite prior failures in the late 19th ingly alone as a revolution that took a and 20th centuries. The peasantry is de- country into the throngs of religiosity and fined here as the portion of the population put under question the Marxian notion who are neither royal, nor aristocratic no- of revolution as the culmination of class bility, nor business owners, whilst the Ula- struggle. This paper seeks to demistify ma are the religious clergy and scholars. such phenomena by bridging the gap be- Mirroring the two-pronged nature of this tween a class-based conception of revo- study, there are two substantial sections 69 lution and the role of religion in causing to this paper. The first section focuses on the 1979 Revolution. I will be examining the role of class relations in determining the success of protest in Iran in relation the outcome of contentious events in Iran, to two factors: 1) the support of the peas- analyzing the importance of the peasantry antry, and 2) the support of the religious to the success of acts of contentious poli- clergy or Ulama. As such, this paper seeks tics through a Marxian lens. In the second to address the following question: why did portion of the paper, I focus specifically protests against the monarchy fail to yield on the role of the Ulama in providing a XII | ISSUE Copyright© 2020 Armaan Sahgal mobilizing structure for acts of conten- analyzing the role of the Ulama, is rooted tious claim-making in the context of Iran, in Charles Tilly’s conceptualization of pro- drawing largely on Charles Tilly’s concept test and revolutionary politics as acts of of protest. As such, I argue that while both contentious claim making wherein parties featured acts of contentious claim-making make “claims that bear on” the interests against the monarchy, a realignment in the of other parties.3 This section centres on support of the peasantry and the Ulama the unique role historically played by the enabled the 1979 Revolution to succeed in Ulama in providing the structure for con- abolishing the monarchy whereas similar tentious episodes and performances to be contentious action under the late Qajar executed, as Amina Elbendary outlines in dynasty failed. the context of the Middle East4 and as Er- vand Abrahamian does so in the specific Methodology: Marx, Tilly, and Conten- context of Iran.2 The analysis in these two tious Claim-Making portions of this paper yield two import- As discussed, the first section of ant and interconnected findings. First- this paper will analyze the peasantry’s role ly, that the success of acts of contentious in contentious claim-making in Iran in claim-making in Iran has historically cor- the context of class warfare from a Marx- related with the support of the peasantry. ian lens, conceptualizing history in terms Secondly, that the Ulama exercises signifi- of class conflict.1 The traditional Marxian cant influence over the success of such acts view of history is centred on the notion on account of organized religion’s role as that industrialization is accompanied and the most important mobilizing structure driven by a successful “Bourgeois revo- for acts of contentious claim making in lution” that is subsequently followed by a Iran. Through a mixture of a class-centric successful “Proletarian revolution.”1 In the Marxian analysis of Iranian protest poli- Iranian context, however, bourgeois acts tics and an analysis of the role of religion of contentious claim-making against the as a pivotal mobilizing structure for acts of aristocracy at the dawn of industrializa- contentious claim-making in the country, tion were only partially successful. In the I demonstrate that the support of the peas- aftermath of the First World War, the 1921 antry and the Ulama is crucial to the suc- Persian Coup d’État saw the Qajar Dynas- cess of such acts. Thus, a shift in the sen- ty overthrown. While the initial goal of the timents of two segments of the populace Coup was to install a republic, the peas- is identified as the primary reason why antry’s demand for the maintenance of a the Revolution of 1979 succeeded while monarchical state as opposed to a republic anti-Monarchist protests in the late Qajar 70 led to the installation of the Pahlavi Dy- Dynasty failed to establish a republic. nasty.2 The second portion of this paper, 1 Benno Teschke, “Bourgeois Revolu- tion, State Formation and the Absence of the 3 Charles Tilly, Contentious Perfor- International,” Historical Materialism 13, no. 2 mances (Cambridge: Cambridge University (2005): 3. Press, 2013), 5. 2 Ervand Abrahamian, “The Crowd 4 Amina Elbendary, “Popular Politics In Iranian Politics 1905‐1953,” Past and Pres- in the Medieval Middle East,” History Com- NMC JOURNAL | JOURNAL NMC ent 41, no. 1 (1968): 202. pass 16, no. 2 (2018). Literature Review the rise of wage labour in the aftermath of World War Two as a key distinction This analysis centres on three between Qajar-era and late 20th century types of sources. Firstly, it draws on empir- protests.6 This notion places particular ical data (i.e. the basic structure of events, significance on the role of the peasantry, and how different instances of contentious and specifically on the transformation of claim-making in Iran unfolded at the two their interests as a result of the shift from time-periods in question) from authors rural and agricultural livelihoods to those such as Ervan Abrahamian, Jack Gold- of a rapidly industrializing nation’s prole- stone, Peter Seeberg, Theda Skocpol, and tarian class. Abrahamian also gives signifi- Karen Rasler. Secondly, in order to ana- cance to the role of the Ulama, noting that lyze the importance of the peasantry and during the late Qajar dynasty, Ulama with the Ulama in determining the outcome ties to business interests in the bazaar (or of contentious claim-making, it evaluates marketplace) facilitated protests against the claims made by such sources as to the the monarchy while those with royal ties causes behind the success of the 1979 Rev- facilitated counter-protests, placing the olution and the failure of what Abrahami- Ulama as integral to protest politics in an characterizes as pre-industrial protests the country.7 A competing view posited that took place during the late Qajar Dy- by Goldstone emphasizes the visionary 5 nasty. Thirdly, it incorporates ideas on leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and contentious claim-making and mobilizing the Ulama as key to the success of those structures drawn from Charles Tilly to protests.8 This view, emphasizing the pri- analyse the structural role played by the macy of religious leadership, is partially Ulama in Iranian protest politics and class supported by Goldstone’s observation that analyses outlined by the Marxist scholars “Shah and Islam” counter-protests led by such as Benno Teschke to analyze the im- loyalist Ulama avoided the establishment portance of the role played by the peasant- of a republic after the 1921 Coup d’État.7 ry. These three lines of research are used to Seeberg, on the other hand, centres his substantiate the thesis that a realignment argument for the success of the Islamic in the support of the peasantry and the Revolution of 1979 on the diversion of the Ulama ultimately enabled the 1979 Revo- nation’s wealth to classes who supported lution to succeed in abolishing the monar- the Shah.9 Similarly, Rasler argues that chy where similar contentious action un- the inconsistent use of repression and the der the late Qajar dynasty had failed. allocation of concessions by the Pahlavi The literature on the role of the Dynasty in the run up to the Islamic Rev- peasantry and the Ulama in Iranian pro- 6 Abrahamian, “The Crowd In Irani- 71 test politics has been construed in a multi- an Politics 1905‐1953,” 202. 7 Ibid., 196. tude of ways by different scholars. Ervand 8 Jack A. Goldstone, Revolutions: Abrahamian, writing in the decade before a Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford the 1979 Revolution, describes the rise University Press, 2014), 101. of class consciousness that accompanied 9 Peter Seeberg, “The Iranian Rev- olution, 1977–79: Interaction and Transfor- 5 Abrahamian, “The Crowd In Irani- mation,” British Journal of Middle Eastern an Politics 1905‐1953,” 180. Studies 41, no. 4 (2014): 485. XII | ISSUE olution can be credited with the regime’s Whereas early contentious action oppos- downfall.10 Ultimately, scholars have come ing monarchy in Iran during the late Qa- to a variety of conclusions on the topic. In jar Dynasty was supported by the wealthy analyzing the two factors outlined in the proto-bourgeoisie of Iran’s bazaars and thesis, the support of the peasantry and opposed by the peasantry, the 1979 Rev- that of the Ulama, this essay posits that a olution was supported by the newly prole- shift in these two factors between the late tarianizing peasantry and opposed by the Qajar dynasty and the run up to the 1979 bourgeoisie reliant on patronage from the revolution explain why the latter success- Shah. In both eras, affirming the thesis, the fully abolished monarchy whilst protests support of the peasantry correlates with against the Shah during the late Qajar dy- the success of protest in Iran.
Recommended publications
  • Brunei 2019 International Religious Freedom Report
    BRUNEI 2019 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary The constitution states that while the official religion is the Shafi’i School of Islam, all other religions may be practiced “in peace and harmony.” In April the government implemented the second and third phases of the Sharia Penal Code (SPC), which includes offenses punishable by corporal and capital punishments, including stoning to death, amputation of hands or feet, and caning. The SPC, which is in force in parallel with the common-law-based secular penal code, applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims, including foreigners, with non-Muslims exempted from certain sections. Under full SPC implementation, Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF) and Religious Enforcement Division officers cooperate on investigations of crimes covered by both secular law and sharia. Following international condemnation, the sultan announced in May that the de facto moratorium on the death penalty would be extended to include cases under the SPC and that “individual privacy” would be respected. He also declared the government would ratify the United Nations Convention against Torture (UNCAT). Responding to UN expressions of concern regarding the SPC, the foreign minister reiterated that the constitution recognizes the right of non- Muslims to practice their religions “in peace and harmony.” Non-Muslims reported no significant changes with respect to the practice of minority religions following the full implementation of the SPC but noted that the law imposes new restrictions on the ability of non-Muslims to proselytize other non-Muslims, which until April had been legal. The government continued to prohibit non-Muslims from proselytizing among Muslims or persons with no religious affiliation.
    [Show full text]
  • Shia-Islamist Political Actors in Iraq Who Are They and What Do They Want? Søren Schmidt DIIS REPORT 2008:3 DIIS REPORT
    DIIS REPORT 2008:3 SHIA-IsLAMIST POLITICAL ACTORS IN IRAQ WHO Are THEY AND WHAT do THEY WANT? Søren Schmidt DIIS REPORT 2008:3 DIIS REPORT DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1 DIIS REPORT 2008:3 © Copenhagen 2008 Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK -1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler Layout: mgc design, Jens Landorph Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN: 978-87-7605-247-8 Price: DKK 50.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk Hardcopies can be ordered at www.diis.dk. 2 DIIS REPORT 2008:3 Contents Abstract 4 1. Introduction 5 2. The Politicisation of Shia-Islam 7 2.1 Introduction 7 2.2 The History of Shia-Islamism in Iraq 8 3. Contemporary Shia-Islamist political actors 15 3.1 Ali Husseini Sistani 15 3.2 The Da’wa Party 21 3.3 SCIRI 24 3.4 Moqtada al-Sadr 29 4. Conclusion: Conflict or Cooperation? 33 Bibliography 35 3 DIIS REPORT 2008:3 Abstract The demise of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 was an important wa- tershed in Iraqi political history. Iraq had been governed by groups which belonged to the Arab Sunni minority since the Iraqi state emerged out of the former Otto- man Empire in 1921. More recently, new political actors are in the ascendancy, rep- resenting the Kurdish minority and the Shia majority in Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Shia-Sunni Sectarianism: Iran’S Role in the Tribal Regions of Pakistan
    SHIA-SUNNI SECTARIANISM: IRAN’S ROLE IN THE TRIBAL REGIONS OF PAKISTAN A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of The School of Continuing Studies and of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies By Shazia Kamal Farook, B.A. Georgetown University Washington, D.C. April 1, 2015 Copyright © Shazia Kamal Farook 2015 All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT SHIA-SUNNI SECTARIANISM: IRAN’S ROLE IN THE TRIBAL REGIONS OF PAKISTAN SHAZIA KAMAL FAROOK, B.A. MALS Mentor: Dr. John Esposito This thesis analyzes Shia-Sunni sectarianism in the northern tribal areas of Pakistan, and the role of Iran in exacerbating such violence in recent years. The northern tribal regions have been experiencing an unprecedented level of violence between Sunnis and Shias since the rise of the Tehreek-e-Taliban militant party in the area. Most research and analysis of sectarian violence has marked the rise as an exacerbation of theologically- driven hatred between Sunnis and Shias. Moreover, recent scholarship designates Pakistan as a self- deprecating “failed” state because of its mismanagement and bad governance with regard to the “war on terror.” However, the literature ignores the role of external factors, such as Iranian’s foreign policy towards Pakistan playing out in the tribal areas of Pakistan in the period since the Soviet-Afghan War. Some of the greatest threats to the Shia population in Pakistan arise from the Islamization policies of General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s. Policies in favor of Sunni Islam have since pervaded the nation and have created hostile zones all over the nation.
    [Show full text]
  • Constitutional Documents of All Tcountries in Southeast Asia As of December 2007, As Well As the ASEAN Charter (Vol
    his three volume publication includes the constitutional documents of all Tcountries in Southeast Asia as of December 2007, as well as the ASEAN Charter (Vol. I), reports on the national constitutions (Vol. II), and a collection of papers on cross-cutting issues (Vol. III) which were mostly presented at a conference at the end of March 2008. This collection of Constitutional documents and analytical papers provides the reader with a comprehensive insight into the development of Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia. Some of the constitutions have until now not been publicly available in an up to date English language version. But apart from this, it is the first printed edition ever with ten Southeast Asian constitutions next to each other which makes comparative studies much easier. The country reports provide readers with up to date overviews on the different constitutional systems. In these reports, a common structure is used to enable comparisons in the analytical part as well. References and recommendations for further reading will facilitate additional research. Some of these reports are the first ever systematic analysis of those respective constitutions, while others draw on substantial literature on those constitutions. The contributions on selected issues highlight specific topics and cross-cutting issues in more depth. Although not all timely issues can be addressed in such publication, they indicate the range of questions facing the emerging constitutionalism within this fascinating region. CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Volume 2 Reports on National Constitutions (c) Copyright 2008 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Singapore Editors Clauspeter Hill Jőrg Menzel Publisher Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 34 Bukit Pasoh Road Singapore 089848 Tel: +65 6227 2001 Fax: +65 6227 2007 All rights reserved.
    [Show full text]
  • Universal Periodic Review 2009
    UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 2009 SAUDI ARABIA NGO: European Centre for Law and Justice 4, Quai Koch 67000 Strasbourg France RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE SAUDI ARABIA SECTION 1: Legal Framework I. Saudi Constitutional Provisions Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy.1 The Saudi Constitution is comprised of the Koran, Sharia law, and the Basic Law.2 “Islamic law forms the basis for the country’s legal code.”3 Strict Islamic law governs,4 and as such, the Saudi Constitution does not permit religious freedom. Even the practice of Islam itself is limited to the strict, Saudi-specific interpretation of Islam.5 Importantly, the Saudi government makes essentially no distinction between religion and government.6 According to its constitution, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy with a limited Consultative Council and Council of Ministers.7 The Consultative Council is governed by the Shura Council Law, which is based on Islam,8 and serves as an advisory body that operates strictly within the traditional confines of Islamic law.9 The Council of Ministers, expressly recognized by the Basic Law,10 is authorized to “examine almost any matter in the kingdom.”11 The Basic Law was promulgated by the king in 1993 and operates somewhat like a limited “bill of rights” for Saudi citizens. Comprising a portion of the Saudi Constitution, the Basic Law broadly outlines “the government’s rights and responsibilities,” as well as the general structure of government and the general source of law (the Koran). 12 The Basic Law consists of 83 articles defining the strict, Saudi Islamic state. By declaring that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state and by failing to make any 1 U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Islamic Diplom
    Russia's Islamic Diplom Russia's Islamic Diplomacy ed. Marlene Laruelle CAP paper no. 220, June 2019 "Islam in Russia, Russia in the Islamic World" Initiative Russia’s Islamic Diplomacy Ed. Marlene Laruelle The Initiative “Islam in Russia, Russia in the Islamic World” is generously funded by the Henry Luce Foundation Cover photo: Talgat Tadjuddin, Chief Mufti of Russia and head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia, meeting with the Armenian Catholicos Karekin II and Mufti Ismail Berdiyev, President of the Karachay-Cherkessia Spiritual Board, Moscow, December 1, 2016. Credit : Artyom Korotayev, TASS/Alamy Live News HAGFW9. Table of Contents Chapter 1. Russia and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Conflicting Interactions Grigory Kosach………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….5 Chapter 2. Always Looming: The Russian Muslim Factor in Moscow's Relations with Gulf Arab States Mark N. Katz………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2 1 Chapter 3. Russia and the Islamic Worlds: The Case of Shia Islam Clément Therme ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 25 Chapter 4. A Kadyrovization of Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Autocrats in Track II Diplomacy and Other Humanitarian Activities Jean-Francois Ratelle……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3 1 Chapter 5. Tatarstan's Paradiplomacy with the Islamic World Guzel Yusupova……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3 7 Chapter 6. Russian Islamic Religious Authorities and Their Activities at the Regional, National, and International Levels Denis Sokolov………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 41 Chapter 7. The Economics of the Hajj: The Case of Tatarstan Azat Akhunov…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..4 7 Chapter 8. The Effect of the Pilgrimage to Mecca on the Socio-Political Views of Muslims in Russia’s North Caucasus Mikhail Alexseev…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5 3 Authors’ Biographies……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….5 9 @ 2019 Central Asia Program Chapter 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Success and Failure of a Shiite Modernist: Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Mandi Al-Khalisi (1890-1963)
    Sonderdrucke aus der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg WERNER ENDE Success and failure of a shiite modernist Muhammad ibn Muhammad Mahdi al-Khalisi (1890 - 1963) Originalbeitrag erschienen in: Alessandro Monsutti (Hrsg.): The other shiites: from the Mediterranean to Central Asia. Bern: Lang, 2007, S. [231]-244 WERNER ENDE Success and Failure of a Shiite Modernist: Muhammad ibn Muhammad Mandi al-Khalisi (1890-1963) Since 1920, the year in which the British Mandate authorities installed a first cabinet in Iraq, the history of that country may be seen in large part as one of efforts by the Shiite population to increase their share of key political, administrative and military positions — and thus, from their point of view, to make internal political conditions more equit- able. 1 In March 1947, when Salih Jabr became the first Shiite prime minister of modern Iraq — heading the fortieth government to be formed since 1920 — an important demand of politically conscious Shiites seemed to have been fulfilled.2 The feelings that this aroused among quite a few Sunnis may be gauged from the fact that, soon af- ter Salih Jabr took office, demonstrations in Baghdad that initially had nothing to do with religious issues escalated into a situation where stu- dents from the Sunni Kulliyyat al-sharra chanted the slogan: 'Down 1 For various aspects of this problem see H. Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton, N. J., 1978, 12-50 and passim; A. Kelidar, "The Shil Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East", Middle Eastern Studies 19 (1983), 3-16; E.
    [Show full text]
  • Redalyc.Myths and Realities on Islam and Democracy in the Middle East
    Estudios Políticos ISSN: 0121-5167 [email protected] Instituto de Estudios Políticos Colombia Cevik, Salim Myths and Realities on Islam and Democracy in the Middle East Estudios Políticos, núm. 38, enero-junio, 2011, pp. 121-144 Instituto de Estudios Políticos Medellín, Colombia Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=16429066007 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Myths and Realities on Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* Salim Cevik** Abstract There is a strong body of literature that claims that Islam and democracy are essentially incompatible. However, Islam like all other religions is multivocal and it has strong theorethical elements that can also work for a basis of a democratic polity. Throughout the Muslim world there are certain countries that achieved a considerable level of democratization. It is only the Arab world, not the Muslim world, that so far represents a complete failure in terms of democratic transition. The failure of Arab world should be attributed to more political reasons, such as oil economy and the rentier state model than to Islam. Lack of international support for pro-democracy movements in the region, under the fear that they might move towards an Islamist political system is also an important factor in the democratic failures in the region. However, democratic record of Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party challenges these fears. With the international attention it attracts, particularly from the Arab world, Turkish experience provides a strong case for the compatibility of [ 121 ] democracy and Islam.
    [Show full text]
  • Modernity, Wahhabi Islam and Monarchial Power in Qatar
    MODERNITY, WAHHABI ISLAM, AND MONARCHIAL POWER IN QATAR EXHIBITED IN ITS CONTEMPORARY ART ____________ A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University Dominguez Hills ____________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Humanities ____________ by Christine Crane Fall 2017 This thesis is dedicated to my husband, Mark, whose confidence in me and support made it possible. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge my mentor Dr. Patricia Gamon. I would also like to acknowledge the use of the library and graduate tutoring services at Utah Valley University, especially the help and support of Rebecca and Kelsey in the Writing Center. iii PREFACE Because of the laws in the Gulf that do not allow for criticism of any of the Gulf monarchy as well as Islam, in order to maintain their position at Qatari schools or even their research and travel privileges in the Gulf, authors ignore or soft-pedal any serious problems in the Gulf states; this must be taken into consideration when doing any research regarding this region. Another shortsightedness, I have also seen repeated in the scholarship of Qatar is a disregard for the belief in Wahhabi Islam, almost always reducing it to a “culture” or “tradition.” I examine art created and collected within a cultural context that includes the influence of Wahhabi Islam as religion. To this end, I have chosen to use the English word for Allah, which is of course God. My sources are entirely based on English-language sources. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE DEDICATION ......................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................................iii PREFACE ...............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • How Does the Introduction of the Idea of Civil Society and the Development
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by RMIT Research Repository TERROR IN INDONESIA: TERRORISM AND THE REPRESENTATION OF RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THREE INDONESIAN NEWS PUBLICATIONS WITHIN A CONTEXT OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL TRANSITION PRAYUDI AHMAD A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at RMIT University SCHOOL OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION COLLEGE OF DESIGN AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ROYAL MELBOURNE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA JUNE 2010 ii DECLARATION I certify that this dissertation does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material which has been submitted for an award of any other university or other institutions. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the dissertation. The content of the dissertation is the result of work which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved research program. Any editorial work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged. Signed : Date : June 2010 iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation is the outcome of four years of doctoral research in the School of Media and Communication, College of Design and Social Context, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. During this time, I have worked with a great number of people who have contributed in various ways to the research and the completion of the dissertation. It is a pleasure to convey my gratitude to them all and convey my humble acknowledgment. First and foremost I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Shia Democracy': Myth Or Reality? by Sreeram Chaulia the Other Islam
    ‘Shia Democracy’: Myth or Reality? By Sreeram Chaulia The Other Islam Discussions about the democracy-deficit in the Muslim world tend to conflate Sunnis and Shias as culturally homogeneous groups. Nuances about diversity within Islam only come up related to the regional variation in practices and political institutions (e.g. Middle Eastern Islam, North African Islam, South Asian Islam, Central Asian Islam and Southeast Asian Islam).1 Some scholars make the distinction between Arab and non-Arab countries with regard to their political culture and regime type.2 The unspoken assumption in studies proving the proclivity of Muslim countries toward authoritarianism is that sectarian schisms within Islam do not matter much when it comes to attitude and receptivity to democracy. Whether there are well-delineated differences between Shias and Sunnis in the way they conceive of – and construct – political authority has not been given much serious research. This is a surprising omission in contrast to the extent to which political scientists have debated the impact of the Catholic-Protestant schism 1 The classic exposition of cross-national differences in Islam and its impact on society and politics is V.S.Naipaul’s book comparing Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan and Malaysia. Cf. 1999. Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions Among the Converted Peoples, New York: Random House. 2 Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson argue that the 31 Muslim majority but non-Arab countries are over-achievers for GDP per capita levels in terms of holding competitive elections, while the 16 Arab countries are under-achievers. Cf. 2003. ‘An “Arab” More Than “Muslim” Electoral Gap’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 3.
    [Show full text]
  • How Islamic Is Indonesia Constitution?
    Implementing Islamic Constitutionalism: How Islamic Is Indonesia Constitution? Muhammad Siddiq Armia Abstract: Implementing Islamic Constitutionalism: How Islamic Is Indonesia Constitution?. Religious constitutionalism has recently become a global discussion. Such a trend arises as a result of several countries that have a majority of religious adherents declare their constitution based on certain religions. Thailand, for example, provides special norms about Buddhism (Buddhist constitutionalism), the Vatican has special norms about Catholicism (Catholic constitutionalism), India has special norms about Hinduism (Hindu constitutionalism), Saudi Arabia has norms specifically about Islam (Islamic constitutionalism), and so on. This article analyzes whether or not the Islamic principles have been adopted in the Indonesian Constitution. These principles consist of protecting religion, soul, mind, offsprings, and property. The author uses the five principles as a standard in measuring the entire Indonesian Constitution which constitutes to the teachings of Islam (Islamic constitutionalism). The implementation of Islamic constitutionalism can be identified through articles in the constitution. This study concluded that, in general, the Indonesian constitution could be considered to have agreed to Islamic constitutionalism, although in some cases it still needs to be actualized more. Keywords: Islamic constitutionalism, Indonesian’s constitution, comparative constitutional Abstrak: Mengimplementasikan Konstitusionalisme Islam: Seberapa Islamkah
    [Show full text]