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RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 1

English Articles Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/ Winter 2021

Workshop to Empower Iranian Women Refugees in Moria, Greece By: Maryam Zar P 2

AAnn OOutstandingutstanding IranianIranian Statesman:Statesman: Remembering Mr. Abdolreza ANSARI By Amir Taheri P 5

HOVEYDA and Ardeshir ZAHEDI A Curious Cohabitation Interview with Ardeshir Zahedi by: Najmieh Sadjadi P 11 Ali Reza PAHLAVI A Memoire By: Dr. James R. Russell P 37

Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI Commemoration of 100 Years Sholeh Shams Shahbaz P 45

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 2 Workshop to Empower Iranian Women Refugees in Moria, Greece

Workshop to Empower Iranian Women Refugees in Moria, Greece By: Maryam Zar (Associate Editor InChief , English Rahavard) In the months since I have been to Moria, a lock- down due to COVID-19 has been imposed. The people I met while I was there in February, do- ing a workshop to empower women, have been unable to move beyond a certain radius from the camp. They have been relegated to a mea- ger eking out of their days in a squalid camp, overcrowded with people, in the stifling heat of summer when the stench of uncollected garbage, overflowing urine and indisposed feces can over- whelm the senses. The tents in which families live are hot and the air is stale. The “connex” – corrugated containers given to the lucky few, are hot and stifling – but still, people have endured. They endure in the hope of a better future in Europe and be- yond. In the last month or so, many of the women that were in our program have been given a Greek ID, and transitioned off the island of Lesvos, and the camp at Moria, to Athens. There are two camps in Athens that house refugees which are far better run than the squalor on the Islands which serve as a catch all for the stream of refugees off the sea. But even the camps in Athens are fast becoming crowded. The refugees from Moria are not being send to those camps - they are being send to Athens on their own, to fend for themselves. Once the migrants given Greek ID cards, they are cutoff from the monthly stipend pro- vided to them by Greek government when they arrive on Greek soil. This arrangement made in early 2015, when the migrant crisis was at its peak and the flow of people des- perate for better living circumstances became undeniable to the world looking on. The

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 3 Workshop to Empower Iranian Women Refugees in Moria, Greece

EU nations came together and resolved to give money to Greece (the outer border nation on the European continent that would host a little over a million refugees crossing the narrow waters from Turkey or shared land borders), in order to help contain and manage the flow of people. The approximate $800M infusion of capital (which has come in pieces and has been allocated to various agencies for various relief schemes) culminated in a stipend being paid to each refugee family, ranging in payments from 90 Euro a month for the head of the household, to 40 euro per each family member. As of March 2019, the Greek government has a new strategy to deal with the overflow of refugees. They are offering 2000 euro to anyone who voluntarily leaves Greece and returns to where they came from. Together with tougher border controls and aggressive chasing of migrant boats on the coastal waters shared with Turkey, are to generate a measurable reduction in remaining refugees. But is has not. The reward offering was not popular with people who had left their homelands to escape war and conflict, or economic disaster and famine. As a result, the number of refugees continue to grow, with new asylum seekers crossing the border despite tighter controls. The Greek population beginning to lose pa- tience. The new strategy is to allow the migrants on the Islands to have ID cards to be able to travel to the mainland, namely Athens, and fend for themselves. Victoria Square in Athens has become the new squalid refugee camp to replace the squa- lor of the island camps. The park at Victoria Square is close to Piraeus Port which re- ceives the migrants arriving from the Aegean Island camps. Without language skills or marketable commercial capabilities, these refugees are left without a monthly stipend, without real asylum papers, without the opportunity to move beyond Greece, and stuck in an unwelcoming cosmopolitan city with no means to provide for themselves or their families. Prior to 2016, this park was a gateway to resettlement in other European nations – most commonly Germany and Sweden. But since the Balkan route to Northern Europe has been all but closed, this park has become a holding place, where dreams again fester, hope languishes, and squalor revisits these refugees who have now escaped stepped one step closer to their dreams of European resettlement, but find themselves stuck yet again, in an outdoor park with no support. The realty for many is simple survival. One family I know, with a 10- year- old a 5- year- old and a newborn is now scrambling for diapers in the park. Another young woman

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 4 Workshop to Empower Iranian Women Refugees in Moria, Greece who is here with her minor brother (whose mental state is increasingly precarious) scours for sanitary pads each month, along with her friends who have resorted to using cloth as a means to catch the flow of menstruation.Another young woman with her mother and elderly father with a compromised immune system are just landing as we speak. They worry about COVID-19 and the toll of outdoor living in close quarters on the health of the father. A young woman, immigrating alone, hoping to reach her mother and sisters in western Europe begs for work and even considers prostitution to survive. She is thinking about a daring escape. That same escape attempted by one of the Iranian girls in our program a few years ago. She was caught and detained. Her ordeal in jail has left a mark on her psyche, and when she speaks of it, she cannot help but sob as she looks away in silence. There is no pleasant outcome waiting for these people right now. They are waiting through an unpredictable cycle of geopolitics that does not welcome immigration and certainly is not friendly to the influx of Muslims in their midst. These brown masses of people stuck in European border lands, kept at bay by increasingly isolationist polices led by so called “populist” leaders who foment prejudice. At the same time, the flames of conflict fanning around the world through proxy battles carrying either economically or physically on people’s soil. As long as we can’t provide peace and calm in nations, we will see the stream of desperate people flowing to places where lives are lived in safe and calm environments, and hope has a chance of thriving into opportunity. We cannot expect people to give up hope; and we cannot expect to keep it all for ourselves in safe lands where borders are closed to immigration.

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 5 AAnn OutstandingOutstanding IIranianranian Statesman:Statesman:

Remembering Mr. Abdolreza Ansari By Amir Taheri

.REMEMBERING MR. ABDOLREZA ANSARI

In the 1960s, as Iran emerged from decades of instability triggered by the Allied invasion and occupation in World War II, the Azerbaijan crisis, the aftershocks of oil nationalization and a looming demographic explosion, the nation’s gov- erning elite desperately looked for a shortcut to economic transformation. With oil income steadily, though slowly, increasing, the government could mo- bilize greater resources for development. Iran did have a pool of skills in diplo- macy, bureaucracy and classical military. What was lacking, however, was a pool of managerial skill and experience to bring ambitious projects to fruition as quickly as possible. In the early days, the pool in question consisted of a few dozen young men, many of them US-educated and having gained experience by working for Point IV, the aid program set up by resident Harry S. Truman to help World War II allies like Iran that were not covered by the much larger Marshall Plan, which

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 6 An Outstanding Stateman: Remembering Mr. Abdolreza Ansari was focused on Europe. Abdolreza Ansari, who has sadly passed away in Paris, belonged to that gen- eration of young, forward-looking and can-do Iranians who combined a deep attachment to their ancestral culture with modern skills of management. It was, therefore, natural that Ansari should quickly establish his reputation as a rising star of the emerging technocratic elite gathered around Mohammad-Re- za Shah and committed to realizing his ambitious dreams. In those days, the technocrats who were to play a crucial role in Iran’s economic and social success over the following decades benefited from what amounted to an unofficial training scheme on the job. A young technocrat could move from post to post in a short time, acquiring different skills before being recognized as the best player in a particular field. Mr. Ansari moved from heading the Khuzestan water and power department to becoming Deputy Finance Minister, then Minister of Labor and Minister of the Interior. I first met Mr. Ansari when he had been sent by the Shah to transform my home province into a launching pad for Iran’s economic modernization. But as if gods, or fate, were testing his mettle, his first task was to cope with one of the perennial floods that turn the low-lying valley at the foot of the Iranian plateau into a massive lake. A deft handling of the crisis — which meant that the big flood claimed almost no lives and was quickly brought under control — revealed Mr. Ansari’s cour- age, selfless determination and composure under pressure. Very soon, the slogan “Go South Young Man,” which first started as a tongue- in-cheek quip, became a reality, as large numbers of peoples moved in from other parts of Iran to work in the booming oil industry, the new agro-industrial complexes and the largest hydroelectric projects launched anywhere outside Europe and North America. Khuzestan, a well-watered land in a largely dry country and a four-season cli- mate, had great potential for agricultural and industrial development.

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 7 An Outstanding Stateman: Remembering Mr. Abdolreza Ansari

Initial seed money from the government attracted a growing flow of domestic and even foreign investment which, in turn, was used as a magnet for young talent from all over Iran. Mr. Ansari, then a dashing young man with the looks of a matinee idol, presid- ed over what came to be known as the “Khuzestan miracle.” David Lilienthal, who had made his reputation with the Tennessee Valley Au- thority in the United States, visited Khuzestan in the early stages of the big Karun hydroelectric project and praised Mr. Ansari’s management of the prov- ince as “top notch.”

CEREMONY TO BEGIN POURING OF CEMENT OF DEZ DAM, 30 OCTOBER 1961. Washington Post editor Alfred Friendly, also a visitor to Khuzestan, described Mr. Ansari as a “model governor, mixing deep immersion with his own culture with knowledge of the most advanced management techniques.” Success in the south put Ansari on a trajectory for greater responsibility at the national level.

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 8 An Outstanding Stateman: Remembering Mr. Abdolreza Ansari

As Minister of the Interior, one of the four regalian positions in the Cabinet, Ansari showed that he could be as good a politician as he had been a techno- crat-cum-governor. He pushed through a radical reform of old electoral laws which had always led to disputes while enabling big landlords, clerics and local notables to influence the results. He also presented a reconfiguration of provincial divisions to better reflect historic background and potentials for future development. One of Mr. Ansari’s many “peculiarities,” as his detractors charged, was his insistence on “going there and seeing things.” Thus, he became the first Iranian Interior Minister to visit all provinces, including the remote and often neglect- ed Sistan-and-Baluchistan. At the Interior Ministry, he discovered a long-standing scam that consisted of inviting real or even bogus Western consultants to offer recipes for develop- ment based on wishful thinking expressed through pseudo-scientific jargon. His campaign for a more centralized approach to planning, with the help of the Planning Organization’s chief Safi Asfia, contributed to a thorough revision of Iranian thinking about developmental philosophy. Not unexpectedly, friends and foes alike started to circulate Mr. Ansari’s name as a future prime minister. Alone in his generation of public servants, Mr. An- sari had acquired experience both on the ground, as project head and then provincial governor, and at ministerial headquarters in Tehran. His tenure as Minister of Interior had also brought him into direct contact with political groups, official parties, and lobbying interests of all sorts. However, due to a combination of circumstances, among them his lack of a killer instinct, he was sidelined and did not reach the top of the greasy pole. Was he bitter about that? I put the question to him decades later. “Yes and no,” he said. “Yes, because I feel that I did not do all I could for my beloved Iran. And no because I had the chance to serve in a new and exciting field.” The new and exciting field was the Royal Organization for Social Ser- vices (ROSS) with Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s twin sister, as patron.

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 9 An Outstanding Stateman: Remembering Mr. Abdolreza Ansari

The chief task of ROSS was to provide a safety net for the more vulnerable sections of Iranian society and fill the gaps in educational, welfare and health coverage offered by the government. The organization played a crucial role in the mass literacy campaign that earned Iran UNESCO’s gold medal for success. It was in that context that Mr. Ansari pushed through the project to publish a newspaper for the newly literate. The paper, Rouz-e-Now (New Day), was printed and distributed by Kayhan and helped millions of newly literate Iranians to be informed and to join the na- tional conversation. After the seizure of power by the mullahs, Mr. Ansari was among the first Ira- nian former officials to build links with fellow exiles and start the “what to do next” conversation. Early in 1981 we had a conversation about the possibility of starting a Per- sian-language newspaper in Paris but decided against it for political and logis- tical reasons. We concluded that Iran was still experiencing the aftershocks of the political earthquake it had suffered and would be in no mood to consider alternative narratives in a sober mood. Logistically, in those pre-Internet days, regardless of how attractive our message was, it seemed impossible to build a wide audi- ence inside Iran. However, Ansari did not sit back and enjoy the delights of an imposed exile. He worked hard to help new arrivals from Iran who needed residence permits, jobs, housing and, above all a shoulder to cry on. In effect, Mr. Ansari became a one-man Organization for Social Services for many Iranians forced to flee their homeland. One former ambassador who benefited from Mr. Ansari’s moral and material support said: “Abdolreza is doing on a miniature scale what he was doing on a big scale in Iran.” In a sense, it is precisely this that makes Abdolreza Ansari and his generation of Iranian statesmen, politicians and technocrats, important figures in a historic tragedy.

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 10 An Outstanding Stateman: Remembering Mr. Abdolreza Ansari

They could have done much more for their homeland but were cut short by a treacherous fate.

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 11 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi

A Curious Cohabitation

After several decades, Ardeshir Zahedi finally speaks about his relations with late Mr. Hoveyda and throws light on the mysteries.

For the past decades the curious cohabitation, collaboration and personal relations of Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hov- eyda and the Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi has been “the talk of the town.” So many writers, journalists, film makers and TV producers have shown interest and looked for answers to their questions. In two extensive interviews, one for the third volume of his Memoirs and the other with Miss Najmieh Sadjadi, a columnist for the political and cultural monthly magazine: NASIME BIDARI, Ambassador Zahedi speaks with Mrs Najmieh Sadjadi of his friendship, collaboration but also serious differences with a man who for 13 years served as the head of the government. AZADI MONTHLY JOURNAL -Let us address your relationship with the Prime Minister. The disagreements and bickering between the two of you was an item that was always a subject of talk in political circles and among the people. One of these instances was the famous meeting of the members of the cabinet to address the crisis in Tehran University, a story which received a great deal of embellishment. It made every-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 12 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation

one in the country very happy that you thwarted the efforts of the late Hoveyda and SAVAK who were inclined to intervene militarily in the university. You have already given an account of this event, so we are not going back to it. What was the root cause and origin of this disagreement? Ardeshir Zahedi: I had no personal disagreement with the late Hoveyda. The first difference of opinion - I say difference of opinion and not a difference- as I have already mentioned, occurred between us over the issue of the budget and the regulations governing the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was not a staff member of the Foreign Ministry. At the time of my first ambas- sadorship to Washington and then London, I noticed that the structure and modus operandi of the Ministry was by no means suited to the requirements and exigencies of our country. When some people looked from outside, they had the impression that the Foreign Ministry was an apparatus set up in service of reveling and having a good time. Perhaps this was an accurate assessment in some instances. Never- theless, after I assumed the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, I realized that in contrast to the small minority that deservedly became the subject of public criticism, the bulk of diplomats and staff, from the highest rank and file, were diligent and honorable individuals who cared about the prestige of their coun- try and worked hard to secure its best interests. It was of prime importance to get the system moving forward and invigorate it. Working 14 to 15 hours a day I wanted to shake up the system and I did shake it up. Whatever success we achieved was the fruit of the collective effort and devotion of my colleagues. With such a mental predisposition and quality of effort, and goals in mind and the methods we needed to bring into play, we had to supply minimum neces- sary comfort and a suitable standard of living for our employees. This had to be done within a legitimate and fair framework, so that it would behoove the dig- nity and stature of their country and be on par with their international peers. All these points are a reiteration of what I have mentioned before in chapters that covered the beginning of my career in the Foreign Ministry and in the segment concerning the policy of national independence. I have touched upon them in all the other matters that I have related. Presented all my programs

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 13 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation to His Majesty and received his approval. Shah’s aim in appointing me to this position was to transform the system. Once in Vienna, he quipped with a smile that now, no one would be able to hold back Ardeshir. As I said earlier, the charter of the Foreign Ministry with all due care and preci- sion was drafted under the supervision of highly qualified experts. The salaries and benefits of the staff needed to be in line with the stated goals of the charter. We got all this ready and suddenly, Confronted with opposition of Hoveyda, he asserted that the charter should have been sent to the Iran Novin Party first and then to the parliament. He took his complaint to the King. This unreasonable expectation made me angry. As a foreign minister, I had nothing to do with the party. I neither approved nor disapproved of it. What I was saying was that being foreign minister is a link between the country and the outside world. The Foreign Ministry should stay away from internal political maneuverings. Today, a government comes and tomorrow it could be replaced by another. Foreign policy should enjoy stability and continuity. Personally, I was also against join- ing a political party. Even when the Rastakhiz party was established and it was said that it is His Majesty’s order that everyone should become its members, I clearly stated I would not join the party and did not accept its membership. I have a document in the Shah’s own handwriting in my files implicitly admitting that the scheme of working with one political party was a mistake. Hence, I told His Majesty that I could not report the activity of the foreign ministry to the party. Once the charter was sent to the parliament, I would go and defend it. I added: ‘I am yours and also the country’s foreign minister’. Eventually the king accepted my view that at least as long as I remained in this position, an exception should be made about the foreign ministry. The matter concluded, nevertheless, the late Hoveyda’ s grievance regarding the issue persisted. Not long afterward, the issue of the Foreign Ministry’s budget came up. The programs that I had envisaged for the foreign ministry, that I have already mentioned in relevant chapters, required money. If you lack sufficient budget and up-to-date equipment, relying only on telex machines to send your mes- sages and your diplomatic pouch has to wait for an agent to deliver it in person,

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 14 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation

youy will not be able to keep pace with ttheh developed world and succeed in aadvancing. You cannot tie a person’s aarmsr and legs and expect him to run. ThThis would only result in his falling ddown and injuring himself. A difference of opinion (I am saying a difference of opinion and not a rift) occurredo over making provisions for theth funds necessary for the Foreign ministrym between the Prime Minister andan I. Waiting for an opportunity to broachb the subject to the Shah in the presence of the Prime Minister so the king would, so to speak, settle the prob- lem between us. This opportunity arose during a trip to Pakistan to take part in the R.C.D. summit. I was accompanying the king to Pakistan on an Iran airplane. It should be remembered that the Shah still did not have a private plane at the time. The late Hoveyda was seated next to me facing the Shah. A little further behind him was General Fazeli, the special equerry of the Shah who was gesticulating to me to speak calmly. I had a thick file with me, and as I put it on the table, I said: “I had mentioned to Your Majesty before that I was not interested in holding an office. I have no quarrel with the Prime Minister either and I dislike talking behind people’s backs therefore I would like to say whatever I have to say in front of him.’ It was the concluding months of Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s government, and during the flight, I remarked to the Shah that he had ordered the Prime Min- ister, the Minister of Finance and the head of the Planning and Budget Orga- nization to reform the budget of Foreign Ministry many times and had also approved it in the Economic Conference. I added: “Thus far Your Majesty’s orders have not been implemented. As it stands, the foreign ministry is not able to

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 15 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation perform its tasks. I am not in love with the foreign ministry and I loathe creating difficulties for His Majesty, Prime Minister or anyone else. If you do not wish me to remain in this job, I will leave. Here is the file containing all the documents.” Here the Prime Minister turned towards me and said: “Are you joking dear Ardi?” (he used to call me dear Ardi or Ardeshir in private, and I used to call him Amir-Abbas or Amir). I replied: “when it comes to serious matters, I never joke, neither with you nor with anyone else. I am saying my piece and here are the relevant documents.” His Majesty was upset with this exchange but coolly listened to our views and then ordered that a committee be formed to deal with this issue in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after our return. In this committee, Mr Djamshid Amou- zegar, the Minister of Finance, Mr Manuchehr Goodarzi, the Minister for the Civil Service, and a few high-ranking personnel of the foreign ministry, in particular Dr Abbas Nayeri, were present. To forestall the distortion of the re- port of our discussion to the Shah, I requested that Mr Moeinian should also be present in the meeting... The problem solved, nevertheless, the gripe and bitterness persisted. These kinds of disagreements always occur but never develop into political wrangles and confrontation. Various other instances transpired. At present, I recall one of them and will recount it. The day that the President of Czechoslovakia was paying a visit to Iran, the Prime Minister kindly offered to come to the foreign ministry so we could have lunch and then go to the airport together while talking about work. We had our lunch and then came down. I never used the ministry’s car and rode in my own personal vehicle. I sat in the driver’s seat and the Prime Minister took the seat beside me. Ali Khan, the foreign ministry’s driver, sat in the back seat. He was a decent and loyal man. During the time Dr Ali-Gholi Ardalan was minister, he had sustained facial injuries in a car accident. I liked him very much and always took great care of him, lest he felt that his presence was unnecessary. In any case, we moved from the Foreign ministry to Ghavam-ol-Saltaneh

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Street and drove up towards Naderi Avenue and the Soviet Embassy turning right heading towards the airport. Suddenly, the Prime Minister started whin- ing about Savak, saying that they were trying to control our activities. They recorded our telephone calls and reported them. Was he really complaining, or did he wish to hint that he was being informed of my comings and goings and my conversations? Not knowing I replied: “So much the better! Let them do it, what difference does it make? Wehave nothing to hide. Moreover, you are the Prime Minister and Savak is legally under your supervision. You are the only person who has a right, any time, day or night, anywhere in the country, without prior warning, to go into any spot or building belonging to SAVAK and carry out an inspection. You can summon the director of Savak and ask him, ‘what are you doing this for?’ Do we have anything that needs hiding? I have no business inter- fering in His Majesty’s private life, but I relate to him even my own revelling and I have no anxiety that my comings and goings and words be reported to him from other channels.” We were talking for a few minutes. Hoveyda was sitting in front of the car beside me and we reached the Culture Amphitheatre (Talar Far- hang). Amir-Abbas said: “Yes, we should remain in power for twenty years. His Majesty has also said the same thing.” Hearing this was like getting an electric shock. Slamming on the breaks the car jolted so violently that poor Ali Khan was thrown from the back seat and the late Hoveyda’s head hit the windscreen. I said: “Dear Amir, I was His Majesty’s son-in-law, I could not live more than a few years with my wife. And you are saying I should remain Foreign Minister and you Prime Minister for another twenty years? No, this is not for me. It is neither prudent for me, nor for you or His Majesty that we would grab the office of a minister or prime minister.” Hoveyda was very miffed and I became cross. We did not speak again all the way to the airport. After welcoming the President and accompanying him to the Golestan Palace, we made our departure. The day after, when I finished reporting the daily matters to the Shah, he remarked: “And what else?” I asked: “Regarding what issue?” The Shah asked: What“ did you say in the car?” I replied that it was a friendly discussion: “The Prime Min- ister said we ought to remain for twenty years. When I put on the brakes, I was

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 17 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation very embarrassed, and he added that His Majesty had said so.’ I replied: ’first of all, if we remain in office for twenty years, we will create twenty million enemies for His Majesty. Secondly why, whatever comes up, do you remark that it is His Majesty’s order?” Shah said: “Was this all?” And I replied this was the exact truth. The Shah knew that I never lied to him; and perhaps this was one of the reasons he tolerated my behaviour and approach. He then smiled and said the incident had been reported to us differently. In any case, this is an issue that belongs to history and I would like to mention here that my opposition to the choice of Her Majesty as regent was on the basis that I found the idea and decision to be unconstitutional. I never wished for an act to be carried out in the name of the Shah that would be contrary to the correct norms and standards and would give rise to controversy. It is for this very reason that this resolution never went to the National Consultative Assembly and never gained a lawful aspect. On this issue I disagreed with Hoveyda as well. - Was Mr Hoveyda used to making these types of complaints? Unfortunately, he used to gripe about various people. He grumbled about his colleagues, or people he considered his opposition or being in his way. He was constantly nagging about them, badmouthing them to the Shah and going as far as doctoring and distorting reality and creating divisiveness and animosity between his rivals. The Shah did not usually pay attention to all this, especially if he knew that the Prime Minister had a personal grudge against someone or harbored hostility towards that person. However, neither approach of Hoveyda was appropriate and honorable, nor His Majesty’s reactions permitting him to behave in such a manner. This was one of the main problems of leadership in our country at the time. Their way of acting created a type of malaise and mistrust among those in charge in the country and impaired the accomplishment of tasks. In any case, this tendency of Hoveyda did not befit the head of a government. It did not show any grit. - very interesting incident; were there other instances too? We should have been on amicable terms, but there were many such instances that soured our relationship. For instance, I mentioned the episode regard-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 18 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation ing him welcoming the German ambassador at the airport that went against the diplomatic protocol because he had not yet been officially confirmed in his post as ambassador. In other words, he had not yet been presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Shah had not yet accepted his credentials. According to diplomatic practice, the head of the Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs goes to the airport to welcome the ambassadors who arrive in the country. Was angry when I heard that Hoveyda had personally gone to the airport. telephoned him and said that he should not have done so because it was contrary to standard practice and in the future other ambassadors might expect the same treatment then wrote a long official letter to His Majesty. The next day when I had an audience with the King, I ran into Hoveyda. He said: “I was just visiting the Shah, and when I mentioned to him the story of the letter that was dispatched, Shah remarked that coincidentally, in this case, Ardeshir was right but ask him to retract the letter.” I said: “That’s impossible. I will not go back on my word, and the letter has been classified and registered as an official document of the foreign ministry.” When he came to see me, this new ambassa- dor was leaning back cross-legged and since it was against etiquette, I banged on the table so hard that the cup of tea on the table spilled and I cut short the meeting. On the day of the King’s audience, I was taking him to His Majesty to present his credentials. He was so frightened of what I had done that his legs were trembling, and it led to a formal complaint of the foreign ministry or can- cellation of the meeting that Mr Robert Buron, the minister in the cabinet of Charles de Gaulle and the head of the Seminar of Economic Development had organised at the Pahlavi University - a seminar that had been inaugurated with a message from His Majesty. At the last minute, I organised a luncheon in the foreign ministry for him and a few others and I took Buron for a few minutes to His Majesty, although it was not in his schedule. Everyone was delighted and returned to their country happy and satisfied. Hoveyda’s soreness against me however remained. And so on, and so forth. Ultimately my reservations about Hoveyda were of a fundamental nature. Let us then turn to other points on the late Hoveyda.

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Hoveyda, who came to office under special circumstances after the assassina- tion of Hasan Ali Mansur considered his government as a kind of interim cab- inet at the beginning. Gradually however, he became so power thirsty wishing to hold on to his position as an end in itself, and not as a means of serving his country. He longed to remain head of government at any price. He was hiding the reality of what was going on in the country from the Shah as much as pos- sible. Even Her Majesty who had a lot of affection for him has admitted this point in her memoirs. I remember a day as going up the steps of the palace to have an audience with the Shah, I saw Hoveyda standing behind a column in the hallway. Asked with astonishment: “Amir, what are you doing here?” He replied that His Majesty had given him some orders. He added “I have come to say farewell.” He was scheduled to travel to Romania, and I had charged Dr Abbas Nayeri to accom- pany him as the representative of the Foreign Ministry. In any case we entered the room. When we were alone, he said “yes, they have gone and undermined us in front of His Majesty.” I asked: “how?” He replied: “they have told him that people are unhappy, and the Shah was distraught; wondering about the source of people’s dissatisfaction. It would be advisable to form a committee to look into this issue.” I asked for further clarification. When he finished, I said: “No one has undermined you. If you consider what you have told me as undermining, I am the one undermining”. We need to understand the reasons of malcontent among people, youth and the university students. If the causes for dissatisfac- tion continue, these people can be easily manipulated to join the throngs of the opposition. Afterwards the issue of the assassination of General Farsio came up. Again, I raised the point of the dissatisfaction of the youth. The poor Gen- eral had a bullet wound and was fighting for his life. I went to visit him in the hospital. A few top Generals of the army were present. Privately, the doctors told me that there was no hope for him pulling through. I mentioned to Hov- eyda that I intended to suggest to His Majesty to visit this officer in the hospital. I pointed out: “This was where the dissatisfaction lied. Nobody has conspired to undermine you. What is at stake is the fate of a country that cannot afford negli-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 20 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation gence. Dear Amir, this is the reality.” The Prime Minister responded, “Yes, His Majesty has said that a committee comprised of you, me, and the Minister of Court should be formed to look into this issue.” I told the Prime Minister that: “I was unable to participate since first of all I was the Foreign Minister and was constantly travelling, and secondly the managing of the country’s internal affairs was his responsibility.” I further re- marked that: “I had still not forgotten the episode concerning my criticism of the Tehran traffic which had been a source of public vexation and dismay.” I added: “Under your directives (the Prime Minister’s) the Head of the Constab- ulary and various authorities came to see me. We discussed the matter for hours. We made plenty of efforts and compiled reports, but it didn’t get anywhere. I also recollect the problem of the military intervention in the university which you and Savak had prescribed. Therefore, it makes no sense for me to get involved in this. You do as you deem appropriate, but again, no one has tried to do you in. I men- tioned to His Majesty that incidentally the previous day, General de Gaulle had fired his Prime Minister.” I noticed that this news greatly perturbed Amir-Ab- bas and had made him worried lest the Shah also decided to do the same thing. - And then what happened? Here, I would like to refer to another incident that took place sometime later. One day, I was sitting in my office when General Gholam Ali Oveissi, the Com- mander of the Gendarmerie, telephoned me sounding very distraught. He said something awful had happened and I was the only one who could inform His Majesty. An hour earlier, when General Farsio was leaving his house, he was ambushed by a terrorist group and came under machine gun fire and Molo- tov cocktail. He was now in a very critical condition. I said: “It was incumbent on him to tell His Majesty, but I would also let him know that General Oveissi had something urgent to communicate regarding the Judiciary organisation of the army.” It was close to noontime, so, as usual, I would be received by the king. At that time, His Majesty was residing at the Sahebgheranyeh Palace. He was very dejected and upset. I related the matter to the Shah and said that I had just returned from the hospital and had conveyed to General Farsio his kind

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 21 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation wishes and regards. He was in such a moodd that tears filled his eyes. I started crying too.o. His comportment and gestures showed hisis emotions. When the normal daily businessss finished, I said: Your“ Majesty, I have some-e- thing to relate.” He said: “Go right ahead”.”. Using this expression in talking to me was a sign that he was feeling downcast by the cir-r- cumstances or by me. I said: “You remem-m- ber that I had mentioned to you that in myy youth I suffered from ulcers? Now every timee I have stomachache, I go to the same doctoror who has the record of my illness. Two or threeee years ago I was ill again, and this doctor suspected that I might be suffering from throat cancer. You said that I should go to the specialist in Zurich. Now every time I have throat problem, I go to this doctor. Presently, our country has fallen ill. It is afflicted with a problem. This incident of Farsio’s attempted assassination is a sign that there is a problem in our country.” His Majesty stated that “We provided a good life for our people, what else did they demand?” I said: “Let’s assume we give them gold ingots. They will gain nothing by eating gold ingots, except developing a terrible disease and dying. We should give them bread and invest the gold ingots in the bank for the benefit of the coun- try. We must give people what they need. We should not force things on them and instead of earning their gratitude, provoke resentment and negative reactions.” My words had a very heart-warming effect. We had a long conversation and afterwards had lunch together. Later, of course, the question of assessing the causes of dissatisfaction was brought up. The army was given the task of in- vestigating the problem. They formed a think tank. However, as a result of Hoveyda’s opposition who imagined a conspiracy against him, none of these efforts got anywhere. He did his utmost to prevent the Shah from hearing about public discontent

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 22 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation and as the saying went “to keep His Majesty’s mind unperturbed”. Some mem- bers of his inner circle and a number of those in charge of intelligence also assisted Hoveyda in his stratagem. And eventually, we all witnessed the conse- quence of all this. This is another matter which I should perhaps relate in another volume of my memoirs. My intention is to analyse the causes and factors contributing to the revolution; a revolution that was due to many internal catalysts as well as for- eign incitements. Regarding Mr Hoveyda, I should add that his anxiety, lest a rival might emerge and challenge his grip on power, caused him to undermine all those individuals in his cabinet who possessed a strength of character. A boss should support his colleagues and invigorate them. If they have any weaknesses, he should try to find a way to redress those weaknesses or remove these people from their jobs. In any case, he did not deserve the grim fate that befell him. Maybe if Hoveyda had pursued his career in diplomacy or in international organizations, it would have been more suited for him and for Iran. No doubt he would have made a first-rate ambassador in an important diplomatic post. But perhaps thirteen years as the head of the cabinet, especially with the authority he enjoyed to- wards the end, was not good for Iran and for Hoveyda himself, which resulted in his paying the ultimate price. *** In a more recent interview with the columnist of Nasime Bidari, Mrs Najmieh Sadjadi, we read the following exchanges:

- For five years you served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mr Hoveyda’s cabi- net. Before talking about this particular period could you say how you came to know Mr. Hoveyda? It started with friendship. It goes back to 1954 when he worked in Switzerland. Later he moved to the Iranian Embassy in Turkey but had problems with Gen- eral Arfa, our Ambassador. I spoke to his Majesty about his difficulties and he agreed to his return to Iran. From the very beginning Hoveyda liked to work at the National Iranian Oil

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Company which was under the executive directorship of Mr Entezam. The two knew each other well. Soon Mr Mansour became Prime Minister and Hoveyda entered his cabinet as the Finance Minister. At that time, I was ambassador in UK and we were engaged in negotiations on the Iranian oil. Hoveyda came to London to participate in our sessions as Minister of Finance. At the same time Dr Manouchehr Eghbal who was then the managing director of the NIOC also joined us. Hoveyda did not trust some of the members of the Iranian delegation and thought that were too close to the British. I was not happy about this and told him that I cannot report such a thing to Tehran and in any case those who have been officially sent by Tehran should participate in our discussions. He also did not see eye to eye with Dr. Eghbal. In fact, it was not clear which one of the two was at the head of the Iranian delegation. Before this, Dr Eghbal had a higher rank at the NIOC and was not happy about Mansour government’s decision to raise the price of domestic petrol. I suggested to his majesty that it would be better if Dr Eghbal return to Tehran and let the Minister of Finance in charge. The Shah agreed; Dr. Eghbal went for another meeting to Vienna, Hoveyda and I continued our discussions with the British. Throughout our negotiations, Prime Minister Mansour was in contact with Mr. Hoveyda and me to be in- formed of the situation. Finally, I told him once we have reached decisions, I shall report directly to His Majesty and inform him too. Asked Hoveyda to say the same thing. Then arranged a private meeting between Hoveyda and Lord Shawcross who was the principal advisor of the SHELL company, wanting them to know each other so that our negotiations could advance more smoothly and come to con- clusion quickly. This is in fact what happened. All this was about a year before I became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Soon after I joined his cabinet, I confronted the issues on which we disagreed. Everyone knows that the appointment of Hoveyda as Prime Minister was the issue of the assassination of Prime Minister Mansour. To many, including Hov- eyda himself, this came as a surprise. He did not expect it and when his nom-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 24 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation ination was announced he thought it would be an interim position. Once he was confirmed as PM, his attitude began to change. Gradually seduced by the taste of power and ready to do anything to stay in his position, now wanted power for the sake of power. All these I talk about are documented and many of them I have published in the third volume of my Memoirs that deals with the period I served as Foreign Minister. - What were the major problems you had with him? We certainly had no conflicts as such. We just had different ways of seeing things and had different solutions for some problems. There were several things happening in government with which I could not agree. However, we remained in good personal relation and spoke together like two good friends. Problems were not with Hoveyda himself, but with Hoveyda the Prime Minister and in relation with our functions. The first of such cases was related to the charter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With group of experts we had worked hard on drafting the new charter the Foreign Ministry needed to implement its re- forms. Hoveyda was not happy and wanted the project first to be presented to his majority party “The Iran -e- Novin” to be studied before presentation of the bill to the parliament. I was seriously angry. As minister of foreign affairs, I had nothing to do with political parties. I believed strongly that the ministry should remain out of party politics. Parties come and go, and every election may bring fundamental changes, but our foreign policy needs continuity and stability. I was never a member of any political party myself. Even when the Rastakhiz or “Resurrection Party” created by the Shah, and he ordered every Iranian to join, I wrote a letter to him saying that as minister of foreign affairs I had no inten- tion to join. I have his handwritten answer accepting my request. Concerning the charter of the ministry, I told His Majesty I did not want to go through the party. Once the bill is presented to the Parliament, I will go there to defend it and answer the questions. Once again, Shah accepted, and the Foreign Ministry was made an exception to the rule at least as long I was responsible. Hoveyda, naturally, was not happy about this. Short time after the question of the Charter, we faced difficulties regarding

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 25 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation the budget for the ministry. During the discussions on the question, we had an official trip to Pakistan in the company of the Shah. Mr. Hoveyda was with us. During our flight I started talking about the budget. I had a big file full of documents that I put on the table in front the Shah and said “You know, your majesty, that I am not that attached to my position. I have no personal grudges against the Prime Minister and I do not like to speak behind anybody’s back. Several times you have ordered the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance to revise the budget of the ministry of Foreign Affairs and so far, nothing has been done. The ministry under my responsibility cannot function properly in such conditions. I do not want to create problems for anyone; If you do not want me to stay, I resign.” Prime Minister Hoveyda turned to me and said “Ardeshir, you must be joking!” I replied: “No I am not joking neither with you nor with anyone else.” His Majesty visibly disturbed by my reaction continued with his usual patience listening to us and at the end ordered the government to solve the problem as soon as we are back. Once gain Hoveyda did not like it. - Why didn’t you attend the cabinet meeting and how did Hoveyda react to this? I attended those sessions where there was something related to my ministry. Everybody knew this and His Majesty was informed. - You used to report directly to the Shah. Was Hoveyda, as the head of the govern- ment, complaining about this and your rare attendance of His Cabinet meetings? The day I was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs I said publicly that no one can and should interfere in the affairs of my department be it Prime Min- ister or a member of the royal family. The day I returned to Tehran to assume my new responsibilities, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Alam the Court minister and several others had come to the airport to welcome me. Hoveyda kindly sug- gested to drive me to my home in his car. The following day also he came to pick me up to take me to Saadabad Palace to officially introduce me to the sovereign as Minister of Foreign Affairs. These were opportunities to discuss between us our future relations. I started telling him that: “I am a stubborn person and prefer to be frank with you and settle all

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 26 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation issues before I start. First, I want you to tell me directly whenever there is problem. Next, I will not accept anyone criticising of my predecessor, Mr. Abbas Aram. Thirdly I do not want anyone interfering in the affaire of my ministry. Good or bad whatever is done there I assume the whole responsibility. I have different methods of working from my predecessor and intend to change many things. I have several reforms in mind.” Hoveyda very kindly accepted all my arguments. When I said that usually I did not attend the cabinet meeting should not be interpreted as if I did not know what was going on there. Besides, I had in- formed His Majesty, the Prime Minister and the other members of his cabinet that my job required frequent trips abroad to attend meetings and carry on my duties and could not be regularly present in the cabinet meetings, especially those in which there was nothing concerning my ministry in the agenda. But I appointed my deputy, Mr. Amir Khosrow Afshar who was an experienced and highly respected colleague to represent me in the cabinet meetings. There was no intention to undermine Hoveyda’s authority or ignore others. This sim- ple matter was interpreted differently from the very beginning and generated many unfounded rumors around our relationships. - Despite friendship you always had a critical view of Hoveyda’s government, and this could not have been without some effect on your relationship. Which aspect of his government troubled you? Did you consider some of colleagues inefficient or was your criticism directed at the Prime Minister himself? Hoveyda had a multimillion secret budget for his office and used it at his dis- cretion to advance certain projects he had in mind. He thought that he could buy everyone with money be it the members of clergy or laypeople. The police department, the ministries needed extra budget to cope with the new respon- sibilities and developments. He had the habit of delaying answers and would keep them waiting. He was so lost in his own world with a priority to keep his job at whatever price possible. On one occasion he had said that he was simply the director of the secretariat of the Shah. Why should a Prime Minister have said a thing like that. My prob- lem with Hoveyda and number of others was that whatever they did or said

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 27 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation they implicated the Shah. This was the best way to escape responsibility. One day I heard the owner of a small fruit shop near our house whose name was Samad was beaten in public and accused of overpricing his goods. The same day I had an audience with Shah. I asked him “Your Majesty do you know Samad? What about Ahmad Ali and Hassanali Jaffar” He said that he had never heard of them and do not know who they were. I continued “But Your Majesty, they have been beaten in your name and by your order.” To get their jobs done without facing challenges, they related everything to the Shah and continued to create enemies for him. I could not accept this. Hoveyda also had the habit of nagging about his colleague when he was alone with Shah. Fortunately, the Shah did not pay attention to this especially when he knew that Hoveyda did not like the person he was complaining about and was only making effort to settle his personal accounts. - TToo whatwhat extentextent wouldwould youyou saysay thatthat HoveydaHoveyda waswas hidinghiding thethe truthtruth fromfrom thethe ShahShah oorr wwasas misinformingmisinforming hhim?im? BBesidesesides tthehe ShahShah hadhad severalseveral sourcessources ofof intelligenceintelligence andand itit wwasas notnot oonlynly tthroughhrough HHoveydaoveyda thatthat hehe ggotot hhisis iinformation.nformation. This is true. For example, I had regular audiences and reported to him directly on matters concerning my diplomatic missions. Savak, the office of the Chief of Staff and certain key military commanders had their own contacts with the Shah and were regularly received by him in private. So, in many of the sensitive domains Hoveyda was not involved or even informed and he could not then report on those issues. On other questions that fell within his field of responsi- bility he always tried to give a positive picture to the Shah. He did not want the Shah to know about the negative aspects or the shortcomings, not to disturb the peace of his mind as he called it. Yet it was the duty of the Prime Minister to tell the Shah the truth and let him know all the facts. He always suspected people of working against him and trying to create a dis- tance between him and the king. One day when I was entering the palace for my daily audience, I saw him standing on the stairs at the entrance. I asked him what he was doing there at that time. He said that he was going on an official visit to Romania and had come to say goodbye and take his leave. We spoke about

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 28 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation different matters and suddenly he said: “Once again they have gone to the Shah and said something against us. They have told him the people are unhappy and dissatisfaction is growing. The Shah wanted me to form a committee to search for the reasons and come up with suggestions.” I told him: “No one has complained about you. If you are referring to dissatisfaction of the people, the origin has been me and no one else. I have been telling the Shah that we should take the discon- tentment of the people and particularly the students seriously. I had added that if the situation continues the young people will become easy prey for our enemies.” This is to me a critical and urgent matter to attend to. Unfortunately, Hoveyda did not take it seriously and did nothing about it. He often left me no choice but to interfere directly as in the case of the bus fares and students riots on the campus. - It seems that you also had some disagreement with Hoveyda over the question of Bahrain, its separation from Iran and its future. The third volume of my memoirs deals with the period I served as Foreign Minister and have written in detail about Bahrain. Hoveyda did not have a direct role to play. When all decisions made, we had to present the bill to the parliament and get it ratified. Considering the importance of the question I insisted that it should be the Prime Minister himself that presented the bill. We had to show that the Prime Minister and all members of his cabinet were unit- ed and defended the bill. He was unwilling and began to find a way to avoid responsibility. Maybe he wanted to remain popular in the public opinion. I nneverever sslappedlapped HHoveydaoveyda - Since our discussion is about your relations with Hoveyda and your differences in a number of issues that might throw lights upon the historical events of the time, we shall stick to the principles, but I also wanted to ask you, in parenthesis, about the rumors that once you hit Hoveyda in the face. Is it true? Absolutely not. I never did or thought of doing such a thing. Sometimes I was angry, rude or foul spoken but I never hit any one of my colleagues in the face. When I got very angry, would call them traitors. With Hoveyda I had several moments of verbal clashes but whoever has said that I hit him is a liar. I would

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 29 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation not allow myself to do that. He was the Prime Minister of our country; Neither ethical nor social standards would allow it. Had I done so, they could have sent me to jail. At that time everyone had friends and foes. Clashes were frequent but are also given to exaggerations. I assure you I never did such a thing and if I ever had done, I would have told you frankly. - It seems that these disagreements and divergences finally led to your leaving your job as minister in his cabinet after five years. During that period twice I wrote very harsh letters to Hoveyda. These letters should be somewhere in the archives of the ministry. They were neither secret nor private letters. They were official and duly registered in the secretariat and bore serial reference numbers. Once there was a diplomatic issue and a matter of protocol that was very im- portant to me. The new ambassador designate of Germany was arriving in Tehran and Hoveyda had gone to the airport personally to welcome him. The German envoy was not officially an ambassador as his credentials were not yet presented to the ministry and he was not introduced to the Shah. I was angry, wrote a letter to Amir Abbas asking him why he had done such a thing. Then I called him and said you had yourself served in the diplomatic missions and should know about the protocol. He was not happy and said he had known the new ambassador for years and he was a close friend. He had re- ported the incident to the Shah who had said that I was right and that Hoveyda should settle the matter directly with me. Hoveyda gave me the Shah’s message and asked me to withdraw the letter I had sent. Refusing I said it was an official letter registered in the annals. Adding that I had not written it as a personal letter, it was a matter of principal and it was my duty to react and remind. A second time I wrote an angry letter telling Hoveyda that one of his particular actions, was against the law and contrary to the interests of the country. I asked him to read my letter to all members of his cabinet. Once again, he had rushed to see the Shah telling him that I had accused him of treason. The Shah wanted me to take the letter back and destroy it. I refused and said this is not good for the ministry; I added if I am right and you agree with me alright if not, I will resign. I cannot change my mind.

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It was the anniversary of the death of my father I went to visit his tomb and when I returned, I saw Mr Moeinian, the head of the Shah’s special bureau, who had a message from his Majesty telling me that I should continue my work at the Ministry. I said this was not the time to talk about such things. Then I went to see the Shah himself and said I had served for five years as his minister but have had enough and could not continue like that. That was the end of my mission as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. - In a way the Shah supported Hoveyda and kept him as Prime Minister for over 13 years. Didn’t this add to Hoveyda’s self-confidence and enhance his authority? This is true. In fact, there were a few who were happy when they heard I had resigned, and Shah had finally accepted. Hoveyda and a few of his ministers, the Israelis and the British. With my departure there was no one to challenge and criticize them. They were free to do whatever they wanted without any se- rious opposition or barriers. So, they rejoiced my departure, but honestly, I do not regret for had I continued to stay in the government in the circumstances that I have described I could not have done much and most of my time would have been wasted. In some of your interviews you have said and on several occasions that Shah wanted to replace Hoveyda with someone else and you were one of the persons he had in mind. How far was this serious? There were internal conflicts and rivalries in the cabinet. Some ministers were not happy. Once ministers Ansari and Amouzegar came to me and began to complain about the Prime Minister. I said, they should go and speak directly to the Shah and added that I was not a candidate for premiership. Later the same day I was in audience with the Shah. I told him about what I had heard, he said that Hoveyda knows this and is afraid that I might dismiss him. He added that: “I should go and prepare myself just in case there is a change of government.” I humbly asked him to forget about me. He asked why? I said: “I was a member of his government and I could not do this unless I resign from the government first. Besides I do not want everybody to think that I had this post simply because of you and thanks to your support. I prefer, you leave it to the parliament. Let them choose and propose three candidates to you for the post of Prime Minister.

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If I happen to be one the three that has the confidence of the parliament and if am assured of their support, then I will respect their choice and accept your offer.” He was not happy to hear this from me. - Why didn’t Shah accept this and decided to keep Hoveyda for several more years? I have always said that keeping him as Prime Minister for 13 years was a mis- take. This is one of the things that did much damage to us. I had already told Hoveyda in all friendship that: “It was neither in his interest nor that of the country to insist on staying in power for a long time. Staying a long time in power one begins to lose contact with realities, with the people and leads to a kind of dangerous overconfidence.” I insisted on several occasions that: “The government should be changed after a reasonable period of time.” But the Shah wanted to continue working with Hoveyda and Hoveyda himself had no intention to leave his position. The day the President of Czechoslovakia was paying a visit to Iran, the Prime Minister kindly offered to come to the foreign ministry so we could have lunch and then go to the airport together while talking about our work. We had our lunch and then came down to go to the airport. I never used the ministry’s car and rode in my own personal vehicle. I sat in the driver’s seat and the Prime Minister took the seat beside me. Ali Khan, the foreign ministry’s driver, sat on the back seat. He was a decent and loyal man. During the time Dr Ali-Gholi Ardalan was minister, he had sustained facial injuries in a car accident. I liked him very much and always took great care of him, lest he felt that his presence was unnecessary. In any case, we moved from the Foreign ministry to Ghavam-ol-Saltaneh Street and drove up towards Naderi Avenue and the Soviet Embassy to turn right and head towards the airport. Suddenly, the Prime Minister started whining about Savak, saying that: “They were trying to control our activities. They recorded our telephone calls and reported them.” Was he really complaining, or did he wish to hint that he was being informed of my comings and goings and my conversa- tions? I don’t know. I replied: “So much the better! Let them do it, what difference does it make? We have nothing to hide. Moreover, you are the Prime Minister and

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Savak is legally under your supervision. You are the only person who has a right, any time, day or night, anywhere in the country, without prior warning, to go into any spot or building belonging to SAVAK and carry out an inspection. You can summon the director of Savak and ask him, ‘what are you doing this for?’ Do we have anything that needs hiding? I have no business interfering in His Majes- ty’s private life, but I relate to him even my own reveling and I have no anxiety that my comings and goings and words be reported to him from other channels.” We continued talking for a few more minutes. Hoveyda was sitting in front of the car beside me. We reached the Culture Amphitheatre (Talar Farhang). Amir-Abbas said: “Yes, we should remain in power for twenty years. His Majesty has also said the same thing.” Hearing this was like getting an electric shock. I slammed on the breaks and the car jolted so violently that poor Ali Khan was thrown from the back seat and the late Hoveyda’s head hit the windscreen. I said: “Dear Amir, I was His Maj- esty’s son-in-law, I could not live more than a few years with my wife. And you are saying I should remain Foreign Minister and you Prime Minister for another twenty years? No, this is not for me. It is neither prudent for me, nor for you or His Majesty that we would grab the office of a minister or prime minister”’ Hoveyda was very miffed and I became cross. - Not only Hoveyda stayed in his post for thirteen years but at the end he was ap- pointed the minister of the imperial court. I was not happy about this appointment. Hoveyda went to the court for he had rivalries with Jamshid Amouzegar who replaced him as prime Minister. In appearance they were good friends, shook hands, smiled and spoke of friend- ship. But Hoveyda was provoking the enemies of Amouzegar and encouraging them. He kept sending messages to the members of parliament not to vote for Amouzegar. There was a kind of civil war between the Minister of the Imperial Court and the Prime Minister. This did us a lot of damage. If Hoveyda had continued his diplomatic career, he would have been a great ambassador and much more successful.

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- When in 1978 the country faced a critical situation and was on the verge of a revo- lution, to restore calm the imperial court decided to arrest a number of personalities including Mr. Hoveyda. What was your reaction to this? Did you have a part to play in this decision? I have seen certain memoirs in which they refer to you being at the origin of the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Hoveyda. Not at all. I was Ambassador and in Washington DC. When they were about to change the Minister of the Imperial Court, I told his majesty: “It would be bet- ter if you send Hoveyda abroad, provide him with the necessary financial means to continue his life.” This was not done. I was still in Washington when the Shah appointed General Azhari at the head of a military government. In a telephone conversation the Shah told me: “They had no choice but to arrest a few of the responsible people in the former govern- ments.” I was not of the same opinion and thought it would be a mistake. I believed this would be regarded as a sign of weakness. I did not insist more because my brother -in -law, Dariush Homayoun, a former minister of infor- mation was also on the list and I did not want Shah to think that I was against the idea because my own relative was and wanted to save him. However, since everybody knew that I had differences with Hoveyda and had criticized his methods of governing, the rumors rapidly spread that I had been at the origin of his arrest. A polyglot and highly cultivated man, HOVEYDA would have made a FIrst-rate am- bassador but perhaps thirteen years at the head of the government was neither good for Iran nor for Hoveyda himself

It is true that I disagreed with Hoveyda on many issues and I disapproved of his continuing as Prime Minister for thirteen long years, but given the con- ditions of the country I did not approve of the decision to send him to jail. Meanwhile when I was in Tehran for a few days I thought of going and visiting some friends and former colleagues who were in Jamshidieh prison. I thought the Prime Minister Sharif Emami would not be happy about this, so I told the Shah about my plan and he said it had nothing to do with the Prime Minister and I was free to go. I first went to the mausoleum of my father and then to

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 34 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation the prison where all the dignitaries arrested, were lodged. Talked to every one of them, we laughed, joked and all agreed that such measures would not solve the problems the country was facing. If they arrest people, they should be the ones who were at the origin of the real problems and punish them. Arresting a former prime minister and putting all the blames for the mistakes committed and relating all the troubles to him could backlash and in the eye of the public have negative effects on the government. When Hoveyda was arrested under the military government of General Azhari, several former Prime Ministers of England sent messages to Shah asking for his immediate release. The French who had great sympathy for Hoveyda began to attack the Iranian government and Shah himself. In the country many person- alities who had important responsibilities in the past were afraid of their future, they decided to leave the country. They were right in saying if the Shah puts his own Prime Minister and minister of court in jail there is no security for anyone. HHoveydaoveyda diddid notnot deservedeserve tthehe grimgrim fatefate thatthat befellbefell himhim

- You had a pivotal role in coordinating the Shah’s departure from the country and then his movements from place to place in the rest of his life. When he was leaving the country wasn’t the possibility of taking Hoveyda with him mentioned? No; the country was in turmoil and it was not right for the Shah to take Hoveyda with him. You have seen that even the countries that had close friendship with Iran had turned their backs on us. Only President Sadat volunteered to receive the Shah as his guest. I did much to coordinate this. When you are somebody’s guest and in the conditions that we lived through, we could not take another guest with us. About the events of those days, I have spoken in my memoirs in detail and volume four of the memoirs will soon be ready to be published. I hope that God will support me and give me the energy to finish it. - What was the Shah’s reaction to the execution of Hoveyda? Where was the Shah at that time? Was he not in Bahamas? To be honest with you I cannot remember. I was still Ambassador in Washington moving from place to place. I had already resigned but the Shah wanted me to continue to the last possible moment. I only know that when he heard the news, he was very sad. I do not wish to talk much about the tragic destiny that befell Hoveyda. The way Hoveyda was

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 35 Hoveyda and Ardeshir Zahedi: A Curious Cohabitation executed was cruel and contrary to any law and justice. Unfortunately, we had a number of people like Ghotb Zadeh and Yazdi who continued to give incorrect information to Khomeini. They were themselves agents and spies of America. But this is a long history. -How far would you say Hoveyda had a responsibility in the fall of the Pahlavi regime? Unfortunately, Hoveyda had much changed during the period he was in power. He was no more the man I knew at the start. With huge financial facilities at his disposal and a secret budget that was subject to no control, he did not much care about anyone. They had buried their heads in the sand. There was no sense or reason for a prime minister to stay 13 years in power. His Majesty had made up his mind to keep him in this post, but it was my duty to say what I felt was right. In the crisis at the university over the bus fares, if I had not interfered, the mistaken policy of the government would have led to fatal clashes between the university students and the armed forces, leaving hundreds of dead. When I was in Washington DC, I kept receiving regular reports about the problems of the country and the complaints of the people and transmitted those to the Shah. I continued to tell him that we were on the wrong track. We all had our shares in the errors, but we should let the bygones be bygones. Today only Iran and the people of Iran and their future matters. The people deserve to live in peace and comfort. The existing problems must be solved. We have a country which is rich and has abundant resources. No country has such background and experience. This is the right of all nations. I have written two books on the tragic events of Yemen and offered documents that condemn the British and the Americans for their atrocities. Defended the rights of the people of this country and sympathized with their sufferings. I have sent all the proceedings of the books sales through the United Nations Humanitarian Agencies to be spend on food and medicine for the war-stricken children. Whether you read the Bible or the Koran they say the same thing. You listen to the words of wisdom from Imam Ali and you come to the same conclusion. We have to give and forgive. That is the greatest pleasure man can find in this world.

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RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 37 AliReza Pahlavi: A Memoire

Ali Reza Pahlavi A Memoire

Written exclusivelyllfhdll for Rahavard Bilingual issue 132/133 / Fall ll/ 2020/Winter 2021 By: Dr. James R. Russell Fresno, California 13th May 2020 About Author: Dr. James Robert Russell (born October 1953) is a scholar and professor in Ancient Near Eastern, Iranian and Armenian Studies. He has published extensively in journals and has written several books. Soon after finishing his Ph.D. he taught at Columbia University in the Department of Middle Eastern Languages and Cultures (MELAC). He then became a Lady Davis Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Soon after he was

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 38 AliReza Pahlavi: A Memoire appointed to the Mashtots Chair in Armenian Studies in the Near Eastern Languages and Civi- lizations Department at Harvard University, which he has occupied since 1993. He also teaches a wide range of subjects, including freshman seminars on literature and comparative religions, literature and cultures. Dr. Russell serves on the executive committees of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. He has taught and lectured in Armenia, India, and Iran and at the Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Saint Petersburg State University. He was Government Fellowship Lecturer at the Cama Institute in Bombay, India. *******

Soon after the Islamic revolution and the departure of the royal family from Iran, the little Prince Ali Reza Pahlavi was enrolled at St. David’s school in Manhattan, where my younger brother was his teacher. Josh remembered him as a pleasant boy who played soccer in Central Park with fierce determination. The years passed, and after receiving his BA from Princeton, Ali Reza came to study Zoroastrianism, the other religions of pre-Islamic Iran, and the Middle Persian and Avestan languages with me at Columbia. The program in Ancient Iranian studies had then existed for nearly a hundred years. The great A.V. Williams Jackson and Louis Gray had taught, among others, Dastur Dhalla and Ervad Pavry. The head of Iranian Studies in the Middle East department, Professor Ehsan Yarshater of blessed memory, was hard at work on the first volumes of the crowning achievement of his prolific career, theEncyclopaedia Iranica. In those days I wore a little pendant of the winged figure of Achae-

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menid art that is identified with either the Creator Ahura Mazda or with the immortal component of the human soul, the Fravashi or Faravahar. When Ali Reza walked into my office for the first time, he noticed it, laughed, and exclaimed “So you’re a Zoroastrian too!” and showed me the Fravashi he wore. That first day, Ali Reza’s bodyguard, a retired New Jersey police detective, intro- duced himself also: “This is the first and last time you’ll see me,” he said, “but I’ll always be here.” That was the only time, one was reminded, in a practical way, that this cheerful, modest, friendly student was also connected to one of the most turbulent political situations of our age. Otherwise he was just a part of the group of enthusiastic graduate students who studied Ancient Iran with me: there were five or six, and we met for classes in my office on the fifth floor of Kent Hall on the Morningside campus. I brewed tea for us in an electric kettle and he often brought cookies; he always joined in the No Ruz celebration at my little apartment uptown, in Washington Heights. Sometimes I would joke, “Mr. Pahlavi, please translate the sentence into Pahlavi.” Because of a schedule conflict I was unable to attend a dinner with his mother, the Shahbanu, and I did not meet his siblings, but he and I became friends. We did not speak about his father the Shah very much, Iran’s political fate and the

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 40 AliReza Pahlavi: A Memoire exile and death of its king are still painful topics and were much more so then, in the mid-to-late 1980s, when the Iran-Iraq war had been claiming hundreds of thousands of lives and Iran’s international reputation had plummeted with the fatwa against the novelist Salman Rushdie, the bloody repression within the country, and the regime’s active support for terrorism abroad. When we spoke about the future, Ali Reza did not imagine for himself any role in politics. He wanted only to serve the people of Iran through their multi-eth- nic, multi-religious culture. Though nominally a Muslim respectful of the Islamic component of Iranian tradition, he respected and venerated equally the cultures and faiths of the living Baha’is, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians of his realm, as well as the Buddhist, Manichaean, Mithraic and other religious teachings of its ancient past. As a Freemason (past Master, Perfect Square Lodge No. 204, F. & A. M.) I had a particular interest in what I believed to be the Mithraic heritage of the Masonic Craft and the Zoroastrian roots of the European Renaissance and Enlighten- ment, and in my teaching illustrated the subject by introducing my students to Mozart’s Masonic opera, Die Zauberflöte (“The Magic Flute”), in which the high priest of the Temple of Wisdom is named Sarastro, that is, Zarathustra. Ali Reza had many friends belonging to the Grand Lodge of Iran, and when he joined the Craft he requested that the holy books of the living faiths of Iran be placed upon the altar for him to take the Obligation: the Holy Qur’an in Ara- bic, the Christian Gospels in Armenian, the Torah in Hebrew, and the Avesta in its original language and script, Avestan. (There may have been a Baha’i book there too.) I was privileged to lend for the ceremony a Parsi manuscript in my personal library of the Vendidad. The festive collation following Brother Ali Reza’s First Degree was held in the dining room of the Explorers’ Lodge in the building on 23rd Street of the Grand Lodge of New York. I remember the bowsprits of the sailing ships of adventurous Brethren of the past that protrud- ed many feet over our heads from the walls.

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Ali Reza planned to do a PhD under my direction, but the professor who then chaired Columbia’s Middle East department— an emi- nent scholar of Islamic sci- ence with very strong Arab nationalist and anti-Israel views that he expressed ex cathedra often and forceful- ly— wished to steer Iranian studies in the direction of contemporary Muslim Iran. I looked forward confident- ly to tenure in a position in Armenian, though, thanks to many publications and a stellar teaching record: my course on the Religions and Philosophies of Ancient Iran gradually increased its registration to nearly thirty, my course on Shamanism had two hundred, and my Literature Humanities course was the most popular at Columbia. But the chair of the community advisory commit- tee for the Armenian program took me aside and told me point blank there was no way a Jew would get that job. After twelve years at Columbia, my father’s and my Alma Mater (I was Salutatorian of the Class of 1974), I was suddenly out of work, collecting a mountainous pile of rejections from various places I’d applied to. My pupil, Jennifer Rose had to find a new advisor for her PhD- in-progress; Ali Reza got an MA and moved to Harvard, where there was still a program in Ancient Iranian. (It, too, has now been closed and only Muslim Iranian culture and history are taught there.) I got a fellowship at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and taught Ancient Iranian and Armenian there for a very happy year: my pupils Dan Shapira and Geoffrey Herman have become eminent scholars and Prof. Herman’s work on the Iranian component in the

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Talmud is the most authoritative in the field. When I was offered the chair in Armenian at a great northeastern university and returned to this country, Ali Reza and I met again and he enrolled in a few of my courses— he lived only a few yards from my apartment and we some- times dined there or met for coffee near campus. There was a greasy spoon on the Square, now long gone, called the Tasty, that was popular because it was one of the few establishments that stayed open into the small hours in that pu- ritan town. It was famous (well, infamous) for its hot dogs, grilled cheese sand- wiches, and the acerbic African-American gentleman who fried and served them with a garnish of tart comments and unsolicited advice to the customer at no extra charge. One afternoon an Iranian student (who now teaches in southern California), Ali Reza, and I stopped into the Tasty for a snack and the student, giving the order, declared with his customary pomposity “His Imperial Highness will have a grilled cheese sandwich.” Now, the street corner where the Tasty once stood is something of a crossroads of the universe for eccentrics, but this took even the seasoned waiter aback. I do not remember his reply, but the tone of it still reduces me to helpless laughter— it was somewhat like that of Samuel Jack- son’s thoughtful “Royale with cheese” in the movie Pulp Fiction (https://you- tu.be/6Pkq_eBHXJ4). Ali Reza would just chuckle quietly to himself at such times, looking down with modest embarrassment. Although Ali Reza was a humble and friendly soul, he complained several times to me of rude and disrespectful treatment by his new advisor, which hurt him to the point that he left the doctoral program. I would have intervened on his behalf but had no power to do so and would have been defenseless against the vindictive reaction. The most one could do was commiserate. It is not un- common for students at that institution to feel a sense of lordly entitlement and to blame their professors for their own laziness or lack of talent; but Ali Reza was neither arrogant, nor lazy, nor unintelligent. I have always felt that his terrible experience there was a factor that contributed,

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 43 AliReza Pahlavi: A Memoire along with others, to his untimely passing. He loved Iran deeply and was very proud of it, and the sometimes, dishonorable behavior of some of its leaders wounded him. Whatever the ruling clique that gave the country a bad name may have thought of the royal family, I experienced first-hand what Iranians themselves thought of the younger prince. In 2000, for the first, and so far, the last time in my life I was able to visit the holy soil of Iran. It was a fortunate combination of circumstances: a colleague had helped to organize a conference on the Shah-nameh of Ferdousi in Tehran, and the son of the Ayatollah of Shiraz, a scholarly and decent man, helped me to get a visa despite my long record (Jew, lived in Israel, worked with Con- gress to issue immigration permits to the USA for Iranian Zoroastrian refugees stranded in India, etc.). Look at this fellow’s record! the visa official had said. Yes, replied the Hojatoleslam, but he is Iranparast. He is? Yes. Okay, then. And I got a visa! The two weeks of that September were like a dream: the country was more beautiful that I had even imagined; the people, even better. I loved sitting in Shah-e Cheragh mosque in the evening, conversing on the philoso- phy of life, or sitting at a qahve-khaneh smoking a kalyun and conversing on the meaning of life, or drinking tea on the Si-o-seh Pol and conversing on the meaning of life, or eating flat bread, cheese, tomatoes, and henduneh at a picnic and conversing on the meaning of life, or looking over Maman’s shoulder in a Tehran kitchen learning how to cook khoresht-e fesenjan, and conversing on the meaning of life… Well, you get it. Iran isn’t about Achaemenid palaces or Sasanian carvings, it’s about Iranians. God, it was wonderful. One afternoon as we were touring Niyavaran palace, a few friends, among them one or two akhundan, murmured to me: -“Please give Ali Reza regards from his house.” And I did. I think on some level he always knew that Iran was still his home, where people loved him. If only that knowledge had given him more strength and patience to endure

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 44 AliReza Pahlavi: A Memoire these times. Life often burdens us with unbearable sorrow. Looking back on the transformation of American academia from an exalted temple of learning to a hypocritical, worthless labor- camp-cum-kindergarten of political correctness, I often feel despair and wonder what I have lived for. But very often depression is a prison cell with high walls that not only isolates us but also makes it impossible for us to see the broader picture, to perceive what we mean to others, the important role we play in their own lives. I learned of Ali Reza’s passing in 2011 the day before a trip to Israel to deliver a lecture at the Hebrew University. As I sat in my brother’s apartment in uptown Manhattan the evening before the flight and we reminisced about Ali Reza, the full horror of the loss came upon me; Josh revived me with a large tumbler of single malt, and we talked about our pupil, our friend. I have no memory of the trip otherwise. I felt only hollowed out and shattered. One day at Columbia, long ago, while we were drinking tea together, the stu- dents and I— Jenny, Katsuyo, Ali Reza, maybe others— I said to him: -“You know, Ali Reza, if you ordered us right now to start walking into the ocean towards Iran for you, we would do it.” He nodded with his characteristic, mild friendliness, and knew it was true. Some day we will walk there with him one way or the other. If it means a trans-Atlantic hike, then perhaps the Lord will part the waters of the sea, as He has been known to do before elsewhere… May the Creator of Heaven and Earth, Ahura Mazda, Allah, Khoda, Ter Astvadz, Hashem, the sole God, the Great Architect Of The Universe, bless the enfranchised soul of His good and faithful servant, his Imperial Highness Ali Reza Pahlavi, our once and future king.

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 45 Commemoration of 100 Years

Commemoration of 100 YEARS

Sholeh Shams Shahbaz

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 46 Commemoration of 100 Years

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: Shah of Iran Full name: Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Regal name: Mohammad Reza Shah House: Pahlavi Father: Reza Shah Mother: Tadj ol-Molouk Religion: Shia Islam Schools: Institut Le Rosey Madrasa Nezam Born: 26 October 1919 Tehran, Iran Died: 27 July 1980 Cairo Egypt at the age of 60 Burial: 29 July 1980, Al-Rifa’i Mosque, Cairo, Egypt Spouses: Princess Fawzia of Egypt (married 1939; divorced 1948) Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiari (married 1951; divorced 1958) Farah Diba (married 1959) Children: Princess Shahnaz Reza, Crown Prince of Iran Princess Farahnaz Prince Ali-Reza Princess Leila Reign: 16 September 1941 – 11 February 1979 Coronation: 26 October 1967 Predecessor: Reza Shah Successor: Monarchy abolished. Ruhollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader Prime Ministers: Mohammad-Ali Foroughi Ali Soheili Ahmad Qavam Mohammad Sa’ed Morteza-Qoli Bayat Ebrahim Hakimi Mohsen Sadr Mohammad-Reza Hekmat Abdolhossein Hazhir Ali Razmara Hossein Ala’

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Mohammad Mossaddegh Fazlollah Zahedi Manouchehr Eghbal Jafar Sharif-Emami Ali Amini Asadollah Alam Hassan-Ali Mansur Amir-Abbas Hoveida Jamshid Amouzegar Gholam-Reza Azhari Shapour Bakhtiar

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (26 October 1919 – 27 July 1980), also known as Mohammad Reza Shah, was the last Shah (King) of Iran from 16 September 1941 until his overthrow in the Iranian Revolution on 11 February 1979. Due to his status as the last Shah of Iran, he is often known as simply the Shah. Mohammad Reza Shah took the title ShahanShah (King of Kings) on 26 Octo- ber 1967. The second and last monarch of the House of Pahlavi he held several other titles, including that of Aryamehr («Light of the Aryans”) and Bozorg Ar- teshtaran (Commander-in-Chief). His dream of what he referred to as a «Great Civilization” (romanized: tamadon-e‎ bozorg) in Iran led to a rapid industrial and military modernization, as well as economic and social reforms. He came to power during World War II after an Anglo-Soviet invasion forced the abdication of his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi. During Mohammad Reza Shah reign, the British owned oil industry was briefly nationalized by Iranian Prime Minis- ter Mohammad Mosaddegh until a UK- and U.S.-backed coup d’état deposed Mosaddegh and brought back foreign oil firms under the Consortium Agreement of 1954. During Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign, Iran marked the anniversary of 2,500 years of continuous Persian monarchy since the founding of the Achaemenid Em- pire by Cyrus the Great. Concurrent with this celebration, the Shah changed the benchmark of the Iranian calendar from the hegira to the beginning of the First

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Persian Empire, measured from Cyrus the Great’s coronation.He also introduced the White Revolution, a series of economic, social and political reforms with the proclaimed intention of transforming Iran into a global power and modernizing the nation by nationalizing certain industries and granting women suffrage. During his 38-year rule, Iran spent billions on industry, education, health, and armed forces and enjoyed economic growth rates exceeding the United States, En- gland, and France. The national income also rose 423 times over. By 1977, Iran’s armed services spending had made it the world’s fifth strongest military. Mohammad Reza Shah lost support from the Shi’a clergy of Iran and the working class due to alleged corruption related to the royal family, suppression of political dissent via Iran›s intelligence agency, SAVAK (including the arrest of up to 3,200 political prisoners), banishment of the Tudeh Party, U.S. and UK support for his regime, his modernization policies, laïcité or secularism, conflict with wealthy merchants known as bazaaris, relations with Israel, and clashes with leftists and Islamists. By 1979, this political unrest became a revolution leading to the monarchy’s over- throw. The Shah’s refusal to order his troops to fire on protesters forced him to leave Iran on 17 January 1979. Soon thereafter, the Iranian monarchy was for- mally abolished, and Iran was declared an Islamic republic led by Ruhollah Kho- meini (known in the West as Ayatollah Khomeini). Facing likely execution should he return to Iran, the Shah died in exile in Egypt, whose president, Anwar Sadat, had granted him asylum.

Early life Born in Tehran, to Reza Khan (later Reza Shah Pahlavi) and his second wife, Tadj ol-Molouk, Mohammad Reza was the eldest son of Reza Khan, who later be- came the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty, and the third of his eleven children.

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Mohammad Reza was born along with Reza Shah Pahlavi -1878-1944- and his twin sister, Ashraf. However, Shams, three of his children, the future Shah Mohammad Reza, princesss Shams and Mohammad Reza, Ashraf, Ali Reza, and Ashraf. Iran, about 1925. their older half-sister, Fatimeh, were not royalty by birth, as their father did not become Shah until 1925. His father, a former Brigadier-General of the Per- sian Cossack Brigade was Mazanda- rani origin born in Alasht, Savadkuh County, 0Ɨ]DQGDUƗQ Province. Mo- hammad Reza’s paternal grandfather, Abbas-Ali, was a Mazandarani, com- missioned in the 7th Savadkuh Regi- ment, and served in the Anglo-Persian War War in 1856. His paternal grand- mother, Noush-Afarin, was a Muslim immigrant from Georgia (then part of the Russian Empire), whose family had emigrated to mainland Iran after Iran was forced to cede all of its territories in the Caucasus following the Rus- so-Persian Wars several decades prior to Reza Khan’s birth. His mother, Tadj ol-Molouk, was of Azerbaijani origin, being born in Baku, Russian Empire (now Azerbaijan). Reza Shah was always convinced that his sudden quirk of good fortune had commenced in 1919 with the birth of his son who was dubbed khoshghad- am (good omen). Like most Iranians at the time, Reza Khan did not have a surname and after the 1921 Persian coup d’état which deposed Ahmad Shah Qajar, he was in- formed that he would need a name for his house. This led Reza Shah to pass a law ordering all Iranians to take a surname; he chose the surname Pahlavi for himself, the name for the Middle Persian language, itself derived from Old Persian.

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At his father’s coronation on 24 April 1926, Mohammad Reza was proclaimed Crown Prince.

Mohammad Reza and his father Reza Shah

Family Mohammad Reza described his father in his book Mission for My Country as «one of the most frightening men» he had ever known, depicting Reza Shah as a dominating man with a violent temper. A Mohammad Reza in childhood tough, fierce, and very ambitious soldier who became the first Persian to command the elite Russian-trained Cossack Brigade, Reza Shah liked to kick subordinates in the groin who failed to follow his orders. Growing up under his shadow, Mohammad Reza was a deeply scarred and insecure boy who lacked self-confidence. Reza Shah believed if fathers showed love for their sons, it caused homosexuality later in life, and to ensure his favorite son was

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 51 Commemoration of 100 Years heterosexual, denied him any love and affection when he was young, though he later become more affectionate towards the Crown Prince when he was a teenager. Reza Shah always addressed his son as shoma («sir») and refused to use more informal tow («you»). The Polish journalist Ryszard KapuäciÑski observed in his book “Shah of Shahs” that looking at old photographs of Reza Shah and his son, he was struck by how self-confident and assured Reza Shah appeared in his uniform while his son Mohammad Reza appeared nervous and jittery in his uniform standing next to his father. In the 1930s, Reza Shah was an outspoken admirer of Adolf Hitler, though this was less because of any racism and anti-Semitism on his part, but rather be- cause Reza Shah saw Hitler as someone much like himself, a man who had ris- en from an undistinguished background to become a notable leader of the 20th century. Reza Shah often impressed on his son his belief that history was made by great men such as himself, and that a real leader is an autocrat. Reza Shah was a huge barrel-chested and muscular man towering at over 6 feet 4 inches (1.93 m), leading his son to liken him to a mountain, and throughout his life, Mohammad Reza was obsessed with height and stature.

Crown Prince Mohammad Reza and his mother, Tadj ol-Molouk

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Mohammad Reza’s mother, Tadj ol-Molouk was an assertive woman who was also very superstitious. She believed that dreams were messages from another world, sacrificed lambs to bring good fortune and scare away evil spirits, and clad her children with protective amulets to ward off the power of the evil eye. Tadj ol-Molouk was the main emotional support to her son, cultivating a belief in him that destiny had chosen him for great things. Mohammad Reza grew up surrounded by women, as the main influences on him were his mother, his older sister Shams and his twin sister Ashraf, leading the American psychologist Marvin Zonis to conclude it was «from women, and apparently from women alone» that the future Shah «received whatever psychological nourishment he was able to get as a child». Traditionally, male children were considered preferable to females, and as a boy, Mohammad Reza was often spoiled by his mother and sisters. He was very close to his twin sister Ashraf who commented: “It was this twinship and this relationship with my brother that would nourish and sustain me throughout my childhood ... No matter how I would reach out in the years to come—sometimes even desperately—to find an identity and a purpose of my own, I would remain inextricably tied to my brother ... always, the center of my existence was, and is, Mohammad Reza”. Young Mohammad Reza After becoming Crown Prince, he was taken entering Madrasa Nezam, a military school in Tehran, 1938 away from his mother and sisters to be given a “manly education” by officers selected by his fa- ther. The result of his upbringing between a lov- ing, if possessive and superstitious mother and an overbearing father was to make Mohammad Reza in the words of Zonis: “A young man of low self-esteem who masked his lack of self-confidence, his indecisiveness, his passivity, his dependency and his shyness with masculine bravado, impulsiveness, and

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arrogance”, making him into a person of marked contradictions as the Crown Prince was “both gentle and cruel, withdrawn and active, dependent and assertive, weak and powerful”.

Education By the time he turned 11, his fa- ther deferred to the recommendation A young Mohammad Reza with Abdolhos- of Abdolhossein Teymourtash, the sein Teymourtash at the Institut Le Rosey in Lausnne, Switzerland, 1932 Minister of Court, to dispatch his son to Institut Le Rosey, a Swiss boarding school, for further studies. The crown prince left Iran for Switzerland on 7 September 1931. As a student, Mohammad Reza played competitive football, but the school records indicate that his principal problem as a football player was his “timidity” as the Crown Prince was afraid to take risks. The Crown Prince was educated in French at Le Rosey, and his time there left him with a lifelong love of all things French. In articles he wrote in French for the student newspaper in 1935 and 1936, Mohammad Reza praised Le Rosey for broaden- ing his mind and introducing him to European civilization. He was the first Iranian prince in line for the throne to be sent abroad to attain a foreign education. In 1936 he returned to obtain his high school diploma in Iran. The Crown Prince was registered at the local military academy in Tehran where he remained enrolled until 1938, graduating as a Second Lieutenant. Upon graduating, he was quickly promoted to the rank of Captain, a rank which he kept until he became Shah. During college, the young prince was appointed Inspector of the Army and spent three years travelling across the country, examining both civil and military installations. Crown Prince spoke English, French and German fluently in addition to his

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 54 Commemoration of 100 Years native language Persian. During his time in Switzerland, he befriended Ernest Perron who introduced him to French poetry and under his influence Cha- teaubriand and Rabelais became his “favorite French authors”. He liked Perron so much that when he returned to Iran in 1936, he brought Perron back with him, installing him in the Marble Palace. Perron lived in Iran until his death in 1961 and became a man of considerable behind-the-scenes power.

Early Reign First Marriage One of the main initiatives of Iranian and Turkish foreign policy had been the Saadabad pact of 1937, an alliance bringing together Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, with the intent of creating a Muslim bloc to deter any aggres- sors. President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey suggested to his friend Reza Shah during the latter’s visit to Turkey that a marriage between the Iranian and Egyptian courts would be beneficial for the two countries and their dynasties, as it might lead to Egypt joining the Saadabad pact. In line with this suggestion, crown prince and Princess Fawzia married.

Dilawar Princess Fawzia of Egypt (5 November 1921 – 2 July 2013), a daughter of King Fuad I of Egypt and Nazli Sabri, was a sister of King Farouk I of Egypt. They married on 15 March 1939 in the Abdeen Palace in Cairo. Reza Shah did not attend the ceremony. During his visit to Egypt, Mohammad Reza was greatly impressed with the grandeur of the Egyptian court as he visited the var- ious palaces built by the Isma’il Pasha, aka “Isma’il the Magnificent”, the famous Khedive of Egypt, and resolved that Iran needed palaces to match those built by Isma’il. His marriage to Fawzia produced one child, a daughter, Princess Shahnaz Pahlavi (born 27 October 1940). Their marriage was not a happy one as the Crown Prince was openly unfaithful. His dominating and extremely posses-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 55 Commemoration of 100 Years Wedding ceremony of Crown Prince Mohammad Reza (right) and Princess Fawzia of Egypt at Abdeen Palace in Cairo, 1939

Princess Fawzia and Mohammad Reza with their daughter Princess Shahnaz

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 56 Commemoration of 100 Years sive mother saw her daughter-in-law as a rival to her son’s love, and took to humiliating Princess Fawzia, whose husband sided with his mother. A quiet, shy woman, Fawzia described her marriage as miserable, feeling very much un- wanted and unloved by the Pahlavi family and longing to go back to Egypt. In his 1961 book Mission For My Country, Mohammad Reza wrote the “only happy light moment” of his entire marriage to Fawzia was the birth of his daugh- ter Shahnaz.

Reza Shah Abdication In the midst of World War II in 1941, Nazi Germany began Operation Bar- barossa and invaded the Soviet Union, breaking the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. This had a major impact on Iran, which had declared neutrality in the con- flict. In the summer of 1941, Soviet and British diplomats passed on numerous messages warning that they regarded the presence of a number of Germans administering the Iranian state railroads as a threat, implying war if the Ger- mans were not dismissed. Britain wished to ship arms to the Soviet Union via Iranian railroads, and the German managers of the Iranian railroads would not cooperate. This made both Moscow and London insistent that the Germans Reza Shah had hired to run his railroads had to be fired at once. As his father’s closest advisor, the Crown Prince Mohammad Reza did not raise the issue of a possible Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, assuring his father that nothing would happen. The Iranian-American historian Abbas Milani wrote about the relationship between the Reza Shah and the Crown Prince: «As his father’s now constant companion, the two men consulted on virtually every decision”. Later that year British and Soviet forces occupied Iran in a military invasion, forcing Reza Shah to abdicate. On 25 August 1941, British and Australian naval forces at- tacked the Persian Gulf while the Soviet Union conducted a land invasion from the north. On the second day of the invasion with the Soviet air force bombing

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Pahlavi meeting with American president Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Tehran Con- ference (1943), two years after his father›s forced abdication during the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran

Tehran, the crown prince was shocked to see the Iranian military simply col- lapse, with thousands of terrified officers taking off their uniforms in order to desert and run away despite the fact they had not seen combat yet. Reflecting the panic, a group of senior Iranian generals called the Crown Prince to receive his blessing to hold a meeting to discuss how best to surrender. When Reza Shah learned of the meeting, he flew into a rage and attacked one of his gener- als, Ahmad Nakhjavan, striking him with his riding crop, tearing off his medals and was about to personally execute him when his son persuaded him to have the general court-martialed instead. The collapse of the Iranian military in the summer of 1941 that his father had worked so hard to build up humiliated his son, who vowed that he would never see Iran defeated like that again, which explained Mohammad Reza Shah’s later obsession with military spending.

Ascension To The Throne On 16 September 1941, Prime Minister Forughi and Foreign Minister Ali Soheili

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On Sept 17 1941 the Crown Prince took the oath of office and was re- ceived warmly by parliamentarians.

attended a special session of parliament to announce the resignation of Reza Shah and that Mohammad Reza was to replace him. The next day, at 4:30 pm, Crown Prince took the oath of office and was received warmly by parliamen- tarians. On his way back to the palace, the streets filled with people welcoming the new Shah jubilantly. The British would have liked to put a Qajar back on the throne, but the principal Qajar claim- ant to the throne was Prince Hamid Mirza, an officer in the Royal Navy who did not speak Persian, so the Brit- ish had to accept Mohammad Reza as Shah and the main Soviet interest in 1941 was political stability in Iran to Mohammad Ali Foroughi (left) with the ensure Allied supplies. Iran became a new king Mohammad Reza Shah

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 59 Commemoration of 100 Years major conduit for British and, later, American aid to the USSR during the war. This massive supply effort became known as the Per- sian Corridor. Credit should be given to Mohammad Ali Foroughi for orchestrating a smooth Mohammad Ali Foroughi with the new king transition of power from the King to the Crown Prince. Suffering from angina, a frail Foroughi was summoned to the Palace and appointed prime minister when Reza Shah feared the end of the Pahlavi dynasty once the Allies invaded Iran in 1941. When Reza Shah sought his assistance to ensure that the Allies would not put an end to the Pahlavi dynasty, Foroughi put aside his adverse personal sentiments for having been politically sidelined since 1935. Foroughi successfully derailed thoughts by the Allies to undertake a more drastic change in the political infrastructure of Iran.

Two days days after Crown Prince’s accession to the throne on 19 September 1941, a general amnesty was issued. All political personalities who had suffered disgrace during his father’s reign were rehabilitated, and the forced unveiling policy by his father in 1935 was overturned. During his early days as Shah, Mohammad Reza lacked self-confidence. In 1942, Mohammad Reza Shah met Wendell Willkie, the Republican candi- date for the U.S. presidency in the 1940 election who was now on a world tour for President Roosevelt to promote his “one world” policy; Willkie took him flying for the first time. Enjoying the flight he told Willkie that when he was flying he “wanted to stay up indefinitely” and subsequently hired the American pilot Dick Collbarn to teach him how to fly.

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Pahlavi (centre), pictured to the right of Joseph Stalin at the Tehran Conference During the Tehran conference in 1943, the Shah was humiliated when he met Joseph Stalin, who visited him in the Marble Palace and did not allow the Shah’s bodyguards to be present, with the Red Army alone guarding the Mar- ble Palace during Stalin’s visit.

Opinion of His Father Despite his public professions of admiration in later years, he had serious mis- givings about not only the coarse and roughshod political means adopted by his father, but also his unsophisticated approach to affairs of state. The young Shah possessed a decidedly more refined temperament, and the political dis- grace brought by his father on Teymourtash; the dismissal of Foroughi by the mid-1930s; and Ali Akbar Davar’s suicide in 1937 “would haunt him when he was king”. An even more significant decision that cast a long shadow was the disastrous and one-sided agreement his father had negotiated with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1933, one which compromised the country’s ability to receive more favorable returns from oil extracted from the country. He expressed concern for his exiled father who had previously complained to the British governor of Mauritius that living on the island was both a

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 61 Commemoration of 100 Years climatic and social prison. Attentively following his life in exile, Mohammad Reza would object to his father’s treatment to British at any opportunity. The two sent letters to one another, although delivery was often delayed, and Mo- hammad Reza commissioned his friend, Ernest Perron, to hand-deliver a taped message of love and respect to his father, bringing back with him a recording of his voice. “My dear son, since the time I resigned in your Favor and left my country, my only pleasure has been to witness your sincere service to your country. I have always known that your youth and your love of the country are vast reservoirs of power on which you will draw to stand firm against the difficulties you face and that, despite all the troubles, you will emerge from this ordeal with honor. Not a moment passes without my thinking of you and yet the only thing that keeps me happy and satisfied is the thought that you are spending your time in the service of Iran. You must remain always aware of what goes on in the country. You must not succumb to advice that is self-serving and false. You must remain firm and constant. You must never be afraid of the events that come your way. Now that you have taken on your shoulders this heavy burden in such dark days, you must know that the price to be paid for the slightest mistake on your part may be our twenty years of service and our family’s name. You must never yield to anxiety or despair; rather, you must remain calm and so strongly rooted in your place that no power may hope to move the constancy of your will.”

The Young Shah In 1945–46, the main issue in Iranian politics were the Soviet-sponsored sep- aratist government in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, which alarmed the Shah. He repeatedly clashed with his prime minister Ahmad Qavam, whom he viewed as too pro-Soviet. At the same time, the growing popularity of the Tudeh Party also worried the young Shah, who felt there was a serious pos- sibility of a coup by the Tudeh. In June 1946, he was relieved when the Red

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Army pulled out of Iran. However, Formal portrait of the young Shah in full military dress, c. 1949 the Pishevari regime remained in power in Tabriz, and Shah sought to undercut Qavam’s attempts to make an agreement with Pishevari as way of getting rid of both. On 11 December 1946, the Iranian Army led by the Shah in person entered Iranian Azerbaijan and the Pishe- vari regime collapsed with little re- sistance, with most of the fighting occurring between ordinary peo- ple who attacked functionaries of the Pishevari regime who had be- haved brutally. In his statements at the time and later, Shah credited his easy success in Azerbaijan to his “mystical power”. Knowing Qavam’s penchant for corruption, the Shah used that issue as a reason to sack him. By this time, Fawzia had returned to Egypt, and despite efforts to have King Farouk persuade her to return to Iran she refused to go, which led Mohammad Reza to divorce her on 17 November 1947. A qualified pilot, the Shah was fascinated with flying and the technical details of airplanes. He directed more money to the Imperial Iranian Air Force than any branch of the armed forces, and his favorite uniform was that of the Mar- shal of the Imperial Iranian Air Force. Zonis wrote that “Mohammad Reza’s obsession with flying reflected an Icarus complex, also known as “ascensionism”, a form of narcissism based on “a craving for unsolicited attention and admiration” and the “wish to overcome gravity, to stand erect, to grow tall ... to leap or swing into the air, to climb, to rise, to fly.”

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Shah often spoke of women as sexual objects who existed only to gratify him, which led to his 1973 exchange with Fallaci, who vehemently objected to his attitudes towards women. As a regular visitor to the nightclubs of Italy, France and the United Kingdom, he was linked romantically to several actresses in- cluding Gene Tierney, Yvonne De Carlo and Silvana Mangano. At least two unsuccessful assassination attempts were made against the young Shah. On 4 February 1949, while attending an annual ceremony to commemorate the founding of Tehran University, at a range of three metres Fakhr-Arai fired five shots at him. Only one of the shots hit him, grazing his cheek. Fakhr-Arai was instantly shot by nearby officers.

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Mohammad Reza Shah in hospital after the failed assassination attempt, 1949 After the assassination attempt; for a After an investigation, it was thought that year used a mustache to hide the scar caused by the bullet. Fakhr-Arai was a member of the Tudeh Par- ty, which was subsequently banned. However, there is evidence that the would- be assassin was not a Tudeh member but a religious fundamentalist member of Fada’iyan-e Islam. The Shah’s second wife was Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiari, a half-German, half-Iranian and the only daughter of Khalil Esfandiary, Iranian Ambassador to West Germany, and his wife, the former Eva Karl. She was introduced to the Shah by Forough Zafar Bakhtiary, a close relative of Soraya’s, via a photograph taken by Goodarz Bakhtiary, in London, per Forough Zafar’s request.

They married on 12 February 1951, when Soraya was 18 according to the of- ficial announcement; however, it was rumoured that she was actually 16, the Shah being 32. As a child Soraya was tutored and brought up by Frau Mantel, and hence lacked proper knowledge of Iran, as she herself admits in her personal mem- oirs, stating, “I was a dunce—I knew next to nothing of the geography, the legends of my country, nothing of its history, nothing of Muslim religion.”

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Wedding of Mohammad Reza Shah and Soraya Bakhtiari Feb 12, 1951 Oil Nationalisation And The 1953 Coup By the early 1950s, the political crisis brewing in Iran commanded the attention of British and American policy leaders. In 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh was appointed prime minister. He was committed to nationalizing the Iranian petroleum industry controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (as Anglo-Persian Oil Company, or APOC, had become). Under the lead- ership of Mosaddegh and his nationalist movement, the Iranian parliament unanimously voted to nationalize the oil industry—thus shutting out the im- mensely profitable APOC, which was a pillar of Britain’s economy and provid-

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The Shah speaking with Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, 1951 ed it political clout in the region. At the start of the confrontation, American political sympathy was forthcom- ing from the Truman Administration. However, eventually American deci- sion-makers lost their patience, and by the time the Republican administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower entered office, fears that communists were poised to overthrow the government of Iran became an all-consuming con- cern. Shortly prior to the 1952 presidential election in the United States, the British government invited Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Kermit Roosevelt Jr., to London to propose collaboration on a secret plan to force Mo- saddegh from office. Under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt Jr., a senior CIA officer and grand- son of former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, the American CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) funded and led a covert operation to

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 67 Commemoration of 100 Years depose Mosaddegh with the help Dr. Mohammad Mossaddegh, Prime Minister of military forces disloyal to the government. Referred to as Oper- ation Ajax, the plot hinged on or- ders signed by the Shah to dismiss Mosaddegh as prime minister and replace him with General Fazlollah Zahedi. Despite the high-level coordination and planning, the coup initially failed, causing the Shah to flee to Baghdad, and then to Rome. During his time in Rome, a British diplomat reported: “He hates taking decisions and cannot be relied on to stick to them when taken. He succumbs easily to fear”. To get him to support the coup, his twin sister Princess Ashraf, much tougher, visited on 29 July 1953 to berate him into signing a decree dismissing Mossaddegh. Before the first attempted coup, the American Embassy in Tehran reported that Mosaddegh’s popular support remained robust. The Prime Minister requested direct control of the army from the Majlis. Given the situation, alongside the strong personal support of Conservative Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden for covert action, the American government gave the go-ahead to a committee, attended by the Secretary of State John

Foster Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles, Kermit Roos- evelt, Henderson, and Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson. Kermit Roos- evelt returned to Iran on 13 July 1953, and again on 1st of August 1953, in his first meeting with the king. A car picked him up at midnight and drove him to the palace. He lay down on the seat and covered himself with a blanket as guards waved his driver through the gates. The Shah got into the car andRoo- sevelt explained the mission. The Communists staged massive demonstrations to hijackMosaddegh’s ini-

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Bottom: The Shah’s firman naming GGeneral Fazlollah Zahedi the new prime mminister. Coup operatives made copies of the document and circulated it around Tehran to help regenerate momentum. LLeft: General Zahedi & The Young Shah

tiatives,tiatives aandnd tthehe UnitedUnited StatesStates activelyactively plotted against him. On 16 August 1953, the right wing of the Army attacked. Armed with an or- der by the Shah, it appointed Gener- al Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. A coalition of mobs and retired offi- cers close to the Palace executed this coup d’état. They failed dismally and the Shah decided to leave the coun- try. Ettelaat, the nation’s largest daily newspaper, and its pro-Shah publish- er, Abbas Massoudi, were against him leaving the country, calling the defeat “humiliating”. During the following two days, the Communists turned against Mosaddegh. Opposition against him grew tremendously. They roamed Tehran, raising red flags and pulling down statues of Reza Shah. This was rejected by conservative clerics like Kashani, who sided with the king.

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On 18 August 1953, Mosaddegh defended the government against this new attack. Tudeh partisans were clubbed and dis- persed. The Tudeh party had no choice but to accept defeat. In the meantime, Zahedi as prime minister appealed to the mili- tary, charged Mosaddegh with staging a coup by ignoring the Shah’s decree.

On 19 August 1953, pro-Shah parti- sans—bribed with $100,000 in CIA Ernest Peron and Mohammad Reza funds—finally appeared and marched Shah 1950 out of south Tehran into the city cen- tre, where others joined in. Gangs with clubs, knives, and rocks controlled the streets, overturning Tudeh trucks and beating up anti-Shah activists. As Roo- sevelt was congratulating Zahedi, the new Prime Minister’s mobs burst in and carried him upstairs on their shoulders.

After a brief exile in Italy, Shah returned to Iran. A deposed Mosaddegh was arrested and tried. The king intervened and commuted the sentence to three years, to be followed by life in internal exile. General Fazlollah Zahedi was in- stalled to succeed Mosaddegh. U.S. actions further solidified sentiments that the West was a meddlesome in- fluence in Iranian politics. In the year 2000, reflecting on this notion, U.S. Sec- retary of State Madeleine K. Albright stated: “In 1953 the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the over- throw of Iran’s popular prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh. The Eisen- hower Administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons; but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development. And it is

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easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. Shah returned to power, but never extended the elite status of the court to the technocrats and intellectuals who emerged from Iranian and Western univer- sities. Indeed, his system irritated the new classes, for they were barred from partaking in real power.”

In the aftermath of the 1953 coup d’état, Mohammad Reza Shah was widely viewed as a figurehead monarch, andGeneral Fazlollah Zahedi, the Prime Min- ister, saw himself and was viewed by others as the “strong man” of Iran. Shah fearing the history repeating itself, remembering how his father was a general who had seized power in a coup d’état in 1921 and deposed the last Qajar Shah in 1925, his major concern in the years 1953–55 was to neutralize Zahe- di. American and British diplomats in their reports back to Washington and London in the 1950s were openly contemptuous of Shah’s ability to lead, and incapable of making a decision. The contempt in which the Shah was held by Iranian elites led to a period in the mid-1950s where the elite displayed fissip- arous tendencies, feuding amongst themselves now that Mossadegh had been overthrown, which ultimately allowed Shah to play off various factions in the elite to assert himself as the nation’s leader.

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Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi with Ulema The very fact that he was considered a coward and insubstantial turned out to be an advantage as the Shah proved to be an adroit politician, playing off the factions in the elite and the Americans against the British with the aim of being an autocrat in practice as well in theory. Supporters of the banned National Front were persecuted, but in his first important decision as leader, Shah in- tervened to ensure most of the members of the National Front brought to trial, such as Mosaddegh himself, were not executed as many had expected. Many in the Iranian elite were openly disappointed that he did not conduct the expected bloody purge and hang Mosaddegh and his followers as they had wanted and expected. In 1954, when twelve university professors issued a public statement criticizing the 1953 coup, all were dismissed from their jobs, but in the first of his many acts of “magnanimity” towards the National Front, Shah intervened to have them reinstated. He tried very hard to co-opt the supporters of the National Front by adopting some of their rhetoric and addressing their concerns, for example declaring in several speeches his concerns about the Third World eco- nomic conditions and poverty which prevailed in Iran, a matter that had not much interested him before.

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The Shah was determined to copyMosaddegh , who had won popularity by promising broad socio-economic reforms, and wanted to create a mass power- base as he did not wish to depend upon the traditional elites, who only wanted him as a legitimizing figurehead. In 1955, he dismissedGeneral Zahedi from his position as prime minister and appointed his archenemy, the technocrat Hos- sein Ala’ as prime minister, whom he in turn dismissed in 1957. Starting in 1955, Shah began to quietly cultivate left-wing intellectuals, many of whom had supported the National Front and some of whom were associated with the banned Tudeh party, asking them for advice about how best to reform Iran. It was during this period that he began to embrace the image of a “progressive” Shah, a reformer who would modernize Iran, who attacked in his speeches the “reactionary” and “feudal” social system that was retarding progress, bring about land reform and give women equal rights.

Determined to rule as well as reign, it was in the mid 1950’s that Shah started to promote a state cult around Cyrus the Great, portrayed as a great Shah who had reformed the country and built an empire with obvious parallels to him- self. Alongside this change in image, he started to speak of his desire to “save” Iran, a duty that he claimed he had been given by God, promised that under his leadership Iran would reach a Western standard of living in the near fu-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 73 Commemoration of 100 Years ture. During this period, he also sought the support of the ulema, and resumed the traditional policy of persecuting those Iranians who belonged to the Baháތí Faith, allowing the chief Baháތí temple in Tehran to be razed in 1955 and bringing in a law banning the Baháތí from gathering together in groups. A British diplomat reported in 1954 that Reza Shah “must have been spinning in his grave at Rey. To see the arrogance and effrontery of the mullahs once again rampant in the holy city! How the old tyrant must despise the weakness of his son, who allowed these turbulent priests to regain so much of their reactionary influence!” By this time, the Shah’s marriage was under strain as Queen Soraya complained about the power of his best friend Ernest Perron, whom she called a “shetun” and a “limping devil”. Perron was a man much resented for his influence on the Shah and was often described by enemies as a diabolical“ ” and “mysterious” character, whose position was that of a private secretary, but who was one of the Shah’s closest advisors, holding far more power than his job title suggested.

In a 1957 study compiled by the U.S. State Department, Shah was praised for his “growing maturity” and no longer needing “to seek advice at every turn” as the previous 1951 study had concluded. On 27 February 1958, a military coup to depose the Shah led by General Valiollah Gharani was thwarted, which led to a major crisis in Iranian American relations when evidence emerged that associates of Gharani had met American diplomats in Athens, which the Shah used to demand that henceforward no American officials could meet with his opponents. Another issue in Iranian American relations was Shah’s suspicion that the United States was insufficiently committed to Iran’s defense, observing that the Americans refused to join the Baghdad Pact, and military studies had indicated that Iran could only hold out for a few days in the event of a Soviet invasion. In January 1959, the Shah began negotiations on a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, which he claimed to have been driven to by a lack of Amer-

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Mahnaz Zahedi Hugging his grandfather (the Shah) with Ardeshir Zahedi

ican support. After receiving a mildly threatening letter from President Eisen- hower warning him against signing the treaty, he chose not to sign, which led to a major Soviet propaganda effort calling for his overthrow. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev ordered Mohammad Reza Shah assassinated. A sign of Shah’s power came in 1959 when a British company won a contract with the Iranian government that was suddenly cancelled and given to Siemens instead. On 24 July 1959, Mohammad Reza gave Israel de facto recognition by allowing an Israeli trade office to be opened in Tehran that functioned as a de fac- to embassy, a move that offended many in the Islamic world. When Eisenhower visited Iran on 14 December 1959, Shah told him that Iran faced two main external threats: the Soviet Union to the north and the new pro-Soviet revolutionary government in Iraq to the west. This led him to ask for vastly increased American military aid, saying his country was a front-line

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 75 Commemoration of 100 Years state in the Cold War that needed as much military power as possible. The Shah andSoraya ’s marriage ended in 1958 when it became apparent that, even with help from medical doctors, she could not bear children. Soraya later told The New York Times that the Shah had no choice but to divorce her, and that he was heavy-hearted about the decision. Even after the divorce, it is re- ported that the Shah still had great love for Soraya, and it is reported that they met several times after their divorce and that she lived her post-divorce life comfortably as a wealthy lady, even though she never remarried; being paid a monthly salary of about $7,000 from Iran. Following her death in 2001 at the age of 69 in Paris, an auction of the possessions included a three-million-dollar Paris estate, a 22.37-carat diamond ring and a 1958 Rolls-Royce. Pahlavi subsequently indicated his interest in marrying Princess Maria Gabri- ella of Savoy, a daughter of the deposed Italian king, Umberto II. Pope John XXIII reportedly vetoed the suggestion. In an editorial about the rumours sur- rounding the marriage of a “Muslim sovereign and a Catholic princess”, the Vatican newspaper, L’Osservatore Romano, considered the match “a grave dan- ger”, especially considering that under the 1917 Code of Canon Law a Roman Catholic who married a divorced person would be automatically, and could be formally, excommunicated. In the 1960 U.S. presidential election, the Shah had favored the Republican candidate, incumbent Vice President Richard Nixon, whom he had first met in 1953 and rather liked, and according to the diary of his best friend Asadollah Alam, he contributed money to the 1960 Nixon campaign. Relations with the victor of the 1960 election, the Democrat John F. Kennedy, were not friendly. In an attempt to mend relations after Nixon’s defeat, Shah sent General Teymur Bakhtiar of SAVAK to meet Kennedy in Washington on 1 March 1961. From Kermit Roosevelt, Shah learned that Bakhtiar, during his trip to Washington, had asked the Americans to support a coup he was planning, which greatly increased the Shah’s fears about Kennedy. On 2 May 1961, a teacher’s strike involving 50,000 people began in Iran, which

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Shah believed was the work of the CIA. He had to sack his prime minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and give in to the teachers after learning that the Army probably would not fire on the demonstrators. In 1961, Bakhtiar was dismissed as chief of SAVAK and expelled from Iran following a clash between demonstrating university students and the army on 21 January 1962 that left three dead. In April 1962, when Shah visited Washington, he was met with demonstrations by Iranian students at American universities, which he believed were orga- nized by U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the President’s brother and the leading anti-Pahlavi voice in the Kennedy administration. Afterwards, he visited London. In a sign of the changed dynamics in Anglo-Iranian relations, the Shah took offence when he was informed he could join Queen Elizabeth II for a dinner at Buckingham Palace that was given in somebody else›s honor, insisting successfully he would have dinner with the Queen only when given in his own honor. Mohammad Reza Shah’s first major clash with Ayatollah Khomeini occurred in 1962, when he changed the local laws to allow Iranian Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Baha’i to take the oath of office for municipal councils using their holy books instead of the Koran. Khomeini wrote to the Shah to say this was unacceptable and that only the Koran could be used to swear in members of the municipal councils regardless of what their religion was, writing that he heard “Islam is not indicated as a precondition for standing for office and women are being granted the right to vote...Please order all laws inimical to the sacred and official faith of the country to be eliminated from government policies.” The Shah wrote back, addressing Khomeini as Hojat-al Islam rather than as Ayatol- lah, declining his request. Feeling pressure from demonstrations organized by the clergy, the Shah withdrew the offending law, but it was reinstated with the White Revolution of 1963. Middle years In 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah launched the White Revolution, a series of

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 77 Commemoration of 100 Years far-reaching reforms, which 15 Khordad 1963 Khomeini’s uprising caused much opposition from the religious scholars. They were enraged that the referendum approving of the White Revolution in 1963 al- lowed women to vote, with the Ayatollah Khomeini saying in his sermons that the fate of Iran should never be allowed to be decided by wom- en. In 1963 and 1964, nationwide demonstrations against Shah’s rule took place all over Iran, with the centre of the unrest being the holy city of Qom. Students studying to be imams at Qom were most active in the protests, and Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as one of the leaders, giving sermons calling for the Shah’s overthrow. At least 200 people were killed, with the police throwing some stu- dents to their deaths from high buildings, and Khomeini was exiled to Iraq in August 1964.

The second attempt on the Shah’s life occurred on 10 April 1965. A soldier shot his way through the Marble Palace. The assassin was killed before he reached

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Wedding of the Shah with Farah Diba on 20 December 1959

the royal quarters, but two civilian guards died protecting the Shah. According to Vladimir Kuzichkin, a former KGB officer who defected to MI-6, the Soviet Union also targeted the Shah. The Soviets tried to use a TV remote control to detonate a bomb-laden Volkswagen Beetle; the TV remote failed to function. A high-ranking Romanian defector, Ion Mihai Pacepa, also sup- ported this claim, asserting that he had been the target of various assassination attempts by Soviet agents for many years.

Final Marriage The Shah’s third and final wife was Farah Diba (born 14 October 1938), the only child of Sohrab Diba, a captain in the Imperial Iranian Army (son of an Iranian ambassador to the Romanov Court in St. Petersburg, Russia), and his wife, the former Farideh Ghotbi. They were married in 1959, and Queen Farah was crowned Shahbanu, or Empress, a title created for her in 1967. Previous royal consorts had been known as “Malakeh” or Queen. The couple remained together for twenty one years, until the Shah’s death. They had four children together: -Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi (born 31 October 1960), heir to the now defunct

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Iranian throne. Reza Pahlavi is the founder and leader of National Council of Iran, a government in exile of Iran; -Princess Farahnaz Pahlavi (born 12 March 1963); -Prince Ali-Reza Pahlavi (28 April 1966 – 4 January 2011); -Princess Leila Pahlavi (27 March 1970 – 10 June 2001). Shah’s visits to the West were invariably the occasions for major protests by the Confederation of Iranian Students, an umbrella group of left-wing Iranian uni- versity students studying abroad, and he had one of the world’s largest security details as he lived in constant fear of assassination. Milani described Mohammad Reza’s court: “As open and tolerant, noting that his and Farah’s two favorite interior de- signers, Keyvan Khosravani and Bijan Saffari, were openly gay, and were not penalised for their sexual orientation with Khosravani often giving advice to the Shah about how to dress.” Milani noted: “The close connection between architecture and power in Iran as architec- ture is the “poetry of power” in Iran. In this sense, the Niavaran Palace, with its mixture of modernist style, heavily influenced by current French styles and traditional Persian style, reflected Mohammad Reza Shah’s personality as a Francophile whose court had a decidedly French ambiance to it.” He commissioned a documentary from the French film-maker Albert Lam- orisse meant to glorify Iran under his rule. But he was annoyed that the film focused only on Iran›s past, writing to Lamorisse there were no modern build- ings in his film, which he charged made Iran look “backward”. His office was functional whose ceilings and walls were decorated with Qajar art. Farah began collecting art and by the early 1970s owned works by Picasso, Gauguin, Cha- gall, and Braque, which added to the modernist feel of the Niavaran Palace.

Coronation On 26 October 1967, twenty-six years into his reign as Shah (“King”), he took

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1967 Coronation of the Shah with his consort Farah Pahlavi & crown prince

the ancient title 6KƗKDQVKƗK «Emperor” or “King of Kings” in a lavish corona- tion ceremony held in Tehran. He said that he chose to wait until this moment to assume the title because in his own opinion he «did not deserve it» up until then; he is also recorded as saying that: “There was “no honor in being Emperor of a poor country” (which he viewed Iran as being until that time).

2,500-Year Celebration of Persian Empire As part of his efforts to modernize Iran and give the Iranian people a non-Is- lamic identity, Shah quite consciously started to celebrate Iranian history be- fore the Arab conquest with a special focus on the Achaemenid period.

At the celebration at Persepolis in 1971, the Shah had an elaborate fireworks show put on together with a sound and light show transmitted by hundreds of hidden loudspeakers and projectors intended to send a dual message; that:

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Shah’s Speech at Pasargad, Cyrus the Great Tomb “O Cyrus, great King, King of Kings, Emperor of the Achaemenians, monarch of the land of Iran. I, the ShahanShah of Iran, offer thee salutations from myself and from our nation. “We are here to acclaim Cyrus, the Great, the immortal of Iran, the founder of the most ancient empire of the World; to praise Cyrus, the extraordinary emancipator of History; and to declare that he was one of the most noble sons of the Humanity. “Cyrus, we gather today around the tomb in which you eternally rest to tell you: Rest in Peace, for we are well awake and we will always be alert in order to preserve your proud legacy. “We promise to preserve forever the traditions of humanism and goodwill, with which you founded the Persian Empire: traditions which made our people be the carrier of message transmitted everywhere, professing fraternity and truth.” “Iran was still faithful to its ancient traditions and that Iran had transcended its past to become a modern nation, that Iran was not «stuck in the past», but as a nation that embraced modernity had chosen to be faithful to its past.” The message was further reinforced the next day when the “Parade of Per- sian History” was performed at Persepolis when 6,000 soldiers dressed in the uniforms of every dynasty from the Achaemenids to the Pahlavi’s marched past the Shah in a grand parade that many contemporaries remarked “sur-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 82 Commemoration of 100 Years passed in sheer spectacle the most florid celluloid imaginations of Hollywood ep- ics”. To complete the message, Shah finished off the celebrations by opening a brand new museum in Tehran, the Shahyad Aryamehr, that was housed in a very modernistic building and attended another parade in the newly opened Aryamehr Stadium, intended to give a message of “compressed time” between antiquity and modernity. A brochure put up by the Celebration Committee explicitly stated the message: “Only when change is extremely rapid, and the past ten years have proved to be so, does the past attain new and unsuspected values worth cultivat- ing”, going on to say the celebrations were held because “Iran has begun to feel confident of its modernization”. Milani noted: “It was sign of the liberalization of the middle years of Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign that Hussein Amanat, the architect who designed the Shahy- ad was a young Baha’i from a middle-class family who did not belong to the “thousand families” that traditionally dominated Iran, writing that it only in this moment in Iranian history that this was possible.”

Economy In the 1970s, Iran had an economic growth rate equal to that of South Korea, Turkey and Taiwan, and Western journalists all regularly predicated that Iran would become a First World Nation within the next generation. Significantly, a «reverse brain drain» had begun with Iranians who had been educated in the West returning home to take up positions in government and business. The firm of Iran National ran by the Khayami brothers had become by 1978 the largest automobile manufacturer in the Middle East producing 136,000 cars every year while employing 12,000 people in Meshed. Shah considered himself to be a socialist, saying he was “more socialist and revolutionary than anyone”.

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Reflecting his self-proclaimed socialist tendencies, though unions were illegal, but the Shah brought in labor laws that were “surprising fair to workers”.

Iran in the 1960s and 70s was a tolerant place for the Jewish minority with one Iranian Jew, David Menasheri, remembering that: “Shah’s reign was the “golden age” for Iranian Jews when they were equals, and when the Iranian Jewish community was one of the wealthiest Jewish communities in the world.”

The Baha’i minority also did well after the bout of persecution in the mid- 1950s ended with several Baha’i families becoming prominent in world of Ira- nian business.

Foreign Relations

In 1961, the Francophile Shah visited Paris to meet his favorite leader, Gen- eral Charles de Gaulle of France. He saw height as the measure of a man and a woman (the Shah had a marked preference for tall women) and the 6’5” de Gaulle was his most admired leader. Shah loved to be compared to his “ego ideal” of General de Gaulle, and his courtiers constantly flattered him by calling him Iran’s de Gaulle. During the French trip, Queen Farah, who shared her husband’s love of French culture and language, befriended the culture minister André Malraux, who ar- ranged for the exchange of cultural artifacts between French and Iranian muse- ums and art galleries, a policy that remained a key component of Iran’s cultural diplomacy until 1979. Many of the legitimizing devices of the regime such as the constant use of ref- erendums were modelled after de Gaulle’s regime. Intense Francophiles, Shah and Farah preferred to speak French rather than Persian to their children.

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The Shah’s diplomatic foundation was the United States’ guarantee that it would protect his regime, enabling him to stand up to larger enemies. While the ar- rangement did not preclude other partnerships and treaties, it helped to pro- vide a somewhat stable environment in which he could implement his reforms. Another factor guiding him in his foreign policy was his wish for financial stability, which required strong diplomatic ties. A third factor was his wish to present Iran as a prosperous and powerful na- tion; this fueled his domestic policy of Westernization and reform. A final component was his promise that communism could be halted at Iran’s border if his monarchy was preserved.

By 1977, the country’s treasury, the Shah’s autocracy, and his strategic alliances seemed to form a protective layer around Iran. Although the U.S. was responsible for putting the Shah in power, he did not always act as a close American ally. In the early 1960s, when the State De- partment’s Policy Planning Staff that included William R. Polk encouraged the Shah to distribute Iran’s growing revenues more equitably, slow the rush toward Militarization, and open the government to political processes, he be- came furious and identified Polk as “the principal enemy of his regime.” In July 1964, the Shah, Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, and Pakistani Presi- dent Ayub Khan announced in Istanbul the establishment of the Regional Co- operation for Development (RCD) Organization to promote joint transporta- tion and economic projects. It also envisioned Afghanistan’s joining at some time in the future. The Shah was the first regional leader to recognize the State of Israel as a de facto state. Although when interviewed on 60 Minutes by reporter Mike Wal- lace, he criticized American Jews for their presumed control over U.S. media and finance, those remarks were intended to pacify Arab critics, and bilateral relations between Iran and Israel were not adversely affected.

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In a 1967 memo to President Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara wrote that: “Our sales [to Iran] have created about 1.4 million man-years of employment in the U.S. and over $1 billion in profits to American industry over the last five years,» leading him to conclude that Iran was an arms market the United States could not do without.” In June 1965, after the The Pahlavis meeting with general secretary Americans proved Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, 1970 reluctant to sell some of the weapons Shah asked for, he visited Moscow, where the Soviets agreed to sell some $110 million worth of weaponry; the threat of Iran pursuing the «Soviet option» caused the Americans to resume selling Iran weapons. Additionally, British, French, and Italian arms firms were willing to sell Iran weapons, thus giving The Shah considerable leverage in his talks with the Americans, who sometimes worried that the Shah was buying more weapons than Iran needed or could handle. Concerning the fate of Bahrain (which Britain had controlled since the 19th century, but which Iran claimed as its own territory) and three small Persian Gulf islands, the Shah negotiated an agreement with the British, which, by means of a public consensus, ultimately led to the independence of Bah- rain (against the wishes of Iranian nationalists). In return, Iran took full con- trol of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Strait of Hormuz, three strategically sensitive islands which were claimed by the United Arab Emirates. During this period, the Shah maintained cordial relations with the Persian Gulf

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 86 Commemoration of 100 Years states and established close diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia.

Mohammad Reza speaks with Richard Nixon in the Oval Office, 1973

Mohammad Reza Shah saw Iran as the natural dominant power in the Persian Gulf region, and tolerated no challenges to Iranian hegemony, a claim that was supported by a gargantuan arms-buying spree that started in the early 1960s. He supported the Yemeni royalists against republican forces in the Yemen Civ- il War (1962–70) and assisted the sultan of Oman in putting down a rebel- lion in Dhofar (1971). In 1971, Mohammad Reza told a journalist: “World events were such that we were compelled to accept the fact that sea adjoining the Oman Sea—I mean the Indian Ocean—does not recognise bor- ders. As for Iran’s security limits—I will not state how many kilometers we have in mind, but anyone who is acquainted with geography and the strategic situation, and especially with the potential air and sea forces, know what dis- tances from Chah Bahar this limit can reach”. Iran’s relations with Iraq, however, were often difficult due to political instabil- ity in the latter country. Shah was distrustful of both the Socialist government of Abd al-Karim Qa- sim and the Arab nationalist Baath party. He resented the internationally rec- ognised Iran-Iraq border on the Shatt al-Arab river, which a 1937 treaty fixed

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 87 Commemoration of 100 Years on the low watermark on the Iranian side, giving Iraq control of most of the Shatt al-Arab. On 19 April 1969, the Shah abrogated the treaty, and as a result Iran ceased paying tolls to Iraq when its ships used the Shatt al-Arab, ending Iraq’s lucrative source of income. He justified his move by arguing that almost all river borders all over the world ran along the thalweg (deep channel mark), and by claiming that because most of the ships that used the Shatt al-Arab were Iranian, the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran. Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but when on 24 April 1969 an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships sailed down the Shatt al-Arab without paying tolls, Iraq, being the militarily weaker state, did nothing. The Iranian abrogation of the 1937 treaty marked the beginning of a period of acute Iraqi-Iranian tension that was to last until the Algiers Accords of 1975. The fact that Iraq had welcomed the former SAVAK chiefGeneral Teymur Bakhtiar to Baghdad, where he regularly met with representatives of the Tudeh Party and the Confederation of Iranian Students, added to the difficult rela- tions between Iran and Iraq. On 7 August 1970, Bakhtiar was badly wounded by a SAVAK assassin who shot him five times, and he died five days later. On May 7 1972, Shah told a visiting President Richard Nixon: «the Soviet Union was attempting to dominate the Middle East via its close ally Iraq, and that to check Iraqi ambitions would also be to check Soviet ambitions». Nixon agreed to support Iranian claims to have the thalweg in the Shatt al-Arab recognized as the border and to generally back Iran in its confrontation with Iraq. The Shah financed Kurdish separatist rebels in Iraq, and to cover his tracks, armed them with Soviet weapons which Israel had seized from Soviet-backed Arab regimes, then handed over to Iran at the Shah’s behest. The initial opera- tion was a disaster, but the Shah continued attempts to support the rebels and weaken Iraq.

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Then, in 1975, the countries signed the Algiers Accord, which granted Iran equal navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab as the thalweg was now the new border, while Shah agreed to end his support for Iraqi Kurd- ish rebels. He also maintained close relations The Shah meeting Algerian President Houari with King Hussein of Jordan, Presi- Boumediène and Iraqi Vice President Sadd- am Hussein in Algiers in order to sign the dent Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and King 1975 Algiers Agreement Hassan II of Morocco. Beginning in 1970, Shah formed an unlikely alliance with the militantly left-wing regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, as both leaders wanted higher oil prices for their nations, leading Iran and Libya joining forces to press for the «leapfrogging» of oil prices. The U.S.-Iran relationship grew more contentious as the U.S. became more de- pendent on the Shah to be a stabilising force in the Middle East, under the Nix- on Doctrine. In a July 1969 visit to Guam, President Nixon had announced the Nixon Doc- trine, which declared that: “The United States would honour its treaty commitments in Asia, but as far as the problems of international security are concerned ... the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will increas- ingly be handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.” The particular Asian nation the Nixon Doctrine was aimed at was South Viet- nam, but the Shah seized upon the doctrine, with its message that Asian na- tions should be responsible for their own defence, to argue that the Americans should sell him arms without limitation, a suggestion that Nixon embraced.

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A particular dynamic was established in American Iranian relations from 1969 onward, in which the Americans gave in to whatever Shah demanded, as they felt they needed a strong Iran as a pro-American force in the Middle East and could not afford to lose Iran as an ally. Further adding to the Shah’s confidence was the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969, which forced the Red Army to make a major redeployment to the Chinese border. Shah, who always feared the prospect of a Soviet invasion, welcomed the Sino-Soviet war and the resulting reduction of Red Army divisions along the Soviet-Iranian border as giving him more room internationally. Under Nixon, the United States finally agreed to sever all contact with any Irani- ans opposed to the Shah’s regime, a concession that Shah had been seeking since 1958. The often very anti-American tone of the Iranian press was ignored because Shah supported the U.S. in the Vietnam War and likewise the Americans ig- nored the Shah’s efforts to raise oil prices, despite the fact it cost many American consumers more. After 1969, a process of «Reverse Leverage» set in, when Shah began to dictate to the United States as the Americans needed him more than he needed the Americans. The American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger wrote in 1982 that because of the Vietnam War, it was not politically possible in the 1970s for the United States to fight a major war: «There was no possibility of assigning any American forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam War and its attendant trauma. Congress would have tolerated no such commitment; the public would not have supported it. Fortunately, Iran was willing to play this role.» Consequently, the Americans badly needed Iran as an ally, which allowed Shah to dictate to them. This experience greatly boosted the Shah’s ego, as he felt he was able to impose his will on the world’s most powerful nation.

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The Americans initially rejected his suggestion that they join him in support- ing the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighting for independence on the grounds that an independent Kurdistan would inspire the Turkish Kurds to rebel, and they had no interest in antagonizing the NATO member Turkey. Some of the Shah’s advisers also felt it was unwise to support the peshmerga, saying that if the Iraqi Kurds won independence, then the Iranian Kurds would want to join them. When Nixon and Kissinger visited Tehran in May 1972, the Shah convinced them to take a larger role in what had, up to then, been a mainly Israeli-Iranian operation to aid Iraqi Kurds in their struggles against Iraq, against the warnings of the CIA and State Department that the Shah would ultimately betray the Kurds. He did this in March 1975 with the signing of the Algiers Accord that settled Iraqi-Iranian border disputes, an action taken without prior consulta- tion with the U.S., after which he cut off all aid to the Kurds and prevented the U.S. and Israel from using Iranian territory to provide them assistance.

As a way of increasing pressure on Baghdad, the peshmerga had been encour- aged by Iran and the U.S. to abandon guerrilla war for conventional war in April 1974, so the years 1974–75 saw the heaviest fighting between the Iraqi Army and the peshmerga. The sudden cut-off of Iranian support in March 1975 left the Kurds very exposed, causing them to be crushed by Iraq. The British journalist Patrick Brogan wrote that “...the Iraqis celebrated their victory in the usual manner, by executing as many of the rebels as they could lay their hands on.” Kissinger later wrote in his memoirs: “it was never the intention of the U.S. or Iran to see the peshmerga actually win, as an independent Kurdistan would have created too many problems for both Turkey and Iran; rather, the intention was to “irritate” Iraq enough to force the Iraqis to change their foreign policy.”

The Shah also used America’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil as leverage;

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Iranian Minister Jamshid Amouzegard and the Shah of Iran Mo- hammad Reza Pahlavi at the OPEC Conference in Algérie, March 1975 although Iran did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo, he purposely in- creased production in its aftermath to capitalise on the higher prices. In December 1973, only two months after oil prices were raised by 70 per cent, he urged OPEC nations to push prices even higher, which they agreed to do, more than doubling the price. Oil prices increased 470 per cent over a 12-month period, which also increased Iran’s GDP by 50 per cent. Despite personal pleas from President Nixon, the Shah ignored any complaints, claimed the U.S. was importing more oil than any time in the past, and pro- claimed that: “The industrial world will have to realise that the era of their terrific progress and even more terrific income and wealth based on cheap oil is finished.”

Modernisation With Iran’s great oil wealth, the Shah became the preeminent leader of the middle East, and self-styled “Guardian” of the Persian Gulf.” In 1961 he defended his style of rule, saying “When Iranians learn to behave like Swedes, I will behave like the King of Sweden.”

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During the last years of his regime, the Shah’s government became more auto- cratic. In the words of a U.S. Embassy dispatch: “The Shah’s picture is everywhere. The beginning of all film showings in public theaters presents the Shah in various regal poses accompanied by the strains of the National Anthem ... The monarch also actively extends his in- fluence to all phases of social affairs ... there is hardly any activity or vocation in which the Shah or members of his family or his closest friends do not have a direct or at least a symbolic involvement. In the past, he had claimed to take a two-party system seriously and declared, ‘If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organized’.” However, by 1975, Shah had abolished the two-party system of government in Favor of a one-party state under the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party. This was the merger of the New Iran Party, a centre-right party, and the People’s Party, a liberal party. The Shah justified his actions by declaring: “We must straighten out Iranians’ ranks. To do so, we divide them into two categories: those who believe in Monarchy, the constitution and the Six Bah- man Revolution and those who don’t ... A person who does not enter the new political party and does not believe in the three cardinal principles will have only two choices. He is either an individual who belongs to an illegal organi- zation, or is related to the outlawed Tudeh Party, or in other words a traitor. Such an individual belongs to an Iranian prison, or if he desires he can leave the country tomorrow, without even paying exit fees; he can go anywhere he likes, because he is not Iranian, he has no nation, and his activities are illegal and punishable according to the law.” In addition, the Shah had decreed that all Iranian citizens and the few remain- ing political parties become part of Rastakhiz.

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The Shah In The 1970s From 1973 onward, he had proclaimed his aim as that of the “tamaddon-e-bo- zorg”, the “Great Civilisation,” a turning point not only in Iran’s history, but also the history of the entire world, a claim that was taken seriously for a time in the West. On 2 December 1974, The New Yorker published an article by Paul Erd- man that was a conjectural future history entitled: “The Oil War of 1976: How The Shah Won the World. The World as We Knew It Came to an End When the Shah Of Iran Decided to Restore The Glory of Ancient Persia with Western Arms”. In 1975, U.S. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller declared in a speech: «We must take His Imperial Majesty to the United States for a couple of years so that he can teach us how to run a country.» In 1976, a pulp novel by Alan Williams was published in the United States under the title “A Bullet for the Shah: All They Had To Do Was Kill the World’s Most Powerful Man”, whose subtitle reveals much about how the American people viewed the Shah at the time (the original British title was the more prosaic Shah-Mak). The great wealth generated by Iran’s oil encouraged a sense of nationalism at the Imperial Court. The Empress Farah recalled of her days as a university student in 1950s France about being asked where she was from: “When I told them Iran ... the Europeans would recoil in horror as if Iranians were barbarians and loathsome. But after Iran became wealthy under the Shah in the 1970s, Iranians were courted everywhere. Yes, Your Majesty. Of course, Your Majesty. If you please, Your Majesty. Fawning all over us. Greedy sycophants. Then they loved Iranians.” Shah shared the Empress’s sentiments as Westerners came begging to his court looking for his largesse, leading him to remark in 1976:

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King Hassan of Morocco “Now we are the masters and our former masters are our slaves. Everyday they a beat a track to our door begging for favors. How can they be of assistance? Do we want arms? Do we want nuclear power stations? We have only to answer, and they will fulfill our wishes.”

Because the House of Pahlavi were a par- venu house as Reza Shah had begun his career as a private in the Persian Army, ris- en up to the rank of general, taking power in a coup d’état in 1921, and making himself Shah in 1925, Mohammad Reza Shah was keen to gain the approval of the older royal families of the world, and was prepared to spend large sums of money to gain that social acceptance. Amongst the royalty that came to Tehran looking for the Shah’s generosity were King Hussein of Jordan, the former King Constantine II of Greece, King Has- san II of Morocco, the princes and princesses of the Dutch House of Orange, and the Italian Princess Maria Gabriella of Savoy, whom the Shah had once courted in the 1950s. He coveted the British Order of the Garter, and had, pri- or to courting Maria Gabriella, inquired about marrying Princess Alexandra of Kent, granddaughter of King George V, but in both cases he was rebuffed in no uncertain terms. As an Iranian, he greatly enjoyed supporting the Greek branch of the House of Glücksburg, knowing the Greeks still celebrated their victories over the Persians in the 5th and 4th centuries BC. He enjoyed close relations with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, as demonstrated by the fact that he was the guest of honor at the Persepolis celebrations in 1971. Ethiopia and Iran, along with Turkey and Israel, were envisioned as an «alliance of the periphery” that would constrain Arab power in the greater Middle East.

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In an era of high oil prices, Iran’s economy boomed while the economies of the Western nations were trapped in stag- flation (economic stagnation and inflation) after the 1973– 74 oil shocks, which seemed to prove the greatness of Mohammad Reza Shah both to himself and to the rest of the world. In 1975, both the British Prime Minister Har- old Wilson and the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing made pleading phone calls to him asking him for loans, which ultimately led the Shah to give a US$1 billion loan to the United Kingdom and another US$1 billion to France. In a televised speech in January 1975 explaining why he was lending Britain a sum equal to US$1 billion, he declared in his usual grandiose style: “I have known the dark hours when our country was obliged to pass under the tutelage of foreign powers, amongst them England. Now I find that En- gland has not only become our friend, our equal, but also the nation to which, should we be able, we will render assistance with pleasure,” going on to say that since he “belonged to this [European] world,” he did not want Europe to collapse economically. As Britain had often dominated Iran in the past, the change in roles was greatly gratifying to Mohammad Reza Shah. Courtiers at the Imperial court were devoted to stroking the Shah’s ego, com- peting to be the most sycophantic, with him being regularly assured he was a greater leader than his much admired General de Gaulle, that democracy was doomed, and that based on Rockefeller’s speech, that the American people

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 96 Commemoration of 100 Years wanted him to be their leader, as well as doing such a great job as Shah of Iran. All of this praise boosted his ego, and went from being a merely narcissistic man to a megalomaniac, believing himself a man chosen by Allah Himself to transform Iran and create the “Great Civilization.” Befitting all this attention and praise, Shah started to make increasingly out- landish claims for the “Great Civilization”, telling the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in a 1973 interview: “Halfway measures, compromises, are unfeasible. In other words, either one is a revolutionary or one demands law and order. One can’t be a revolution- ary with law and order. And even less with tolerance ... when Castro came to power, he killed at least 10,000 people ... in a sense, he was really capable, because he’s still in power. So am I, however! And I intend to stay there, and to demonstrate that one can achieve a great many things by the use of force, show even that your old socialism is finished. Old, obsolete, finished ... I achieve more than the Swedes ... Huh! Swedish socialism! It didn’t even nationalize forests and water. But I have ... my White Revolution ... is a new original kind of socialism and ... believe me, in Iran we’re far more advanced than you and we really have nothing to learn from you.” In an interview with Der Spiegel published on 3 February 1974, he declared: “I would like you to know that in our case, our actions are not just to take vengeance on the West. As I said, we are going to be a member of your club”.

In a press conference on 31 March 1974, he predicted what Iran would be like in 1984, saying: “In the cities, electric cars would replace the gas engines and mass transpor- tation systems would be switched to electricity, monorail over the ground or electric buses. And, furthermore, in the great era of civilization that lies ahead of our people, there will be least two or three holidays a week.”

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In 1976, he told the Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in an interview: “I want the standard of living in Iran in ten years’ time to be exactly on a level with that in Europe today. In twenty years’ time we shall be ahead of the United States”. Reflecting his need to have Iran seen as part“ of the world” (by which he meant the western world), all through the 1970s he sponsored conferences in Iran at his expense, with for example in one week in September 1975 the Internation- al Literacy Symposium meeting in Persepolis, the International Congress of Philosophy meeting in Mashhad and the International Congress of Mithraic Studies meeting in Tehran. He also sought to hold the 1984 Summer Olympics in Tehran.

For most ordinary Iranians, struggling with inflation, poverty, air pollution (Iranian cities in the 1970s were amongst the most polluted in the world), hav- ing to pay extortion payments to the police who demanded money from even those performing legal jobs such as selling fruits on the street, and daily traffic jams, the Shah’s sponsorship of international conferences were just a waste of money and time. Furthermore, conferences on pre-Islamic practices such as the cult of Mithra fuelled religious anxieties. Though Shah envisioned the “Great Civilization” of a modernised Iran whose standard of living would be higher than those of the United States and at the forefront of modern technology, he did not envision any political change, mak- ing it clear that Iran would remain an autocracy. ACHIEVEMENTS In his “White Revolution” starting in the 1960s, Shah made major changes to modernize Iran. He curbed the power of certain ancient elite factions by ex- propriating large and medium-sized estates for the benefit of more than four million small farmers. He took a number of other major measures, includ-

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Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi hands out documents of owner- ship of land to new owners, white revolution, land reform, 1963.

ing extending suffrage to women and the participation of workers in factories through shares and other measures. In the 1970s, the governmental program of free-of-charge nourishment for children at school known as “Taghziye R¢yegan” (lit. free nourishment) was implemented. Under the Shah’s reign, the national Iranian income showed an unprecedented rise for an extended period. Improvement of the educational system was made through the creation of new elementary schools. In addition, literacy courses were set up in remote villages by the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, this initiative being called “Sep¢h-e D¢nesh” meaning “Army of Knowledge”. The Armed Forces were also en- gaged in infrastructural and other educational projects throughout the country “Sep¢h-e Tarvij va #b¢d¢ni” (lit. army for promotion and development) as well as in health education and promotion “Sep¢h-e Behd¢sht” (lit. “army for hygiene”). The Shah instituted exams for Islamic theologians to become established cler- ics. Many Iranian university students were sent to and supported in foreign, especially Western, countries and the Indian subcontinent. Between 1967 and 1977, the number of universities increased in number from 7 to 22, the number of institutions of advanced learning rose from 47 to 200, and the number of students in higher education soared from 36,742 to 100,000.

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Iran’s literacy programs were among the most innovative and effective any- where in the world, so that by 1977 the number of Iranians able to read and write had climbed from just 17 percent to more than 50 percent.

In the field of diplomacy, Iran realised and maintained friendly relations with Western and East European countries as well as the state of Israel and China and became, especially through its close friendship with the United States, more and more a hegemonial power in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East. The suppression of the communist guerrilla movement in the region of Dhofar in Oman with the help of the Iranian army after a formal request by Sultan Qaboos was widely regarded in this context.

As to infrastructural and technological progress, the Shah continued and de- veloped further the policies introduced by his father. His programs included projects in technologies such as steel, telecommunications, petrochemical fa- cilities, power plants, dams and the automobile industry. The Aryamehr Uni- versity of Technology was established as a major new academic institution.

International cultural cooperation was encouraged and organised, such as the 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire and Shiraz Arts Festival. As part of his various financial support programs in the fields of culture and arts, the Shah, along with King Hussein of Jordan made a donation to the Chinese Muslim Association for the construction of the Taipei Grand Mosque.

Revolution The overthrow of the Shah came as a surprise to almost all observers. The first militant anti-Shah demonstrations of a few hundred started in October 1977, after the death of Khomeini’s son Mostafa. On 7 January 1978, an article Iran and Red and Black Colonization was published in the newspaper Ettela’at attacking Ruhollah Khomeini, who was in exile in

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Ayatollah Khomeini Iraq at the time; it referred to him as a homosexual, a drug addict, a British spy and claimed he was an Indian, not an Iranian. Khomeini’s supporters had brought in audio tapes of his sermons, and Shah was angry with one sermon, alleging corruption on his part, and decided to hit back with the article, despite the feeling at the court, SAVAK and Ettela’at ed- itors that the article was an unnecessary provocation that was going to cause trouble. The next day, protests against the article began in the holy city of Qom, a traditional centre of opposition to the House of Pahlavi.

Cancer Patient The Shah was diagnosed with cancer in 1974. As it worsened, from the spring of 1978, he stopped appearing in public, with the official explanation being that he was suffering from a “persistent cold.” In May 1978, the Shah suddenly cancelled a long, planned trip to Hungary and Bulgaria and disappeared from view. He spent the entire summer of 1978 at his Caspian Sea resort, where two of France›s most prominent doctors, Jean Bernard and Georges Flandrin, treated his cancer. To try to stop his cancer, Bernard and Flandrin had him take prednisone, a drug that can cause depression and impair thinking. As nationwide protests and strikes swept Iran, the court found it impossible to get decisions from the Shah, as he became utterly passive and indecisive, con-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 101 Commemoration of 100 Years tent to spend hours listlessly staring into space as he rested by the Caspian Sea while the revolution raged. The seclusion of the Shah, who normally loved the limelight, sparked all sorts of rumors about the state of his health and damaged the imperial mystique, as the man who had been presented as a god-like ruler was revealed to be fallible. A July 1978 attempt to deny the rumors of Shah’s declining health (by publish- ing a crudely doctored photograph in the newspapers of the Emperor and Em- press walking on the beach) instead further damaged the imperial mystique, as most people realised that what appeared to be two beach clogs on either side of the Shah were merely substitutes inserted for his airbrushed aides, who were holding him up as he now had difficulty walking by himself. In June 1978, Shah’s French doctors first revealed to the French government how serious his cancer was, and in September the French government in- formed the American government that the Shah was dying of cancer; until then, U.S. officials had no idea that he had even been diagnosed with cancer four years earlier.

The Shah had created a very centralizedsystem in which he was the key deci- sion-maker on all issues, and as the Iranian-American historian Abbas Milani noted, he was mentally crippled in the summer of 1978 owing to his tendency to be indecisive when faced with a crisis which, combined with his cancer and the effects of the anti-cancer drugs, made his mood increasingly“ volatile and unpredictable. One day, he was full of verve and optimism and the next day or hour he fell into a catatonic stupor,” bringing the entire government to a halt. Milani wrote that: “The Shah was in 1978 “beset with depression, indecision and paralysis, and his indecision led to the immobilization of the entire system.” Empress Farah grew so frustrated with her husband that she suggested numerous times that he leave Iran for medical treatment and appoint her regent, saying she would handle the crisis and save the House of Pahlavi. The very

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masculine Shah vetoed this idea, saying he did not want Farah to be “Joan of Arc,” and it would be too humiliating for him as a man to flee Iran and leave a woman in charge.”

Black Friday 1978 The Shah-centred command structure of the Iranian military, and the lack of training to confront civil unrest, was marked by disaster and bloodshed. There were several instances where army units had opened fire, the most sig- nificant being the events on 8 September 1978. The day, which later became known as “Black Friday”, thousands of people had gathered in Tehran’s Jaleh Square for a religious demonstration. With the population generally refusing to recognise martial law, the soldiers opened fire, killing and seriously injur- ing a large number of people. Black Friday played a crucial role in further radicalising the protest movement. The massacre so reduced the chance for reconciliation that Black Friday is referred to as “the point of no return” for the revolution. On 2 October 1978, the Shah declared and granted an amnesty to dissidents living abroad, including Ayatollah Khomeini. By October 1978, strikes were paralyzing the country. In early December a “total of 6 to 9 million”—more than 10% of the country—marched against the Shah throughout Iran. In October 1978, after flying over a huge demonstration in Tehran in his he- licopter, Shah accused the British ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons and the American ambassador William H. Sullivan of organizing the demonstrations, screaming that he was being “betrayed” by the United Kingdom and the Unit- ed States. The fact that the BBC’s journalists tended to be very sympathetic towards the revolution was viewed by most Iranians, including the Shah, as a sign that Brit-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 103 Commemoration of 100 Years ain was supporting the revolution. This impression turned out to be crucial, as the Iranian people had a very exaggerated idea about Britain’s capacity to “direct events” in Iran. In a subsequent internal inquiry, the BBC found many of its more left-wing journalists disliked him as a reactionary”“ force, and sym- pathized with a revolution seen as “progressive”. Shah spent much of his time working out various conspiracy theories about who was behind the revolution, with his Favorite candidates being some com- bination of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. Milani wrote that: “Shah’s view of the revolution as a gigantic conspiracy organized by foreign powers suggested that there was nothing wrong with Iran, and the millions of people demonstrating against him were just dupes being used by foreign ers, a viewpoint that did not encourage concessions and reforms until it was too late. For much of 1978, Shah saw his enemies as “Marxist” revolu- tionaries rather than Islamists. The Shah had exaggerated ideas about the power of the KGB, which he thought of as omnipotent, and often expressed the view that all of the demonstrations against him had been organized in Moscow, saying only the KGB had the power to bring out thousands of ordinary people to demonstrate.” In October 1978, the oil workers went on strike, shutting down the oil indus- try and with it, Shah’s principal source of revenue. The Iranian military had no plans in place to deal with such an event, and the strike pushed the regime to the economic brink. The revolution had attracted support from a broad coalition ranging from sec- ular, left-wing nationalists to Islamists on the right, and Khomeini, who was temporarily based in Paris after being expelled from Iraq, chose to present himself as a moderate able to bring together all the different factions leading the revolution.

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On 3 November, a SAVAK plan to arrest about 1,500 people considered to be leaders of the revolution was submitted to Shah, who at first tentatively agreed, but then changed his mind, disregarding not the only plan, but also dismissing its author, Parviz Sabeti. On 5 November 1978, Shah went on Iranian television to say: “I have heard the voice of your revolution” and promise major reforms. In a major concession to the opposition, on 7 November 1978, he freed all polit- ical prisoners while ordering the arrest of the former prime minister Amir-Ab- bas Hoveyda and several senior officials of his regime, a move that both em- boldened his opponents and demoralized his supporters. On 21 November 1978, the Treasury Secretary of the United States Michael Blu- menthal visited Tehran to meet the Shah and reported back to President Jimmy Carter, “This man is a ghost”, as by now the ravages of his cancer could no longer be concealed. In late December 1978, Shah learned that many of his generals were making overtures to the revolutionary leaders and the loyalty of the military could no longer be counted upon. In a sign of desperation, the following month Shah reached out to the National Front, asking if one of their leaders would be will- ing to become prime minister. The Shah was especially interested in having the National Front’s Gholam Hos- sein Sadighi as prime minister. Sadighi had served as interior minister under Mosaddegh, had been impris- oned after the 1953 coup, and had pardoned by the Shah on the grounds that he was a “patriot”. Sadighi remained active in the National Front and had often been harassed by SAVAK, but was willing to serve as prime minister under the Shah in order to “save” Iran, saying he feared what might come after if the Shah was overthrown. Despite the opposition of the other National Front leaders, Sadighi visited the

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Niavaran palace several times in December 1978 to discuss the terms under which he might become prime minister, with the main sticking point being that he wanted the Shah not to leave Iran, saying he needed to remain in order to ensure the loyalty of the military. On 7 December 1978, it was announced that President Carter of the U.S., Pres- ident Giscard d’Estaing of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany and Prime Minister James Callaghan of the United Kingdom would meet in Guadeloupe on 5 January 1979 to discuss the crisis in Iran. For the Shah this announcement was the final blow, and he was convinced that the Western leaders were holding the meeting to discuss how best to abandon him. END OF MONARCHY On 16 January 1979, Shah made a contract with Farboud and left Iran at the behest of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar (a longtime opposition leader him- self), who sought to calm the situation. As he boarded the plane to take him out of Iran, many of the Imperial Guardsmen wept while Bakhtiar did little to hide his disdain and dislike for the Shah. Spontaneous attacks by members of the public on statues of the Pahlavi’s followed, and “within hours, almost every sign of the Pahlavi dynasty” was destroyed. Bakhtiar dissolved SAVAK, freed all political prisoners, and allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to return to Iran after years in exile. He asked Khomeini to create a Vatican-like state in Qom, promised free elec- tions, and called upon the opposition to help preserve the constitution, propos- ing a “national unity” government including Khomeini’s followers. Khomeini rejected Bakhtiar’s demands and appointed his own interim govern- ment, with Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister, stating that: “I will appoint a state. I will act against this government. With the nation’s support, I will appoint a state.”

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Newspapers wrote: “Shah is Gone”

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Shah and Shahbanu Farah shortly before leaving Iran in 1979.

In February, pro-Khomeini revolutionary guerrilla and rebel soldiers gained the upper hand in street fighting, and the military announced its neutrality. On the evening of 11 February, the dissolution of the monarchy was complete.

Criticism of Reign And Causes Of His Overthrow An Amnesty International assessment on Iran for 1974–1975 stated: “The Shah of Iran retains his benevolent [world] image despite the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief. ... the total number of political prisoners has

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been reported at times throughout the year [1975] to be anything from 25,000 to 100,000”. At the Federation of American Scientists, John Pike writes: “In 1978 the deepening opposition to the Shah erupted in widespread demon- strations and rioting. Recognizing that even this level of violence had failed to crush the rebellion, the Shah abdicated the Peacock Throne and fled Iran on 16 January 1979. Despite decades of pervasive surveillance by SAVAK, working closely with CIA, the extent of public opposition to the Shah, and his sudden departure, came as a considerable surprise to the US intelligence com- munity and national leadership. As late as 28 September 1978 the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the Shah “is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years.” Explanations for the overthrow of the Shah include his status as a dictator put in place by a non-Muslim Western power, the United States, whose foreign culture was seen as influencing that of Iran. Additional contributing factors included reports of oppression, brutality, corruption, and extravagance. Basic functional failures of the regime have also been blamed—economic bot- tlenecks, shortages and inflation; the regime’s over-ambitious economic pro- gram; the failure of its security forces to deal with protests and demonstra- tions; and the overly Centralized royal power structure. International policies pursued by the Shah in order to increase national in- come by remarkable increases in the price of oil through his leading role in the Organization of the Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) have been stressed as a major cause for a shift of Western interests and priorities, and for a reduction of their support for him reflected in a critical position of Western politicians and media, especially of the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter regarding the question of human rights in Iran, and in strengthened economic ties between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s.

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In October 1971, Shah celebrated the twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of the Iranian monarchy; The New York Times reported that $100 million was spent on the celebration. Next to the ancient ruins of Persepolis, the Shah gave orders to build a tent city covering 160 acres (0.65 km2), studded with three huge royal tents and fifty-nine lesser ones arranged in a star-shaped design. French chefs from Maxim’s of Paris prepared breast of peacock for royalty and dignitaries from around the world, the buildings were decorated by Maison Jansen (the same firm that helped Jacqueline Kennedy redecorate the White House), the guests ate off Limoges porcelain and drank from Baccarat crystal glasses. This became a major scandal, as the contrast between the dazzling ele- gance of the celebration and the misery of the nearby villages was so dramatic that no one could ignore it. Months before the festivities, university students went on strike in protest. Indeed, the cost was so sufficiently impressive that the Shah forbade his associates to discuss the actual figures. However, he and his supporters argued that the celebrations opened new investments in Iran, im- proved relationships with the other leaders and nations of the world providing greater recognition of Iran. Other actions that are thought to have contributed to his downfall include antagonizing formerly apolitical Iranians, especially merchants of the bazaars with the creation in 1975 of a single-party political monopoly (the Rastakh- iz Party), with compulsory membership and dues, and general aggressive inter- ference in the political, economic, and religious concerns of peoples lives; and the 1976 change from an Islamic calendar to an Imperial calendar, marking the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus as the first day, instead of the migration of Mu- hammad from Mecca to Medina. This supposed date was designed so that the year 2500 would fall on 1941, the year when his own reign started. Overnight, the year changed from 1355 to 2535. During the extravagant festivities to celebrate the 2500th anniversary, the Shah

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 110 Commemoration of 100 Years was quoted as saying at Cyrus’s tomb: “Rest in peace, Cyrus, for we are awake”. It has been argued that the White Revolution was «shoddily planned and hap- hazardly carried out», upsetting the wealthy while not going far enough to pro- vide for the poor or offer greater political freedom. In 1974, Mohammad Reza learned from his French doctors that he was suffer- ing from the cancer that was to kill him six years later. Though this was such a carefully guarded secret that not even the Americans were aware of it (as late as 1977 the CIA submitted a report to President Carter describing the Shah as being in “robust health”), the knowledge of his impending death left him depressed and passive in his last years, a man no longer capable of acting. Some achievements of the Shah—such as broadened education, had unintend- ed consequences. While school attendance rose (by 1966 the school attendance of urban seven- to fourteen-year-olds was estimated at 75.8%), Iran’s labor market could not absorb a higher number of educated youth. In 1966, high school graduates had “a higher rate of unemployment than did the illiterate”, and the educated unemployed often supported the revolution. EXILE During his second exile, he travelled from country to country seeking what he hoped would be temporary residence. First he flew to Aswan, Egypt, where he received a warm and gracious welcome from President Anwar El-Sadat. He later lived in Marrakesh, Morocco as a guest of King Hassan II. The exiled Shah loved to support royalty during his time as Shah and one of those who benefitted had been Hassan, who received an interest-free loan of $110 million. He expected Hassan to return the Favor, but soon learned Hassan had other motives. Richard Parker, the American ambassador to Morocco reported: “The Moroccans believed the Shah was worth about $2 billion, and they

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wanted to take their share of the loot”. After leaving Morocco, he lived in Para- dise Island, Bahamas, and in Cuernava- ca, Mexico, near Mexico City, as a guest of José López Portillo. Richard Nixon, the former president, visited the Shah in summer 1979 in Mexico. Former U.S. President Richard Nixon An American doctor, Benjamin Kean who visits Mohammad Reza Shah examined the Shah in Cuernavaca later in exile, c. 1979 wrote: “There was no longer any doubt. The atmosphere had changed completely. The Shah’s appearance was stunningly worse ... Clearly, he had obstruc- tive jaundice. The odds favored gallstones, since his fever, chills and ab- dominal distress suggested an infection of the biliary tract. Also, he had a history of indigestion. Besides the probable obstruction – he now had been deeply jaundiced for six to eight weeks – he was emaciated and suffering from hard tumor nodes in the neck and a swollen spleen, signs that his cancer was worsening, and he had severe anemia and very low white blood counts.”

The Shah suffered from gallstones that would require prompt surgery. He was offered treatment in Switzerland, but insisted on treatment in the United States. President Carter did not wish to admit the Shah to the U.S. but came under pressure from many quarters, with Henry Kissinger phoning Carter to say he would not endorse the SALT II treaty that Carter had just signed with the Sovi- et Union unless the former Shah was allowed into the United States, reportedly prompting Carter more than once to hang up his phone in rage in the Oval Of- fice and shout «Fuck the Shah!». As many Republicans were attacking the SALT II treaty as an American give-away to the Soviet Union, Carter was anxious to

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have the endorsement of a Republican elder statesman like Kissinger to fend off this criticism. Former Shah had decided not to tell his Mexican doctors he had cancer, and the Mexican doctors had misdiagnosed his illness as malaria, giving him a re- gime of anti-malarial drugs that did nothing to treat his cancer, which caused

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Last Days of Shah

his health to go into rapid decline as he lost 30 pounds (14 kg). In September 1979, a doctor sent by David Rockefeller reported to the State Department that Shah needed to come to the United States for medical treat- ment, an assessment not shared by Kean, who stated that the proper medical equipment for treating his cancer could be found in Mexico and the only prob- lem was the former Shah’s unwillingness to tell the Mexicans he had cancer. The State Department warned Carter not to admit the former Shah into the U.S., saying it was likely that the Iranian regime would seize the American em- bassy in Tehran if that occurred. Milani suggested: “There was a possible conflict of interest on the part of Rockefeller, noting that his Chase Manhattan Bank had given Iran a $500 million loan under ques- tionable conditions in 1978 (several lawyers had refused to endorse the loan) which placed the money in an account with Chase Manhattan, that the new Islamic republic had been making «substantial withdrawals» from its account with Chase Manhattan, and that Rockefeller wanted Shah in the US, knowing full well it was likely to cause the Iranians to storm the U.S. embassy, which

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in turn would cause the U.S. government to freeze Iranian financial assets in America—such as the Iranian account at Chase Manhattan”. On 22 October 1979, President Jimmy Carter reluctantly allowed the Shah into the United States to undergo surgical treatment at the New York Hospital– Cornell Medical Center. While there, Shah used the name of “David D. New- som”, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at that time, as his temporary code name, without Newsom’s knowledge. The Shah was taken later by U.S. Air Force jet to Kelly Air Force Base in Tex- as and from there to Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland Air Force Base. It was anticipated that his stay in the United States would be short; however, sur- gical complications ensued, which required six weeks of confinement in the hospital before he recovered.

His prolonged stay in the United States was extremely unpopular with the rev- olutionary movement in Iran, which still resented the United States’ overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh and the years of support for the Shahs rule. The Iranian government demanded his return to Iran, but he stayed in the hospi- tal. His time in New York was highly uncomfortable; he was under a heavy security detail as every day, Iranian students studying in the United States gath- ered outside his hospital to shout “Death to the Shah!”, a chorus that he heard.

The former Monarch was obsessed with watching news from Iran and, was upset at the new order being imposed by the Islamic Republic. He could no longer walk by this time, and for security reasons had to be moved in his wheelchair under the cover of darkness when he went to the hospital while covered in a blanket, as the chances of his assassination were too great.

There are claims that his admission to the United States resulted in the storm- ing of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the kidnapping of American diplomats,

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 115 Commemoration of 100 Years military personnel, and intelligence officers, which soon became known as the Iran hostage crisis. In the Shah’s memoir, Answer to History, he claimed that the United States never provided him any kind of health care and asked him to leave the country. From the time of the storming of the American embassy in Tehran and the taking of the embassy staff as hostages, his presence in the United States was viewed by the Carter administration as a stumbling block to the release of the hostages, and as Zonis noted “... he was, in effect, expelled from the country”. Shah wanted to go back to Mexico, saying he had pleasant memories of Cu- ernavaca, but was refused. Mexico was a candidate to be a rotating member of the UN Security Council, but needed the vote of Cuba to be admitted, and the Cuban leader Fidel Castro told President José López Portillo that Cuba’s vote was conditional on Mexico not accepting the Shah again. Shah left the United States on 15 December 1979 and lived for a short time in the Isla Contadora in Panama. This caused riots by Panamanians who ob- jected to the Shah being in their country. General Omar Torrijos, the dictator of Panama kept the Shah as a virtual prisoner at the Paitilla Medical Center, a hospital condemned by the former Shah’s American doctors as “an inadequate and poorly staffed hospital”, and in order to hasten his death allowed only Pan- amanian doctors to treat his cancer. General Torrijos, a populist left-winger had only taken in the Shah under heavy American pressure, and he made no secret of his dislike of him, whom he called after meeting him “the saddest man he had ever met”. When he first met the Shah, Torrijos taunted him by telling him: “it must be hard to fall off the Peacock Throne into Contadora” and called him a “chupon”, a Spanish term meaning an orange that has all the juice squeezed out of it, which is slang for someone who is finished. Torrijos added to Shah’s misery by making his chief bodyguard a militantly Marxist sociolo- gy professor who spent much time lecturing him on how he deserved his fate

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because he been a tool of the “American imperialism” that was oppressing the Third World, and charged him a monthly rent of US$21,000, making him pay for all his food and the wages of the 200 National Guardsmen assigned as his bodyguards.” The new government in Iran still demanded his and his wife Queen Farah Pahlavi’s immediate extradition to Tehran. A short time after Shah’s arrival in Panama, an Iranian ambassador was dispatched to the Central American nation carrying a 450-p. extradition request. That official appeal alarmed both the Shah and his advisors. Whether the Panamanian government would have complied is a matter of speculation amongst historians. After that, the Shah again sought the support ofEgyptian president Anwar El-Sadat, who renewed his offer of permanent asylum in Egypt to the ailing monarch. Shah returned to Egypt in March 1980, where he received urgent medical treat- ment, including a splenectomy performed by Michael DeBakey. On 28 March 1980, his French and American doctors finally performed an operation meant to have been performed in the fall of 1979. Kean recalled: The operation went beautifully. That night, however, was terrible. The med- ical team-American, Egyptian, French-was in the pathology lab. The focus was on the Shah’s cancerous spleen, grotesquely swollen to 20 times normal. It was one-foot long, literally the size of a football. But I was drawn to the liver tissues that had also been removed. The liver was speckled with white. Malig- nancy. The cancer had hit the liver. The Shah would soon die ... The tragedy is that a man who should have had the best and easiest medical care had, in many respects, the worst.

DEATH In 1974 the Shah’s doctor, Dr. Ayadi, diagnosed the Shah with splenomega-

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Egyptian President Sadat gave the Shah a state funeral. The former Shah of Iran is bur- ied in the Al Rifa’i Mosque in Cairo, a mosque of great symbolic importance. Also buried there is Farouk of Egypt, Mohammad Reza Shah’s former brother-in-law. The tombs lie to the left of the entrance. Years earlier, his father and predecessor, Reza Shah had also initially been buried at the Al Rifa›i Mosque. ly after he complained of a swollen abdomen. On 1 May 1974, French Professor Georges Flandrin flew into Tehran to treat the Shah. Upon the first visit, Georg- es was able to diagnose the Shah with chronic lymphocytic leukemia. The Shah’s diagnosis of cancer would not be revealed to him until 1978. Medi- cal reports given to the Shah were falsified and altered in order to state that the Shah was in good health to conceal his cancer from him. The Shah later met with French physicians in 1976 in Zurich who were dis- turbed by the Shah’s abnormal blood count. They discovered he was being treated with a wrong medication worsening his condition.

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In 1979, when the Shah left Iran first, found refuge in the Bahamas but was later forced to leave. He then sought treatment in Mexico. Multiple recommen- dations urged the Shah to seek treatment in the United States. In response, the Shah stated: “How could I go to a place [USA] that had undone me?” After some initial denials, he agreed to travel to America for treatment. The Shah later left America for Panama. While the Shah was in Panama, one of Ruhol- lah Khomeini’s close advisors, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh had a meeting with Ham- ilton Jordan, Jimmy Carter’s Chief of Staff. Ghotbzadeh requested the CIA kill the Shah while he was in Panama. Fearing for his life, the Shah left Panama delaying further surgery. He fled to Cairo, Egypt, with his condition worsening. In his hospital bed, the Shah was asked to describe his feelings for Iran and its people and to define the country. He, a fervent nationalist, responded “Iran is Iran.” After pausing a few minutes, he said Its“ land, people, and history,” and “Every Iranian has to love it.” He continued on to repeat “Iran is Iran” over and over. Shortly after, the Shah slipped into a coma and died on 27 July 1980 at age 60. He kept a bag of Iranian soil under his death bed.

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Funeral Egyptian President Sadat gave the Shah a state funeral. In addition to members of the Pahlavi family, Anwar Sadat, Richard Nixon and Constantine II of Greece attended the funeral ceremony in Cairo. The anthem of imperial Iran was performed, and President Sadat then led a funeral cortege transporting the coffin, draped with the Iranian flag and driv- en on a gun carriage drawn by six horses, from the presidential palace to the Al-Rifai mosque. Behind him followed members of the former imperial family, representatives of other deposed royal families, including Greece’s King Con- stantine, and thousands of Egyptian soldiers. No sitting head of state made the journey. The United States, France, Britain, Japan, Australia and Israel sent am- bassadors. Among the mourners was former US president Richard Nixon. He described as “shameful” the US administration’s hot then cold policy towards the Shah, “a loyal friend and ally of the United States” for more than 30 years.

Under a heavy sky, the funeral cortege travelled for two kilometres (1.2 miles) across popular neighbourhoods of Cairo that usually swarmed with people. Along with a heavy security presence, some 100,000 people lined the route.

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On arrival at the mosque, Sadat and the former Shah’s two sons, Reza and Ali Reza, accompanied the body to the funeral chamber. A 21-gun salute was fired over the square. He is buried in the same place that his father Reza Shah, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, had initially been buried after his death in South Africa. Also buried there is Farouk of Egypt, Mohammad Reza’s former brother-in-law.

LEGACY Shortly after his overthrow, Shah wrote an autobiographical memoir (Answer to History). It was translated from the original French into English, Persian (Pa- sokh be Tarikh), and other languages. However, by the time of its publication, the Shah had already died. The book is his personal account of his reign and accomplishments, as well as his perspective on issues related to the Iranian Revolution and Western foreign policy toward Iran. He places some of the blame for the wrongdoings of SAVAK, and the failures of various democratic and social reforms (particularly through the White Rev- olution), upon Amir Abbas Hoveyda and his administration. Recently, the Shah’s reputation has experienced something of a revival in Iran, with some people looking back on his era as a time when Iran was more pros- perous and the government less oppressive. On 28 October 2016, thousands of people in Iran celebrating Cyrus Day at the Tomb of Cyrus, chanted slogans in support of him, and against the current Islamic regime of Iran and Arabs, and many were subsequently arrested.

Women’s rights Under Mohammad Reza Shah’s father, Reza Shah, government supported ad- vancements by women against child marriage, polygamy, exclusion from pub- lic society, and education segregation. However, independent feminist political groups were shut down and forcibly integrated into one state-created institu- tion, which maintained many paternalistic views.

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Despite substantial opposition from Shiite religious jurists, the feminist move- ment, led by activists such as Fatemah Sayyeh, achieved further advancement under the Shah. His regime’s changes focused on the civil sphere, and pri- vate-oriented family law remained restrictive, although the 1967 and 1975 Family Protection Laws attempted to reform this trend. During his reign, women gained the right to freely choose any profession, for example first female Iranian ministers such as Farrokhroo Parsa and judges such as Shirin Ebadi, while Mehrangiz DowlatShahi became the first female cabinet member and ambassador of Iran. These activities alienated Islamic traditionalists and hastened the fall of the Shah.

Religious Beliefs From his mother, Shah inherited an almost messianic belief in his own great- ness and that God was working in his Favor, which explained the often passive and fatalistic attitudes that he displayed as an adult. In 1973, he told the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci: “A king who does not need to account to anyone for what he says and does is, un- avoidably doomed to loneliness. However, I am not entirely alone, because a force, others can’t perceive, accompanies me. My mystical force. I have lived, with God besides me, since I was 5 years old. I receive messages from him.” Shah from childhood onward, in public and in private, often spoke of his belief that God had chosen him for a “divine mission” to transform Iran, and believed that religious dreams he had as a child of the Twelve Imams of Shia Islam were all messages from God. In his 1961 book Mission for My Country, he wrote: “From the time I was six or seven, I have felt perhaps there is a supreme being, who is guiding me. I don’t know. Sometimes the thought disturbs me because then, I ask myself, what is my own personality, and am I possessed of free will? Still, I often reflect, if I am driven-or perhaps I should say supported-by another force, there must be a reason.”

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In his biography of the Shah, Marvin Zonis has argued: “The Shah really believed in his claims of divine support. Shia Islam has no tradi- tion of describing Shahs being Favored with messages from God, very few Shahs had ever claimed that their dreams were divine messages, and most people in the West laughed and snickered at his claim that his dreams were messages from God. Reza Shah who was an atheist dismissed these visions as nonsense, and told his son to have more common sense. “ Fereydoon Hoveyda, a veteran diplomat who served as the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations (1971–1979), and the brother of Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, the Prime Minister under the Shah (1965–1977) executed after the Islamic rev- olution, and himself a critic of the régime who died in exile, says: “when it comes to religion and spirituality, many passages of the monarch’s and Khomeini’s publications are interchangeable”, which he perceives as the continuity of the Iranian civilization, where the reli- gion changes but the spirit remains.

Wealth The Shah inherited his wealth built by his father Reza Shah who preceded him as king of Iran and became known as the richest person in Iran during his reign, with his wealth estimated to be higher than 600 million rials, including vast amounts of land and numerous large estates especially in the province of Mazandaran obtained usually at a fraction of their real price. Reza Shah, facing criticism for his wealth, decided to pass on all of his land and wealth to his eldest son Mohammad Reza in exchange for a sugar cube, known in Iran as habbe kardan. However, shortly after obtaining the wealth Mohammad Reza Shah was ordered by his father, then king, to transfer a mil- lion toman ($500,000) to each of his siblings. By 1958, it was estimated that the companies possessed by Mohammad Reza had a value of $157 million with an estimated additional $100 million outside Iran. Rumors of his family’s corruption began to surface. In 1958, using funds from

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 123 Commemoration of 100 Years inherited crown estates, he established the Pahlavi Foundation which func- tioned as a tax-exempt charity and held all his assets. According to Business Insider, the Shah had set up the organization “to pursue Iran’s charitable interests in the U.S.” In his book Answer to History, he affirms that henever “ made the slightest profit” from the Nonprofit Pahlavi Foundation. In a 1974 interview with Mike Wallace, shown in a documentary titled “Crisis in Iran”, Shah told Mike Wallace that the rumors of corruption were “the most unjust thing that I have heard,” calling them a “cheap accusation” whilst arguing the allegations were not as serious as those regarding other governments, in- cluding that of the United States. In November 1978, after he dismissedPrime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and appointed a military government, he pledged in a televised address «not to repeat the past mistakes, illegalities, the cruelty and corruption.” The Shah’s wealth remained considerable during his time in exile. While staying in the Bahamas he offered to purchase the island he was staying for $425 million (in 1979 USD); however, his offer was rejected by the Bahamas claiming the island was worth far more. On 17 October 1979, in exile knowing the gravity of his illness, he split up his wealth amongst his his wife and children.

CIA Declassified Document KHOMEINI’S Message to John F. Kennedy A recently declassified CIA document reveals that, in November 1963, Kho- meini, while being held under house arrest in Tehran, sent a rare message of support to the Kennedy administration through Haj Mirza Khalil Kamaraei, a professor of the Theological Faculty of Tehran University and an Iranian pol- itician close to oppositionist religious group. It was a few days after a military firing squad executed two alleged organisers of the protests and ahead of a

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 124 CIA Declassified Document Reveals Kkhomeini’s Mmessage to JFK landmark visit by the Soviet head of state to Iran, which played into US fears of Iran tilting towards a friendlier relationship with the USSR. “Khomeini wanted US Government, the Shah’s chief benefactor, to understand that he had no quarrel with America.”

Partially Declassified CIA Document According to a 1980 CIA analysis titled “Islam in Iran”, partially released document to the public in 2008, in the message Khomeini explained: “He was not opposed to American interests in Iran,” Khomeini told the US: “On the contrrary, an American presence was necessary to counter the Soviet and British influence.” The embassy cable containing the full text of Khomeini’s message remains clas- sified. It’s not clear if President Kennedy ever saw the message. Two weeks later, he would be assassinated in Texas. A year later, Khomeini was expelled from Iran. He had launched a new attack on the Shah, this time over extending judicial immunity to US military per-

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 125 Commemoration of 100 Years sonnel in Iran. Not receiving any answer to his message from US president John F. Kennedy this time Khomeini shortly before going into exile, declared: “The American president should know that he is the most hated person among our nation,” Fifteen years later, Khomeini would end up in Paris. He was now the leader of a movement on the verge of ridding Iran of its monarchy. So close to victory, the ayatollah still needed America.

Mohammad Reza Shah, U.S. President John F. Kennedy, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the White House Cabinet Room, 1962 IMAGE COPYRIGHT NATIONAL ARCHIVES Sources: 1- Afkhami Gholam Reza Afkhami (27 October 2008). The Life and Times of the Shah. Uni- versity of California Press 2- Alikarami Leila (2019). Women and Equality in Iran: Law, Society and Activism. Bloomsbury 3- Ansari, Ali. Modern Iran Since 1921, London: Pearson, 2003, p. 128 4- Bill, James A. (1970). “The Journal of Politics: Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1970)”. The Journal of Politics. 32 (1): 1940. 5- Cooper, Andrew. The Fall of Heaven. 6- Dareini Ali Akbar, Hossein Fardoust (1998). Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty. 7- Gerhard Peters, John T. Woolley; The American Presidency Project (9 July 1951). “Message to the Prime Minister of Iran Following the Breakdown of Oil Discussions with Great Britain”.

RAHAVARD Issues 132/133 Fall 2020/Winter 2021 126 Commemoration of 100 Years ucsb.edu 8- Hoveyda Fereydoun. The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution (Westport: Praeger, 2003) 9- Inlow, E. Burke (1979). ShahanShah: The Study of Monarachy Of Iran. .DSXĞFLĔVNL Ryszard. Shah of Shahs, New York: Vintage, 1992, 11- Katouzian Homa. State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis. I. B. Tauris, 2006. 12- Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan 2011, 13- Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. New York: John Wiley & Sons 14- Nahai, Gina B. (2000). Cry of the Peacock. New York: Simon and Schuster. 15- Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall ofthe Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 16- Milani Abbas; Eminent Persians. Syracuse University Press (2008). 17- Dreyfuss, Robert (2006). Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamen- talist Islam. Owl Books. 18- Behrooz writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark j. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, 19- Shiva Balaghi; New York University. “A Brief History of 20th-Century Iran”. nyu.edu. 20- Michael Clark (28 April 1951). “Premier Quits as Iran Speeds Nationalization of Oil Fields”. nytimes.com. 21- Kermit Roosevelt. Counter Coup, New York, 1979. 22- Risen, James (2000). “Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran”. The New York Times. 23- Saeed Kamali Dehghan; Richard Norton-Taylor (19 August 2013). “CIA admits role in 1953 Iranian coup”. The Guardian. 24- Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (2005) 25- Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power 26- R. W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran. 27- “Soraya Arrives for US Holiday” (PDF). The New York Times. 23 April 1958. 28- “Princess Soraya, 69, Shah’s Wife Whom He Shed for Lack of Heir”. The New York Times. 26 October 2001. 29- Paul Hofmann, “Pope Bans Marriage of Princess to Shah”, The New York Times, 24 Febru- ary 1959 30- National Geographic magazine, Vol. 133, No. 3 (March 1968) 31- Bulloch, John and Morris, Harvey. The Gulf War, London: Methuen, 1989 32- Interview with Farah Pahlavi Archived 31 July 2012 at Archive.today Mary Bitterman, 15 March 2004. 33- Karsh, Effraim Islamic Imperialism A History, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, 34- Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988, London: Osprey, 2002 35- Brogan, Patrick The fighting never stopped, New York: Vintage Books, 1989

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36- Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for my Country, London, 1961, 37- Cottam, Richard W. (1979). Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978. University of Pittsburgh Pre. 38- Fred Halliday, Iran; Dictatorship and Development, Penguin, 39- Amir Taheri, “New Frame for a New Picture,” Kayhan International, 10 June 1978. 40- Robert Graham, Iran, St. Martins, January 1979 41- Milani Abbas, The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution, Mage Publishers, 1 October 2003; 42- Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution (1991) 43- Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, HUP, 2004, 44- Cultural History After Foucault by John Neubauer 45- The A to Z of Iran, by John H. Lorentz 46- Nikazmerad, Nicholas M. (1980). “A Chronological Survey of the Iranian Revolution”. Ira- nian Studies. 13 47- “1979: Shah of Iran flees into exile”. BBC. 16 January 1979. 48- Amnesty International Annual Report 1974-1975”. Amnesty International. Archived from the original on 22 November 2018. Retrieved 19 December 2018. 49- Baraheni, Reza (28 October 1976). “Terror in Iran”. The New York Review of Books. 50- “Federation of American Scientists”. Archived from the original on 4 October 2012. 51- Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001). 52- Andrew Scott Cooper. The Oil Kings: How the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. Simon & Schuster, 2011. 53- Abrahamian, Ervand (Iran Between Two Revolutions) (1982) 54- Farmanfarmaian, Mannucher and Roxane. Blood & Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince. Ran- dom House, New York, 1997 55- “Iran protests Shah’s Move to Texas”. 3 December 1979. Retrieved 18 June 2011. 56- Pahlavi Mohammad Reza. Answer to History. Stein & Day Pub, 1980. 57- Khooshnood, Arvin (2016). “The death of an emperor – Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and his political cancer”. Alexandria Journal of Medicine. 52 (3): 201–208. 58- Cooper, Andrew. The Fall of Heaven. 59- Shah’s Flight. Time. 31 March 1980 60- Sciolino, Elaine, Persian Mirrors, Touchstone (2000), 61- Fereydoun Hoveyda, “The Shah and the Ayatollah”: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revo- lution, ABC-CLIO (2003) 62- Naraghi, Ehsan (1994). From Palace to Prison: Inside the Iranian Revolution. I. B. Tauris. 63- Gayathri, Amrutha. “US Government Set To Seize New York City Building Linked To Iran In “Largest Ever Terrorism-Related Forfeiture” Business Insider. Retrieved 18 September 2020. 64- Abrahamian, Ervand. “A History of Modern Iran”. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008 65- Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza (1974). “Crisis in Iran” (Interview). Interviewed by Mike Wallace.

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66- Graham, Robert (1980). Iran: the illusion of power (Rev. ed.). New York: St. Martin’s Press. Bibliography Mohammad Reza Pahlavi published several books in the course of his kingship and two later works after his downfall. Amongst others, these include: • Mission for My Country (1960) • The White Revolution (1967) • Toward the Great Civilization (Persian version: Imperial 2536 = 1977 CE; English version: 1994) • Answer to History (1980) • The Shah’s Story (1980)

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