A Royal Romance: the Cult of Cyrus the Great in Modern Iran

A Royal Romance: The Cult of Cyrus the Great in Modern Iran ALI ANSARI Abstract: This article looks at the continuing fascination with the idea of monarchy in Iran, dismissed and condemned after the revolution but gradually rehabilitated through an engagement with the Shahnameh and a reinvigorated interest in ancient Iran. The interest in Sasanian Iran, as the cradle for the development of Islamic civilisation, has in turn enabled a popular reacquaintance with Achaemenid Iran, previously frowned on for its association with Mohammad Reza Shah but legitimised by the enthusiastic endorsement of the figure of Cyrus the Great by President Ahmadinejad. This political myth of Cyrus the Great reflects the changing political dynamics of the Islamic Republic and the need to appropriate popular nationalist iconography to the state. Key words: Monarchy, Shahnameh, Sasanian Iran, Achaemenid Iran, Cyrus the Great, political myth, nationalism Royalty has rarely been more popular in Iran. As paradoxical as this statement may first appear it should come as little surprise that after nearly 40 years of Islamic Revolution and Republic the public are reacting against an official ideology that has ostensibly defined itself against the institution of monarchy. Part of this reaction is a consequence of the continuing romance of monarchy that is deeply embedded within Iranian culture and which is reflected in the widespread fascination with the ‘national’ epic, the Shahnameh; a fascination that despite initial reservations, the political establishment of the Islamic Republic, has come to embrace, if for no other reason than its literary merit. But the interest goes further and into areas that highlight not only the contradictions of contemporary political culture but the difficulties in imposing state narratives on an unwilling population. Interest in the Shahnameh can be explained as a form of cultural retrenchment; a reversion to tradition in which the more knowledgeable may point out - despite the title - is not sparing of the failings of kings. As a cultural icon of Iran, therefore, the Shahnameh can be 1 fairly described as ambiguous about monarchy and its benefits. Not that this has prevented a commercial preoccupation with cultural artefacts on the pre-Islamic monarchy with busts of various Sasanian and Achaemenid kings on sale to an enthusiastic public (see Figure 1). INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE. LEGEND: Figure 1. But there is something altogether more interesting going on when this romantic nostalgia transfers itself to an interest in the immediate pre-Revolutionary monarchy. For many in Iran today, the Pahlavi monarchs - Reza Shah (r. 1926-41) and Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 1941-79) - offer a stark and often favourable contrast with the present, facilitating a growing nostalgia for what is perceived as a simpler time, when the economy appeared healthy and Iran’s status in the world, was by all accounts high1. Indeed, if Iranian history, and its imperial history in particular, fuelled by a socially reinvigorated nationalist narrative, provides a mythological refuge from the distress of the present, its most recent manifestation has been re- energised both by a generation that retains memories of that earlier ‘halcyon period’, and by a new generation, whose fertile nationalist imagination both complements and compensates for the memory of others. This imagination is paradoxically reinforced by the near obsession of the contemporary elite for a royal past which it seeks to condemn, and an imperial past that it frequently wants to emulate. The didactic drive to educate the public about the wickedness of the Pahlavis is, thus, not only undermined by the tendency of the public to react against any such attempt, but by a curious affection of the regime elite for the imperial past which identifies past grandeur with 1 ‘Why Iranians are lapping up Shah memorabilia’, The Guardian, 17 June 2015; Iranians celebrating ‘Cyrus the Great Day’, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-8QwyWHGFU (accessed 17 February 2021). 2 monarchy in a manner which would not have been entirely unfamiliar to the Pahlavis themselves. Perhaps the obvious case of this has been the regime’s attempts to harness the renewed interest in the figure of Cyrus the Great (559-529BC), the founder of the first Persian Empire, the imperial ancestor most dear to the heart of Mohammad Reza Shah, and increasingly ‘rehabilitated’ by Iranians as the ‘father of the nation’.2 Long viewed with suspicion by the authorities of the Islamic Republic largely because of his association in the public imagination with the last Shah, his rehabilitation was signalled in grand style by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who sought to definitively appropriate Cyrus to his own political advantage. The parallels with the Shah were striking, if the exploitation distinct, but there could be little doubt as President Putin filed past a mock-up of the Persepolis frieze on his way to a joint press conference in Tehran in 2007, that the Achaemenids had been brought back in from the cold (see Figure 2). INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE. LEGEND: Figure 2. A royal progress of rehabilitation This was, of course, the culmination of a process that had emerged from the shadows of the Iran-Iraq war. At the onset of the revolution, the Achaemenids, and the monuments associated with them, had been so closely identified with the last Shah that any association short of outright condemnation was regarded as effectively blasphemous. In the heat of revolution, some limited voice was even given to those who felt that the Achaemenids were a wholly invented tradition imposed on Iran by Westerners in a bid to diminish the ‘real’ history of Iran 2 According to Herodotus, The Histories (London, 2003), p. 452, the Persians regarded Cyrus as ‘a father’. This new rendition appended the term ‘nation’. 3 which was in turns Islamic but also intriguingly, if tentatively at first, encapsulated in the myths of the Shahnameh. For a brief moment – though some have held fast to this belief – Cyrus had to give way to Jamshid. What this did, of course, was to facilitate the return of the Shahnameh as a legitimate text not only as a receptacle of the Persian language but as a repository of Iran’s traditional, pre-Islamic history. Talk of kings in this particular context, as an exercise in Iranian authenticity – as opposed to the pastiche of the Pahlavis – became both tolerated and increasingly accepted back into the cultural framework of Iran. Consequently, some of the more zealous revolutionary actions, such as the renaming of Kermanshah province as Bakhtaran (on the basis that it was more authentic), were after decades reversed: an early example of the limits of government ideology. It was justified on the grounds of restoring the traditional name, but that tradition had been reflected in the unwillingness of the locals to use the new ‘traditional’ name. The government of the Islamic Republic was relatively quick to recognise that rejection was a poor and largely ineffective substitute for a more managed control and appropriation, though even this approach was to have its limitations. Despite these constraints on the pedagogic use of the past in the service of controversial Islamist narratives, at the very least such a didactic approach provided a cover for the gradual rehabilitation of Iran’s imperial and royal history. The monument that proved too seductive to avoid remained Persepolis – a site that some revolutionaries had wanted to destroy – but now served as a template to warn against the dangers of decadence. There was a convenient duality to this narrative. One related to the collapse of the Achaemenids and of Iran’s ancient civilisation in general, as a result of moral collapse, with the more immediate narrative related to the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah. His association with the site was writ large in the public imagination because of the ‘greatest party of the world’ held in Persepolis in 1971, ostensibly to commemorate the 2500th anniversary of 4 the foundation of the Persian Empire.3 Thus, when President Rafsanjani became the first senior official of the Islamic Republic to visit Persepolis in 1991, his visit was laced with a heavy layer of educative moralising about the futility of earthly power and the dangers of decadence, though more critical eyes noticed with opprobrium that Rafsanjani could not completely disguise his sense of pride. It was a limited if important opening, and while in previous – pre-revolutionary moments – the government enthusiastically endorsed and supported Achaemenid narratives, in the revolutionary present this enthusiasm would be left in large part to society, that due to its new found literacy, given added momentum by the advent of new technologies, provided new energy to this renewed interest in the ancient past. For many young Iranians disillusioned, and increasingly disenfranchised, this interest in the ancient history of the country fuelled and supported – in a safe and non-political way – a growing nationalist sentiment and movement. Popular histories provided a new historical mythology to reinforce the cultural renaissance that in time would seep into a more political narrative which the regime would seek to harness. For the time being, however, Rafsanjani’s visit had enabled a discussion, even if the focus of this was a movement from below rather than an orthodox narrative dictated from above. Indeed, for the establishment itself, the focus of official research remained firmly Islamic, but perhaps more pointedly towards the origins and rise of Islam in Iran. Like the historians of Christianity in Europe who were obliged through the need for context to study the Roman Republic and Empire, so too did a new generation of enthusiastic religious historians Iran turn to the Sasanians Empire to understand the context of Iran’s submission to Islam. Like their pre-revolutionary pre-cursors, they ended up discovering and arguing things that were not 3 Calculating 2500 from 559BC would actually take us to 1941, the date of the accession of Mohammad Reza Shah (a coincidence that he is unlikely to have missed).

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